EN BANC

G.R. No. 210500, April 02, 2019

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL ROGELIO SOLUTA; REP.
FERNANDO HICAP FOR HIMSELF AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST; CENTER
FOR TRADE UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DAISY ARAGO;
JOSELITO USTAREZ AND SALVADOR CARRANZA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KMU; NENITA GONZAGA, PRESCILA A. MANIQUIZ, REDEN
ALCANTARA, PETITIONERS, v. HON. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, AND EMILIO S. DE QUIROS, JR.,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

This Court is called to determine the validity of the Social Security System premium hike, which took effect in January
2014. The case also involves the application of doctrines on judicial review, valid delegation of powers, and the
exercise of police power.

This resolves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 1 praying that a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to annul the Social Security System premium hike embodied in the following
issuances: (1) Resolution No. 262-s. 2013 dated April 19, 2013;2 (2) Resolution No. 711-s. 2013 dated September 20,
2013;3 and (3) Circular No. 2013-0104 dated October 2, 2013 (collectively, the assailed issuances). Kilusang Mayo
Uno, together with representatives from recognized labor centers, labor federations, party-list groups, and Social
Security System members (collectively, Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al.), filed the case against government officials and
agencies involved in issuing the assailed issuances.

On April 19, 2013, the Social Security Commission issued Resolution No. 262-s. 2013,5 which provided an increase
in: (1) the Social Security System members' contribution rate from 10.4% to 11%; and (2) the maximum monthly salary
credit from P15,000.00 to P16,000.00. The increase was made subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines.6

In a September 6, 2013 Memorandum, the President approved the increase. 7

On September 20, 2013, the Social Security Commission issued Resolution No. 711-s. 2013,8 which approved,
among others, the increase in contribution rate and maximum monthly salary credit.

On October 2, 2013, the Social Security System, through President and Chief Executive Officer Emilio S. De Quiros,
Jr., issued Circular No. 2013-010,9 which provided the revised schedule of contributions that would be in effect in
January 2014. Per the circular, the employer and the employee shall equally shoulder the 0.6% increase in
contributions. Thus, the employer would pay a contribution rate of 7.37% (from 7.07%); the employee, 3.63% (from
3.33%).

On January 10, 2014, Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 10 questioning the
validity of the assailed issuances.

Maintaining that a majority of them are Social Security System members directly affected by the premium hike,
petitioners assert having the requisite locus standi to file the Petition.11 Citing David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,12 they
further argue that the other petitioners' legal personality arises from the transcendental importance of the Petition's
issues.13

Petitioners claim that the assailed issuances were issued per an unlawful delegation of power to respondent Social
Security Commission based on Republic Act No. 8282, or the Social Security Act. In particular, Section 18 14 allegedly
offers vague and unclear standards, and are incomplete in its terms and conditions. This provision, they claim, has
allowed respondent Social Security Commission to fix contribution rates from time to time, subject to the President's
approval. Petitioners claim that the delegation of the power had no adequate legal guidelines to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority. 15

In addition, petitioners claim that the increase in contribution rate violates Section 4(b)(2) of the Social Security
Act,16 which states that the "increases in benefits shall not require any increase in the rate of contribution[.]" They
argue that this proviso prohibits the increase in contributions if there was no corresponding increase in benefits. 17
Petitioners then argue that the increase in contributions is an invalid exercise of police power for not being reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought, as well as for being unduly oppressive on the labor
sector.18 According to them, the Social Security System can extend actuarial life and decrease its unfunded liability
without increasing the premiums they pay. 19

Petitioners further insist that the revised ratio of contributions between employers and employees, per the assailed
issuances, is grossly unjust to the working class and is beyond respondents' powers. They claim that for the purposes
of justice and consistency, respondents should have maintained the 70%-30% ratio in the premium increase.
Changing it, they add, is grossly unfair and detrimental to employees. 20

Petitioners further emphasize that the State is required to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare
under the Constitution.21

Lastly, petitioners pray that a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued to stop the
implementation of the increase in contributions. They aver that stopping it is necessary to protect their substantive
rights and interests. They point out that their earnings for food and other basic needs would be reduced and allocated
instead to defraying the amount needed for contributions. 22

The issues for this Court's resolution are:

First, whether or not this Court can exercise its power of judicial review;

Second, whether or not there is an actual case or controversy;

Third, whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies;

Fourth, whether or not petitioners have legal standing to file the Petition; and

Finally, whether or not the assailed issuances were issued in violation of laws and with grave abuse of discretion.

In connection with the fifth issue, this Court further resolves:

First, whether or not the assailed issuances are void for having been issued under vague and unclear standards
contained in the Social Security Act;

Second, whether or not the increase in Social Security System contributions is reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the purpose sought and is unduly oppressive upon the labor sector; and

Finally, whether or not the revised ratio of contributions between employers and employees is grossly unjust to the
working class and beyond respondent Social Security Commission's power to enact.

This Court denies the Petition for lack of merit.

Procedural infirmities attend the filing of this Petition. To begin with, former President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III,
as President of the Philippines, is improperly impleaded here.

The president is the head of the executive branch, 23 a co-equal of the judiciary under the Constitution. His or her
prerogative is entitled to respect from other branches of government.24 Inter-branch courtesy25 is but a consequence
of the doctrine of separation of powers. 26

As such, the president cannot be charged with any suit, civil or criminal in nature, during his or her incumbency in
office. This is in line with the doctrine of the president's immunity from suit. 27

In David,28 this Court explained why it is improper to implead the incumbent President of the Philippines. The doctrine
has both policy and practical considerations:

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil
or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high
office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to
fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.
However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains
accountable to the people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by
impeachment.29 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

As to the propriety of seeking redress from this Court, it is best to be guided by the power of judicial review as
provided in Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution:

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

This Court has discussed in several cases how the 1987 Constitution has expanded the scope of judicial power from
its traditional understanding. As such, courts are not only expected to "settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable[,]"30 but are also empowered to determine if any government branch or
instrumentality has acted beyond the scope of its powers, such that there is grave abuse of discretion. 31

This development of the courts' judicial power arose from the use and abuse of the political question doctrine during
the martial law era under former President Ferdinand Marcos. In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers,
Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc.,32 this Court held:

In Francisco v. The House of Representatives, we recognized that this expanded jurisdiction was meant "to ensure the
potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by 'any branch or instrumentalities of
government.'" Thus, the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 engraves, for the first time in its history, into black
letter law the "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, whose nature and purpose had been provided in the
sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion[:]

....

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of
fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense
at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political question and got away with it. As a consequence, certain
principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of
political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government
set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to
pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did
not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations
thereof during the martial law regime.

....
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as
those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.33 (Emphasis in the original,
citations omitted)

Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court provides remedies to address grave abuse of discretion by any
government branch or instrumentality, particularly through petitions for certiorari and prohibition:

SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies
of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as
provided in the paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

SECTION 2. Petition for Prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent
to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs
as law and justice may require.

The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof,
copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping
as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

While these provisions pertain to a tribunal's, board's, or an officer's exercise of discretion in judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions, Rule 65 still applies to invoke the expanded scope of judicial power. In Araullo v. Aquino III,34 this
Court differentiated certiorari from prohibition, and clarified that Rule 65 is the remedy to "set right, undo[,] and restrain
any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial[J or ministerial functions."35

This Court further explained:

The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both
are governed by Rule 65. . . .

The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our present system are aptly explained in Delos Santos v.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:

....

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant
the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial
power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from
prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal,
and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a
preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself. The Court expounded on the
nature and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative
function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further
proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity's or person's jurisdiction, or are
accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or
quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its
jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to
afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in
handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or
where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.
Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners' remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an
action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners' allegation that
"respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may
appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and
reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a
tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo
and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, . . . .

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials. 36 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

Here, petitioners filed a Petition for both certiorari and prohibition to determine whether respondents Social Security
System and Social Security Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in releasing the assailed issuances.
According to them, these issuances violated the provisions of the Constitution on the protection of workers, promotion
of social justice, and respect for human rights.37 They further claim that the assailed issuances are void for having
been issued based on vague and unclear standards. They also argue that the increase in contributions is an invalid
exercise of police power as it is not reasonably necessary and, thus, unduly oppressive to the labor sector. Lastly,
they insist that the revised ratio in contributions is grossly unjust to the working class.38

Petitioners must, thus, comply with the requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review: (1) there must be an
actual case or justiciable controversy before this Court; (2) the question before this Court must be ripe for adjudication;
(3) the person challenging the act must be a proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case.39

I (A)

Most important in this list of requisites is the existence of an actual case or controversy. 40 In every exercise of judicial
power, whether in the traditional or expanded sense, this is an absolute necessity.

There is an actual case or controversy if there is a "conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution."41 A petitioner bringing a case before this Court must establish that there is a legally demandable
and enforceable right under the Constitution. There must be a real and substantial controversy, with definite and
concrete issues involving the legal relations of the parties, and admitting of specific relief that courts can grant. 42

This requirement goes into the nature of the judiciary as a co-equal branch of government. It is bound by the doctrine
of separation of powers, and will not rule on any matter or cause the invalidation of any act, law, or regulation, if there
is no actual or sufficiently imminent breach of or injury to a right. The courts interpret laws, but the ambiguities may
only be clarified in the existence of an actual situation.

In Lozano v. Nograles,43 the petitions assailing House Resolution No. 1109 were dismissed due to the absence of an
actual case or controversy. This Court held that the "determination of the nature, scope[,] and extent of the powers of
government is the exclusive province of the judiciary, such that any mediation on the part of the latter for the allocation
of constitutional boundaries would amount, not to its supremacy, but to its mere fulfillment of its 'solemn and sacred
obligation' under the Constitution." 44 The judiciary's awesome power of review is limited in application. 45
Jurisprudence lays down guidelines in determining an actual case or controversy. In Information Technology
Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections,46 this Court required that "the pleadings must show an
active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other; that is, it must
concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue." 47 Further, there must be "an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." 48

Courts, thus, cannot decide on theoretical circumstances. They are neither advisory bodies, nor are they tasked with
taking measures to prevent imagined possibilities of abuse.

Hence, in Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council,49 this Court ruled:

Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has
no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity
the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond
judicial review for lack of ripeness.

The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm
of the surreal and merely imagined, . . . Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step
in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.50 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)

In Republic v. Roque,51 this Court further qualified the meaning of a justiciable controversy. In dismissing the Petition
for declaratory relief before the Regional Trial Court, which assailed several provisions of the Human Security Act, we
explained that justiciable controversy or ripening seeds refer to:

. . . an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or
merely anticipatory. Corollary thereto, by "ripening seeds" it is meant, not that sufficient accrued facts may be
dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper,
animosity, passion, and violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead. The concept describes a state of facts
indicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing
declaration.52 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The existence of an actual case or controversy depends on the allegations pleaded. 53

Here, petitioners allege that the premium hike, through the assailed issuances, violates their rights as workers whose
welfare is mandated to be protected under the Constitution. 54 They further allege that the issuances are grossly unjust
to the working class and were issued beyond the scope of constitutional powers.55

Thus, petitioners' allegations present violations of rights provided for under the Constitution on the protection of
workers, and promotion of social justice. 56 They likewise assert that respondents Social Security Commission and
Social Security System acted beyond the scope of their powers.

This Court, however, notes that petitioners failed to prove how the assailed issuances violated workers' constitutional
rights such that it would warrant a judicial review. Petitioners cannot merely cite and rely on the Constitution without
specifying how these rights translate to being legally entitled to a fixed amount and proportion of Social Security
System contributions.

Moreover, an actual case or controversy requires that the right must be enforceable and legally demandable. A
complaining party's right is, thus, affected by the rest of the requirements for the exercise of judicial power: (1) the
issue's ripeness and prematurity; (2) the moot and academic principle; and (3) the party's standing.57

I (B)

A case is ripe for adjudication when the challenged governmental act is a completed action such that there is a direct,
concrete, and adverse effect on the petitioner.58 It is, thus, required that something had been performed by the
government branch or instrumentality before the court may step in, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. 59

In connection with acts of administrative agencies, ripeness is ensured under the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Courts may only take cognizance of a case or controversy if the petitioner has exhausted all
remedies available to it under the law. The doctrine ensures that the administrative agency exercised its power to its
full extent, including its authority to correct or reconsider its actions. It would, thus, be premature for courts to take
cognizance of the case prior to the exhaustion of remedies, not to mention it would violate the principle of separation
of powers. Thus, in Rule 65 petitions, it is required that no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy is available to the
party. In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc.:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies to a petition for certiorari, regardless of the act of the
administrative agency concerned, i.e., whether the act concerns a quasi-judicial, or quasi-legislative function, or is
purely regulatory.

Consider in this regard that once an administrative agency has been empowered by Congress to undertake a
sovereign function, the agency should be allowed to perform its function to the full extent that the law grants. This full
extent covers the authority of superior officers in the administrative agencies to correct the actions of subordinates, or
for collegial bodies to reconsider their own decisions on a motion for reconsideration. Premature judicial intervention
would interfere with this administrative mandate, leaving administrative action incomplete; if allowed, such premature
judicial action through a writ of certiorari, would be a usurpation that violates the separation of powers principle that
underlies our Constitution.

In every case, remedies within the agency's administrative process must be exhausted before external remedies can
be applied. Thus, even if a governmental entity may have committed a grave abuse of discretion, litigants should, as a
rule, first ask reconsideration from the body itself, or a review thereof before the agency concerned. This step ensures
that by the time the grave abuse of discretion issue reaches the court, the administrative agency concerned would
have fully exercised its jurisdiction and the court can focus its attention on the questions of law presented before it.

Additionally, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies affects the ripeness to adjudicate the
constitutionality of a governmental act, which in turn affects the existence of the need for an actual case or
controversy for the courts to exercise their power of judicial review. The need for ripeness — an aspect of the
timing of a case or controversy — does not change regardless of whether the issue of constitutionality reaches the
Court through the traditional means, or through the Court's expanded jurisdiction. In fact, separately from ripeness,
one other concept pertaining to judicial review is intrinsically connected to it: the concept of a case being moot and
academic.

Both these concepts relate to the timing of the presentation of a controversy before the Court — ripeness relates to its
prematurity, while mootness relates to a belated or unnecessary judgment on the issues. The Court cannot preempt
the actions of the parties, and neither should it (as a rule) render judgment after the issue has already been resolved
by or through external developments.

The importance of timing in the exercise of judicial review highlights and reinforces the need for an actual case or
controversy — an act that may violate a party's right. Without any completed action or a concrete threat of injury to the
petitioning party, the act is not yet ripe for adjudication. It is merely a hypothetical problem. The challenged act must
have been accomplished or performed by either branch or instrumentality of government before a court may come into
the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the
challenged action.

In these lights, a constitutional challenge, whether presented through the traditional route or through the Court's
expanded jurisdiction, requires compliance with the ripeness requirement. In the case of administrative acts, ripeness
manifests itself through compliance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 60 (Emphasis in the
original, citations omitted)

Here, it is clear that petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.

Petitioners allege that they "have no appeal nor any plain, speedy[,] and adequate remedy under the ordinary course
of law except through the instant Petition."61

However, Sections 4 and 5 of the Social Security Act are clear that the Social Security Commission has jurisdiction
over any dispute arising from the law regarding coverage, benefits, contributions, and penalties. The law further
provides that the aggrieved party must first exhaust all administrative remedies available before seeking review from
the courts:

SECTION 4. Powers and Duties of the Commission and SSS. — (a) The Commission. — For the attainment of its
main objectives as set forth in Section 2 hereof, the Commission shall have the following powers and duties:

(1) To adopt, amend and rescind, subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines, such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act;

....
SECTION 5. Settlement of Disputes. — (a) Any dispute arising under this Act with respect to coverage, benefits,
contributions and penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the Commission, and
any case filed with respect thereto shall be heard by the Commission, or any of its members, or by hearing officers
duly authorized by the Commission and decided within the mandatory period of twenty (20) days after the submission
of the evidence. The filing, determination and settlement of disputes shall be governed by the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission.

(b) Appeal to Courts. — Any decision of the Commission, in the absence of an appeal therefrom as herein provided,
shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the date of notification, and judicial review thereof shall be
permitted only after any party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has exhausted his remedies before the Commission.
The Commission shall be deemed to be a party to any judicial action involving any such decision and may be
represented by an attorney employed by the Commission, or when requested by the Commission, by the Solicitor
General or any public prosecutor. (Emphasis supplied)

In Luzon Stevedoring Corporation v. Social Security Commission,62 this Court upheld the jurisdiction and competence
of the Social Security Commission with regard to the grant of authority under the unambiguous provisions of the
Republic Act No. 8282.63 This Court stated:

Section 5 of the Social Security Act . . . on its face, would show that any dispute arising therein "with respect to
coverage entitlement to benefits, collection and settlement of premium contributions and penalties thereon, or any
other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the Commission . . . ." On its face, support for the competence of
respondent Commission to decide . . . would thus seem to be evident. 64 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In Enorme v. Social Security System,65 this Court categorically sustained the Social Security Commission's exclusive
power and jurisdiction to take cognizance of all disputes covered under the Social Security Act. 66 Consequently,
plaintiffs must first exhaust all administrative remedies before judicial recourse is allowed. 67

In Social Security Commission v. Court of Appeals,68 this Court upheld the rules of procedure of the Social Security
Commission with regard to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies before a resort to the courts may be
permitted:

It now becomes apparent that the permissive nature of a motion for reconsideration with the SSC must be read in
conjunction with the requirements for judicial review, or the conditions sine qua non before a party can institute certain
civil actions. A combined reading of Section 5 of Rule VI, quoted earlier, and Section 1 of Rule VII of the SSC's 1997
Revised Rules of Procedure reveals that the petitioners are correct in asserting that a motion for reconsideration is
mandatory in the sense that it is a precondition to the institution of an appeal or a petition for review before the Court
of Appeals. Stated differently, while Rago certainly had the option to file a motion for reconsideration before the SSC,
it was nevertheless mandatory that he do so if he wanted to subsequently avail of judicial remedies.

....

The policy of judicial bodies to give quasi-judicial agencies, such as the SSC, an opportunity to correct its mistakes by
way of motions for reconsideration or other statutory remedies before accepting appeals therefrom finds extensive
doctrinal support in the well-entrenched principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The reason for the principle rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its
mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly. The principle insures orderly
procedure and withholds judicial interference until the administrative process would have been allowed to duly run its
course. This is but practical since availing of administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies. Even comity dictates that unless the available administrative remedies have
been resorted to and appropriate authorities given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum, judicial recourse must be held to be inappropriate, impermissible, premature, and even
unnecessary.69 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Furthermore, jurisdiction is determined by laws enacted by Congress. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies ensures that this legislative power is respected by courts. Courts cannot ignore Congress' determination that
the Social Security Commission is the entity with jurisdiction over any dispute arising from the Social Security Act with
respect to coverage, benefits, contributions, and penalties.

Here, nothing in the records shows that petitioners filed a case before the Social Security Commission or asked for a
reconsideration of the assailed issuances. Moreover, petitioners did not even try to show that their Petition falls under
one (1) of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies:
However, we are not unmindful of the doctrine that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an
ironclad rule. It may be disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely
a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4)
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6)
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and
assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8)
when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, (12) when no administrative review is provided by law,
(13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies, and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot. 70 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is settled in jurisprudence. 71 As early as 1967, this Court has
recognized the requirement that parties must exhaust all administrative remedies available before the Social Security
Commission.72 The Social Security Commission, then, must be given a chance to render a decision on the issue, or to
correct any alleged mistake or error, before the courts can exercise their power of judicial review. This Court ruled:

In the case at bar, plaintiff has not exhausted its remedies before the Commission. The Commission has not even
been given a chance to render a decision on the issue raised by plaintiff herein, because the latter has not appealed
to the Commission from the action taken by the System in insisting upon the enforcement of Circular No.
34.73 (Emphasis in the original)

Thus, petitioners have prematurely invoked this Court's power of judicial review in violation of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Notably, petitioners failed to abide by the principle of primary administrative jurisdiction. This principle states that:

. . . courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of
the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. 74

In Republic v. Gallo:75

[U]nder the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, if an administrative tribunal has jurisdiction over a
controversy, courts should not resolve the issue even if it may be within its proper jurisdiction. This is especially true
when the question involves its sound discretion requiring special knowledge, experience, and services to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.

In Republic v. Lacap:

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts
cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative
tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise
of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. . . .

Thus, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the competence of a court to take cognizance of a
case at first instance. Unlike the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, it cannot be waived. 76 (Emphasis in
the original, citations omitted)

Here, respondent Social Security Commission qualifies as an administrative tribunal, given sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact. This is evident from the qualifications of its members and its powers and duties
under Sections 3 and 4 of the Social Security Act:

SECTION 3. Social Security System. — (a) . . . The SSS shall be directed and controlled by a Social Security
Commission, hereinafter referred to as 'Commission', composed of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly
designated undersecretary, the SSS president and seven (7) appointive members, three (3) of whom shall represent
the workers' group, at least one (1) of whom shall be a woman; three (3), the employers' group, at least one (1) of
whom shall be a woman; and one (1), the general public whose representative shall have adequate knowledge and
experience regarding social security, to be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The six (6) members
representing workers and employers shall be chosen from among the nominees of workers' and employers'
organizations, respectively. . . .
(b) The general conduct of the operations and management functions of the SSS shall be vested in the SSS President
who shall serve as the chief executive officer immediately responsible for carrying out the program of the SSS and the
policies of the Commission. The SSS President shall be a person who has had previous experience in technical and
administrative fields related to the purposes of this Act. . . .

(c) The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President, shall appoint an actuary and such other
personnel as may be deemed necessary; fix their reasonable compensation, allowances and other benefits; prescribe
their duties and establish such methods and procedures as may be necessary to insure the efficient, honest and
economical administration of the provisions and purposes of this Act: . . . Provided, further, That the personnel of the
SSS shall be selected only from civil service eligibles and be subject to civil service rules and regulations:. . .

SECTION 4. Powers and Duties of the Commission and SSS. — (a) The Commission. — For the attainment of its
main objectives as set forth in Section 2 hereof, the Commission shall have the following powers and duties:

(1) To adopt, amend and rescind, subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines, such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act;

(2) To establish a provident fund for the members which will consist of voluntary contributions of employers
and/or employees, self-employed and voluntary members and their earnings, for the payment of benefits to
such members or their beneficiaries, subject to such rules and regulations as it may promulgate and
approved by the President of the Philippines;

(3) To maintain a Provident Fund which consists of contributions made by both the SSS and its officials and
employees and their earnings, for the payment of benefits to such officials and employees or their heirs under
such terms and conditions as it may prescribe;

(4) To approve restructuring proposals for the payment of due but unremitted contributions and unpaid loan
amortizations under such terms and conditions as it may prescribe;

(5) To authorize cooperatives registered with the cooperative development authority or associations registered
with the appropriate government agency to act as collecting agents of the SSS with respect to their
members: Provided, That the SSS shall accredit the cooperative or association: Provided, further, That the
persons authorized to collect are bonded;

(6) To compromise or release, in whole or in part any interest, penalty or any civil liability to SSS in connection
with the investments authorized under Section 26 hereof, under such terms and conditions as it may
prescribe and approved by the President of the Philippines; and

(7) To approve, confirm, pass upon or review any and all actions of the SSS in the proper and necessary
exercise of its powers and duties hereinafter enumerated. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, petitioners should have first filed their case before
respondent Social Security Commission.

I (C)

As for mootness, as earlier mentioned, moot cases prevent the actual case or controversy from becoming justiciable.
Courts cannot render judgment after the issue has already been resolved by or through external developments. This
entails that they can no longer grant or deny the relief prayed for by the complaining party. 77

This is consistent with this Court's deference to the powers of the other branches of government. This Court must be
wary that it is ruling on existing facts before it invalidates any act or rule.78
Nonetheless, this Court has enumerated circumstances when it may still rule on moot issues. In David:

Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third,
when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.79 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

The third exception is corollary to this Court's power under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution. 80 This
Court has the power to promulgate rules and procedures for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts. It applies where there is a clear need to clarify principles and
processes for the protection of rights.

As for the rest of the exceptions, however, all three (3) circumstances must be present before this Court may rule on a
moot issue. There must be an issue raising a grave violation of the Constitution, involving an exceptional situation of
paramount public interest that is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Here, since respondent Social Security Commission is set to issue new resolutions for the Social Security System
members' contributions, the issue on the assailed issuances' validity may be rendered moot. Nonetheless, all the
discussed exceptions are present: (1) petitioners raise violations of constitutional rights; (2) the situation is of
paramount public interest; (3) there is a need to guide the bench, the bar, and the public on the power of respondent
Social Security Commission to increase the contributions; and (4) the matter is capable of repetition yet evading
review, as it involves a question of law that can recur. Thus, this Court may rule on this case.

I (D)

Petitioners argue that they have the legal standing to file the Petition since: (1) a majority of them are Social Security
System members and are directly affected by the increase in contributions; 81 and (2) other petitioners argue that the
standing requirement must be relaxed since the issues they raise are of transcendental importance. 82

On the contrary, not all petitioners have shown the requisite legal standing to bring the case before this Court.

Legal standing is the personal and substantial interest of a party in a case "such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized
grievance."83

Petitioners Joselito Ustarez, Salvador T. Carranza, Nenita Gonzaga, Prescila A. Maniquiz, Reden R. Alcantara, and
Anakpawis Party-List Representative Fernando Hicap, for himself, are Social Security System members who stand to
suffer direct and material injury from the assailed issuances' enforcement. They are, thus, clothed with legal
personality to assail the imposed increase in contribution rates and maximum monthly salary credit.

On the other hand, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno, Anakpawis Party-List, Center for Trade Union and Human Rights,
and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno all failed to show how they will suffer direct and material
injury from the enforcement of the assailed issuances.

However, jurisprudence is replete with instances when a liberal approach to determining legal standing was adopted.
This has allowed "ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations[,] and rulings." 84

This Court has provided instructive guides to determine whether a matter is of transcendental importance: "(1) the
character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the
lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised." 85

Here, the assailed issuances set the new contribution rate and its date of effectivity. The increase in contributions has
been in effect since January 2014. As such, the issue of the validity of increase in contributions is of transcendental
importance. The required legal standing for petitioners must be relaxed.

It is worth noting that this issue affects millions of Filipinos working here and abroad. A substantial portion of members'
salaries goes to the Social Security System fund. To delay the resolution of such an important issue would be a great
disservice to this Court's duty enshrined in the Constitution.

For all these reasons, and despite the technical infirmities in this Petition, this Court reviews the assailed issuances.
 II

Petitioners' attack on the increase in contribution rate and maximum monthly salary credit is two (2)-tiered: (1) they
assail the validity of the exercise of respondents Social Security System and Social Security Commission's power
under the law; and (2) they assail the validity of the delegation of power to respondent Social Security Commission.

Petitioners argue that the assailed issuances are void for being issued under vague and unclear standards under the
Social Security Act. They admit that Section 18 allows the Social Security Commission to fix the contribution rate
subject to several conditions. However, petitioners claim that the term "actuarial calculations" is too vague and
general, and the relationship between the rate of benefits and actuarial calculations is not clearly defined. Thus, they
conclude that the delegation of power to fix the contribution rate is incomplete in all its terms and conditions.

Petitioners' argument lacks merit.

Petitioners are putting in issue not only the validity of the exercise of the delegated power, but also the validity of the
delegation itself. They are, thus, collaterally attacking the validity of the Social Security Act's provisions.

Collateral attacks on a presumably valid law are not allowed. Unless a law, rule, or act is annulled in a direct
proceeding, it is presumed valid.86

Furthermore, the "delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed in the face
of increasing complexity of modern life." 87 In Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign Affairs:88

Given the volume and variety of interactions involving the members of today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature
can promulgate laws dealing with the minutiae aspects of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative
bodies, as the principal agencies tasked to execute laws with respect to their specialized fields, the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. 89

For a valid exercise of delegation, this Court enumerated the following requisites:

All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation must be germane
to the objects and purposes of the law; and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the
standards prescribed by the law. Under the first test or the so-called completeness test, the law must be complete in
all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it. The second test or the sufficient standard test, mandates that there should be adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot.90

Simply put, what are needed for a valid delegation are: (1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and
(2) the presence of a sufficient standard. 91

To determine completeness, all of the terms and provisions of the law must leave nothing to the delegate except to
implement it. "What only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to
determine how the law shall be enforced." 92

More relevant here, however, is the presence of a sufficient standard under the law. Enforcement of a delegated
power may only be effected in conformity with a sufficient standard, which is used "to map out the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and thus 'prevent the delegation from running riot.'" 93 The law must contain the limitations or
guidelines to determine the scope of authority of the delegate.

Not only is the Social Security Act complete in its terms; it also contains a sufficient standard for the Social Security
Commission to fix the monthly contribution rate and the minimum and maximum monthly salary credits.

Section 18 states:

SECTION 18. Employee's Contribution. — (a) Beginning as of the last day of the calendar month when an employee's
compulsory coverage takes effect and every month thereafter during his employment, the employer shall deduct and
withhold from such employee's monthly salary, wage, compensation or earnings, the employee's contribution in an
amount corresponding to his salary, wage, compensation or earnings during the month in accordance with the
following schedule:
 MONTHLY
SALARY RANGE OF MONTHLY
SALARY
BRACKET COMPENSATION CONTRIBUTION
CREDIT

EMPLOYER EMPLOYEE TOTAL

I 1,000.00-1,249.99 1000 50.70 33.30 84.00

II 1,250.00-1,749.99 1500 76.00 50.00 126.00

III 1,750.00-2,249.99 2000 101.30 66.70 168.00

IV 2,250.00-2,749.99 2500 126.70 83.30 210.00

V 2,750.00-3,249.99 3000 152.00 100.00 252.00

VI 3,250.00-3,749.99 3500 177.30 116.70 294.00

VII 3,750.00-4,249.99 4000 202.70 133.30 336.00

VIII 4,250.00-4,749.99 4500 228.00 150.00 378.00

IX 4,750.00-5,249.99 5000 253.30 166.70 420.00

X 5,250.00-5,749.99 5500 278.70 183.70 462.40

XI 5,750.00-6,249.99 6000 304.00 200.00 504.00

XII 6,250.00-6,749.99 6500 329.30 216.70 546.00

XIII 6,750.00-7,249.99 7000 354.70 233.30 588.00

XIV 7,250.00-7,749.99 7500 380.00 250.00 630.00

XV 7,750.00-8,249.99 8000 405.30 266.70 672.00

XVI 8,250.00-8,749.99 8500 430.70 283.30 714.00

XVII 8,750.00-OVER 9000 456.00 300.00 756.00

The foregoing schedule of contribution shall also apply to self-employed and voluntary members.

The maximum monthly salary credit shall be Nine thousand pesos (P9,000.00) effective January Nineteen hundred
and ninety six (1996): Provided, That it shall be increased by One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) every year thereafter
until it shall have reached Twelve thousand pesos (P12,000.00) by Nineteen hundred and ninety nine
(1999): Provided, further, That the minimum and maximum monthly salary credits as well as the rate of contributions
may be fixed from time to time by the Commission through rules and regulations taking into consideration actuarial
calculations and rate of benefits, subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

In relation to Section 18, Section 4(a) prescribes the powers and duties of the Social Security Commission. It provides:

SECTION 4. Powers and Duties of the Commission and SSS. — (a) The Commission. — For the attainment of its
main objectives as set forth in Section 2 hereof, the Commission shall have the following powers and duties:

(1) To adopt, amend and rescind, subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines, such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act;

....

(7) To approve, confirm, pass upon or review any and all actions of the SSS in the proper and necessary exercise of
its powers and duties hereinafter enumerated.
It is evident from these provisions that the legislature has vested the necessary powers in the Social Security
Commission to fix the minimum and maximum amounts of monthly salary credits and the contribution rate. The
agency does not have to do anything except implement the provisions based on the standards and limitations
provided by law.

In fixing the contribution rate and the minimum and maximum amounts of monthly salary credits, the legislature
specified the factors that should be considered: "actuarial calculations and rate of benefits" 94 as an additional limit to
the Social Security Commission's rate fixing power under Section 18, the legislature required the approval of the
President of the Philippines.

The Social Security Act clearly specifies the limitations and identifies when and how the Social Security Commission
will fix the contribution rate and the monthly salary credits.

Actuarial science is derived from the concepts of utilitarianism and risk aversion. Thus:

Just as economic systems are the realm of the economist, social systems are the realm of the sociologist, and
electrical systems are the realm of the electrical engineer, financial security systems have become the realm of the
actuary. The uniqueness of the actuarial profession lies in the actuary's understanding of financial security systems in
general, and the inner workings of the many different types in particular. The role of the actuary is that of the designer,
the adaptor, the problem solver, the risk estimator, the innovator, and the technician of the continually changing field
of financial security systems.

....

