Sarmiento v ECC, 244 Phil 323

Facts:

The record shows that the late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the National Power
Corporation in Quezon City as accounting clerk in May 1974. At the time of her death on August
12, 1981 she was manager of the budget division. History of the deceased's illness showed that
symptoms manifested as early as April 1980 as a small wound over the external auditory canal
and mass over the martoid region. Biopsy of the mass revealed cancer known as "differentiated
squamous cell carcinoma." The employee sought treatment in various hospitals, namely,
Veterans Memorial Hospital, United Doctors Medical Hospital and Makati Medical Center. In
March 1981, a soft tissue mass emerged on her left upper cheek as a result of which her lips
became deformed and she was unable to close her left eye. She continued treatment and her
last treatment at the Capitol Medical Center on July 12, 1 981 was due to her difficulty of
swallowing food and her general debility. On August 12, 1981, she succumbed to
cardiorespiratory arrest due to parotid carcinoma. She was 40 years old.

Believing that the deceased's fatal illness having been contracted by her during employment was
service-connected, appellant herein filed a claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree
No. 626, as amended. On September 9, 1982, the GSIS, through its Medical Services Center,
denied the claim. It was pointed out that parotid carcinoma is "Malignant tumor of the parotid
gland (salivary gland)" and that its development was not caused by employment and
employment conditions. Dissatisfied with the respondent System's decision of denial, claimant
wrote a letter dated October 8, 1982 to the GSIS requesting that the records of the claim be
elevated to the Employees' Compensation Commission for review pursuant to the law and the
Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation. (At pp. 17-18, Rollo)

It may be noted that the petitioner was earlier paid GSIS benefits in the amount of P142,285.03
but the claim for employee's compensation was disallowed.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
The petitioner, while principally stressing the compensability of the deceased's ailment, attacks
the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, the law on employees'
compensation which superseded the Labor Code and the of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
He alleges that provisions the said law infringes upon the guarantees of promotion of social
justice, substantive due process, and equal protection of laws, and also permits unjust
discrimination and amounts to class legislation in its enforcement. He prays for the application of
the Old Workmen's Compensation Act which provided for a presumption of compensability
whenever an ailment supervened during the course of the employment.

1
Ruling:

We dismiss the petition.

We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner’s attach against the constitutionality of the
new law on employee’s compensation. It must be noted that the petitioner filed his claim under
the provisions of this same law. It was only when his claim was rejected that he now questions
the constitutionality of this law on appeal by certiorari.

The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and rejected claims
according to its provisions. We find in it no infringement of the worker’s constitutional rights. It is
now settled jurisprudence (see Sulit v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483;
Armena v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851; Erese v. Employees’
Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192; De Jesus v. Employees’ Compensation
Commission, 142 SCRA 92) that the new law discarded the concepts of “presumption of
compensability” and “aggravation” to restore what the law believes is a sensible equilibrium
between the employer’s obligation to pay workmen’s compensation and the employees’ rights to
receive reparation for work-connected death or disability.

In the case of De Jesus v. Employees’ Compensation, (supra), this Court explained the new
scheme of employees’ compensation as follows:

The new law establishes a state insurance fired built up by the contributions of
employers based on the saries of their employees. The injured worker does not
have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim. There
is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply
files a claim with a new neutral Employees’ Compensation Commission which
then determines on the basis of the employee’s supporting papers and medical
evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is
more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has
also been doubled.

On the other hand, the employer’s duty is only to pay the regular monthly
premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet
sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet
these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously
documented or long past claims.

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen’s
compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a find under
its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation
process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open
ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered
claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the

rules on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have
importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which
called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the
claimant, is now absent. (At pp. 99-100)

The petitioner’s challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. These is no serious
attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds.

2
The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a matter that should be
addressed to the President and Congress, not to this Court. Whether or not the former
workmen's compensation program with its presumptions, controversions, adversarial procedures,
and levels of payment is preferable to the present scheme must be decided by the political
departments. The present law was enacted in the belief that it better complies with the mandate
on social justice and is more advantageous to the greater number of working men and women.
Until Congress and the President decide to improve or amend the law, our duty is to apply it.

Under the present law, a compensable illness means any illness accepted as an occupational
disease and listed by the Employees' Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by
employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased
by working conditions (Bonifacio v. Government Service Insurance System, 146 SCRA 276).

Applying the law to the present case, parotid carcinoma or cancer of the salivary glands is not an
occupational disease considering the deceased's employment as accounting clerk and later as
manager of the budget division. The petitioner must, therefore, prove that his wife's ailment was
caused by her employment or that her working conditions increased the risk of her contracting
the fatal illness.

We find these allegations as mere conjectures. As with other kinds of cancer, the cause and
nature of parotid carcinoma is still not known. 

Given the preceding medical evaluations, we affirm the findings of the public respondents which
found no proof that the deceased's working conditions have indeed caused or increased the risk
of her contracting her illness.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decisions of the Government Service Insurance
System and the Employees' Compensation Commission denying the claim are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

3
Nitura v ECC , 201 SCRA 278

Facts:

The deceased Pfc. Regino S. Nitura, 681349 PA, started his military service on October 5, 1978
when he was caged for military training in the Philippine Army. At the time of his death on March
3, 1986, he was assigned to the "D" Coy 44th Inf. Bn., lst Inf. (TABAK) Division, stationed at
Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte.

In the evening of March 2, 1986, he was instructed to go to Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City,
which is more or less one (1) kilometer from the Command Post of his Company, to check on
several personnel of the Command who were then attending a dance party. This instruction was
attested to by his Battalion Commander, Col. Loreto M. Deus, 0-90573 Inf. (GSC) PA in his
affidavit dated July 8, 1986 (Annex "A" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 15). On his way back to the
camp, he passed, crossed and fell from a hanging wooden bridge connects Barangay San Jose,
Dipolog City and Barangay Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, his head hitting the
stony portion of the ground. His death certificate (Annex 'B" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 16) shows
that he died of "cardiorespiratory arrest, shock, traumatic due to hemorrhage, intracranial due to
severe concussion of the brain due to accidental fall".

Herein petitioner Juanita Nitura filed a death claim for compensation benefits under Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended, with the GSIS. In a letter dated October 27, 1986 signed by Oscar
R. Marcelino, Manager, Employees' Compensation Department (Annex "C" of the Petition, Rollo,
p. 17), petitioner's claim was denied on the ground that the condition for compensability, that the
injury and the resulting disability or death must be the result of an accident arising out of and in
the course of the employment, has not been satisfied. Her request for reconsideration was
likewise denied on the ground that her son was not at his place of work nor performing his official
function as a PA soldier when the accident occurred (Annex "D" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 18).

Issue:
The sole issue in the case at bar is whether or not the death of Pfc. Regino S. Nitura is
compensable pursuant to the applicable statutes and regulations.

Ruling:

The petition is impressed with merit.

