Digested Cases in Labor Law

CALALANG v. WILLIAMS, 70 PHIL 726, GR No. 47800, December 2, 1940

 
FACTS:  The National Traffic Commission resolved that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along some major streets such a Rizal Ave. in Manila for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Secretary of Public Works
approved the resolution on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of
Police of Manila have enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn
vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to
the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
 
ISSUE:  Does the rule infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of
social justice? What is Social Justice?
 
HELD:  No. The regulation aims to promote safe transit and avoid obstructions on national
roads in the interest and convenience of the public. Persons and property may be subject to
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated.
Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may  at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in
the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption
of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of Salus Populi
est Suprema Lex.(Justice Laurel)
 
 
CASTOR-GARUPA v. ECC, 487 SCRA 171
 
FACTS:  Petitioner is resident physician in a hospital in Negros Oriental, who was diagnosed
of a kidney disease. After having her kidney transplant, she filed a work-related sickness
compensation claim with the respondent ECC through the GSIS, which denied the same,
arguing that the disease she contracted is not listed among the occupational diseases
determined by them to be compensable as work-related sickness. Petitioner appealed
contending that the bacteria causing the disease was contracted while being employed in
the hospital since symptoms have already manifested since 1994, and relying upon the
theory that her employment poses an increased risk in contracting the diseases. 
 
ISSUE:  Is the contention of the petitioner correct?
 
HELD:  Yes. In determining whether an injury or sickness is work-related or not, what the
law requires is reasonable work connection, not a direct causal connection. It is observed
that the WCL has not ceased to be a social legislation, hence liberality of the law in the form
of the workingman or woman still prevails.
 
 
GSIS v. VALENCIANO, 487 SCRA 109
 
FACTS:  While being an employee of the Philippine Ports Authority, respondent was inflicted
with tuberculosis, hypertension and diabetes. He then filed with the petitioner Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) a claim for compensation benefits under PD No. 626.
However, petitioner denied the respondent’s claim on the ground that the ailments are not
considered occupational diseases, and there is no clear evidence, such as medical records,
showing that he contracted the diseases during his work or his duties have increased the
risk of contracting said ailments. Petitioner rejected respondent's contention that there is
probability of contracting TB with the kind of job the respondent has.
 
ISSUE:  How should PD 626 be applied with respect to determining compensability of work-
related diseases?
 
HELD:  A social legislation should interpreted liberally. In applying liberality in the
interpretation of Workmen's Compensation Law, the degree of proof required by the law is
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept to support a conclusion.
Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone. Any doubt on this matter has to be interpreted
in favor of the employees considering that PD 626 is a social legislation.
 
 
PRIMICIAS v. FUGUSO, 80 PHIL 71
 
FACTS: Mayor Fuguso refused to grant the petitioner and his party a permit to hold a public
meeting at Plaza Miranda, based on a city ordinance which grants the mayor the discretion
to regulate such conduct of public assemblies, as a lawful exercise of police power.
 
ISSUE:  What is police power? How was it supposed to be exercised by the Manila City
Officials?
 
HELD:  Police Power is the power of the State to enact laws and prescribe regulations that
will promote the health, morals, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the
People. However, in the exercise of police power the council may, in its discretion, regulate
the exercise of such rights in a reasonable manner, but cannot suppress them, directly or
indirectly, by attempting to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or any other officer.
The ordinance grants the mayor the power to regulate as to how, when and where a public
assembly should be held, but not the discretion to refuse the grant of such permit to
derogate the right of the petitioner to peaceably assemble and seek redress against the
government.
 
 
PASEI v DRILON, 163 SCRA 386
 
FACTS:  The Department of Labor and Employment issued an order suspending the
deployment of Filipino domestic and household workers, in view of the heightened abuses
committed against OFWs abroad. The petitioner, a local recruitment agency, petitioned for
the invalidation of such order for alleged violation of equal protection clause.
 
ISSUE:  Is the deployment ban a valid exercise of police power? What is police power?
 
HELD:  Yes, the deployment ban of domestic helpers is a valid exercise of police power.
Police Power is the inherent power of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty and property in order to promote the general welfare.
 
 
CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER (CMC) v. MERIS,
 
FACTS:  Petitioner closed its industrial service unit due to alleged loss and extinct demand
resulting to the termination of the employment of the respondent. The latter filed an illegal
dismissal case but the same was denied by the labor arbiter, and subsequently by the NLRC
contending that the same is part of the management prerogative.
 