Utilitarianism as a philosophy, and risk aversion as a feature of human psychology, lead to the evolution of financial
security systems as a means of reducing the financial consequences of unfavorable events. Actuaries are those
professionals with a deep understanding of, and training in, financial security systems; their reason for being, their
complexity, their mathematics, and the way they work.95 (Emphasis supplied)

Actuarial science is "primarily concerned with the study of consequences of events that involve risk and uncertainty.
Actuarial practice identifies, analyzes and assists in the management of the outcomes—including costs and benefits—
associated with events that involve risk and uncertainty." 96

Actuarial science is relevant to the operation of a social security system, in that "the actuary plays a crucial role in
analysing [the system's] financial status and recommending appropriate action to ensure its viability. More specifically,
the work of the actuary includes assessing the financial implications of establishing a new scheme, regularly following
up its financial status and estimating the effect of various modifications that might have a bearing on the scheme
during its existence."97

The application of actuarial calculations in the operation of a social system scheme requires the determination of
benefits.98 To question the use of "actual calculations" as factor for fixing rates is to question the policy or wisdom of
the legislature, which is a co-equal branch of government.

As a component of the doctrine of separation of powers, courts must never go into the question of the wisdom of the
policy of the law.99 In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.,100 where this Court resolved the issue of the
morality of gambling, this Court held:

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered
inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing
gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the
exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may
prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has
prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress
has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said
that courts do no[t] sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments.
It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary
but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of
government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own
conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice. 101 (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted)

Recently, in Garcia v. Drilon,102 this Court has upheld the long-settled principle that courts do not go into the wisdom
of the law:
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute. Hence, we dare
not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress . . . Congress has made its choice and
it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the
remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is
the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. We only step in when
there is a violation of the Constitution.103 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Hence, the Social Security Act has validly delegated the power to fix the contribution rate and the minimum and
maximum amounts for the monthly salary credits. It is within the scope of the Social Security Commission's power to
fix them, as clearly laid out in the law.

III

On the question of the validity of the exercise of respondents Social Security Commission and Social Security
System's powers, this Court disagrees with petitioners' argument that the increase in contribution rate is prohibited by
Section 4(b)(2) of the Social Security Act. The provision states:

SECTION 4. Powers and Duties of the Commission and SSS. . . .

(b) The Social Security System. — Subject to the provision of Section four (4), paragraph seven (7) hereof, the SSS
shall have the following powers and duties:

....

(2) To require the actuary to submit a valuation report on the SSS benefit program every four (4) years, or more
frequently as may be necessary, to undertake the necessary actuarial studies and calculations concerning increases
in benefits taking into account inflation and the financial stability of the SSS, and to provide for feasible increases in
benefits every four (4) years, including the addition of new ones, under such rules and regulations as the Commission
may adopt, subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines: Provided, That the actuarial soundness of the
reserve fund shall be guaranteed: Provided, further, That such increases in benefits shall not require any increase in
the rate of contribution[.] (Emphasis supplied)

However, an examination of the provision and the assailed issuances reveals that the questioned increase in
contribution rate was not solely for the increase in members' benefits, but also to extend actuarial life.

Social Security Commission Resolution No. 262-s.2013 provides:

RESOLVED, That the Commission approve and confirm, as it hereby approves and confirms, the SSS 2013 Reform
Agenda, the effectivity of which shall be as approved by the President of the Philippines, which aims to address SSS'
unfunded liability, extend SSS' fund life to a more secure level and provide improved benefits for current and future
generations of SSS members, consisting of the following:

1. Increase in the contribution rate from 10.4% to 11%; and

2. Increase in the maximum monthly salary credit (MSC) from P15,000 to P16,000.

The above is based on the recommendation of the President and CEO in his memorandum dated 19 November
2012.104

The provisos in Section 4(b)(2) must not be read in isolation, but within the context of the provision, as well as the
policy of the law.

The two (2) provisos refer to the last part of Section 4(b)(2), or on the System's duty to "provide for feasible increases
in benefits every four (4) years, including the addition of new ones[.]" Section 4(b)(2) states that the "actuarial
soundness of the reserve fund shall be guaranteed" in providing any increase in benefits. As established earlier,
Congress has expressly provided the Social Security System, through the Social Security Commission, power to fix
the minimum and maximum monthly salary credits and the contribution rate.

To disregard actuarial soundness of the reserves would be to go against the policy of the law on maintaining a
sustainable social security system:

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is the policy of the State to establish, develop, promote and perfect a sound
and viable tax-exempt social security system suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines which
shall promote social justice and provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazards
of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial
burden. Towards this end, the State shall endeavor to extend social security protection to workers and their
beneficiaries. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners' argument is, thus, bereft of merit.

In arguing that the increase in contributions is unduly oppressive upon the labor sector, petitioners are again asking
this Court to inquire into the wisdom of the policy behind the issuances made by the executive branch. This, as earlier
said, we cannot and will not do.105

Furthermore, this Court is not persuaded by petitioners' argument that the increase in contributions constitutes an
unlawful exercise of police power.

Police power has been defined as:

. . . state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." [It is] "the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people." 106

To be a valid exercise of police power, there must be a lawful subject and the power is exercised through lawful
means.107 The second requisite requires a reasonable relation between the purpose and the means. 108

Using the parameters above, we hold that the increases reflected in the issuances of respondents are reasonably
necessary to observe the constitutional mandate of promoting social justice under the Social Security Act. The public
interest involved here refers to the State's goal of establishing, developing, promoting, and perfecting a sound and
viable tax-exempt social security system. To achieve this, the Social Security System and the Social Security
Commission are empowered to adjust from time to time the contribution rate and the monthly salary credits. Given the
past increases since the inception of the law, the contribution rate increase of 0.6% applied to the corresponding
monthly salary credit does not scream of unreasonableness or injustice.

Moreover, this Court will not delve into petitioners' argument that the revised ratio of contributions was supposedly
inconsistent with previous schemes.109 Nothing in the law requires that the ratio of contributions must be set at a 70%-
30% sharing in favor of the employee. Supplanting the executive branch's determination of the proper ratio of
contribution would result in judicial legislation, which is beyond this Court's power.

A parameter of judicial review is determining who can read the Constitution. Interpreting its text has never been within
the exclusive province of the courts. Other branches of government are equally able to provide their own interpretation
of the provisions of our organic law, especially on the powers conferred by the Constitution and those delegated by
Congress to administrative agencies.

However, other departments' reading or interpretation is limited only to a preliminary determination. Only this Court
can read the text of the Constitution with finality.

In People v. Vera,110 Associate Justice Jose Laurel elucidated on how laws must be accorded presumption of
constitutionality due to the premise that the Constitution binds all three (3) branches of government. He explained:

Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution. This court, by
clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may
declare an act of the national legislature invalid because in conflict with the fundamental law. It will not shirk from its
sworn duty to enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme law by
setting aside a statute in conflict therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty.

This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed
to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but
on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department
of the government itself." . . . And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained by the sanction of the executive.
The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must be
presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not
intend to violate the Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn
declarations of two of the three grand departments of the government. . . . Then, there is that peculiar political
philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature
and an elective Chief Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the
Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain to require a citation of authorities. 111 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

As such, courts, in exercising judicial review, should also account for the concept of "pragmatic adjudication." 112 As
another parameter of judicial review, adjudicative pragmatism entails deciding a case with regard to the "present and
the future, unchecked by any felt duty to secure consistency in principle with what other officials have done in the
past[.]"113 The pragmatist judge is:

. . . not uninterested in past decisions, in statutes, and so forth. Far from it. For one thing, these are repositories of
knowledge, even, sometimes, of wisdom, and so it would be folly to ignore them even if they had no authoritative
significance. For another, a decision that destabilized the law by departing too abruptly from precedent might have, on
balance, bad results. There is often a trade-off between rendering substantive justice in the case under consideration
and maintaining the law's certainty and predictability. This trade-off, which is perhaps clearest in cases in which a
defense of statute of limitations is raised, will sometimes justify sacrificing substantive justice in the individual case to
consistency with previous cases or with statutes or, in short, with well-founded expectations necessary to the orderly
management of society's business. Another reason not to ignore the past is that often it is difficult to determine the
purpose and scope of a rule without tracing the rule to its origins.

The pragmatist judge thus regards precedent, statutes, and constitutions both as sources of potentially valuable
information about the likely best result in the present case and as signposts that must not be obliterated or obscured
gratuitously, because people may be relying upon them. 114

Going into the validity of respondents' actions, petitioners must show that the assailed issuances were made without
any reference to any law, or that respondents knowingly issued resolutions in excess of the authority granted to them
under the Social Security Act to constitute grave abuse of discretion.

Grave abuse of discretion denotes a "capricious, arbitrary[,] and whimsical exercise of power. The abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, as not to act at all in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility." 115

Any act of a government branch, agency, or instrumentality that violates a statute or a treaty is grave abuse of
discretion.116 However, grave abuse of discretion pertains to acts of discretion exercised in areas outside an agency's
granted authority and, thus, abusing the power granted to it. 117 Moreover, it is the agency's exercise of its power that is
examined and adjudged, not whether its application of the law is correct.118

Here, respondents were only complying with their duties under the Social Security Act when they issued the assailed
issuances. There is no showing that respondents went beyond the powers under the law that amounts to lack of or in
excess of their jurisdiction. Petitioners' claims are unsubstantiated and, as such, merit no finding of grave abuse of
discretion.

IV

Petitioners have failed to show that there was an invasion of a material and substantial right, or that they were entitled
to such a right. Moreover, they failed to show that "there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious and irreparable damage."119 Accordingly, petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction is denied.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Resolution Nos. 262-s. 2013 and 711-s. 2013 issued by the
Social Security Commission, as well as Circular No. 2013-010 issued by the Social Security System, are valid. The
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction is also DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin (C.J.), Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo,
Carandang and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Jardeleza, J., no part and on official business.
J. Reyes, Jr., J., on official leave.
Hernando, J., on leave.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 216930, October 09, 2018

COUNCIL OF TEACHERS v SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Doon sa ang trona’y ginawa ng dunong, bagong kabataa’y sadyang umuusbong, mga kamalia’y kanyang natutunton,
at dangal ng diwa ang pinayayabong; ang liig ng bisyo’y kanyang napuputol; sala’y namumutla kung nasasalubong;
sinusupil niya ang bansang ulupong, at hangal mang tao’y kanyang inaampon.

- Jose Rizal1

Before the Court are consolidated petitions under Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No.
105332 (K to 12 Law), RA No. 101573 (Kindergarten Education Act), and related issuances of the Department of
Education (DepEd), Commission on Higher Education (CHED), Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) implementing the K to 12 Basic Education Program.

History of the Philippines' Basic

Education System

On January 21, 1901, the Philippine Commission created the Department of Public Instruction 4 through Act No. 745.
All schools established under the auspices of the Military Government were made under the control of the officers of
the Department of Public Instruction6 and as early as this law, the primary education established through it was
considered free.7 Act No. 74 also made English language as the basis of all public school instruction 8 and allowed
optional religious instruction in all schools. 9

On March 10, 1917, Act No. 270610 was passed mandating the recognition and inspection of private schools and
colleges by the Secretary of Public Instruction in order to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private
schools and colleges.11 The authority of the Secretary over private schools and colleges was later on expanded under
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 18012. The Secretary was vested with the power "to supervise, inspect and regulate said
schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same."13

The concept of free public primary instruction was also enshrined in the 1935 Philippine Constitution. Specifically, the
State's interest in a complete and adequate system of public education was stated in Section 5, Article XIV:

SEC. 5. All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of and subject to regulation by the State. The
Government shall establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and shall
provide at least free public primary instruction, and citizenship training to adult citizens. All schools shall aim to
develop moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience, and vocational efficiency, and to teach the duties of
citizenship. Optional religious instruction shall be maintained in the public schools as now authorized by law.
Universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom. The State shall create scholarships in arts,
science, and letters for specially gifted citizens. (Emphasis supplied)

On August 7, 1940, CA No. 586,14 otherwise known as the Educational Act of 1940, was enacted to comply with the
constitutional mandate on free public primary education. This resulted in the revision of the public elementary
system,15 which had the following objectives:

x x x (a) to simplify, shorten, and render more practical and economical both the primary and intermediate courses of
instruction so as to place the same within the reach of the largest possible number of school children; (b) to afford
every child of school age adequate facilities to commence and complete at least the primary course of instruction; (c)
to give every child completing the primary course an adequate working knowledge of reading and writing, the
fundamentals of arithmetic, geography, Philippine history and government, and character and civic training; and (d) to
insure that all children attending the elementary schools shall remain literate and become useful, upright and patriotic
citizens.16

To give effect to the foregoing objectives, the Department of Public Instructions was authorized to revise the
elementary school curriculum, to be approved by the President, and adjust the academic school calendar to coincide
with the working season in the Philippines. 17 In addition, Section 4 set standards for the age of admission to public
elementary schools and the minimum length of time for the completion of primary and intermediate courses, to wit:
SEC. 4. With the approval of the President of the Philippines, the required age for admission to the public elementary
schools may be raised to not more than nine years and the length of time required for the completion of the
elementary instruction comprising both the primary and intermediate courses reduced to not less than five years. Any
increase that may be approved in accordance with this section regarding the minimum age of school children shall not
affect those already enrolled before the school year 1940-1941.

The law also made compulsory the attendance and completion of elementary education, except when the child was
mentally or physically incapable of attending school or when it was inconvenient to do so considering the means of
transportation available or on account of economic condition of the parents the child could not afford to continue in
school.18 The parents or guardians or those having control of children therein required to attend school without
justification were liable to a fine of not less than twenty nor more than fifty pesos. 19

In 1947, Executive Order (EO) No. 9420 was issued renaming the Department of Instructions to the Department of
Education.

In 1953, RA No. 89621 or the Elementary Education Act of 1953 was passed, again revising the elementary school
system and instituting a primary course composed of Grades I to IV, and an intermediate course composed of Grades
V to VII, thus:

SEC. 3. To put into effect the educational policy established by this Act, the Department of Education is hereby
authorized to revise the elementary-school system on the following basis: The primary course shall be composed of
four grades (Grades I to IV) and the intermediate course of three grades (Grade V to VII). Pupils who are in the sixth
grade of the time this Act goes into effect will not be required to complete the seventh grade before being eligible to
enroll in the first year of the secondary school: Provided, That they shall be allowed to elect to enroll in Grade VII if
they so desire.

This law also made the enrollment and completion of elementary education mandatory. 22 Every parent or guardian or
other person having custody of any child was required to enroll such child in a public school upon attaining seven
years of age except when: (1) the child enrolled in or transferred in a private school, (2) the distance from the home of
the child to the nearest public school exceeded three kilometers or the said public school was not safely or
conveniently accessible, (3) on account of indigence, the child could not afford to be in school, (4) child could not be
accommodated because of excess enrollment, and (5) child was being homeschooled, under the conditions
prescribed by the Secretary of Education.23

The revision of the elementary school system was guided by the policy stated in Section 5, Article XIV of the 1935
Philippine Constitution and with the consideration that it was "the main function of the elementary school to develop
healthy citizens of good moral character, equipped with the knowledge, habits, and ideals needed for a happy and
useful home and community life."24

In 1972, the Department of Education was again renamed to Department of Education and Culture, through
Proclamation No. 1081;25 and was later on converted to Ministry of Education and Culture in 1978. 26

The 1973 Philippine Constitution maintained the State's interest in a free public elementary education. This concept of
free education was, however, expanded to the secondary level, if the finances of the State permitted it, thus:

Article XV

SEC. 8. (1) All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of, and subject to regulation by, the State. The
State shall establish and maintain a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the
goals of national development.

xxxx

(5) The State shall maintain a system of free public elementary education and, in areas where finances permit,
establish and maintain a system of free public education at least up to the secondary level. (Emphasis
supplied)

Legislations under the 1973 Philippine Constitution implemented the foregoing policies. In Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg.
232,27 or the Education Act of 1982, it was declared as a policy of the State "to establish and maintain a complete,
adequate and integrated system of education relevant to the goals of national development." 28 And under BP Blg. 232,
"Formal Education" was defined as the hierarchically structured and chronologically graded learnings organized and
provided by the formal school system and for which certification was required in order for the learner to progress
through the grades or move to higher levels." 29 It corresponded to (1) elementary education, which was primarily
concerned with providing basic education and usually corresponds to six or seven years, including the preschool
programs;30 and (2) secondary education as "the state of formal education following the elementary level concerned
primarily with continuing basic education and expanding it to include the learning of employable gainful skills,
usually corresponding to four years of high school." 31 This law also created the Ministry of Education, Culture and
Sports,32 which later on became the Department of Education Culture and Sports by virtue of EO No. 117. 33

As shown above, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitution did not state that education at any level was
compulsory. This changed in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which made elementary education mandatory, thus:

Article XIV

SEC. 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and shall take
appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.

SEC. 2. The State shall:

xxxx

(2) Establish and maintain a system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels. Without
limiting the natural right of parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all children of
school age[.] (Emphasis supplied)

Subsequent legislations implemented the policies stated in the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Thus, secondary
education was provided for free in RA No. 6655, 34 otherwise known as the Free Public Secondary Education Act of
1988. Under RA No. 6655, students in public high schools were free from payment of tuition and other school
fees.35 And in response to the mandate of the Constitution to promote and make quality education accessible to all
Filipino citizens, RA No. 6728,36 otherwise known as Government Assistance To Students and Teachers In Private
Education Act, was enacted in 1989 where the voucher system under the Private Education Student Financial
Assistance Program (PESFA)37 was implemented as follows:

SEC. 5. Tuition Fee Supplement for Student in Private High School. — (1) Financial assistance for tuition for students
in private high schools shall be provided by the government through a voucher system in the following manner:

(a) For students enrolled in schools charging less than one thousand
five hundred pesos (P1,500) per year in tuition and other fees during
school year 1988-1989 or such amount in subsequent years as may
be determined from time to time by the State Assistance Council:
The Government shall provide them with a voucher equal to two
hundred ninety pesos (P290.00): Provided, That the student pays in
the 1989-1990 school year, tuition and other fees equal to the tuition
and other fees paid during the preceding academic year: Provided,
further, That the Government shall reimburse the vouchers from the
schools concerned within sixty (60) days from the close of the
registration period: Provided, furthermore, That the student's family
resides in the same city or province in which the high school is
located unless the student has been enrolled in that school during
the previous academic year.
(b) For students enrolled in schools charging above one thousand five
hundred pesos (P1,500) per year in tuition and other fees during the
school year 1988-1989 or such amount in subsequent years as may
be determined from time to time by the State Assistance Council, no
assistance for tuition fees shall be granted by the
Government: Provided, however, That the schools concerned may
raise their tuition fees subject to Section 10 hereof.

(2) Assistance under paragraph (1), subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall be granted and tuition fees under subparagraph
(c) may be increased, on the condition that seventy percent (70%) of the amount subsidized allotted for tuition fee or
of the tuition fee increases shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of teaching and
non-teaching personnel except administrators who are principal stockholders of the school, and may be used to cover
increases as provided for in the collective bargaining agreements existing or in force at the time when this Act is
approved and made effective: Provided, That government subsidies are not used directly for salaries of teachers of
non-secular subjects. At least twenty percent (20%) shall go to the improvement or modernization of buildings,
equipment, libraries, laboratories, gymnasia and similar facilities and to the payment of other costs of operation. For
this purpose, school shall maintain a separate record of accounts for all assistance received from the government, any
tuition fee increase, and the detailed disposition and use thereof, which record shall be made available for periodic
inspection as may be determined by the State Assistance Council, during business hours, by the faculty, the non-
teaching personnel, students of the school concerned, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and other
concerned government agencies.

The voucher system was expanded in RA No. 8545, 38 or the Expanded Government Assistance to Students and
Teachers in Private Education Act, as follows:

SEC. 5. Tuition Fee Supplements for Students in Private High Schools.— (1) Financial Assistance for tuition for
students in private high schools shall be provided by the government through a voucher system in the following
manner:

(a) For students enrolled in schools charging an amount as may be determined by the State Assistance Council, the
government shall provide them with a voucher in such an amount as may be determined by the council: Provided,
That the government shall reimburse the vouchers from the schools concerned within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the close of the registration period.

(2) Assistance under paragraph (1), subparagraph (a) shall be guaranteed to all private high schools participating in
the program for a number of slots as of the effectivity of this Act as the total number of students who availed of tuition
fee supplements for school year 1997-1998: Provided, That the State Assistance Council may in subsequent years
determine additional slots and/or additional participating high schools as may be deemed necessary.

In the same law, elementary and secondary education were redefined. Elementary education was the first six (6)
years of basic education, excluding pre-school and grade seven;39 while secondary education was the next four (4)
years after completion of basic education. 40

In 2001, RA No. 898041 or the Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD) Act was implemented. This law
established a national ECCD system which "refers to the full range of health, nutrition, early education and social
services programs that provide for the basic holistic needs of young children from birth to age six (6), to promote their
optimum growth and development." 42 These programs include, among others, optional center-based and home-based
early childhood education.43

In the same year, RA No. 915544 or the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001 was enacted. Section 2 thereof
declared it as a State policy "to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality basic education and to make
such education accessible to all by providing all Filipino children a free and compulsory education in the elementary
level and free education in the high school level." 45 Basic education was defined in this law as "the education intended
to meet basic learning needs which lays the foundation on which subsequent learning can be based. It encompasses
early childhood, elementary and high school education as well as alternative learning systems for out-of-school youth
and adult learners and includes education for those with special needs." 46 It was also in this law where the then
Department of Education Culture and Sports was renamed the DepEd. 47

Education for All 2015 and the

Kindergarten Education Act

In 2000, at the World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal, one hundred sixty four (164) governments, including the
Philippines, pledged to achieve, by 2015, the following six (6) Education for All (EFA) goals: (1) expansion and
improvement of early childhood care and education; (2) universal access to complete free and compulsory primary
education of good quality; (3) equitable access to appropriate learning and life skills program for youth and adult; (4)
improvement of levels of adult literacy, especially for women; (5) gender parity and equality in education; and (6)
improvement of all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring their excellence. 48

In consonance with the country's agreement to achieve these goals, the DepEd, in 2002, undertook the preparation of
the Philippine EFA 2015 Plan of Action, in collaboration with various stakeholders at the national and field levels,
including relevant government agencies and civil society groups. 49 The primary goal of the Philippine EFA 2015 Plan
of Action, which the government officially adopted in 2006, 50 is to provide "basic competencies for all that will bring
about functional literacy."51 The Philippine EFA 2015 Plan of Action translated the sic (6) Dakar goals into four (4)
objectives and nine (9) critical tasks, to wit:

Universal Goals and Objectives of Philippine EFA 2015

1. Universal Coverage of out of school youth and adults in providing learning needs;
2. Universal school participation and total elimination of dropouts and repeaters in grades 1-3;
3. Universal completion of the full basic education cycle with satisfactory annual achievement levels; and
4. Total community commitment to attain basic education competencies for all.
Nine Urgent and Critical Tasks

1. Make every school continuously improve its performance.

2. Expand early childhood care and development coverage to yield more EFA benefits.
3. Transform existing non-formal and informal learning options into a truly viable alternative learning
system yielding more EFA benefits;
4. Get all teachers to continuously improve their teaching practices.
5. Increase the cycle of schooling to reach 12 years of formal basic education.
6. Continue enrichment of curriculum development in the context of pillars of new functional literacy;
7. Provide adequate and stable public funding for country-wide attainment of EFA goals;
8. Create network of community-based groups for local attainment of EFA goals; Monitor progress in
effort towards attainment of EFA goals. 52

On January 20, 2012, the Philippine Congress took a pivotal step towards the realization of the country's EFA goals
with the enactment of the Kindergarten Education Act. Section 2 thereof declared it the policy of the State "to provide
equal opportunities for all children to avail of accessible mandatory and compulsory kindergarten education that
effectively promotes physical, social, intellectual, emotional and skills stimulation and values formation to sufficiently
prepare them for formal elementary schooling" and "to make education learner-oriented and responsive to the needs,
cognitive and cultural capacity, the circumstances and diversity of learners, schools and communities through the
appropriate languages of teaching and learning."

The Kindergarten Education Act institutionalized kindergarten education, which is one (1) year of preparatory
education for children at least five years old, 53 as part of basic education, and is made mandatory and compulsory for
entrance to Grade 1.54 It also mandated the use of the learner's mother tongue, or the language first learned by a
child,55 as the primary medium of instruction in the kindergarten level in public schools, except for the following cases
wherein the primary medium of instruction would be determined by the DepEd:

a. When the pupils in the kindergarten classroom have different mother tongues or when some of them speak
another mother tongue;

b. When the teacher does not speak the mother tongue of the learners;

c. When resources, in line with the use of the mother tongue, are not yet available; and

d. When teachers are not yet trained how to use the Mother Tongue Based Multilingual Education (MTB-MLE)
program.56

On April 17, 2012, DepEd, in consultation with the Department of Budget and Management, issued DepEd Order (DO)
No. 32,57 the Kindergarten Education Act's implementing rules and regulations. DO No. 32 provides that the
Kindergarten Education General Curriculum (KEGC) shall focus on the child's total development according to his/her
individual needs and socio-cultural background. The KEGC shall be executed in a play-based manner and shall
address the unique needs of diverse learners, including gifted children, children with disabilities, and children
belonging to indigenous groups.58

The K to 12 Law and related issuances.

Before the enactment of the K to 12 Law, the Philippines was the only country in Asia and among the three remaining
countries in the world that had a 10-year basic education program.59 The expansion of the basic education program,
however, is an old proposal dating to 1925. The studies are as follows: (a) the Monroe Survey (1925) stated that
secondary education did not prepare for life and recommended training in agriculture, commerce, and industry; (b) the
Prosser Survey (1930) recommended to improve phases of vocational education such as 7 th grade shopwork,
provincial schools, practical arts training in the regular high schools, home economics, placement work, gardening,
and agricultural education; (c) the UNESCO Mission Survey (1949) recommended the restoration of Grade 7; (d)
the Education Act of 1953 mandated that the primary course be composed of four grades (Grades I to IV) and the
intermediate course of three grades (Grade V to VII); (e) the Swanson Survey (1960) recommended the restoration of
Grade 7; (f) Presidential Commission to Survey Philippine Education (PCSPE) (1970) gave high priority to the
implementation of an 11-year program, consisting of six years of compulsory elementary education and five years of
secondary education; (g) Congressional Commission on Education (EDCOM) Report (1991), recommended that if one
year was to be added, it might either be seven years of elementary education or five years of secondary education; (h)
Presidential Commission on Educational Reforms (2000) proposed to include the establishment of a one-year pre-
baccalaureate system that would also bring the Philippines at par with other countries; and (i) Presidential Task Force
on Education (2008) emphasized that in a 12-year pre-university program, it was important "to specify the content of
the 11th and the 12th years and benchmark these with programs abroad."60
Despite these proposals, the 10-year basic education cycle remained in force. Thus, prior to the enactment of the K to
12 Law, the Philippines, joined only by Djibouti and Angola, were the only countries in the world with a 10-year basic
education system.61

To be at par with international standards and in line with the country's commitment in EFA 2015, the Philippine
Congress, on May 15, 2013, passed the K to 12 Law, which took effect on June 8, 2013. The K to 12 Law seeks to
achieve, among others, the following objectives: (1) decongest the curriculum; (2) prepare the students for higher
education; (3) prepare the students for the labor market; and (4) comply with global standards. 62

One of the salient features of the K to 12 Law is the expansion of basic education from ten (10) years to thirteen (13)
years, encompassing "at least one (1) year of kindergarten education, six (6) years of elementary education, and six
(6) years of secondary education x x x. Secondary education includes four (4) years of junior high school and two (2)
years of senior high school education." 63

The K to 12 Law also adopts the following key changes in the Basic Education Curriculum (BEC): (1) Mother Tongue
(MT) will be used as a primary medium of instruction from Kindergarten to Grade 3 and an additional learning area in
Grades 1 to 3;64 (2) the time allotted per learning area in elementary will generally be reduced to allow off-school
learning experiences at home or in the community; while the time allotment in secondary level will generally increase
in view of the additional two (2) years in Senior High School; 65 (3) the spiral progression approach will be used in
Science, Mathematics, Araling Panlipunan, MAPEH and Edukasyon sa Pagpapakatao, wherein the learning process
is built upon previously learned knowledge for students to master their desired competencies by revisiting the subject
several times and relating new knowledge or skills with the previous one; 66 and (4) specialization courses will be
offered to prepare students for employment or engage in profitable enterprise after high school. 67

Apart from mastering core subjects, the additional two (2) years of Senior High School will allow students to choose
among academic, technical-vocational, or sports and arts, as specialization, based on aptitude, interest and school
capacity.68 Hence, graduates of Senior High School under the K to 12 BEC are envisioned to already be prepared for
employment, entrepreneurship, or middle-level skills development should they opt not to pursue college education. 69

Furthermore, the K to 12 Law extends the benefits provided under RA No. 8545 to qualified students. 70 DepEd is
mandated to engage the services of private education institutions and non-DepEd schools offering Senior High School
through the programs under RA No. 8545 and other financial arrangements based on the principle of public-private
partnership.

The K to 12 Law also imposes upon the DepEd, CHED, and TESDA, the task to promulgate the implementing rules
and regulations, which shall provide, among others, appropriate strategies and mechanisms to ensure the smooth
transition from the existing 10-year basic education cycle to the K to 12 cycle addressing issues such as multi-year
low enrollment and displacement of faculty of Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and Technical Vocational
Institutions (TVIs).71

DepEd is likewise mandated to coordinate with TESDA and CHED in designing the enhanced BEC to ensure college
readiness and avoid remedial and duplication of basic education subjects;72 and to consult other national government
agencies and other stakeholders in developing the K to 12 BEC, which shall adhere to the following standards:

(a) The curriculum shall be learner-centered, inclusive and developmentally

appropriate;
(b) The curriculum shall be relevant, responsive and research-based;
(c) The curriculum shall be culture-sensitive;
(d) The curriculum shall be contextualized and global;
(e) The curriculum shall use pedagogical approaches that are constructivist, inquiry-
based, reflective, collaborative and integrative;
(f) The curriculum shall adhere to the principles and framework of Mother Tongue-
Based Multilingual Education (MTB-MLE) which starts from where the learners are
and from what they already knew proceeding from the known to the unknown;
instructional materials and capable teachers to implement the MTB-MLE
curriculum shall be available;
(g) The curriculum shall use the spiral progression approach to ensure mastery of
knowledge and skills after each level; and
(h) The curriculum shall be flexible enough to enable and allow schools to localize,
indigenize and enhance the same based on their respective educational and
social contexts. The production and development of locally produced teaching
materials shall be encouraged and approval of these materials shall devolve to the
regional and division education units.73
On September 4, 2013, the K to 12 implementing rules and regulation (K to 12 IRR) were issued.74 Rule VI of the K to
12 IRR covers the implementation of RA No. 8545 for qualified students enrolled in senior high school. The programs
of assistance are available primarily to students who complete junior high school in public schools and taking into
consideration other factors such as income background and financial needs of the students. 75 The forms of assistance
that the DepEd may provide include a voucher system, "where government issues a coupon directly to students to
enable them to enroll in eligible private education institutions or non-DepEd public schools of their choice under a full
or partial tuition or schooling subsidy".76

Further, Section 31 of the K to 12 IRR confers upon the DepEd, in collaboration with the DOLE, CHED and TESDA,
the duty to promulgate the appropriate joint administrative issuance to ensure the sustainability of the private and
public educational institutions, and the promotion and protection of the rights, interests and welfare of teaching and
non-teaching personnel. For this purpose, the DOLE was tasked to convene a technical panel with representatives
from the DepEd, CHED, TESDA and representatives from both teaching and non-teaching personnel organizations,
and administrators of educational institutions. 77

In compliance with the foregoing mandate, DOLE organized three area-wide tripartite education fora on K to 12 in
Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. DOLE also conducted regional consultations with HEIs, teaching and non teaching
personnel.78

As a result of the tripartite consultations, DOLE, DepEd, TESDA and CHED issued on May 30, 2014 the Joint
Guidelines on the Implementation of the Labor and Management Component of Republic Act No. 10533 (Joint
Guidelines). The Joint Guidelines was issued to (a) ensure the sustainability of private and public educational
institutions; (b) protect the rights, interests, and welfare of teaching and non-teaching personnel; and (c) optimize
employment retention or prevent, to the extent possible, displacement of faculty and non-academic personnel in
private and public HEIs during the transition from the existing 10 years basic education cycle to the enhanced K to 12
basic education.79

To achieve these goals, the Joint Guidelines provides that the following, in the exercise of management prerogative,
shall be observed:

a. ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy making processes affecting their rights, duties, and
welfare;

b. the DepEd and private educational institutions may hire, as may be relevant to the particular subject,
graduates of science, mathematics, statistics, engineering, music and other degree courses needed to teach
in their specialized subjects in elementary and secondary education, provided they passed the Licensure
Examination for Teachers;

c. graduates of technical-vocational courses may teach in their specialized subjects in secondary education,
provided that they possess the necessary certification from TESDA and undergo in-service training;

d. the DepEd and private educational institutions may hire practitioners, with expertise in the specialized learning
areas, to teach in the secondary level, provided that they teach on part-time basis only;

e. faculty of HEIs offering secondary education shall be given priority in hiring, provided said faculty is a holder of
a relevant Bachelor's degree and must have satisfactorily served as a full time HEI faculty;

f. if it is impossible for the affected HEI faculty members and academic support personnel to be placed within
the institution, they shall be prioritized in hiring in other private and public senior high schools (SHS);

g. faculty of HEIs may be allowed to teach in their general education or subject specialties in secondary
education, provided said faculty is a holder of a relevant Bachelor's degree and must have satisfactorily
served as a full time HEI faculty;

h. without prejudice to existing collective bargaining agreements or institutional policies, HEI faculty and non-
teaching personnel who may not be considered may avail of the retrenchment program pursuant to the
provisions of the Labor Code; and

i. in educational institutions where there is no collective agreement or organized labor union, management may
adopt policies in consultation with faculty or non-academic clubs or associations in the school consistent and
in accordance with the aforementioned criteria.80

K to 12 Program Implementation
and CHED Memorandum Order
(CMO) No. 20, Series of 2013
The K to 12 basic education was implemented in parts. Universal kindergarten was offered starting School Year (SY)
2011-2012.81 In 2012, DepEd started unclogging the BEC to conform to the K to 12 Curriculum. Thus, DO No. 31 was
issued setting forth policy guidelines in the implementation of the Grades 1 to 10 of the K to 12 Curriculum. DO No. 31
provides that effective SY 2012-2013, the new K to 12 BEC, which follows a spiral approach across subjects and uses
the mother tongue as a medium of instruction from Grades 1 to 3, shall be first implemented in Grades 1 and 7 of all
public elementary and secondary schools; and while private schools are enjoined to do the same, they may further
enhance the curriculum to suit their school's vision/mission. 82

Five (5) school years from SY 2012-2013, the implementation of the K to 12 basic education was to be completed. In
2018, the first group of Grade 6 and Grade 12 students under the K to 12 BEC are set to graduate.

