DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN vs SECRETARY OF LABOR AND

EMPLOYMENT and DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU

Topic: Deadlock Bar Rule

FACTS:

Divine Word University Employees Union (DWUEU) was certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the Divine Word University. Subsequently, the Divine Union submitted its
collective bargaining proposals March 7, 1985

The University replied and requested a preliminary conference. However, two days before the
scheduled conference the DWUEU’s resigned vice-president Mr. Brigido Urminita wrote a letter
addressed to the University unilaterally withdrawing the CBA proposals. Consequently, the
preliminary conference was cancelled.

After almost three years, or on March 11, 1988, the DWUEU, which had by then affiliated with
the Associated Labor Union (ALU), requested a conference with the University for the purpose
of continuing the collective bargaining negotiations. A follow-up letter was sent regarding their
request but to no avail.

DWUEU -ALU filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of
Labor and Employment a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor
practice acts, specifically, refusal to bargain, discrimination and coercion on employees.

After the filing of the notice of strike, a conference was held which led to the conclusion of an
agreement between the University and DWUEU-ALU on May 10, 1888

However, it turned out that an hour before the May 10, 1988 agreement was concluded, the
University had filed a petition for certification election

On the other hand, on May 19, 1988, DWUEU-ALU, consonant with the agreement, submitted
its collective bargaining proposals. These were ignored by the University.

Med-Arbiter Milado, acting on the University’s petition for certification election, issued an Order
directing the conduct of a certification election to be participated in by DWUEU-ALU and “no
union,” after he found the petition to be “well-supported in fact and in law.

Said Order prompted the DWUEU-ALU to file with the Secretary of Labor an urgent motion
seeking to enjoin Milado from further acting on the matter of the certification election.

The Divine Word University Independent Faculty and Employees Union (DWUIFEU), which was
registered earlier that day, filed a motion for intervention alleging that it had “at least 20% of the
rank and file employees” of the University.
The Secretary of Labor dismissed not only the case filed by DWUEU-ALU for unfair labor
practice on the ground of the union’s failure to prove the commission of the unfair labor
practice acts specifically complained of but also the complaint filed by the University for unfair
labor practices and illegal strike for “obvious lack of merit brought about by its utter failure to
submit evidence”

The DWUEU-ALU had filed a second notice of strike charging the University with violation of the
return-to-work order which was previously ordered by the Secretary of Labor and unfair labor
practices such as dismissal of union officers, coercion of employees and illegal suspension

Acting Secretary then concluded that for reneging on the agreement of May 10, 1988 and for its
“reluctance and subscription to legal delay,” the University should be “declared in default.” He
also maintained that since under the circumstances the University cannot claim deprivation of
due process, the Office of the Secretary of Labor may rightfully impose the Union’s May 19,
1988 collective bargaining agreement proposals motu proprio.

ISSUE​: Whether or not there was a deadlock or an impasse in the collective bargaining process

RULING​: YES. A thorough study of the records reveals that there was no “reasonable effort at
good faith bargaining” especially on the part of the University. Its indifferent attitude towards
collective bargaining inevitably resulted in the failure of the parties to arrive at an agreement. As
it was evident that unilateral moves were being undertaken only by the DWUEU-ALU, there was
no “counteraction” of forces or an impasse to speak of. While collective bargaining should be
initiated by the union, there is a corresponding responsibility on the part of the employer to
respond in some manner to such acts.

However, the Court cannot help but notice that the DWUEU was not entirely blameless in the
matter of the delay in the bargaining process. While it is true that as early as March 7, 1985,
said union had submitted its collective bargaining proposals and that, its subsequent withdrawal
by the DWUEU Vice President being unauthorized and therefore ineffective, the same
proposals could be considered as subsisting, the fact remains that said union remained passive
for three years. The records do not show that during this three-year period, it exerted any effort
to pursue collective bargaining as a means of attaining better terms of employment.