In resolving this issue in a similar case, this Court ruled that the Employees' Compensation Act is
basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working men and women in our
surety. While the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code, it is
significant that the liberality of the law in general in favor of the working man still subsists. As an
official agent charged by law to implement social justice guaranteed and affirmed by the
Constitution, the ECC should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims
for compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work
connection with the incident. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the
compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that
"all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including
its implementing rules and regulations should be resolved in favor of labor." The policy then is to
extend the applicability of the decree (P.D. 626) to as many employees who can avail of the
benefits thereunder, which includes protection to employees for a reasonable period of time prior

4
to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the work
premises (Lazo v. ECC, 186 SCRA 574-575 [1990]).

Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation provides that:

Section 1. Grounds — (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all the
following conditions:

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work require him to be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order
of the employer.

The concept of a "work place" referred to cannot always be literally applied to a soldier in active
duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or a
clerk in a particular fixed office. A soldier must go where his company is stationed (Hinoguin v.
ECC, 172 SCRA 350 [1990]). In the case at bar, Pfc. Nitura's station was at Basagan, Katipunan,
Zamboanga del Norte. But then his presence at the site of the accident was with the permission
of his superior officer having been directed to go to Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. In carrying
out said directive, he had to pass by the hanging bridge which connects the two places. As held
in the Hinoguin case (supra.), a place where soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at
cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their
commanding officer.

As to the question of whether or not he was performing an official function at the time of the
incident, it has been held that a soldier on active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day official
duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to
call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, seven (7) days a week, except, of
course, when he is on vacation leave status. Thus, a soldier should be presumed to be on official
duty unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition
temporarily by going on an approved vacation leave. Even vacation leaves may, it must be
remembered, be pre-terminated by superior orders (Hinoguin v. ECC, supra.). In the instant
case, the deceased was neither on vacation leave nor on an overnight pass when the incident
occurred. In fact, he was directed by his superior to check on several personnel of the command
then attending the dance party, as attested to by his Battalion Commander. Hence, since Pfc.
Nitura was not on vacation leave, he did not effectively cease performing "official functions."

More than that, it was correctly pointed out by petitioner Juanita Nitura that the contention of the
GSIS and the ECC that the deceased did not sustain the injury while performing the instructions
of his superior would put to naught an actual fact-finding and evaluation undertaken by the
military that the death of Pfc. Regino S. Nitura was in line of duty. She pointed out that the Line of
Duty Board of Officers which convened on March 4, 1986 at the Hqs. 44th W Bn 1st Inf. (TABAK)
Division, PA at Anastacio, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte made the following findings:

Consequently, Leon O. Ridao Assistant Secretary, Legal Affairs, in his 3rd Indorsement to the
Administrator, Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, dated January 26, 1988 (Annex 'H" of the
Petition, Rollo, p. 26) ordered the payment of the death gratuity under the provisions of Republic
Act NO. 610, as amended, to his rightful heirs, as may be determined by the Claims Division,
OTJAG AFP (Memorandum for the Petitioner, Rollo, pp. 9395).

5
With regard respondents' contention that the claim is precluded by the fact that the deceased
was drunk and acted with notorious negligence, it has been held that even if it could be shown
that a person drank intoxicating liquor it is incumbent upon the person invoking drunkenness as a
defense to show that said person was extremely drunk. This is so because a person may take as
much as several bottles of beer or several glasses of hard liquor and still remain sober and
unaffected by the alcoholic drink. Thus, intoxication which does not incapacitate the employee
from following his occupation is not sufficient to defeat the recovery of compensation, although
intoxication may be a contributory cause to his injury. It must be shown that the intoxication was
the proximate cause of death or injury and the burden of proof lies on him who raises
drunkenness as a defense (Vda. de Yohanan v. Balena and WCC, 78 SCRA 348 [1977]). While
it may be admitted that the deceased drank intoxicating liquor at the dance party, respondents
ECC and GSIS have not established that the state of drunkenness of the deceased is the
proximate cause of his death.

On the other hand, notorious negligence has been defined as something more than mere or
simple negligence or contributory negligence; it signifies a deliberate act of the employee to
disregard his own personal safety. Disobedience to rules, orders, and/or prohibition does not in
itself constitute notorious negligence, if no intention can be attributed to the injured to end his life
(Luzon Stevedoring Corporation v. WCC, 105 SCRA 675 [1981] reiterating Paez v. WCC, 7
SCRA 588 [1963]). As stressed by the petitioner, it was not shown that the deceased had any
intention to end his life. Crossing a hanging bridge may seem dangerous to an ordinary man but
the deceased was a soldier who had been trained and prepared for this kind of work. As
explained by his mother, petitioner herein, the deceased had seen the worse and was not afraid
or intimidated by the fact that he had to pass through a hanging bridge. Facing danger had
become second nature to him (Rollo, pp. 98-99).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED, the decision of respondent ECC dated
May 24, 1989 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petitioner and the illegimate minor children
of the deceased, namely Regina and Rogian, are AWARDED the full benefits pursuant to the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.

6
Lopez v ECC , 228 SCRA 257

Facts:

Petitioner's late husband, Pedro Lopez, was employed as a public school teacher at the
Urdaneta National High School, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, from
July 1, 1973 until his untimely demise on May 27, 1987.

On April 27, 1987, a memorandum was issued to Pedro Lopez by the head of the school's
Science Department and noted by Lino A. Caringal, Sr. the principal, which reads:

In view of your long and competent teaching experience as a PHYSICS Teacher

and in anticipation with (sic) the forthcoming Division Search for Outstanding
Improvised Secondary Science Equipment for Teachers to be held at the TAP
Bldg. in Lingayen, Pangasinan on October 8 and 9, 1987, you are hereby
designated to prepare the MODEL DAM, UNHS official entry to said contest.

In this connection, you are further advised to complete this MODEL DAM on or
before scheduled date of the contest (Rollo, p. 54; emphasis supplied).

Lopez complied with his superior's instruction and constructed an improvised electric micro-dam,
which he took home to enable him to finish it before the deadline.

On May 27, 1987, at around 6:30 A.M., while he was engrossed in his project, he in contact with
a live wire was electrocuted. He was immediately brought to a clinic for emergency treatment but
was pronounced dead on arrival. The death certificate showed that he died of cardiac arrest due
to accidental electrocution.

Petitioner then filed a claim for death benefits with the GSIS, which was denied on the ground
that her husband's death did not arise out and in the course of employment. Petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied.

She then elevated the case to the ECC for review, which affirmed the decision rendered by the
GSIS and dismissed the same.

Issue:
 whether or not respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the cause of
death of petitioner's husband is not work connected and therefore it is not compensable under
P.D. No. 626.

7
Ruling:

The Employees Compensation Act is a social legislation whose primordial purpose is to provide
amelioration of the working class of our society. As held in the case of Nitura v. Employees
Compensation Commission, 201 SCRA 278 (1991):

As an official agent charged by law to implement social justice guaranteed and

secured by the Constitution, the ECC should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of
the employee in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is
some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection with the incident. This kind
of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the
law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that all doubts
in the implementation and interpretation of the Labor Code including its
implementing rules and regulations should be resolved in favor of labor.