Accordingly, to accommodate the changes brought about by the K to 12 Law, and after several public consultations
with stakeholders were held,83 CMO No. 20, entitled General Education Curriculum: Holistic Understandings,
Intellectual and Civic Competencies was issued on June 28, 2013. CMO No. 20 provides the framework and rationale
of the revised General Education (GE) curriculum. It sets the minimum standards for the GE component of all degree
programs that applies to private and public HEIs in the country. 84

Previously, there were two General Education Curricula (GECs), GEC-A and GEC-B. CMO No. 59, Series of 1996
provided for GEC-A, which required 63 units divided into 24 units of language and literature, 15 units of mathematics
and natural sciences, 6 units of humanities, 12 units of social sciences, and 6 units of mandated subjects. This was
taken by students majoring in the humanities, social sciences, or communication. Meanwhile, CMO No. 4, series of
1997 implemented GEC-B, which was taken by all other students. GEC-B required 51 units divided into 21 units of
language and humanities, 15 units of mathematics, natural sciences, and information technology, 12 units of social
sciences, and 3 units of mandated subjects.

Under CMO No. 20, the GE curriculum became outcome-oriented and categorized into: (a) Intellectual Competencies;
(b) Personal and Civic Competencies; and (c) Practical Responsibilities. 85 This GE curriculum requires the completion
of 36 units as compared to the previous 63/51 units requirement. These 36 units are distributed as follows: 24 units of
core courses; 9 units of elective courses; and 3 units on the life and works of Rizal. 86 The required GE core courses
are: (1) Understanding the Self; (2) Readings in Philippine History; (3) The Contemporary World; (4) Mathematics in
the Modern World; (5) Purposive Communication; (6) Art Appreciation; (7) Science, Technology and Society; and (8)
Ethics.87 Further, the GE curriculum provided an element of choice88 through elective courses which include the
following: (1) Mathematics, Science and Technology; (2) Social Sciences and Philosophy; and (3) Arts and
Humanities.89

The Petitions

Claiming that the K to 12 Basic Education Program violates various constitutional provisions, the following petitions
were filed before the Court praying that the Kindergarten Education Act, K to 12 Law, K to 12 IRR, DO No. 31, Joint
Guidelines, and CMO No. 20, be declared unconstitutional:

1. Petition for Certiorari90 filed by Council for Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines
and several other organizations duly organized under Philippine laws, representing faculty and staff of
colleges and universities in the Philippines, docketed as G.R. No. 216930;

2. Petition to Declare Republic Act No. 10533, otherwise known as the "Enhanced Basic Education Act of 2013,"
as Unconstitutional and/or Illegal 91 filed by petitioners Antonio "Sonny" Trillanes, Gary C. Alejano, and
Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers, and members of Congress, docketed
as G.R. No. 217752;

3. Petition to Declare Unconstitutional, Null, Void, and Invalid Certain Provisions of R.A. No. 10533 And Related
Department of Education (DepEd) Implementing Rules and Regulations, Guidelines or Orders92 filed by
petitioners Eduardo R. Alicias, Jr. and Aurelio P. Ramos, Jr., in their capacities as citizen, taxpayer, parent
and educator, docketed as G.R. No. 218045;

4. Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus93 filed by petitioner Richard Troy A. Colmenares in his
capacity as citizen invoking strong public interest and transcendental importance, petitioners Kathlea
Francynn Gawani D. Yañgot and several others, as a class, and on behalf of others who stand to suffer direct
injury as a result of the implementation of the K to 12 Basic Education Program, and petitioners Rene Luis
Tadle and several others, in their capacities as taxpayers concerned that public funds are being illegally and
improperly disbursed through the enforcement of the invalid or unconstitutional laws and issuances, docketed
as G.R. No. 218098;

5. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,94 docketed as G.R. No. 218123, filed by Antonio Tinio, et al., suing in
their capacities as taxpayers and concerned citizens;
 6. Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus95 filed by petitioners Spouses Ma. Dolores M. Brillantes and
Severo L. Brillantes and several others, as students, parents and teachers, who stand to suffer direct injury
from the K to 12 BEC and implementation of the two (2) additional years of high school, docketed as G.R. No.
218465; and

7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera and several others who are faculty and
staff of colleges and universities in the Philippines who stand to suffer direct injury in the implementation of
CMO No. 20 and Congressman Antonio Tinio and other party-list representatives in their capacities as
members of the Congress, who are also collectively suing in their capacities as taxpayers and concerned
citizens, docketed as G.R. No. 217451.96

The present consolidated petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against the implementation of the K to 12 Law and other administrative issuances in relation
thereto.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the public respondents, opposed these petitions. 97 Private respondent Miriam
College in G.R. No. 216930 also filed its Comment/Opposition. 98

On April 21, 2015, the Court issued a TRO in G.R. No. 217451, enjoining the implementation of CMO No. 20 insofar
only as it excluded from the curriculum for college the course Filipino and Panitikan as core courses. 99

However, in G.R. Nos. 216930, 217752, 218045, 218098, 218923 and 218465, the Court denied petitioners' prayer for
issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction on the implementation of the K to 12 Law, its implementing
rules, the Kindergarten Education Act, and other administrative issuances in relation thereto, for lack of merit. 100

In the Resolutions dated April 5, 2016101 and April 12, 2016,102 the Court directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.

The Issues

Culled from the submissions of petitioners, public respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and
respondent Miriam College, the following are the issues for the Court's resolution:

A. Procedural:

1. Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy;

2. Whether certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the laws and issuances.

B. Substantive:

1. Whether the K to 12 Law was duly enacted;

2. Whether the K to 12 Law constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power;

3. Whether DO No. 31 is valid and enforceable;

4. Whether the K to 12 Law, K to 12 IRR, DO No. 31 and/or the Joint Guidelines contravene provisions
of the Philippine Constitution on:

a. establishing and maintaining a system of free elementary and high school education and
making elementary education compulsory for all children of school age (Section 2[2], Article
XIV);

b. the right to accessible and quality education at all levels and duty of the State to make such
education accessible to all (Section 1, Article XIV);

c. the primary duty of parents to rear and prepare their children (Section 2[2], Article XIV);

d. the right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study (Section 5[3], Article XIV);

e. patriotism and nationalism (Sections 13 and 17, Article II, Section 3[1] and [2], Article XIV);
 f. the use of Filipino as medium of official communication and as language of instruction in the
educational system (Section 6, Article XIV); and regional languages as auxiliary media of
instruction (Section 7, Article XIV);

g. academic freedom (Section 5[2], Article XIV); and

h. the right of labor to full protection (Section 18, Article II, Section 3, Article XIII and Section
5[4], Article XIV);

5. Whether CMO No. 20 contravenes provisions of the Philippine Constitution on:

a. the use of Filipino as medium of official communication and as language of instruction in the
educational system (Section 6, Article XIV);

b. preservation, enrichment, and dynamic evolution of a Filipino national culture (Sections 14,
15, and 16, Article XIV);

c. inclusion of the study of the Philippine Constitution as part of the curriculum of all educational
institutions (Section 3[1], Article XIV);

d. giving priority to education to foster patriotism and nationalism (Section 17, Article II and
Sections 2 and 3, Article XIV); and

e. the protection of the rights of workers and promotion of their welfare (Section 18, Article II and
Section 3, Article XIII).

6. Whether CMO No. 20 violates the following laws:

a. RA No. 7104 or the Commission on the Filipino Language Act;

b. BP Blg. 232 or the Education Act of 1982; and

c. RA No. 7356 or the Act Creating the National Commission for Culture and the Arts,
Establishing National Endowment Fund for Culture and the Arts and For Other Purposes.

7. Whether the K to 12 Law violates petitioners' right to substantive due process and equal protection of
the laws.

THE COURT'S RULING

Procedural Issues

Power of Judicial Review and the

Remedies of Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus

The OSG submits that the cases filed by petitioners involve the resolution of purely political questions which go into
the wisdom of the law: they raise questions that are clearly political and non-justiciable and outside the power of
judicial review.103 The OSG further asserts that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition sought by petitioners are
unwarranted because Congress, DepEd and CHED did not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function, nor
did they unlawfully neglect the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty, with regard to the
assailed issuances.104

The Court disagrees.

The political question doctrine is "no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review" 105 under the
expanded definition of judicial power of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Section 1, Article VIII thereof authorizes
courts of justice not only "to settle actual case controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable" but also "to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

In determining whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by
any branch or instrumentality of the government, the Court is guided primarily, by the Constitution, and secondarily, by
existing domestic and international law, which set limits or conditions to the powers and functions conferred upon
these political bodies.106 Thus, when a case is brought before the Court with serious allegations that a law or
executive issuance infringes upon the Constitution, as in these consolidated cases, it becomes not only the right but in
fact the duty of the Court to settle the dispute.107 In doing so, the Court is "not judging the wisdom of an act of a
coequal department, but is merely ensuring that the Constitution is upheld." 108 And, if after said review, the Court does
not find any constitutional infringement, then, it has no more authority to proscribe the actions under review.109

Moreover, that the assailed laws and executive issuances did not involve the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial
function is of no moment. Contrary to the Solicitor General's assertion, it has long been judicially settled that under the
Court's expanded jurisdiction, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, any act of any branch or
instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.110

That said, the Court's power is not unbridled authority to review just any claim of constitutional violation or grave
abuse of discretion. The following requisites must first be complied with before the Court may exercise its power of
judicial review, namely: (1) there is an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
petitioner has standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance, i.e., he has a personal and substantial
interest in the case that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the act or
issuance; (3) the question of constitutionality is raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is
the very lis mota of the case.111 Of these four, the most important are the first two requisites, and thus will be the focus
of the following discussion.

Actual case or controversy

An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute since the courts
will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve
hypothetical or moot questions.112 Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
"ripeness," and a question is ripe when the act being challenged has a direct effect on the individual challenging
it.113 For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that an act had been accomplished or
performed by either branch of government before a court may interfere, and the petitioner must allege the existence of
an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. 114

Relevantly, in Sps. Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,115 (Imbong) where the constitutionality of the Reproductive Health Law was
challenged, the Court found that an actual case or controversy existed and that the same was ripe for judicial
determination considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules had already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law had already been passed. Moreover, the petitioners therein had sufficiently shown that
they were in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of. 116

Similar to Imbong, these consolidated cases present an actual case or controversy that is ripe for adjudication. The
assailed laws and executive issuances have already taken effect and petitioners herein, who are faculty members,
students and parents, are individuals directly and considerably affected by their implementation.

Legal Standing

Legal standing refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. 117 In constitutional cases, which are often brought through
public actions and the relief prayed for is likely to affect other persons, 118 non-traditional plaintiffs have been given
standing by this Court provided specific requirements have been met. 119

When suing as a concerned citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties
by reason of the statute or act complained of. 120

In the case of taxpayers, they are allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law.121

On the other hand, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers, and privileges vested by
the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which infringe upon
their legislative prerogatives.122

An organization, asserting the rights of its members, may also be granted standing by the Court. 123
Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 216930 and 218465 include organizations/federations duly organized under the laws of the
Philippines, representing the interest of the faculty and staff of their respective colleges and universities, who allegedly
are threatened to be demoted or removed from employment with the implementation of the K to 12 Law. Petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 217752 and 218045 are suing as citizens, taxpayers and in their personal capacities as parents whose
children would be directly affected by the law in question. Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 218123 and 217451 are suing in
their capacities as teachers who allegedly are or will be negatively affected by the implementation of the K to 12
Law and CMO No. 20, respectively, through job displacement and diminution of benefits; and as taxpayers who have
the right to challenge the K to 12 Law and CMO No. 20 as public funds are spent and will be spent for its
implementation.

Under the circumstances alleged in their respective petitions, the Court finds that petitioners have sufficient legal
interest in the outcome of the controversy. And, considering that the instant cases involve issues on education, which
under the Constitution the State is mandated to promote and protect, the stringent requirement of direct and
substantial interest may be dispensed with, and the mere fact that petitioners are concerned citizens asserting a public
right, sufficiently clothes them with legal standing to initiate the instant petition. 124

Substantive Issues

I.

K to 12 Law was duly enacted

Petitioners question the validity of the enactment of the K to 12 Law claiming that: (1) sectors which would be directly
affected by the K to 12 Basic Education Program were deprived of their right, under Section 16, Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution, to be consulted or participate in matters which involved their interest prior to the passage of the
law;125 (2) the enrolled bill which the President signed into law varies significantly from the reconciled version of the bill
as approved by Congress and reported in the Senate Journal on January 30, 2013, 126 and that the Court, pursuant to
its ruling in Astorga v. Villegas,127 (Astorga) should look into the entries in the Journal to determine whether the K to
12 Law was duly enacted;128 and (3) the K to 12 Law was incomplete because it failed to provide sufficient standards
by which the DepEd, CHED and TESDA, might be guided in addressing the possible impact of the implementation of
the K to 12 Law on labor; thus, Section 31 of the K to 12 IRR and the Joint Guidelines, which spring forth from such
undue delegation of legislative power, are invalid and unconstitutional. 129

For its part, the OSG contends that the K to 12 Law was enacted in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the
Constitution and that contrary to petitioners' assertion, the text of the enrolled bill which was eventually signed into law
is not different from the consolidated bill drafted by the Bicameral Conference Committee and approved by the Senate
and House of Representatives.130 Further, the OSG argues that there is no undue delegation of legislative power
because the K to 12 Law provides a sufficient standard on the impact on labor due to its implementation.131

Private respondent Miriam College shares the same view that the K to 12 Law sufficiently provided standards to guide
the relevant administrative agencies and the private educational institutions in the implementation of the K to 12
Law and address all issues on labor.132

The Court holds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the K to 12 Law was validly enacted.

First, petitioners' claim of lack of prior consultations is belied by the nationwide regional consultations conducted by
DepEd pursuant DepEd Memorandum Nos. 38 133 and 98,134 series of 2011. The regional consultations, which aimed
"to inform the public [and] to elicit their opinions, thoughts, and suggestions about the K to 12 program," 135 ran from
February to March 2011 and were participated in by students, parents, teachers and administrators, government
representatives, and representatives from private schools and private sectors. 136

The Philippine Congress, in the course of drafting the K to 12 Law, also conducted regional public hearings between
March 2011 to February 2012, wherein representatives from parents-teachers' organizations, business, public/private
school heads, civil society groups/non-government organizations/private organizations and local government officials
and staffs were among the participants. 137 And even assuming that no consultations had been made prior to the
adoption of the K to 12, it has been held that the "[p]enalty for failure on the part of the government to consult could
only be reflected in the ballot box and would not nullify government action." 138

Second, the enrolled bill doctrine applies in this case. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the
Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress
that it was passed is conclusive not only as to its provisions but also as to its due enactment. 139 The rationale behind
the enrolled bill doctrine rests on the consideration that "[t]he respect due to coequal and independent departments
requires the [Judiciary] to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated
in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, [as in the instant consolidated
cases], whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution." 140

Jurisprudence will show that the Court has consistently adhered to the enrolled bill doctrine. Claims that the required
three-fourths vote for constitutional amendment has not been obtained, 141 that irregularities attended the passage of
the law,142 that the tenor of the bill approved in Congress was different from that signed by the President, 143 that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill,144 and even claims that the enrolled copy of the bill sent to the
President contained provisions which had been "surreptitiously" inserted by the conference committee, 145 had all failed
to convince the Court to look beyond the four corners of the enrolled copy of the bill.

As correctly pointed out by private respondent Miriam College, petitioners' reliance on Astorga is quite misplaced.
They overlooked that in Astorga, the Senate President himself, who authenticated the bill, admitted a mistake and
withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider. 146 Without such attestation,
and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the Court was constrained to consult the entries in the
journal to determine whether the text of the bill signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both
Houses of Congress.147

In stark contrast to Astorga, this case presents no exceptional circumstance to justify the departure from the salutary
rule. The K to 12 Law was passed by the Senate and House of Representatives on January 20, 2013, approved by
the President on May 15, 2013, and, after publication, took effect on June 8, 2013. Thus, there is no doubt as to the
formal validity of the K to 12 Law.

Third, there is no undue delegation of legislative power in the enactment of the K to 12 Law.

In determining whether or not a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted
two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all
its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it.148 The policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate must be set forth
therein.149 The sufficient standard test, on the other hand, mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented.150

The K to 12 Law adequately provides the legislative policy that it seeks to implement. Section 2 of the K to 12
Law provides:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State shall establish, maintain and support a complete, adequate, and integrated
system of education relevant to the needs of the people, the country and society-at-large.

Likewise, it is hereby declared the policy of the State that every graduate of basic education shall be an empowered
individual who has learned, through a program that is rooted on sound educational principles and geared towards
excellence, the foundations for learning throughout life, the competence to engage in work and be productive, the
ability to coexist in fruitful harmony with local and global communities, the capability to engage in autonomous,
creative, and critical thinking, and the capacity and willingness to transform others and one's self.

For this purpose, the State shall create a functional basic education system that will develop productive and
responsible citizens equipped with the essential competencies, skills and values for both life-long learning and
employment. In order to achieve this, the State shall:

(a) Give every student an opportunity to receive quality education that is globally competitive based on a
pedagogically sound curriculum; that is at par with international standards;

(b) Broaden the goals of high school education for college preparation, vocational and technical career opportunities
as well as creative arts, sports and entrepreneurial employment in a rapidly changing and increasingly globalized
environment; and

(c) Make education learner-oriented and responsive to the needs, cognitive and cultural capacity, the circumstances
and diversity of learners, schools and communities through the appropriate languages of teaching and learning,
including mother tongue as a learning resource.

Moreover, scattered throughout the K to 12 Law are the standards to guide the DepEd, CHED and TESDA in carrying
out the provisions of the law, from the development of the K to 12 BEC, to the hiring and training of teaching personnel
and to the formulation of appropriate strategies in order to address the changes during the transition period.
SEC. 5. Curriculum Development. — The DepEd shall formulate the design and details of the enhanced basic
education curriculum. It shall work with the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) to craft harmonized basic and
tertiary curricula for the global competitiveness of Filipino graduates. To ensure college readiness and to avoid
remedial and duplication of basic education subjects, the DepED shall coordinate with the CHED and the Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA).

To achieve an effective enhanced basic education curriculum, the DepED shall undertake consultations with other
national government agencies and other stakeholders including, but not limited to, the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), the private and public schools associations, the
national student organizations, the national teacher organizations, the parents-teachers associations and the
chambers of commerce on matters affecting the concerned stakeholders.

The DepED shall adhere to the following standards and principles in developing the enhanced basic education
curriculum:

(a) The curriculum shall be learner-centered, inclusive and developmentally appropriate;

(b) The curriculum shall be relevant, responsive and research-based;

(c) The curriculum shall be culture-sensitive;

(d) The curriculum shall be contextualized and global;

(e) The curriculum shall use pedagogical approaches that are constructivist, inquiry-based, reflective, collaborative
and integrative;

(f) The curriculum shall adhere to the principles and framework of Mother Tongue-Based Multilingual Education (MTB-
MLE) which starts from where the learners are and from what they already knew proceeding from the known to the
unknown; instructional materials and capable teachers to implement the MTB-MLE curriculum shall be available;

(g) The curriculum shall use the spiral progression approach to ensure mastery of knowledge and skills after each
level; and

(h) The curriculum shall be flexible enough to enable and allow schools to localize, indigenize and enhance the same
based on their respective educational and social contexts. The production and development of locally produced
teaching materials shall be encouraged and approval of these materials shall devolve to the regional and division
education units.

xxxx

SEC. 7. Teacher Education and Training. — To ensure that the enhanced basic education program meets the
demand for quality teachers and school leaders, the DepED and the CHED, in collaboration with relevant partners in
government, academe, industry, and nongovernmental organizations, shall conduct teacher education and training
programs, as specified:

(a) In-service Training on Content and Pedagogy. — Current DepED teachers shall be retrained to meet the content
and performance standards of the new K to 12 curriculum. The DepED shall ensure that private education institutions
shall be given the opportunity to avail of such training.

(b) Training of New Teachers. — New graduates of the current Teacher Education curriculum shall undergo additional
training, upon hiring, to upgrade their skills to the content standards of the new curriculum. Furthermore, the CHED, in
coordination with the DepED and relevant stakeholders, shall ensure that the Teacher Education curriculum offered in
these Teacher Education Institutes (TEIs) will meet the necessary quality standards for new teachers. Duly recognized
organizations acting as TEIs, in coordination with the DepED, the CHED, and other relevant stakeholders, shall
ensure that the curriculum of these organizations meet the necessary quality standards for trained teachers.

(c) Training of School Leadership. — Superintendents, principals, subject area coordinators and other instructional
school leaders shall likewise undergo workshops and training to enhance their skills on their role as academic,
administrative and community leaders.

Henceforth, such professional development programs as those stated above shall be initiated and conducted regularly
throughout the school year to ensure constant upgrading of teacher skills.
SEC. 8. Hiring of Graduates of Science, Mathematics, Statistics, Engineering and Other Specialists in Subjects with a
Shortage of Qualified Applicants, Technical-Vocational Courses and Higher Education Institution Faculty. —
Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 26, 27 and 28 of Republic Act No. 7836, otherwise known as the
"Philippine Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994", the DepED and private education institutions shall hire, as may
be relevant to the particular subject:

(a) Graduates of science, mathematics, statistics, engineering, music and other degree courses with shortages in
qualified Licensure Examination for Teachers (LET) applicants to teach in their specialized subjects in the elementary
and secondary education. Qualified LET applicants shall also include graduates admitted by foundations duly
recognized for their expertise in the education sector and who satisfactorily complete the requirements set by these
organizations: Provided, That they pass the LET within five (5) years after their date of hiring: Provided, further, That if
such graduates are willing to teach on part-time basis, the provisions of LET shall no longer be required;

(b) Graduates of technical-vocational courses to teach in their specialized subjects in the secondary
education: Provided, That these graduates possess the necessary certification issued by the TESDA: Provided,
further, That they undergo appropriate in-service training to be administered by the DepED or higher education
institutions (HEIs) at the expense of the DepED;

(c) Faculty of HEIs be allowed to teach in their general education or subject specialties in the secondary
education: Provided, That the faculty must be a holder of a relevant Bachelor's degree, and must have satisfactorily
served as a full-time HEI faculty;

(d) The DepED and private education institutions may hire practitioners, with expertise in the specialized learning
areas offered by the Basic Education Curriculum, to teach in the secondary level: Provided, That they teach on part-
time basis only. For this purpose, the DepED, in coordination with the appropriate government agencies, shall
determine the necessary qualification standards in hiring these experts.

xxxx

SEC. 12. Transitory Provisions. — The DepED, the CHED and the TESDA shall formulate the appropriate strategies
and mechanisms needed to ensure smooth transition from the existing ten (10) years basic education cycle to the
enhanced basic education (K to 12) cycle. The strategies may cover changes in physical infrastructure, manpower,
organizational and structural concerns, bridging models linking grade 10 competencies and the entry requirements of
new tertiary curricula, and partnerships between the government and other entities. Modeling for senior high school
may be implemented in selected schools to simulate the transition process and provide concrete data for the transition
plan.

To manage the initial implementation of the enhanced basic education program and mitigate the expected multi-year
low enrolment turnout for HEIs and Technical Vocational Institutions (TVIs) starting School Year 2016-2017, the
DepED shall engage in partnerships with HEIs and TVIs for the utilization of the latter's human and physical
resources. Moreover, the DepED, the CHED, the TESDA, the TVIs and the HEIs shall coordinate closely with one
another to implement strategies that ensure the academic, physical, financial, and human resource capabilities of
HEIs and TVIs to provide educational and training services for graduates of the enhanced basic education program to
ensure that they are not adversely affected. The faculty of HEIs and TVIs allowed to teach students of secondary
education under Section 8 hereof, shall be given priority in hiring for the duration of the transition period. For this
purpose, the transition period shall be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations (IRR).151

Clearly, under the two tests, the K to 12 Law, read and appreciated in its entirety, is complete in all essential terms
and conditions and contains sufficient parameters on the power delegated to the DepEd, CHED and TESDA. The fact
that the K to 12 Law did not have any provision on labor does not make said law incomplete. The purpose of
permissible delegation to administrative agencies is for the latter to "implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by 'filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide." 152 With
the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the legislature has found it necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them, the
authority to provide direct and efficacious solutions to these problems. 153 This is effected by the promulgation of
supplementary regulations, such as the K to 12 IRR jointly issued by the DepEd, CHED and TESDA and the Joint
Guidelines issued in coordination with DOLE, to address in detail labor and management rights relevant to
implementation of the K to 12 Law.

DO No. 31 is valid and enforceable

Petitioners also claim that DO No. 31 is a usurpation of legislative authority as it creates a law without delegation of
power.154 According to petitioners, DO No. 31, which changed the curriculum and added two (2) more years to basic
education, has no statutory basis. It also violates the constitutional right of parents to participate in planning programs
that affect them and the right to information on matters of public concern. 155 Petitioners further contend that since DO
No. 31 imposes additional obligations to parents and children, public consultations should have been conducted prior
to its adoption and that the assailed DO should have been published and registered first with the Office of the National
Administrative Register before it can take effect. 156

Again, petitioners' arguments lack factual and legal bases. DO No. 31 did not add two (2) years to basic education nor
did it impose additional obligations to parents and children. DO No. 31 is an administrative regulation addressed to
DepEd personnel providing for general guidelines on the implementation of a new curriculum for Grades 1 to 10 in
preparation for the K to 12 basic education. DO No. 31 was issued in accordance with the DepEd's mandate to
establish and maintain a complete, adequate and integrated system of education relevant to the goals of national
development,157 formulate, plan, implement, and coordinate and ensure access to, promote equity in, and improve the
quality of basic education;158 and pursuant to the Secretary's authority to formulate and promulgate national
educational policies,159 under existing laws.

Moreover, more than a year prior to adoption of DO No. 31, and contrary to petitioners' assertions, DepEd conducted
regional consultations and focus group discussions, participated in by students, parents, teachers and administrators,
government representatives, and representatives from private schools and private sector, 160 to elicit opinions,
thoughts and suggestions about the K to 12 basic education. 161

There is also no merit in petitioners' claim that publication is necessary for DO No. 31 to be effective. Interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature, including the rules and guidelines to be followed by subordinates in
the performance of their duties are not required to be published. 162 At any rate, the Court notes that DO No. 31 was
already forwarded to the University of the Philippines Law Center for filing in accordance with Sections 3 and 4 of
the Administrative Code of 1987 and took effect pursuant to said provisions. 163

Having established that the K to 12 Law and its related issuances were duly enacted and/or validly issued, the Court
now discusses whether they contravene provisions of the Constitution.

II.

Police power of the State

Police power is defined broadly as the State's authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare. This all-comprehensive definition provides ample room for the State
to meet the exigencies of the times depending on the conditions and circumstances. As the Court eruditely explained
in Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corp.164 (Basco):

The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta,
35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to
foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA
386).

Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the
greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra).

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter. Along with the
taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental
attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the
expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe,
American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection
and is most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708)
It is "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic
force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of the winds of change. 165

From the legislative history of the Philippine education system as detailed above, one can easily discern that the
enactment of education laws, including the K to 12 Law and the Kindergarten Education Act, their respective
implementing rules and regulations and the issuances of the government agencies, are an exercise of the State's
police power. The State has an interest in prescribing regulations to promote the education and the general welfare of
the people. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,166 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "[t]here is no doubt as to the power of a State,
having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and
duration of basic education."167
Here, petitioners essentially assail the State's exercise of police power to regulate education through the adoption of
the K to 12 Basic Education Program, because the K to 12 Law and its related issuances purportedly violate the
Constitutional provisions as enumerated in the outline of issues above.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. 168 For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.169 The grounds for nullity must be clear beyond reasonable
doubt.170 Hence, for the Court to nullify the assailed laws, petitioners must clearly establish that the constitutional
provisions they cite bestow upon them demandable and enforceable rights and that such rights clash against the
State's exercise of its police power under the K to 12 Law.

To be sure, the Court's role is to balance the State's exercise of its police power as against the rights of petitioners.
The Court's pronouncement in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion171 (Lantion) instructs:

x x x The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing of interests approach which is a "fundamental postulate of
constitutional law." The approach requires that we "take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of
interests observable in a given situation or type of situation." These interests usually consist in the exercise by an
individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the government's promotion of fundamental public interest or
policy objectives on the other.172

In fact, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,173 where the question was the validity of a statute criminalizing the failure of parents to
allow their children to attend compulsory high school education, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that although the
State's interest in universal education is highly ranked in terms of State functions, this does not free this exercise of
State function from the balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, specifically the Free
Exercise Clause, thus:

There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose
reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education. See, e.g., Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US
510, 534, 69 L Ed 1070, 1077, 45 S Ct 571, 39 ALR 468 (1925). Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the
function of a State. Yet even this paramount responsibility was, in Pierce, made to yield to the right of parents to
provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system. There the Court held that Oregon's statute compelling
attendance in a public school from age eight to age 16 unreasonably interfered with the interest of parents in directing
the rearing of their offspring, including their education in church-operated schools. As that case suggests, the values
of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years have a
high place in our society. See also Ginsberg v New York, 390 US 629, 639 20 L Ed 2d 195, 203, 88 S Ct 1274 (1968);
Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390, 67 L Ed 1042, 43 S Ct 625, 29 ALR 1446 (1923); cf. Rowan v Post Office Dept., 397
US 728, 25 L Ed 2d 736, 90 S Ct 1484 (1970). Thus, a State's interest in universal education, however highly we
rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests,
such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the traditional
interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children so long as they, in the words of
Pierce, "prepare [them] for additional obligations." 268 US at 535, 69 L Ed AT 1078.174

As quoted above, this balancing of interest approach has been applied in this jurisdiction in Lantion in determining
whether there was a violation of the private respondent's right to due process when he was not furnished a copy of the
request for his extradition. This right was balanced against the country's commitment under the RP-US Extradition
Treaty to extradite to the United States of America persons who were charged with the violation of some of its laws. 175

The Court held in Lantion that at the stage of the extradition, it was only at an evaluation stage; thus there was yet no
requirement that he be given notice of the proceedings. At that stage, the balance was tilted in favor of the interest of
the State in helping suppress crime by facilitating the extradition of persons covered by treaties entered into by the
government.176

It is with these standards and framework that the Court examines whether the enactments of the Kindergarten
Education Act, the K to 12 Law and their implementing rules and regulations, were valid exercises of the State's police
power to regulate education.

In this regard, and to digress, only self-executing provisions of the Constitution embody judicially enforceable rights
and therefore give rise to causes of action in court. 177 Accordingly, it is necessary to determine first whether the
constitutional provisions invoked by petitioners are self-executing; and if they are, is there a conflict between these
rights and the State's police power to regulate education? If a conflict does exist, do the rights of petitioners yield to
the police power of the State?

