Drug store owners assail the law with the contention that
granting the discount would result to loss of profit and capital
GOVERNMENTAL POWERS and INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AND FREEDOM (THE BILL OF RIGHTS)
A. FUNDAMENTAL POWERS AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS
1. CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. vs. DSWD, ET. AL
FACTS: Petitioners, belonging to domestic corporations and
proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines, are
praying for preliminary injunction assailing the
constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9257, otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act
of 2003.” On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending
R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and it became effective on March 21,
2004. Section 4(a) of the Act states:
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The
senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from
all establishments relative to the utilization of
services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation centers,
and purchase of medicines in all establishments for
the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens,
including funeral and burial services for the death of
senior citizens;
The establishment may claim the discounts granted under
(a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of
the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost
of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross
income for the same taxable year that the discount is
granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the
claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable,
shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax
purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and
to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended.
The DSWD, on May 8, 2004, approved and adopted the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 9275, Rule
VI, Article 8 which contains the proviso that the
implementation of the tax deduction shall be subject to the
Revenue Regulations to be issued by the BIR and approved
by the DOF. With the new law, the Drug Stores Association
of the Philippines wanted a clarification of the meaning of tax
deduction. The DOF clarified that under a tax deduction
scheme, the tax deduction on discounts was subtracted from
Net Sales together with other deductions which are
considered as operating expenses before the Tax Due was
computed based on the Net Taxable Income. On the other
hand, under a tax credit scheme, the amount of discounts
which is the tax credit item, was deducted directly from the
tax due amount.
The DOH issued an Administrative Order that the twenty
percent discount shall include both prescription and non-
prescription medicines, whether branded or generic. It
stated that such discount would be provided in the purchase
of medicines from all establishments supplying medicines for
the exclusive use of the senior citizens.
Page 1 of 190
especially that such law failed to provide a scheme to justly
compensate the discount.
ISSUE: WON Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens
Act is unconstitutional or not violative of Article 3 Section 9 of
the Constitution which provides that private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation and the
equal protection clause of Article 3 Section 1.
HELD: The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a
forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private
property for public use or benefit. This constitutes
compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily
become entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation
is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the
taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to
intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens
for medical and dental services, and diagnostic and
laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert
halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture,
leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea
travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and
purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of
senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides
that business establishments extending the twenty percent
discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax
deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which,
similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare
for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact
definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies
and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the
greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as “the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does to all the great public needs.” It is “[t]he
power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.”
 2. Drug Stores Association of the Philippines vs
National Council on Disability Affairs
FACTS: On March 24, 1992, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7277,
entitled "An Act Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-
Development and Self-Reliance of Disabled Persons and
their Integration into the Mainstream of Society and for Other
Purposes," otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons," was passed into law. The law defines
"disabled persons", "impairment" and "disability" as follows:
SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of
this Act, these terms are defined as follows:
(a) Disabled Persons are those suffering from
restriction of different abilities, as a result of a
mental, physical or sensory impairment, to perform
an activity in the manner or within the range
considered normal for a human being;
(b) Impairment is any loss, diminution or aberration
of psychological, physiological, or anatomical
structure of function;
(c) Disability shall mean (1) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more
psychological, physiological or anatomical function
of an individual or activities of such individual; (2) a
record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded
as having such an impairment.
On April 30, 2007, Republic Act No. 9442[7] was enacted
amending R.A. No. 7277. The Title of R.A. No. 7277 was
amended to read as "Magna Carta for Persons with
Disability" and all references on the law to "disabled persons"
were amended to read as "persons with disability" (PWD).
Specifically, R.A. No. 9442 granted the PWDs a twenty (20)
percent discount on the purchase of medicine, and a tax
deduction scheme was adopted wherein covered
establishments may deduct the discount granted from gross
income based on the net cost of goods sold or services
rendered:
CHAPTER 8. Other Privileges and Incentives. SEC.
32. Persons with disability shall be entitled to the
following:
(d) At least twenty percent (20%) discount for the
purchase of medicines in all drugstores for the
exclusive use or enjoyment of persons with
disability;
The abovementioned privileges are available only to
persons with disability who are Filipino citizens
upon submission of any of the following as proof of
his/her entitlement thereto:
(i) An identification card issued by the city or
municipal mayor or the barangay captain
of the place where the person with
disability resides;
(ii) The passport of the person with disability
concerned; or
(iii) Transportation discount fare Identification
Card (ID) issued by the National Council
for the Welfare of Disabled Persons
(NCWDP).
Page 2 of 190
The establishments may claim the discounts granted in sub-
sections (a), (b), (c), (f) and (g) as tax deductions based on
the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered:
Provided, however, That the cost of the discount shall be
allowed as deduction from gross income for the same
taxable year that the discount is granted: Provided, further,
That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of
value-added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross
sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper
documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
9442 was jointly promulgated by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), Department of
Education, Department of Finance (DOF), Department of
Tourism, Department of Transportation and Communication,
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) and
Department of Agriculture. Insofar as pertinent to this
petition, the salient portions of the IRR are hereunder
quoted:
RULE IV. PRIVILEGES AND INCENTIVES FOR THE
PERSONS WITH DISABILITY
Section 6. Other Privileges and Incentives. Persons with
disability shall be entitled to the following:
6.1.d. Purchase of Medicine - at least twenty
percent (20%) discount on the purchase of
medicine for the exclusive use and enjoyment of
persons with disability. All drugstores, hospital,
pharmacies, clinics and other similar establishments
selling medicines are required to provide at least
twenty percent (20%) discount subject to the
guidelines issued by DOH and PHILHEALTH.
6.11 The abovementioned privileges are available
only to persons with disability who are Filipino
citizens upon submission of any of the following as
proof of his/her entitlement thereto subject to the
guidelines issued by the NCWDP in coordination
with DSWD, DOH and DILG.
6.11.1 An identification card issued by the city or
municipal mayor or the barangay captain of the
place where the person with disability resides;
6.11.2 The passport of the persons with disability
concerned; or
6.11.3 Transportation discount fare Identification
Card (ID) issued by the National Council for the
Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP). However,
upon effectivity of this Implementing Rules and
Regulations, NCWDP will already adopt the
Identification Card issued by the Local Government
Unit for purposes of uniformity in the
implementation. NCWDP will provide the design
and specification of the identification card that will
be issued by the Local Government Units.
6.14. Availment of Tax Deductions by
Establishment Granting Twenty Percent. 20%
Discount - The establishments may claim the
discounts granted in sub-sections (6.1), (6.2), (6.4),
(6.5) and (6.6) as tax deductions based on the net
cost of the goods sold or services rendered:
 Provided, however, that the cost of the discount
shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for
the same taxable year that the discount is granted:
Provided, further, That the total amount of the
claimed tax deduction net of value-added tax if
applicable, shall be included in their gross sales
receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to
proper documentation and to the provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
On April 23, 2008, the National Council on Disability Affairs
(NCDA) issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of
2008, prescribing guidelines which should serve as a
mechanism for the issuance of a PWD Identification Card
(IDC) which shall be the basis for providing privileges and
discounts to bona fide PWDs in accordance with R.A. 9442:
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
and tax incentives for establishments granting the discount.
Section 4 of Revenue Regulations No. 001-09 states that
drugstores can only deduct the 20% discount from their
gross income subject to some conditions.
On May 20, 2009, the DOH issued A.O. No. 2009-0011
specifically stating that the grant of 20% discount shall be
provided in the purchase of branded medicines and
unbranded generic medicines from all establishments
dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the PWDs. It
also detailed the guidelines for the provision of medical and
related discounts and special privileges to PWDs pursuant to
R.A. 9442.
On July 28, 2009, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition
with application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals to
annul and enjoin the implementation of the following laws:

The Local Government Unit of the City or Municipal Office 1) Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277 as amended by R.A.
shall implement these guidelines in the issuance of the No. 9442;
PWD-IDC
2) Section 6, Rule IV of the Implementing Rules and
D. Issuance of the appropriate document to confirm the Regulations of R.A. No. 9442;
medical condition of the applicant is as follows:
3) NCDA A.O. No. 1;
Disability Document Issuing Entity
Apparent Medical Licensed Private 4) DOF Revenue Regulation No. 1-2009;
Disability Certificate or Government
5) DOH A.O. No. 2009-0011.
Physician
School Licensed On July 26, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision upholding the
Assessment Teacher duly constitutionality of R.A. 7277 as amended, as well as the
signed by the
assailed administrative issuances. However, the CA
School Principal
suspended the effectivity of NCDA A.O. No. 1 pending proof
Certificate of Head of the of respondent NCDA's compliance with filing of said
Disability Business administrative order with the Office of the National
Establishment or Administrative Register (ONAR) and its publication in a
Head of Non- newspaper of general circulation. The dispositive portion of
Government the Decision states:
Organization
Non-Apparent Medical Licensed Private WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
Disability Certificate or Government The effectivity of NCDA Administrative Order No. 1
Physician is hereby SUSPENDED pending Respondent's
compliance with the proof of filing of NCDA
Administrative Order No. 1 with the Office of the
E. PWD Registration Forms and ID Cards shall be issued National Administrative Register and its publication
and signed by the City or Municipal Mayor, or Barangay in a newspaper of general circulation.
Captain.
Respondent NCDA filed a motion for reconsideration before
the CA to lift the suspension of the implementation of NCDA
A.O. No. 1 attaching thereto proof of its publication in the
V. IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES
Philippine Star and Daily Tribune on August 12, 2010, as
Any bonafide person with permanent disability can apply for well as a certification from the ONAR showing that the same
the issuance of the PWD-IDC. His/her caregiver can assist in was filed with the said office on October 22, 2009. Likewise,
the application process. Procedures for the issuance of the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA
ID Cards are as follows: Decision.

A. Completion of the Requirements. Complete
and/or make available the following requirements:
Two "1x1" recent ID pictures with the names, and
signatures or thumbmarks at the back of the picture
In a Resolution dated November 19, 2010, the CA dismissed
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and lifted the
suspension of the effectivity of NCDA A.O. No. 1 considering
the filing of the same with ONAR and its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.

One (1) Valid ID Hence, the instant petition.