"In the course of" points to the place and circumstances under which the accident takes place
and the time when it occurs. Of the two phrases on work connection, "in the course of" is
deemed broader than "arising out of" (Fernandez and Quiason, Labor Standards and Welfare
Legislation, 1964 ed., pp. 563-564).

While the death of Pedro Lopez took place in his house and not in his official work station, which
is the school, he was still discharging his function as the one in-charge of the project. He was
constrained to finish the project within a specific period of time and he could only do so if he
worked overtime in his house.

The death of petitioner's husband is service-connected even if it happened during the summer
vacation. He was still under the employ of the government and there still existed an employer-
employee relationship although teachers do not report for duty during that period (Pepito v.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, 78 SCRA 35 [1977] ).

It can even be said that the conditions set forth under sec. 1, par. (a), Rule III of the amended
Rules on Employees Compensation, have been complied with.

The said rule requires that the injury must have been sustained by the employee at "the place
where his work requires him to be" and if the injury is sustained elsewhere the employees "must
have been executing an order from his superior." Inasmuch as Lopez had to finish the project on
the time for the contest scheduled on October 5 and 9, 1987, it can be implied that Lopez was
given permission, if not direction, to perform his work at his house.

Respondent ECC cannot rely on the fact that Lopez had been ordered by the school principal to
report for duty to assist in the enrollment of the fourth-year students on the day of the accident.
Lopez was electrocuted at 6:30 A.M. while he was working on the model he was asked to build.
To claim that he should have been in school at the time he died in order to entitle his widow any
compensation benefits, is to strain good sense and logic.

For an injury to be compensable it is not important that the cause therefor shall have taken place
within the purview of his employment, performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental
thereto, the injury sustained by reason thereof falls within the protection of the law regardless of
the place of injury (ECC Implementing Rules and Regulations, Rule III, Sec. 1; ECC Resolution
No. 2799, July 25, 1984; Enao v. Employees Compensation Commission, 135 SCRA 660
[1985]).

The thrust of social justice is compassion for the poor. By denying under the peculiar
circumstances the claim of the petitioner for benefits arising from the death of her husband,
public respondents ignored this public policy and committed a grave abuse of discretion.

8
Orate v Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132761, 26 March 2003

Facts:

On December 5, 1972, petitioner Norma Orate was employed by Manila Bay

Spinning Mills, Inc., as a regular machine operator.

On March 22, 1995, she was diagnosed to be suffering from invasive ductal
carcinoma (breast, left), 6 commonly referred to as cancer of the breast.
Consequently, she underwent modified radical mastectomy on June 9, 1995. 7 The
operation incapacitated her from performing heavy work, for which reason she was
forced to go on leave and, eventually, to retire from service at the age of 44.

On November 17, 1995, petitioner applied for employees compensation benefits 8

with the Social Security System (SSS), but the same was denied on the ground that
her illness is not work-related. On January 22, 1996, she moved for reconsideration
contending that her duties as machine operator which included lifting heavy objects
increased the risk of contracting breast cancer. 9 The SSS, however, reiterated its
denial of petitioner’s claim for benefits under the Employees’ Compensation
Program. Instead, it approved her application as a sickness benefit claim under the
SSS, 10 and classified the same as a permanent partial disability equivalent to a
period of twenty-three (23) months. 11 Thus —

Issue:

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition insisting that her disability should be
compensated under the provisions of the Labor Code and not under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act.

Ruling:

The resolution of the instant controversy hinges on the following issues: (1) What is
the law applicable to petitioner’s claim for disability benefits? and (2) Is she entitled
under the applicable law to be compensated for disability arising from breast
carcinoma?

The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of
employers based on the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not
have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim. There is
no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a
claim with a new neutral Employees’ Compensation Commission which then
determines on the basis of the employee’s supporting papers and medical evidence
whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt.
The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been
doubled.

9
On the other hand, the employer’s duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums
to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands
for compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet these contingencies. It
does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen’s
compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a fund under its
exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and
it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of
Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering
from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules
on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The
lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization
through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent. . . .

In workmen’s compensation cases, the governing law is determined by the date

when the claimant contracted the disease. An injury or illness which intervened prior
to January 1, 1975, the effectivity date of P.D. No. 626, shall be governed by the
provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, while those contracted on or after
January 1, 1975 shall be governed by the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No. 626.
24 Corollarily, where the claim for compensation benefit was filed after the
effectivity of P.D. No. 626 without any showing as to when the disease intervened,
the presumption is that the disease was contracted after the effectivity of P.D. No.
626.25 cralaw:red

In the case at bar, petitioner was found to be positive for breast cancer on March
22, 1995. No evidence, however, was presented as to when she contracted said
ailment. Hence, the presumption is that her illness intervened when P.D. No. 626
was already the governing law.

The instant controversy is not on all fours with the cases where the Court applied
the "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, even though the claim for compensation benefit was filed after
January 1, 1975. In the said cases, the symptoms of breast cancer manifested
before or too close to the cut off date — January 1, 1975, that it is logical to
presume that the breast carcinoma of the employee concerned must have
intervened prior to January 1, 1975. Thus —

Clearly therefore, the "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" under the

Workmen’s Compensation Act cannot be applied to petitioner’s claim for
compensation benefit arising from breast cancer. We are not experts in this field to
rule that the onset of her breast carcinoma occurred prior to January 1, 1975, or
almost twenty years ago. Hence, the provisions of the Labor Code govern. For
breast carcinoma and resulting disability to be compensable, the claimant must
prove, by substantial evidence, either of two things: (a) that the sickness was the
result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees’
Compensation; or (b) if the sickness is not so listed, that the risk of contracting the
disease was increased by the claimant’s working conditions. 32

There is no dispute that cancer of the breast is not listed as an occupational disease
under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees’ Compensation. As such, petitioner has
the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the causal relationship between her

10
illness and her working conditions. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 33 In the case at bar, petitioner argued
before the SSS and the ECC that her job as machine operator, which required lifting
of heavy objects increased the risk of her contracting breast carcinoma. In addition,
she contended that her job in the winding department exposed her to cancer-
causing dyes used in coloring threads. 34 In support thereof, she cited the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Some industrial chemicals create a cancer hazard for people who work with them.
Such chemicals include aniline dyes, arsenic, asbestos, chromium and iron
compounds, lead, nickel, vinyl chloride, and certain products of coal, lignite, oil
shale, and petroleum. Unless industrial plants carefully control the use of such
chemicals, excessive amounts may escape or be released into the environment. The
chemicals then create a cancer hazard for people in surrounding areas. (World Book
Encyclopedia, Vol. 3, 1992 ed., p. 119) 35

Regrettably, however, said bare allegations and vague excerpts on cancer do not
constitute such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support the conclusion that there is a causal relationship between her illness and her
working conditions. Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations and
presumptions. The claimant must prove a positive proposition. 36 A perusal of the
records reveals that there is no evidence that she was indeed exposed to dyes. Even
assuming that she was dealing directly with chemicals, there is no proof that the
company where she worked did not implement measures to control the hazards
occasioned by the use of such chemicals.