Non-self-executing constitutional provisions

As defined, "a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action." 178

In Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System,179 it was ruled that all provisions of the Constitution
are presumed self-executing,180 because to treat them as requiring legislation would result in giving the legislature "the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law." 181 And this could result in a cataclysm.182

This pronouncement notwithstanding, however, the Court has, in several cases, had occasion to already declare
several Constitutional provisions as not self-executory.

In Tanada v. Angara,183 it was settled that the sections found under Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution are
not self-executing provisions. In fact, in the cases of Basco,184Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,185 and Tondo Medical Center
Employees Association v. Court of Appeals,186 the Court categorically ruled that Sections 11, 12, 13, 17 and 18 of
Article II, Section 13 of Article XIII, and Section 2 of Article XIV, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respectively, are
non-self-executing. The very terms of these provisions show that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional
rights but merely guidelines for legislation. 187 And the failure of the legislature to pursue the policies embodied therein
does not give rise to a cause of action in the courts. 188

In specific application to the present petitions, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,189 the Court also ruled that Section
1, Article XIV on the right of all citizens to quality education is also not self-executory. The provision "for the promotion
of the right to 'quality education' x x x [was] put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights."190

Further, Section 6, Article XIV on the use of the Filipino language as a medium of instruction is also not self-executory.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this:

MR. DE CASTRO. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner de Castro is recognized.

MR. DE CASTRO. Just a matter of clarification. On the first sentence, we use Filipino as an official medium of
communication in all branches of government. Is that correct?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes.

MR. DE CASTRO. And when we speak of Filipino, can it be a combination of Tagalog and the local dialect, and,
therefore, can be "Taglish"? Is that right?

MR. VILLACORTA. Not really "Taglish," Madam President.

MR. BENNAGEN. It can be standard.

MR. DE CASTRO. Or the combination of the local language and Tagalog?

MR. VILLACORTA. As it naturally evolves.

MR. DE CASTRO. Suppose I am a Muslim official from Sulu and I will use Filipino in my communication. So I will
write: "Di makadiari ang iniisip mo." It is a combination of Tausog — "di makadiari" and Tagalog — "ang iniisip mo."
The one receiving in the main office may not understand the whole thing. I am just clarifying because when we use
Filipino as a medium of official communication, there is a possibility that the message may not be understood when it
reaches the central office or when it goes to another area.

MR. VILLACORTA. That is why the wording is, "The government shall take steps to initiate and sustain the use of
Filipino." And in Section 1, it says: "as it evolves, it shall be further developed and enriched," the implication being that
it will be standardized as a national language.

MR. DE CASTRO. Yes, but then in Section 2, we come out with Filipino as a medium of official communication. I am
just giving an example that as an official communication, it may not be understood by the one at the receiving end,
especially if one comes from the South and whose message is received in the North or in the center. As I said, "Di
makadiari ang iniisip mo," is half Tausog and half Tagalog.
MR. VILLACORTA. Commissioner Bennagen, who is an expert on culture and minorities, will answer the question of
the Gentleman.

MR. BENNAGEN. I think what we envision to happen would be for government agencies, as well as other
nongovernmental agencies involving this, to start immediately the work of standardization — expanding the
vocabularies, standardizing the spelling and all appropriate measures that have to do with propagating Filipino.

MR. DE CASTRO. In short?

MR. BENNAGEN. The work will codify this national lingua franca as it is taking place and will be subjected to other
developmental activities.

MR. OPLE. Madam President, may I say a word?

MR. DE CASTRO. In short, does the committee want us to understand that Section 2, even if ratified, will not
as yet be effective because it is still subject to the provisions of law and as Congress may deem appropriate?
So the medium of official communication among branches of government cannot as yet be Filipino until
subject to provisions of law and as Congress may deem appropriate. Is that correct?

MR. OPLE. Madam President.

MR. DE CASTRO. No, I am asking the committee, please.

THE PRESIDENT. What is the answer of the committee?

MR. VILLACORTA. That is correct, Madam President.

MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.

MR. OPLE. I just wanted to point out that when the words "official communication'' is used, this must satisfy the
standards of accuracy, precision and, perhaps, clarity or lack of ambiguity; otherwise, it will not be communication.
One can lose a war through imprecise communication in government and, therefore, I think the word "communication"
should be understood in its correct light — that when one writes from Sulu, as in the example given by Commissioner
de Castro, he has to consider the following: Is his communication clear? Is it unambiguous? Is it precise? I just want to
point out that when we speak of official communication, these normal standards of good communication ought to be
recognized as controlling, otherwise, the interest of public administration will be vitally affected.

Thank you, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Shall we vote now on the first sentence?

MR. RODRIGO. I think it should be on the first two sentences.

THE PRESIDENT. There was a suggestion, and that was accepted by the committee, to vote on the first sentence.

MR. RODRIGO. Only on the first sentence? But there are two sentences.

THE PRESIDENT. No, that was already approved.

MR. VILLACORTA. Madam President, may I ask for a vote now because this has been extensively discussed.

THE PRESIDENT. Will the chairman read what is to be voted upon?

MR. VILLACORTA. Madam President, the first sentence reads: "SUBJECT TO PROVISIONS OF LAW AND AS
CONGRESS MAY DEEM APPROPRIATE, THE GOVERNMENT SHALL TAKE STEPS TO INITIATE AND SUSTAIN
THE USE OF FILIPINO AS A MEDIUM OF OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION AND AS LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION
IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM."

VOTING

THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor of the first sentence, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised
their hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)

The results show 37 votes in favor and none against; the first sentence is approved. 191

Section 3, Article XIII, on the protection of labor and security of tenure, was also declared by the Court in Agabon v.
National Labor Relations Commission,192 (Agabon) as not self-executory. Reiterating Agabon, the Court explained
in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.,193 that Section 3, Article XIII, does not automatically confer judicially
demandable and enforceable rights and cannot, on its own, be a basis for a declaration of unconstitutionality, to wit:

While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-executing, there are some which this Court has
declared not judicially enforceable, Article XIII being one, particularly Section 3 thereof, the nature of which, this
Court, in Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, has described to be not self-actuating:

Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of tenure may be deemed as self-executing in the
sense that these are automatically acknowledged and observed without need for any enabling legislation. However, to
declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and
the realization of ideals therein expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents
the dangerous tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated. The guarantees of "full protection to labor" and
"security of tenure", when examined in isolation, are facially unqualified, and the broadest interpretation possible
suggests a blanket shield in favor of labor against any form of removal regardless of circumstance. This interpretation
implies an unimpeachable right to continued employment — a utopian notion, doubtless — but still hardly within the
contemplation of the framers. Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed
rights to ensure the protection and promotion, not only the rights of the labor sector, but of the employers' as well.
Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to
approximate at least the aims of the Constitution.

Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its own, be a source of a positive enforceable right to
stave off the dismissal of an employee for just cause owing to the failure to serve proper notice or hearing. As
manifested by several framers of the 1987 Constitution, the provisions on social justice require legislative enactments
for their enforceability. (Emphasis added)

Thus, Section 3, Article XIII cannot be treated as a principal source of direct enforceable rights, for the violation of
which the questioned clause may be declared unconstitutional. It may unwittingly risk opening the floodgates of
litigation to every worker or union over every conceivable violation of so broad a concept as social justice for labor.

It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow on the working class any actual enforceable
right, but merely clothes it with the status of a sector for whom the Constitution urges protection through executive or
legislative action and judicial recognition. Its utility is best limited to being an impetus not just for the executive and
legislative departments, but for the judiciary as well, to protect the welfare of the working class. And it was in fact
consistent with that constitutional agenda that the Court in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee
Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, penned by then Associate Justice now Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno, formulated the judicial precept that when the challenge to a statute is premised on the perpetuation of prejudice
against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection — such as the working class or a section thereof
— the Court may recognize the existence of a suspect classification and subject the same to strict judicial scrutiny.

The view that the concepts of suspect classification and strict judicial scrutiny formulated in Central Bank Employee
Association exaggerate the significance of Section 3, Article XIII is a groundless apprehension. Central Bank applied
Article XIII in conjunction with the equal protection clause. Article XIII, by itself, without the application of the equal
protection clause, has no life or force of its own as elucidated in Agabon. 194

Here, apart from bare allegations that the K to 12 Law does not provide mechanisms to protect labor, which, as
discussed, have no legal bases, petitioners have not proffered other bases in claiming that the right to protect labor
and/or security of tenure was violated with the implementation of the K to 12 Law. To be sure, the protection of labor
from illegal dismissal has already been set in stone with the enactment of the Labor Code and the Civil Service Law.

Given the foregoing, petitioners cannot claim that the K to 12 Law and/or any of its related issuances contravene or
violate any of their rights under the foregoing constitutional provisions because these provisions simply state a policy
that may be "used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the
legislature in its enactment of laws." 195 They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights. 196 In other
words, the Kindergarten Education Act, the K to 12 Law and its related issuances cannot be nullified based solely on
petitioners' bare allegations that they violate general provisions of the Constitution which are mere directives
addressed to the executive and legislative departments. If these directives are unheeded, the remedy does not lie with
the courts, but with the power of the electorate in casting their votes. 197 As held in Tañada v. Angara:198 "The reasons
for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced from basic
considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade 'into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy-making."'199

In view of the foregoing, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the remaining constitutional provisions, international
treaties, and other special laws invoked by petitioners, which have allegedly been violated by the implementation of
the K to 12 Law. For the constitutional provisions, the Court shall determine whether these constitutional provisions
are in conflict with the police power of the State in enacting and implementing the K to 12 Law, and if so, whether
these constitutional provisions yield to the police power of the State.

Compulsory Elementary and High

School Education

Petitioners argue that the legislature violated the Constitution when they made kindergarten and senior high school
compulsory. For petitioners, compulsory kindergarten and senior high school expanded the constitutional definition of
elementary education and that the Congress violated the rule of constitutional supremacy when it made kindergarten
and senior high school compulsory.200

On the other hand, the OSG contends that while Section 2, Article XIV states that elementary education shall be
compulsory, it did not preclude Congress from making kindergarten and secondary education mandatory (based on
the clear wording of the law and deliberations of the Constitutional Commission). 201 Further, the laws advance the
right of child to education, and they do not violate any international agreement (Universal Declaration of Human Rights
[UDHR], the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR] and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child [CRC]) to which the Philippines is a signatory. 202

The State's policy in implementing the K to 12 Program is stated as follows:

x x x [I]t is hereby declared the policy of the State that every graduate of basic education shall be an empowered
individual who has learned, through a program that is rooted on sound educational principles and geared towards
excellence, the foundations for learning throughout life, the competence to engage in work and be productive, the
ability to coexist in fruitful harmony with local and global communities, the capability to engage in autonomous,
creative, and critical thinking, and the capacity and willingness to transform others and one's self.

For this purpose, the State shall create a functional basic education system that will develop productive and
responsible citizens equipped with the essential competencies, skills and values for both life-long learning and
employment. In order to achieve this, the State shall:

(a) Give every student an opportunity to receive quality education that is globally competitive based on a
pedagogically sound curriculum that is at par with international standards;

(b) Broaden the goals of high school education for college preparation, vocational and technical career opportunities
as well as creative arts, sports and entrepreneurial employment in a rapidly changing and increasingly globalized
environment; and

(c) Make education learner-oriented and responsive to the needs, cognitive and cultural capacity, the circumstances
and diversity of learners, schools and communities through the appropriate languages of teaching and learning,
including mother tongue as a learning resource.203

There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law and related issuances and the Constitution when it made kindergarten
and senior high school compulsory. The Constitution is clear in making elementary education compulsory; and the K
to 12 Law and related issuances did not change this as, in fact, they affirmed it.

As may be gleaned from the outlined history of education laws in the Philippines, the definition of basic education was
expanded by the legislature through the enactment of different laws, consistent with the State's exercise of police
power. In BP Blg. 232, the elementary and secondary education were considered to be the stage where basic
education is provided.204 Subsequently, in RA No. 9155, the inclusion of elementary and high school education as part
of basic education was affirmed.205

The legislature, through the Kindergarten Education Act, further amended the definition of basic education to include
kindergarten. Thereafter, the legislature expanded basic education to include an additional two (2) years of senior high
school. Thus, by then, basic education comprised of thirteen (13) years, divided into one (1) year of kindergarten, six
(6) years of elementary education, and six (6) years of secondary education — which was divided into four (4) years of
junior high school and two (2) years of senior high school.
The Constitution did not curtail the legislature's power to determine the extent of basic education. It only provided a
minimum standard: that elementary education be compulsory. By no means did the Constitution foreclose the
possibility that the legislature provides beyond the minimum set by the Constitution.

Petitioners also contend that the expansion of compulsory education to include kindergarten and secondary education
violates the UDHR, the ICESCR and the CRC.206

Petitioners' argument is misleading.

There is nothing in the UDHR, ICESCR and CRC which proscribes the expansion of compulsory education beyond
elementary education.

Article 26 of the UDHR states:

1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental
stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made
generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship
among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the
maintenance of peace.

3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

There is absolutely nothing in Article 26 that would show that the State is prohibited from making kindergarten and
high school compulsory. The UDHR provided a minimum standard for States to follow. Congress complied with this
minimum standard; as, in fact, it went beyond the minimum by making kindergarten and high school compulsory. This
action of Congress is, in turn, consistent with Article 41 of the CRC which provides that "[n]othing in the present
Convention shall affect any provisions which are more conducive to the realization of the rights of the child and which
may be contained in: (a) [t]he law of a State party; or (b) [i]nternational law in force for that State.''

The enactment of the K to 12 Law was the manner by which the Congress sought to realize the right to education of
its citizens. It is indeed laudable that Congress went beyond the minimum standards and provided mechanisms so
that its citizens are able to obtain not just elementary education but also kindergarten and high school. Absent any
showing of a violation of any Constitutional self-executing right or any international law, the Court cannot question the
desirability, wisdom, or utility of the K to 12 Law as this is best addressed by the wisdom of Congress. As the Court
held in Tablarin v. Gutierrez207:

x x x The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable
and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of due process. Again, petitioners have failed to specify just
what factors or features of the NMAT render it "unfair" and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to suggest
that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary requirement when added on top of the admission requirements set out in
Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admission requirements established by internal regulations of the
various medical schools, public or private. Petitioners' arguments thus appear to relate to utility and wisdom or
desirability of the NMAT requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a question of power or authority: this Court
has neither commission nor competence to pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation or
administrative regulation. Those questions must be addressed to the political departments of the government not to
the courts.

There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the legislative and administrative provisions
impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police power of the state. The police
power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure
and promote all the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the general community. An
important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the
securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. 208

Petitioners also claim that the K to 12 basic education and the two (2) additional years in high school should not have
been applied retroactively in violation of Article 4 of the Civil Code. 209 Petitioners assert that students who had already
began schooling prior to 2013 or upon the passage of the K to 12 Law already acquired a "vested right" to graduate
after the completion of four (4) years of high school, pursuant to Sections 9(2) and 20 of BP Blg. 232; thus, the K to 12
BEC cannot be applied to them.210
Again, petitioners' contentions are without merit.

The K to 12 Basic Education Program is not being retroactively applied because only those currently enrolled at the
time the K to 12 Law took effect and future students will be subject to the K to 12 BEC and the additional two (2) years
of senior high school. Students who already graduated from high school under the old curriculum are not required by
the K to 12 Law to complete the additional two (2) years of senior high school.

More importantly, BP Blg. 232 does not confer any vested right to four (4) years of high school education. Rights are
vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of some particular person or
persons as a present interest. The right must be absolute, complete, and unconditional, independent of a contingency,
and a mere expectancy of future benefit, or a contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of
existing laws, does not constitute a vested right. 211 Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the rights of students under
Section 9 of BP Blg. 232 are not absolute. These are subject to limitations prescribed by law and regulations. In fact,
while Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 232 states that students have the right to continue their course up to graduation, Section
20 of the same law does not restrict elementary and high school education to only six (6) and four (4) years. Even RA
No. 9155 or the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001, which was enacted under the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, does not specify the number of years in elementary and high school. In other words, BP Blg. 232 or RA
No. 9155 does not preclude any amendment or repeal on the duration of elementary and high school education. In
adding two (2) years of secondary education to students who have not yet graduated from high school, Congress was
merely exercising its police power and legislative wisdom in imposing reasonable regulations for the control and
duration of basic education, in compliance with its constitutional duty to promote quality education for all.

Right to select a profession or course of study

Petitioners in G.R. No. 218123 insist that the implementation of the K to 12 Law is a limitation on the right of senior
high school students to choose their professions. 212 For petitioners, a number of prospective senior high school
students will be unable to choose their profession or vocation because of the limit on what senior high schools can
offer and the availability of the different strands. This lacks basis.

There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law and its IRR and the right of the senior high school students to choose
their profession or course of study. The senior high school curriculum is designed in such a way that students have
core subjects and thereafter, they may choose among four strands: 1) Accountancy, Business and Management
(ABM) Strand; 2) Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) Strand; 3) Humanities and Social
Sciences (HUMSS) Strand; and 4) General Academic (GA) Strand. 213

Petitioners have failed to show that the State has imposed unfair and inequitable conditions for senior high schools to
enroll in their chosen path. The K to 12 Program is precisely designed in such a way that students may choose to
enroll in public or private senior high schools which offer the strands of their choice. For eligible students, the voucher
program also allows indigent senior high school students to enroll in private institutions that offer the strands of their
choice.

Mother Tongue as medium of instruction

Petitioners argue that the use of the MT or the regional or native language as primary medium of instruction for
kindergarten and the first three (3) years of elementary education contravenes Section 7, Article XIV of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, which expressly limits and constrains regional languages simply as auxiliary media of
instruction.214 This is an argument of first blush. A closer look at the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal the contrary. In fine, there is no conflict between the use of the
MT as a primary medium of instruction and Section 7, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

Sections 6 and 7, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides:

SEC. 6. The national language of the Philippines is Filipino. As it evolves, it shall be further developed and enriched
on the basis of existing Philippine and other languages.

Subject to provisions of law and as the Congress may deem appropriate, the Government shall take steps to initiate
and sustain the use of Filipino as a medium of official communication and as language of instruction in the educational
system.

SEC. 7. For purposes of communication and instruction, the official languages of the Philippines are Filipino and, until
otherwise provided by law, English.

The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in the regions and shall serve as auxiliary media of
instruction therein.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also confirm that MT or regional languages may be used as a
medium of instruction:

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. When the Commissioner speaks of auxiliary official languages in their
respective regions, what exactly does he have in mind?

MR. BENNAGEN. In addition to Filipino and English, they can be accepted also as official languages, even in
government and in education.

MR. SUAREZ. So that not only will they be a medium of instruction or communication but they can be
considered also as official languages.

MR. BENNAGEN. That is the intention of the committee. We should respect also the regional languages. x x
x215 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

xxxx

MR. DAVIDE. May I be enlightened on some of the aspects of this proposed substitute amendment? The first is, does
it follow from the wording that the regional languages shall serve as an auxiliary media of instruction and no law can
prohibit their use as such? This means that subject to provisions of law and as Congress may deem appropriate, it
would refer only to what are included in the first sentence. It will not apply to the second sentence relating to regional
languages as auxiliary media of instruction.

MR. TREÑAS. That is correct. Precisely, there is a period after "educational system" and that is a new sentence.

MR. DAVIDE. As an auxiliary medium of instruction, it can actually be the primary medium, until Congress
shall provide otherwise.

MR. TREÑAS. It shall be auxiliary.

MR. DAVIDE. But in the meantime that Congress shall not have deemed appropriate or that there is no provision of
law relating to the use of Filipino as the medium of instruction, it can itself be the primary medium of instruction in
the regions.

MR. TREÑAS. That is correct because of the provision of the first sentence.

MR. DAVIDE. On the supposition that there is already a law that Congress had deemed it appropriate, the regional
language shall go hand in hand with Filipino as a medium of instruction. It cannot be supplanted in any way by Filipino
as the only medium of instruction in the regional level.

xxxx

VOTING

xxxx

MR. VILLACORTA. Shall we vote now on the next sentence, Madam President?

THE PRESIDENT. Will the chairman please read the next sentence.

MR. VILLACORTA. The next sentence, Madam President, reads: "THE REGIONAL LANGUAGES SHALL SERVE AS
AUXILIARY MEDIA OF INSTRUCTION IN THE RESPECTIVE REGIONS."

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Padilla is recognized before we proceed to vote.

MR. PADILLA. Section 2 of the committee report states:

The official languages of the Philippines are Filipino and English, until otherwise provided by law. The regional
languages are the auxiliary official languages in their respective regions.

That second sentence in Section 2 of the committee report may be amended by that second sentence which says:
"THE REGIONAL LANGUAGES SHALL SERVE AS AUXILIARY MEDIA OF INSTRUCTION IN THE RESPECTIVE
REGIONS." I believe we should consider the first sentence of Section 2 and then say: "THE REGIONAL
LANGUAGES SHALL SERVE AS AUXILIARY MEDIA OF INSTRUCTION IN THE RESPECTIVE REGIONS." That is
my proposal.

THE PRESIDENT. In other words, the Commissioner's point is that this particular second sentence here should be
transposed to Section 2 of the other committee report.

MR. PADILLA. Yes, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. What does the committee say?

REV. RIGOS. Madam President, perhaps if we approve the second sentence, we can delete the second sentence in
Section 2. Is that the idea?

MR. PADILLA. That is correct.

REV. RIGOS. Since we are talking about medium of instruction here, we would rather retain it in the first section.

MR. PADILLA. Madam President, but if no mention is made of English, it might be the impression contrary to what has
already been agreed upon — that English may not be used as a medium of instruction. And it shall be clear that the
first preference is Filipino, the national language, without prejudice to the use of English and also the regional
languages.

REV. RIGOS. Madam President, do we understand the Commissioner correctly that he would rather delete that in the
first section and amend the second sentence in Section 2?

MR. PADILLA. Yes, Madam President. That is the reason I suggested that the proposal be divided into two sentences.
We approved the first sentence. The second sentence should be corrected to Section 2 of the committee report.

MR. VILLACORTA. Madam President, the committee is divided; therefore, we would like the floor to decide on this
matter.

MR. PADILLA. The only reason I am saying this is to make clear in the Constitution that the medium of
communication and the language of instruction are not only Filipino as a national language, and that the
medium of instruction is the regional languages, otherwise, there would be no mention of English. I believe
that we are all agreed that the first preference is the national language, Filipino, but it does not prevent the
use of English and also of the regional languages. 216 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is thus clear from the deliberations that it was never the intent of the framers of the Constitution to use only Filipino
and English as the exclusive media of instruction. It is evident that Congress has the power to enact a law that
designates Filipino as the primary medium of instruction even in the regions but, in the absence of such law, the
regional languages may be used as primary media of instruction. The Congress, however, opted not to enact such
law. On the contrary, the Congress, in the exercise of its wisdom, provided that the regional languages shall be the
primary media of instruction in the early stages of schooling. Verily, this act of Congress was not only Constitutionally
permissible, but was likewise an exercise of an exclusive prerogative to which the Court cannot interfere with.

Petitioners further contend that the MTB-MLE is counter-productive, anti-developmental and does not serve the
people's right to quality of education, which the State, under the Constitution, is mandated to promote. 217 Moreover, in
contrast to the benefits of the MTB-MLE that respondents assert, petitioners claim that comparative international and
domestic data have shown MT monolingualism to be inferior; while high literacy and proficiency in English indicates
human development, makes people more globally competitive and relatively happier. 218

Petitioners' arguments are again misplaced. While the Constitution indeed mandates the State to provide quality
education, the determination of what constitutes quality education is best left with the political departments who have
the necessary knowledge, expertise, and resources to determine the same. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission again are very instructive:

Now, Madam President, we have added the word "quality" before "education" to send appropriate signals to
the government that, in the exercise of its supervisory and regulatory powers, it should first set satisfactory
minimum requirements in all areas: curriculum, faculty, internal administration, library, laboratory class and other
facilities, et cetera, and it should see to it that satisfactory minimum requirements are met by all educational
institutions, both public and private.
When we speak of quality education we have in mind such matters, among others, as curriculum
development, development of learning resources and instructional materials, upgrading of library and laboratory
facilities, innovations in educational technology and teaching methodologies, improvement of research quality, and
others. Here and in many other provisions on education, the principal focus of attention and concern is the students. I
would like to say that in my view there is a slogan when we speak of quality of education that I feel we should be
aware of, which is, "Better than ever is not enough." In other words, even if the quality of education is good now, we
should attempt to keep on improving it.219 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, when the government, through the K to 12 Law and the DepEd issuances, determined that the use of MT as
primary medium of instruction until Grade 3 constitutes a better curriculum, it was working towards discharging its
constitutional duty to provide its citizens with quality education. The Court, even in the exercise of its jurisdiction to
check if another branch of the government committed grave abuse of discretion, will not supplant such determination
as it pertains to the wisdom of the policy.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 218045 also claim that the provision on the use of MT violates the natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth, recognized under Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. Petitioners aver that by using the MT in teaching the students, it compels parents to do something utterly
redundant, inefficient, and wasteful, as the students are presumably already fluent in speaking their MT. 220 In other
words, they no longer need to be taught their native language.

Petitioners are once again incorrect as there is no conflict between the use of MT as a primary medium of instruction
and the right of parents in rearing their children.

While Section 12, Article II grants parents the primary right to rear and educate their children, the State, as parens
patriae, has the inherent right and duty to support parents in the exercise of this constitutional right. In other words,
parents' authority and the State's duty are not mutually exclusive but complement each other. 221 In the matter of
education, a parent is always the first teacher. The language first learned by the child or his "mother tongue", which
the child understands best and hence, an effective tool for further learning, is first and foremost taught by the parent.
The inclusion in the K to 12 Program of the MT as a medium of instruction and a subject in the early years of learning
is, therefore, not intended to curtail the parents' right but to complement and enhance the same.

Moreover, despite the provision on the use of MT as primary medium of instruction for kindergarten and Grades 1 to 3,
Filipino and English remain as subjects in the curriculum during the earlier stages of schooling and will later on be
used as primary medium of instruction from Grade 4 onwards. In other words, in addition to the MT, the basics of
Filipino and English will still be taught at the early stages of formal schooling; and should the parents, in the exercise
of their primary right and duty to rear their children, so desire to give additional Filipino and English lessons to their
children, they have the absolute right to do so. Nothing in the K to 12 Law prohibits the parents from doing so.

Academic freedom

Petitioners in G.R. No. 216930 also allege that faculty from HEI stand to lose their academic freedom when they are
transferred to senior high school level as provided in the K to 12 Law, the K to 12 Law IRR and the Joint Guidelines.222

Without question, petitioners, who are faculty members in HEIs, indeed possess the academic freedom granted by
Constitution. This Court, in its previous decisions, has defined academic freedom for the individual member of the
academe as "the right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make
known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his
conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or
academic establishments."223

However, the Court does not agree with petitioners that their transfer to the secondary level, as provided by the K to
12 Law and the assailed issuances, constitutes a violation of their academic freedom. While the Court agrees, in
principle, that security of tenure is an important aspect of academic freedom — that the freedom is only meaningful if
the faculty members are assured that they are free to pursue their academic endeavors without fear of reprisals — it is
likewise equally true that convergence of security of tenure and academic freedom does not preclude the termination
of a faculty member for a valid cause.224 Civil servants, like petitioners, may be removed from service for a valid
cause, such as when there is a bona fide reorganization, or a position has been abolished or rendered redundant, or
there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service. 225 Hence,
petitioners' contention that the law is unconstitutional based on this ground is specious.

Free public education in the

elementary and high school levels
Petitioners claim that making kindergarten compulsory limits access to education; 226 that 400,000 to 500,000 Grade
11 students will be forced to enroll in private schools, pushed by government towards a more expensive, not free
education;227 and that there will be a de facto privatization of senior high school education (through the voucher
system) and that this is a violation of the constitutional provision mandating free high school education. 228

The OSG counters that the Senior High School Voucher program (subsidy given to those who will enroll in non-DepEd
schools) does not force students to enroll in private SHS. It simply offers a viable alternative to both student and
government — to the student, a subsidized private education; and to the government, decongested public schools. 229

The Court fully agrees with the OSG.

Petitioners' argument that the establishment of the voucher system will result in the de facto privatization of senior
high school is not only speculative, it is also without any basis. The voucher system is one of the mechanisms
established by the State through RA No. 6728, otherwise known as the Government Assistance to Students and
Teachers in Private Education Act. In Mariño, Jr. v. Gamilla,230 the Court recognized that RA No. 6728 was enacted in
view of the declared policy of the State, in conformity with the mandate of the Constitution, to promote and make
quality education accessible to all Filipino citizens, as well as the recognition of the State of the complementary roles
of public and private educational institutions in the educational system and the invaluable contribution that the private
schools have made and will make to education."231 Through the law, the State provided "the mechanisms to improve
quality in private education by maximizing the use of existing resources of private education x x x." 232 One of these is
the voucher system where underprivileged high school students become eligible for full or partial scholarship for
degree or vocational/technical courses.

The program was later expanded through RA No. 8545. In the K to 12 Law, the benefits under RA No. 8545, including
the voucher system, were made applicable to qualified students under the enhanced basic education, specifically to
the qualified students enrolled in senior high school. 233

The establishment and expansion of the voucher system is the State's way of tapping the resources of the private
educational system in order to give Filipinos equal access to quality education. The Court finds that this manner of
implementing the grant of equal access to education is not constitutionally infirm.

CMO No. 20 is constitutional

Petitioners assert that CMO No. 20 is violative of the Constitution because the study of Filipino, Panitikan and the
Philippine Constitution are not included as core subjects.

The Court disagrees.

First, the constitutional provisions alleged by petitioners to be violated are non-self-executing provisions. As discussed
above, the framers of the Constitution, in discussing Section 6 of Article XIV, explained that the use of Filipino as a
medium of official communication is still subject to provisions of law. 234

In Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc.,235 the Court held that Section 15 on arts and culture of Article XIV is not self-
executory because Congress passed laws dealing with the preservation and conservation of our cultural
heritage.236 The Court was of the view that all sections in Article XIV pertaining to arts and culture are all non-self-
executing, which includes Section 14 on Filipino national culture and Section 18 on access to cultural opportunities.
The Court in Basco237 also ruled that Section 17, Article II on giving priority to education, science and technology, arts,
culture, and sports, and Section 2, Article XIV on educational values, are non-self-executing.

Thus, the Court reiterates that these constitutional provisions are only policies that may be "used by the judiciary as
aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws." 238 The
Court reiterates that they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights. 239

Second, it is misleading for petitioners to allege that there is a violation of the constitutional provisions for the simple
reason that the study of Filipino, Panitikan and the Constitution are actually found in the basic education curriculum
from Grade 1 to 10 and senior high school. To be sure, the changes in the GE curriculum were implemented to ensure
that there would be no duplication of subjects in Grade 1 to 10, senior high school and college. Thus, the allegation of
petitioners that CMO No. 20 "removed" the study of Filipino, Panitikan and the Constitution in the GE curriculum is
incorrect.

As regards Section 3(1), Article XIV on the requirement that all educational institutions shall include the study of the
Constitution as part of the curricula, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm that the intention was
for it to be constitutionally mandated. The Court agrees that there is indeed a constitutional mandate that the study of
the Constitution should be part of the curriculum of educational institutions. However, the mandate was general and
did not specify the educational level in which it must be taught. Hence, the inclusion of the study of the Constitution in
the basic education curriculum satisfies the constitutional requirement.

In this regard, it must be emphasized that CMO No. 20 only provides for the minimum standards for the GE
component of all degree programs. Under Section 13 of RA No. 7722 or the Higher Education Act of 1994, the CHED
is authorized to determine the (a) minimum unit requirements for specific academic programs; (b) general education
distribution requirements as may be determined by the Commission; and (c) specific professional subjects as
may be stipulated by the various licensing entities. The provision further provides that this authority shall not be
construed as limiting the academic freedom of universities and colleges. Therefore, HEIs are given the freedom to
require additional Filipino or Panitikan courses to these minimum requirements if they wish to.

Third, petitioners aver that non-inclusion of these subjects in the GE curriculum will result to job displacement of
teachers and professors, which contravenes the constitutional provisions on protection of labor and security of tenure.
Once more, Section 3, Article XIII and Section 18, Article II do not automatically confer judicially demandable and
enforceable rights and cannot, on their own, be a basis for a declaration of unconstitutionality. Further, the Court finds
that, in fact, teachers and professors were given the opportunity to participate in the various consultations and
decision-making processes affecting their rights as workers. 240

CMO No. 20 does not contravene

any other laws

As claimed by petitioners, CMO No. 20 violated Section 14 of RA No. 7104 or the Commission on the Filipino
Language Act because it interfered with the authority of the Commission on the Filipino Language (CFL) on matters of
language. Petitioners reiterate that it is the CFL who has the authority to formulate policies, plans and programs to
ensure the further development, enrichment, propagation and preservation of Filipino and other Philippine
language241 and thus, CMO No. 20 should have retained the nine (9) units of Filipino in the GE curriculum, as
proposed by the CFL.