Document to confirm the medical or disability

condition (See Section IV, D for the required
document). ISSUE/S:

On December 9, 2008, the DOF issued Revenue WHETHER OR NOT CA SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A
Regulations No. 1-2009 prescribing rules and regulations to QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
implement R.A. 9442 relative to the tax privileges of PWDs MANDATED PWD DISCOUNT IS A VALID EXERCISE OF

Page 3 of 190
POLICE POWER. ON THE CONTRARY, IT IS AN INVALID
EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
BECAUSE IT FAILS TO PROVIDE JUST COMPENSATION
TO PETITIONERS AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED
DRUGSTORES;
WHETHER OR NOT CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
RULED THAT SECTION 32 OF RA 7277 AS AMENDED BY
RA 9442, NCDA AO 1 AND THE OTHER IMPLEMENTING
REGULATIONS DID NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE;
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN
IT RULED THAT THE DEFINITIONS OF DISABILITIES
UNDER SECTION 4(A), SECTION 4(B) AND SECTION 4(C)
OF RA 7277 AS AMENDED BY RA 9442, RULE 1 OF THE
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS[23] OF RA
7277, SECTION 5.1 OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF RA 9442, NCDA AO 1 AND DOH AO
2009-11 ARE NOT VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
WHETHER OR NOT CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE MANDATED PWD DISCOUNT DOES
NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
HELD: We deny the petition.
The CA is correct when it applied by analogy the case of
Carlos Superdrug Corporation et al. v. DSWD, et al. wherein
We pronounced that Section 4 of R.A. No. 9257 which grants
20% discount on the purchase of medicine of senior citizens
is a legitimate exercise of police power:
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which,
similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare
for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact
definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies
and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the
greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is [t]he
power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to
the primacy of police power because property rights, though
sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good
would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of
petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital,
the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the
absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory
effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its
nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every
law has in its favor.
Police power is the power of the state to promote public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property. On the other hand, the power of eminent domain is
the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which
Page 4 of 190
the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private
property to public use upon payment of just compensation. In
the exercise of police power, property rights of private
individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
state. A legislative act based on the police power requires
the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. In
more familiar words, (a) the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, should
justify the interference of the state; and (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
R.A. No. 7277 was enacted primarily to provide full support
to the improvement of the total well-being of PWDs and their
integration into the mainstream of society. The priority given
to PWDs finds its basis in the Constitution:
ARTICLE XII: NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY
xxxx
Section 6. The use of property bears a social
function, and all economic agents shall contribute to
the common good. Individuals and private groups,
including corporations, cooperatives, and similar
collective organizations, shall have the right to own,
establish, and operate economic enterprises,
subject to the duty of the State to promote
distributive justice and to intervene when the
common good so demands.
ARTICLE XIII: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS
xxxx
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods,
health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for
the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Thus, R.A. No. 7277 provides:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. The grant of the
rights and privileges for disabled persons shall be
guided by the following principles:
(a). Disabled persons are part of the Philippine
society, thus the Senate shall give full support to the
improvement of the total well-being of disabled
persons and their integration into the mainstream of
society.
Toward this end, the State shall adopt policies
ensuring the rehabilitation, self-development and
self-reliance of disabled persons.
It shall develop their skills and potentials to enable
them to compete favorably for available
opportunities.
(b). Disabled persons have the same rights as other
people to take their proper place in society. They
should be able to live freely and as independently
as possible. This must be the concern of everyone -
 the family, community and all government and non-
government organizations.
Disabled person's rights must never be perceived
as welfare services by the Government.
xxxx
(d). The State also recognizes the role of the private
sector in promoting the welfare of disabled persons
and shall encourage partnership in programs that
address their needs and concerns.
To implement the above policies, R.A. No. 9442 which
amended R.A. No. 7277 grants incentives and benefits
including a twenty percent (20%) discount to PWDs in the
purchase of medicines; fares for domestic air, sea and land
travels including public railways and skyways; recreation and
amusement centers including theaters, food chains and
restaurants. This is specifically stated in Section 4 of the IRR
of R.A. No. 9442:
Section 4. Policies and Objectives - It is the
objective of Republic Act No. 9442 to provide
persons with disability, the opportunity to participate
fully into the mainstream of society by granting them
at least twenty percent (20%) discount in all basic
services. It is a declared policy of RA 7277 that
persons with disability are part of Philippine society,
and thus the State shall give full support to the
improvement of their total wellbeing and their
integration into the mainstream of society. They
have the same rights as other people to take their
proper place in society. They should be able to live
freely and as independently as possible. This must
be the concern of everyone the family, community
and all government and non-government
organizations. Rights of persons with disability must
never be perceived as welfare services. Prohibitions
on verbal, non-verbal ridicule and vilification against
persons with disability shall always be observed at
all times.
Hence, the PWD mandatory discount on the purchase of
medicine is supported by a valid objective or purpose as
aforementioned. It has a valid subject considering that the
concept of public use is no longer confined to the traditional
notion of use by the public, but held synonymous with public
interest, public benefit, public welfare, and public
convenience. As in the case of senior citizens, the discount
privilege to which the PWDs are entitled is actually a benefit
enjoyed by the general public to which these citizens belong.
The means employed in invoking the active participation of
the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or
objective of the law, is reasonably and directly related. Also,
the means employed to provide a fair, just and quality health
care to PWDs are reasonably related to its accomplishment,
and are not oppressive, considering that as a form of
reimbursement, the discount extended to PWDs in the
purchase of medicine can be claimed by the establishments
as allowable tax deductions pursuant to Section 32 of R.A.
No. 9442 as implemented in Section 4 of DOF Revenue
Regulations No. 1-2009. Otherwise stated, the discount
reduces taxable income upon which the tax liability of the
establishments is computed.
Further, petitioners aver that Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277 as
amended by R.A. No. 9442 is unconstitutional and void for
violating the due process clause of the Constitution since
Page 5 of 190
entitlement to the 20% discount is allegedly merely based on
any of the three documents mentioned in the provision,
namely: (i) an identification card issued by the city or
municipal mayor or the barangay captain of the place where
the PWD resides; (ii) the passport of the PWD; or (iii)
transportation discount fare identification card issued by
NCDA. Petitioners, thus, maintain that none of the said
documents has any relation to a medical finding of disability,
and the grant of the discount is allegedly without any process
for the determination of a PWD in accordance with law.
Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277, as amended by R.A. No. 9442,
must be read with its IRR which stated that upon its
effectivity, NCWDP (which is the government agency tasked
to ensure the implementation of RA 7277), would adopt the
IDC issued by the local government units for purposes of
uniformity in the implementation. Thus, NCDA A.O. No. 1
provides the reasonable guidelines in the issuance of IDCs
to PWDs as proof of their entitlement to the privileges and
incentives under the law and fills the details in the
implementation of the law.
As stated in NCDA A.O. No. 1, before an IDC is issued by
the city or municipal mayor or the barangay captain, or the
Chairman of the NCDA,[42] the applicant must first secure a
medical certificate issued by a licensed private or
government physician that will confirm his medical or
disability condition. If an applicant is an employee with
apparent disability, a "certificate of disability" issued by the
head of the business establishment or the head of the non-
governmental organization is needed for him to be issued a
PWD-IDC. For a student with apparent disability, the "school
assessment" issued by the teacher and signed by the school
principal should be presented to avail of a PWD-ID.
Petitioners' insistence that Part IV (D) of NCDA
Administrative Order No. 1 is void because it allows allegedly
non-competent persons like teachers, head of
establishments and heads of Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) to confirm the medical condition of the
applicant is misplaced. It must be stressed that only for
apparent disabilities can the teacher or head of a business
establishment validly issue the mentioned required document
because, obviously, the disability is easily seen or clearly
visible. It is, therefore, not an unqualified grant of authority
for the said non-medical persons as it is simply limited to
apparent disabilities. For a non-apparent disability or a
disability condition that is not easily seen or clearly visible,
the disability can only be validated by a licensed private or
government physician, and a medical certificate has to be
presented in the procurement of an IDC. Relative to this
issue, the CA validly ruled, thus:
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General's (OSG)
ratiocination that teachers, heads of business establishments
and heads of NGOs can validly confirm the medical condition
of their students/employees with apparent disability for
obvious reasons as compared to non-apparent disability
which can only be determined by licensed physicians. Under
the Labor Code, disabled persons are eligible as apprentices
or learners provided that their handicap are not as much as
to effectively impede the performance of their job. We find
that heads of business establishments can validly issue
certificates of disability of their employees because aside
from the fact that they can obviously validate the disability,
they also have medical records of the employees as a pre-
requisite in the hiring of employees. Hence, Part IV (D) of
NCDA AO No. 1 is logical and valid.
Furthermore, DOH A.O. No. 2009-11 prescribes additional
guidelines for the 20% discount in the purchase of all
medicines for the exclusive use of PWD. To avail of the
discount, the PWD must not only present his I.D. but also the
doctor's prescription stating, among others, the generic name
of the medicine, the physician's address, contact number and
professional license number, professional tax receipt number
and narcotic license number, if applicable. A purchase
booklet issued by the local social/health office is also
required in the purchase of over-the-counter medicines.
Likewise, any single dispensing of medicine must be in
accordance with the prescription issued by the physician and
should not exceed a one (1) month supply. Therefore, as
correctly argued by the respondents, Section 32 of R.A. No.
7277 as amended by R.A. No. 9442 complies with the
standards of substantive due process.
We are likewise not persuaded by the argument of
petitioners that the definition of "disabilities" under the
subject laws is vague and ambiguous because it is allegedly
so general and broad that the person tasked with
implementing the law will undoubtedly arrive at different
interpretations and applications of the law. Aside from the
definitions of a "person with disability" or "disabled persons"
under Section 4 of R.A. No. 7277 as amended by R.A. No.
9442 and in the IRR of RA 9442, NCDA A.O. No. 1 also
provides:
Identification Cards shall be issued to any bonafide PWD
with permanent disabilities due to any one or more of the
following conditions: psychosocial, chronic illness, learning,
mental, visual, orthopedic, speech and hearing conditions.
This includes persons suffering from disabling diseases
resulting to the person's limitations to do day to day activities
as normally as possible such as but not limited to those
undergoing dialysis, heart disorders, severe cancer cases
and such other similar cases resulting to temporary or
permanent disability.
Similarly, DOH A.O. No. 2009-0011 defines the different
categories of disability as follows:
Rule IV, Section 4, Paragraph B of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of this
Act required the Department of Health to address
the health concerns of seven (7) different categories
of disability, which include the following: (1)
Psychological and behavioral disabilities (2) Chronic
illness with disabilities (3) Learning (cognitive or
intellectual) disabilities (4) Mental disabilities (5)
Visual/seeing disabilities (6) Orthopedic/moving,
and (7) communication deficits.
Elementary is the rule that when laws or rules are clear,
when the law is unambiguous and unequivocal, application
not interpretation thereof is imperative. However, where the
language of a statute is vague and ambiguous, an
interpretation thereof is resorted to. A law is deemed
ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by
reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more
senses. The fact that a law admits of different interpretations
is the best evidence that it is vague and ambiguous.
In the instant case, We do not find the aforestated definition
of terms as vague and ambiguous. Settled is the rule that
courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with
the regulation of activities coming under the special and
technical training and knowledge of such agency.[48] As a
matter of policy, We accord great respect to the decisions
Page 6 of 190
and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because
of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their
presumed knowledge, ability, and expertise in the
enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their
jurisdiction. The rationale for this rule relates not only to the
emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or
modernizing society and the establishment of diverse
administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those
needs; it also relates to the accumulation of experience and
growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative
agency charged with implementing a particular statute.
Lastly, petitioners contend that R.A. No. 7227, as amended
by R.A. No. 9442, violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because it fairly singles out drugstores to bear
the burden of the discount, and that it can hardly be said to
"rationally" meet a legitimate government objective which is
the purpose of the law. The law allegedly targets only
retailers such as petitioners, and that the other enterprises in
the drug industry are not imposed with similar burden. This
same argument had been raised in the case of Carlos
Superdrug Corp., et al. v. DSWD, et al., and We reaffirm and
apply the ruling therein in the case at bar:
The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the
pharmaceutical industry and the competitive pricing
component of the business. While the Constitution
protects property rights, petitioners must accept the
realities of business and the State, in the exercise
of police power, can intervene in the operations of a
business which may result in an impairment of
property rights in the process.
Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While
Article XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for the
protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence,
particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts
and public utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that the
right to property can be relinquished upon the command of
the State for the promotion of public good.
Under the equal protection clause, all persons or things
similarly situated must be treated alike, both in the privileges
conferred and the obligations imposed. Conversely, all
persons or things differently situated should be treated
differently. In the case of ABAKADA Guro Party List, et al. v.
Hon. Purisima, et al.,We held:
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection
clause is equality under the same conditions and
among persons similarly situated; it is equality
among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons
who are classified based on substantial differences
in relation to the object to be accomplished. When
things or persons are different in fact or
circumstance, they may be treated in law differently.
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, this
Court declared:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
guaranty of equality in the application of the laws
upon all citizens of the State. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a
statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not
mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely
as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees
equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does
 not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The
equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does
not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by the territory within
which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution
allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the
purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction,
the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of
discretion. It is not necessary that the classification be based
on scientific or marked differences of things or in their
relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be
made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative
classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow
distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not
preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or
harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may
appear.
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification,
that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to R.A. No.
9442, its expressed public policy is the rehabilitation, self-