It was only after its affiliation with the ALU that the same union, through the ALU Director for
Operations, requested an “initial conference” for the purpose of collective bargaining. That the
DWUEU abandoned its collective bargaining proposals prior to its affiliation with ALU is further
confirmed by the fact that in the aforequoted May 10, 1988 agreement with the University, said
Union bound itself to submit a new set of proposals on May 13, 1988. Under the circumstances,
the agreement of May 10, 1988 may as well be considered the written notice to bargain referred
to in the aforequoted Art. 250(a) of the Labor Code, which thereby set into motion the machinery
for collective bargaining, as in fact, on May 19, 1988, DWUEU-ALU submitted its collective
bargaining proposals.
Be that as it may, the Court is not inclined to rule that there has been a deadlock or an impasse
in the collective bargaining process. As the Court earlier observed, there has not been a
“reasonable effort at good faith bargaining” on the part of the University. While DWUEU-ALU
was opening all possible avenues for the conclusion of an agreement, the record is replete with
evidence on the University’s reluctance and thinly disguised refusal to bargain with the duly
certified bargaining agent, such that the inescapable conclusion is that the University evidently
had no intention of bargaining with it. Thus, while the Court recognizes that technically, the
University has the right to file the petition for certification election as there was no bargaining
deadlock to speak of, to grant its prayer that the herein assailed Orders be annulled would put
an unjustified premium on bad faith bargaining. Bad faith on the part of the University is further
exemplified by the fact that an hour before the start of the May 10, 1988 conference, it
surreptitiously filed the petition for certification election. And yet during said conference, it
committed itself to “sit down” with the Union. Obviously, the University tried to preempt the
conference which would have legally foreclosed its right to file the petition for certification
election. In so doing, the University failed to act in accordance with Art. 252 of the Labor Code
which defines the meaning of the duty to bargain collectively as “the performance of a mutual
obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith.” Moreover, by filing the
petition for certification election while agreeing to confer with the DWUEU-ALU, the University
violated the mandate of Art. 19 of the Civil Code that “(e)very person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.”

Kiok Loy vs. NLRC is applicable in the instant case considering that the facts therein have also
been indubitably established in this case. These factors are: (a) the union is the duly certified
bargaining agent; (b) it made a definite request to bargain and submitted its collective
bargaining proposals, and (c) the University made no counter proposal whatsoever. As we said
in Kiok Loy, “[a] company’s refusal to make counter proposal if considered in relation to the
entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith and this is especially true where the Union’s
request for a counter proposal is left unanswered.”
G.R. No. 181806 : March 12, 2014

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. WESLEYAN

UNIVERSITY-PHILIPPINES FACULTY and STAFF ASSOCIATION, Respondent.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS​:
Wesleyan University-Philippines (Petitioner), a non-stock, non-profit educational institution duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines and Wesleyan University-Philippines
Faculty and Staff Association (Respondent), a duly registered labor organization acting as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file faculty and staff employees of petitioner
signed a 5-year CBA9 effective June 1, 2003 until May 31, 2008.

A Memorandum providing guidelines on the implementation of vacation and sick leave credits
as well as vacation leave commutation was issued by petitioner, through its President, Atty.
Guillermo T. Maglaya (Atty. Maglaya). Respondent President, Cynthia L. De Lara (De Lara)
wrote a letter to Atty. Maglaya informing him that respondent is not amenable to the unilateral
changes made by petitioner and questioning the guidelines for being contrary to the existing
practices and the CBA.

Petitioner advised respondent to file a grievance complaint on the implementation of the

vacation and sick leave policy during their Labor Management Committee (LMC) Meeting.
Petitioner announced therein its plan of implementing a one-retirement policy whichwas
unacceptable to respondent.

Unable to settle their differences at the grievance level, the parties referred the matter to a
Voluntary Arbitrator. Respondent submitted affidavits showing that there is an established
practice of giving two retirement benefits: one from the Private Education Retirement Annuity
Association (PERAA) Plan and another from the CBA Retirement Plan.

The Voluntary Arbitrator declared that the one-retirement policy and the Memorandum dated
August 16, 2005 is contrary to law.

Petitioner appealed the case to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. The CA affirmed the nullification of the one-retirement policy and the Memorandum dated
August 16, 2005 on the ground that these unilaterally amended the CBA without the consent of
respondent. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CA denied the same.
ISSUES:​ Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave and palpable error in ruling that
a university practice of granting its employees two (2) sets of Retirement Benefits had already
been established? Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave and palpable error in
revoking petitioner Memorandum dated 16 August 2005 for being contrary to extant policy?

HELD​: Decision of the Court of Appeals is sustained.

LABOR LAW: non-diminution rule

Article 100 of the Labor Code provides for the Non-Diminution Rule. This rule prohibits the
employers from eliminating or reducing the benefits received by their employees. It applies only
if the benefit is based on an express policy, a written contract, or has ripened into a practice. To
be considered a practice, it must be consistently and deliberately made by the employer over a
long period of time. However, this rule admits of an exception and that is when the practice is
due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law. The error,
however, must be corrected immediately after its discovery; otherwise, the rule on
Non-Diminution of Benefits would still apply.