Petitioners also aver that CMO No. 20 violates RA No. 7356 or the Law Creating the National Commission for Culture
and the Arts because the non-inclusion of Filipino and Panitikan as subjects in the GE curriculum is a violation of our
"duty x x x to preserve and conserve the Filipino historical and cultural heritage and resources." 242

Lastly, petitioners allege that CMO No. 20 violates BP Blg. 232 or the Education Act of 1982, specifically, Section 3 on
the role of the educational community to promote the social and economic status of all school personnel and Section
23 on the objectives of tertiary education which includes a general education program that will promote national
identity and cultural consciousness.

Again, the Court disagrees.

It must be noted that nothing in these laws requires that Filipino and Panitikan must be included as subjects in the
tertiary level. Further, as already established, it is within the authority of the CHED to determine the GE distribution
requirements. The Court also reiterates that the study of Filipino and Panitikan can easily be included as courses in
the tertiary level, if the HEIs wish to. Thus, petitioners' arguments that CMO No. 20 violates the aforementioned laws
must fail.

III.

The K to 12 Law does not violate

substantive due process and equal
protection of the laws.

Petitioners also assert that the K to 12 Law is unconstitutional for violating the due process clause, as the means
employed is allegedly not proportional to the end to be achieved, and that there is supposedly an alternative and less
intrusive way of accomplishing the avowed objectives of the law. They point to studies which showed that lengthening
the time did not necessarily lead to better student performance. They further assert that "[g]iven adequate instruction,
armed with sufficient books, and a conducive learning environment, the Filipino student does not need at all two (2)
additional years of senior high school" and hence the imposition of additional years in senior high school is "unduly
oppressive an unwarranted intrusion into the right to education of all Filipino students, thus violating their right to
substantive due process."243 In addition, they claim that the assailed law is violative of the due process clause
because, allegedly, the law served the interests of only a select few. According to them, majority of the Filipinos will
never apply for graduate school admission to a foreign university or for professional work in a foreign corporation, and
these are the only people who supposedly need the additional two years of basic education. They point to the fact that
Filipinos are being currently employed as caregivers, seafarers, house helpers, etc. despite the fact that they have
undergone only ten (10) years of basic education. Hence, the assailed law is unconstitutional for serving the interests
of only a select few.244

Again, the Court disagrees. There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law and right of due process of the students.

It is established that due process is comprised of two components, namely, substantive due process which requires
the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural
due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by
an impartial and competent tribunal.245

Substantive due process, the aspect of due process invoked in this case, requires an inquiry on the intrinsic validity of
the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his property. In Abakada Guro Party List vs. Ermita,246 the Court
held:

x x x The inquiry in this regard is not whether or not the law is being enforced in accordance with the prescribed
manner but whether or not, to begin with, it is a proper exercise of legislative power.

To be so, the law must have a valid governmental objective, i.e., the interest of the public as distinguished from
those of a particular class, requires the intervention of the State. This objective must be pursued in a lawful manner,
or in other words, the means employed must be reasonably related to the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive.247 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, two things must concur: (1) the interest of the public, in general, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, requires the intervention of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on individuals.

Here, the K to 12 Law does not offend the substantive due process of petitioners. The assailed law's declaration of
policy itself reveals that, contrary to the claims of petitioners, the objectives of the law serve the interest of the public
and not only of a particular class:248

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall establish, maintain and support a complete, adequate, and integrated
system of education relevant to the needs of the people, the country and society-at-large.

Likewise, it is hereby declared the policy of the State that every graduate of basic education shall be an empowered
individual who has learned, through a program that is rooted on sound educational principles and geared
towards excellence, the foundations for learning throughout life, the competence to engage in work and be
productive, the ability to coexist in fruitful harmony with local and global communities, the capability to
engage in autonomous, creative, and critical thinking, and the capacity and willingness to transform others
and one's self.

For this purpose, the State shall create a functional basic education system that will develop productive and
responsible citizens equipped with the essential competencies, skills and values for both life-long learning
and employment. In order to achieve this, the State shall:

(a) Give every student an opportunity to receive quality education that is globally competitive based on a
pedagogically sound curriculum that is at par with international standards;

(b) Broaden the goals of high school education for college preparation, vocational and technical career opportunities
as well as creative arts, sports and entrepreneurial employment in a rapidly changing and increasingly globalized
environment; and

(c) Make education learner-oriented and responsive to the needs, cognitive and cultural capacity, the circumstances
and diversity of learners, schools and communities through the appropriate languages of teaching and learning,
including mother tongue as a learning resource. (Emphasis supplied)

All students are intended to benefit from the law. Without ruling on the effectiveness of the revised curriculum, it is
erroneous to view the K to 12 Law and the DepEd Orders in question extending basic education by two (2) years
simply to comply with international standards; rather, the basic education curriculum was restructured according to
what the political departments believed is the best approach to learning, or what they call as the "spiral approach."
This approach, according to respondent, will yield the following benefits for all students: (1) it is decongested and
offers a more balanced approach to learning; (2) it would help in freeing parents of the burden of having to spend for
college just to make their children employable; (3) it would prepare students with life skills that they learn while
schooling; (4) it is seamless; (5) it is relevant and responsive, age-appropriate, and focused on making learners
succeed in the 21st century; and (6) it is enriched and learner-centered.249 Thus, contrary to the claims of petitioners,
the assailed law caters to the interest of the public in general, as opposed to only a particular group of people.

Furthermore, the means employed by the assailed law are commensurate with its objectives. Again, the restructuring
of the curriculum with the corresponding additional years in senior high school were meant to improve the quality of
basic education and to make the country's graduates more competitive in the international arena.

Respondents proffer, and petitioners concede, that the Philippines is the last country to adopt a 12-year basic
education curriculum. However, petitioners submit that adding two (2) years in the basic education curriculum is not
the answer to achieve these objectives, and that there is supposedly a less intrusive way to achieve these goals,
namely, to increase the salaries of the teachers, invest in better and more resource materials, and building of more
classrooms to achieve the goal of improving the quality of education in the Philippines. Petitioners ought to be
reminded, however, that the objectives of the law are two-pronged. It was meant not only to (1) improve the basic
education in the country, but also to (2) make it at par with international standards. It is in this second purpose that the
means employed by the assailed law is justified. Thus, having established that the interest of the public in general is at
the heart of the law, and that the means employed are commensurate to its objectives, the Court holds that the K to
12 Law is not violative of the due process clause.

The students of Manila Science High School (MSHS), petitioners in G.R. No. 218465, aver, in particular, that the
decongestion of the originally existing basic education curriculum and the lengthening of the basic education cycle do
not, and should not, be made to apply to them as their curriculum is supposedly congested on purpose. 250 It
supposedly should not apply to them because "[they] are gifted and thus are advanced for their age, with the
capability to learn better and faster compared to other high school students. Because of their higher mental
capabilities, they neither need decongesting nor a longer period of time or any spiral approach, for them to in fact
master their heavier in scope and more advanced math and science subjects." 251 They are supposedly "not being
trained for immediate employment after high school but for them to pursue tertiary education, particularly career paths
either as mathematicians, scientists or engineers, which the country needs most for its development." 252 This, these
petitioners asseverate, makes the means employed by the K to 12 Law not reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of its intended purpose. Thus, as applied to MSHS students, the K to 12 Law is arbitrary, unfair,
oppressive, discriminatory and unreasonable and thus violative of their substantive due process. 253 They further
allege that the law is violative of the equal protection clause for treating them in the same way as all other high school
students when they are supposed to be treated differently for not being similarly situated with the rest.254

In essence, what these petitioners are saying is that the K to 12 Law did not make a substantial distinction between
MSHS students and the rest of the high school students in the country when it, in fact, should have done so.

This contention is without merit.

To assure that the general welfare is promoted, which is the end of the law, a regulatory measure may cut into the
rights to liberty and property.255 Those adversely affected may invoke the equal protection clause only if they can
show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common goal, was prompted
by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. 256 This, petitioners' failed to
sufficiently show. For this reason, the Court holds that the K to 12 Law did not violate petitioners' right to due process
nor did it violate the equal protection clause. In JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,257 the
Court explained the object and purpose of the equal protection clause in this wise:

The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is
not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to
operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. We have held, time and again, that the equal protection
clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. If classification is
germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future
conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee. 258 (Emphasis supplied)

To emphasize, valid classifications require real and substantial differences to justify the variance of treatment between
the classes. The MSHS students did not offer any substantial basis for the Court to create a valid classification
between them and the rest of the high school students in the Philippines. Otherwise stated, the equal protection
clause would, in fact, be violated if the assailed law treated the MSHS students differently from the rest of the high
school students in the country.

To be clear, the Court is not saying that petitioners are not gifted, contrary to their claims. The Court is merely saying
that the K to 12 Law was not infirm in treating all high school students equally. The MSHS students are, after all, high
school students just like all the other students who are, and will be, subjected to the revised curriculum.
The Court agrees with these petitioners to the extent of their claim that they have the right granted by Article 3(3) and
(6) of Presidential Decree No. 603, or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, to education commensurate with their
abilities.259 However, the Court disagrees that the said right granted by the Child and Youth Welfare Code was
violated when the revised curriculum under the K to 12 Law was applied to them. It bears repeating that the law is
being merely applied to the whole segment of the population to which petitioners belong. Further, the basic education
under the K to 12 was intended to meet the basic learning needs of the students and it is broad enough to cover
alternative learning systems for out-of-school learners and those with special needs.260

This is not to say that they shall be continually subjected strictly to the K to 12 curriculum which they describe as
"inferior," "diluted," and "anemic." 261 The K to 12 Law explicitly recognized the right of schools to modify their curricula
subject, of course, to the minimum subjects prescribed by the DepEd: 262

SEC. 5. Curriculum Development. — The DepED shall formulate the design and details of the enhanced basic
education curriculum. It shall work with the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) to craft harmonized basic and
tertiary curricula for the global competitiveness of Filipino graduates. To ensure college readiness and to avoid
remedial and duplication of basic education subjects, the DepED shall coordinate with the CHED and the Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA).

To achieve an effective enhanced basic education curriculum, the DepED shall undertake consultations with other
national government agencies and other stakeholders including, but not limited to, the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), the private and public schools associations, the
national student organizations, the national teacher organizations, the parents-teachers associations and the
chambers of commerce on matters affecting the concerned stakeholders.

The DepED shall adhere to the following standards and principles in developing the enhanced basic education
curriculum:

(a) The curriculum shall be learner-centered, inclusive and developmentally appropriate;

(b) The curriculum shall be relevant, responsive and research-based;

(c) The curriculum shall be culture-sensitive;

(d) The curriculum shall be contextualized and global;

(e) The curriculum shall use pedagogical approaches that are constructivist, inquiry-based, reflective, collaborative
and integrative;

(f) The curriculum shall adhere to the principles and framework of Mother Tongue-Based Multilingual Education (MTB-
MLE) which starts from where the learners are and from what they already knew proceeding from the known to the
unknown; instructional materials and capable teachers to implement the MTB-MLE curriculum shall be available;

(g) The curriculum shall use the spiral progression approach to ensure mastery of knowledge and skills after each
level; and

(h) The curriculum shall be flexible enough to enable and allow schools to localize, indigenize and enhance the
same based on their respective educational and social contexts. The production and development of locally
produced teaching materials shall be encouraged and approval of these materials shall devolve to the regional and
division education units. (Emphasis supplied)

In fact, the K to 12 IRR confirms the inclusiveness of the design of the Enhanced Basic Education in mandating that
the enhanced basic education programs should be able to address the physical, intellectual, psychosocial, and
cultural needs of learners.263 The IRR mandates that the Basic Education Program should include programs for the
gifted and talented, those with disabilities, the Madrasah Program for Muslim learners, Indigenous Peoples Programs,
and Programs for Learners under Difficult Circumstances. 264 The K to 12 IRR also allows the acceleration of learners
in public and private educational institutions.265 Therefore, the remedy of petitioner students is with MSHS and/or
DepEd, and not with this Court.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 218045 also challenge the K to 12 Law on the ground of violation of the equal protection clause
by arguing that private schools are allowed to offer extra and optional curriculum subjects in addition to those required
by the K to 12 Law and DepEd Orders, and thus, rich families will tend to enroll their children in private schools while
poor families will be constrained to enroll their children in English starved public schools. 266
The argument is untenable.

The Court, no matter how vast its powers are, cannot trample on the previously discussed right of schools to enhance
their curricula and the primary right of parents to rear their children, which includes the right to determine which
schools are best suited for their children's needs. Even before the passage of the K to 12 Law, private educational
institutions had already been allowed to enhance the prescribed curriculum, considering the State's recognition of the
complementary roles of public and private institutions in the educational system. 267 Hence, the Court cannot sustain
petitioners' submission that the assailed law is invalid based on this ground.

Other arguments against the

constitutionality of the K to 12 Law

Petitioners in G.R. No. 217752 argue that DepEd's use of global competitiveness as justification in the policy shift to K
to 12 is not relevant to the needs of the people and society, as not everyone will be working abroad.268 Essentially,
they are assailing the validity of the law for allegedly violating Section 2(1), Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, which states that:

SEC. 2. The State shall:

(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the needs
of the people and society[.]

As previously discussed, however, Section 2, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is a non-self-executing
provision of the Constitution. Again, as the Court already held in Basco, "Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV
of the 1987 [Philippine] Constitution x x x are merely statements of principles and policies. As such, they are basically
not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such
principles."269 The K to 12 Law is one such law passed by the Legislature to bring the said guiding principle to life. The
question of what is 'relevant to the needs of the people and society' is, in turn, within the sole purview of legislative
wisdom in which the Court cannot intervene.

Another assertion against the constitutionality of the K to 12 Law is that it allegedly violates the constitutional State
duty to exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of educational institutions mandated by Section 4, Article XIV
of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners in G.R. No. 218123 allege that DepEd's Basic Education Sector Transformation
Program (BEST) is supported by Australian Aid and managed by CardNo, a foreign corporation listed in the Australian
Securities Exchange. CardNo allegedly hires specialists for the implementation of the K to 12 curriculum. 270 This
partnership between CardNo and DepEd is allegedly violative of the above Constitutional provision, which reads:

SEC. 4. (1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the educational system
and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions.

(2) Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and mission boards, shall be owned
solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens. The Congress may, however, require increased Filipino equity participation in all educational
institutions.

The control and administration of educational institutions shall be vested in the citizens of the Philippines.

No educational institution shall be established exclusively for aliens and no group of aliens shall comprise more than
one-third of the enrollment in any school. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to schools established for
foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents and, unless otherwise provided by law, for other foreign temporary
residents.

(3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate
existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law.

Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions
subject to the limitations provided by law including restrictions on dividends and provisions for reinvestment.

(4) Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments, donations, or contributions used actually, directly,
and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners point to Section 4(1) and Section 4(2), paragraph 2, as legal basis for the supposed unconstitutionality of
the partnership between DepEd and CardNo in the implementation of the K to 12 curriculum.

Petitioners' reading of the above Constitutional provisions is erroneous. Sections 4(1) and 4(2) deal with two separate
matters that the Framers of the Constitution sought to address. Section 4(1) was a provision added by the Framers to
crystallize the State's recognition of the importance of the role that the private sector plays in the quality of the
Philippine education system. Despite this recognition, the Framers added the second portion of Section 4(2) to
emphasize that the State, in the exercise of its police power, still possesses the power of supervision over private
schools. The Framers were explicit, however, that this supervision refers to external governance, as opposed
to internal governance which was reserved to the respective school boards, thus:

Madam President, Section 2(b) introduces four changes: one, the addition of the word "reasonable" before the phrase
"supervision and regulation"; two, the addition of the word "quality" before the word "education"; three, the change of
the wordings in the 1973 Constitution referring to a system of education, requiring the same to be relevant to the goals
of national development, to the present expression of "relevant to the needs of the people and society"; and four, the
explanation of the meaning of the expression "integrated system of education" by defining the same as
the recognition and strengthening of the complementary roles of public and private educational institutions
as separate but integral parts of the total Philippine educational system.

When we speak of State supervision and regulation, we refer to the external governance of educational
institutions, particularly private educational institutions as distinguished from the internal governance by their
respective boards of directors or trustees and their administrative officials. Even without a provision on external
governance, the State would still have the inherent right to regulate educational institutions through the exercise of its
police power. We have thought it advisable to restate the supervisory and regulatory functions of the State provided in
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with the addition of the word "reasonable." We found it necessary to add the word
"reasonable" because of an obiter dictum of our Supreme Court in a decision in the case of Philippine Association of
Colleges and Universities vs. The Secretary of Education and the Board of Textbooks in 1955. In that case, the court
said, and I quote:

It is enough to point out that local educators and writers think the Constitution provides for control of education by the
State.

The Solicitor General cites many authorities to show that the power to regulate means power to control, and quotes
from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to prove that State control of private education was intended by
organic law.

The addition, therefore, of the word "reasonable" is meant to underscore the sense of the committee, that
when the Constitution speaks of State supervision and regulation, it does not in any way mean control. We
refer only to the power of the State to provide regulations and to see to it that these regulations are duly
followed and implemented. It does not include the right to manage, dictate, overrule and prohibit. Therefore, it does
not include the right to dominate.271 (Emphasis supplied)

In stark contrast, Section 4(2), Article XIV, which was copied from the 1973 Philippine Constitution, refers
to ownership and administration of individual schools. This interpretation is clear both from a plain reading of the
provision itself, and from the deliberations of the Framers of the Constitution:

MR. GUINGONA. The committee refers to both ownership and administration. If I may be allowed to continue, may I
refer the Commissioner to the same section that I have specified in the 1973 Constitution. The Commissioner will
notice that this particular provision does not only refer to administration because it speaks also of educational
institution which should be owned solely by citizens or corporations of the Philippines.

MR. REGALADO. Yes.

MR. GUINGONA. In other words, even in the 1973 Constitution, the contemplation or the intention of the fundamental
law was to include both ownership and administration.

MR. REGALADO. They are not merely these, because otherwise there is an error of language in the Constitution
then. Paragraph 7 of Section 8 states: "Educational institutions, other than those established by religious orders,
mission boards, or charitable organizations."

MR. GUINGONA. Yes.

MR. REGALADO. In other words, with the exception of educational institutions established by religious orders,
mission boards, or charitable organizations, then all educational institutions shall be owned solely by citizens of the
Philippines and at the time, of course, by corporations or associations 60 per centum of the capital of which is owned
by citizens. In other words, educational institutions of religious orders were exempted from that requirement by the
very constitutional provision which was further implemented and ramified with clarity in P.D. No. 176.272

Thus, petitioners are mistaken in applying Section 4(2), Article XIV to Section 4(1), Article XIV as they deal with
completely different matters. The restrictions expressed in Section 4(2), Article XIV only refer to ownership, control,
and administration of individual schools, and these do not apply to the State's exercise of reasonable supervision and
regulation of educational institutions under Section 4(1), Article XIV. Hence, there is nothing under the provisions of
the Constitution which prohibits the State to forge a partnership with a foreign entity, like CardNo, in the exercise of
this supervision and regulation of educational institutions.

Further, it is asserted that the K to 12 Law violates the constitutional duty of the State to provide adult citizens, the
disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills as commanded by
Section 2, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Petitioners decry the supposed lack of mechanisms in the K
to 12 Law to accommodate groups with special needs.273 As previously discussed, Section 2, Article XIV of the 1987
Philippine Constitution is not a self-executing provision. Furthermore, petitioners' argument has no factual basis
because DepEd has already put in place programs to address the needs of indigenous peoples, Muslim children, adult
learners, PWDs, out of school youth and other sectors of society in keeping with the aforesaid constitutional
provisions, in line with the K to 12 Law. The Court agrees with the following discussion by the OSG in its Comment on
this point:

The petitioners' argument has no factual basis because the DepEd has already put in place programs to address the
needs of the indigenous peoples, Muslim schoolchildren, adult learners, and persons with disabilities (PWDs) in line
with the K-12 program. DepEd Order No. 103, s. 2011 directed the creation of the Indigenous Peoples Education
Office (IPsEO), which is a mechanism for the mobilization, implementation, and coordination of all the programs and
projects of DepEd pertaining to IPs education, pursuant to "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997." This law
mandates all government agencies to recognize and promote the rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities and
Indigenous Peoples within the framework of national unity and development.

Dep[E]d Order No. 62, s. 2011 entitled "The National Indigenous Peoples Education Policy Framework," was issued to
serve as an instrument in promoting shared accountability, continuous dialogue, engagement, and partnership among
governments, IPs communities, civil society, and other education stakeholders in upholding the IPs Learners'
education rights. In support of DepEd's commitment to strengthen its policy on Indigenous Peoples Education (IPEd),
DepEd Order No. 26, s. 2013 promulgated the Implementing Guidelines on the Allocation and Utilization of the
Indigenous Peoples Education (IPEd) Program Support Fund.

Likewise, DepEd Order No. 46, s. 2013, entitled "Guidelines on the Madrasah Education Program and Utilization of
the Support Fund," was issued to engage Muslim learners with relevant educational opportunities and processes.

On the other hand, DepEd Order No. 39, s. 2013 was issued in support of DepEd's Special Education Program for
learners with special needs and disabilities, including those who are gifted and talented. DepEd Memorandum No.
108, s. 2013 entitled "2013 Alternative Learning System Accreditation and Equivalency (ALS & ALE) Test Registration
and Administration" was promulgated to facilitate the ALS & ALE Test, designed to measure the competencies of
those who have neither attended nor finished the elementary or secondary education in the formal school system.
Passers of this test are given a certificate/diploma (which bears the seal and the signature of the Secretary of the
Department of Education) certifying their competencies as comparable to graduates of the formal school system.
Hence, they are qualified to enroll in the secondary and post secondary schools.

DepEd Order No. 17, s. 2014 was also issued to provide the guidelines on the Abot-Alam Program, a convergence
program that is being undertaken by a consortium of various national government agencies, non government
organizations, the National Youth Commission, and institutions under the leadership of DepEd to locate the out-of-
school youth (OSY) nationwide who are 15-30 years old and who have not completed basic/higher education or who
are unemployed, and to mobilize and harmonize programs which will address the OSY's needs and aspirations.

DepEd Order No. 77, s. 2011 organized the Advisory Council for the Education of Children and Youth with Disabilities
(ACECYD) to formulate an agenda for action and the framework for collaboration between the DepEd and the
disability sector and other stakeholders in providing education to children and youth with disabilities.

DepEd Order No. 64, s. 2011 directed all Schools Division and City Superintendents (SDSs) and District Supervisors
to strictly implement relevant policies and best practices on the promotion and compensation of all Alternative
Learning System (ALS) mobile teachers and implementers to ensure equal opportunities and standard implementation
on the promotion and compensation of the ALS implementers.
Likewise, DepEd Order No. 22, s. 2010, entitled "Mainstreaming and Institutionalizing Madrasah Education Program
by Transferring Its Developed Components to the Bureau of Elementary Education, Regional and Division Offices,
and the Establishment of Madrasah Education Unit," was promulgated with the ultimate objective of peace building,
national unity and understanding. Under this scheme, DepEd shall develop the Standard Madrasah Curriculum (SMC)
for Pre-elementary and Secondary levels, along with the development of instructional and learning materials, to
complete the cycle of basic education Madrasah.

These inclusion programs are continuously being implemented to respond to the needs of the education sector during
the transition period. They show the resolve of the DepEd to harness the necessary systems and structures to
respond to the needs of the indigenous peoples, Muslim schoolchildren, adult learners, PWDs, OSYs, and the other
sectors of society, in keeping with the constitutional provisions on the rights of indigenous peoples to preserve and
develop their cultures, and to provide training in civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills to adult, disabled, and
out-of-school youth.274

In fine, the contentions of petitioners are therefore without any factual basis and utterly devoid of merit.

IV.

Policy issues

In an attempt to bolster their case against the K to 12 Law, petitioners also raised the following policy issues:

a) K to 12 only increases the resource gap by creating more need for resources. The
solution to the problem is closing the resource gap by giving priority to education
in the budget and public spending program of the government and addressing the
issue of poverty and malnutrition and programs aimed at alleviating if not
eradicating poverty in the long run but instead government comes up with the K to
12 Law which is a copycat and elitist solution.275
b) K to 12 is problem-ridden. Instead, what we need is to prioritize deficiencies in
personnel, facilities and materials; and a nationalist-oriented curriculum relevant to
the needs of the people.276
c) The Philippine government does not have enough funds to add two (2) more years
of senior high school.277
d) Student-teacher ratio is far from ideal.278
e) Teachers are paid low salaries.279
f) There is no assurance that senior high school results in good employment. 280

Policy matters are not the concern of the Court. To reiterate, government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the
political branches of the government. It is not for the Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
determination.281 Stated otherwise, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation.282 Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory,
whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its
prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner — all these are matters for the judgment of the
legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.
When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine
whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. 283 In the case of Tañada v.
Cuenco,284 the Court, quoting American authorities, held:

"Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the province
of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where,
therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are
exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the question as to
the existence and extent of these discretionary powers.

"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as
the political departments of government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by
considerations of public or political policy. These considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the
legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not granted him by the
Constitution or by statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to recognize
that a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations, together with the
consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts." 285 (Emphasis in the original)
Similarly, in Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. DENR Region 12 Employees,286 the Court held
that:

x x x. However, these concern issues addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality. It is basic in
our form of government that the judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive or
the legislative department, for each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of
authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other department, but also to
inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the
other departments.

The Supreme Court should not be thought of as having been tasked with the awesome responsibility of
overseeing the entire bureaucracy. Unless there is a clear showing of constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Court's exercise of the judicial power, pervasive and
limitless it may seem to be, still must succumb to the paramount doctrine of separation of powers. After a
careful review of the records of the case, we find that this jurisprudential element of abuse of discretion has not been
shown to exist.287 (Emphasis supplied)

Further, the courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution, but also because the judiciary, in the determination of actual
cases and controversies, must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives
in the executive and legislative departments of the government. 288 The Court, despite its vast powers, will not review
the wisdom, merits, or propriety of governmental policies, but will strike them down only on either of two grounds: (1)
unconstitutionality or illegality and/or (2) grave abuse of discretion.289 For having failed to show any of the above in the
passage of the assailed law and the department issuances, the petitioners' remedy thus lies not with the Court, but
with the executive and legislative branches of the government. 290

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the Court declares Republic Act No.
10533, Republic Act No. 10157, CHED Memorandum Order No. 20, Series of 2013, Department of Education Order
No. 31, Series of 2012, and Joint Guidelines on the Implementation of the Labor and Management Component of
Republic Act No. 10533, as CONSTITUTIONAL. The Temporary Restraining Order dated April 21, 2015 issued in
G.R. No. 217451 is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, Tijam, and A. Reyes, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Bersamin and Gesmundo, JJ., on official business.
J. Reyes, Jr., J., on wellness leave.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R.
TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.

Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.

BIDIN, J.:

Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."

Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one
legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district,
sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on
February 9, 1994.

Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong
were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city
as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population.
Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed
ratified and in effect.

Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is
unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.

Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:

As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first
representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder
of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of
San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election.

Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill"
rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:

Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.

Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two
principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the
congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since
the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law.
Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill"
rule has not been complied with.

Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to
wit:

Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations.

Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.

Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section
49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that
provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made
pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.
And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.

The contentions are devoid of merit.

Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably
ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution:

. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate congressional
district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.

Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical
consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the
subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.

Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not
to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional
requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all
the provisions are germane to that general subject."

The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21
SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).

Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the
assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of
250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the
validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional
processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the
establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature
must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.

As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the
Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit
of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter
clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a
legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not
unconstitutional.

Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the
assailed Section 49 of R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.

As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was
Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress
cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments against the validity
thereof.

Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No.
7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal
subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of
separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded
from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.

Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the practice
of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed
by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent
representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San
Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be
considered as favorable to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE
MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995

JOHN R. OSMEÑA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL
TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854
as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized
City to be known as the City of Makati." 1

G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano,
Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina
Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of
Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as
unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:

1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati
by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;

2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local
elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.

3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:

(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in
violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be
passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census;

(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and

(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmeña as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner
assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.

We find no merit in the petitions.

 I

Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized
city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the
present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction
bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest
by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.

The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency or
forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the
City of Makati and the adjoining local government units. (Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code
which require that the area of a local government unit should be made by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions.2

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires.
Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise
of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the
Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions.

Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description made
in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed
City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch
the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the
established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area
"shall comprise the present territory of the municipality."

The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of
Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No.
7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court
litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute
should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact
which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained
from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary
disputes.4

We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will
prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the
cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness,
made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not
prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General
in this regard, viz.:

Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the
requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should
be described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions" — was made in order to provide a
means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the
requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government
units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably
ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case,
then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served.

Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed
technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To
require such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the
very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is
 to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local
governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a
vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral
type of description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then
becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be
the intendment of the law.

Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be
consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when to do
so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Tañada v. Cuenco,
103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of
government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and
statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v.
Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar.

II

Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51
states:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati
shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until
such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and
assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive
officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and
they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.

They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which
provide:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of
Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive
terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No.
7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served
by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay,
who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and
eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another
three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted.
Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of
respondent Mayor Binay.

We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can
challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many
contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected
in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that
these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an
actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to
raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court
has no jurisdiction.

III

Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854.
Section 52 of the Charter provides:

Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. — Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall
thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing
districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on
Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held after the effectivity of this Act.
Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmariñas and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of
Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis supplied)

They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1)
reapportionment6 cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of
the bill7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).

These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos.8 In said case, we ruled that
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The
Constitution9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250)
members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing
its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done
by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold
that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative
districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The
intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty
cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3),
Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as
of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it
has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14

Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in Makati
should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated
the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation.
To be sure, with Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely
catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject."

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and
Francisco, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 83216 September 4, 1989

TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES, GLORIA T. ARAGON (M.D.), LOURDES V. MASTURA, TRINIDAD A. GOMEZ,
ADUL DE LEON, JOSEFINA AZARCON-DELA CRUZ, TRINIDAD M. DOMINGO, MARIA MAYET T. LEDANO,
LOLIT ANTONIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS, AND OFFICES (C.A.), COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE CHIEF
ACCOUNTANT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ET AL., respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

This is a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus with injunction seeking to compel respondent Commission
on Appointments to allow petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles to perform and discharge her duties as a member of the
House of Representatives representing the Women's Sector and to restrain respondents from subjecting petitioner's
appointment to the confirmation process.

The antecedent facts which gave rise to this petition are as follows:

On April 6, 1988, petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to
Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, Jr. transmitted by letter, also dated April 6,1988 (Annex L) the appointment of the said sectoral
representatives to Speaker Ramon Mitra, Jr. as follows:

April 6, 1988

Hon. Ramon V. Mitra, Jr.

Speaker, House of Representatives
Quezon City

S i r:

Pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7, of the Constitution, the President has
appointed the following persons to the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article
VI of the Constitution:

1. Teresita Quintos-Deles —-Women

2. Al Ignatius G. Lopez —Youth

3. Bartolome Arteche —-Peasant

4. Rey Magno Teves —-Urban Poor

Copies of their appointments are enclosed.

With best wishes.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) CATALINO MACARAIG JR

Executive Secretary

On April 18, 1988, the above-mentioned sectoral representatives were scheduled to take their oaths before Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. at the Session Hall of Congress after the Order of Business. However, petitioner and the three
other sectoral representatives- appointees were not able to take their oaths and discharge their duties as members of
Congress due to the opposition of some congressmen-members of the Commission on Appointments, who insisted
that sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by the respondent Commission before they could take their oaths
and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives. This opposition compelled Speaker Ramon V.
Mitra, Jr. to suspend the oath-taking of the four sectoral representatives.
In view of this development, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. transmitted on April 25,1988, a letter dated
April 11, 1988 of the President addressed to the Commission on Appointments submitting for confirmation the
appointments of the four sectoral representatives as follows:

l1 April 1988

The Honorable
Jovito R. Salonga
The Senate President and
The Members of the Commission
on Appointments
Congress of the Philippines
Manila

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2, and Article XVIII, Section 7, of the Constitution, I hereby submit, for
confirmation, the appointments of the following persons as Members of the House of Representatives representing the
sectors indicated opposite their respective names:

TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES — Women

AL IGNATIUS G. LOPEZ — Youth

BARTOLOME ARTECHE — Peasant

REY MAGNO TEVES — Urban Poor

An early confirmation of their appointments will be appreciated.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd) Corazon C. Aquino

Meanwhile, petitioner in a letter dated April 22, 1988 addressed to Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. (Annex V) appealed to
the House of Representatives alleging, among others, that since 41 no attempt was made to subject the sectoral
representatives* already sitting to the confirmation process, there is no necessity for such confirmation and subjection
thereto of the present batch would certainly be discriminatory."

In reply, Speaker Mitra in a letter dated May 2, 1988 (Annex BB) informed petitioner that since "President Corazon C.
Aquino has submitted your appointment to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation in a letter dated April 11,
1988, . . . the Commission on Appointments now has sole jurisdiction over the matter."