development and self-reliance of PWDs. Persons with
disability form a class separate and distinct from the other
citizens of the country. Indubitably, such substantial
distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose
of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded
to the PWDs fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
Thus, Congress may pass a law providing for a different
treatment to persons with disability apart from the other
citizens of the country.
Subject to the determination of the courts as to what is a
proper exercise of police power using the due process
clause and the equal protection clause as yardsticks, the
State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it,
and in this particular, a large discretion is necessarily vested
in the legislature to determine, not only what interests of the
public require, but what measures are necessary for the
protection of such interests. Thus, We are mindful of the
fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. The burden of proof is on him
who claims that a statute is unconstitutional. Petitioners
failed to discharge such burden of proof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated July 26, 2010, and the Resolution
Page 7 of 190
dated November 19, 2010, in CA-G.R. SP No. 109903 are
AFFIRMED.
3. Southern Luzon Drug Corporation vs. DSWD
FACTS: On April 23, 1992, R.A. No. 7432, entitled "An Act to
Maximize the Contribution of Senior Citizens to Nation-
Building, Grant Benefits and Special Privileges and For
Other Purposes," was enacted. Under the said law, a senior
citizen, who must be at least 60 years old and has an annual
income of not more than P60,000.00, may avail of the
privileges provided in Section 4 thereof, one of which is 20%
discount on the purchase of medicines. The said provision
states:
Sec. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizen. – x x x:
a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from
all establishments relative to utilization of
transportation services, hotels and similar lodging
establishment, restaurants and recreation centers
and purchase of medicine anywhere in the country:
Provided, That private establishments may claim
the cost as tax credit[.]
To recoup the amount given as discount to qualified senior
citizens, covered establishments can claim an equal amount
as tax credit which can be applied against the income tax
due from them.
On February 26, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo signed R.A. No. 9257, amending some provisions of
R.A. No. 7432. The new law retained the 20% discount on
the purchase of medicines but removed the annual income
ceiling thereby qualifying all senior citizens to the privileges
under the law. Further, R.A. No. 9257 modified the tax
treatment of the discount granted to senior citizens, from tax
credit to tax deduction from gross income, computed based
on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered. The
pertinent provision, as amended by R.A. No. 9257, reads as
follows:
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The
senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from
all establishments relative to the utilization of
services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation centers,
and purchase of medicines in all establishments for
the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens,
including funeral and burial services for the death of
senior citizens;
The establishment may claim the discounts granted
under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on
the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered:
Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be
allowed as deduction from gross income for the
 same taxable year that the discount is granted.
Provided, further, That the total amount of the
claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if
applicable, shall be included in their gross sales
receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to
proper documentation and to the provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
On May 28, 2004, the DSWD issued the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9257. Article 8 of Rule VI
of the said IRR provides:
Article 8. Tax Deduction of Establishments. - The
establishment may claim the discounts granted
under Rule V, Section 4 – Discounts for
Establishments; Section 9, Medical and Dental
Services in Private Facilities and Sections 10 and
11 – Air, Sea and Land Transportation as tax
deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold
or services rendered. Provided, That the cost of the
discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross
income for the same taxable year that the discount
is granted; Provided, further, That the total amount
of the claimed tax deduction net of value-added tax
if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales
receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to
proper documentation and to the provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended;
Provided, finally, that the implementation of the tax
deduction shall be subject to the Revenue
Regulations to be issued by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and approved by the Department of
Finance (DOF).
The change in the tax treatment of the discount given to
senior citizens did not sit well with some drug store owners
and corporations, claiming it affected the profitability of their
business. Thus, on January 13, 2005, Carlos Superdrug
Corporation (Carlos Superdrug), together with other
corporation and proprietors operating drugstores in the
Philippines, filed a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary
Injunction before this Court, entitled Carlos Superdrug
Corporation v. DSWD,[5] docketed as G.R. No. 166494,
assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of R.A. No.
9257 primarily on the ground that it amounts to taking of
private property without payment of just compensation. In a
Decision dated June 29, 2007, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the assailed provision, holding that the
same is a legitimate exercise of police power. The relevant
portions of the decision read, thus:
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power
which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. Police power is not
capable of an exact definition, but has been
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and
provide enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances, thus
assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has
been described as "the most essential, insistent and
the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to
all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power vested
in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain,
and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good
Page 8 of 190
and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same."
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature, property rights must
bow to the primacy of police power because
property rights, though sheltered by due process,
must yield to general welfare.
Moreover, the right to property has a social
dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution
provides the precept for the protection of property,
various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on
agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts and
public utilities, continuously serve as a reminder
that the right to property can be relinquished upon
the command of the State for the promotion of
public good.
Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens
program rests largely on the support imparted by
petitioners and the other private establishments
concerned. This being the case, the means
employed in invoking the active participation of the
private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or
objective of the law, is reasonably and directly
related. Without sufficient proof that Section 4(a) of
R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued
implementation of the same would be
unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court
will refrain from quashing a legislative act.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
On August 1, 2007, Carlos Superdrug filed a motion for
reconsideration of the foregoing decision. Subsequently, the
Court issued Resolution dated August 21, 2007, denying the
said motion with finality.
Meanwhile, on March 24, 1992, R.A. No. 7277 pertaining to
the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons" was enacted,
codifying the rights and privileges of PWDs. Thereafter, on
April 30, 2007, R.A. No. 9442 was enacted, amending R.A.
No. 7277. One of the salient amendments in the law is the
insertion of Chapter 8 in Title 2 thereof, which enumerates
the other privileges and incentives of PWDs, including the
grant of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines. Similar
to R.A. No. 9257, covered establishments shall claim the
discounts given to PWDs as tax deductions from the gross
income, based on the net cost of goods sold or services
rendered. Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 reads:
CHAPTER 8. Other Privileges and Incentives
SEC. 32. Persons with disability shall be entitled to
the following:
xxxx
(c) At least twenty percent (20%) discount for the
purchase of medicines in all drugstores for the
exclusive use or enjoyment of persons with
disability;
xxxx
The establishments may claim the discounts
granted in sub-sections (a), (b), (c), (e), (f) and (g)
as tax deductions based on the net cost of the
goods sold or services rendered: Provided,
however, That the cost of the discount shall be
 allowed as deduction from gross income for the
same taxable year that the discount is granted:
Provided, further, That the total amount of the
claimed tax deduction net of value-added tax if
applicable, shall be included in their gross sales
receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to
proper documentation and to the provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as
amended.
Pursuant to the foregoing, the IRR of R.A. No. 9442 was
promulgated by the DSWD, Department of Education, DOF,
Department of Tourism and the Department of
Transportation and Communications. Sections 5.1 and 6.1.d
thereof provide:
Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. For purposes of these
Rules and Regulations, these terms are defined as
follows:
5.1. Persons with Disability are those individuals
defined under Section 4 of RA 7277, "An Act
Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-Development
and Self-Reliance of Persons with Disability as
amended and their integration into the Mainstream
of Society and for Other Purposes." This is defined
as a person suffering from restriction or different
abilities, as a result of a mental, physical or sensory
impairment, to perform an activity in a manner or
within the range considered normal for human
being. Disability shall mean: (1) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more
psychological, physiological or anatomical function
of an individual or activities of such individual; (2) a
record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded
as having such an impairment.
xxxx
6.1.d Purchase of Medicine – At least twenty
percent (20%) discount on the purchase of
medicine for the exclusive use and enjoyment of
persons with disability. All drug stores, hospital,
pharmacies, clinics and other similar establishments
selling medicines are required to provide at least
twenty percent (20%) discount subject to the
guidelines issued by DOH and PHILHEALTH.
On February 26, 2008, the petitioner filed a Petition for
Prohibition with Application for TRO and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction with the CA, seeking to declare as
unconstitutional (a) Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257, and (b)
Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 and Section 5.1 of its IRR,
insofar as these provisions only allow tax deduction on the
gross income based on the net cost of goods sold or
services rendered as compensation to private
establishments for the 20% discount that they are required to
grant to senior citizens and PWDs. Further, the petitioner
prayed that the respondents be permanently enjoined from
implementing the assailed provisions.
Ruling of the CA
On June 17, 2011, the CA dismissed the petition, reiterating
the ruling of the Court in Carlos Superdrug particularly that
Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 was a valid exercise of police
power. Moreover, the CA held that considering that the same
question had been raised by parties similarly situated and
was resolved in Carlos Superdrug, the rule of stare decisis
Page 9 of 190
stood as a hindrance to any further attempt to relitigate the
same issue. It further noted that jurisdictional considerations
also compel the dismissal of the action. It particularly
emphasized that it has no original or appellate jurisdiction to
pass upon the constitutionality of the assailed laws, the same
pertaining to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Even assuming
that it had concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC, the principle
of hierarchy of courts mandates that the case be
commenced and heard by the lower court. The CA further
ruled that the petitioner resorted to the wrong remedy as a
petition for prohibition will not lie to restrain the actions of the
respondents for the simple reason that they do not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial duties relative to the
issuance or implementation of the questioned provisions.
Also, the petition was wanting of the allegations of the
specific acts committed by the respondents that demonstrate
the exercise of these powers which may be properly
challenged in a petition for prohibition.
The petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision dated June 17, 2011 of the CA, but the same was
denied in a Resolution dated November 25, 2011.
Unyielding, the petitioner filed the instant petition, raising the
following assignment of errors, to wit:
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Petition for Prohibition may be filed to
question the constitutionality of a law
Whether or not the case constitute stare decisis
Whether or not the 20% Sales Discount for Senior Citizens
PWDs does not violate the petitioner’s right to equal
protection of the law
Whether or not the definitions of Disabilities and PWDs are
vague and violates the petitioners right to due process of law
RULING:
1. Yes. Prohibition may be filed to question the
constitutionality of a law. Generally, the office of
prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive
exercise of authority and is directed against
proceedings that are done without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there
being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is the remedy
to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or
persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or
power with which they have not been vested by the
law. This is, however, not the lone office of an action
for prohibition. In Diaz, et al. v. The Secretary of
Finance, et al., prohibition was also recognized as a
proper remedy to prohibit or nullify acts of executive
officials that amount to usurpation of legislative
authority. And, in a number of jurisprudence,
prohibition was allowed as a proper action to assail
the constitutionality of a law or prohibit its
implementation.
2. No. The Court agrees that the ruling in Carlos
Superdrug does not constitute stare decisis to the
instant case, not because of the petitioner's
submission of financial statements which were
 wanting in the first case, but because it had the good
sense of including questions that had not been raised
or deliberated in the former case of Carlos Superdrug,
i.e., validity of the 20% discount granted to PWDs, the
supposed vagueness of the provisions of R.A. No.
9442 and violation of the equal protection clause.
3. Yes. The subject laws do not violate the equal
protection clause. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may be treated
and regulated differently from another." For a
classification to be valid, (1) it must be based upon
substantial distinctions, (2) it must be germane to the
purposes of the law, (3) it must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and (4) it must apply equally
to all members of the same class.
4. No. The definitions of "disabilities" and "PWDs" are
clear and unequivocal. Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 7277,
the precursor of R.A. No. 94421 defines "disabled
persons" as follows:
(a) Disabled persons are those suffering from
restriction or different abilities, as a result of a mental,
physical or sensory impairment, to perform an activity
in the manner or within the range considered normal
for a human being[.]
On the other hand, the term "PWDs" is defined in
Section 5.1 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9442 as follows:
5.1. Persons with Disability are those individuals
defined under Section 4 of [R.A. No.] 7277 [or] An Act
Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-Development and
Self-Reliance of Persons with Disability as amended
and their integration into the Mainstream of Society
and for Other Purposes. This is defined as a person
suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a
result of a mental, physical or sensory impairment, to
perform an activity in a manner or within the range
considered normal for human being. Disability shall
mean (1) a physical 1or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more psychological,
physiological or anatomical function of an individual or
activities of such individual; (2) a record of such an
impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an
impairment.
In view of the foregoing disquisition, Section 4(a) of Republic
Act No. 9257 and Section 32 of Republic Act No. 9442 are
hereby declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
Page 10 of 190
4. Crisostomo B. Aquino vs. Municipality Of Malay,
Aklan
IN THE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER AND THE
GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE, PROPERTY RIGHTS OF
INDIVIDUALS MAY BE SUBJECTED TO RESTRAINTS
AND BURDENS IN ORDER TO FULFIL THE OBJECTIVES
OF THE GOVERNMENT.
FACTS: In a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,
petitioner Crisostomo Aquino, the president and chief
executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove, assailed the
decisions of the Municipality of Malay, Aklan for denying his
application for zoning compliance and issuing demolition
closure and demolition order and the CA for denying his
petition for certiorari for being the improper remedy.
Petitioner’s application for zoning compliance and building
permit covering the construction of an additional three-storey
hotel over a parcel of land covered by a Forest Land Use
Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) were denied by
the Municipal Zoning Administrator on the ground that the
proposed construction site was within the "no build zone"
demarcated in a Municipal Ordinance. Thereafter, the
respondent issued a 1) Cease and Desist Order enjoining
the expansion of the resort, and 2) EO No. 10 ordering the
closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel. EO 10
was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Also,
respondents demolished the improvements introduced by
Boracay West Cove.
Petitioner alleged that the order was issued and executed
with grave abuse of discretion. He argued that judicial
proceedings should first be conducted before the respondent
mayor could order the demolition of the company’s
establishment.
On the other hand, respondents argued that the demolition
needed no court order because the municipal mayor has the
express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to
order the removal of illegally constructed buildings.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the procedural due process (of due notice
and hearing) was complied with.