In the case at bar, respondent presented substantial evidence in the form of affidavits
supporting its claim that there are two retirement plans. As gleaned from the affidavits, petitioner
has been giving two retirement benefits as early as 1997. Petitioner failed to present any
evidence to refute the veracity of said affidavits. Moreover, no evidence was shown to prove
petitioner contention that there is only one retirement plan as the CBA Retirement Plan and the
PERAA Plan are one and the same.

LABOR LAW: collective bargaining agreement cannot be unilaterally changed

The Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 imposes a limitation not agreed upon by the parties
nor stated in the CBA. Hence, it must be struck down.

It is provided in Sections 1 and 2 of Article XII of the CBA that all covered employees are
entitled to 15 days sick leave and 15 days vacation leave with pay every year and that after the
second year of service, all unused vacation leave shall be converted to cash and paid to the
employee at the end of each school year, not later than August 30 of each year. Whereas, it is
provided in the Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 that vacation and sick leave credits are not
automatic as leave credits would be earned on a month-to-month basis. The said Memorandum,
therefore, limits the available leave credits of an employee at the start of the school year.

Basic is the rule that when the provisions of the CBA is clear, the literal meaning of the
stipulation shall govern. Any doubt in its interpretation must be resolved in favor of labor.

The present petition for review is DENIED.

FVC Labor Union-PTGWO v. Sama-samang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC-SIGLO
GR No. 176249
Labor Relations: Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)

Facts:
Petitioner FVCLU-PTGWO signed a five-year collective bargaining agreement with the
company, which should originally run from February 1, 1998 to January 30, 2003. At the end of
the 3rd year of the CBA, FVCLU-PTGWO and the company entered into the renegotiation of the
CBA and modified, among other provisions, the CBA’s duration. The renegotiated CBA
extended the original five-year period of the CBA by four months.On January 21, 2003, nine
days before the expiration of the originally-agreed five-year CBA term, the respondent
SANAMA-SIGLO filed before the DOLE a petition for certification election for the same
rank-and-file unit covered by the FVCLU-PTGWO CBA.

FVCLU-PTGWO moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the certification election
petition was filed outside the freedom period or outside of the 60 days before the expiration of
the CBA on May 31, 2003.

Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed outside the 60-day period
counted from the May 31, 2003 expiry date of the amended CBA. DOLE set aside the
Med-Arbiter’s decision. She ordered the conduct of a certification election in the company.

FVCLU-PTGWO moved for the reconsideration of the Secretary’s decision. The Acting
Secretary set aside the previous decision of the DOLE. The Acting Secretary held that the
amended CBA had been ratified by members of the bargaining unit some of whom later
organized themselves as SANAMA-SIGLO, the certification election applicant.

The CA found SANAMA-SIGLO’s petition meritorious on the basis of the applicable law and the
rules, as interpreted in the congressional debates. It set aside the challenged DOLE Secretary
decisions and reinstated her earlier ruling calling for a certification election.

Issue:
Whether the negotiated extension of the CBA term has legal effect on the FVCLU-PTGWO’s
exclusive bargaining representation status which remained effective only for five years ending
on the original expiry date of January 30, 2003

Held:
No. The negotiated extension of the CBA term has no legal effect on the FVCLU-PTGWO’s
exclusive bargaining representation status which remained effective only for five years ending
on the original expiry date of January 30, 2003.

While the parties may agree to extend the CBA’s original five-year term together with all other
CBA provisions, any such amendment or term in excess of five years will not carry with it a
change in the union’s exclusive collective bargaining status. By express provision of Article
253-A of the Labor Code, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and the
representation status is a legal matter not for the workplace parties to agree upon. In other
words, despite an agreement for a CBA with a life of more than five years, either as an original
provision or by amendment, the bargaining union’s exclusive bargaining status is effective only
for five years and can be challenged within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the CBA’s
first five years.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. SECRETARY OF LABOR LEONARDO QUISUMBING, GR
No. 127598, 2000-02-22

Facts:

In the Decision promulgated on January 27, 1999, the Court disposed of the case as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders of public respondent Secretary of Labor
dated August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996 are set aside to the extent set forth above. The
parties are directed to execute a Collective Bargaining Agreement incorporating the... terms and
conditions contained in the unaffected portions of the Secretary of Labor's orders of August 19,
1996 and December 28, 1996, and the modifications set forth above. The retirement fund issue
is remanded to the Secretary of Labor for reception of evidence and... determination of the legal
personality of the Meralco retirement fund."