Indeed, cancer is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person’s
employment appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or
a highly paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the deep bowels of
the earth. It makes no difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a
white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller or a
resident of a rural area. 37

It is not also correct to say that all disability or death resulting from all kinds of
cancer are not compensable. There are certain cancers which are reasonably
considered as strongly induced by specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in
Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain
chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally
accepted as increasing the risks of contracting specific cancers. What the law
requires for others is proof. 38 This was not satisfied in the instant case.

Hence, while we sustain petitioner’s claim that it is the Labor Code that applies to
her case, we are nonetheless constrained to rule that under the same code, her
disability is not compensable. Much as we commiserate with her, our sympathy
cannot justify an award not authorized by law. It is well to remember that if diseases
not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included,
the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims
of diseases not covered by law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the
trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families look to for
compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur. This stems
from the development in the law that no longer is the poor employee still arrayed
against the might and power of his rich corporate employer, hence the necessity of

11
affording all kinds of favorable presumptions to the employee. This reasoning is no
longer good policy. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if
benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. 39

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 42280, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Employees’
Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. MS-7938-296, dismissing petitioner’s
claim for compensation benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program is
REINSTATED.

12
Raro v ECC, 172 SCRA 845
The problem is attributable to the inherent difficulty in applying the new principle of "proof of
increased risk." There are two approaches to a solution in cases where it cannot be proved that
the risk of contracting an illness not listed as an occupational disease was increased by the
claimant's working conditions. The one espoused by the petitioner insists that if a claimant
cannot prove the necessary work connection because the causes of the disease are still
unknown, it must be presumed that working conditions increased the risk of contracting the
ailment. On the other hand, the respondents state that if there is no proof of the required work
connection, the disease is not compensable because the law says so.

Facts:

The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by the Bureau of
Mines and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional office on March 17, 1975. About
four years later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent headaches coupled with blurring
of vision. Forced to take sick leaves every now and then, she sought medical treatment in
Manila. She was then a Mining Recorder in the Bureau.

The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain tumor. By
that time, her memory, sense of time, vision, and reasoning power had been lost.

A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) was denied. A motion for reconsideration was similarly denied. An appeal to the
Employees' Compensation Commission resulted in the Commission's affirming the GSIS
decision.

Issue:

1. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during employment is
compensable under the present compensation laws.

2. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable under the present

compensation laws when a disease is not listed as occupational disease. (p. 17, Rollo)

Ruling:
It is not also correct to say that all cancers are not compensable. The list of occupational
diseases prepared by the Commission includes some cancers as compensable, namely —

The petitioner questions the above listing. We see no arbitrariness in the Commission's allowing
vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be compensated for brain cancer. There are certain
cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by specific causes. Heavy doses
of radiation as in Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain
chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted as
increasing the risks of contracting specific cancers. What the law requires for others is proof.

The first thing that stands in the way of the petition is the law itself.

13
The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing – the illness was caused
by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To
say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is
contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-
existent proof cannot be presumed .

To understand why the "Presumption of compensability" together with the host of decisions
interpreting the "arising out of and in the course of employment" provision of the defunct law has
been stricken from the present law, one has to go into the distinctions between the old
workmen's compensation law and the present scheme.

On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel scheme under
the new Labor Code. The new law discarded, among others, the concepts of "presumption of
compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a system based on social security principles.
The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies — the Government
Service Insurance System and Social Security System — under the Employees' Compensation
Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation
to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for work-
connected death or disability. (Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483
[1980]; Armena v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851 [1983]; Erese v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192 [1985]; De Jesus v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92 [1986]; Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, et al., GR No. 65680, May 11, 1988).

Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer, we now have
a social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by employers to a trust fund and
claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can prove entitlement.

The non-adversarial nature of employees' compensation proceedings is crucial to an

understanding of the present scheme. There is a widespread misconception that the poor
employee is still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate employer. Hence, he
must be given all kinds of favorable presumptions. This is fallacious. It is now the trust fund and
not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the
law. The employer joins its employees in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is
spared the problem of proving a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by
employment. It is a government institution which protects the stability and integrity of the State
Insurance Fund against the payment of non-compensable claims. The employee, this time
assisted by his employer, is required to prove a positive proposition, that the risk of contracting
the is increased by working conditions.

The social insurance aspect of the present law is the other important feature which distinguishes
it from the old and familiar system.

Employees' compensation is based on social security principles. All covered employers

throughout the country are required by law to contribute fixed and regular premiums or
contributions to a trust fund for their employees. Benefits are paid from this trust fund. At the time
the amount of contributions was being fixed, actuarial studies were undertaken. The actuarially
determined number of workers who would probably file claims within any given year is important
in insuring the stability of the said fund and making certain that the system can pay benefits when
due to all who are entitled and in the increased amounts fixed by law.

14
We have no actuarial expertise in this Court. If diseases not intended by the law to be
compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is
endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need
to show a greater concern for the trust fund to winch the tens of millions of workers and their
families look for compensation whenever covered accidents, salary and deaths occur. As earlier
stated, if increased contributions or premiums must be paid in order to give benefits to those who
are now excluded, it is Congress which should amend the law after proper actuarial studies. This
Court cannot engage in judicial legislation on such a complex subject with such far reaching
implications.

We trust that the public respondents and the Social Security System are continually evaluating
the actuarial soundness of the trust funds they administer. In this way, more types of cancers and
other excluded diseases may be included in the list of covered occupational diseases. Or
legislation may be recommended to Congress either increasing the contribution rates of
employers, increasing benefit payments, or making it easier to prove entitlement. We regret that
these are beyond the powers of this Court to accomplish.

For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practising lawyers concerned, this decision
expressly supersedes the decisions in Panotes v. Employees' Compensation Commission [128
SCRA 473 (1984)]; Mercado v. Employees' Compensation Commission [127 SCRA 664
(1984)]; Ovenson v. Employees' Compensation Commission [156 SCRA 21 (1987)]; Nemaria v.
Employees' Compensation Commission [155 SCRA 166 (1987)] and other cases with
conclusions different from those stated above.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED The questioned decision of the public
respondents is AFFIRMED.

15
Jesus Villamor v ECC et al., G. R. No.204422, Nov. 21, 2016

Facts:

In 1978, petitioner, with Social Security System (SSS) No. 03-4047063-3, was
employed by Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. (VVCCI). 6

On November 3, 2006, he was brought to Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital, Manila, due
to dizziness associated with numbness and weakness on his left arm and leg. 7 His
Cranial Computed Tomography (CT) scan revealed that he had an “acute non-
hemorrhage infarct on the right pons/basal ganglia." 8

After more than a week of confinement, 9 petitioner was discharged from the said
hospital with diagnoses of Hypertension Stage 1; Cerebro-Vascular Disease (CVD)
Acute, Non-Hemorrhagic Infarct Right Pons and Right Basal Ganglia;
Dyslipidemia10 (abnormal levels of lipids [cholesterol triglycerides, or both] carried
by lipoproteins in the blood).