Whether or not judicial proceedings should first be conducted

before the respondent mayor could order the demolition of
the company’s establishment.

RULING:

1. Yes, the procedural due process (of due notice and

hearing) was complied with.

First, basic is the rule that public officers enjoy the

presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties.
The burden is on the petitioner herein to prove that Boracay
West Cove was deprived of the opportunity to be heard
before EO 10 was issued. Regrettably, copies of the Cease
and Desist Order issued by the LGU and of the assailed EO
10 itself were never attached to the petition before this Court,
which documents could have readily shed light on whether or
not petitioner has been accorded the 10-day grace period
provided in Section 10 of the Ordinance. In view of this fact,
the presumption of regularity must be sustained.

Second, as quoted by petitioner in his petition before the CA, 5. FERRER, JR. v. BAUTISTA
the assailed EO 10 states that petitioner received notices
from the municipality government on March 7 and 28, 2011,
requiring Boracay West Cove to comply with the zoning FACTS: Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-
ordinance and yet it failed to do so. If such was the case, the 2095, S-2011, or the Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City
grace period can be deemed observed and the which allowed the imposition of special assessment (1/2 of
establishment was already ripe for closure and demolition by the assessed value of land in excess of P100k).
the time EO 10 was issued in June.
Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-20135 was enacted on
December 16, 2013 and took effect ten days after when it
was approved by the City Mayor relative to Garbage
2. No, petitioner’s right to due process was not violated for
Collection Fees imposing fees depending on the amount of
lack of judicial proceedings prior to the issuance of
the land or floor area.
demolition order.
Jose Ferrer, as a property in Quezon City questioned the
The government may enact legislation that may interfere with
validity of the city ordinances. Ferrer claims that the city has
personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations
no power to impose the tax. The SH Tax violates the rule on
to promote the general welfare. One such piece of legislation
equality because it burdens real property owners with
is the Local Government Code (LGC), which authorizes city
expenses to provide funds for the housing of informal
and municipal governments, acting through their local chief
settlers. The SH Tax is confiscatory or oppressive.
executives, to issue demolition orders and to hear issues
involving property rights of individuals and to come out with On the validity of the garbage fees imposition, Ferrer claims
an effective order or resolution thereon. Pertinent herein is that it violates the rule on double taxation. And it violates the
Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor rule on equality because the fees are collected from only
to order the closure and removal of illegally constructed domestic households and not from restaurants, food courts,
establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits. fast food chains, and other commercial dining places that
spew garbage much more than residential property owners.
Though the court agreed with Petitioner’s contention that,
under the LGC, the Sanggunian does not have the power to
authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of a
nuisance per accidens, still the SC ruled that the LGU may ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances were valid.
nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition without
due hearing thereon in a tribunal, because in the exercise of
police power and the general welfare clause provided in the HELD:
Constitution, property rights of individuals may be subjected
to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the 1st ordinance: Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City is
government. valid.

Hence, the right to due process was satisfied in the case at Cities have the power to tax
bar.
It must be noted that local government units such as cities
has the power to tax. The collection for the socialized
housing tax is valid. It must be noted that the collections
were made to accrue to the socialized housing programs and
projects of the city.

Page 11 of 190
The imposition was for a public purpose (exercise of power
of taxation + police power)
In this case, there was both an exercise of the power to tax
(primary) and police power (incidental). Removing slum
areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the
underprivileged and homeless constituents but
advantageous to the real property owners as well.
The situation will improve the value of the their property
investments, fully enjoying the same in view of an orderly,
secure, and safe community, and will enhance the quality of
life of the poor, making them law-abiding constituents and
better consumers of business products.
There is no violation of the rule on equality
Note: There is a substantial distinction between: real
property owner and an informal settler. In fact, the Supreme
Court said that the disparity is so obvious. It is inherent in the
power to tax that a State is free to select the subjects of
taxation. Inequities which result from a singling out of one
particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation.
All these requisites are complied with: An ordinance based
on reasonable classification does not violate the
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The
requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1)
it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class.
The ordinance is not oppressive or confiscatory
The ordinance is also not oppressive since the tax rate being
imposed is consistent with the UDHA (Urban Development
and Housing Act of 1992). While the law authorizes LGUs to
collect SHT on properties with an assessed value of more
than P50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only covers
properties with an assessed value exceeding P100,000.00.
As well, the ordinance provides for a tax credit equivalent to
the total amount of the special assessment paid by the
property owner beginning in the sixth (6th) year of the
effectivity of the ordinance.
2nd ordinance: The imposition of garbage fee is invalid.
Note: There was no violation of double taxation but there
was a violation of the rule on equity.
There is no violation of double taxation: the garbage
fees are not taxes
In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, the
Court declared that:
"if the generating of revenue is the primary purpose
and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is
a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the
fact that incidentally revenue is also obtained does
not make the imposition a tax."
Contention of Ferrer: That the imposition of garbage fee is
tantamount to double taxation because garbage collection is
a basic and essential public service that should be paid out
from property tax, business tax, transfer tax, amusement tax,
community tax certificate, other taxes, and the IRA of the
Quezon City Government. All these are valid taxes. The
garbage fees are license fees.
Page 12 of 190
Footnote: In order to constitute double taxation in the
objectionable or prohibited sense the same property must be
taxed twice when it should be taxed but once; both taxes
must be imposed on the same property or subject-matter, for
the same purpose, by the same State, Government, or taxing
authority, within the same jurisdiction or taxing district, during
the same taxing period, and they must be the same kind or
character of tax.
There is a violation of the rule on equality: no
substantial distinction
There is no substantial distinction between an occupant of a
lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a
condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, on
the other hand.
Most likely, garbage output produced by these types of
occupants is uniform and does not vary to a large degree;
thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and equitable.
The garbage fees or rates are unjust and inequitable
A resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or
socialized housing project has to pay twice the amount than
a resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all
occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have
to pay a fixed rate of Php100.00; and the same amount of
garbage fee is imposed regardless of whether the resident is
from a condominium or from a socialized housing project.
The classifications are not germane to the purpose of
the ordinance
The declared purpose is: "promoting shared responsibility
with the residents to attack their common mindless attitude in
over-consuming the present resources and in generating
waste."
Instead of simplistically categorizing the payee into land or
floor occupant of a lot or unit of a condominium, socialized
housing project or apartment, respondent City Council
should have considered factors that could truly measure the
amount of wastes generated and the appropriate fee for its
collection. Factors include, among others, household age
and size, accessibility to waste collection, population density
of the barangay or district, capacity to pay, and actual
occupancy of the property.
SC:
→ Validity of Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City is
upheld.
→ Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an annual
garbage fee on all domestic households in Quezon City, is
unconstitutional and illegal

