Social Justice Society v. PDEA, G.R. No.

157870, 03 November 2008

Facts:

In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other
personalities, is put in issue.

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government
forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH
to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two
(2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of
drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following
shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

xxxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall,
pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with
notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and
private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as
contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with
administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of
Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

xxxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory
drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use
shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.

Issue:

(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and

(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal
protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?

1
Ruling:

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally
impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on
nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art.
VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency.
Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other
qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress
cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or
weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared
as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution,
that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must
conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. 8 In the discharge of their defined functions,
the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. 9

Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as
1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the
following wise:

Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the
boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as
governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are
limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can
only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the
shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over
which it cannot leap.10

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional
limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of
legislation.11 The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights 12 and other
provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for
senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for
senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to
meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a
citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of
requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. 13

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched,
said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously
as a pre - condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine
qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC resolution
completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties
of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g)
of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987
Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug - free bar set
up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting
elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non - compliance with the drug - testing
requirement.
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It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not
expressly state that non - compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to
nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is
optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception, made drug - testing on those covered
mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences
for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with candidates for public office, it
stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the
election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the
mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.

While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer
enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the
candidates running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate
to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance.

It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is
rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements
for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.

SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students
and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The
objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well being of [the] citizenry,
particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose, per the policy -
declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of "an intensive and unrelenting
campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated system of planning,
implementation and enforcement of anti - drug abuse policies, programs and projects." 14 The primary
legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this
random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability
should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. 

The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the
well - being of the people,21 particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims.
Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of
students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety
and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted
and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is as important
as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of drugs"; the necessity for
the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug - infested school are visited not just upon
the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty. 22 Needless to stress, the random testing scheme
provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual
students.

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed
by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly
for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that "subjecting
almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the
3
individual right to privacy,"23 has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or
unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which
the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In
this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the
employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office
is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if
any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in
fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law.
Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated
in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"? 32

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation
that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every
officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be
a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to
discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be
observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that
the employees concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as contained in the company's work rules
and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place."

For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as
possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the
procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to
ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in
the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access - controlled laboratories
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an
accurate chain of custody.33 In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results
shall be on the "need to know" basis;34 that the "drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential
subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results." 35 Notably, RA 9165
does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence
relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of
the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is
accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is
relatively minimal.

To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect
the well - being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The
law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a
national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test. 36 To the Court, the need for
drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual's privacy
interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender, age
group, and social - economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking
of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor's dream were it not for the illegal and immoral
components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law public
execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance with respect to
this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an
effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat of
4
detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a
reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set forth
in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged
drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers,
all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. 37 And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who,
by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with
utmost responsibility and efficiency.

Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],

[f], and [g] of RA 9165)

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of
the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by
the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting
their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the
constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the
reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office
with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts
in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a
crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The
ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal
complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of
committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves
to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test
as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case
would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

5
People v. Calates, G.R. No. 214759, 04 April 2018

Facts:

On April 24, 2003, the accused was charged in the RTC with violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165
under the following information docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-24786, to wit:

That on or about the 22nd of April, 2003, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, not being authorized by law to sell, trade, dispense,
deliver, give away to another; distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, give away to a police poseur-buyer in a buy-
bust operation, one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug weighing 0.03 gram, in exchange for a price of ₱100.00 in
marked money of ₱100.00 bill with Serial No. P915278, in violation of the aforementioned law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

The CA summarized the antecedent facts as follows:

The evidence for the prosecution is summarized as follows: In the morning of April 20, 2003 Insp.
Jonathan Lorilla received an information from a reliable informant that alias "Dangdang" Calates is
engaged in sale of illegal drug activities. Insp. Lorilla verified if the information is true through a police
asset. During the briefing, PO1 Sonido acted as the poseur-buyer with the asset, Insp. Lorilla as team
leader and with P02 Malate, PO2 Villeran, P02 Perez and PO2 Belandrez as back-up security. About
10:50 or 10:55 am of April 22, 2003, the group all in civilian clothes, proceeded to 27th Calamba
Street, Purok Sigay, Barangay 2. PO1 Sonido and the asset went ahead of the group. They entered
the place, a woman with "semi-calbo" and sporting blond hair, met the duo and asked if they would buy
shabu. PO1 Sonido and the asset, alias "Toto", wiped their nostrils with their right finger, meaning their
answer to the question is "yes". The accused extended her left hand to receive the marked money
which PO1 Sonido gave her (accused), while the latter took a small sachet of suspected shabu from
her right pocket and gave it to PO1 Sonido. Thereafter, PO1 Sonido immediately arrested the accused,
identified himself as police officer, PO1 Sonido informed her of the reason of her apprehension and her
rights to remain silent and counsel. When the other member of the team saw that the accused was
arrested, they rushed towards PO1 Soni do and rendered assistance by putting the accused to a
manacle.

The marked money was recovered and the sachet of shabu was marked "ASS" which stands for Alain
S. Sonido. Thereafter, the incident was recorded in the police blotter and the plastic sachet
of shabu was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory.

6
Issue:

In her appellant's brief, Dina argues that the Prosecution did not prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt; that the testimonies of the Prosecution's witnesses had doubtful credibility; that there had been
another drug operation at the same place, date and time that led to the arrest of one Cromwell Canlas;
that it was improbable for the police operatives to have conducted the operation against Canlas and to
still conduct another operation against her just five minutes later on; that the identity of the corpus
delicti had been compromised by the lack of the inventory and the non-taking of photographs in her
presence, and in the presence of any representative from the media and the "Department of Justice, as
required by Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165; that the Prosecution did not even bother explaining why the
procedures prescribed by the law had not been complied with; and that because of the irregularities,
substantial gaps attended the chain of custody of the seized drug and rendered the identity of the drug
highly suspicious.

Ruling:

The appeal is meritorious.

In prosecutions for violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the State bears the burden not only of
proving the elements of the offenses of sale of dangerous drug and of the offense of illegal possession
of dangerous drug, but also of proving the corpus delicti, the body of the crime. Corpus delicti has
been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a
crime was actually committed. As applied to a particular offense, it means the actual commission by
someone of the particular crime charged. The corpus delicti is a compound fact made up of two things,
namely: the existence of a certain act or result forming the basis of the criminal charge, and the
existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or result. The dangerous drug itself is the
very corpus delicti of the violation of the law prohibiting the illegal sale or possession of dangerous
drug. Consequently, the State does not comply with the indispensable requirement of proving
the corpus delicti when the drug is missing, or when substantial gaps occur in the chain of custody of
the seized drugs as to raise doubts about the authenticity of the evidence presented in court.   As
10

such, the duty to prove the corpus delicti of the illegal sale or possession of dangerous drug is as
important as proving the elements of the crime itself.

The arrest of Dina following the seizure of the illegal substance resulted from the buy-bust
operation.  Although buy-bust operations have become necessary in dealing with the drug menace, it
1âwphi1

has also been acknowledged that buy-bust operations were susceptible to abuse by turning them into
occasions for extortion.  Addressing the possibility of abuse, Congress prescribed procedural
11

safeguards to ensure that such abuse would be circumvented. The State and its agents are thereby
mandated to faithfully observe the safeguards in every drug-related operation and prosecution.  12

The procedural safeguards cover the seizure, custody and disposition of the confiscated drug. Section
21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, relevantly provides:

Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items
7
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected
public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures and custody over said items;

xxxx

The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Section 21 (a) of R.A. No. 9165 have reiterated the
statutory safeguards, thus:

xxxx

(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory

and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items; (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx

The proper handling of the confiscated drug is paramount in order to ensure the chain of custody, a
process essential to preserving the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti. In this
connection, chain of custody refers to the duly recorded authorized movement and custody of seized
drugs, controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment, from the
time of seizure or confiscation to the time of receipt in the forensic laboratory, to the safekeeping until
presentation in court as evidence and for the purpose of destruction. The documentation of the
movement and custody of the seized items should include the identity and signature of the person or
persons who held temporary custody thereof, the date and time when such transfer or custody was
made in the course of safekeeping until presented in court as evidence, and the eventual
disposition.   There is no denying that the safeguards of marking, inventory and picture-taking are all
13

vital to establish that the substance confiscated from the accused was the very same one delivered to
and presented as evidence in court.

A review of the records reveals that the non-compliance with the procedural safeguards prescribed by
law left serious gaps in the chain of custody of the confiscated dangerous drug.