Issue:

Hence, petitioner filed the instant Petition and Supplemental Petition under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court contending that the CA erred in denying his claim for EC TTD.

Ruling:

Petitioner was not a mere clerk at the

time he suffered a stroke.

The denial of petitioner's claim is based on the factual finding of respondents SSS
and ECC that he is a mere clerk of VVCCI, responsible for the issuance of vouchers
and receipts to its member. 45 Based on this, respondents SSS and ECC ruled that in
the absence of any substantial evidence showing the causal relationship between his
stroke and the clerical nature of his work, petitioner is not entitled to his
claim.46 This factual finding, however, is not supported by the evidence on record.

In 1978, VVCCI employed petitioner as a waiter. 47 It then transferred him to the
Sports Department as Sports Dispatcher, and later, promoted him as Sports Area
In-Charge.48 His Identification Card49 and SSS Employees' Notification Form B-
30050 both prove his claim that his position at the club is not a mere clerk but is a
Sports Area-In-Charge. In fact, his Job Description 51 proves that his work is not
limited to issuing vouchers and receipts to club members, but includes the following
duties and responsibilities:  ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

16
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that contrary to the findings of the respondents
SSS and ECC, petitioner's job is not a mere clerk issuing vouchers or receipts. His
duties and responsibilities as Sports Area In-Charge are obviously laborious and
stressful since he is tasked to cater to the needs of all club members and their
guests, and to coordinate with the other departments of the club regarding their
needs. He also receives the complaints and requests of club members and their
guests, and ensures that these complaints and requests are properly addressed. To
do all these, he has to move around the club and deal with the club members and
their guests. Obviously, he has to endure both physical and mental stress in order to
perform his duties.

Aside from his position as Sports Area In-Charge, petitioner is also the President of
the VVCCI Employees Union since 1984, except for the period 2000- 2004. 52 As the
president of the union, he was subjected to harassment and unfair labor tactics of
the management of the club. In fact, when petitioner suffered a stroke, there were
four pending cases filed by him, on behalf of the union and in his own personal
capacity, to wit: 
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Petitioner is entitled to his claim for EC

TTD benefits under PD No. 626, as
amended.

The Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation provides that for an illness or

disease to be compensable, "[it] must be a result of occupational disease listed
under Annex 'A' of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise,
proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions."54 In the case of stroke and hypertension, both are compensable
since they are listed as occupational diseases under Nos. 19 55 and 29,56 respectively,
of Annex "A" of the said rules.

Taking the cue from the Baul case, the Court finds that petitioner is entitled to
compensation for his illness. Just like in Baul, petitioner was diagnosed with
hypertension and stroke, as evidenced by his medical reports: Cranial CT
Scan,59 Chest X-Ray Result,60 Laboratory or Blood Chemistry Result, 61 and
Electrocardiogram Result.62 He was also able to show that his work and position in
the union caused him physical and mental strain as he had to deal with the demands
of various types of people. Thus, there is a probability that his work and position in
the union increased his risk of suffering a stroke, which affected his brain, caused
cerebral infarctions, paralysis of the left side of his body, difficulty in speaking, and
loss of muscular coordination.

Direct evidence showing that his work and position in the union caused his illness is
not necessary. As we have consistently ruled, the test of proof in compensation
proceedings is probability, and not the ultimate degree of certainty. 63 In fact, in
claims for compensation, the strict rules of evidence need not be observed as the
primordial and paramount consideration should be the employee's welfare. 64

As to the findings of respondents SSS and ECC that petitioner is a chronic smoker
and drinker, the Court finds that it should not bar petitioner's claim for
compensation, whether or not such findings are true. In Government Service
Insurance System v. De Castro,65 the Court said that:

17
We find it strange that both the ECC and the GSIS singled out the presence of
smoking and drinking as the factors that rendered De Castro's ailments, otherwise
listed as occupational, to be non-compensable. To be sure, the causes of CAD and
hypertension that the ECC listed and explained in its decision cannot be denied;
smoking and drinking are undeniably among these causes. However, they are not
the sole causes of CAD and hypertension and, at least, not under the
circumstances of the present case. For this reason, we fear for the implication of the
ECC ruling if it will prevail and be read as definitive on the effects of smoking and
drinking on compensability issues, even on diseases that are listed as occupational
in character. The ruling raises the possible reading that smoking and drinking, by
themselves, are factors that can bar compensability.

We ask the question of whether these factors can be sole determinants of

compensability as the ECC has apparently failed to consider other factors such as
age and gender from among those that the ECC itself listed as major and minor
causes of atherosclerosis and, ultimately, of CAD. While age and gender are
characteristics inherent in the person (and thereby may be considered non-work
related factors), they also do affect a worker's job performance and may in this
sense, together with stresses of the job, significantly contribute to illnesses such as
CAD and hypertension. To cite an example, some workplace activities are
appropriate only for the young (such as the lifting of heavy objects although these
may simply be office files), and when repeatedly undertaken by older workers, may
lead to ailments and disability. Thus, age coupled with an age-affected work activity
may lead to compensability. From this perspective, none of the ECC's listed factors
should be disregarded to the exclusion of others in determining compensability.

In any determination of compensability, the nature and characteristics of the job are
as important as raw medical findings and a claimant's personal and social history.
This is a basic legal reality in workers' compensation law. We are therefore surprised
that the ECC and the GSIS simply brushed aside the disability certification that the
military issued with respect to De Castro's disability, based mainly on their primacy
as the agencies with expertise on workers' compensation and disability issues.

While ECC and GSIS are admittedly the government entities with jurisdiction over
the administration of workers' disability compensation and can thus claim primacy in
these areas, they cannot however claim infallibility, particularly when they use
wrong or limited considerations in determining compensability. 66 (Emphasis in the
original)

All told, the Court finds that under prevailing jurisprudence, the nature of
petitioner's work and his medical results are substantial evidence to support his
claim for EC TTD benefits under PD No. 626, as amended.

18
GSIS v Baul, 529 Phil 390

Facts:

Luz M. Baul was employed by the Department of Education and Culture and Sports (DECS),
Tarlac South District, as an elementary school teacher on August 1, 1962.