On May 10, 1988, petitioner Deles received an invitation dated May 6, 1988 to attend a Commission on Appointments
Committee Meeting scheduled for May 12, 1988 for the deliberation of her appointment as sectoral representative for
women (Annex DD). Petitioner sent a reply dated May 11, 1988 explaining her position and questioning the jurisdiction
of the Commission on Appointments over the appointment of sectoral representatives (Annex EE).

In the May 12,1988 meeting of the Committee of the Constitutional Commissions and Offices of the Commission on
Appointments, chaired by Sen. Edgardo J. Angara, the Committee ruled against the position of petitioner Deles.

Hence, this petition for prohibition and mandamus praying that respondent Commission on Appointments be enjoined
from subjecting to confirmation process the petitioner's appointment as sectoral representative for the women's sector
and as member of Congress.

Petitions in intervention were likewise filed by Estefania Aldaba Lim, et al. (Rollo, p. 147); Ma. Iris Melizza, et al.
(Rollo, p. 172); Margarita Gomez, et al. (Rollo, p. 186); Hernani Panganiban, et al. (Rollo, p. 208); Presentacion
Castro, et al. (Rollo, p. 215); Sr. Teresa Dagdag, et al. (Rollo, p. 251); and Civil Liberties Union (Rollo, p. 274).

Petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles contends that her appointment as Sectoral Representative for Women by the
President pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, does not require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments to qualify her to take her seat in the House of Representatives.
The opposite view is taken by the Solicitor General in his Statement of Position (In lieu of Comment), dated July
15,1988 (Rollo, p. 206) in this wise: "In view of the President's submission d the four sectoral representatives, the
petitioner included, to the Commission on Appointments by letter dated April 11, 1988, then confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments is required."

On August 15, 1988, respondent Commission on Appointments, in addition to adopting the Statement of Position (in
lieu of Comment) submitted by the Solicitor General, likewise submitted its own Statement of Position (In lieu of
Comment) and further manifested that (1) the appointment of petitioner Deles was not acted upon by the Commission
on Appointments when Congress went into recess as required by the Constitution; (2) the case of petitioner Deles for
appointment as sectoral representative to the House of Representatives has become moot and academic not having
been finally acted upon at the close of the session of Congress pursuant to See. 23 of the Rules of the Commission
(Rollo, pp. 233-234) which reads as follows:

Section 23. Suspension of Consideration of Nomination or Appointments to be Returned to the

President.- Nominations or appointments submitted by the President of the Philippines which are not
finally acted upon at the close of the session of Congress shall be returned to the President, and
unless resubmitted, shall not again be considered by the Commission.

On January 31, 1989, the Court after noting the reply filed by the petitioner and the rejoinder filed by respondents,
resolved to give due course to the petition and the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda (Rollo,
p. 309). By way of manifestation and motion dated March 9, 1989 (Rollo, p. 311), the Office of the Solicitor General
adopted its statement of position (in lieu of comment) and rejoinder as its memorandum. Petitioners and intervenor
Civil Liberties Union submitted their memoranda on March 22, 1989 and March 30, 1989, respectively. A
supplemental statement of position (in lieu of memorandum) dated March 31, 1989 was filed by respondent
Commission.

The Constitution provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty
(250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from the legislative districts and those who as
provided by law, shall be elected thru a party-list system. The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the
total number of representatives or fifty (50) seats. One-half or twenty-five (25) of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives is reserved for sectoral representatives. The reservation is limited to three consecutive terms after
ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Section 5 (1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SEC. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification
of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector.

Under Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, the appointment of sectoral representatives is vested upon the
President until otherwise provided by law, as follows:

SEC. 7. Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the
respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article
VI of this Constitution.

The issue is, whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
enumerates among others, the officers who may be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, as follows:

SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
 authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower
in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions,
or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

In Sarmiento vs. Mison, et al. (156 SCRA 549 [19871), we construed Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution to
mean that only appointments to offices mentioned in the first sentence of the said Section 16, Article VII require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, as follows:

It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4)
groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter
refer from time to time, are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.

The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

xxx xxx xxx

(T)he purposive intention and deliberate judgment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution (is) that,
except as to those officers whose appointments require the consent of the Commission on
Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments of other
officers are left to the President without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
This conclusion is inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that the framers of the 1987
Constitution were knowledgeable of what they were doing and of the foreseeable effects thereof.

Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on

or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of
Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein
enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

Our ruling in Mison was reiterated in the recent case of Mary Concepcion Bautista vs. Sen. Jovito Salonga, et al. (G.R.
No. 86439, promulgated on April 13, 1989) wherein the Court held:

The Mison case was the first major case under the 1987 Constitution and in constructing Sec. 16, Art.
VII of the 1987 Constitution, ... this Court, drawing extensively from the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission and the country's experience under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, held
that only those appointments expressly mentioned in the first sentence of See. 16, Art. VII are to be
reviewed by the Commission on Appointments, namely, 'the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.'
All other appointments by the President are to be made without the participation of the Commission
on Appointments.

Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment
by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is undubitable that sectoral
representatives to the House of Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution," referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).

Nevertheless, there are appointments vested in the President in the Constitution which, by express mandate of the
Constitution, require no confirmation such as appointments of members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No such exemption from confirmation
had been extended to appointments of sectoral representatives in the Constitution. Petitioner was appointed on April
6, 1988 pursuant to Art. XVIII, Section 7 and Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 of the Constitution, to wit:

6 April 1988

Madam:

Pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7, of the Constitution, you
are hereby appointed MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

By virtue hereof, you may qualify to said position furnishing this office with copies of your oath of
office.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO

Hon. TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES

(Annex "M", Petition, Rollo, p. 108.)

The invocation of Art. XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution as authority for the appointment of petitioner places said
appointment within the ambit of the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII; hence, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments under the Mison doctrine. Petitioner's appointment was furthermore made pursuant to
Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 which provides:

SEC. 16. ...

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

The reference to paragraph 2, Section 16 of Article VII as additional authority for the appointment of petitioner is of
vital significance to the case at bar. The records show that petitioner's appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or
while Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of
Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her.

Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the appointment of petitioner is, the
recognition by the President as appointing authority that petitioner's appointment requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Under paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII, appointments made by the President pursuant
thereto "shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
the Congress." If indeed appointments of sectoral representatives need no confirmation, the President need not make
any reference to the constitutional provisions above-quoted in appointing the petitioner, As a matter of fact, the
President in a letter dated April 11, 1989 had expressly submitted petitioner's appointment for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Considering that Congress had adjourned without respondent Commission on
Appointments having acted on petitioner's appointment, said appointment/nomination had become moot and
academic pursuant to Section 23 of the Rules of respondent Commission and "unless resubmitted shall not again be
considered by the Commission."

Petitioners further contend that nowhere in the Constitution nor in Executive Order No. 198 is mention made of the
need for petitioner's appointment to be submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. Executive
Order No. 198 promulgated on June 18, 1687 before the convening of Congress, is denominated: "Providing for the
Manner of Nomination and Appointment of Sectoral Representatives to the House of Representatives." We agree with
the submission of respondent Commission that the provisions of Executive Order No. 198 do not deal with the manner
of appointment of sectoral representatives. Executive Order No. 1 98 confines itself to specifying the sectors to be
represented, their number, and the nomination of such sectoral representatives.
The power of the President to appoint sectoral representatives remains directly derived from Section 7, Article XVIII of
the Constitution which is quoted in the second "Whereas' clause of Executive Order No. 198. Thus, appointments by
the President of sectoral representatives require the consent of the Commission on Appointments in accordance with
the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII of the Constitution. More to the point, petitioner Deles' appointment was
issued not by virtue of Executive Order No. 198 but pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Art. XVIII,
Section 7 of the Constitution which require submission to the confirmation process.

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 177597 July 16, 2008

BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 178628

PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These consolidated petitions1 seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. 2

The Facts

The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for the Province of
Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities. 3 Maguindanao forms part
of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA
6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054). 4 Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of
Maguindanao’s first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in
the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989.

On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces
under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, 5 enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act
201 provides:

Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat,
Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby separated from the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and
independent province, which is hereby created, to be known as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

xxxx

Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the appointment by the Regional Governor or
election of the governor and majority of the regular members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao shall continue to serve their unexpired
terms in the province that they will choose or where they are residents: Provided, that where an elective position in
both provinces becomes vacant as a consequence of the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent
elective provincial officials shall have preference for appointment to a higher elective vacant position and for the time
being be appointed by the Regional Governor, and shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected and
qualified in the next local elections; Provided, further, that they shall continue to receive the salaries they are receiving
at the time of the approval of this Act until the new readjustment of salaries in accordance with law. Provided,
furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in the number of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
mother province.

Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato as a part thereof,
shall remain.

Later, three new municipalities6 were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan,
bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities
constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, is not
part of the Province of Maguindanao.

The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.

On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the
COMELEC to "clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a
regular province" under MMA Act 201.

In answer to Cotabato City’s query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the
status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao." Resolution
No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELEC’s Law Department under a Memorandum dated
27 February 2007,7 provides in pertinent parts:

Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the recommendation of the
Law Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status quo with
Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied)

However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No.
7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment
of MMA Act 201.8

On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-
0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First
District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City)." 91avvphi1

In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of "Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City," prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from
canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one
representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution 10 and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution.11 Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in Maguindanao’s first legislative district despite the
COMELEC’s earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as the lone component of
Maguindanao’s reapportioned first legislative district. 12 Sema further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the
COMELEC usurped Congress’ power to create or reapportion legislative districts.

In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), chose not to reach the merits of the
case and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No.
7902 because the COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial, power and (2)
Sema’s prayer for the writ of prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became moot with the proclamation of respondent
Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as representative of the legislative district of Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.

In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from questioning COMELEC Resolution No.
7902 because in her certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as
representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City." Respondent Dilangalen added that COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or
reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanao’s first legislative district.
Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could not reapportion Maguindanao’s first legislative
district to make Cotabato City its sole component unit as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively
with Congress, not to mention that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum population requirement under Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of a legislative district within a city. 13

Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in respondents’ Comments and reiterating her claim
that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902.

In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in G.R. No. 177597 to comment on the issue of
whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to
one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for
such new province. The parties submitted their compliance as follows:

(1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a) the Court in Felwa v.
Salas14 stated that "when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes
into existence neither by authority of that statute — which cannot provide otherwise — nor by apportionment,
but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment"; (b) Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA
7160) "affirms" the apportionment of a legislative district incident to the creation of a province; and (c) Section
5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution mandate the
apportionment of a legislative district in newly created provinces.

(2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG, apparently abandoned its earlier stance on the propriety
of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and joined causes with Sema, contending that Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution is "self-executing." Thus, every new province created by the ARMM Regional
Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives even in the absence of
a national law; and

(3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the following grounds: (a) the "province"
contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is one that is created by an act of Congress taking
into account the provisions in RA 7160 on the creation of provinces; (b) Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054
withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to enact measures relating to national elections,
which encompasses the apportionment of legislative districts for members of the House of Representatives;
(c) recognizing a legislative district in every province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the
disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the House of Representatives as the Regional Assembly can
create provinces without regard to the requirements in Section 461 of RA 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which
has a population of less than 250,000, is not entitled to a representative in the House of Representatives.

On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No. 177597 in oral arguments on the following issues: (1)
whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces,
is constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative
district for such new province.15

In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 filed their respective
Memoranda on the issues raised in the oral arguments.16 On the question of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article
VI of RA 9054, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following positions:

(1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional (a) as a valid delegation by
Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution
granting to the autonomous regions, through their organic acts, legislative powers over "other matters as may
be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region" and (b) as an
amendment to Section 6 of RA 7160.17 However, Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to "prescribe standards lower than
those mandated" in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.18 Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19 "should be construed as prohibiting the Regional
Assembly from prescribing standards x x x that do not comply with the minimum criteria" under RA 7160. 19

(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional on the
following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was not among those granted to the autonomous regions
under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the
ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in Section 461 of
RA 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the Equal
Protection Clause; and
 (3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent Dilangalen (thus effectively abandoning
the position the COMELEC adopted in its Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007) and
contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section 10 and
Section 6,20 Article X of the Constitution and (b) the power to create provinces was withheld from the
autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.

On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such
new province, Sema and respondent Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the positions they adopted in their
Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007. The COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to submit its position
on this issue considering its stance that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional.

The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the oral arguments on 27 November 2007.
Thus, in the Resolution of 19 February 2008, the Court ordered G.R. No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597.
The petition in G.R. No. 178628 echoed Sema's contention that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution
No. 7902 depriving the voters of Cotabato City of a representative in the House of Representatives. In its Comment to
the petition in G.R. No. 178628, the COMELEC, through the OSG, maintained the validity of COMELEC Resolution
No. 7902 as a temporary measure pending the enactment by Congress of the "appropriate law."

The Issues

The petitions raise the following issues:

I. In G.R. No. 177597:

(A) Preliminarily –

(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test the constitutionality of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and

(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan

Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.

(B) On the merits –

(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power
to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and

(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act
201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province.

II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid for maintaining
the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato
City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]"), despite the creation of the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City).

The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.

On the Preliminary Matters

The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate

to Test the Constitutionality of
Election Laws, Rules and Regulations

The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by "any tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions."21 On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act "which the law specifically enjoins as a duty." 22 True, the
COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions.23 Nor is there a
law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for
representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City." These, however, do not justify the outright
dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also prayed for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition and
we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations. 24

Respondent Dilangalen’s Proclamation

Does Not Moot the Petition

There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalen’s proclamation as winner in the 14 May 2007 elections
for representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City" mooted this petition. This case does not
concern respondent Dilangalen’s election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No.
7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome
of this petition, one way or another, determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the
district of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City" will be included in the canvassing of ballots. However, this
incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The
Court’s ruling in these petitions affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the other succeeding
elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future
additional provinces.

On the Main Issues

Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly
Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan

The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units – province, city, municipality or barangay – must comply
with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local
Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be
a plebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to
regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to
reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has
delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction,25 subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite
requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, "only x x x an
Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities or municipalities. 261avvphi1

Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary
legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers
granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. 27 In the present case, the question arises whether the
delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.

There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to
create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the
creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with
a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" in the
House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Any province
that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty
thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x."

Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a
population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a
province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even
the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because
once the city’s population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the
power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.

For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same time
the power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives? The answer is in the
negative.

Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned

Only by an Act of Congress

Under the present Constitution, as well as in past 28 Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable membership in
the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

xxxx

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.
Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts.
The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of
existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that
regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be
increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress.
In Montejo v. COMELEC,29 we held that the "power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power
(of Congress) to make laws," and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.

This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical.
Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership
through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It
would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national
legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the
membership of the superior legislative body.

The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not
divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the
ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the
organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4) Personal, family, and property relations;

(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;

 (6) Economic, social, and tourism development;

(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of
the region.

Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to
create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.

On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, "The Regional
Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x
x." Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot
create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law
creating a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the "next national elections" from the
effectivity of the law.30

Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member
of the House of Representatives, is a national official.31 It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like
the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional
territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out
of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative
body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office.

To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside
the ARMM’s territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the
coverage of the Regional Assembly’s legislative powers "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x."

The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive nature of Congress’
power to create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff
Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201 provides that:

Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato City as a part
thereof, shall remain. (Emphasis supplied)

However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that
"each province shall have at least one representative." Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
without a legislative district is unconstitutional.

Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(Emphasis supplied)

and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which states:

Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two
hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such
number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the
standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of Members
apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so
increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such
adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)

serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, created on 29 October 2006, is
automatically entitled to one member in the House of Representatives in the 14 May 2007 elections. As further
support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that "when a province is created by statute, the
corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute — which cannot provide
otherwise — nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment."
The contention has no merit.

First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional representation in the old
and new provinces, was unconstitutional for "creati[ng] congressional districts without the apportionment provided in
the Constitution." The Court answered in the negative, thus:

The Constitution ordains:

"The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twenty Members who shall be
apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants,
but each province shall have at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three
years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been made, the
House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly,
who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall
comprise as far as practicable, contiguous and compact territory."

Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into existence: (a) indirectly, through the creation
of a province — for "each province shall have at least one member" in the House of Representatives; or (b) by
direct creation of several representative districts within a province. The requirements concerning the
apportionment of representative districts and the territory thereof refer only to the second method of creation of
representative districts, and do not apply to those incidental to the creation of provinces, under the first method. This is
deducible, not only from the general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the
apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act of Congress. Indeed, when a province is
created by statute, the corresponding representative district, comes into existence neither by authority of that statute
— which cannot provide otherwise — nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a
reapportionment.

There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of, or other conditions under which a province may be
created, except, perhaps, if the consequence thereof were to exceed the maximum of 120 representative districts
prescribed in the Constitution, which is not the effect of the legislation under consideration. As a matter of fact,
provinces have been created or subdivided into other provinces, with the consequent creation of additional
representative districts, without complying with the aforementioned requirements. 32 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created legislative districts
"indirectly" through a special law enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of the legislative
districts will not result in breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided under the 1935
Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new provinces were created by
a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new province was created merely by a regional law enacted
by the ARMM Regional Assembly.

What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate alone from Congress’
power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress’ power to create provinces which cannot be created
without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of the
Constitution because the Constitution provides that "each province shall have at least one representative" in the
House of Representatives. This does not detract from the constitutional principle that the power to create legislative
districts belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely prevents any other legislative body, except Congress, from
creating provinces because for a legislative body to create a province such legislative body must have the power to
create legislative districts. In short, only an act of Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative district by operation
of the Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the power to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative district.

Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation,
this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato
City cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a population of only
163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone as the surviving first legislative district of Maguindanao will violate Section
5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which requires that "[E]ach city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand x x x, shall have at least one representative."

Second. Sema’s theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of Representatives. Under
Section 19,33 Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM
with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income of
₱20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000. 34 The
following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:
 (1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100 or more provinces and thus
increase the membership of a superior legislative body, the House of Representatives, beyond the maximum
limit of 250 fixed in the Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise);

(2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on one representative for at least
every 250,000 residents will be negated because the ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the
requirement in Section 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every province created must have a population of at least
250,000; and

(3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the House of Representatives
through the ARMM Regional Assembly’s continuous creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM.

The following exchange during the oral arguments of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 highlights the absurdity of
Sema’s position that the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces:

Justice Carpio:

So, you mean to say [a] Local Government can create legislative district[s] and pack Congress with their own
representatives [?]

Atty. Vistan II:35

Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows that.

Justice Carpio:

So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM can create and create x x x provinces x x x and, therefore, they can have
thirty-five (35) new representatives in the House of Representatives without Congress agreeing to it, is that what you
are saying? That can be done, under your theory[?]

Atty. Vistan II:

Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual circumstances.

Justice Carpio:

Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can create thirty-five (35) new provinces, there may be x x x [only] one
hundred thousand (100,000) [population], x x x, and they will each have one representative x x x to Congress without
any national law, is that what you are saying?

Atty. Vistan II:

Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your Honor, that is what we are saying.

xxxx

Justice Carpio:

So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new provinces, sen[d] one thousand (1000) representatives to the
House of Representatives without a national law[,] that is legally possible, correct?

Atty. Vistan II:

Yes, Your Honor.36 (Emphasis supplied)

Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on regional autonomy, 37 nor
Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the
tri-branch system of government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts
cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly
recognizes this.
The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the regional assemblies.
Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states, "[A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x shall
be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member," refers to a province created by Congress
itself through a national law. The reason is that the creation of a province increases the actual membership of the
House of Representatives, an increase that only Congress can decide. Incidentally, in the present 14th Congress,
there are 21938 district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives. Since party-list
members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats
available in every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats for
district representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need now for
Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House, even before Congress can create new
provinces.

It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of
the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited "[w]ithin its
territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x." The Preamble
of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is established "within the framework of
the Constitution." This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM "shall be
created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."

The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily involves also the creation of a
legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays
that does not comply with the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution, because the creation of such municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation of legislative
districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an appropriate case.

In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of
the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create
provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative
districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative
district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM
Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress
because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as
provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional
Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.

Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution

Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and legislative district of the
First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section
20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants
to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities.
Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary-
general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE,
ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS &
HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW);
BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No.
3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION; LABAN
NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA
PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution No.
3785. respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001

BAYAN MUNA, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY;
MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP;
and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people who
have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate
directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the
underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream
of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district
elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and
mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.

The Case

Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1 issued by
the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.

The Factual Antecedents

With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties,
organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity
of these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With
the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions
as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions
promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions
and processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of
the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2

Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December
22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to
participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were
denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list
elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.

The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations,
but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:

"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation scheme
will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly
participate in this electoral window.

"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the
number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those who
substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or
evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of [some
of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions
Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly
amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed,
and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 5

On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file Comments within
three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May 3,
2001. 7 During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. 8

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition 9 before
this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No.
3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a
non-extendible period of five days from notice. 11

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, 12 docketed as GR No. 147613, also
challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered the
consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective
Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added
that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred
the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.

Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument
was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective
Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15

Issues:

During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues:

"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?

"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and
organizations.

"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No.
3785." 16

The Court's Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus
Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.

First Issue:

Recourse Under Rule 65

Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there are other plain,
speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor General argues that
petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of registration,
pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated November 9, 2000. 19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001.
Indeed, under both the Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a
verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion
for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure. 21

The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that
Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was
no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to this
date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because
the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite clear.

In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other
remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of
urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it
potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.

Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court must urgently
resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules." 25

Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the
principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available." 26

Second Issue:

Participation of Political Parties

In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the party-list
system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects
to the participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the
impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the
party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations." 29

We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."

Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the
party-list system.

"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law." 30

During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the
participants in the party-list system may "be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, 31 Magsasaka,
or a regional party in Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo
and Blas Ople: 33

"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal
at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido."

Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order
to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in
Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there
were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But
they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way,
they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative
districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system."

For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party
or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group
of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and
which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public office."

Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list system.
We quote the pertinent provision below:

"x x x

"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in
the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in
the party-list system.

x x x"

Indubitably, therefore, political parties – even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections.

Third Issue:

Marginalized and Underrepresented

That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or
any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must
be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:

"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)

Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission
declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence,
when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully,
usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature." 35

The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in
accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective
of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:

"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system
in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
simplest scheme possible."

The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-
style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,

1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and

2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but

3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation
as a whole.

of
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented," and "lack well-
defined constituencies."

"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list
election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it
refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section
5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented,
because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons
nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."

Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like
voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate
interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."

In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and
underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.

The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who
have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent,
the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of
Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 37

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are enumerated in
Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:

"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its
constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent
of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by
reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a
statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. 38

The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions

Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941 "does
not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In
fact, it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in the
elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes
Park or Dasmariñas Village could participate in the party-list elections. 41

The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that
the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens – specifically those belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties – to be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of
the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear
statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the
party-list system.

Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by
the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's
position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna
Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could
not join the party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors. 43

While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized
nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than
their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of one's
constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of one's bank accounts.

It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty,
destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only genuine hope,
but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their
constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest
sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites
those marginalized and underrepresented in the past – the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in
the underground movement – to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during
the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice
vehicle.

Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections
normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of
Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled
80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG
and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the party-list
elections.

As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, 44 in order to enhance the chance
of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest
scheme possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it
-- those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do
so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it -- those privileged
sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.

The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student dormitory "open
house," which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of
outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In the
same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular elections
otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.

Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system
would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the
intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not
have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must
permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.

Refutation of the Separate Opinions

The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored
mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.

The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain
constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still
prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous
aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in
order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed. 47

Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at
the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention
'are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof."

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of
the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and
implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions
ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.

But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof
unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed to "enable
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x x x." The
criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to
the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are,
at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.

Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they
remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.

Fourth Issue:

Grave Abuse of Discretion

From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the
law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above.
The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented,
could field candidates in the party-list elections.

When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution
or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49 Indeed, the
function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-
guess it. 50

In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of the major political
parties – Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP – on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No.
4073, they have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001
elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of getting official Comelec Election Returns,
Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x." We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the
party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of determining which parties
would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether respondents herein
and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the
party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.

Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a
government entity using government resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51 It is not
equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.

Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualify
under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be
elected under the party-list system.

Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants

The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after summary
evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply
with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled
from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of
incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the
interest of such sectors.

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the
party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words, while
they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they
represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other
similarly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:

"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party must claim to
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?

ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes." 52

Third, in view of the objections53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is
allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be
represented in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following
discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:

"MR. OPLE. x x x

In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of members and supporters,
in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those parties I had
mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that also not
fall within this prohibition?

MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can
pierce through the legal fiction."54

The following discussion is also pertinent:

"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of course,
prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent their
group.

REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the
Protestant Church et cetera."55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be registered." 56 The
prohibition was explained by a member 57 of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T] he prohibition is on any
religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a
candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party." 58

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the
grounds for disqualification as follows:

"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of
the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered."59

Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with
election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks
to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to
become members of the House of Representatives." A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with
this policy must be disqualified.

Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens,
organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the
government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal 60 and unfair to other parties, but also
deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of
RA 7941 reads as follows:

"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than
one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age
on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so
also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be
fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow
otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.

Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able
to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator
Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or regional, is
not going to represent a particular district x x x." 61

Epilogue

The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives."

Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in life should
have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the
great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and
even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and
seize the opportunity.

Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-
list system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the
marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system.
Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken
them and aggravate their marginalization.

In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing
more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people
empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA
7941.

WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct
summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated
in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the
Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such number
of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this
Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.1âwphi1.nêt

The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming any winner" during
the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its
compliance with the foregoing disposition.

This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result.
Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the dissent of J. Vicente M. Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., abroad on official

EN BANC

G.R. No. 176951 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREÑAS,
CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO,
PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY
OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN
SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF
TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF
ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF
SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY
OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF
CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.

x-----------------------------x

G.R. No. 177499 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREÑAS,
CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF
TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO
ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF
TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF
ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF
SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY
OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF
CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x

G.R. No. 178056 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREÑAS,
CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF
TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF
ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF
SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY
OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF
CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These are consolidated petitions for prohibition 1 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P.
Treñas2 assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

The Facts

During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However,
Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.

During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), 5 which took effect on 30
June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into
cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal
independence.6
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12 th Congress7 adopted Joint Resolution No.
29,8 which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
cityhood bills were not approved in the 11 th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1
and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.
Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual
cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100
million income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the
cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills
lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature. 11

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent
municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. 12 Petitioners also lament that the wholesale
conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment
because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the
Local Government Code.13

The Issues

The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and

2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petitions.

The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive
application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting
a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009
remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in
interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the
exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

Preliminary Matters
Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws administered by the COMELEC, 14 like the
Cityhood Laws, which direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood Laws. Petitioner
League of Cities of the Philippines has legal standing because Section 499 of the Local Government Code tasks the
League with the "primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting city government
administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto."15 Petitioners-in-intervention,16 which
are existing cities, have legal standing because their Internal Revenue Allotment will be reduced if the Cityhood Laws
are declared constitutional. Mayor Jerry P. Treñas has legal standing because as Mayor of Iloilo City and as a
taxpayer he has sufficient interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public funds, like the release of more Internal
Revenue Allotment to political units than what the law allows.

Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law

RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress. This law specifically amended Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, which now provides:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years
based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land
Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the
National Statistics Office.

The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the
time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The
requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from
the increased income requirement.

Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Thirty-three
cityhood bills became law before the enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the
11th Congress.

During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, exempting from the income
requirement of P100 million in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon during the
11th Congress. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed
between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills
containing a common provision, as follows:

Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement
prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.

This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income requirement of P100 million
prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. These cityhood bills lapsed
into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.

Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective
on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills
which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of
laws.17 This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied
retroactively but prospectively.

Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. 18 The Constitution requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not even
the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of
cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local
Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million
to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local
Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million
income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption from this income requirement.

In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood
bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity
of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution

Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are essential to implement a fair
and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
provides:

Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied)

If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same share in
national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and
income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria,
prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just share" of local government units in national taxes. Since the
Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they prevent the fair
and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.

Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,

Plain and Unambiguous

There can be no resort to extrinsic aids – like deliberations of Congress – if the language of the law is plain, clear and
unambiguous. Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within the law's four
corners.19 If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to its
express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to
extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law. 20
Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not provide any exemption
from the increased income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending
when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contains no
exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a
city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law in applying
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.

The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government Code

True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the various
deliberations on the matter during the 11 th Congress. However, Congress did not write this intended exemption into
law. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is fatal to the cause
of respondent municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section 450 of
the Local Government Code. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a city,
including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. Congress cannot
prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any other law. In short, Congress cannot create a city
through a law that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the Local Government Code.

Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting Congress from creating private
corporations except by a general law. Section 16 of Article XII provides:

The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation
of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by
special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability. (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation, organization, or regulation" of private corporations in
a general law applicable to all without discrimination.21 Congress cannot create a private corporation through a
special law or charter.

Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable

Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11th Congress became mere
scraps of paper upon the adjournment of the 11 th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during the
11th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the adjournment of the 11 th Congress. These
hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13th or subsequent
Congresses.

The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills filed in one Congress become functus
officio upon adjournment of that Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the next Congress.
When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13 th Congress, the bills had to start from
square one again, going through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first time, from the filing to the
approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules of the Senate, on Unfinished Business, provides:

Sec. 123. x x x

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may
be taken by the succeeding Congress as if presented for the first time. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on Unfinished Business, states:

Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall consist of the following:

a. Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the House at the time of its last
adjournment. Its consideration shall be resumed until it is disposed of. The Unfinished Business at the
end of a session shall be resumed at the commencement of the next session as if no adjournment
has taken place. At the end of the term of a Congress, all Unfinished Business are deemed
terminated. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the deliberations during the 11 th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations during
the 12th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities, have no
legal significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses.
Applicability of Equal Protection Clause

If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contained an exemption to the P100 million
annual income requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of the equal
protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the Local Government Code, could be assailed on
the ground of absence of a valid classification. However, Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by
RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are
unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in Section
10, Article X of the Constitution.

Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. The
exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be exempted
from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." This one sentence exemption provision
contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not
exempted.

Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11 th Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood bills
should be exempt from the P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the equal
protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills
pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classification between those entitled
and those not entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement.

To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions, rationally related to a
legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law, 23 not limited to existing conditions only, and
applicable to all similarly situated. Thus, this Court has ruled:

The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following
conditions:

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class. 24

There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and
municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress is not a
material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality.
Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11 th Congress might even have lower annual income than
municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-
viable municipalities from converting into cities.

Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that a pending cityhood bill in the
11th Congress would be a condition for exemption from the increased P100 million income requirement. Had they
been informed, many municipalities would have caused the filing of their own cityhood bills. These municipalities, even
if they have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent municipalities, cannot now convert into cities if their income
is less than P100 million.

The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the
time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid
classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. This requirement is illustrated in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v.
Ten Eyck,25 where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in business prior to a fixed date to sell at a price
lower than that allowed to newcomers in the same business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court held:

We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may be prospective in operation and
may except from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed. Examples
are statutes licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the profession subsequent
to the passage of the act and exempt those then in practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings,
or laws forbidding slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting existing establishments. The
 challenged provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a regulation of a business or an
activity in the interest of, or for the protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an economic
advantage to those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those who enter the
industry after that date. The appellees do not intimate that the classification bears any relation to the public
health or welfare generally; that the provision will discourage monopoly; or that it was aimed at any abuse,
cognizable by law, in the milk business. In the absence of any such showing, we have no right to conjure up
possible situations which might justify the discrimination. The classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and
denies the appellant the equal protection of the law. (Emphasis supplied)

In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based
on an arbitrary date − the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11 th Congress - as against all other
municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.

Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must
apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert
into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the
Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic
Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR
CITIZENS), Intervenor.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179295 April 21, 2009

BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION AND
HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and ABONO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) — in a
petition for certiorari and mandamus,1 assails the Resolution2 promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELEC’s resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny
the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to
Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.

The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT),
and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).

Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,
Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) — in a petition for certiorari with mandamus
and prohibition,3 assails NBC Resolution No. 07-604 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial
proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the
Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would
determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans
Federation Party v. COMELEC5 (Veterans).

Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to
intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.

The Facts

The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted
15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.6

On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and
the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound
to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list
seats."7 There were no intervenors in BANAT’s petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.