To start with, PO1 Sonido, who testified having marked the confiscated drug at the place of arrest, did
not claim that he did the marking in the presence of Dina. The unilateral marking engendered doubt
about the integrity of the evidence presented during the trial, for determining if the drug he thereby
marked was the same drug confiscated from Dina became literally impossible. 14

8
Secondly, although P/Insp. Jonathan Lorilla attested on cross-examination that an inventory of the
confiscated drug had been conducted, his testimony had no corroboration in the records. That he was
also unsure if photographs of the confiscated drug had been taken in the presence of Dina accented
the non-observance of the safeguards. At the very least, his declared uncertainty reflected the
inexcusability of the oversight on the part of the apprehending lawmen regarding the safeguards
considering that the arrest of Dina had been effected during the pre-planned buy-bust
operation.   Worse, the lack of the inventory and his professed uncertainty about the taking of
15

photographs in the presence of Dina could only mean that no inventory and photograph had been
taken, in violation of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

The Court has consistently reminded about the necessity for the arresting lawmen to comply with the
safeguards prescribed by the law for the taking of the inventory and photographs. The safeguards,
albeit not absolutely indispensable, could be dispensed with only upon justifiable grounds. Indeed, as
pronounced in People v. Pagaduan,   and other rulings of the Court, the deviations from the standard
16

procedure dismally compromise the integrity of the evidence, and the only reason for the courts to
overlook the deviations is for the Prosecution to recognize the deviations and to explain them in terms
of their justifiable grounds, and to show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized
were nonetheless substantially preserved. Any shortcoming on the part of the Prosecution in this
regard is fatal to its cause despite the saving clause stated in Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165, supra, precisely because:

In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation to justify the failure of the
police to conduct the required physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs. The
apprehending team failed to show why an inventory and photograph of the seized evidence had not
been made either in the place of seizure and arrest or at the nearest police station (as required by the
Implementing Rules in case of warrantless arrests). We emphasize that for the saving clause to
apply, it is important that the prosecution explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses,
and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had been preserved. In other words, the
justifiable ground for noncompliance must be proven as a fact. The court cannot presume what
these grounds are or that they even exist.   [Bold emphasis supplied]
17

The records have been vainly searched for the credible justification for the entrapment team's non-
compliance with the safeguards set by law. The absence of the justification accented the gaps in the
chain of custody, and should result in the negation of the evidence of the corpus delicti right from the
outset. Clearly, the Prosecution did not discharge its burden to prove the guilt of Dina beyond
reasonable doubt.

9
People v. Crispo, G.R. No. 230065, 14 March 2018

Facts:

This case stemmed from two (2) Informations  filed before the RTC charging accused-appellants of the
5

crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, and Crispo of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs, the accusatory portions of which state:

The prosecution alleged that at around 1:30 in the afternoon of November 19, 2012,  a confidential
8

informant (CI) tipped the Manila Police District Station 4 (MPD) of the alleged illegal drug activities of a
certain alias "Gogo" (later identified as Crispo) at Ma. Cristina Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Thus, after
coordinating with the operatives of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, the MPD organized a
buy-bust operation at the said area, with Police Officer (PO) 2 Dennis Reyes (P02 Reyes) as the
poseur buyer. Upon arrival at the area at around 5:30 in the afternoon of even date, the CI and P02
Reyes saw Crispo talking to his runner, Herrera, and decided to approach them. As they went nearer,
Herrera approached the CI and P02 Reyes, while Crispo remained about five (5) to six (6) meters
away. P02 Reyes then signified his intention of buying shabu, prompting Herrera to get the marked
money from him, and thereafter, approach Crispo in order to remit the money and get a sachet
containing white crystalline substance from the latter. When Herrera handed over the sachet to P02
Reyes, the latter performed the pre-arranged signal, directly causing his backups to rush into the scene
and apprehend accused-appellants. Upon frisking accusedappellants, the arresting officers recovered
three (3) other plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from Crispo. The accused-
appellants and the seized items were then taken to the barangay office where the arresting
officers, inter alia, conducted the inventory and photography in the presence of two (2) barangay
kagawads, as indicated in the Receipt of Property/Evidence Seized.  After examination  at the Crime
9 10

Laboratory, it was confirmed that the sachets seized from accused-appellants contain
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.  11

Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged  and offered their version of the events.
12

According to Crispo, he was just on board a tricycle going to his niece's house when suddenly, a car
with five (5) policemen in civilian clothes blocked the tricycle's path. One of the policemen then poked a
gun at Crispo, and told him, "Mga pulis kami, sumama ka sa presinto." Fearful for his life, Crispo
10
complied. Upon arrival at the police station, the policemen demanded from him ₱30,000.00 for his
release; otherwise, they will plant evidence against him. The policemen then proceeded to show him
four (4) sachets of shabu which will be used against him. For his part, Herrera averred that he was
riding a bicycle when he accidentally bumped a brown van. Three (3) men then alighted from the van,
arrested him, and took him to the police station. Thereat, an affidavit was purportedly prepared for him
and that he signed the same even without reading it out of confusion.

Issue:

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld accused-appellants'
conviction for the crimes charged.

Ruling:

Here, Crispo was charged with the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs,
respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. Notably, in order to
properly secure the conviction of an accused charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the
prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration;
and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.  Meanwhile, in instances wherein an accused is
29

charged with Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must establish the following
elements to warrant his conviction: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as
a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug. 30

Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of
the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of the
dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and
account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their
presentation in court as evidence of the crime. 31

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must follow when
handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.  Under the said
32

section, prior to its amendment by RA 10640,  the apprehending team shall, among
33

others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph
the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were
seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP
Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.  In the case
34

of People v. Mendoza,  the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the
35

representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public official during the seizure and
marking of the [seized drugs), the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the
evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure
and confiscation of the[said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus
adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x
presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody." 36

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements
of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible.  In fact, the Implementing Rules and
37

11
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA
10640  - provide that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police
38

station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-
compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds
- will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer or team.   In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the
39

procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the
seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily
proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved.  In People v.Almorfe,  the Court explained that for
40 41

the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had
nonetheless been preserved.  Also, in People v. De Guzman,   it was emphasized that the
42 43

justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot
presume what these grounds are or that they even exist . 44

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the arresting officers committed unjustified
deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and
evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Crispo.

An examination of the records reveals that while the inventory and photography of the seized items
were made in the presence of two (2) elected public officials, i.e., Barangay Kagawads Ramon Amtolim
and Helen Tolentino, as evidenced by their signatures on the Receipt of Property/Evidence
Seized,  the same were not done in the presence of representatives from either the DOJ and the
45

media. This fact was confirmed by P03 Manolito Rodriguez (P03 Rodriguez), a member of the buy-bust
team that apprehended Crispo, in his testimony in direct and cross-examinations, to wit:

The law requires the presence of an elected public official, as well as representatives from the DOJ
and the media to ensure that the chain of custody rule is observed and thus, remove any suspicion of
tampering, switching, planting, or contamination of evidence which could considerably affect a case.
However, minor deviations may be excused in situations where a justifiable reason for non-compliance
is explained. In this case, despite the non-observance of the witness requirement, no plausible
explanation was given by the prosecution .. In fact, the poseur-buyer, P02 Reyes, only feigned
ignorance as to the reason why no representatives of the DOJ and the media were present during the
inventory of the seized items:

At this point, it is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the
confiscated items inadmissible.  However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any
48

genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 must be adduced.  In People v. Umipang,  the Court held that the prosecution must show
49 50

that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for
"[a] sheer statement that representatives were unavailable - without so much as an explanation on
whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances - is
to be regarded as a flimsy excuse."  Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious
51

attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-
compliance.  These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient
52

time - beginning from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the
accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the
necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the
set procedure prescribed in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled
not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but mustin fact, also convince the Court that
they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given
circumstances, their actions were reasonable. [[53]]

12
Thus, for failure of the prosecution to provide justifiable grounds or show that special circumstances
exist which would excuse their transgression, the Court is constrained to conclude that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Crispo have been compromised. It is settled that
in a prosecution for the sale and possession of dangerous drugs under RA 9165, the State carries the
heavy burden of proving not only the elements of the offense, but also to prove the integrity of
the corpus delicti, failing in which, renders the case for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. 54

Verily, the procedural lapses committed by the arresting officers, which were unfortunately left
unjustified, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against Crispo, as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.  It is well-settled that the procedure
55

in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a
simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects.  As such, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for noncompliance with
56

the aforesaid provision, Crispo’s acquittal is perforce in order.

In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove compliance
with the procedure set forth in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended. As such, they must
have the initiative to not only acknowledge but also justify any perceived deviations from the
said procedure during the proceedings before the trial court. Since compliance with the procedure
is determinative of the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the
liberty of the accused, the fact that any issue regarding the same was not raised, or even threshed out
in the court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including this Court, from fully examining
the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been completely complied with,
and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no such reasons exist, then it is
the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction.