Medical records show that due to extreme dizziness, headache, chest pain, slurred speech,
vomiting and general body weakness, she was admitted to the St. Martin de Porres Hospital
inside Hacienda Luisita, San Miguel, Tarlac from July 1 to 9, 1993. Dr. Salvador A. Fontanilla, the
medical director of the hospital, diagnosed her illness as Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease
(HCVD)-Essential Hypertension. Prognosis was "poor" and "guarded." 3 To monitor her health
condition, she had frequent consultation and treatment as an outpatient until her compulsory
retirement on May 2, 1998.4

On January 19 to 20, 1999, Luz was confined at the Ramos General Hospital in Ligtasan, Tarlac
City. Dr. Conrado M. Orquiola, a cardiologist, corroborated the earlier findings of Dr. Fontanilla
that she had a HCVD. On May 17, 1999, she consulted Dr. Ernesto Cunanan, an internal
medicine specialist, and the doctor noted that her hypertension had worsened to Transient
Ischemic Attack (TIA), Essential Hypertension Stage III (moderate to severe hypertension).
Eventually, on April 17, 2000, she suffered from a Cerebro-Vascular Accident (CVA), i.e., stroke,
and was rushed to the Ramos General Hospital where she stayed for four days under the
medical supervision of Dr. Orquiola and Dr. Albert Lapid, a neurologist. 5 The CT Scan result
revealed the impression "ischemic infarct, right occipital lobe." 6

Convinced that her hypertension supervened by reason and in the course of her employment
with the DECS and persisted even after her retirement, she filed a claim on June 10, 1999 before
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Tarlac Branch, for disability and hospital
medical benefits under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626, as amended. 7

On August 15, 2001, GSIS Tarlac Branch Manager Amando A. Inocentes denied petitioner's
claim due to the alleged absence of proof to confirm that there was a resulting permanent
disability due to hypertension prior to retirement.

Issue:

Petitioner insists that the ruling of the CA rests on mere presumptions, and points out that an
award of disability benefits cannot depend on surmises and conjectures. The beneficiary must
present evidence to prove that the illness was caused by employment or that the working
conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease. Also, there is no showing that
respondent's ailment is at all considered permanent partial or total disability by the GSIS and
approved by the ECC medical groups.

Ruling:

Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are considered as occupational diseases

under Nos. 19 and 29, respectively, of Annex "A" of the Implementing Rules of P.D. No. 626, as
amended. Thus, it is not necessary that there be proof of causal relation between the work and
the illness which resulted in the respondent's disability. The open-ended Table of Occupational

19
Diseases requires no proof of causation. In general, a covered claimant suffering from an
occupational disease is automatically paid benefits. 13

However, although cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are listed occupational
diseases, their compensability requires compliance with all the conditions set forth in the Rules.
In short, both are qualified occupational diseases. For cerebro-vascular accident, the claimant
must prove the following: (1) there must be a history, which should be proved, of trauma at work
(to the head specifically) due to unusual and extraordinary physical or mental strain or event, or
undue exposure to noxious gases in industry; (2) there must be a direct connection between the
trauma or exertion in the course of the employment and the cerebro-vascular attack; and (3) the
trauma or exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage. On the other hand, essential
hypertension is compensable only if it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys,
heart, eyes and brain, resulting in permanent disability, provided that, the following documents
substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray report; (b) ECG report; (c) blood chemistry report; (d) funduscopy
report; and (e) C-T scan.

The degree of proof required to validate the concurrence of the above-mentioned conditions
under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. What the law requires is a
reasonable work-connection and not direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on
which the workmen's claim is based is probable. 14 As correctly pointed out by the CA, probability,
not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings. 15 For, in
interpreting and carrying out the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, the primordial and paramount consideration is the employee's welfare. To
safeguard the worker's rights, any doubt as to the proper interpretation and application must be
resolved in their favor.16

In the instant case, medical reports and drug prescriptions of respondent's attending physicians
sufficiently support her claim for disability benefits. Neither the GSIS nor the ECC convincingly
deny their genuineness and due execution. The reports are made part of the record and there is
no showing that they are false or erroneous, or resorted to as a means of deceiving the Court,
hence, are entitled to due probative weight. The failure of respondent to submit to a full medical
examination, as required by the rules, to substantiate her essential hypertension, is of no
moment. The law is that laboratory reports such as X-ray and ECG are not indispensable
prerequisites to compensability,17 the reason being that the strict rules of evidence need not be
observed in claims for compensation.18 Medical findings of the attending physician may be
received in evidence and used as proof of the fact in dispute. 19 The doctor's certification as to the
nature of claimant's disability may be given credence as he or she normally would not make
untruthful certification. Indeed, no physician in his right mind and who is aware of the far reaching
and serious effect that his or her statements would cause on a money claim against a
government agency would vouch indiscriminately without regarding his own interests and
protection.

It bears stressing, however, that medical experiments tracing the etiology of essential
hypertension show that there is a relationship between the sickness and the nature and
conditions of work.22 In this jurisdiction, we have already ruled in a number of cases 23 the
strenuous office of a public school teacher.

The fact that the essential hypertension of respondent worsened and resulted in a CVA at the
time she was already out of service is inconsequential. The main consideration for its
compensability is that her illness was contracted during and by reason of her employment, and
any non-work related factor that contributed to its aggravation is immaterial. 29

20
Indeed, an employee's disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but rather
over a period of time. It is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary
may later on become permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes totally and
permanently disabled from the same cause.30 The right to compensation extends to disability due
to disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury.
Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural
consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the
result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant's own negligence or
misconduct. Simply stated, all medical consequences that flow from the primary injury are
compensable.31

P.D. No. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the presumption of compensability and
the theory of aggravation prevalent under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

21
Beberisa Rino v ECC et al., G. R. 132558, May 9, 2000

Facts:

Virgilio T. Riño Sr., husband of herein petitioner, was employed by Allied Port Services Inc. as
stevedore since July, 1982. His duties included: (1) handling of steel cargoes; (2) loading and
unloading of silica sand; (3) handling, loading and unloading of lumber products; (4) supervising
other stevedores; and (5) performing other related work. 6

On July 19, 1992, Virgilio Riño collapsed while working at the South Harbor, Manila. He was
rushed to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) because of "melena, fever, chills and abdominal
pains 8 days [prior to confinement] . . . ." He died three days later. According to the Medical
Certificate issued by Fe B. Bais, chief of the PGH Medical Records Division, the cause of death
was "uremia [secondary] to chronic renal failure. Chronic glomerulonephritis. . . ."
7

Petitioner Beberisa Riño, his spouse, filed a claim for death benefits before the Social Security
System (SSS). However, the SSS denied the claim in this wise: 8

Issue:

Whether . . . petitioner's claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended, shall prosper
under the increased risk theory.

Ruling:

Under the Labor Code, as amended,  the beneficiaries of an employee are entitled to death
16 

benefits if the cause of death is a sickness listed as occupational disease by the ECC; or any
other illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by the working conditions.  17

The primary and antecedent causes of Virgilio Riño's death are not listed as occupational
diseases. Hence, petitioner should have presented substantial evidence, or such relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, showing
that the nature of her husband's employment or working conditions increased the risk of uremia,
chronic renal failure or chronic glomerulonephritis.  This the petitioner failed to do.
18 

Petitioner did not adduce any proof of a reasonable connection between the work of the
deceased and the cause of his death. There was no showing that the progression of the disease
was brought about largely by the conditions in Virgilio's job. Indeed, petitioner presented no
medical history, records or physician's report in order to substantiate her claim that the working
conditions at the Port Area increased the risk of uremia, renal failure or
glomerulonephritis. 19

As we ruled in Sante v. Employees' Compensation Commission,  ". . . a claimant must submit