Dissatisfied with the Decision, some alleged members of private respondent union (Union for
brevity) filed a motion for intervention and a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision. A
separate intervention was likewise made by the supervisor's union (FLAMES[2]) of petitioner
corporation alleging that it has bona fide legal interest in the outcome of the case.[3] The Court
required the "proper parties" to file a comment to the three motions for reconsideration but the
Solicitor-General asked... that he be excused from filing the comment because the "petition filed
in the instant case was granted" by the Court.[4] Consequently, petitioner filed its own
consolidated comment. An "Appeal Seeking Immediate Reconsideration" was also filed by the
alleged... newly elected president of the Union.[5] Other subsequent pleadings were filed by the
parties and intervenors.

The issues raised in the motions for reconsideration had already been passed upon by the
Court in the January 27, 1999 decision. No new arguments were presented for consideration of
the Court. Nonetheless, certain matters will be considered herein, particularly those involving...
the amount of wages and the retroactivity of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) arbitral
awards.

Issues:

Petitioner warns that if the wage increase of P2,200.00 per month as ordered by the Secretary
is allowed, it would simply pass the cost covering such increase to the consumers through an
increase in the rate of electricity.

Ruling:

This is a non sequitur. The Court cannot be... threatened with such a misleading argument. An
increase in the prices of electric current needs the approval of the appropriate regulatory
government agency and does not automatically result from a mere increase in the wages of
petitioner's employees. Besides, this argument... presupposes that petitioner is capable of
meeting a wage increase. The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support its
position regarding the wage issue can not be an accurate basis and conclusive determinant of
the rate of wage increase. Section 45 of Rule

130 Rules of Evidence provides:

"Commercial lists and the like. - Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation
is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so... stated if that compilation
is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied
upon by them therein."

Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical may be admitted
only "if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is
generally used and relied upon by them therein." As correctly held in our Decision dated

January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere newspaper account and not even a commercial list.
At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive weight for purposes of this
case as no sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither did anybody... testify to its
accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in their
occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that the publication was regularly prepared by
a person in touch with the market and that it is generally regarded as... trustworthy and reliable.
Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not admissible.[6] In the same
manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence when the
source of the reports is available.[7] With more reason, mere analyses or projections of such
reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of the report in this case can be easily
made available considering that the same is necessary for compliance with certain
governmental requirements
Arellano University Employees and Workers Union vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 139940,
September 19, 2006

Facts:
The Arellano University Employees and Workers Union (the Union), the exclusive bargaining
representative of about 380 rank-and-file employees of Arellano University, Inc. (the University),
filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike charging the
University with Unfair Labor Practice (ULP). After several controversies and petitions, a strike
was staged. In the Order of August 5, 1998, the DOLE Secretary directed the strikers to return
to work within twenty-four (24) hours. The order was served upon the Union on August 6, 1998,
and the following day, August 7, 1998, at about 3:00 p.m., the Union lifted its strike.
The University filed a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). The NLRC granted the petition and declared the loss of employment
status of all the strikers for knowingly defying the Return-to-Work Order of the DOLE Secretary.

Issue:
Whether or not an employee is deemed to have lost his employment by mere participation in an
illegal strike

Held:
Article 264 of the Labor Code provides:
Article 264. x x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker
or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may
be declared to have lost his employment status
Under the immediately quoted provision, an ordinary striking worker may not be declared to
have lost his employment status by mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof
that he knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike. While the
University adduced photographs showing strikers picketing outside the university premises, it
failed to identify who they were. It thus failed to meet the substantiality of evidence test
applicable in dismissal cases.
With respect to the union officers, their mere participation in the illegal strike warrants their
dismissal.
REN TRANSPORT CORP. V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. NOS.
188020 & 188252, [JUNE 27, 2016]

FACTS​: Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Ren Transport (SMART) is a registered union, which

had a five-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Ren Transport Corp. (Ren
Transport) set to expire on 31 December 2004. The 60-day freedom period of the CBA passed
without a challenge to SMART’s majority status as bargaining agent. SMART thereafter
conveyed its willingness to bargain with Ren Transport, to which it sent bargaining proposals.
Ren Transport, however, failed to reply to the demand.