ISSUE:  Has employer the right to close its business even without basis resulting to the
displacement of the worker?
 
HELD:  No. Employers are also accorded with rights and privileges to assure their self-
determination and independence and reasonable return of capital. This mass of privileges is
called management prerogatives. Although they may be broad and unlimited in scope, the
State has the right to determine whether an employer's privilege is exercised in a manner
that complies with the legal requirements and does not offend the protected rights of labor.
 
 
BREWMASTER INTERNATIONAL INC. v. NAFLU
 
FACTS:  Private respondent Estrada is a member of the respondent labor union. He did not
report for work for 1 month due to a grave family problem as his wife deserted him and
nobody was there to look after his children. He was required to explain. Finding his reasons
to be unjustified, the petitioner terminated him, since according to company rules, absence
for 6 consecutive days is considered abandonment of work.
 
ISSUE:  Should a worker be summarily dismissed relying on some company rules?
 
HELD:  No. While the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations to
govern the conduct of his employees, these rules and their implementation must be fair,
just and reasonable. No less than the Constitution looks with compassion on the
workingman and protects his rights not only under a general statement of a state policy but
under the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, thus placing labor contracts on a
higher plane and with greater safeguards. Verily, relations between labor and capital are not
merely contractual. They are impressed with public interest and labor contracts must,
perforce, yield to the common good.
 
 
JAMER v. NLRC

FACTS:  Petitioners are cashiers of Isetann Department Store who were dismissed for
having accumulated shortages. Petitioners admitted this in their affidavits. The labor arbiter
ruled them having been illegally dismissed. The NLRC reversed the ruling.
 
ISSUE: Were the petitioners validly dismissed?
 
HELD:  Yes. The failure of the petitioners to report to the management the irregularities
constitute "fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed in them by their employer or duly
authorized representative"--one of the just causes of valid termination of employment. The
employer cannot be compelled to retain employees who were guilty of malfeasance as their
continued employment will be prejudicial to the former's best interest. The law, in
protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of
the employer.
 
 
GANDARA MILL SUPPLY v. NLRC

FACTS:  Private respondent Silvestre Germane did not report for work because his wife
delivered their first child. He did not however notify his employer, causing a disruption in
the business of the latter. When the respondent returned to work he was surprised upon
knowing that someone has been hired to take his place.
 
ISSUE:  Was there a case of illegal dismissal?
 
HELD:  Yes. It appeared that the respondent was illegally dismissed. While a prolonged
absence without leave may constitute as a just cause for dismissal, its illegality stems from
the non-observance of due process. Applying the WenPhil Doctrine by analogy, where
dismissal was not preceded by the twin requirement of notice and hearing, the illegality of
the dismissal in question, is under heavy clouds and therefore illegal.
 
 
PHIL MOVIE PICTURES WORKERS ASSOC. v. PREMIERE PRODUCTIONS, 92 PHIL 843
 
FACTS:  Respondent filed 2 petitions with the CIR: 1.) to lay off its 44 employees on the
ground that the company is losing its operations, and 2.) to lease its equipment to certain
individuals. Judge Roldan of the CIR, after ocular inspection, approved the petitions, thereby
leaving the petitioners, if not unemployed, having nothing to do because of absence of
equipment in the studios. Petitioner assailed the ruling of the judge, and appealed to the
CIR en banc.
 
ISSUE:  Should the court grant a petition for mass dismissal without hearing the side of the
employees concerned?
 
HELD:  No. A worker cannot be deprived of his job or his wages without due process of law.
The case was then remanded to CIR for proper hearing.
 
 
CALLANTA v. CARNATION PHILS., 145 SCRA 268, G.R. No. 70615 October 28, 1986
 
FACTS: Upon clearance approved by the MOLE Regional Office, respondent dismissed the
petitioner in June 1979. On July 1982, petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case with claim for
reinstatement with the Labor Arbiter, who granted it. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the
judgment based on the contention that the action by the petitioner has already prescribed,
since Art. 291 & 292 of the Labor Code is expressed that offenses penalized under the Code
and all money claims arising from employer-employee relationships shall be filed within 3
years from when such cause of action arises, otherwise it will be barred.
 
ISSUE: Is ruling of the NLRC correct?
 