6. PHILIPPINE CARE HEALTH PROVIDERS, INC. v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNATL REVENUE
FACTS: On January 27, 2000, the respondent CIR sent
petitioner assessment of deficiency taxes, both Value-Added
Tax (VAT) and documentary stamp tax (DST) in the total
amount of P224,702,641.18 for taxable years 1996 and
1997.
Petitioner protested such assessment in a letter, but the
respondent did not act on the protest which led the petitioner
to file a petition in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) seeking
the cancellation of said assessments. CTA partially granted
the petition wherein the petitioner is ordered to pay the
deficiency VAT and set aside the DST deficiency tax.
Respondent appealed in Court of Appeals (CA) with regard
to the cancellation of DST assessment. CA granted the
petition. The Court affirmed CA’s decision. Hence, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is liable to pay the
DST on its health care agreement pursuant to Sec.185 of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997
RULING: Petition granted. Petitioner is not contemplated to
be included in “or other branch insurance” covered by
Section 185 of NIRC because it is a Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO) and not an insurance company. HMOs
primary purpose is rendering service to its member by
lowering prices and reducing the cost rather than the risk of
medical health. On the other hand, insurance businesses
undertakes for a consideration to indemnify its clients against
loss, damage or liability arising from unknown or contingent
event. The term “indemnify” therein presuppose that a
liability or claim has already been incurred. In HMOs, there is
Page 13 of 190
no indemnity precisely because the member merely avails of
medical services to be paid or already paid in advance at a
pre-agreed price under the agreements.
The Power To Tax Is Not The Power To Destroy
As a general rule, the power to tax is an incident of
sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its
very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to
be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which
imposes the tax on the constituency who is to pay it.51 So
potent indeed is the power that it was once opined that "the
power to tax involves the power to destroy."
Petitioner claims that the assessed DST to date which
amounts to ₱376 million53 is way beyond its net worth of
₱259 million.54 Respondent never disputed these
assertions. Given the realities on the ground, imposing the
DST on petitioner would be highly oppressive. It is not the
purpose of the government to throttle private business. On
the contrary, the government ought to encourage private
enterprise.55 Petitioner, just like any concern organized for a
lawful economic activity, has a right to maintain a legitimate
business. As aptly held in Roxas, et al. v. CTA, et al.:
The power of taxation is sometimes called also the
power to destroy. Therefore it should be exercised
with caution to minimize injury to the proprietary
rights of a taxpayer. It must be exercised fairly,
equally and uniformly, lest the tax collector kill the
"hen that lays the golden egg."
Legitimate enterprises enjoy the constitutional protection not
to be taxed out of existence. Incurring losses because of a
tax imposition may be an acceptable consequence but killing
the business of an entity is another matter and should not be
allowed. It is counter-productive and ultimately subversive of
the nation’s thrust towards a better economy which will
ultimately benefit the majority of our people.
Moreover, HMOs play an important role in society as
partners of the State in achieving its constitutional mandate
of providing citizens with affordable health services.
Also, the DST assessment of the petitioner for the years
1996 and 1997 became moot and academic since it availed
tax amnesty under RA 9480 on December 10, 2007. Thus,
petitioner is entitled to immunity from payment of taxes for
taxable year 2005 and prior years.

7. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. CITY OF
CABANATUAN
FACTS: Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled
corporation created under Commonwealth Act No. 120, as
amended.
For many years now, petitioner sells electric power to the
residents of Cabanatuan City, posting a gross income of
P107,814,187.96 in 1992.7 Pursuant to section 37 of
Ordinance No. 165-92,8 the respondent assessed the
petitioner a franchise tax amounting to P808,606.41,
representing 75% of 1% of the latter’s gross receipts for the
preceding year.
Petitioner refused to pay the tax assessment arguing that the
respondent has no authority to impose tax on government
entities. Petitioner also contended that as a non-profit
organization, it is exempted from the payment of all forms of
taxes, charges, duties or fees in accordance with sec. 13 of
Rep. Act No. 6395, as amended.
The respondent filed a collection suit in the RTC, demanding
that petitioner pay the assessed tax due, plus surcharge.
Respondent alleged that petitioner’s exemption from local
taxes has been repealed by section 193 of the LGC, which
reads as follows:
“Sec. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges.-
Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax
exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently
enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical,
including government owned or controlled
corporations, except local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938,
non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational
institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the
effectivity of this Code.”
Page 14 of 190
RTC upheld NPC’s tax exemption. On appeal the CA
reversed the trial court’s Order on the ground that section
193, in relation to sections 137 and 151 of the LGC,
expressly withdrew the exemptions granted to the petitioner.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent city government has the
authority to issue Ordinance No. 165-92 and impose an
annual tax on “businesses enjoying a franchise
HELD: YES. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government, for
without taxes, the government can neither exist nor endure.
A principal attribute of sovereignty, the exercise of taxing
power derives its source from the very existence of the state
whose social contract with its citizens obliges it to promote
public interest and common good. The theory behind the
exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity;
without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of
promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people.
Section 137 of the LGC clearly states that the LGUs can
impose franchise tax “notwithstanding any exemption
granted by any law or other special law.” This particular
provision of the LGC does not admit any exception. In City
Government of San Pablo, Laguna v. Reyes, MERALCO’s
exemption from the payment of franchise taxes was brought
as an issue before this Court. The same issue was involved
in the subsequent case of Manila Electric Company v.
Province of Laguna.75 Ruling in favor of the local
government in both instances, we ruled that the franchise tax
in question is imposable despite any exemption enjoyed by
MERALCO under special laws, viz:
“It is our view that petitioners correctly rely on
provisions of Sections 137 and 193 of the LGC to
support their position that MERALCO’s tax
exemption has been withdrawn. The explicit
language of section 137 which authorizes the
province to impose franchise tax ‘notwithstanding
any exemption granted by any law or other special
law’ is all-encompassing and clear. The franchise
tax is imposable despite any exemption enjoyed
under special laws.
Section 193 buttresses the withdrawal of extant tax
exemption privileges. By stating that unless otherwise
provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted
to or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or
juridical, including government-owned or controlled
corporations except (1) local water districts, (2) cooperatives
duly registered under R.A. 6938, (3) non-stock and non-profit
hospitals and educational institutions, are withdrawn upon
the effectivity of this code, the obvious import is to limit the
exemptions to the three enumerated entities. It is a basic
precept of statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others
as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. In the absence of any provision of the Code
to the contrary, and we find no other provision in point, any
existing tax exemption or incentive enjoyed by MERALCO
under existing law was clearly intended to be withdrawn.
Reading together sections 137 and 193 of the LGC, we
conclude that under the LGC the local government unit may
now impose a local tax at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of
the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar based
on the incoming receipts realized within its territorial
jurisdiction. The legislative purpose to withdraw tax privileges
enjoyed under existing law or charter is clearly manifested by
the language used on (sic) Sections 137 and 193
categorically withdrawing such exemption subject only to the
exceptions enumerated. Since it would be not only tedious
and impractical to attempt to enumerate all the existing
statutes providing for special tax exemptions or privileges,
the LGC provided for an express, albeit general, withdrawal
of such exemptions or privileges. No more unequivocal
language could have been used.” (emphases supplied)
Doubtless, the power to tax is the most effective instrument
to raise needed revenues to finance and support myriad
activities of the local government units for the delivery of
basic services essential to the promotion of the general
welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and
prosperity of the people. As this Court observed in the
Mactan case, “the original reasons for the withdrawal of tax
exemption privileges granted to government-owned or
controlled corporations and all other units of government
were that such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion
and distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situated
enterprises.” With the added burden of devolution, it is even
more imperative for government entities to share in the
requirements of development, fiscal or otherwise, by paying
taxes or other charges due from them.
B. DUE PROCESS
1. REPUBLIC v. CAGANDAHAN
FACTS: On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer
Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13,
1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of
Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary
male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a... condition where
persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed
to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six,
underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she
has small ovaries. At age... thirteen, tests revealed that her
ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing
and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then
alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in
mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus,
she prayed that... her birth certificate be corrected such that
her gender be changed from female to male and her first
name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the
testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General
Hospital.
He explained that genetically respondent is female but
because her body secretes male hormones, her female
organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs
Page 15 of 190
- female and male. He testified that this condition is very
rare, that respondent's uterus is not fully developed...
because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no
monthly period. He further testified that respondent's
condition is permanent and recommended the change of
gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted
to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would
be... advantageous to her.
Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the
following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer
Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:... a) By
changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF
CAGANDAHAN; and... b) By changing the gender from
female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioner's school records, voter's
registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are
hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected
data.
this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE
RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT
ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT'S MEDICAL
CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA
DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE."... respondent counters
that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was
not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of
Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was
furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on
December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in
the course of the proceedings, respondent is actually a male
person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to
reflect his true sex/gender, change of sex or... gender is
allowed under Rule 108, and respondent substantially
complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court.
Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all
persons who have or... claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings.
Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a
party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil
registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no
final... determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all
possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the
proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much
too short of the requirements of the rules.
ISSUE: Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court
erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from
female to male, on the ground of her medical condition
known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff,"...
under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
RULING: The determination of a person's sex appearing in
his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to
the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides:
 ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and
has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what
he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered
his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone
treatment and taken steps, like taking... lifelong medication,
to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he
did not. He chose not to do so.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the

diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what
nature has handed out. In other words, we respect
respondent's congenital condition and his mature decision to
be a male. Life is already difficult for the... ordinary person.
We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his
unordinary state and thus help make his life easier,
considering the unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this

Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right
but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.

Considering the consequence that respondent's change of

name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit
in respondent's change of name. Such a... change will
conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate
from female to male.

Republic's petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January

12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna, is AFFIRMED

ISSUE: Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in

her birth certificate be changed. 2. BRIGIDO B. QUIAO v. RITA C. QUIAO

RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
lower court. It held that, in deciding the case, the Supreme
Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of
the various degrees of intersex as variations which should
not be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court made
use of the available evidence presented in court including the
fact that private respondent thinks of himself as a male and
as to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s
body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen),
which is preponderant biological support for considering him
as being male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1)
the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with
what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court
respects the respondent’s congenital condition and his
mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the
ordinary person.
The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of
right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of
the reasons and the consequences that will follow.
FACTS: Respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint
for legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao
(Brigido). The judgment finds petitioner-husband as the guilty
party and forfeited his share in the conjugal property in favor
of the common children.
The petitioner is saying that since the property relations
between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner
acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the
Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the
Civil Code, which provides: All property of the conjugal
partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband
and wife.[60] Thus, since he is one of the owners of the
properties covered by the conjugal partnership of gains, he
has a vested right over half of the said properties, even after
the promulgation of the Family Code; and he insisted that no
provision under the Family Code may deprive him of this
vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which
prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it
will prejudice a person's vested right.

ISSUE: WON the forfeiture violated the vested right of the

petitioner?

HELD: NO.

Page 16 of 190
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent
do not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder,
or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
contingency. The term vested right expresses the concept of
present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural
justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or
an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free
society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual
rights, cannot deny.