20 

such proof as would constitute a reasonable basis for concluding either that the conditions of
employment of the claimant caused the ailment or that such working conditions had aggravated
the risk of contracting that ailment. What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an
adequate basis for a reasonable man (not necessarily a medical scientist) to reach one or the
other conclusion, can obviously be determined only on a case-to-case basis. That evidence
must, however, be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-

22
causation or work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real . . . not merely apparent." At most,
petitioner merely claims that:

. . . The nature of his work required physical strength in handling cargoes and at
the same time giving full attention in supervising his men as the group's leadman
assigned at Del Pan Area. It is worth mentioning that in the place where the
deceased was assigned, there were no available comfort rooms to enable him to
answer the "call of nature". In effect, delayed urination was a reality, coupled with
the fact that being the leadman of his group, his continuing physical presence at
the work's premises was indispensable. . . .  21

Such bare allegation does not ipso facto make Virgilio's death compensable. Awards of
compensation cannot rest on speculations or presumptions.  The beneficiaries must present
22 

evidence to prove a positive proposition.  2

While this Court has ruled that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its
beneficiaries,  it is likewise important to note that such sympathy must be balanced by the
24 

equally vital interest of denying undeserving claims for compensation. "Compassion for the
victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the
trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families to look to for compensation
whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur."  In this case, this Court has no other
25 

course but to apply the clear provisions of the law.

23
Benito Lorenzo v GSIS & Dep Ed, G. R. 188385, October 2, 2013

Facts:

This case emanates from a simple claim for Employees’ Compensation death benefits filed by
the petitioner, surviving spouse of Rosario D. Lorenzo (Rosario), a Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) member with GSIS Policy No. CM-56244, who during her lifetime
served as Elementary Teacher I at the Department of Education (DepEd) for a period covering 2
October 1984 to 27 December 2001.

The records of the benefit claim which was docketed as ECC Case No. GM-18068-0307-08,
show that on 1 October 2001, Rosario was admitted at the Medical City Hospital due to
Hematoma on the Tongue, Left Inner Lip and Right Cheek with Associated Gingival Bleeding. 4

It appears that prior to her hospitalization, she was previously diagnosed by the same hospital for
Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia and was in fact confined therein on 31 July 2001 because of
Pneumonia which was a result of immuno-compromise secondary to leukemia. Rosario’s health
condition was confirmed by means of a bone marrow examination which showed "hypercellular
aspirate with marked myeloid hyperplasia."

There was no other document on record indicating any past medical, family and personal or
social history of Rosario. On 27 December 2001,Rosario died of Cardio-Respiratory Arrest due to
Terminal Leukemia.5

Petitioner, being the surviving spouse, claimed for Employees Compensation death benefits from
the GSIS. It was denied on the ground that the GSIS Medical Evaluation and Underwriting
Department (MEUD) found Rosario’s ailments and cause of death, Cardio-respiratory Arrest
Secondary to Terminal Leukemia, a non-occupational diseases contemplated under P.D. No.
626, as amended.

Unconvinced, petitioner elevated his Employee’s Compensation claim to the ECC for review and
reconsideration under the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation provided in P.D. No.
626.

Issue:

We are called to decide whether or not the ailment of the late Rosario Lorenzo is compensable
under the present law on employees’ compensation.

Ruling:

We find the Petition unmeritorious.

Sickness, as defined under Article 167 9 (1) Chapter I, Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code of the
Philippines refers to "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the
Employees’ Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by employment, subject to proof
that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.

24
In cases of death, such as in this case, Section 1(b), Rule III of the Rules Implementing P.D. No.
626, as amended, requires that for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the claimant must show: (1) that it is the result of an occupational disease listed
under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation with the conditions set
therein satisfied; or (2) that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions.

Section 2(a), Rule III of the said Implementing Rules, on the other hand, defines occupational
diseases as those listed in Annex "A" when the nature of employment is as described therein.
The listed diseases are therefore qualified by the conditions as set forth in the said Annex "A,"
hereto quoted:

OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES

For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the
following conditions must be satisfied:

(1) The employee’s work must involve the risks described herein;

(2) The disease was contracted as a result of the employee’s exposure to the described risks;

(3) The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors
necessary to contract it;

(4) There was no notorious negligence on the part of the employee.

xxxx

Occupational Disease Nature of Employment

xxx

15. Leukemia and Lymphoma Among operating room

personnel due to

anesthetics

Gauging from the above, the ECC was correct in stating that, contrary to the earlier finding of the
MEUD of the GSIS, Rosario’s disease is occupational, which fact, however, does not thereby
result in compensability in view of the fact that petitioner’s wife was not an operating room
personnel.

As correctly pointed out by the ECC, the coverage of leukemia as an occupational disease
relates to one’s employment as an operating room personnel ordinarily exposed to anesthetics.
In the case of petitioner’s wife, the nature of her occupation does not indicate exposure to
anesthetics nor does it increase the risk of developing Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia. There
was no showing that her work involved frequent and sufficient exposure to substances
established as occupational risk factors of the disease. 10 Thus, the need for the petitioner to
sufficiently establish that his wife’s job as a teacher exposed her to substances similar to
anesthetics in an environment similar to an "operating room." 11 This leans on the precept that the
awards for compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions. 12

Indeed, following the specific mandate of P.D. No. 626, as amended, and its Implementing
Rules, the petitioner must have at least provided sufficient basis, if not medical information which

25
could help determine the causal connection between Rosario’s ailment and her exposure to
muriatic acid, floor wax and paint as well as the rigors of her work. Instead, petitioner merely
insists on the supposition that the disease might have been brought about by the harmful
chemicals of floor wax and paint aggravated by the fact that the Manggahan Elementary School
is just along the highway which exposed Rosario to smoke belched by vehicles, all contributing to
her acquisition of the disease.

We find such factors insufficient to demonstrate the probability that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the working conditions of Rosario as a public school teacher; enough to
support the claim of petitioner that his wife is entitled to employees compensation. Petitioner
failed to show that the progression of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions in
Rosario’s work. Not even a medical history or records was presented to support petitioner’s
claim.

At most, petitioner solely relies on a possibility that the demands and rigors of Rosario’s job
coupled with exposure to chemicals in paint or floor wax could result or contribute to contracting
leukemia. This is but a bare allegation no different from a mere speculation. As we held in Raro
v. Employees Compensation Commission:14

The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing – the illness was caused
by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To
say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is
contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-
existent proof cannot be presumed.

It is well to stress that the principles of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" found
in the old Workmen’s Compensation Act is expressly discarded under the present compensation
scheme. As illustrated in the said Raro case, the new principle being applied is a system based
on social security principle; thus, the introduction of "proof of increased risk." As further declared
therein:

The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies – the Government Service
Insurance System and Social Security System – under the Employees Compensation
Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer’s obligation
to pay workmen’s compensation and the employee’s right to receive reparation for work-
connected death or disability.

All told, this is not to say, however, that this Court is unmindful of the claimant’s predicament.
While we sympathize with the petitioner, it is important to note that such sympathy must be
balanced by the equally vital interest of denying undeserving claims for compensation. 17

Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a
greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families look
to for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur. 18

In light of the foregoing, we are constrained to declare the non-compensability of petitioner’s

claim, applying the provisions of the law and jurisprudence on the purpose of the law.