HELD: No. It is a principle well recognized in this jurisdiction, that one's employment,
profession, trade or calling is a property right, and the wrongful interference therewith is an
actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of the
Constitutional guarantee of due process of law.

Verily, the dismissal without just cause of an employee from his employment constitutes a
violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations. Such violation,
however, does not amount to an "offense" as understood under Article 291 of the Labor
Code. In its broad sense, an offense is an illegal act which does not amount to a crime as
defined in the penal law, but which by statute carries with it a penalty similar to those
imposed by law for the punishment of a crime. The confusion arises over the use of the
term "illegal dismissal" which creates the impression that termination of an employment
without just cause constitutes an offense. It must be noted, however that unlike in cases of
commission of any of the prohibited activities during strikes or lockouts under Article 265,
unfair labor practices under Article 248, 249 and 250 and illegal recruitment activities under
Article 38, among others, which the Code itself declares to be unlawful, termination of an
employment without just or valid cause is not categorized as an unlawful practice.
 
 
DE LEON v. NLU, 100 PHIL 789
 
FACTS: The defendant-appellees had been picketing the Dalisay Theater owned by the
plaintiff for the purpose of securing reinstatement to their respective jobs in the theater
when it was run and operated by the Filipino Theatrical Enterprises (FTE), then a lessee of
the parcel of land owned by plaintiff on which the theater was erected. The defendant-
appellees lost their jobs upon termination of the lease contract between De Leon and the
FTE, which turned over the rights  to the theater back to De Leon, the owner of the lot.
 
ISSUE: Has terminated employees the right to strike in this case?
 
HELD: Yes. Although the employees has no business with the owner of the establishment,
they have nevertheless the right to peaceful picketing which applies also to cases where
employer-employee relationship is absent. The picketing, a form of freedom of expression,
is conducted not to disrupt the business of the owner but to appeal for a humanitarian
consideration, after having been laid off due to the termination of the business of their
previous employer.
 
 
PAFLU v. CLORIBEL, 27 SCRA 465

FACTS: Petitioner labor union picketed against Metrobank, which is occupying an office

space in the Wellington building. Wellington complained that the picketers were annoyingly
blocking the common passageway of the building, the only ingress and egress being used
by the occupants of the second to the sixth floors thereof as well as by their respective
employees, clients and customers, so that the picket has caused a disruption of the
business of Wellington as well as the other lessors in the building.
 
ISSUE: Does the court have the power to enjoin the picket, despite being peaceful?
 
HELD: Yes. The courts are vested with the power to limit the exercise of the right of
peaceful picketing to parties involved in the labor dispute, or having a direct interest to the
context of this issue. Wellington is a mere "innocent bystander" who is not involved in the
labor dispute. Thus, they are entitled to seek protection of their rights from the courts and
the courts may, accordingly, legally extend the same.
 
 
LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS v. PCWU, 108 SCRA 16

FACTS:  The picket held by defendant-appellant union against their employer prevented

herein plaintiff-appellee's truck from loading and unloading of its products inside the
premises of Permanent Concrete Products, where the plaintiff-appellee was occupying as a
sub-lessee. Hence, the latter sought to enjoin the picket.
 
ISSUE:  May a picket be enjoined at the instance of a third party?
 
HELD:  Yes. Peaceful picketing, while being allowed as a phase of freedom of expression
guaranteed by the Constitution and could not be curtailed even in the absence of employer-
employee relationship, is not an absolute right. The courts are not without power to localize
the sphere of demonstration, whose interest are foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus
the right may be recognized at the instance of an "innocent bystander" who is not involved
in the labor dispute if it appears that the result of the picketing is create an impression that
a labor dispute exists between him and the picketing union.
 
 
KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CAMARA SHOES v. CAMARA SHOES, 111 SCRA 478
 
FACTS:  Petitioner Ramos was suspended for writing the phrase "under protest" in the
company payroll to object to the P1.0 deduction made by the respondent for allegedly
getting P500 worth of lumber in 1964. The deduction started only in 1969, at the peak of
union activities of the petitioner when several complaints of unfair labor practices were filed
by the union against the respondent.
 
ISSUE: Is the action of the petitioner a lawful exercise of freedom of expression?
 
