DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN v. SECRETARY OF LABOR, G.R. No.

91915,
September 11, 1992

Facts:
• On September 6, 1984, Med-Arbiter Bienvenido C. Elorcha certified the Divine
Word University Employees Union (DWUEU) as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the Divine Word University. On March 7, 1985, DWUEU submitted its
collective bargaining proposals. Two days before the scheduled conference or on
May 26, 1985, DWUEU’s resigned vice-president Mr. Brigido Urminita (or
Urmeneta) wrote a letter addressed to the University unilaterally withdrawing the
CBA proposals.
• On March 11, 1988, DWUEU, which had by then affiliated with the Associated
Labor Union, requested a conference with the University for the purpose of
continuing the collective bargaining negotiations. Not having heard from the
University, DWUEU-ALU sent a follow-up letter on March 23, 1988 reiterating its
request for a conference and warning the University against committing acts of
interference through its various meetings with both the academic and non-
academic employees regarding their union affiliation and activities. Despite the
letter, the University persisted in maintaining silence.
• On April 25, 1988, DWUEU-ALU filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board of the Department of Labor and Employment a notice of strike on the
grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice acts, specifically, refusal
to bargain, discrimination and coercion on (sic) employees.

Issue:
Whether in the absence of a certified CBA and there having been no certification
election held in petitioner unit for more than five (5) years, a certification election is
mandatory.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the union

Law:
Art. 250(a) of the Labor Code
Art 252 of the Labor Code
Opinion:
In this case, there was no "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining" specially on the
part of the University. Its indifferent attitude towards collective bargaining inevitably
resulted in the failure of the parties to arrive at an agreement. As it was evident that
unilateral moves were being undertaken only by the DWUEU-ALU, there was no
"counteraction" of forces or an impasse to speak of. While collective bargaining should
be initiated by the union, there is a corresponding responsibility on the part of the
employer to respond in some manner to such acts.
Considering the procedure outlined above, the Court cannot help but notice that the
DWUEU was not entirely blameless in the matter of the delay in the bargaining process.
While it is true that as early as March 7, 1985, said union had submitted its collective
bargaining proposals and that, its subsequent withdrawal by the DWUEU Vice-President
being unauthorized and therefore ineffective, the same proposals could be considered
as subsisting, the fact remains that said union remained passive for three years. The
records do not show that during this three-year period, it exerted any effort to pursue
collective bargaining as a means of attaining better terms of employment.
Obviously, the University tried to preempt the conference which would have legally
foreclosed its right to file the petition for certification election. In so doing, the
University failed to act in accordance with Art. 252 of the Labor Code which defines the
meaning of the duty to bargain collectively as "the performance of a mutual obligation
to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith."

Case History:
• Citing the Bulletin Today cases, the said Order pronounced as untenable the
University s claim that the assumption Order earlier issued by the Office of the
Secretary of Labor merely held in abeyance the holding of a certification election
and that the representation issue was not deemed consolidated by virtue of the
said assumption Order.
• The Acting Secretary then concluded that for reneging on the agreement of May
10, 1988 and for its "reluctance and subscription to legal delay," the University
should be "declared in default." He also maintained that since under the
circumstances the University cannot claim deprivation of due process, the Office
of the Secretary of Labor may rightfully impose the Union’s May 19, 1988
collective bargaining agreement proposals motu proprio. On the University’s
contention that the motion for intervention of the DWU-IFEU was not resolved,
the Acting Secretary ruled that said motion was in effect denied when the
petition for certification election filed by the University was dismissed in the
Order of May 23, 1989.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Hence, the University had recourse to instant petition.

INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL v. WATERFRONT INSULAR HOTEL DAVAO,
G.R. Nos. 174040-41
September 22, 2010

Facts:
• On November 6, 2000, respondent sent the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), a Notice of Suspension of Operations notifying the same
that it will suspend its operations for a period of six months due to severe and
serious business losses.
• During the period of the suspension, Domy R. Rojas (Rojas), the President of
Davao Insular Hotel Free Employees Union (DIHFEU-NFL), the recognized labor
organization in Waterfront Davao, sent respondent a number of letters asking
management to reconsider its decision.
• It is understood that with the suspension of the CBA renegotiations, the same
existing CBA shall be adopted and that all provisions therein shall remain
enforced except for those mentioned in this proposal. These proposals shall
automatically supersede the affected provisions of the CBA.
• Accordingly, respondent downsized its manpower structure to 100 rank-and-file
employees as set forth in the terms of the MOA. Moreover, as agreed upon in the
MOA, a new pay scale was also prepared by respondent. The retained employees
individually signed a "Reconfirmation of Employment which embodied the new
terms and conditions of their continued employment. On June 15, 2001,
respondent resumed its business operations.

Issue:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MUST HAVE SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT ARTICLE 100 OF THE LABOR CODE APPLIES ONLY TO BENEFITS
ENJOYED PRIOR TO THE ADOPTION OF THE LABOR CODE WHICH, IN EFFECT,
ALLOWS THE DIMINUTION OF THE BENEFITS ENJOYED BY EMPLOYEES FROM ITS
ADOPTION HENCEFORTH.