People v. Cornel, G.R. No. 229047, 16 April 2018

Facts:

n preparation for the buy-bust operation, coordination was made with the District Anti-Illegal
Drugs (DAID) and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Control No. PDEA-RO-NCR I2/13-00I
75 was issued by the PDEA as proof that they received the coordination form dated December 15,
20I3. Led by PCI Gaylord Tamayo, a pre-operation plan was made where PO1 Angulo was designated
a poseur-buyer. A one thousand peso bill was provided and marked for use in the operation. A petty
cash voucher was prepared in relation to his receipt of the money from PCI Tamayo. The team then
proceeded to the reported place of operation at Barangay East Rembo, Makati City and arrived therein
at around 7:30 in the evening. A final briefing was conducted by PCI Tamayo. After the final briefing,
PO1 Angulo proceeded on foot to 23rct Street together with the regular informant. Before they could
reach their destination, they saw the subject appellant at a store. The informant introduced him to the
subject as a "tropa." In the course of their conversation, he asked appellant "kung meron ba" to which
appellant replied, "meron namart.'. POI Angulo then asked appellant if he could see the item, but the
latter asked for the payment first. Appellant took the buy-bust money and placed it in his pocket.
Appellant then brought out the item from the same pocket and handed it over to PO1 Angulo. The
transaction having been consummated, PO1 Angulo gave the pre-arranged signal, by means of
removing his cap, to the rest of the team. SPO1 Randy Obedoza arrived after PO1 Angulo grabbed
appellant and introduced himself as a police officer. They then placed appellant under arrest. Initial
body search was made where they were able to recover the marked money used in buying the item.
SPOI Obedoza informed the appellant of his constitutional rights. The inventory was conducted at
13
the barangay hall. After the inventory, PO1 Angulo turned the seized items over to the duty
investigator, PO2 Michelle Gimena, so that the necessary referrals could be made. A Request for
Laboratory Examination was prepared and the seized items were submitted to the Scene of the Crime
Operatives (SOCO) for examination. Photographs of the inventory and the marking were also taken at
the barangay hall. 3

Thus, an Information was filed against the appellant for violation of Section 5, Article II ofR.A. No. 9165
that reads as follows:

n preparation for the buy-bust operation, coordination was made with the District Anti-Illegal
Drugs (DAID) and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Control No. PDEA-RO-NCR I2/13-00I
75 was issued by the PDEA as proof that they received the coordination form dated December 15,
20I3. Led by PCI Gaylord Tamayo, a pre-operation plan was made where PO1 Angulo was designated
a poseur-buyer. A one thousand peso bill was provided and marked for use in the operation. A petty
cash voucher was prepared in relation to his receipt of the money from PCI Tamayo. The team then
proceeded to the reported place of operation at Barangay East Rembo, Makati City and arrived therein
at around 7:30 in the evening. A final briefing was conducted by PCI Tamayo. After the final briefing,
PO1 Angulo proceeded on foot to 23rct Street together with the regular informant. Before they could
reach their destination, they saw the subject appellant at a store. The informant introduced him to the
subject as a "tropa." In the course of their conversation, he asked appellant "kung meron ba" to which
appellant replied, "meron namart.'. POI Angulo then asked appellant if he could see the item, but the
latter asked for the payment first. Appellant took the buy-bust money and placed it in his pocket.
Appellant then brought out the item from the same pocket and handed it over to PO1 Angulo. The
transaction having been consummated, PO1 Angulo gave the pre-arranged signal, by means of
removing his cap, to the rest of the team. SPO1 Randy Obedoza arrived after PO1 Angulo grabbed
appellant and introduced himself as a police officer. They then placed appellant under arrest. Initial
body search was made where they were able to recover the marked money used in buying the item.
SPOI Obedoza informed the appellant of his constitutional rights. The inventory was conducted at
the barangay hall. After the inventory, PO1 Angulo turned the seized items over to the duty
investigator, PO2 Michelle Gimena, so that the necessary referrals could be made. A Request for
Laboratory Examination was prepared and the seized items were submitted to the Scene of the Crime
Operatives (SOCO) for examination. Photographs of the inventory and the marking were also taken at
the barangay hall. 3

Thus, an Information was filed against the appellant for violation of Section 5, Article II ofR.A. No. 9165
that reads as follows:

Issue:

According to appellant, his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt as the testimony of the
witness had full of irregularities. He also claims that his warrantless arrest was illegal. He also
questions the irregularities committed in the conduct of the inventory of the confiscated item. He also
insists that there was a broken chain of custody of the confiscated dangerous drug.

Ruling:

Under Article II, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 or illegal sale of prohibited drugs, in order to be convicted
of the said violation, thefollowing must concur:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.  6

14
In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the sale transaction actually happened and that
"the [procured] object is properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the same drugs
seized from the accused."  7

In illegal sale, the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused comprise the corpus delicti of the·
charges.   In People v. Gatlabayan,  the Court held that it is of paramount importance that the identity of
8 9

the dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable doubt; and that it must be proven with certitude
that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is exactly the same substance offered in
evidence before the court. In fine, the illegal drug must be produced before the court as exhibit and that
which was exhibited must be the very same substance recovered· from the suspect.   Thus, the chain
10

of custody carries out this purpose "as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of
the evidence are removed."  11

To ensure an unbroken chain of custody, Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 specifies:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21 (a) of the IRR Of R.A. No. 9165 provides:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items. were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where
the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]

On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 10640 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165. Among other modifications,
it essentially incorporated the saving clause contained in the IRR, thus:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and
custody over said items.

Under the original provision of Section 21, after seizure and confiscation of the drugs, the
apprehending team was required to immediately conduct a physical inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of ( 1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
15
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) a representative from the media and (3) the
DOJ, and (4) any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof. It is assumed that the presence of these three persons will guarantee "against
planting of evidence and frame up," i.e., they are "necessary to insulate the apprehension and
incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity."   Now, the amendatory law
19

mandates that the conduct of physical inventory and photograph of the seized items must be in the
presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public official and (3) a representative of the
National Prosecution Service or the media who shall sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof. In the present case, the old provisions of Section 21 and its IRR shall apply since the
alleged crime was committed before the amendment.

This Court rules otherwise. In this case, PO1 Angulo testified that the inventory was not conducted at
the place of the arrest but at the Barangay Hall of East Rembo, thus:

The CA also ruled that the prosecution was able to sufficiently explain why the item seized was not
immediately marked, thus:

Here, it has been explained by the prosecution that the reason why the item seized from appellant was
not immediately marked at the target place was because a commotion ensued after appellant's arrest.
For security purposes and to prevent any damage, the arresting team decided to make the markings at
the Barangay Hall of East Rembo, Makati. 22

This Court, however, finds the said explanation as insufficient and unjustifiable considering that the
team who arrested the appellant was composed of eight (8) police officers, and only one of them was
unarmed. Such number of armed police operatives could have easily contained a commotion and
proceed with the immediate inventory of the seized item so as to comply with the law. As testified by
PO1 Angulo:

Absent therefore any justifiable reason, the apprehending team should have immediately conducted
the inventory upon seizure and confiscation of the item.

Furthermore, no explanation nor a valid reason was also given for the absence of a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice during the inventory of the item seized.

The identity of the seized item, not having been established beyond reasonable doubt, this Court,
therefore, finds it apt to acquit the appellant.1âwphi1

De Lima v. Guerrero, 229781, 10 October 2017

Facts:

The facts are undisputed. The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several inquiries
on the proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), inviting inmates
who executed affidavits in support of their testimonies.

On January 13, 2017, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition and
Certiorari assailing the jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel over the complaints against her. The petitions,
14

docketed as CA-G.R. No. 149097 and CA-G.R. No. SP No. 149385, are currently pending with the
Special 6th Division of the appellate court.  Meanwhile, in the absence of a restraining order issued by
15

the Court of Appeals, the DOJ Panel proceeded with the conduct of the preliminary investigation  and,
16

in its Joint Resolution dated February 14, 2017,  recommended the filing of Informations against
17

petitioner De Lima. Accordingly, on February 17, 2017, three Informations were filed against petitioner
De Lima and several co-accused before the RTC ofMuntinlupa City. One of the Infonnations was

16
docketed as Criminal Case No. 17-165  and raffled off to Branch 204, presided by respondent judge.
18

This Information charging petitioner for violation of Section 5 in relation to Section (jj), Section 26(b),
and Section 28 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, contained the following averments:

That within the period from November 2012 to March 2013, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Leila M. De Lima, being then the Secretary of
the Department of Justice, and accused Rafael Marcos Z. Rages, being then the Officer-in-Charge of
the Bureau of Corrections, by taking advantage of their public office, conspiring and confederating with
accused Ronnie P. Dayan, being then an employee of the Department of Justice detailed to De Lima,
all of them having moral ascendancy or influence over inmates in the New Bilibid Prison, did then and
there commit illegal drug trading, in the following manner: De Lima and Ragos, with the use of their
power, position, and authority, demand, solicit and extort money from the high profile inmates in the
New Bilibid Prison to support the senatorial bid of De Lima in the May 2016 election; by reason of
which, the inmates, not being lawfully authorized by law and through the use of mobile phones and
other electronic devices, did then and there willfully and unlawfully trade and traffic dangerous drugs,
and thereafter give and deliver to De Lima, through Ragos and Dayan, the proceeds of illegal drug
trading amounting to Five Million (₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 24 November 2012, Five Million
(₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 15 December 2012, and One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos
weekly "tara" each from the high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison. 19

On February 20, 2017, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash, mainly raising the following: the RTC lacks
20

jurisdiction over the offense charged against petitioner; the DOJ Panel lacks authority to file the
Information; the Information charges more than one offense; the allegations and the recitals of facts do
not allege the corpus delicti of the charge; the Information is based on testimonies of witnesses who
are not qualified to be discharged as state witnesses; and the testimonies of these witnesses are
hearsay. 21

On February 23, 2017, respondent judge issued the presently assailed Order  finding probable cause
22

for the issuance of warrants of arrest against De Lima and her co-accused. 