HELD: Yes. The freedom of expression is available to individual workers subject to legal
limitation of industrial peace to air valid grievances. It is thus too clear from the foregoing
that petitioner Ramos was justified in airing his grievances against the unauthorized and
illegal deductions made by respondent company. By writing "under protest" on the company
payroll, petitioner Ramos was well within the ambit of his constitutional freedom of
expression as well as the right to petition against what was obviously a calculated undue
harassment amounting to unfair labor practice perpetuated by respondent employer herein.
 
 
VICTORIANO v. ERWU, 59 SCRA 54
 
FACTS:  Stepping on the provisions of RA 3350 exempting members of religious sects which
prohibit its members from joining associations, plaintiff-appellee, being of a faithful of
Iglesia ni Cristo, withdrew his membership from the appellant union. The latter, who have
pact a closed-shop provision in their collective bargaining agreement with respondent
company sought the separation of the plaintiff-appellee. The trial court enjoined the
supposed dismissal, prompting the union to assail the validity of RA 3350 particularly the
provision granting exemption to members of above-mentioned sects.
 
ISSUE: Does the law infringe the right or freedom of labor to associate?
 
HELD: No. Freedom of association implies not only the right to join a labor union, but also
the privilege of not joining one,  of selecting which union to join, and of disaffiliating from a
union. It is clear that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on
freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said
religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty
and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their
religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union,
they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they
can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from
joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join.
 
 
REPUBLIC SAVINGS BANK v. CIR, 21 SCRA 226
 
FACTS:  Petitioner bank terminated private respondents for having written and published a
"patently libelous letter tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt not only the
officers and employees of the bank, but also their employer" by demanding the resignation
of the bank president on grounds of immorality, nepotism and favoritism. CIR ruled that the
petitioner's act constitutes an unfair labor practice.
 
ISSUE: Does the dismissal of employees airing their grievance against their employer
constitute unfair labor practice?
 
HELD: Yes. Even assuming that respondents acted in their individual capacities when they
wrote the letter, they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted
activity, in the exercise of their right to self-organization that includes concerted activity for
mutual aid and protection, interference with which constitutes unfair labor practice.

The petitioner should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances as a mechanism
in a collective bargaining agreement. Collective bargaining... normally takes the form of
negotiation when major conditions of employment to be written into an agreement are
under consideration, and of grievance committee meetings and arbitration when questions
arising from the administration of an agreement are at stake.
 
 
SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOC. v. CA, 175 SCRA 686
 
FACTS:  Petitioners went on strike after their employer SSS failed to act upon the union's
demands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed an injunction contending
that the petitioners are covered by Civil Service laws which prohibits employees of the
government from staging a strike. SSSEA on the other hand, argued that the NLRC has the
jurisdiction of the case by virtue of the provisions of the Labor Code.
 
ISSUE: Does the court have jurisdiction? Do employees covered by the Civil Service have
the right to strike?
 
HELD:  On question of jurisdiction, yes. The RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction
under BP 129, has jurisdiction over petitioner's claim for damages and for the issuance of a
writ of injunction to stop the strike, since the Labor Code do not apply to government
employees.

On the right to strike of government workers, No. The Constitution provides guarantee
among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities. On the
other hand, EO 180 provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities in government service shall be observed subject to any legislation that may be
enacted by Congress. Referring to Memo Circular No.6, s. 1987 of the CSC which states that
prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government
employees, enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officials and
employees from staging a strike, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms
of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service, the
court ruled that in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike,
they are therefore prohibited from doing so.
 

GARCIA v. PAL, GR 164856, Jan. 20, 2009

FACTS: PAL filed an administrative case against Garcia and Dumago after they were
allegedly caught sniffing shabu at the PAL Tool Room. After due notice, they were dismissed
for transgressing the PAL Code of Discipline. The petitioners filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of petitioners with an immediate
reinstatement. A writ was issued to such effect pending appeal with the NLRC.

ISSUE: Can the petitioners collect wages on the period of appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s
order up to the final decision of the higher court?

HELD: Yes. The State forcefully and meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and
economic force. In short, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law itself has
determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its execution pending appeal. Therefore,
the petitioners can collect wages from the period of the execution of the decision of the
labor arbiter to the time of the final decision of the higher court.
 