To be vested, a right must have become a title legal or

equitable to the present or future enjoyment of property.

The concept of vested right is a consequence of the

constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a
present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes
not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a
demand but also exemptions from new obligations created
after the right has become vested. Rights are considered
vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,
absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.

From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be

deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is
due process and such deprivation is founded in law and
jurisprudence.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to

due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent
prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be
awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed
that the trial court divide the community assets between the
petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and
evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the
community properties of the parties. Second, when the
Decision dated October 10, 2005 was promulgated, the 3. ANONYMOUS v. RADAM
petitioner never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting
what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article
129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim
being deprived of his right to due process. FACTS: Ma. Victoria Radam, utility worker in the Office of
the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos
Also, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis City in Pangasinan, was charged with immorality. The
considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his unnamed complainant alleged that respondent was
share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if unmarried but got pregnant and gave birth outside wedlock.
he is the guilty party in a legal separation case. The complainant claimed that respondent’s behavior tainted
the image of the judiciary.

In connection with the complaint, Judge Abella conducted a

discreet investigation to verify the allegations against
respondent. He find out that truthfulness of the allegation. He
was told by the respondent that they are unable to marry
because they plan to migrate to Canada. In a further
investigation it was revealed that the father of her son is
unknown, as shown by the child’s Certificate of Live Birth.

In this connection, Judge Abella recommends that

respondent MA. VICTORIA RADAM be accordingly found
GUILTY of IMMORAL CONDUCT or ACT UNBECOMING A
COURT EMPLOYEE. A suspension of one (1) month or a
fine of Php5,000.00 is respectfully recommended, with
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the
future will be dealt with more severely. After reviewing the
findings and recommendation of Judge Abella, the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that,
respondent be absolved of the charge of immorality because
her alleged misconduct (that is, giving birth out of wedlock)
did not affect the character and nature of her position as a
utility worker. However, it proposed that she be held liable for
conduct unbecoming a court employee and imposed a fine

Page 17 of 190
ofP5,000 for stating in the birth certificate of her child
Christian Jeon that the father was "unknown" to her.
ISSUE: whether or not respondent may be held liable in
relation to her entry in her child’s birth certificate regarding
her son’s father?
RULING: No. The essence of due process in an
administrative proceeding is the opportunity to explain one’s
side, whether written or verbal.
This presupposes that one has been previously apprised of
the accusation against him or her. Here, respondent was
deprived of both with regard to her alleged unbecoming
conduct in relation to a certain statement in the birth
certificate of her child. She was indicted only for alleged
immorality for giving birth out of wedlock. It was the only
charge of which she was informed. Judge Abella’s
investigation focused solely on that matter. She was neither
confronted with it nor given the chance to explain it. To hold
her liable for a totally different charge of which she was
totally unaware will violate her right to due process. Case
dismissed
4. MACIAS v. MACIAS
FACTS: This involves an administrative complaint filed by
complainant Margie C. Macias charging her husband,
Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Judge Macias), with
immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. The complaint was filed on March 7, 2001,
when respondent was still sitting as the presiding judge
of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Liloy,
Zamboanga del Norte.
Complainant alleged that sometime in 1998, respondent
engaged in an illicit liaison and immoral relationship with
a certain Judilyn Seranillos (Seranillos), single and in her
early 20s. The relationship continued until the time of
the filing of the complaint.
The witness for respondent was Judge Macias himself. He
denied the allegations of Mutia and Zozobrado. He said that
complainant also filed a complaint for concubinage
against him, but the same was dismissed by the
Regional State Prosecutor for lack of sufficient evidence.
He believed that complainant’s accusations were brought
about by her psychiatric condition characterized as
severe paranoia.
Issue: Whether or not substantial evidence is sufficient to
establish the guilt of a judge charged with a grave offense
Page 18 of 190
Ruling: Yes. While substantial evidence would ordinarily
suffice to support a finding of guilt, the rule is a bit
different where the proceedings involve judges charged
with grave offense. Administrative proceedings against
judges are, by nature, highly penal in character and are
to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal
cases.
In more recent rulings, however, the Court applied
substantial evidence as the normative quantum of proof
necessary in resolving administrative complaints against
judges. In order to diffuse confusion, a clarification has to be
made. First, the pronouncements in Horilleno and
Alcuizar may be said to have been superseded by the
Court’s recent rulings in Gutierrez v. Belen, Reyes v.
Paderanga, and Naval v. Panday.
Second, members of the judiciary are not a class of
their own, sui generis, in the field of public service as
to require a higher degree of proof for the administrative
cases filed against them other than, perhaps, the fact
that because of the nature of the responsibility judges
have, they are required to live up to a higher standard
of integrity, probity and morality. When we dismiss a
public officer or employee from his position or office for
the commission of a grave offense in connection with
his office, we merely require that the complainant prove
substantial evidence. When we disbar a disgraceful
lawyer, we require that complainant merely prove a
clear preponderance of evidence to establish liability.
There appears no compelling reason to require a higher
degree of proof when we deal with cases filed against
judges.
Judges play a vital role in the dispensation of justice. In this
jurisdiction, the integrity demanded of a judge does not
commence only when he dons the habiliments of a
magistrate or ends when he sheds off his judicial robe.
The nature of the position requires nothing less than a
24-hour daily obeisance to this mandate of integrity.
Any judge who cannot live up to this exacting
requirement has no business sitting on the bench.
Considering the proliferation of complaints of abuses and
immorality committed by judges, it is only proper that
the Court be ever vigilant in requiring impeccable
conduct from the members of its bench.
However, in this case, we are not convinced that
complainant was able to prove, by substantial evidence,
that respondent committed the acts complained of. Basic
is the rule that in administrative proceedings,
complainant bears the onus of establishing the
averments of her complaint. If complainant fails to
discharge this burden, respondent cannot be held liable
for the charge.
Under Sections 8 and 11 of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, a judge found guilty of immorality can be
dismissed from the service, if still in the active service,
or may forfeit all or part of his retirement benefits, if
already retired, and disqualified from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office including government-
owned or controlled corporations. We have already ruled
that if a judge is to be disciplined for a grave offense,
the evidence against him should be competent and
derived from direct knowledge. This quantum of evidence,
complainant failed to satisfy.
Nevertheless, we agree with the findings of the
Investigating Justice that although the charges of
immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service were not satisfactorily proven by
complainant, respondent cannot be completely
exonerated. Mutia’s testimony that he saw Judge Macias
having dinner with Seranillos and entering a bedroom
with her may not satisfactorily prove the charge of
immorality, but this act certainly suggested an
appearance of impropriety, Judge Macias being a
married man. Such behavior undeniably constituted
unbecoming conduct, a light offense punishable by a
fine not less than ₱1,000.00 but not more than
₱10,000.00. In light of the circumstances affecting not
only the reputation of Judge Macias himself but the
image and reputation of the whole judiciary as well, we
find it reasonable to impose upon him the maximum
fine of ₱10,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative
complaint for immorality and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service against respondent Judge
Mariano Joaquin S. Macias of RTC, Branch 28, of
Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte is DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence. However, respondent is held
administratively liable for UNBECOMING CONDUCT and
FINED in the amount of ₱10,000.00 to be deducted
from his retirement benefits.
5. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. INDAR
FACTS: This is an administrative complaint for gross
misconduct and dishonesty against respondent Judge Cader
P. Indar, Al Haj (Judge Indar).
There have been reports by the Local Civil Registrars of
Manila and Quezon City to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) that they have received an alarming
number of decisions, resolutions, and orders on annulment
of marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Indar.
The Audit Team found that the list of cases submitted by the
Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City do not
appear in the records of cases received, pending or disposed
by RTC.
Likewise, the annulment decisions did not exist in the
records of RTC-Cotabato, Branch 14. The Audit Team
further observed that the case numbers in the list submitted
by the Local Civil Registrars are not within the series of case
numbers recorded in the docket books
The audit team asked for confirmation on the authenticity of
Judge Indar’s decision, dated 23 May 2007, in Spec. Proc.
No. 06-581, entitled “Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V.
Page 19 of 190
Aguiling,” for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. As regards
this case, the Audit Team found that Spec. Proc. No. 06-584
does not exist in the records of cases filed, pending or
disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak.
Meanwhile, in compliance with DCA Villasor’s Indorsement
and in response to the Australian Embassy letter, Judge
Indar explained, in a Letter dated 10 March 2010, that “this
court is a Court of General Jurisdiction and can therefore act
even on cases involving Family Relations. Hence, the
subject decision rendered by this Court annulling the
marriage of your client is VALID and she is free to marry.”
In a Resolution dated 4 May 2010, the Court En Banc
preventively suspended Judge Indar pending investigation of
this case.
Judge Indar failed to attend the hearing as rescheduled and
to submit the affidavit as required.
Justice Borreta proceeded to determine Judge Indar’s
administrative liability, and found the latter guilty of serious
misconduct and dishonesty.
According to Justice Borreta, Judge Indar’s act of issuing
decisions on annulment of marriage cases without complying
with the stringent procedural and substantive requirements of
the Rules of Court for such cases clearly violates the Code of
Judicial Conduct. Judge Indar made it appear that the
annulment cases underwent trial, when the records show no
judicial proceedings occurred.
Moreover, Judge Indar’s act of affirming in writing before the
Australian Embassy the validity of a decision he allegedly
rendered, when in fact that case does not appear in the
court’s records, constitutes dishonesty. Justice Borreta
recommended the dismissal of Judge Indar from service, and
the investigation of Atty. Silongan, who is not included as
respondent in this case, on her participation in the
certification of the authenticity of the spurious Decisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was due process when the
court handled Judge Indar’s case.
RULING: Yes. It is settled that technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative
proceedings. Thus, administrative due process cannot be
fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. It is
enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before
the case against him is decided.
In this case, Judge Indar was given ample opportunity to
controvert the charges against him. While there is no proof
that Judge Indar personally received the notices of hearing
issued by the Investigating Justices, the first two notices of
hearing were received by one Mustapha Randang of the
Clerk of Court, RTC-Cotabato, while one of the notices was
received by a certain Mrs. Asok, who were presumably
authorized and capable to receive notices on behalf of Judge
Indar.
The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, which govern the conduct of disciplinary and
nondisciplinary proceedings in administrative cases, clearly
provide that technical rules of procedure and evidence do not
strictly apply to administrative proceedings.
“Section 3.  Technical Rules in Administrative
Investigations.· Administrative investigations shall be
conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the
technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to
judicial proceedings.”
In other words, Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully
uphold the law, issued decisions on the questioned
annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that such
cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and
jurisprudential requisites for voiding marriages. Such act
undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct.
In this case, Judge Indar issued Decisions on numerous
annulment of marriage cases when in fact he did not conduct
any judicial proceedings on the cases. Not even the filing of
the petitions occurred. Judge Indar made it appear in his
Decisions that the annulment cases complied with the
stringent requirements of the Rules of Court and the strict
statutory and jurisprudential conditions for voiding marriages,
when quite the contrary is true, violating Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge
perform official duties honestly.
Considering that Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct
and dishonesty, constituting violations of the Lawyer’s Oath,
and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Judge Indar deserves
disbarment.
6. GO v. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN
FACTS: October 2001, Mr. George Isleta, the Head of
Letran’s Auxiliary Services Department, received information
that certain fraternities were recruiting new members among
Letran’s high school students. He also received a list of the
students allegedly involved. School authorities started an
investigation, including the conduct of medical examinations
on the students whose names were on the list.
The school physician, reported that six (6) students bore
injuries, probable signs of blunt trauma of more than two
weeks, on the posterior portions of their thighs. Mr. Rosarda,
the Assistant Prefect for Discipline, conferred with the
students and asked for their explanations in writing.
Four (4) students, namely admitted that they were neophytes
of the Tau Gamma Fraternity and were present in a hazing
rite held on October 3, 2001 in the house of one Dulce in
Tondo, Manila. They also identified the senior members of
the fraternity present at their hazing. These included Kim Go,
then a fourth year high school student.
Page 20 of 190
At the Parents-Teachers Conference, Rosarda informed
Kim’s mother, petitioner Mrs. Angelita Go (Mrs. Go), that
students had positively identified Kim as a fraternity member.
Mrs. Go expressed disbelief as her son was supposedly
under his parents’ constant supervision.
Mr. Rosarda thereafter spoke to Kim and asked him to
explain his side. Kim responded through a written statement;
he denied that he was a fraternity member. He stated that at
that time, he was at Dulce’s house to pick up a gift, and did
not attend the hazing. On the same day, Mr. Rosarda
requested Kim’s parents (by notice) to attend a conference
on January 8, 2002 to address the issue of Kim’s fraternity
membership. Both Mrs. Go and petitioner Mr. Eugene Go
(Mr. Go) did not attend the conference.
The respondents found substantial basis in the neophytes’
statements that Kim was a senior fraternity member. Letran
decided to allow the fourth year students to graduate from
Letran. Students who were not in their fourth year were
allowed to finish the current school year but were barred
from subsequent enrollment in Letran.
Mr. Rosarda conveyed to Mrs. Go and Kim, in their
conference on January 15, 2002, the decision to suspend
Kim from January 16, 2002 to February 18, 2002.
Incidentally, Mr. Go did not attend this conference. On even
date, Mrs. Go submitted a request for the deferment of Kim’s
suspension to January 21, 2002 so that he could take a
previously scheduled examination. The request was granted.
The respondents proposed that the students and their
parents sign a pro-forma agreement to signify their
conformity with their suspension. Mr. and Mrs. Go refused to
sign. They also refused to accept the respondents’ finding
that Kim was a fraternity member. They likewise insisted that
due process had not been observed.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for damages
before the RTC of Caloocan City claiming that the
respondents had unlawfully dismissed Kim. Mr. and Mrs. Go
also sought compensation for the “business opportunity
losses” they suffered while personally attending to Kim’s
disciplinary case.
ISSUE: WON petitionser’s right to due process was violated.
RULING: NO. In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong,
the Court held that Guzman v. National University, is the
authority on the procedural rights of students in disciplinary
cases. In Guzman, we laid down the minimum standards in
the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions, as follows:
[I]t bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases
involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings
similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in
courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases
may be summary; and crossexamination is not, contrary to
petitioners’ view, an essential part thereof. There are withal
minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1)
the students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have
the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed
of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to
adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence
must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case.