Ruling:

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION

With the complexity of the operations involved in Illegal Trading of drugs, as recognized and defined in
RA 9165, it will be quite myopic and restrictive to require the elements of Illegal Sale-a mere
component act-in the prosecution for Illegal Trading.

More so, that which qualifies the crime of Illegal Trafficking to Illegal Trading may make it impossible to
provide the details of the elements of Illegal Sale. By "using electronic devices such as, but not limited
to, text messages, email, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat
17
rooms," the Illegal Trading can be remotely perpetrated away from where the drugs are actually being
sold; away from the subject of the illegal sale. With the proliferation of digital technology coupled with
ride sharing and delivery services, Illegal Trading under RA 9165 can be committed without getting
one's hand on the substances or knowing and meeting the seller or buyer. To require the elements of
Illegal Sale (the identities of the buyer, seller, the object and consideration, in Illegal Trade) would be
impractical.

The same may be said of the second mode for committing Illegal Trading, or trading by "acting as a
broker" in transactions involved in Illegal Trafficking. In this instance, the accused may neither have
physical possession of the drugs nor meet the buyer and seller and yet violate RA 9165. As pointed out
by Justice Perlas-Bernabe, as early as 1916, jurisprudence has defined a broker as one who is simply
a middleman, negotiating contracts relative to property with which he has no custody, viz.:

It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case is given only by law in the manner
and form prescribed by law.  It is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement
90

of the action.  Indeed, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe and apportion the
91

jurisdiction of various courts. It follows then that Congress may also, by law, provide that a certain
class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such would be a special law
that is construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts. 92

The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated the rules provided
in RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A plain reading of RA 9165, as of
RA 6425, will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is exclusively vested with the Regional
Trial Court and no other. The designation of the RTC as the court with the exclusive jurisdiction over
drug-related cases is apparent in the following provisions where it was expressly mentioned and
recognized as the only court with the authority to hear drug-related cases:

For those in the dissent, the failure to reproduce the phrase "exclusive original jurisdiction" is a clear
indication that no court, least of all the RTC, has been vested with such "exclusive original jurisdiction"
so that even the Sandiganbayan can take cognizance and resolve a criminal prosecution for violation
of RA 9165.

As thoroughly discussed by Justice Peralta in his Concurring Opinion, such deduction is unwarranted
given the clear intent of the legislature not only to retain the "exclusive original jurisdiction" of the RTCs
over violations of the drugs law but to segregate from among the several RTCs of each judicial region
some RTCs that will "exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165)." If at all, the
change introduced by the new phraseology of Section 90, RA 9165 is not the deprivation of the RTCs'
"exclusive original jurisdiction" but the further restriction of this "exclusive original jurisdiction" to select
RTCs of each judicial region. This intent can be clearly gleaned from the interpellation on House Bill
No. 4433, entitled "An Act Instituting the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, repealing Republic Act No.
6425, as amended:"

The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to the Sandiganbayan
whenever the accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or higher, regardless of whether the
violation is alleged as committed in relation to office. The power of the Sandiganbayan to sit in
judgment of high-ranking government officials is not omnipotent. The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is
circumscribed by law and its limits are currently defined and prescribed by RA 10660,  which amended
97

Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606.

Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, provides but the general rule, couched in a "broad
and general phraseology. "  Exceptions abound. Besides the jurisdiction on written defamations and
100

libel, as illustrated in Morales  and People v. Benipayo,   the RTC is likewise given "exclusive original
101 102

jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Omnibus Election
18
Code,"  regardless of whether such violation was committed by public officers occupying positions
103

classified as Grade 27 or higher in relation to their offices. In fact, offenses committed by members of
the Armed Forces in relation to their office, i.e., in the words of RA 7055,  "service-connected crimes
104

or offenses," are not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan but by court-martial.

Certainly, jurisdiction over offenses and felonies committed by public officers is not determined solely
by the pay scale or by the fact that they were committed "in relation to their office." In determining the
forum vested with the jurisdiction to try and decide criminal actions, the laws governing the subject
matter of the criminal prosecution must likewise be considered.

In this case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction to "exclusively try and
hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165)." This is an exception, couched in the special law
on dangerous drugs, to the general rule under Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA
10660. It is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law and the
latter is to be considered as an exception to the general. 105

Parenthetically, it has been advanced that RA 10660 has repealed Section 90 of RA 9165. However, a
closer look at the repealing clause of RA 10660 will show that there is no express repeal of Section 90
of RA 9165 and well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. It is only accepted
upon the clearest proof of inconsistency so repugnant that the two laws cannot be enforced.  The106

presumption against implied repeal is stronger when of two laws involved one is special and the other
general.  The mentioned rule in statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law
107

applies regardless of the laws' respective dates of passage. 

To reiterate for emphasis, Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, is the general

law on jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses committed by high-ranking public
officers in relation to their office; Section 90, RA 9165 is the special law excluding from the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction violations of RA 9165 committed by such public officers. In the latter case,
jurisdiction is vested upon the RTCs designated by the Supreme Court as drugs court, regardless of
whether the violation of RA 9165 was committed in relation to the public officials' office.

The exceptional rule provided under Section 90, RA 9165 relegating original exclusive jurisdiction to
RTCs specially designated by the Supreme Court logically follows given the technical aspect of drug-
related cases. With the proliferation of cases involving violation of RA 9165, it is easy to dismiss them
as common and untechnical. However, narcotic substances possess unique characteristics that render
them not readily identifiable.  In fact, they must first be subjected to scientific analysis by forensic
109

chemists to determine their composition and nature.  Thus, judges presiding over designated drugs
110

courts are specially trained by the Philippine Judicial Academy (PhilJa) and given scientific instructions
to equip them with the proper tools to appreciate pharmacological evidence and give analytical insight
upon this esoteric subject. After all, the primary consideration of RA 9165 is the fact that the
substances involved are, in fact, dangerous drugs, their plant sources, or their controlled precursors
and essential chemicals. Without a doubt, not one of the Sandiganbayan justices were provided with
knowledge and technical expertise on matters relating to prohibited substances.

Estipona v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, 15 August 2017;

Facts:

Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation
of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The Information alleged:

19
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in his possession and under his control and
custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G containing
0.084 [gram] of white crystalline substance, which when examined were found to be positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement,  praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of
5

Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time
offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2
thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
government.

In its Comment or Opposition  dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial of the motion
6

for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress'
prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining. Later, in a Comment or
Opposition  dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into
7

plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.]
9165, however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining,
[it] is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."

Issue:

I.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN
ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

II.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT

ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF
PROCEDURE.

III.

WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO,

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
20
JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Ruling:

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the
preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the
latter.  "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which
38

regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of
enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions."  Fabian v. Hon. Desierto  laid down the test for
39 40

determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.

It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are
procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive.
In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in another. It is admitted that
what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not, however,
an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own
procedural and jurisdictional system.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the
lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If
the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to
appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. 41

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights. For
example, in People v. Lacson,   Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as
42

a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an
essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates to extinguish
the right of the State to prosecute the accused.  Speaking through then Associate Justice Romeo J.
43

Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two
years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused
and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression,
unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing
the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and
speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into
account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed
that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the
consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be
respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a
denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.

The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved by the
Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to
due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts of
provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly,
21
either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the
public prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to
causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the
lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite the
mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.

It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his favor,
especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the
hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire.

The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the capacity of the
State to prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence
may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded. Passage of time
makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit
another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the
more difficult it is to prove the crime.

On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a
criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not
derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public
obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of
community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities
incompatible with the presumption of innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories
may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and
thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.

The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the
administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the
accused only. 44

Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.   that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which
45

provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall
lose the remedies available against the judgment, does not take away substantive rights but merely
provides the manner through which an existing right may be implemented.

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted
accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without
justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their
right to avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment.