MORTERA v. CIR, GR L-1340, Oct. 13, 1947

FACTS: All laborers of Canlubang Sugar Estate were ordered to return to work immediately
and stop the strike with the admonition that those who will fail to report will not only lose
any concession but the company was authorized by the public respondent herein to employ
new employees or laborers to take the places or positions of those who fail to report. The
public respondent ordered that picketing under any guise or form, is entirely prohibited
considering that the industry was into sugar, a very important and essential food, lack of
supply would mean destruction of sugar centrals of many provinces.

ISSUE: Was there a  denial of the right to strike?

HELD: Yes. The order on prohibition to strike should be understood to cover only illegal
picketing, that is, picketing through the use of illegal means. Peaceful picketing cannot be
prohibited. It is part of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Petitioners
have not shown reasons to annul the order. Petition dismissed.
 
 
FELIX UY v. COA, GR 130685, March 21, 2000

FACTS: Petitioners were among the more than 60 dismissed permanent employees of the
Capitol of Agusan del Sur by the newly incumbent Governor Paredes. They contended that
the dismissal was a political vengeance because he hired new employees. The Governor
averred that the dismissal was not illegal because it was due to the reduction in work force
due to lack of funds and it is a valid ground of terminating the services of the employees.
The Merit System Protection Board held the dismissal illegal and ordered their reinstatement
but Governor Paredes refused to abide from the order. The COA on the other hand affirmed
the decision of the MSPB but denied the motion of the petitioners stating that it is the
personal liability of Governor Paredes and not the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur.

ISSUE: Can government employees receive backwages and other monetary benefits from
the government?
HELD: Yes. If the MSPB found bad faith on the part of Governor Paredes, it would have
categorically decreed his personal liability for the illegal dismissal of the petitioners. To be
sure, even the petitioners did not proceed from the theory that their dismissal is the
personal liability of Governor Paredes. Familiar learning is our ruling that bad faith cannot
be presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the onus of proving it. In the case at bar, the
decision of the MSPB by itself does not meet the quantum of proof necessary to overcome
the presumption of good faith.
 
 
TIRAZONA v. PHILIPPINE EDS TECHNO-SERVICE (PET) INC
FACTS: The petitioner, a managerial employee who was holding a position of trust and
confidence, was admonished by the latter of her improper handling of a situation involving a
rank-and-file employee. She admitted having read a supposed confidential letter for the PET
directors containing a  legal opinion of the respondent's counsel regarding the status of her
employment. As a consequence, she was terminated for willful breach of trust reposed upon
by her employer. She claimed having been denied of due process.
 
ISSUE: Was her dismissal justified?
 
HELD: Yes. The petitioner has given the respondent more than enough reasons to distrust
her. The arrogance and hostility she has shown towards the company her stubborn
uncompromising stance in almost all  instances justify the company's termination of her
employment.
 
 
PANTRANCO v. PSC, GR 47065, June 26, 1940

FACTS: Petitioner wanted to have Sec. 1 of CA 454 be declared unconstitutional or that if

constitutional be declared inapplicable to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to its
enactment. This arose from the time petitioner applied for ten additional trucks to comply
with his existing certificates of public convenience issued before the enactment of the CA
454 because he was not agreeable with the conditions set forth by PSC. He contended that
this Act violates the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of contracts.
 
ISSUE: Was the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of obligations and contracts
violated?

HELD:  No. Statutes for the regulation of public utilities are a proper exercise by the state of
its police power for the control and regulation of public utilities in order to protect the public.
If one voluntarily placed his property in public service, he cannot complain of the regulation
of the State through its police power. A regulation of public utilities applies not only to
future but also to present contracts in operation. Such statutes are, therefore, not
unconstitutional, either impairing the obligation of contracts, taking property without due
process, or denying the equal protection of the laws, especially inasmuch as the question
whether or not private property shall be devoted to a public and the consequent burdens
assumed is ordinarily for the owner to decide.
 
 
PALMERIA v. NLRC, 247 SCRA 57

FACTS:  Palmeria was employed by private respondent Coca-cola, which later entered into a
contract of service with Lipercon Services. It was made to appear that the petitioner was an
employee of Lipercon, before being dismissed by Coca-cola. Petitioner was able to prove his
employment with Coca-cola, hence sought for reinstatement. The labor arbiter and NLRC
ruled that reinstatement could not be availed of because of the vehement refusal of the
respondent to accept back the petitioner.
 
ISSUE: Should the petition for reinstatement be granted despite the strained relations
between employee and employer?
 