Since disciplinary proceedings may be summary, the

insistence that a “formal inquiry” on the accusation against
Kim should have been conducted lacks legal basis. It has no
factual basis as well. While the petitioners state that Mr. and
Mrs. Go were “never given an opportunity to assist Kim,”56
the records show that the respondents gave them two (2)
notices, dated December 19, 2001 and January 8, 2002, for
conferences on January 8, 2002 and January 15, 2002.57
The notices clearly state: “Dear Mr./Mrs. Go, We would like
to seek your help in correcting Kim’s problem on: Discipline
& Conduct Offense: Membership in Fraternity.” Thus, the
respondents had given them ample opportunity to assist their
son in his disciplinary case. “Where a party was afforded an
opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do
so, he cannot [thereafter] complain of deprivation of due
process.”

The petitioners nevertheless argue that the respondents

defectively observed the written notice rule because they had
requested, and received, Kim’s written explanation at a time
when the respondents had not yet issued the written notice
of the accusation against him.

We see no merit in this argument as the petitioners

apparently hew to an erroneous view of administrative due
process. Jurisprudence has clarified that administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in the strict
judicial sense. The very nature of due process negates any
concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to
every imaginable situation. Thus, we are hard pressed to
believe that Kim’s denial of his fraternity membership before
formal notice was given worked against his interest in the
disciplinary case. What matters for due process purpose is
notice of what is to be explained, not the form in which the
notice is given.

The raison d’etre of the written notice rule is to inform the

student of the disciplinary charge against him and to enable
him to suitably prepare a defense. We are not convinced that
Kim’s right to explain his side as exercised in his written
denial had been violated or diminished. The essence of due
process, it bears repeating, is simply the opportunity to be
heard. And Kim had been heard. His written explanation was
received, indeed even solicited, by the respondents. Thus,
he cannot claim that he was denied the right to adduce
evidence in his behalf.
7. CUDIA v. SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
MILITARY ACADEMY
FACTS: Cadet 1 CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa
Class of 2014 of the PMA, the country's premiere military
academy located at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio City. He
belonged to the "A" Company and was the Deputy Baron of
his class. As claimed by petitioners and petitioner-intervenor
(hereinafter collectively called "petitioners," unless otherwise
indicated), he was supposed to graduate with honors as the
class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the
top Navy cadet graduate, and be commissioned as an
ensign of the Philippine Navy.

Professor Juanita Beron 5th period class issued a

Delinquency Report (DR) against Cadet 1 CL Cudia because
he was "late for two (2) minutes in his Eng 412 class. the
DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers. They were
logged and transmitted to the Company Tactical Officers
(CTO) for explanation of the concerned cadets. Two days
later, Cadet lCL Cudia received his DR. Cadet lCL Cudia
was informed that Maj. Hindang reported him to the HC21 for
violation of the Honor Code. the HC constituted a team to

Page 21 of 190
conduct a preliminary investigation on the reported honor and enforceable but also to determine ,whether or not there
violation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. The formal investigation has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
against Cadet 1 CL Cu di a then ensued. the OIC of the HC branch or instrumentality of the Government even if the
forwarded the Formal Investigation Report to the Staff Judge latter does not exercise judicial' quasi-judicial' or ministerial
Advocate (SJA) for review. Special Orders No. 26 was functions. No one is above the law' including the military'
issued by the PMA Headquarters placing Cadet 1 CL Cudia especially in violations of Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
on indefinite leave of absence without pay and allowances
effective February 10, 2014 pending approval of his
separation by the AFPGHQ, barring him from future
appointment and/or admission as cadet, and not permitting
him to qualify for any entrance requirements to the PMA.
Vice Admiral Abogado approved the recommendation to
dismiss Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Cadet lCL Cudia submitted a
letter to the Office of the Commandant of Cadets requesting
for reinstatement by the PMA of his status as a cadet.

Cadet lCL Cudia made his personal appeal letter to Maj.

Gen. Lopez. On even date, the AFP Chief of Staff ordered a
reinvestigation following the viral Facebook post of Annavee
demanding the intervention of the military leadership. Cadet
1 CL Cudia and his family engaged the services of the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO) in Baguio City. the Spouses Cudia
filed a letter-complaint before the CHR-Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR) Office against the HC members
and Maj. Gracilla for alleged violation of the human rights of
Cadet lCL Cudia, particularly his rights to due process,
education, and privacy of communication. CHR-CAR issued
its Resolution with respect to CHR-CAR Case.The
Commission on Human Rights-CAR Office finds PROBABLE
CAUSE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS against the
officers and members of the PMA Honor Committee and ..
certain PMA officials, specifically for violations of the rights of
CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA to dignity, due process,
education, privacy/privacy of communication, and good life

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the PMA committed grave abuse of

discretion in dismissing Cudia in utter disregard of his right to
due process and in holding that he violated the (Honor
Codethrough lying

2. Whether or not the court can interfere ,with military affair 8. AGABON v. NLRC

RULING: FACTS: Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the

business of selling and installing ornamental and
1.No. The determination of ,whether the PMA cadet has
construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio
rights to due process, education,and property should be
Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice
placed in the context of the Honor Code.All the
installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when
administrative reremedies ,were exhausted. A student of a
they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Thus,
military academy must be prepared to subordinate his private
Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
interest for the proper functioning of the institution" The PMA
payment of money claims. Petitioners also claim that private
may impose disciplinary measures and punishments as it
respondent did not comply with the twin requirements of
deems fit and consistent ,with the peculiar needs of the
notice and hearing. Private respondent, on the other hand,
institution" PMA hasre!ulatory authority to administratively
maintained that petitioners were not dismissed but had
dismiss erring cadets. PMA has a right to invoke academic
abandoned their work
freedom in the enforcement of the internal rules and
regulations.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.

2. Yes. The court is part of the checks and balance
machinery mandated by Article VIII of the Constitution. The
courts mandate according to Section 1 Article 8 is expanded
that the duty of the courts is not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights ,which are legally demandable
RULING: Petitioners’ dismissal was for a just cause. They
had abandoned their employment and were already working
for another employer. Abandonment is the deliberate and

Page 22 of 190
unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his
employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just
cause for termination of employment by the employer.

To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the

existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins the
employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard
and to defend himself. Thus, the procedures for dismissal
should be observed. Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is
based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must
give the employee two written notices and a hearing or
opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before
terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds
for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to
be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a
notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is
based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the
employer must give the employee and the Department of
Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the
effectivity of his separation.

From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be

derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article 282
of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article
283, or for health reasons under Article 284, and due
process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or
authorized cause but due process was observed; (3) the
dismissal is without just or authorized cause and there was
no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for just or authorized
cause but due process was not observed.

The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation.

The dismissal should be upheld because it was established
that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another
company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the
notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices
to the last known addresses would have been useless
because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for
the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the
law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee’s
last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-
compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.
That in cases involving dismissals for cause but without
observance of the twin requirements of notice and hearing,
the better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine and to
follow Wenphil by holding that the dismissal was for just
cause but imposing sanctions on the employer. Such
sanctions, however, must be stiffer than that imposed in 9. MICHAEL H. v. GERALD D.
Wenphil.

Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant

case, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the
dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the
employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of
his statutory rights in the form of nominal damages, i.e.
P30,000.00.
FACTS: Gerald D. was the presumptive father of Victoria D.
since she was born to his wife Carole D.. However, Carole
had an adulterous partner, Michael H., who obtained blood
tests indicating that he was likely the biological father. When
Michael obtained visitation rights in a California state court,
Gerald argued that Michael had no ground under California
law to challenge Gerald's paternity since more than two
years had passed since Victoria's birth. According to Cal.
Evid. Code 621, the child is "presumed to be a child of the
marriage" and another man can only challenge this
presumption within two years of birth. The court ruled in favor
of Gerald and canceled Michael's visitation rights. Michael
claimed that Code 621 violated his Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights by denying him an opportunity to
establish his paternity. A California Court of Appeals upheld
the constitutionality of Code 621.