On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-
60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY),
Bayan Muna, Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabriela’s Women Party (Gabriela), Association of
Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon
Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns
(ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee
for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million
two hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of
Representation, in connection with the National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;

WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of Canvassers reveals
that the projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred twenty
three thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:

Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections

i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated 15,283,659

ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ 1,337,032

untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred)

iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome) 102,430

from areas not yet submitted for canvass (Bogo, Cebu;
Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and Pagalungan,
Maguindanao)

Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the presumptive two percent
(2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes;

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling
in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party, organization
or coalition receving more than the required two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall be determined only
after all party-list ballots have been completely canvassed;

WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three hundred thirty four
thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:

RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES

COALITION RECEIVED

1 BUHAY 1,163,218

2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730

3 CIBAC 760,260

4 GABRIELA 610,451

5 APEC 538,971

6 A TEACHER 476,036

7 AKBAYAN 470,872

8 ALAGAD 423,076

9 BUTIL 405,052

10 COOP-NATCO 390,029

11 BATAS 386,361

12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036

13 ARC 338,194

14 ABONO 337,046

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which
an URGENT PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the Commission,
docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties, organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are
therefore entitled to at least one seat under the party-list system of representation in the meantime.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Executive
Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en
banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain
conditions set forth below, the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System:

1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY

2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA

3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC

4 Gabriela Women’s Party GABRIELA

5 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives APEC

6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through A TEACHER

Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms, Inc.

7 Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party AKBAYAN

8 Alagad ALAGAD

9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL

10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO

 11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS

12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC

13 Abono ABONO

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later on be
established to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.

The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to Veterans
Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until
final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and academic.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall
likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original)

Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72,
which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELEC’s interpretation
of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:

WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers
proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%)
threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus
given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each;

WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of Canvassers, the
projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed
but not included in Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao
del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties,
organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:

Party-List Projected total number of votes

1 BUHAY 1,178,747

2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476

3 CIBAC 755,964

4 GABRIELA 621,718

5 APEC 622,489

6 A TEACHER 492,369

7 AKBAYAN 462,674

8 ALAGAD 423,190

9 BUTIL 409,298

10 COOP-NATCO 412,920

11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165

12 ARC 375,846

13 ABONO 340,151
WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes
among the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the "first party" in accordance
with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus
COMELEC;

WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system of representation
that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula
prescribed by the Supreme Court in Veterans;

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct formula as expressed in Veterans, is:

Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first

= party relative to total votes for
Total votes for party-list system party-list system

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats:

Proportion of votes received Additional seats

by the first party

Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats

Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% One (1) additional seat

Less than 4% No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:

1,178,747
= 0.07248 or 7.2%
16,261,369

which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct
formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:

No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional
Additional seats for
= x seats allocated
a concerned party
No. of votes of to first party
first party

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:

Party List Percentage Additional Seat

BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1

CIBAC 1.28 1

GABRIELA 1.05 1

APEC 1.05 1

A TEACHER 0.83 0

AKBAYAN 0.78 0

ALAGAD 0.71 0

BUTIL 0.69 0
 COOP-NATCO 0.69 0

ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0

ARC 0.63 0

ABONO 0.57 0

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order
No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en banc sitting
as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties,
organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit:

Party List Additional Seats

BUHAY 2

BAYAN MUNA 1

CIBAC 1

GABRIELA 1

APEC 1

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be
established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle
them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1) additional seat.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall
likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.9

Acting on BANAT’s petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which reads as
follows:

This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution
filed by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).

Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)
party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his
comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:

COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:

Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the
Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:

1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as mandated by Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.

2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be harmonized with
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be
applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.

3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and

4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes they
received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in
 proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes
cast in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under
the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST
SEATS, ANNEX "A" of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose
of determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to representative
seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].

5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the procedure
in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N:

The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.

The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of the Canvass of
Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System
During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among others that the total number of seats of each
winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results."1awphi1

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein
petition of BANAT for being moot and academic.

Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.10

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not
file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision
to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the
Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration
during the proceedings of the NBC.11

Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three other
party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural
Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),12 Anak Mindanao (AMIN),13 and An Waray.14 Per the certification15 by
COMELEC, the following party-list organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:

Party-List No. of Seat(s)

1.1 Buhay 3
1.2 Bayan Muna 2
1.3 CIBAC 2
1.4 Gabriela 2
1.5 APEC 2
1.6 A Teacher 1
1.7 Akbayan 1
1.8 Alagad 1
1.9 Butil 1
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1
1.11 Anak Pawis 1
1.12 ARC 1
1.13 Abono 1
 1.14 AGAP 1
1.15 AMIN 1

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an
Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the
Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No.
07-250.

Issues

BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?16

Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their petition:

I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers, committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to
implement the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule:

A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.

B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:

1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats for the "First
Party" violates the principle of proportional representation under RA 7941.

2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the "First Party" and
another for the qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.

3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from those required
under RA 7941;

C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list system as provided for under
the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.

II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list
organizations, the same being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v.
COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable case as the issues involved herein are constitutional in nature,
involving the correct interpretation and implementation of RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to
our nation.17

Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the
following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?
 4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections?
If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?18

The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable
parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:

First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the
party list;

Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid
votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is
entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats;

Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed "in proportion to their total number of votes." 19

However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term "proportional
representation," this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list
organizations.

Number of Party-List Representatives:

The Formula Mandated by the Constitution

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.

The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
(20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.

xxx

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The House of Representatives shall be
composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify
the number of the members of the House of Representatives.1avvphi1.zw+

Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the total
number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of
legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:

Number of seats Number of seats available to

available to legislative districts x .20 = party-list representatives
 .80

This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives
whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district
representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.

220
x .20 = 55
.80

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the
Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the
legislature.

Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:

The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap

All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List System, as
well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the
total party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation
of "additional seats" under the Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,20 and Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza’s dissent in Veterans presented Germany’s Niemeyer formula 21 as an alternative.

The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-list representatives.
Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — x x x

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,22 the following procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. — The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for
the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received
and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list representative
seats.

The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with Section 12 of
R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:

(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of the House of
Representatives including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since
there are 220 District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All
seats shall have to be proclaimed.

(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of the total party-
list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11,
RA 7941).
 (c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups under the
immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those seats,
the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the
maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941. 23

Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s first interpretation.

The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared unconstitutional,
and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the
COMELEC:

(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;

(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,

(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each
party, organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.24

BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the votes
received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by making the votes of a party-
list with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats."25 Thirty-four (34) party-list
seats will be awarded under BANAT’s second interpretation.

In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC’s original 2-4-6 formula and
the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both
formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A
Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second
percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The
number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the
second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent
of the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a
second round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from
highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are filled up. 26

We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.

Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes garnered
during the elections.27

Votes Votes
Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered Garnered

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI 79,386

3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541

4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424

5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327

6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686

8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544

9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220

10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993

11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717

12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012

14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846

15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751

16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522

17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722

18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837

19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612

21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624

22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062

23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512

25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835

26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098

27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938

28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903

29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691

30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896

31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255

32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA PILIPINO 29,130

33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271

34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781

35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946

36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744

37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916

38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729

39 ABANSE! PINAY 130,356 86 APO 16,421

40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241

41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161

42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445

43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915

44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471

45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406

46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221

47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each." This clause
guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration
purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by
each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.

Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for the
party-list.28

Votes Garnered over

Votes Guaranteed
Rank Party Total Votes for Party-
Garnered Seat
List, in %

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1

6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1

9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1

10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1

11 BATAS29 385,810 2.42% 1

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1

15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1

17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1

Total 17

18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number of votes cast
for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that
are "entitled to one seat each," or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17
guaranteed seats.

The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." This is where petitioners’
and intervenors’ problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total
number of votes" to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express
language of R.A. No. 7941.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in
the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let
us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of
55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied
party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.

We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found
in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle
to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives." 30

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following
procedure shall be observed:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional
seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3
below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing
the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates.
There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining
available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and
the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the
remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one
party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of
the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the
number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Votes
Garnered
Guaranteed Additional (B) plus
over Applying
Seat Seats (C), in
Votes Total the three
Rank Party (First (Second whole
Garnered Votes for seat cap
Round) Round) integers
Party List, (E)
(B) (C) (D)
in %
(A)

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.

BAYAN
2 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
MUNA

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.

 4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.

COOP-
931 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
NATCCO

10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.

11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.

15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.

17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.

18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.

21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.

22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.

23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

SENIOR
26 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
CITIZENS

27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.

28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.

29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.

30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.

ANG
31 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
KASANGGA

32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.

33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.

34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.

35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.

36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.

Total 17 55
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives from
the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the
parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party,
are shown in column (D).

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the
party-list elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we
wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening
up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that
is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated
under the party list system. x x x.

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question is
this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run
under the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates
for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for
the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list
system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in the
party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral
candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers,
would he qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who
would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority
political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also
organized along sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely the
contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in
them. Would the Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the
party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko
lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198
seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and
probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the
party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be
allowed to register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

xxxx

MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass organizations to seek
common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able
to make common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed
through the participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of
others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to many
mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass
organizations so that with their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this
amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and the political parties to come
together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the
parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them.
So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and
cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic
Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of
those parties.

It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic Party. But the
businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political
parties and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other so that the very
objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more
institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a
constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives
later on through a party list system; and even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting
political power in the wider constitutional arena for major political parties.

x x x 32 (Emphasis supplied)

R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A.
No. 7941 reads:

Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a
coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-
list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector,

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar
physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
 (f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations
for political and/or election purposes.

Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list
elections.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system.
On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any
permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.33 In
defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941
also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political
parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and
R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major
political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties
are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should
not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal
ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their
chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in
the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI)
can do the same for the urban poor.

The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:

Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a

natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age
on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization’s nominee "wallow in poverty,
destitution and infirmity"34 as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the
sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, 35 that is, if the
nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he
or she must be a senior citizen.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x
x x." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than
20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a
provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from
being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may
occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for
party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political
parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to
allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3
August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare
unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional
seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major
political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

EN BANC

G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its Commissioners, RENE
V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND
GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public
officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines
Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that
the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from taking any steps relative
to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.

Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. 1 In substance, the said law created an additional legislative
district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the
province.

Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of
1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:

District Municipalities/Cities Population

1st District Del Gallego Libmanan 417,304
Ragay Minalabac
Lupi Pamplona
Sipocot Pasacao
Cabusao San Fernando
2nd District Gainza Canaman 474,899
Milaor Camaligan
Naga Magarao
Pili Bombon
Ocampo Calabanga
3rd District Caramoan Sangay 372,548
Garchitorena San Jose
Goa Tigaon
Lagonoy Tinamba
Presentacion Siruma
4th District Iriga Buhi 429,070
Baao Bula
Balatan Nabua
Bato

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured
in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor
and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The following table3 illustrates the reapportionment made by
Republic Act No. 9716:

District Municipalities/Cities Population

1st District Del Gallego 176,383
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao
2nd District Libmanan San Fernando 276,777
Minalabac Gainza
Pamplona Milaor
Pasacao
3rd District (formerly 2nd District) Naga Camaligan 439,043
Pili Magarao
Ocampo Bombon
Canaman Calabanga
4th District (formerly 3rd District) Caramoan Sangay 372,548
Garchitorena San Jose
Goa Tigaon
Lagonoy Tinamba
Presentacion Siruma
5th District (formerly 4th District) Iriga Buhi 429,070
Baao Bula
Balatan Nabua
Bato

Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of the origins of the bill that
became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen
(13) in favor and two (2) against, the process progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on the sentiments
and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new congressional district, as well as
argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a
population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new district. 4

Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the Senate. His co-
petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former second district from which the
municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new second district. No other local executive joined
the two; neither did the representatives of the former third and fourth districts of the province.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of
a legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less
than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population
standard.6 The provision reads:

Article VI

Section 5. (1) x x x x

(2) x x x x

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.

(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).

The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district. 7 The petitioners theorize that, save in the case of a newly created
province, each legislative district created by Congress must be supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000
in order to be valid.8 Under this view, existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form new
districts, provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least 250,000. On the other hand, if the
reapportionment would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a populace of less than 250,000
inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the minimum population
requirement.

In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to
adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in the creation of additional legislative seats.9 The petitioners argue that when
the Constitutional Commission fixed the original number of district seats in the House of Representatives to two
hundred (200), they took into account the projected national population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year
1986.10 According to the petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200 district representatives translates to roughly
250,000 people for every one (1) representative. 11 Thus, the 250,000 population requirement found in Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually based on the population constant used by the Constitutional Commission
in distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.

Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently from the creation of a province,
Congress is bound to observe a 250,000 population threshold, in the same manner that the Constitutional
Commission did in the original apportionment.

Verbatim, the submission is that:

1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of Camarines Sur failed to
meet the population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI,
Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto; and

2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided in Article VI, Section 5
paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution.12

The provision subject of this case states:

Article VI

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) x x x x

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.
Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek the dismissal of the present
petition based on procedural and substantive grounds.

On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal technical defects: first,
petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the petitioners have no locus standi to
question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.

On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities and provinces drawn
by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population
condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the questioned provision will show that the same has no
application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces. 13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum population
is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the reapportionment of districts in
provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an additional legislative district within the province of
Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.

We first pass upon the threshold issues.

The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition, the
petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse. The respondents cite the following reasons:

1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.1avvphi1

2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. Respondents maintain that in implementing
Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging in the
performance of a ministerial act.

3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Considering that the main thrust of the instant petition is the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the same could have been ventilated through a petition for
declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has only appellate, not original jurisdiction.

The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining any substantial injury as a result of the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents,
therefore, conclude that the petitioners lack the required legal standing to question the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9716.

This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with issues that, by reason of
constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments on their content and substance.

The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of procedural rules, 14 as well as
relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever confronted with an important issue of overreaching significance to
society.15

Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)16 and Jaworski v. PAGCOR,17 this
Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of
cases raising issues of paramount public importance. The Jaworski case ratiocinates:

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence
on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible
tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)

Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 18 Tatad v.
Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority20 and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, 21 just to
name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the
latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary, 22 this Court held that in
cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing
requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez v.
Gonzales.23

Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must apply. The beaten path must
be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.

We deny the petition.

We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of
constitutionality.24 Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a
specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a
specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of
constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain. 25

There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a
legislative district.

As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of
250,000 for each legislative district.

The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of
at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative."

The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with
nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly
entitled.

The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000
minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. 26

Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province.

The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the subject of interpretation
by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.27

In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was the law that converted
the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional
legislative district for Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that the creation
of an additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts would
be supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The
Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly created district, explaining the
operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit:

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3),
Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the
1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has
met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.28 (Emphasis supplied)

The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial
legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum
population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000
to be entitled to an additional district.

There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a city, should not
be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not
required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an
additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its
creation and regardless of its population.

Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue of
and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:

Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:
 (i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National
Statistics Office.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the
indispensable income requirement.

Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the deliberations on the words and
meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.

The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fifty thousand" may be
gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article
VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended to the final document. The Ordinance is captioned
"APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used for
the 1986 nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply put,
the population figure was used to determine how many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should
have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be the determinant. Even then, the
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to
the point herein at issue, in the determination of the precise district within the province to which, through the use of the
population benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole, though it
was among, several determinants.

From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the entire country into two hundred
(200) districts, which corresponded to the original number of district representatives. The 200 seats were distributed
by the Constitutional Commission in this manner: first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three (73)
provinces and the ten (10) cities with a population of at least 250,000; 30 second, the remaining seats were then
redistributed among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the number of their
inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." 31 Commissioner Davide, who later became a Member and
then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark 32 for the Ordinance to be appended to the
1987 Constitution:

Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned
among provinces and cities with a population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on the
1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our
population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at least 250, 000 inhabitants
and each province shall have at least one representative, we first allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces, and
each one for all cities with a population of at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan,
Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase
whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their
inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).

Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from this, the determination of the
districts within the province had to consider "all protests and complaints formally received" which, the records show,
dealt with determinants other than population as already mentioned.

Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates:

INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:

Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern towns when it was more affinity with
the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brooke’s Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He stated that the First District
has a greater area than the Second District. He then queried whether population was the only factor considered by the
Committee in redistricting.

Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the standards set in Section 5 of the
Article on the Legislative Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats should be apportioned among the provinces and
cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be compact, adjacent and contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was included with the northern towns.
He then inquired what is the distance between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.

xxxx

Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and based on the apportionment, its
inclusion with the northern towns would result in a combined population of 265,000 as against only 186,000 for the
south. He added that Cuyo and Coron are very important towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was
the capital of Palawan before its transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more potential
candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped together,
there would be less candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not interested in politics. He then
suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in the south or the Second District.

Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of amendments. He requested that the
COMELEC staff study said proposal.33

"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO

On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the interpellations that District I has a
total population of 265,358 including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second District has a total population of
186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be included in the Second District in order to satisfy the
contiguity requirement in the Constitution considering that said City is nearer the southern towns comprising the
Second District.

In reply to Mr. Monsod’s query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed transfer of Puerto Princesa City to the
Second District, the First District would only have a total population of 190,000 while the Second District would have
262,213, and there would be no substantial changes.

Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledo’s proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the Municipality of Aborlan.

There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the Body.

APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN

There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the apportionment and districting
for the province of Palawan was approved by the Body. 34

The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by the importance of the towns
and the city that eventually composed the districts.

Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:

At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a reservation with the Committee for the
possible reopening of the approval of Region I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.

REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO

Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are placed in one district. He
stated that he was toying with the idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio because it is the summer
capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City so that it could, by itself, have its own constituency
and Tuba could be transferred to the Second District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the
population of Baguio City is only 141,149.

Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during certain times of the year, but the
transient population would increase the population substantially and, therefore, for purposes of business and
professional transactions, it is beyond question that population-wise, Baguio would more than qualify, not to speak of
the official business matters, transactions and offices that are also there.

Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Lima’s statement that unless Tuba and Baguio City are united, Tuba will be
isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can only be reached by passing through Baguio City. He stated that the
Committee would submit the matter to the Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated that the Body should have a
say on the matter and that the considerations he had given are not on the demographic aspects but on the fact that
Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and situs of many government offices and functions.

On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the reconsideration of the earlier approval of
the apportionment and districting of Region I, particularly Benguet.

Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of Mr. Regalado was put to a vote. With
14 Members voting in favor and none against, the amendment was approved by the Body.

Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with Baguio City will have two seats. The
First District shall comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok,
Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second District shall comprise of Baguio City alone.

There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of Region I. 35

Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.

It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts based on the distribution of its
three cities, with each district having a city: one district "supposed to be a fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit
area; and the third, a rice growing area," because such consideration "fosters common interests in line with the
standard of compactness."36 In the districting of Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were "political stability
and common interest among the people in the area" and the possibility of "chaos and disunity" considering the
"accepted regional, political, traditional and sectoral leaders." 37 For Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in the
highland should not be grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner Maambong proposed that
they should "balance the area and population."38

Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we stated in Bagabuyo v.
COMELEC39 that:

x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however,
does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x.
To ensure quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the
constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).

This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of petitioner that an additional
provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a 250,000 population is not allowed by the Constitution.

The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.

Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find support. And the
formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the
contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative
district in a province, whose population growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.

Translated in the terms of the present case:

1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is ─ based on the
formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning
legislative districts among provinces and cities ─ entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it
was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this point.40 In other words,
Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for the Province of
Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;

2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and complaints against
strict conformity with the population standard, and more importantly based on the final districting in the
Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and
second legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative
district is valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by the
petitioners.

3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:
 (a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;

(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped municipalities;

(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the reconfigured
District One; and

(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of Districts One and
Two.41

Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased population of the erstwhile
Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion, 42 that
would warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.

To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second legislative districts
of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is
that population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district.
Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form
in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995 IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is
aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973
Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community." 3

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item
no. 8:4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY

PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.

On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte
and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private
respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for
the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.
33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified
and canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven"
months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
 [T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that
it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995.
The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20,
1995 deadline.9

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in
Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office
on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of
Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since
childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as
her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she
noted that:

When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in
Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her
intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her
six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town
of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme
Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional election
in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of
another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his
purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now
filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with
respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest,
orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up
with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off
petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of
Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy
after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year
residency requirement, the Second Division held:

Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was
a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment
should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual
and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative
District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she
stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she always
intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her
memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been
a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a
resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a
resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the Municipality of
Tolosa.

Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced
that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District.
However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to
allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim
and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.

This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the
Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite
aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not
cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked
was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the
question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly
of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the
election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.

From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is

devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case
of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced.
The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election,
or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections."
The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the
instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential
deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to be
elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those
intended to suppress, accurate material representation in the original certificate which adversely
affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds
of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the election.

Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to
prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this
Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her
certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record
accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further
buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994,
requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she
can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different
documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of
August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore,
cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.

xxx xxx xxx

Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this
Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not
complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.

In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile"
which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto
Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In
respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not
Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not
Tacloban.

This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood
is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally
disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit.
Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she
continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in
San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila
where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa
as the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She
could not have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila.
Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she
claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994,
respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the
cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or
transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a
resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because
she became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to
her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since
childhood.
 In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She
registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of
Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such
place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez
vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There
must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3)
intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus
manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila,
coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that
she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.

Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative of such
intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban,
without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of
residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the
election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her
residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.

It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since
childhood."

To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte
for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent
registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter
Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may
be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte.
But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in
Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district for six
months only. 15

In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:

After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new
substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the
petition for disqualification. 18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the
canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of
Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the
elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by
the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a
total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of
Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.

On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of
Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.

Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified into
two general areas:

I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a
period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

II. The Jurisdictional Issue

a) Prior to the elections

 Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the
period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said
Code.

b) After the Elections

Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over
the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.

I. Petitioner's qualification

A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of
settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with
the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution
reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for
the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the
1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a
settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of
domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure,
one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the
foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place"
and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the
physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and
domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his
abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to
remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is
thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can
only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another
domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but
he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile,
but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining
will constitute domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As
these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent
therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence
from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one
is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in
these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent
residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed
beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only
"domicile" to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there
was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the
 day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate
for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in
the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect
lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has
raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than
actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual
residence rather than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in
the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by
law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical
residence. 30

In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987
Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the
same meaning as domicile. 32

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency
requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in
petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement
becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the
space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned
entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual
stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space
provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that she would be
registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the
same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of
actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her
Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry
for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate
seeks election thus:

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO

BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.

Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's
claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The
juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile —
coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing
down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to
negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere
entry on a piece of paper.

We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.

In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second
Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when
(petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila."
The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place
where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959,
resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her
husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter,
she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served
these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion
lies.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place
for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other
things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the
COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in
which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.
In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:

[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives with
his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having
lived either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his residence in the former
municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other municipality in question
and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is
a resident of the latter municipality.

More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to
improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or
engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his
lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons,
or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business activities; so
there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up
or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national
elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of
origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place
other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of
such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his
place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by
positive proof of abandonment for another.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was
ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring
to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled
jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35

What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we
lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to
1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College,
now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she
taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her
cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954,
she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and
 registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and
her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her
husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang
Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu,
Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as
President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a
resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various
residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an
intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a
minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and
eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's
presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home
province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political
power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment,
always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history
and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S
Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of
petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did
not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her
residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing
her intention to live there again." We do not agree.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it
follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by
operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to
private respondent's averments.

37
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or
residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot
have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent
plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in
favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing
petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium
voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result
of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction
between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains
the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in
Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr.
Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:

In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply
relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it
is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

 Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from
living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female
spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of
origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.

Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:

La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin
embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su
residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.

Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the
husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it
refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the
phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall
transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual
residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only
once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept
of actual residence.

The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify
the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin).
This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of
actual residence.

Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and
wife to live together, thus:

Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity
and render mutual help and support.

The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account
the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or
transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together."
Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced
with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one
of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:

Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular matters
is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be
made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are
used synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one another.

xxx xxx xxx

Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place.
A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence.
Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in
the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place,
there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other
place. 41

In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-
clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence
has recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the
wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons,
revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court
held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the
existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife
either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts,
.under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile
of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt.
In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:

Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of
this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the
other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of
such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible
(sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of
consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses
to live under the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice have
assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is
extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the
restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to
warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of
disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this
practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and
in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate,
Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law
on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence,
equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the
injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing
sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of
imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case
of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of
a stipend in the character of alimony.

In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has
ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and
that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed
his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was
based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It
was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of
Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of
contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).

In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of
the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the
alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects
then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all
income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the
marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to
the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited
upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her
disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged — by virtue
of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is
that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos
Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr.
Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a result
of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To
underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence
has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit
from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the
intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code)
and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the
rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual
residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when
petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not
a domicilium necessarium.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired
a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate
that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as
her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner
sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make
them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary
intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in
San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences"
following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not
domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse
either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly
illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive
act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a
domicile different from her husband.

In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are
persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim
of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

II. The jurisdictional issue

Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions
were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the
COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with
Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be
merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the
statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a
directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American
authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of
expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than
enforcing the letter of the law.

In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty
(30) days within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the
statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of
statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is
essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus,
in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to be directory.

The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision after the
period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other
quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision
within a given or prescribed period.

In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident
that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under
Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of
all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate
has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or
deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a
distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws were
flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the
meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he
or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in
the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24,
May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995 AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO ICARO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to be preserved. In any
challenge having the effect of reversing a democratic choice, expressed through the ballot, this Court should be ever
so vigilant in finding solutions which would give effect to the will of the majority, for sound public policy dictates that all
elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in an election. When a
challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so noxious
to the Constitution that giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our democratic
institutions.

On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative
for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. Among others, Aquino provided the following information in his
certificate of candidacy, viz:.

(7) RESIDENCE (Complete Address): 284 AMAPOLA COR. ADALLA STS., PALM VILLAGE,
MAKATI.

xxx xxx xxx

(8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY

PRECEDING THE ELECTION: ______ Years and 10 Months.

xxx xxx xxx

THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said Office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the law, rules and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed to such is
assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that the facts therein are
true to the best of my knowledge.1

On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-
UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino 2 on the ground that the latter
lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the
Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. The
petition was docketed as SPA No. 95-113 and was assigned to the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC).

On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed another certificate of candidacy
amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he had
resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one (l) year and thirteen (13) days. 3
On May 2, 1995, petitioner filed his Answer dated April 29, 1995 praying for the dismissal of the disqualification case. 4

On the same day, May 2, 1995, a hearing was conducted by the COMELEC wherein petitioner testified and presented
in evidence, among others, his Affidavit dated May 2, 1995, 5 lease contract between petitioner and Leonor Feliciano
dated April 1, 1994,6 Affidavit of Leonor Feliciano dated April 28,19957 and Affidavit of Daniel Galamay dated April 28,
1995.8

After hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division of the COMELEC promulgated a Resolution dated
May 6, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission (Second Division) RESOLVES to DISMISS
the instant: petition for Disqualification against respondent AGAPITO AQUINO and declares him
ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of Representative in the Second Legislative District of Makati City.

SO ORDERED.9

On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 6, 1995 resolution with
the COMELEC en banc.

Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where three (3) candidates vied for the congressional
seat in the Second District, petitioner garnered thirty eight thousand five hundred forty seven (38,547) votes as against
another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained thirty five thousand nine hundred ten (35,910) votes.10

On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend
Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's Second
Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.

On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation. The dispositive portion
of the order reads:

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Board of
Canvassers of the City of Makati is hereby directed to complete the canvassing of election returns of
the Second District of Makati, but to suspend the proclamation of respondent Agapito A. Aquino
should he obtain the winning number of votes for the position of Representative of the Second District
of the City of Makati, until the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners on May 7, 1995, shall
have been resolved by the Commission.

The Executive Director, this Commission, is directed to cause the immediate implementation of this
Order. The Clerk of Court of the Commission is likewise directed to inform the parties by the fastest
means available of this Order, and to calendar the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration on May
17, 1995, at 10:00 in the morning, PICC Press Center, Pasay City.

SO ORDERED.11

On May 16, 1995, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition with urgent motion to lift order of suspension of
proclamation.

On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to Resolve Urgent Motion
to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he manifested his intention to raise, among others, the
issue of whether of not the determination of the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order on June
2, 1995, the decretal portion thereof residing:

Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the
Commission RESOLVED to proceed with the promulgation but to suspend its rules, to accept the
filing of the aforesaid motion, and to allow the parties to be heard thereon because the issue of
jurisdiction now before the Commission has to be studied with more reflection and judiciousness. 12

On the same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of the Second
Division dated May 6, 1995. The fallo reads as follows:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of
the Second Division, promulgated on May 6, 1995, is GRANTED. Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is
declared ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second
Legislative District of Makati City in the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the constitutional
qualification of residence. Consequently, the order of suspension of proclamation of the respondent
should he obtain the winning number of votes, issued by this Commission on May 15, 1995 is now
made permanent.

Upon the finality of this Resolution, the Board of Canvassers of the City of Makati shall immediately
reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass of election returns, determine the winner out of
the remaining qualified candidates, who shall be immediately be proclaimed.

SO ORDERED. 13

Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari 14 assailing the orders dated May 15, 1995 and June 2, 1995, as well as the
resolution dated June 2, 1995 issued by the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner's raises the following errors for
consideration, to wit:

THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE AND ADJUDGE THE

DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE INVOLVING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AFTER THE MAY 8,
1995 ELECTIONS, SUCH DETERMINATION BEING RESERVED TO AND LODGE EXCLUSIVELY
WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, SAID JURISDICTION

CEASED IN THE INSTANT CASE AFTER THE ELECTIONS, AND THE REMEDY/IES AVAILABLE
TO THE ADVERSE PARTIES LIE/S IN ANOTHER FORUM WHICH, IT IS SUBMITTED, IS THE
HRET CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 17, ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT PROCEEDED TO

PROMULGATE ITS QUESTIONED DECISION (ANNEX "C", PETITION) DESPITE IT OWN
RECOGNITION THAT A THRESHOLD ISSUE OF JURISDICTION HAS TO BE JUDICIOUSLY
REVIEWED AGAIN, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, THE
COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND SERIOUS ERROR IN
DIRECTING WITHOUT NOTICE THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCLAMATION OF THE
PETITIONER AS THE WINNING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATE AND DESPITE THE
MINISTERIAL NATURE OF SUCH DUTY TO PROCLAIM (PENDING THE FINALITY OF THE
DISQUALIFICATION CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER) IF ONLY NOT TO THWART THE
PEOPLE'S WILL.

THE COMELEC'S FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF

ONE YEAR AGAINST THE PETITIONER IS CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE AND TO APPLICABLE
LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.

IN ANY CASE, THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE LEGAL
IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEWLY CREATED POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE
ONLY EXISTING FOR LESS THAN A YEAR AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION AND BARELY
FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF PETITIONER'S DISTRICT IN MAKATI OF CONGRESSIONAL.

THE COMELEC COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION

WHEN IT ORDERED THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS TO "DETERMINE AND PROCLAIM THE
 WINNER OUT OF THE REMAINING QUALIFIED CANDIDATES" AFTER THE ERRONEOUS
DISQUALIFICATION OF YOUR PETITIONER IN THAT SUCH DIRECTIVE IS IN TOTAL
DISREGARD OF THE WELL SETTLED DOCTRINE THAT A SECOND PLACE CANDIDATE OR
PERSON WHO WAS REPUDIATED BY THE ELECTORATE IS A LOSER AND CANNOT BE
PROCLAIMED AS SUBSTITUTE
WINNER.15

In his first three assignments of error, petitioner vigorously contends that after the May 8, 1995 elections, the
COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications to run for member of the House of
Representatives. He claims that jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification is exclusively lodged with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Given the yet unresolved question of jurisdiction, petitioner avers that the
COMELEC committed serious error and grave abuse of discretion in directing the suspension of his proclamation as
the winning candidate in the Second Congressional District of Makati City. We disagree.

Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the House of Representatives
and a member of the same. Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the
position in the winning candidate. Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective
Members.

Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative to the
election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the latter
become members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who has not been
proclaimed 16 and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of
Representatives subject to Section. 17 of the Constitution. While the proclamation of a winning candidate in an
election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under
circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's contention that "after the conduct of the election and (petitioner)
has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically
divested of authority to pass upon the question of qualification" finds no basis, because even after the elections the
COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide questions
relating to qualifications of candidates Section 6 states:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate, who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.

Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a candidate allowed to continue after the
election (and does not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the highest number of votes will not
result in the suspension or termination of the proceedings against him when the evidence of guilt is strong. While the
phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong" seems to suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable
only to disqualification cases under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of R.A. 6646 allows the
application of the provisions of Section 6 to cases involving disqualification based on ineligibility under Section 78 of
B.P. 881. Section 7 states:

Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The procedure
hereinabove provided shall apply to petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
based on Sec. 78 of Batas Pambansa 881.