HELD: Yes. The importance of the remedy of reinstatement to an unjustly dismissed
employee cannot be overstated. It is the remedy that most effectively restores the right of
an employee to his employment and all its benefits before its violation by his employer. Yet
despite all its virtues, reinstatement does not and cannot fully vindicate all of an employees
injuries for reinstatement no more than compensates for his financial damages. It cannot
make up for his other sufferings, intangible yet valuable xxx  It is a right which cannot be
allowed to be devalued by the purchasing power of employers who are only too willing to
bankroll the separation pay of their illegally dismissed employees to get rid of them.
 

BANGALISAN v. CA, 276 SCRA 619

FACTS:  Petitioners were among the 800 public school teachers who staged “mass actions”
on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances against the alleged failure of the
government to implement measures intended for their material benefit. The Education
Secretary issued a Return-to-Work Order but the petitioners failed to comply. Hence they
were charged by the Secretary with several administrative cases leading to their dismissal
from service.
 
ISSUE: Can government employees engage in a strike?
 
HELD:  No. As a general rule, even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like
Memo Circ. No.6 public employees are denied the right to strike or engage in work stoppage
against a public employer. The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages
public employees was clearly recognized at common law. To grant employees of the public
sector the right to strike there must be a clear and direct legislative authority therefor. In
the absence of any express legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing
their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, employees in the public service
may not engage in strike, walk-outs and temporary work stoppage like workers in the
private sector.
 
 
KAISAHAN v. GOTAMCON SAWMILLS, 80 PHIL 521
 
FACTS: During the pendency of the labor dispute between the petitioners and the
respondents, the CIR managed to forge a voluntary agreement which results into a return-
to-work order, and the respondents was prohibited to, among others, lay-off any of the
petitioners. Barely 4 months the contract, petitioners again staged a strike, violating the
condition of the agreement. The latter countered by assailing the Sec 19 of CA 103, the law
upon which the voluntary agreement was based, arguing that the same results to
involuntary servitude.
 
ISSUE: Should a voluntary agreement with a condition that workers must return to work be
voided upon a ground of involuntary servitude?
 
HELD:  No. An employee entering into a contract of employment voluntarily accepts, among
other conditions, those prescribed in Section 19 of CA 103. The voluntariness of the
employee's entering into it or not--with such implied condition, negatives the possibility of
involuntary servitude ensuing.
 
 
MABEZA v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118506 April 18, 1997

FACTS: The petitioner and her co-employees were asked by their employer to sign an
instrument attesting to the latter’s compliance with minimum wage and other labor
standard provision, and that they have no complaints against the management. The
petitioner signed the affidavit but refused to go to the City’s Prosecutor’s Office to confirm
the veracity and contents of the affidavit as instructed by management. That same day she
was ordered by the hotel management to turn over the keys to her living quarters and to
remove her belongings in the hotel’s premises. She then filed a leave of absence which was
denied by her employer. She attempted to return to work but the hotel’s cashier told her
that she should not report to work and instead continue with her unofficial leave of absence.
The management defended upon a ground of loss of confidence.
 
ISSUE: Was the dismissal of the petitioner valid?
 
HELD:  No. The pivotal question in any case where unfair labor practice on the part of the
employer is alleged is whether or not the employer has exerted pressure, in the form of
restraint, interference or coercion, against his employee’s right to institute concerted action
for better terms and conditions of employment. Without doubt, the act of compelling
employees to sign an instrument indicating that the employer observed labor standard
provisions of the law when he might not have, together with the act of terminating or
coercing those who refuse to cooperate with the employers’ scheme constitutes unfair labor
practice.
 
 
BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORP. v. SANCHEZ, 144 SCRA 628
 
FACTS: Supervisors  and managers in petitioner company formed a union separate from
that of the rank-and-file union, petitioned for certification election, and staged a strike
against the petitioner, prompting the latter to seek a permanent injunction.
 
ISSUE: Are supervisors or managers allowed by law to form a union?
 
HELD:  No. The supervisory employees of petitioner firm may not, under the law, form a
supervisors union, separate and distinct from the existing bargaining unit (BEU), composed
of the rank-and-file employees of the Bulletin Publishing Corporation. It is evident that most
of the private respondents are considered managerial employees. xxx The rationale for this
inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial employees would belong to or
be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in
view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become company- dominated with
the presence of managerial employees in Union membership.