26
Julieta Versonilla v ECC, G.R. No. 232888, August 14, 2019

Facts:

Reynaldo I. Verzonilla (Reynaldo) was employed as a Special Operations Officer

(SOO) III in the Quezon City Department of Public Order and Safety since June 1,
1999 until his death on July 5, 2012: As such, he performed the following functions:

1. Assist the Special Operations Officer V in conducting seminars, training and [dry
runs] on disaster preparedness and first aid techniques relative to rescue and relief
operations.

2. Assist the immediate supervisor in enhancing public awareness on disaster

preparedness through tri-media information campaign.

3. Conduct hazard, vulnerability, and risk assessment within the city.

4. Attend meetings, seminars, and trainings on disaster prevention and

preparedness.

5. Render fieldwork in times of urgent need and coordinate with other government
agencies/offices.4

Pursuant to a Memorandum dated June 29, 2012, Reynaldo attended the training
"on the use of the Rapid Earthquake Damage Assessment System (REDAS)
software" on July 1-6, 2012 in Tagaytay City. Prior to this, he attended several other
seminars.5

On July 5, 2012, Reynaldo died due to "cardio pulmonary arrest, etiology

undetermined" at UniHealth-Tagaytay Hospital and Medical Center, Inc. (UTHMCI).
His Discharge Summary/Clinical Abstract6 shows that he complained of abdominal
pain and chest pain. Records show that Reynaldo was previously diagnosed with
hypertension in 2002.7

Thereafter, petitioner Julieta Verzonilla (Julieta), the surviving spouse of Reynaldo,

filed a claim for compensation benefits before the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) under Presidential Decree (PD) 626. 8 In a letter dated April 26,
2013,9 the GSIS denied the claim of Julieta, stating that based on the documents
submitted, the ailment of Reynaldo was not connected to his work and that no
evidence was found that his duties as SOO III increased the risk of contracting said
ailment.10 Julieta moved for a reconsideration of the denial but the same was denied
in the GSIS decision dated May 24, 2013.

Issue:

Issue

27
Whether the CA erred in affirming the ECC's denial of Julieta's claim for EC benefits
in connection with the death of her late husband Reynaldo.

Ruling:

There is merit in the petition.

Article 165 (1) of Title II, Book IV on Employees' Compensation and State Insurance
Fund of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 1, PD 626, as amended, defines
"sickness" as "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease
listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment, subject to
proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions."

This is reiterated in the Amended Rules on EC, which implements PD 626 and which
requires that, "for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under
Annex "A" of [the] Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof
must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions."23

In plainer terms, to be entitled to compensation, a claimant must show that the

sickness is either: (1) a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of
the Amended Rules on EC under the conditions Annex A sets forth; or (2) if not so
listed, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions.24

Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on EC lists cardiovascular disease as an

"Occupational and Work-Related Disease" subject to certain conditions, thus:

It is well to recall that the first law on workmen's compensation, Act No. 3428,
worked upon the presumption of compensability which means that if the injury or
disease arose out of and in the course of employment, it was presumed that the
claim for compensation fell within the provisions of the law. PD 626 abandoned this
presumption.25 Hence, for the sickness and resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the claimant has the burden of proof to show, by substantial evidence,
that the conditions for compensability is met. 26

Hence, in the present case, the fact that cardiovascular disease is listed as an
occupational disease does not mean automatic compensability. Julieta must show,
by substantial evidence, that any of the conditions in item number 18 of the
Amended Rules on EC was satisfied or that the risk of Reynaldo in contracting his
disease was increased by his working conditions.

Julieta hinges her claim on paragraphs (a) and (b) of item number 18 of the ECC
Board Resolution. She does not dispute that Reynaldo had a pre-existing
hypertension, having been diagnosed with such in 2002. However, she claims that
this illness, as well as the abdominal pain that Reynaldo suffered, was aggravated by
the strenuous conditions of his work as SOO III, which ultimately led to his death. 27

To support her claim, Julieta lays down the series of alleged strenuous work
Reynaldo was subjected to, quoting thus:

28
Indeed, it appears that the CA failed to appreciate whether Reynaldo's case falls
under the paragraphs of Item 18 other than paragraph (c) thereof. Of particular
importance is paragraph (b) which speaks of a situation wherein the strain of work
of the employee which caused an attack was severe and was followed within 24
hours by signs of a cardiac insult. To the Court's mind, if the CA considered the
foregoing, it would have not been so precipitate in dismissing Julieta's claim.

Julieta makes a valid point that from the evidence presented, substantial proof was
shown that Reynaldo's cardiac arrest falls under, at least, paragraph (b) of item 18.
This merely requires that: 1) the strain of work that brings about an acute attack
must be of sufficient severity and 2) it must be followed within 24 hours by the
clinical signs of a cardiac insult. The series of strenuous activities Reynaldo
underwent prior to his heart attack is undisputed. Likewise, that the cardiac arrest
and the resulting death happened within 24 hours from such strain of work is clearly
shown.

There is likewise substantial proof to support that Reynaldo's pre-existing heart

disease was exacerbated by the stresses of his work. Part of Reynaldo's job was to
conduct and attend trainings and seminars and conduct hazard, vulnerability and
risk assessments.31 His job required him to render several hours of field work and,
hence, spend stressful and long hours travelling. Barely two weeks prior to his
death, he attended a two-day out-of-town seminar. He, in fact, died while in
Tagaytay City, on the last day of a five-day seminar. He spent his last living hours
going to five different places and enduring hours of travel time. Upon his return to
the hotel, he had to conduct another lecture and attend a program which ended at
about 10:00 p.m. About three hours thereafter, he suffered the cardiac arrest which
took his life.32 Hence, up to his death, Reynaldo was continuously exposed to
stresses of his work which, at least, contributed to his death.

In arriving at this conclusion, the Court stresses that in determining the

compensability of an illness, it is not necessary that the employment be the sole
factor in the growth, development, or acceleration of a claimant's illness to entitle
him to compensation benefits.33It is enough that his employment contributed,
even in a small degree, to the development of the disease. 34 Moreover, the
degree of proof in establishing at least a small work-connection is merely substantial
evidence. The Court has pronounced in GSIS v. Capacite:

In sum, the Court is convinced that Julieta was able to adduce substantial evidence
to support her claims for compensation benefits in relation to her late husband's
death.

On a final note, it is well to recall that the constitutional guarantee of social justice
towards labor demands a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims
for compensability.37 This holds true despite PD 626's abandonment of the
presumption of compensability under the previous Workmen's Compensation Act.
The Court has ruled, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Assailed

Decision dated October 28, 2016 and Resolution dated July 6, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 134846 are REVERSED. The respondent Employees'

29
Compensation Commission is hereby ordered to award death benefits due petitioner
in relation to the death of Reynaldo I. Verzonilla. The award of death benefits shall
earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of extrajudicial demand

30