Ruling:
The Court ruled in favor of respondent.

Law:
Article 100 of the Labor Code
Article 231 of the Labor Code
Opinion:
Even assuming arguendo that Article 100 applies to the case at bar, this Court agrees
with respondent that the same does not prohibit a union from offering and agreeing to
reduce wages and benefits of the employees. The right to free collective bargaining,
after all, includes the right to suspend it.
The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary collective bargaining
negotiations undertaken in the light of the severe financial situation faced by the
employer, with the peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting industrial
peace at Davao Insular Hotel, but preventing the latter’s closure. We find no conflict
between said agreement and Article 253-A of the Labor Code. Article 253-A has a two-
fold purpose. One is to promote industrial stability and predictability. Inasmuch as the
agreement sought to promote industrial peace at PAL during its rehabilitation, said
agreement satisfies the first purpose of Article 253-A.1awphi1 The other is to assign
specific timetables wherein negotiations become a matter of right and requirement.
Nothing in Article 253-A, prohibits the parties from waiving or suspending the
mandatory timetables and agreeing on the remedies to enforce the same.
Stipulated in each Reconfirmation of Employment were the new salary and benefits
scheme. In addition, it bears to stress that specific provisions of the new contract also
made reference to the MOA. Thus, the individual members of the union cannot feign
knowledge of the execution of the MOA. Each contract was freely entered into and
there is no indication that the same was attended by fraud, misrepresentation or
duress. To this Court's mind, the signing of the individual "Reconfirmation of
Employment" should, therefore, be deemed an implied ratification by the Union
members of the MOA.

Case History:
• On April 5, 2004, AVA Montejo rendered a Decision ruling in favor of Cullo.
• On October 11, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision ruling in favor of respondent.
Rivera v. Espiritu, G.R. No. 135547, January 23, 2002
Facts:
• On June 5, 1998, PAL pilots affiliated with the Airline Pilots Association of the
Philippines (ALPAP) went on a three-week strike, causing serious losses to the
financially beleaguered flag carrier. As a result, PAL’s financial situation went
from bad to worse. Faced with bankruptcy, PAL adopted a rehabilitation plan and
downsized its labor force by more than one-third.
• On September 4, 1998, PAL management submitted to the Task Force an offer
by private respondent Lucio Tan, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of PAL, of
a plan to transfer shares of stock to its employees.
• On September 10, 1998, the Board of Directors of PALEA voted to accept Tan’s
offer and requested the Task Force’s assistance in implementing the same. Union
members, however, rejected Tan’s offer. Under intense pressure from PALEA
members, the union’s directors subsequently resolved to reject Tan’s offer.
• On October 2, 1998, 5,324 PALEA members cast their votes in a DOLE-
supervised referendum. Of the votes cast, 61% were in favor of accepting the
PAL-PALEA agreement, while 34% rejected it.

Issue:
(2) Is the PAL-PALEA agreement of September 27, 1998, stipulating the suspension of
the PAL-PALEA CBA unconstitutional and contrary to public policy?

Law:
Article 253-A of the Labor Code

Ruling:
The Court ruled in favor of the employer

Opinion:
The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary collective bargaining
negotiations undertaken in the light of the severe financial situation faced by the
employer, with the peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting industrial
peace at PAL, but preventing the latter’s closure. We find no conflict between said
agreement and Article 253-A of the Labor Code. Article 253-A has a two-fold purpose.
One is to promote industrial stability and predictability. Inasmuch as the agreement
sought to promote industrial peace at PAL during its rehabilitation, said agreement
satisfies the first purpose of Article 253-A. The other is to assign specific timetables
wherein negotiations become a matter of right and requirement. Nothing in Article 253-
A, prohibits the parties from waiving or suspending the mandatory timetables and
agreeing on the remedies to enforce the same.
In the instant case, it was PALEA, as the exclusive bargaining agent of PAL’s ground
employees, that voluntarily entered into the CBA with PAL. It was also PALEA that
voluntarily opted for the 10-year suspension of the CBA. Either case was the union’s
exercise of its right to collective bargaining. The right to free collective bargaining, after
all, includes the right to suspend it.
The acts of public respondents in sanctioning the 10-year suspension of the PAL-PALEA
CBA did not contravene the "protection to labor" policy of the Constitution. The
agreement afforded full protection to labor; promoted the shared responsibility between
workers and employers; and the exercised voluntary modes in settling disputes,
including conciliation to foster industrial peace."

Case History:
• On September 19, 1998, PALEA informed the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) that it had no objection to a referendum on the Tan’s offer.
2,799 out of 6,738 PALEA members cast their votes in the referendum under
DOLE supervision held on September 21-22, 1998. Of the votes cast, 1,055
voted in favor of Tan’s offer while 1,371 rejected it.
• On October 2, 1998, 5,324 PALEA members cast their votes in a DOLE-
supervised referendum. Of the votes cast, 61% were in favor of accepting the
PAL-PALEA agreement, while 34% rejected it.
• On October 7, 1998, PAL resumed domestic operations. On the same date, seven
officers and members of PALEA filed this instant petition to annul the September
27, 1998 agreement entered into between PAL and PALEA.