It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the
substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to
"provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases." This provision
protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the
simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of
conviction. 46

By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases in all courts  that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of
47

disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an

"important," "essential," "highly desirable," and "legitimate" component of the administration of
justice.  Some of its salutary effects include:
48

x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty and
limiting the probable penalty are obvious - his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can
22
begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are also
advantages - the more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively
attain the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial
resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or
in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof. (Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])

Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most
criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement
for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who
are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time
between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty
when they are ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])

The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial; he
gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in
realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and
scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses
who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431
U.S. 63, 71 [1977])

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval."  There
49

is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.  The essence of the agreement is that both
50

the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses.  Properly administered,
51

plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and
finality - can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court. 52

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,  the rules on plea bargaining neither create a
53

right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by
regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's
case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered
and accepted.  In any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a
54

"serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the
witnesses face to face, to bail (except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not
to be compelled to be a witness against himself. 55

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him
rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.  Under
56

the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on
the consent of the offended party  and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of
57

guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged.  The reason for this is that
58

the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain. 59

[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for
judicial deference are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to
assessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also must consider other tangible and
intangible factors, such as government enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best
to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system that simply cannot accommodate the
23
litigation of every serious criminal charge. Because these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the
kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we have been "properly hesitant to examine
the decision whether to prosecute. " 60

The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused to
plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The
word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to
make such plea.  Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than
61

that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the
convenience of the accused. 62

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the
prosecution already rested its case.  As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial
63

court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.  "Grave abuse of discretion"
64

is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal
violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
65

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the
prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.  The only basis on which the prosecutor
66

and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing
more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a
comment whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the
prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of
plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served.  The ruling on the motion
67

must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.  Absent any finding on the
68

weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of plea is improper
and irregular.

24
Sayre v. Xenos, G.R. No. 244413, 18 February 2020

Facts:

Sayre was charged with violation of Sections 5, 11, and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.)
9165,6 in three separate Information, 7 which respectively read as follows:

Today, he wanted to plea bargain Section 5 and 11 to a lesser offense under Section 12, which carries
with [it] a penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and 1 day to four (4) years. Moreover, for Section
12, penalty of compulsory 6-month rehabilitation. These proposals are without prejudice however to the
guidelines on plea bargaining yet to be released by the Supreme Court, whichever is most favorable
and beneficial to the accused; x x x12

Since the parties failed to reach a consensus insofar as Criminal Case No. CRC 416-2017 for violation
of Section 5 of R.A. 9165 (Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs), the RTC deferred the pre-trial to afford
Sayre another opportunity to convince the prosecution to accept his proposal.22

Sayre reiterated his proposal to plea bargain the charge of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs to the
lower offense of Possession of Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs under Section 12 in accordance
with the guidelines provided by the Court in OCA Circular No. 90-2018.23 On the other hand, the City
Prosecutor argued that they are bound by DOJ Circular No. 27, rejecting Sayre's plea bargain from
Illegal Sale of dangerous Drugs to Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, and insisting that "any plea
bargaining outs1de the DOJ circular is not acceptable."

Ruling:

Plea bargaining is a vital component of restorative justice. In giving preference to working out a
mutually satisfactory resolution of the case sanctioned by the court over lengthy and protracted trial,
both the state and the accused benefit. The plea bargaining mechanism affords speedy disposal and
cost efficiency which significantly contribute to the restorative justice process. By shortening the time
between the original charge and the disposition, it enhances the rehabilitative prospects and
redeeming characteristics of the offender when the trial court approves the plea bargain to a lesser
offense.

We adopt the view of Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen in his Separate Opinion in Estipona v.
Lobrigo43 that the aim is to rehabilitate, not punish, drug offenders. Citing his ponencia in People v.
Holgado,44 he stated:

It is lamentable that while our dockets are clogged with prosecutions under Republic Act No. 9165
involving small-time drug users and retailers, we are seriously short of prosecutions involving the
proverbial "big fish." We are swamped with cases involving small fry who have been arrested for
miniscule amounts. While they are certainly a bane to our society, small retailers are but low-lying fruits
in an exceedingly vast network of drug cartels. Both law enforcers and prosecutors should realize that
the more effective and efficient strategy is to focus resources more on the source and true leadership
of these nefarious organizations. Otherwise, all these executive and judicial resources expended to
attempt to convict an accused for 0.05 gram of shabu under doubtful custodial arrangements will hardly
make a dent in the overall picture. It might in fact be distracting our law enforcers from their more
25
challenging task: to uproot the causes of this drug menace. We stand ready to assess cases involving
greater amounts of drugs and the leadership of these cartels.45

While it is the government's mandate to "pursue an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the
trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances,"46 it is equally important to
highlight "the policy of the State to provide effective mechanisms or measures to re-integrate into
society individuals who have fallen victims to drug abuse or dangerous drug dependence."47 In
consonance with the State policy of restorative and compassionate justice, the confusion created by
DOJ Circular No. 27 must immediately be clarified in order to guide the trial courts in addressing offers
of the accused to plea bargain in drugs cases and afford offenders an opportunity to rehabilitate and
become productive members of society again.

Taking into consideration the requirements in pleading guilty to a lesser offense, We find it proper to
treat the refusal of the prosecution to adopt the acceptable plea bargain for the charge of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs provided in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC as a continuing objection that should be resolved
by the RTC. This harmonizes the constitutional provision' on the rule making power of the Court under
the Constitution and the nature of plea bargaining in Dangerous Drugs cases. DOJ Circular No. 27 did
not repeal, alter, or modify the Plea Bargaining Framework in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.

Therefore, the DOJ Circular No. 27 provision pertaining to acceptable plea bargain for Section 5 of
R.A. 9165 did not violate the rule-making authority of the Court. DOJ Circular No. 27 merely serves as
an internal guideline for prosecutors to observe before they may give their consent to proposed plea
bargains.

Pascua v. People, G.R. No. 250578, 07 September 2020

26
Facts:
The instant case stemmed from two (2) Informations 8 filed before the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 18805 and 18806, respectively charging Pascua with violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
RA 9165 for selling 0.024 gram and possessing 0.054 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride,
or shabu.9 Upon arraignment, Pascua pleaded "not guilty" to the crimes charged. However, he later
filed a Motion to Allow Accused to Enter into Plea Bargaining Agreement wherein he offered to enter a
plea of "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12,10 Article II of RA 9165 for both criminal
cases.11 The prosecution filed its Comment and Opposition thereto, stressing that, per Department of
Justice Department Circular No. 027-18,12 the State's consent is necessary before the accused can
plead to a lesser offense.

Ruling:

To recall, plea bargaining in cases involving drugs cases was recently allowed through the Court's
promulgation of Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo,35 which declared the provision in RA 9165 expressly
disallowing plea bargaining in drugs cases, i.e., Section 23,36 Article II, unconstitutional for
contravening the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court. Following this pronouncement, the Court
issued A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC providing for a plea bargaining framework in drugs cases, which was
required to be adopted by all trial courts handling drugs cases.37

In A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, the Court enumerated, in table format, several violations of RA 9165 which
could be subject to plea-bargaining.38 Included therein is violation of Section 5, Article II thereof,
particularly for the sale, trading, etc. of shabu weighing less than 1.00 gram. The rationale for this
particular exception was explained by the Court in its Resolution dated April 2, 2019 in Re: Letter of
Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta on the Suggested Plea Bargaining Framework Submitted by the
Philippine Judges Association,39 to wit:

It bears emphasis that the main reason of the Court in stating in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC dated April 10,
2018 that "plea bargaining is also not allowed under Section 5 (Sale, Trading, etc. of Dangerous
Drugs) involving all other kinds of dangerous drugs, except shabu and marijuana" lies in the diminutive
quantity of the dangerous drugs involved. Taking judicial notice of the volume and prevalence of cases
involving the said two (2) dangerous drugs, as well as the recommendations of the Officers of the
PJA, the Court is of the view that illegal sale of 0.01 gram to 0.99 gram of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) is very light enough to be considered as necessarily included in the offense of
violation of Section 12 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs), while 1.00 gram and above is substantial enough to disallow plea bargaining. The
Court holds the same view with respect to illegal sale of 0.01 gram to 9.99 grams of marijuana, which
likewise suffices to be deemed necessarily included in the same offense of violation of the same
Section 12 of R.A. No. 9165, while 10.00 grams and above is ample enough to disallow plea
bargaining. (Emphases and underscoring supplied) Ꮮαwρhi ৷

A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC also provides, among others, in the "Remarks" column of the aforesaid offense
that "if accused applies for probation in offenses punishable under R.A. No. 9165, other than for illegal
drug trafficking or pushing under Section 5 in relation to [Section] 24 thereof, then the law on probation
apply."40 Notably, Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 provides that any person convicted for drug
trafficking or pushing under Section 5 of the law cannot avail of the benefits of the Probation Law, viz.:

Section 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. — Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court,
cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as
amended.

27
In this case, the CA construed the aforementioned remark in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC as disqualifying
persons originally charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 but were convicted of the
lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of the same law – such as Pascua – from applying for
probation.

However, the CA is mistaken as the said remark should be simply regarded as a recognition and
reminder of the general rule provided in Section 24 that "[a]ny person convicted for drug trafficking or
pushing under this Act"41 shall be ineligible for probation. Moreover, the CA's view is not supported
neither by the very wording of Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 nor the provisions of the Probation Law.
It likewise disregards the legal consequences of plea bargaining.

It bears stressing that it is only after the trial court arrives at a judgment of conviction can the provisions
of the Probation Law apply.  "Probation" is defined under Section 3 (a) thereof as "a disposition under
Ꮮαwρhi ৷

which a defendant, after conviction and sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the
court and to the supervision of a probation officer."42 Section 9 thereof, which lists the disqualified
offenders, also highlights that the disqualifications pertain to the nature of the convictions meted out to
the prospective applicant:

Section 9. Disqualified Offenders. — The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those:

(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years;

(b) convicted of any crime against the national security;

(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by

imprisonment of more than six (6) months and one (1) day and/or a fine of not more than one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00);

(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and

(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree
became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof." (Emphases supplied)

It is clear from both Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 and the provisions of the Probation Law that in
applying for probation, what is essential is not the offense charged but the offense to which the
accused is ultimately found guilty of.

In this regard, it is worth emphasizing that upon acceptance of a plea bargain, the accused is actually
found guilty of the lesser offense subject of the plea. According to jurisprudence, "[p]lea bargaining in
criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a
lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter
sentence than that for the graver charge."43

Thus, regardless of what the original charge was in the Information, the judgment would be for the
lesser offense to which the accused pled guilty. This means that the penalty to be meted out, as well
as all the attendant accessory penalties, and other consequences under the law, including eligibility for
probation and parole, would be based on such lesser offense. Necessarily, even if Pascua was
originally charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 in Criminal Case No. 18805, he was
ultimately convicted of the lower offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of the same law. Since the
foregoing effectively removed Pascua's case from the coverage of Section 24, Article II of RA 9165, he
should, at the very least, be allowed to apply for probation.

28
People v. Reafol, G.R. No. 247575, 16 November 2020;

Facts:

Plea bargaining to a lesser offense is governed by Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads: cralawred

Section 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser
offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is
cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary.
"Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It
usually involves the defendant pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some
of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the
graver charge."19 Essentially, it is a give-and-take negotiation wherein both the
prosecution and the defense make concessions in order to avoid potential losses. The
rules on plea bargaining neither creates nor takes away a right; rather, it operates as a
means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them.20

Nonetheless, it is well to clarify that "a defendant has no constitutional right to plea
bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty;
the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the
acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the
consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a
valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged.
The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal
actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one,
based on what the evidence on hand can sustain." 21

In view of the foregoing, the basic requisites of plea bargaining are: (a) consent of the
offended party; (b) consent of the prosecutor; (c) plea of guilty to a lesser offense which
is necessarily included in the offense charged; and (d) approval of the court.22

In drugs cases, plea bargaining was recently allowed through the Court's promulgation
of Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo,23 which declared the provision in RA 9165 expressly
disallowing plea bargaining in drugs cases, i.e., Section 23,24 Article II thereof,
unconstitutional, for contravening the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court.
Following this pronouncement, the Court issued A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC providing for a
plea bargaining framework in drugs cases, which was required to be adopted by all trial
courts handling drugs cases.25 In response to A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, the Secretary of
Justice issued DOJ Circular No. 27 as a guideline to be observed by the trial prosecutors
nationwide in entertaining plea bargaining offers in drugs cases.

29
Notably, while both A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC and DOJ Circular No.27 enumerate in table
format several violations of RA 9165 which could be subject to plea bargaining, they differ
in the acceptable plea bargain, i.e. the lesser offense to which the accused may plead
guilty. Naturally, these differences would result in plea bargaining deadlocks, especially in
light of DOJ Circular No. 27's explicit mandate that "if the proposed plea bargain is not
allowed or goes beyond what is allowed under these guidelines, the trial prosecutor shall
reject the proposed plea bargain outright and continue with the proceedings." This
notwithstanding, in the recent case of Sayre v. Xenos26 (Sayre), the Court ruled in favor
of the validity of DOJ Circular No. 27, holding that the same does not contravene the rule-
making authority of the Court, viz.:cralawred

In this petition, A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC is a rule of procedure established pursuant to the
rule-making power of the Supreme Court that serves as a framework and guide to the
trial courts in plea bargaining violations of [RA] 9165.

Nonetheless, a plea bargain still requires mutual agreement of the parties and

remains subject to the approval of the court. The acceptance of an offer to plead
guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of
right but is a matter addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court.

x x x x

The use of the word "may" signifies that the trial court has discretion whether to allow the
accused to make a plea of guilty to a lesser offense. Moreover, plea
bargaining requires the consent of the accused, offended party, and the prosecutor.
It is also essential that the lesser offense is necessarily included in the offense charged.

Taking into consideration the requirements in pleading guilty to a lesser offense, We find
it proper to treat the refusal of the prosecution to adopt the acceptable plea bargain for
the charge of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs provided in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC as a
continuing objection that should be resolved by the RTC. This harmonizes the
constitutional provision on the rule-making power of the Court under the Constitution and
the nature of plea bargaining in Dangerous Drugs cases. DOJ Circular No. 27 did not
repeal, alter or modify the Plea Bargaining Framework in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.

Therefore, the DOJ Circular No. 27 provision pertaining to acceptable plea bargain for
Section 5 of [RA] 9165 did not violate the rule-making authority of the Court. DOJ
Circular No. 27 merely serves as an internal guideline for prosecutors to observe
before they may give their consent to proposed plea bargains. 27 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In Sayre, the Court concluded that the continuing objection on the part of the prosecution
based on DOJ Circular No. 27 will necessarily result in the parties' failure to arrive at a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case that may be submitted for the trial court's
approval. In light of the absence of a mutual agreement to plea bargain, the proper
course of action would be the continuation of the proceedings.

30
In this case, the RTC gravely abused its discretion in granting respondent's motion to plea
bargain notwithstanding the prosecution's opposition to the same which is grounded on
DOJ Circular No. 27. Effectively, respondent's plea of guilty to a lesser offense (to which
he was convicted of) was made without the consent of the prosecution. Since
respondent's plea of guilt and subsequent conviction for a lesser offense clearly lack one
of the requisites of a valid plea bargain, the plea bargaining is void. Resultantly, the
judgment rendered by the RTC which was based on a void plea bargaining is also void ab
initio and cannot be considered to have attained finality for the simple reason that a void
judgment has no legality from its inception. 28 Thus, since the judgment of conviction
rendered against respondent is void, it is only proper to resume with the trial of Criminal
Case No. 2017-0053 - which prior to respondent's filing of his motion to plea bargain, was
at the stage of the prosecution's presentation of evidence - without violating respondent's
right against double jeopardy.

31
Evangelista v. People, G.R. No. 163267, 05 May 2010

Facts:

In an Information6 dated January 31, 1996, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 1 of PD
1866 allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 30th day of January 1996, at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Pasay City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control the following
items:

1. One (1) Unit 9mm Jericho Pistol, Israel with SN F-36283 with one (1) magazine;

2. One (1) Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel Submachine gun with SN 931864 with two (2) magazines;

3. Nineteen (19) 9mm bullets.

without the corresponding permit or license from competent authority.

In the morning of January 30, 1996, Maximo Acierto, Jr. (Acierto), a Customs Police assigned at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) District Command, was informed by his superior that a
certain passenger of Philippine Airlines (PAL) Flight No. 657 would be arriving from Dubai bringing with
him firearms and ammunitions. Shortly after lunch, Acierto, together with Agents Cuymo and
Fuentabella, proceeded to the tube area where they were met by a crewmember who introduced to
them herein petitioner. Acierto asked petitioner if he brought firearms with him and the latter answered
in the affirmative adding that the same were bought in Angola. Thereupon, Acierto was summoned to
the cockpit by the pilot, Capt. Edwin Nadurata (Capt. Nadurata), where the firearms and ammunitions
were turned over to him. Petitioner was then escorted to the arrival area to get his luggage and
thereafter proceeded to the examination room where the luggage was examined and petitioner was
investigated. In open court, Acierto identified the firearms and ammunitions.

During the investigation, petitioner admitted before Special Agent Apolonio Bustos (Bustos) that he
bought the subject items in Angola but the same were confiscated by the Dubai authorities, which
turned over the same to a PAL personnel in Dubai. Upon inquiry, the Firearms and Explosive Office
(FEO) in Camp Crame certified that petitioner is neither registered with said office 11 nor licensed holder
of aforesaid firearms and ammunitions. Bustos likewise verified from the Bureau of Customs, but his
effort yielded no record to show that the firearms were legally purchased. Among the documents
Bustos had gathered during his investigation were the Arrival Endorsement Form 12 and Customs
Declaration Form.13 A referral letter14 was prepared endorsing the matter to the Department of Justice.
Bustos admitted that petitioner was not assisted by counsel when the latter admitted that he bought the
firearms in Angola.

32
Ruling:

Appellant’s argument that he was never found in possession of the subject firearms and ammunitions
within Philippine jurisdiction is specious. It is worthy to note that at the hearing of the case before the
court a quo on October 8, 1996, the defense counsel stipulated that the subject firearms and
ammunitions were confiscated from appellant and the same were given to PAL Station Manager Nilo
Umayaw who, in turn, turned over the same to Capt. Edwin Nadurata. Such stipulation of fact is
binding on appellant, for the acts of a lawyer in the defense of a case are the acts of his client.
Granting that Nilo Umayaw was merely told by the Dubai authorities that the firearms and ammunitions
were found in the luggage of appellant and that Umayaw had no personal knowledge thereof, however,
appellant’s signature on the Customs Declaration Form, which contains the entry "2 PISTOL guns
SENT SURRENDER TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINE," proves that he was the one who brought the guns to
Manila. While appellant claims that he signed the Customs Declaration Form without reading it
because of his excitement, however, he does not claim that he was coerced or persuaded in affixing
his signature thereon. The preparation of the Customs Declaration Form is a requirement for all
arriving passengers in an international flight. Moreover, it cannot be said that appellant had already
been arrested when he signed the Customs Declaration Form. He was merely escorted by Special
Agent Acierto to the arrival area of the NAIA. In fact, appellant admitted that it was only after he signed
the Customs Declaration Form that he was brought to the ground floor of NAIA for investigation.
Consequently, appellant was in constructive possession of the subject firearms. As held in People v.
Dela Rosa, the kind of possession punishable under PD 1866 is one where the accused possessed a
firearm either physically or constructively with animus possidendi or intention to possess the
same. Animus possidendi is a state of mind. As such, what goes on into the mind of the accused, as
his real intent, could be determined solely based on his prior and coetaneous acts and the surrounding
circumstances explaining how the subject firearm came to his possession.

Obviously, it was not only the Customs Declaration Form from which the courts below based their
conclusion that petitioner was in constructive possession of subject firearms and ammunitions.
Emphasis was also given on the stipulations and admissions made during the trial. These pieces of
evidence are enough to show that he was the owner and possessor of these items.

Petitioner contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case filed against him. He claims that
his alleged possession of the subject firearms transpired while he was at the Dubai Airport and his
possession thereof has ceased when he left for the Philippines. He insists that since Dubai is outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and his situation is not one of the exceptions provided in
Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, our criminal laws are not applicable. In short, he had not
committed a crime within the Philippines. 1avvphi1

Indeed it is fundamental that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue
of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. 29 In order for the courts to acquire jurisdiction in
criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should
have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. If the evidence adduced during the trial
shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.30

Contrary to the arguments put forward by petitioner, we entertain no doubt that the crime of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition for which he was charged was committed in the Philippines.
The accomplishment by petitioner of the Customs Declaration Form upon his arrival at the NAIA is very
clear evidence that he was already in possession of the subject firearms in the Philippines.

33
And more than mere possession, the prosecution was able to ascertain that he has no license or
authority to possess said firearms. It bears to stress that the essence of the crime penalized under PD
1866, as amended, is primarily the accused’s lack of license to possess the firearm. The fact of lack or
absence of license constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm.
Since it has been shown that petitioner was already in the Philippines when he was found in
possession of the subject firearms and determined to be without any authority to possess them, an
essential ingredient of the offense, it is beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was perpetrated and
completed in no other place except the Philippines.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. In this case, the information specifically and categorically alleged that on or
about January 30, 1996 petitioner was in possession, custody and control of the subject firearms at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Pasay City, Philippines, certainly a territory within the jurisdiction of
the trial court.

In contrast, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the present charge
happened in Dubai. It may be well to recall that while in Dubai, petitioner, even in a situation between
life and death, firmly denied possession and ownership of the firearms. Furthermore, there is no record
of any criminal case having been filed against petitioner in Dubai in connection with the discovered
firearms. Since there is no pending criminal case when he left Dubai, it stands to reason that there was
no crime committed in Dubai. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his
allegation applies.

34
Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 234196, 21 November 2018

Facts:

The evidence for the prosecution tend to establish that on August 31, 2006, at about
11:45 p.m., during a checkpoint, Police Officer 1 Ryan Pagcaliwagan (PO1 Pagcaliwagan),
PO1 Celso Torres, and PO1 Fheljun Calalo flagged down a motorcycle as it had no license
plate and its three occupants were not wearing a helmet. The occupants were later
identified as Julius Opeña (Opeña), the owner of the motorcycle, Jeffrey Coral (Coral),
and herein petitioner who was then driving the motorcycle. 7

As they were approaching the motorcycle, PO1 Pagcaliwagan saw the petitioner take a
firearm and cover it with a bag. The former then alerted his co-police officers, took the
firearm and arrested the petitioner who denied ownership of the gun, but at the same
time claimed the same was licensed. 8

Confiscated from the petitioner were one (1) gray Ranger caliber .45 pistol with Serial No.
CO2009, one (1) stainless magazine with four (4) pieces of live ammunition, one (1)
black magazine, five (5) live ammunition, and three (3) pieces of empty shells for
caliber .45. The items were brought to the police station and turned over to PO1 Charlie
Bermejo and marked by PO1 Pagcaliwagan.

Ruling:

The petitioner was indicted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms, as defined and
penalized by P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294. The elements for the
prosecution of which crime are: (1) the existence of subject firearm; and (2) the fact that
the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license
for it. Verily, ownership is not an essential element of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms. What is merely required is either actual or constructive possession coupled
with animus possidendi or intent to possess.29

In this controversy, while the existence of the firearm and the absence by the petitioner
of the license to own the same may be conceded, the absence on the part of the
petitioner of animus possidendi is sufficient to cause his acquittal.

Animus possidendi is a concept that eludes specific standards to indicate its existence.
Being a state of mind, animus possidendi is determined on a case to case basis, taking
into consideration the prior and contemporaneous acts of the accused and the
surrounding circumstances.32 "What exists in the realm of thought is often disclosed in a
range of action."33

The petitioner claims that he was not aware that the subject firearm and ammunitions
were inside the motorcycle's compartment. This was corroborated by Carpio, the firearm's
owner. Carpio's testimony was succinctly summarized by the CA, viz.:

35
The consistency of the story and the manner in which Carpio acted coupled with the fact
that the petitioner was merely charged to be the driver on the night of the incident
bolsters the conclusion that the petitioner was indeed not aware of the presence of the
firearm and ammunitions inside the motorcycle compartment. Not being the owner of the
motorcycle, the petitioner cannot even be remotely charged with or presumed to have
knowledge of the subject firearm.

Knowledge is an essential component of intent. Without awareness or knowledge of the

existence of the subject firearm and ammunitions, it cannot be said that the petitioner
has the intent to possess.

While absence of knowledge on the part of the petitioner cannot be established with
absolute certainty in this case, possibilities abound that constrain the Court to acquit the
accused. It is both well settled and elementary principle in criminal law that when the
facts and evidence are susceptible to two or more interpretations, one of which consistent
with the innocence of the accused, and the other with his guilt, acquittal must ensue. 35 As
in that case, the prosecution is regarded to not have hurdled the test of moral certainty
required for conviction.36

The overriding consideration in criminal prosecutions is not whether the court doubts the
innocence of the accused but whether there is a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, in which
case the Court is "under a long standing injunction" to resolve the doubt in favor of the
petitioner.37 Where there is reasonable doubt, presumption of innocence must be favored
and the accused must be exonerated as a matter of right, even though his innocence may
not have been established.38 This is a guarantee that no less that the Constitution
enshrines.

36
People v. Gaborne, G.R. No. 210710, 27 July 2016

Facts:

On 2 February 2007 at around 10:30 in the evening, Rey Perfecto De Luna (De Luna) and Sixto
Elizan  (Elizan) entered a videoke bar  at Barangay Mugdo, Hinabangan, Samar.  Noli Abayan
7 8 9

(Abayan), appellant and Joselito Bardelas (Bardelas) followed five minutes thereafter. 10

While Elizan and De Luna were drinking, singing and merely having fun, four successive
gunshots  were fired through the window. Because of this, Elizan and De Luna were hit from
11

behind.  Later on, De Luna  and Marialinisa Pasana  (Pasana) saw appellant, who was then wearing a
12 13 14

black t-shirt and a black cap, holding a gun aimed at their location. Pasana also saw accused-appellant
and Bardelas escape after the incident. 15

Elizan and De Luna were brought to St. Paul's Hospital at Tacloban City.  Unfortunately, Elizan was
16

pronounced dead upon arrival. De Luna, on the other hand, survived. 17

Appellant steadfastly denied the accusations. According to him, he and his companions ordered for
bottles of beer. However, when they tried to order for more bottles, the waitress refused to give them
their order unless they pay for their previous orders first.  While Abayan was explaining to the father of
18

the owner of the videoke bar, appellant and Barde las went out to urinate,  however, the waitress
19

locked the front door.  While standing outside, he heard the waitress utter the words, "If you will not
20

pay, I [will] have you killed, all of you, right this moment."  He also consistently contend that it was a
21

man wearing black shirt and camouflage pants who fired shots to the videoke bar,  not him. 22

Ruling:

gunpowder as when the hands are bathed in perspiration or washed afterwards. 54

Corpus delicti of the crime can be

established by testimony

With regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm, we
agree with the trial court and the appellate court that the same must be appreciated in the instant case.
In People v. Lualhati, this Court ruled that in crimes involving unlicensed firearm, the prosecution has
the burden of proving the elements thereof, which are: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and (2)
the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding
license or permit to possess the same. 55

Appellant's contention that the corpus delicti was not established for the reason that the firearm used
was not presented as evidence is not persuasive. In People v. Orehuela, this Court held that the
56

existence of the firearm can be established by testimony, even without the presentation of the said
firearm. In the present case, the testimonies of Pasana and De Luna indubitably demonstrated the
existence of the firearms. Furthermore, the certification  from the Philippine National Police that
57

appellant is not a firearm license holder of any caliber proves that he is not licensed to possess the
same. Thus, the prosecution was able to prove the existence of the firearm and that the appellant is
not licensed to possess the same notwithstanding the fact that the firearm used was not presented as
evidence.