Subsequently, two members of SMART wrote to the Department of Labor and Employment —
National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR). The office was informed that a majority of the members
of SMART had decided to disaffiliate from their mother federation to form another union, Ren
Transport Employees Association (RTEA). SMART contested the alleged disaffiliation through a
letter dated 4 April 2005.

During the pendency of the disaffiliation dispute at the DOLE-NCR, Ren Transport stopped the
remittance to SMART of the union dues that had been checked off from the salaries of union
workers as provided under the CBA. Further, on 19 April 2005, Ren Transport voluntarily
recognized RTEA as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of
their company.

On 6 July 2005, SMART filed with the labor arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice against
Ren Transport.

HELD:

Ren Transport violated its duty to

bargain collectively with SMART.

Ren Transport concedes that it refused to bargain collectively with SMART. It claims, though,
that the latter ceased to be the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees
because of the disaffiliation of the majority obits members.

The argument deserves no consideration.

Violation of the duty to bargain collectively is an unfair labor practice under Article 258 (g) of the
Labor Code. An instance of this practice is the refusal to bargain collectively as held in General
Milling Corp. v. CA. In that case, the employer anchored its refusal to bargain with and
recognize the union on several letters received by the former regarding the withdrawal of the
workers’ membership from the union. We rejected the defense, saying that the employer had
devised a flimsy excuse by attacking the existence of the union and the status of the union’s
membership to prevent any negotiation. It bears stressing that Ren Transport had a duty to
bargain collectively with SMART. Under Article 263 in relation to Article 267 of the Labor Code,
it is during the freedom period — or the last 60 days before the expiration of the CBA — when
another union may challenge the majority status of the bargaining agent through the filing of a
petition for a certification election. If there is no such petition filed during the freedom period,
then the employer “shall continue to recognize the majority status of the incumbent bargaining
agent where no petition for certification election is filed.”

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In the present case, the facts are not up for debate. No petition for certification election
challenging the majority status of SMART was filed during the freedom period, which was from
November 1 to December 31, 2004 — the 60-day period prior to the expiration of the five-year
CBA. SMART therefore remained the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees.

Given that SMART continued to be the workers’ exclusive bargaining agent, Ren Transport had
the corresponding duty to bargain collectively with the former. Ren Transport’s refusal to do so
constitutes an unfair labor practice.

Consequently, Ren Transport cannot avail itself of the defense that SMART no longer
represents the majority of the workers. The fact that no petition for certification election was filed
within the freedom period prevented Ren Transport from challenging SMART’s existence and
membership.

Moreover, it must be stressed that, according to the labor arbiter, the purported disaffiliation
from SMART was nothing but a convenient, self-serving excuse. This factual finding, having
been affirmed by both the CA and the NLRC, is now conclusive upon the Court. We do not see
any patent error that would take the instant case out of the general rule.

Ren Transport interfered with the

exercise of the employees’ right to self-

organize.

Interference with the employees’ right to self-organization is considered an unfair labor practice
under Article 258 (a) of the Labor Code. In this case, the labor arbiter found that the failure to
remit the union dues to SMART and the voluntary recognition of RTEA were clear indications of
interference with the employees’ right to self-organization. It must be stressed that this finding
was affirmed by the NLRC and the CA; as such, it is binding on the Court, especially when we
consider that it is not tainted with any blatant error. As aptly pointed out by the labor arbiter,
these acts were ill-timed in view of the existence of a labor controversy over membership in the
union.
Ren Transport also uses the supposed disaffiliation from SMART to justify the failure to remit
union dues to the latter and the voluntary recognition of RTEA. However, for reasons already
discussed, this claim is considered a lame excuse that cannot validate those acts.

SMART is not entitled to an award of moral damages.

We hold that the CA correctly dropped the NLRC’s award of moral damages to SMART. Indeed,
a corporation is not, as a general rule, entitled to moral damages. Being a mere artificial being, it
is incapable of experiencing physical suffering or sentiments like wounded feelings, serious
anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock. Although this Court has allowed the grant of moral
damages to corporations in certain situations. it must be remembered that the grant is not
automatic. The claimant must still prove the factual basis of the damage and the causal relation
to the defendant’s acts. In this case, while there is a showing of bad faith on the part of the
employer in the commission of acts of unfair labor practice, there is no evidence establishing the
factual basis of the damage on the part of SMART.