II

We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of
the Second District of Makati City the latter "must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of
choice. 17
The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be a resident of
the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (l) year prior to the elections. 18 Residence, for
election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 19 this Court held that the term "residence" has always
been understood as synonymous with "domicile" not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987
Constitution. The Court there held: 20

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the
qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, and a
resident thereof', that is, in the district, for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973
Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile (emphasis ours) Records of
the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 87).

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner
Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a
matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De Los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go
back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But We might encounter some difficulty especially considering that
the provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living
abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that
it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110).

The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which
regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.

Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," 21 where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation
from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera at 22 is "to exclude strangers or
newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community" from taking advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of
establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of
representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a
particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose
could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who
have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this Court to
inquire into the threshold question as to whether or not petitioner actually was a resident for a period of one year in the
area now encompassed by the Second Legislative District of Makati at the time of his election or whether or not he
was domiciled in the same.

As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11, 1992 elections, indicated
not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52
years immediately preceding that election. 23 At the time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of
the same district. 24 His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and
Aurora. 25 Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to the COMELEC at various times during his political career,
what stands consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his
most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of condominium
unit in the area. As the COMELEC, in its disputed Resolution noted:

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of respondent's
intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of one's original domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2)
years, and respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for only one (l) year
because he has other "residences" in Manila or Quezon City. 26

While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that
petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims
to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact, of his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole
purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical residence" 27 is not to acquire's new residence or domicile "but only
to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City." 28 The absence of clear and positive
proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification —
sentimental, actual or otherwise — with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement
was effected all belie petitioner's claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District
of Makati. As the COMELEC en banc emphatically pointed out:

[T]he lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence requirement as a
qualification for a candidate of Representative, by establishing a commencement date of his
residence. If a perfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish; a domicile of choice, this
particular lease agreement cannot do better. 29

Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly
supported by the facts in the case at bench. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change
of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose.30 These requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a change
of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of
origin be deemed to continue requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of
a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof,
the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency requirement in a
newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not created out of thin air. It
is carved out from part of a real and existing geographic area, in this case the old Municipality of Makati. That people
actually lived or were domiciled in the area encompassed by the new Second District cannot be denied. Modern-day
carpetbaggers cannot be allowed take advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting
themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing
conditions in these areas. It will be noted, as COMELEC did in its assailed resolution, that petitioner was disqualified
from running in the Senate because of the constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around for a place where he
could run for public office. Nothing wrong with that, but he must first prove with reasonable certainty that he has
effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. This he has not effectively
done.

III

The next issue here is whether or not the COMELEC erred in issuing it Order instructing the Board of Canvassers of
Makati City to proclaim as winner the candidate receiving the next higher number of votes. The answer must be in the
negative.

To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the "first" among the qualified candidates in the May 8,
1995 elections is to misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral process and the sociological and psychological
underpinnings behind voters' preferences. The result suggested by private respondent would lead not only to our
reversing the doctrines firmly entrenched in the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec 31 but also to a massive
disenfranchisement of the thousands of voters who cast their vote in favor of a candidate they believed could be
validly voted for during the elections. Had petitioner been disqualified before the elections, the choice, moreover,
would have been different. The votes for Aquino given the acrimony which attended the campaign, would not have
automatically gone to second placer Syjuco. The nature of the playing field would have substantially changed. To
simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment
for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by
either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a
field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared
to extrapolate the results under such circumstances.

In these cases, the pendulum of judicial opinion in our country has swung from one end to the other. In the early case
of Topacio v. Paredes. 32 we declared as valid, votes cast in favor of a disqualified, ineligilble or dead candidate
provided the people who voted for such candidate believed in good faith that at the time of the elections said
candidate was either qualified, eligible or alive. The votes cast in favor of a disqualified, ineligible or dead candidate
who obtained the next higher number of votes cannot be proclaimed as winner. According to this Court in the said
case, "there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, that wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate
to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving the plurality of the legally cast
ballots."

Then in Ticson v. Comelec, 33 this Court held that votes cast in favor of a non-candidate in view of his unlawful change
of party affiliation (which was then a ground for disqualification) cannot be considered in the canvassing of election
returns and the votes fall into the category of invalid and nonexistent votes because a disqualified candidate is no
candidate at all and is not a candidate in the eyes of the law. As a result, this Court upheld the proclamation of the
only candidate left in the disputed position.

In Geronimo v. Ramos 34 we reiterated our ruling in Topacio v. Paredes that the candidate who lost in an election
cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event the candidate who ran for the portion is ineligible. We held in Geronimo:

[I]t would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared
through their ballots that they do not choose him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he
or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the elections. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S
243, p. 676.)

However, in Santos v. Comelec 35 we made a turnabout from our previous ruling in Geronimo v. Ramos and
pronounced that "votes cast for a disqualified candidate fall within the category of invalid or non-existent votes
because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law," reverting to our earlier ruling in Ticson
v. Comelec.

In the more recent cases of Labo, Jr. v. Comelec 36 Abella v. Comelec; 37 and Benito v. Comelec, 38 this Court
reiterated and upheld the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes and Geronimo v. Ramos to the effect that the ineligibility of a
candidate receiving the next higher number of votes to be declared elected, and that a minority or defeated candidate
cannot be declared elected to the office. In these cases, we put emphasis on our pronouncement in Geronimo
v. Ramos that:

The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified
or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The
votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may be valid to vote the winner into office or
maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in sincere belief that candidate was alive,
qualified, or eligible; they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.

Synthesizing these rulings we declared in the latest case of Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC that: 39

While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the
fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly
voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the
people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make respondent Ortega the
mayor-elect. This is the import of the recent case of Abella v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]),
wherein we held that:
 While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to
the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be
proclaimed the fact remains that the local elections of Feb. 1, 1988 in the province of
Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of
the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for
the position of governor. Her votes was counted and she obtained the highest
number of votes. The net effect is that petitioner lost in the election. He was
repudiated by the electorate. . . What matters is that in the event a candidate for an
elected position who is voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is
disqualified for not possessing the eligibility, requirements at the time of the election
as provided by law, the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes
for the same position cannot assume the vacated position. (Emphasis supplied).

Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see no compelling reason to depart
therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. He
was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.

Thus, while respondent Ortega (G.R. No. 105111) originally filed a disqualification case with the
Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to petitioner's (Labo's) candidacy,
the same did not deter the people of Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was
allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his disqualification having yet
to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78, Omnibus Election Code).

And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec. (supra), We held:

Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed
the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple
reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election,
he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.

The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v. Commission on Election, (137
SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was
proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a
turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the
second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the
Court then (Cuevas J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De
la Fuente, Alampay, and Aquino, JJ., concurring) with three dissenting (Teehankee,
acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera) and another two reserving their
votes (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr.). One was on official leave (Fernando, C.J.)

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the
earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435), which represents the more logical and
democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio
vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of the Court. . . .

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the
eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or
defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849 (State ex rel. Dunning v. Giles, 52 Am.
Dec. 149).

It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the votes intended for
the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered null and void. This would amount to
disenfranchising the electorate in whom, sovereignty resides. At the risk of being repetitious, the
people of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner Labo bona fide without any intention to missapply their
franchise, and in the honest belief that Labo was then qualified to be the person to whom they would
entrust the exercise of the powers of the government. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be
disqualified and cannot assume the office.

Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be installed, under no
circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be deemed elected to the office. Surely, the
12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega is not a larger number than the 27,471 votes cast for petitioner
Labo (as certified by the Election Registrar of Baguio City; rollo, p. 109; G.R. No. 105111).
This, it bears repeating, expresses the more logical and democratic view. We cannot, in another shift of the pendulum,
subscribe to the contention that the runner-up in an election in which the winner has been disqualified is actually the
winner among the remaining qualified candidates because this clearly represents a minority view supported only by a
scattered number of obscure American state and English court decisions. 40 These decisions neglect the possibility
that the runner-up, though obviously qualified, could receive votes so measly and insignificant in number that the
votes they receive would be tantamount to rejection. Theoretically, the "second placer" could receive just one vote. In
such a case, it is absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the voters' "choice." Moreover, even in
instances where the votes received by the second placer may not be considered numerically insignificant, voters
preferences are nonetheless so volatile and unpredictable that the result among qualified candidates, should the
equation change because of the disqualification of an ineligible candidate, would not be self-evident. Absence of the
apparent though ineligible winner among the choices could lead to a shifting of votes to candidates other than the
second placer. By any mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an election cannot be construed to have obtained a
majority or plurality of votes cast where an "ineligible" candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality of the
votes.

In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's conclusion declaring herein petitioner ineligible for the
elective position of Representative of Makati City's Second District on the basis of respondent commission's finding
that petitioner lacks the one year residence in the district mandated by the 1987 Constitution. A democratic
government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government those laws are themselves ordained by
the people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government
positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would
substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Our Order restraining respondent
COMELEC from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional elections
for the Second District of Makati City is made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Melo, Puno and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Cases

These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition1 filed by 52 party-list
groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying
them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under
the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.

This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November 2012, 2 20 November
2012,3 27 November 2012,4 4 December 2012,5 11 December 2012,6 and 19 February 2013.7

The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366
and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections.

G.R. No. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial

A. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s automatic review of the COMELEC
Division’s resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations
Resolution dated 23 November 20128
1 204379 12-099 Alagad ng - The "artists" sector is not
(PLM) Sining (ASIN) considered marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify under RA 7941 and
Ang Bagong Bayani.
Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 2012 9
2 204455 12-041 Manila Teachers - A non-stock savings and
(PLM) Savings and loan association cannot be
Loan considered marginalized and
Association, Inc. underrepresented; and
(Manila - The first and second
Teachers) nominees are not teachers by
profession.
3 204426 12-011 Association of - Failure to show that its
(PLM) Local Athletics members belong to the
Entrepreneurs marginalized; and
and Hobbyists, - Failure of the nominees to
Inc. (ALA-EH) qualify.
Resolution dated 27 November 201210
4 204435 12-057 1 Alliance - Failure of the nominees to
(PLM) Advocating qualify: although registering
Autonomy Party as a regional political party,
(1AAAP) two of the nominees are not
residents of the region; and
four of the five nominees do
not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented.
Resolution dated 27 November 201211
5 204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay - Failure of the group to show
Kalusugan that its nominees belong to
(AKIN), Inc. the urban poor sector.
Resolution dated 29 November 201212
6 204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya - Failure to represent a
(AAB) marginalized sector of
society, despite the formation
of a sectoral wing for the
benefit of farmers of Region
8;
- Constituency has district
representatives;
- Lack of track record in
representing peasants and
farmers; and
- Nominees are neither
farmers nor peasants.
Resolution dated 4 December 201213
7 204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo - Failure to show that the
12-165 Party (AI) party represents a
(PLM) marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
the Province of Iloilo has
 district representatives;
- Untruthful statements in the
memorandum; and
- Withdrawal of three of its
five nominees.
Resolution dated 4 December 201214
8 204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of - Failure to establish that the
Organizations, group can represent 14
Networks and Associations of sectors; - The sectors of homeowners’
the Philippines, associations, entrepreneurs
Inc. (ALONA) and cooperatives are not
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
B. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s review on motion for reconsideration
of the COMELEC Division’s resolutions denying registration of groups
and organizations
Resolution dated 7 November 201215
9 204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng - Failure to prove track
Mamamahayag record as an organization;
(ALAM) - Failure to show that the
group actually represents the
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to establish that the
group can represent all
sectors it seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 7 November 201216
10 204402 12-061 (PP) Kalikasan Party-List - The group reflects an
(KALIKASAN) advocacy for the
environment, and is not
representative of the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- There is no proof that
majority of its members
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented;
- The group represents
sectors with conflicting
interests; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector which the group
claims to represent.
Resolution dated 14 November 201217
11 204394 12-145 (PL) Association of - Failure to prove
Guard, Utility membership base and track
Helper, Aider, record;
Rider, Driver/ - Failure to present activities
Domestic that sufficiently benefited its
Helper, intended constituency; and
Janitor, Agent - The nominees do not belong
and to any of the sectors which
Nanny of the the group seeks to represent.
Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)
Resolution dated 5 December 201218
 12 204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa - Failure to show that the
(PLM) Pinoy (PPP) group represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
Region 12 has district
representatives; and
- Failure to show a track
record of undertaking
programs for the welfare of
the sector the group seeks to
represent.

In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National
Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does not
represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list group;
and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and
underrepresented."20
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN,
GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7
January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604,21 and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the
official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings
to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. COMELEC23 (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following groups and organizations
from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:

G.R. No. SPP Group Grounds for Denial

No.
Resolution dated 10 October 201224
1 203818- 12-154 AKO Bicol Retained registration and
19 (PLM) Political Party accreditation as a political
12-177 (AKB) party, but denied participation
(PLM) in the May 2013 party-list
elections
- Failure to represent any
marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- The Bicol region already
has representatives in
Congress; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 201225
2 203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Inc. (Atong accreditation
Paglaum) - The nominees do not belong
to the sectors which the party
represents; and
- The party failed to file its
Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures for the
2010 Elections.
3 203981 12-187 Association for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Righteousness accreditation
Advocacy on - Failure to comply, and for
Leadership violation of election laws;
(ARAL) - The nominees do not
represent the sectors which
 the party represents; and
- There is doubt that the party
is organized for religious
purposes.
4 204002 12-188 Alliance for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Rural Concerns accreditation
(ARC) - Failure of the nominees to
qualify; and
- Failure of the party to prove
that majority of its members
belong to the sectors it seeks
to represent.
5 204318 12-220 United Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Movement accreditation
Against Drugs - The sectors of drug
Foundation counsellors and lecturers,
(UNIMAD) veterans and the youth, are
not marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to establish track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify as representatives of
the youth and young urban
professionals.
Omnibus Resolution dated 16 October 2012 26
6 204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Cancelled registration
(PLM) Guardians - Failure to define the sector
Brotherhood, it seeks to represent; and
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI) - The nominees do not belong
to a marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
7 204122 12-223 1 Guardians Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nationalist - The party is a military
Philippines, Inc. fraternity;
(1GANAP/ - The sector of community
GUARDIANS) volunteer workers is too
broad to allow for meaningful
representation; and
- The nominees do not appear
to belong to the sector of
community volunteer
workers.
8 20426 12-257 Blessed Cancelled registration
(PLM) Federation of - Three of the seven
Farmers and nominees do not belong to
Fishermen the sector of farmers and
International, fishermen, the sector sought
Inc. (A to be represented; and
BLESSED - None of the nominees are
Party-List) registered voters of Region
XI, the region sought to be
represented.
Resolution dated 16 October 201227
9 203960 12-260 1st Cancelled registration
(PLM) Consumers - The sector of rural energy
Alliance for consumers is not
Rural Energy, marginalized and
Inc. (1-CARE) underrepresented;
- The party’s track record is
related to electric
 cooperatives and not rural
energy consumers; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector of rural energy
consumers.
Resolution dated 16 October 201228
10 203922 12-201 Association of Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Philippine accreditation
Electric - Failure to represent a
Cooperatives marginalized and
(APEC) underrepresented sector; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector that the party
claims to represent.
Resolution dated 23 October 201229
11 204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Party-List Party accreditation
( AT ) - The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sectors that the party
represents (women, elderly,
youth, urban poor); and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized sectors
that the party seeks to
represent.
Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 2012 30
12 203976 12-288 Alliance for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Rural and accreditation
Agrarian - The interests of the peasant
Reconstruction, and urban poor sectors that
Inc. (ARARO) the party represents differ;
- The nominees do not belong
to the sectors that the party
seeks to represent;
- Failure to show that three of
the nominees are bona fide
party members; and
- Lack of a Board resolution
to participate in the party-list
elections.
Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 2012 31
13 204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Cancelled registration
(PLM) Reporma Para sa - The party ceased to exist for
Magsasaka ng more than a year immediately
Pilipinas after the May 2010 elections;
Movement - The nominees do not belong
(AGRI) to the sector of peasants and
farmers that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only four nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
and
- Failure to show meaningful
activities for its constituency.
14 203936 12-248 Aksyon Cancelled registration
(PLM) Magsasaka-Partido Tinig - Failure to show that
majority of its members are
 ng marginalized and
Masa (AKMA-PTM) underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that four of
its nine nominees actually
belong to the farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that five of
its nine nominees work on
uplifting the lives of the
members of the sector.
15 204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nagkakaisang - The Manifestation of Intent
Agilang and Certificate of Nomination
Pilipinong were not signed by an
Magsasaka appropriate officer of the
(KAP) party;
- Failure to show track record
for the farmers and peasants
sector; and
- Failure to show that
nominees actually belong to
the sector, or that they have
undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.
16 204364 12-180 Adhikain at Cancelled registration
(PLM) Kilusan ng - Failure to show that
Ordinaryong nominees actually belong to
Tao Para sa the sector, or that they have
Lupa, Pabahay, undertaken meaningful
Hanapbuhay at activities for the sector.
Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)
17 204141 12-229 The True Cancelled registration
(PLM) Marcos Loyalist - Failure to show that
(for God, majority of its members are
Country and marginalized and
People) underrepresented; and
Association of - Failure to prove that two of
the Philippines, its nominees actually belong
Inc. (BANTAY) to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
18 204408 12-217 Pilipino Cancelled registration
(PLM) Association for - Change of sector (from
Country – Urban urban poor youth to urban
Poor Youth poor) necessitates a new
Advancement application;
and Welfare - Failure to show track record
( PA C YAW ) for the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that
majority of its members and
officers are from the urban
poor sector; and
- The nominees are not
members of the urban poor
sector.
19 204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nationwide - The party represents drivers
Party (PASANG and operators, who may have
MASDA) conflicting interests; and
- Nominees are either
operators or former operators.
20 203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng Cancelled registration
(PLM) mga Nakulong - Failure to prove that
na Walang Sala, na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA) Inc. (KAKUSA)
majority of its officers and
members belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sector that the party
represents (persons
imprisoned without proof of
guilt beyond reasonable
doubt);
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 30 October 201232
21 204428 12-256 Ang Galing Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Pinoy (AG) accreditation
- Failure to attend the
summary hearing;
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 7 November 201233
22 204094 12-185 Alliance for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Nationalism and accreditation
Democracy - Failure to represent an
(ANAD) identifiable marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- Only three nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
- The nominees do not
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented; and
- Failure to submit its
Statement of Contribution
and Expenditures for the
2007 Elections.
Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 2012 34
23 204239 12-060 Green Force for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) the Environment accreditation
Sons and - The party is an advocacy
Daughters of group and does not represent
Mother Earth the marginalized and
(GREENFORCE) underrepresented;
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized citizens.
24 204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Association, Inc. accreditation
(FIRM 24-K) - The nominees do not
belong to the sector that the
party seeks to represent
(urban poor and peasants of
the National Capital Region);
- Only two of its nominees
reside in the National Capital
Region; and
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement.
25 204341 12-269 Action League Cancelled registration and
(PLM) of Indigenous accreditation
Masses (ALIM) - Failure to establish that its
nominees are members of the
indigenous people in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras
sector that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only two of the party’s
nominees reside in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras;
and
- Three of the nominees do
not appear to belong to the
marginalized.
Resolution dated 7 November 201235
26 204358 12-204 Alliance of Cancelled registration
(PLM) Advocates in - The sector it represents is a
Mining specifically defined group
Advancement which may not be allowed
for National registration under the party-list system; and
Progress - Failure to establish that the
(AAMA) nominees actually belong to
the sector.
Resolution dated 7 November 201236
27 204359 12-272 Social Cancelled registration
(PLM) Movement for - The nominees are
Active Reform disqualified from
and representing the sectors that
Transparency the party represents;
(SMART) - Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- There is doubt as to whether
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 7 November 201237
28 204238 12-173 Alliance of Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Bicolnon Party accreditation
(ABP) - Defective registration and
accreditation dating back to
2010;
- Failure to represent any
sector; and
- Failure to establish that the
nominees are employed in the construction
industry, the
sector it claims to represent.
Resolution dated 7 November 201238
29 204323 12-210 Bayani Party Cancelled registration and
(PLM) List (BAYANI) accreditation
- Failure to prove a track
record of trying to uplift the
marginalized and
underrepresented sector of
professionals; and
- One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the
sector of professionals.
Resolution dated 7 November 201239
30 204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Natin Isulong accreditation
(AANI) - Failure to establish a track
record of enhancing the lives
of the marginalized and
underrepresented farmers
which it claims to represent;
and
- More than a majority of the
party’s nominees do not
belong to the farmers sector.
Resolution dated 7 November 201240
31 204125 12-292 Agapay ng Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Indigenous accreditation
Peoples Rights - Failure to prove that its five
Alliance, Inc. nominees are members of the
(A-IPRA) indigenous people sector;
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees actively
participated in the
undertakings of the party; and
- Failure to prove that its five nominees are
bona fide
members.
Resolution dated 7 November 201241
32 204216 12-202 Philippine Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Coconut accreditation
Producers - The party is affiliated with
Federation, Inc. private and government
(COCOFED) agencies and is not
marginalized;
- The party is assisted by the
government in various
projects; and
- The nominees are not
members of the marginalized
sector of coconut farmers and
producers.
Resolution dated 7 November 201242
33 204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Cancelled registration
(PLM) Party-List - Failure to establish a track
(ABANG record of continuously
LINGKOD) representing the peasant
farmers sector;
- Failure to show that its
members actually belong to
the peasant farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that its
nominees are marginalized
 and underrepresented, have
actively participated in
programs for the
advancement of farmers, and
adhere to its advocacies.
Resolution dated 14 November 201243
34 204158 12-158 Action Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Brotherhood for Active accreditation - Failure to show that the
Dreamers, Inc. party is actually able to
(ABROAD) represent all of the sectors it
claims to represent;
- Failure to show a complete
track record of its activities
since its registration; and
- The nominees are not part
of any of the sectors which
the party seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 28 November 201244
35 204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng Cancelled registration and
(PLM) mga Magsasaka accreditation
Para sa mga - The party receives
Magsasaka assistance from the
(BINHI) government through the
Department of Agriculture;
and
- Failure to prove that the
group is marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 28 November 201245
36 204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Party (BUTIL) accreditation
- Failure to establish that the
agriculture and cooperative
sectors are marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The party’s nominees
neither appear to belong to
the sectors they seek to
represent, nor to have
actively participated in the
undertakings of the party.
Resolution dated 3 December 201246
37 204486 12-194 1st Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Kabalikat ng accreditation
Bayan - Declaration of untruthful
Ginhawang statements;
Sangkatauhan - Failure to exist for at least
(1st one year; and
KABAGIS) - None of its nominees
belong to the labor,
fisherfolk, and urban poor
indigenous cultural
communities sectors which it
seeks to represent.
Resolution dated 4 December 201247
38 204410 12-198 1-United Cancelled accreditation
(PLM) Transport - The party represents drivers
Koalisyon (1-UTAK) and operators, who may have
conflicting interests; and
 - The party’s nominees do not
belong to any marginalized
and underrepresented sector.
Resolution dated 4 December 201248
39 204421, 12-157 Coalition of Cancelled registration
204425 (PLM), Senior Citizens - The party violated election
12-191 in the laws because its nominees
(PLM) Philippines, Inc. had a term-sharing
(SENIOR agreement.
CITIZENS)

These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A
BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW,
PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI,
A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were
able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39
petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court
issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only the 54 consolidated petitions that were
granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:

G.R. No. SPP No. Group

Resolution dated 13 November 2012
203818-19 12-154 AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)
(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)
203981 12-187 Association for Righteousness Advocacy on
(PLM) Leadership (ARAL)
204002 12-188 Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)
(PLM)
203922 12-201 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
(PLM) (APEC)
203960 12-260 1st
(PLM) Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc.
(1-CARE)
203936 12-248 Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa
(PLM) (AKMA-PTM)
203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala,
(PLM) Inc. (KAKUSA)
203976 12-288 Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,
(PLM) Inc. (ARARO)
Resolution dated 20 November 2012
204094 12-185 Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy
(PLM) (ANAD)
204125 12-292 Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance,
(PLM) Inc. (A-IPRA)
204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.
(PLM) (1BRO-PGBI)
Resolution dated 27 November 2012
204141 12-229 The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country
(PLM) and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(BANTAY)
204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng
(PLM) Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)
204216 12-202 Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
(PLM) (COCOFED)
204158 12-158 Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc.
(PLM) (ABROAD)
Resolutions dated 4 December 2012
204122 12-223 1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.
(PLM) (1GANAP/GUARDIANS)
203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)
(PLM)
204318 12-220 United Movement Against Drugs Foundation
(PLM) (UNIMAD)
204263 12-257 Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen
(PLM) International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)
204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)
(PLM)
204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong
(PLM) Magsasaka (KAP)
204364 12-180 Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa
(PLM) Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)
204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)
204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG
(PLM) LINGKOD)
204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)
(PLM)
204238 12-173 Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)
(PLM)
204239 12-060 Green Force for the Environment Sons and
(PLM) Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE)
204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)
(PLM)
204323 12-210 Bayani Party List (BAYANI)
(PLM)
204341 12-269 Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)
(PLM)
204358 12-204 Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement
(PLM) for National Progress (AAMA)
204359 12-272 Social Movement for Active Reform and
(PLM) Transparency (SMART)
204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)
(PLM)
Resolution dated 11 December 2012
204402 12-061 (PL) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)
204394 12-145 (PL) Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent
and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)
 204408 12-217 Pilipino Association for Country – Urban Poor
(PLM) Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)
204428 12-256 Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)
(PLM)
204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)
(PLM)
204379 12-099 Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)
(PLM)
204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)
204426 12-011 Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs
(PLM) and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH)
204455 12-041 Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association,
(PLM) Inc. (Manila Teachers)
204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga
(PLM) Magsasaka (BINHI)
204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya (AAB)
204435 12-057 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party
(PLM) (1AAAP)
204486 12-194 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang
(PLM) Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)
204410 12-198 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)
(PLM)
204421, 12-157 Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,
204425 (PLM) Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)
12-191
(PLM)
204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)
12-165
(PLM)
204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of Organizations, Networks and
Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)
204484 11-002 Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)
Resolution dated 11 December 2012
204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG
(PLM) MASDA)

The Issues

We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by
denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration
and accreditation as party-list organizations; and second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system
laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v.
Commission on Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.

The Court’s Ruling

We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this Court in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court
adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-
list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we
remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under
the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters
prescribed in this Decision.

The Party-List System

The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list system is
intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a
chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. 50 The voter elects two representatives in the House of
Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of
choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 5, Article VI

(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C

Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered
under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented
in the voters’ registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies.
However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-list system is
not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."51 The constitutional provisions on the party-list system
should be read in light of the following discussion among its framers:

MR. MONSOD: x x x.

I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is not synonymous with
that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and
who constitute the members of the sectors. In making the proposal on the party list system, we were made aware of
the problems precisely cited by Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral
representation in the Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose
among themselves who would sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because as
we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals,
business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identified here
as "sectoral representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach sectoral
representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other sectors. And we went
through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included which went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know,
the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting the law become because when we make an enumeration we
exclude those who are not in the enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us just
say the farmers and the laborers. These days, there are many citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A doctor
may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer"
so he would be included in that sector.

The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in the Assembly, we are,
in effect, giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We sought to avoid these problems by presenting
a party list system. Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and
farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will then register and present candidates of their
party. How do the mechanics go? Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two votes, so there is no
discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of his legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot,
he will be asked: What party or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented in the Assembly? And here will
be attached a list of the parties, organizations or coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and are
entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a
regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers' party to be represented in the
Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that
had been garnered by each party or each organization — one does not have to be a political party and register in
order to participate as a party — and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been
cast in favor of a party, organization or coalition.

When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be for the party list
system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any party can get out of these 50
seats is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list of 15 names. They have to submit these names because
these nominees have to meet the minimum qualifications of a Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the
day, when the votes are tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent of the
votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a women’s party gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the
vote qualifies and the 50 seats are apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.

What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000 nationwide gets a
seat in the National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate legislative districts, we are saying
that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a group that has a national constituency,
even if it is a sectoral or special interest group, should not have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that,
let us say, there are three or four labor groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets only one
percent or five of them get one percent, they are not entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if
they really have a common interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and,
therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the dynamics of a party list system.

We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same time making sure
that those who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the
National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district
basis. They may not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide basis.

The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties
that, if we count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or
fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six
representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the
mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list system.

BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of party list system though we
refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?

MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even have to mention sectors
because the sectors would be included in the party list system. They can be sectoral parties within the party list
system.

xxxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we
wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening
up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that
is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated
under the party list system. x x x.

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My
question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political
parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it
only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field
candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral
candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under
the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate
in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral
candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers,
would he qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who
would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority
political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also
organized along sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely the
contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in
them. Would the Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the
party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko
lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198
seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and
probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the
party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be
allowed to register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang labor leader or isang
laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.

MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.

MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem of sectoral
representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?

MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is really organized along
a specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political party may submit a list of individuals who
are actually members of such sectors. The lists are to be published to give individuals or organizations
belonging to such sector the chance to present evidence contradicting claims of membership in the said
sector or to question the claims of the existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding
shall be conducted by the COMELEC and shall be summary in character. In other words, COMELEC decisions
on this matter are final and unappealable. 52 (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but
also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the
party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the
party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that
we shall designate in this Constitution."53

In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties in the House of
Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties. As clearly explained
by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:

The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took off
from two staunch positions — the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per centum of the
total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod
expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view that reserving seats
for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their development into full-pledged parties equipped
with electoral machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the
other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest
would be like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more established political parties
ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern when it banned the first five major political parties on
the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives from participating in the party-list system for the first
party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for
permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a compromise — that the party-list system be
open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by allocating only
half of the seats under the party-list system to candidates from the sectors which would garner the required number of
votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group
was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the
enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral base
and brace themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran political groups. 54 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted. Instead, the
reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive terms. 55 There can be
no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list
system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral
and non-sectoral parties.

The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in legislative
district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning
candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry point to membership in the
House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.

The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system both sectoral and
non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after the words "national," and "regional,"
separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended
national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would have stated "national and regional sectoral
parties." They did not, precisely because it was never their intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.

What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list
system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The text
of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.

Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional
parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations
are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be
organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.

Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of
Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This
provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.

First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral
party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties
representing the "marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to
sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly
making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this
period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting
the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for
non-sectoral parties.

Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list system prescribed
in the Constitution, provides:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election
of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a
coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-
list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector.

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar
physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations
for political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that
a "political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a
"sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941
provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each
other.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in
legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To
exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only
option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless,
patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral
party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is
no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or
platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.

Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."56 The
sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and underrepresented." For sure, "professionals"
are not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However,
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus
organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not require national or
regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or
organizations after due notice and hearing.

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of
the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.

None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented."

The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2 on Declaration
of Policy.57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through the party-list system," which will enable Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies," to
become members of the House of Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly
refers to "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the specific implementing provisions
of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the sectors, organizations or parties must be "marginalized and
underrepresented." On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and
underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.

How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its specific
implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their
nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For
these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track
record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does
not mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the
middle class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall in the low
income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board. 58

The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and
the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the
other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by
their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an
opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.

This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system
where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and ideological status, will have the
opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-
list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade
as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.

The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major political parties
cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor represent
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list system
are necessarily those that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national and
regional parties under the party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the
opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.

To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of parties under the
party-list system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling ‘Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of Representatives.’
"However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the political party xxx must represent
the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically disqualified major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the COMELEC’s
refusal to register sectoral wings officially organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing
practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list system, even through
their sectoral wings.

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from participating in the May 1988
party-list elections.59 Thus, major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the
prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties should
participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through
their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined
political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-
defined political constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.

The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and
to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list
elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making.
Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections
must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that
can register under the party-list system.

Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed
by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list
system."

Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision prescribes a special
qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than
one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age
on the day of the election.

Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in
office until the expiration of his term.1âwphi1

A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to represent. In
the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector
represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.

In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang
Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to participate in the party-list system:

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the
party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." x x x.

xxxx

Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.

xxxx

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the
grounds for disqualification as follows:

"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of
the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. x x x.

xxxx

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of
RA 7941 reads as follows:

"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than
one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age
on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.

Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)

In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In BANAT, the majority
officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list elections,60 abandoning even the lip-service
that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can
participate in party-list elections.

The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the party-list system through
their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot
engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list
elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law."61 The experimentations in socio-political engineering have
only resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of the
1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.

We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. In following
prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming
13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and
authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the
allocation of party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang
Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we
declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule62 that a party may appeal to this Court from decisions or orders of
the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May
2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and
do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral
party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-
defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the
youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies,"
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees
are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy these two
criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are
not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners'
nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a
track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified
because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its
nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the
disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 7941.

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-
economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include
the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now
possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by
this Court.

WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been granted Status Quo
Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are
remanded to the Commission on Elections only for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under
the party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013
part-list elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of
petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination whether
petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
under the parameters prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary
hearings for this purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice