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Social Justice Society (SJS) vs.

Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug


Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
G.R. No. 157870
3 November 2008
Velasco, Puno, Quisumbing, Carpio, Corona, Azcuna, Nazario, Reyes, Santiago,
Austria-Martinez, Morales, Tinga, Nachura, Leonardo- De Castro, Brion
Under Article VI Disqualifications and Other Prohibitions [Secs 12, 13, & 14]

Petitioner:
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY

Respondents:
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY

Ponente:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO JR., LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING, ANTONIO T.
CARPIO, RENATO C. CORONA, MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, RUBEN T. REYES,
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES, DANTE O. TINGA, ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA,
TERESITA J. LEONARDO – DE CASTRO, ARTURO D. BRION

Facts:
Three consolidated petitions were laid before the court assailing the constitutionality of
Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it required mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s
office with certain offenses, among other personalities, was put in issue.

In the case under G.R. No. 161658 raised before the court on November 3, 2008 by
petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-
election in the May 10, 2004 elections. In it he sought (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 for being unconstitutional in that they
imposed a qualification candidates for senators in addition nto those already provided
for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing
Resolution No. 6486. Petitioner invoked as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI
of the Constitution that it only prescribed a maximum of five qualifications for one to be
a candidate, and imposing to undergo a mandatory drug test, would only create an
additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free.
He also added that there was no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress
or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidate for senator.

Under the case of G.R. No. 157870, petitioned for prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner
Social Justice (SJS), a registered political party, sought to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs
Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing
paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they were
constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative
power when they gave unbounded discretion to schools and employers to determine the
manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause
inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed
undesirable. And for a third, a person’s constitutional right against unreasonable
searches is also breached by said provision.

Whereas, under the case G.R. No. 158633, petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Lasema, Jr., as
citizen and taxpayer, also sought in petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65
that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for
infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search
and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due
process and equal protection guarantees.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.6486
imposed an additional qualification for candidates for senator.
2. Whether or not could Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for
candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution.
3. Whether or not paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 violate the
right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the
equal protection clause which deemed the paragraphs unconstitutional.

Rulings:
1. Yes. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act
should be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. Thus, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165,
as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably required a candidate for
senator or, with like effect, as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted
upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. It was rooted on it having
infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility
requirement for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator. Court’s decision
stated that COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 was no longer enforceable, for by its
terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections
and the candidates running in that electoral event.

2. No. Legislative power remained limited in the sense that it was the subject to
substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise if
the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive
constitutional limitations were chiefly in the Bill of Rights and other provisions,
such Sec. 3, Art. V1 of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of
candidates for senators.

3. Sec. 36(c), RA 9165 was constitutional as the Court viewed and so held that the
provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing of students was, indeed, within the prerogative of educational institutions
to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules
and regulations and policies.

Sec. 36(d), RA 9165 showed that it was constitutional, and did not violate the
right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III,
Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution. And as may be observed under the given
section it prescribed what, in Ople, was a narrowing ingredient by providing that
the employees concerned should be suspected to “random drug test as
contained in the company’s work rules and regulations fro purposes of reducing
the risk in the work place. As to the Court, the need for drug testing to at least
minimize illegal drug use was substantial enough to override the individual’s
privacy interest under the premises.

Sec. 36(f), RA 9165 was found by the Court no valid justification for mandatory
drug testing for persons accused of crimes and was deemed unconstitutional. A
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless, for when a person
suspected of committing a crime were charged, they were singled out and were
impleaded against their will. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused
was a blatant attempt to harness medical test as a toll for criminal prosecution.
Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse, still, the accused persons were
veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

Sec 36 (g) of RA 9165 was unconstitutional. It was basic that if a law or an


administrative rule violated any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and
void and had no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must
conform; no act should be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the
discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government had no
choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever
limits it imposed must be observed.

Wherefore, the Court resolved to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and
declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9168 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870
and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but
declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies were
accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of rA
9165. No costs.

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