37
Illegal Possession of Firearm as an
aggravating circumstance
in the crimes of Murder and
Frustrated Murder

The CA appropriately appreciated the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in

the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder.  Under R.A. No. 1059, use of loose firearm in the
1âwphi1

commission of a crime, like murder, shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. 58

In view of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 8294 and R.A. No. 10591, to Presidential Decree
No. 1866, separate prosecutions for homicide and illegal possession are no longer in order. Instead,
illegal possession of firearm is merely to be taken as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of
murder.  It is clear from the foregoing that where murder results from the use of an unlicensed firearm,
59

the crime is not qualified illegal possession but, murder.· In such a case, the use of the unlicensed
firearm is not considered as a separate crime but shall be appreciated as a mere aggravating
circumstance. Thus, where murder was committed, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no
longer imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance.  The intent of Congress
60

is to treat the offense of illegal possession of firearm and the commission of homicide or murder with
the use of unlicensed firearm as a single offense. 61

In the case at hand, since it was proven that accused-appellant was not a licensed firearm holder,  and
62

that he was positively identified by the witnesses as the one who fired shots against the victims, the
use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder should
be considered as an aggravating circumstance thereof.

The presence of such aggravating circumstance would have merited the imposition of the death
penalty for the crime of Murder. However, in view of R.A. No. 9346, we are mandated to impose on
appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

38
Ramirez v. CA, G.R. No. 93833, 28 September 1995

Facts:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive
to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to
costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the
civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and
other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information charging
petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:

Ruling:

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication
or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by
all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use
of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator"   under this provision of R.A. 4200.
13

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion
that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third
persons. 

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications.
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

39
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the
same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the
conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed."  14

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does
not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a
point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share
or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation,   or
15

signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a
common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)"   These definitions are broad enough to
16

include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which

are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and
private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. 

40
Mamba v. Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1110, 25 June 2001

Facts:

Based on Bulataos report, the NBI set out to entrap Salvador and respondent
judge. The NBI gave Bulatao 12 pieces of P500.00 marked bills amounting to
P6,000.00,  which the latter would give to Salvador and respondent the next
day. 4 cräläwvirtualibräry

Accordingly, at about 7 o'clock in the morning of the following day, October 30,
Bulatao met the NBI operatives in the house of Francisco Mamba, Sr., former
representative of the 3rd District of Cagayan, where the entrapment was
planned. Bulatao was given a tape recorder to record his conversation with
whoever will receive the money. At 9 a.m., Bulatao went to the Municipal Trial
Court and waited for his case to be called. At 10:30 a.m., respondent went out of
his chambers and talked to SPO2 Jonathan Santos and SPO4 Carlos Poli,
representatives of P/Sr. Inspector Salvador in the preliminary investigation.
Respondent then called Bulatao and led him and the two police officers to the
office of the MTC court personnel. Inside, respondent asked Bulatao if he had
the money with him. When he answered in the affirmative, respondent took
them to his chambers and left them there as he proceeded to his sala. After
handing the money to the police officers, Bulatao went out of respondent's
chambers. Upon his signal, the NBI operatives waiting outside respondent's
court then rushed to the judge's chambers and arrested the two police officers
after recovering 11 pieces of P500.00 marked bills in their possession. 5 cräläwvirtualibräry

After the matter was referred by this Court to Executive Judge Orlando Beltran
for investigation, the latter scheduled several hearings for the reception of
evidence for the respondent. The records show that hearings were set on
different dates (December 10, 1997, January 30, 1998, February 10, 1998,
March 3, 1998, March 10, 1998, September 10, 1998, October 9, 1998,
November 11, 1998, January 5, 1999, February 9, 1999, March 4, 1999, and
April 5, 1999), but respondent did not appear despite due notice. Accordingly,
he was deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case was
submitted for decision. Hence only his counter-affidavit was considered, in
which respondent claimed that it was Bulatao who asked permission to talk to
the two police officers. He denied that he took the three to his chambers. 6 cräläwvirtualibräry

On the basis of these facts, the Investigating Judge made the following
recommendation:

41
"The foregoing facts indisputably show that the respondent Judge allowed the
use of his chambers by the two (2) police officers SPOII Jonathan Santos and
SPOIV Carlos Poli and Renato Bulatao, the accused in the criminal case for
illegal possession of firearms, so that they could talk about the "settlement" of
Bulatao's case which was then pending preliminary investigation by the
respondent Judge. Although the two (2) witnesses, Abner Cardenas and Tomas
Latauan, Jr., claimed that they did not hear the subject of the conversation
between Bulatao, on one hand, and the two (2) policemen and the respondent
Judge Dominador L. Garcia, on the other, before the three first-named persons
went inside the chambers of the respondent Judge, it is not difficult to conclude
that they must have talked about the criminal case of Bulatao and its
"settlement." For if the subject-matter of their conversation were other than
said "settlement" there appears no reason or purpose to allow the policemen
and the accused to go inside the judge's chambers and there to continue their
conversation. Simply stated, the respondent judge allowed the two (2)
policemen and the accused Renato Bulatao to use his chambers so that they
could consummate the arrangements for the dismissal of the case, particularly
the payment of the sum of money being demanded as consideration for such
dismissal.

"In this connection, the undersigned Investigating Judge cannot help but refer
to the taped conversation between the two (2) policemen and Renato Bulatao
inside the chamber of the respondent Judge. A portion of the translated dialogue
between Poli and Bulatao, which was in Ilocano, tends to show that the
P6,000.00 pay-off handed by Bulatao to the policemen was not intended for the
respondent Judge but solely for the policemen and their superior, P/Sr.
Inspector Salvador. However, it is not easy to disregard the implication obvious
from the said conversation that the respondent Judge was privy to the entire
transaction. SPOIV Poli pointedly told Bulatao "to take care of the Judge" which
implies that the Judge knew of the pay-off being made and was willing to abide
by the "deal" provided he would be "taken care of" by Bulatao.

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Gaanan v. IAC, G.R. No. L-69809, 16 October 1986

Facts:

"In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel
Montebon were in the living room of complainant’s residence discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City
Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed
conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 3-
5).

"That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer to come to his office
and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer,
Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to
the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. (Exhibit ‘D’, tsn, April 22,
1982, pp. 4-5).

"When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the
telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the
proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the
following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault"

"Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to
the conditions. Laconico answered `Yes’. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for
instructions on where to deliver the money. (tsn, March 10, 1983, pp. 2-12).

"Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the
office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend
Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary,
insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp.
26-33). When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested
by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.

"Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant
demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the
affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against
complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant’s
consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act.

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Ruling:

We rule for the petitioner.

We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of
evidence. The issue is not the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of
a telephone by a third party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the
telephone and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should both
face prison sentences simply because the extension was used to enable them to both
listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.

There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor
and accused Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made
between one person and another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a
public. It is also undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority
to listen to and overhear the caller’s message with the use of an extension telephone line.
Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed
the alleged demand for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a
direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal’s Office if he
knew that another lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that
affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using
a telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or
annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the caller against the listener’s.

Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and
the extra heavy loads which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas,
telephone users often encounter what are called "crossed lines." An unwary citizen who
happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate
to inform police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of
using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the would be
criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous results. chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of
the phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a
device or arrangement as would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six
months to six years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a
public officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension lines to their
bosses’ telephones are sometimes asked to use answering or recording devices to record
business conversations between a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a
recorded message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? Or for that matter,
would a "party line" be a device or arrangement under the law?

The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the
enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to
the same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that
in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the
Senate, telephones and extension telephones were already widely used instruments,
probably the most popularly known communication device.

44
Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed
on the floor of the Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was
made of telephones in the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise
described." The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were
intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.

The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by
the term "device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or
portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set
of a movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming
part of a main telephone set which can be detached or removed and can be transferred
away from one place to another and to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to
get the desired communication coming from the other party or end.

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There
must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a
device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. chanrobles law library : red

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone,

dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use
thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The
telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be
there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to
determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the
statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see
Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113, 120).

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not
exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of
the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to
tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or
presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their
very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the
extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be
moved from place to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely
presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension
telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a
telephone unit which shares its line with another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v.
United States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138): chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

45
"Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the
bell to ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone
conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an extension telephone and
may allow another to overhear the conversation. When such takes place there has been
no violation of any privacy of which the parties may complain. Consequently, one element
of 605, interception, has not occurred." cralaw virtua1aw library

In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no
way if instead of repeating the message he held out his hand-set so that another could
hear out of it and that there is no distinction between that sort of action and permitting
an outsider to use an extension telephone for the same purpose.

Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of
the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension
telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be
construed as not including an extension telephone.

It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment,
persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from
installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or
gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act
of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated
devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension
telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.

46