Page 23 of 190
ISSUE: Does Cal. Evid. Code 621 violate the Due Process
Clause by denying a possible biological father the chance to
establish his paternity of a child after two years have passed
since the child's birth?
RULING: NO. Based on its analysis of common-law tradition,
the plurality opinion found that a possible biological father
does not have a fundamental right to obtain parental rights
after the presumptive father has exercised significant
responsibility over the child. Therefore due process
protection does not apply. Code 621 was based on common-
law precedent which showed "an aversion to declaring
children illegitimate" and supported "the interest in promoting
the 'peace and tranquility of States and families.'" Restricting
Michael's parental rights achieved this by granting Gerald the
sole responsibility to play the role of Victoria's father.
10. WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG, 521 U.S. 702
(1997)
FACTS: It as always been a crime to assist a suicide in the
State of Washington. The State's present law makes
"[p]romoting a suicide attempt" a felony, and provides: "A
person is guilty of [that crime] when he knowingly causes or
aids another person to attempt suicide." Dr. Harold
Glucksberg -- along with four other physicians who
occasionally treat terminally ill, suffering patients, declare
that they would assist these patients in ending their lives if
not for the State's assisted suicide ban. They, along with
three gravely ill plaintiffs who have since died and a nonprofit
organization that counsels people considering physician
assisted suicide, filed this suit against petitioners, the State
and its Attorney General, seeking a declaration that the ban
is, on its face, unconstitutional. They assert a liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause which extends to a personal choice by a mentally
competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician assisted
Page 24 of 190
suicide. The Federal District Court agreed, concluding that
Washington's assisted suicide ban is unconstitutional
because it places an undue burden on the exercise of that
constitutionally protected liberty interest. The en banc Ninth
Circuit affirmed.
ISSUE: WON Washington's ban on physician assisted-
suicide violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause by denying competent terminally ill adults the liberty
to choose death over life. NO
HELD: An examination of our Nation's history, legal
traditions, and practices demonstrates that Anglo American
common law has punished or otherwise disapproved of
assisting suicide for over 700 years; that rendering such
assistance is still a crime in almost every State; that such
prohibitions have never contained exceptions for those who
were near death; that the prohibitions have in recent years
been reexamined and, for the most part, reaffirmed in a
number of States; and that the President recently signed the
Federal Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997,
which prohibits the use of federal funds in support of
physician assisted suicide.
In light of that history, this Court's decisions lead to the
conclusion that respondents' asserted "right" to assistance in
committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause. The Court's
established method of substantive due process analysis has
two primary features: First, the Court has regularly observed
that the Clause specially protects those fundamental rights
and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition. Second, the Court has required
a "careful description" of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest. The Ninth Circuit's and respondents' various
descriptions of the interest here at stake--e.g., a right to
"determin[e] the time and manner of one's death," the "right
to die," a "liberty to choose how to die," a right to "control of
one's final days," "the right to choose a humane, dignified
death," and "the liberty to shape death"--run counter to that
second requirement. Since the Washington statute prohibits
"aiding another person to attempt suicide," the question
before the Court is more properly characterized as whether
the "liberty" specially protected by the Clause includes a right
to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in
doing so. This asserted right has no place in our Nation's
traditions, given the country's consistent, almost universal,
and continuing rejection of the right, even for terminally ill,
mentally competent adults. To hold for respondents, the
Court would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and
practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of
almost every State.
The constitutional requirement that Washington's assisted
suicide ban be rationally related to legitimate government
interests is unquestionably met here. These interests include
prohibiting intentional killing and preserving human life;
preventing the serious public health problem of suicide,
especially among the young, the elderly, and those suffering
from untreated pain or from depression or other mental
disorders; protecting the medical profession's integrity and
ethics and maintaining physicians' role as their patients'
healers; protecting the poor, the elderly, disabled persons,
the terminally ill, and persons in other vulnerable groups from
indifference, prejudice, and psychological and financial
pressure to end their lives; and avoiding a possible slide
towards voluntary and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia.
The relative strengths of these various interests need not be
weighed exactingly, since they are unquestionably important
and legitimate, and the law at issue is at least reasonably
related to their promotion and protection.
11. LAWRENCE et al. v. TEXAS 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
Argued March 26, 2003—Decided June 26, 2003;
JUSTICE KENNEDY
FACTS: In Houston, Texas, officers of the Harris County
Police Department were dispatched to a private residence in
response to a reported weapons disturbance. They entered
an apartment where one of the petitioners, John Geddes
Lawrence, resided. The right of the police to enter does not
seem to have been questioned. The officers observed
Lawrence and another man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a
sexual act. The two petitioners were arrested, held in
custody over night, and charged and convicted before a
Justice of the Peace.
The complaints described their crime as "deviate sexual
intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the same
sex (man)." The applicable state law is Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 21.06(a). It provides: "A person commits an offense if
Page 25 of 190
he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another
individual of the same sex." The statute defines "[d]eviate
sexual intercourse" as follows: (A) any contact between any
part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of
another person; or (B) the penetration of the genitals or the
anus of another person with an object." § 21.01(1).
The petitioners exercised their right to a trial de novo in
Harris County Criminal Court. They challenged the statute as
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and of a like provision of the Texas Constitution.
Those contentions were rejected. The petitioners, having
entered a plea of nolo contendere, were each fined $200 and
assessed court costs of $141.25.
The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District
considered the petitioners' federal constitutional arguments
under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment. After hearing the case en banc
the court, in a divided opinion, rejected the constitutional
arguments and affirmed the convictions. In affirming, the
State Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that the statute was
not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Then, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.
ISSUES: (1) WON the petitioners' criminal convictions under
the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law—which criminalizes
sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical
behavior by different-sex couples—violate the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
(2) WON the petitioners' criminal convictions for adult
consensual sexual intimacy in their home violate their vital
interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
(3) WON Bowers v. Hardwick should be overruled.
HELD: The main question before the Court is the validity of a
Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same
sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. On June
26, 2003, the Supreme Court released its 6–3 decision
striking down the questioned Texas statute. Five justices
held it violated due process guarantees, and a sixth, Sandra
Day O'Connor, held it violated equal protection guarantees.
The five-member majority opinion overruled Bowers v.
Hardwick and implicitly invalidated similar sodomy statutes in
13 other states.
Resolution of this case depends on whether petitioners were
free as adults to engage in private conduct in the exercise of
their liberty under the Due Process Clause. For this inquiry
the US Supreme Court deems it necessary to reconsider its
Bowers holding. The Bowers Court's initial substantive
statement-"The issue presented is whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals
to engage in sodomy ... ," To say that the issue in Bowers
was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct
demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would
demean a married couple were it said that marriage is just
about the right to have sexual intercourse. Although the laws
involved in Bowers and here purport to do no more than
prohibit a particular sexual act, their penalties and purposes
have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the
most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the
most private of places, the home. They seek to control a
personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal
recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to
choose without being punished as criminals. The liberty
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the
right to choose to enter upon relationships in the confines of
their homes and their own private lives and still retain their
dignity as free persons.
Having misapprehended the liberty claim presented to it, the
Bowers Court stated that proscriptions against sodomy have
ancient roots. It should be noted, however, that there is no
longstanding history in U.S. of laws directed at homosexual
conduct as a distinct matter. Early American sodomy laws
were not directed at homosexuals as such but instead
sought to prohibit non-procreative sexual activity more
generally, whether between men and women or men and
men. Moreover, early sodomy laws seem not to have been
enforced against consenting adults acting in private. Instead,
sodomy prosecutions often involved predatory acts against
those who could not or did not consent: relations between
men and minor girls or boys, between adults involving force,
between adults implicating disparity in status, or between
men and animals. The longstanding criminal prohibition of
homosexual sodomy upon which Bowers placed such
reliance is as consistent with a general condemnation of non-
procreative sex as it is with an established tradition of
prosecuting acts because of their homosexual character. The
Bowers Court was, of course, making the broader point that
for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn
homosexual conduct as immoral, but the US Supreme
Court's obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate
its own moral code. The Nation's laws and traditions in the
past half century are most relevant here. They show an
emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives
in matters pertaining to sex.
Bowers' deficiencies became even more apparent in the
years following its announcement. The 25 States with laws
prohibiting the conduct referenced in Bowers are reduced
now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against
homosexual conduct. In those States, including Texas, that
still proscribe sodomy (whether for same-sex or heterosexual
conduct), there is a pattern of nonenforcement with respect
to consenting adults acting in private. Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992)
confirmed that the Due Process Clause protects personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education-and Romer
v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 624-which struck down class-based
legislation directed at homosexuals-cast Bowers' holding into
even more doubt. The stigma the Texas criminal statute
imposes, moreover, is not trivial.
Although the offense is but a minor misdemeanor, it remains
a criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of the
persons charged, including notation of convictions on their
records and on job application forms, and registration as sex
offenders under state law. Where a case's foundations have
sustained serious erosion, criticism from other sources is of
greater significance. In the United States, criticism of Bowers
has been substantial and continuing, disapproving of its
reasoning in all respects, not just as to its historical
assumptions. And, to the extent Bowers relied on values
shared with a wider civilization, the case's reasoning and
holding have been rejected by the European Court of Human
Rights, and that other nations have taken action consistent
with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual
adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct. There has
Page 26 of 190
been no showing that in this country the governmental
interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more
legitimate or urgent. Stare decisis is not an inexorable
command. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828. Bowers'
holding has not induced detrimental reliance of the sort that
could counsel against overturning it once there are
compelling reasons to do so. Bowers causes uncertainty, for
the precedents before and after it contradict its central
holding.
In his dissenting opinion in Bowers, JUSTICE STEVENS
concluded that (1) the fact a State's governing majority has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice,
and (2) individual decisions concerning the intimacies of
physical relationships, even when not intended to produce
offspring, are a form of “liberty” protected by due process.
That analysis should have controlled Bowers, and it controls
here. Bowers was not correct when it was decided, is not
correct today, and is hereby overruled. This case does not
involve minors, persons who might be injured or coerced,
those who might not easily refuse consent, or public conduct
or prostitution. It does involve two adults who, with full and
mutual consent, engaged in sexual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle. Petitioners' right to liberty under the
Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in
private conduct without government intervention. Casey,
supra, at 847. The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state
interest which can justify its intrusion into the individual's
personal and private life.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Texas
Fourteenth District was reversed, and the case was
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
(US Supreme Court’s) opinion.
12. OBERGEFELL ET AL. v. HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL.
FACTS: The petitioners, 14 same-sex couples and two men
whose same-sex partners are deceased, filed suits in
Federal District Courts in their home States, claiming that
respondent state officials violate the Fourteenth Amendment
by denying them the right to marry or to have marriages
lawfully performed in another State given full recognition.
Each District Court ruled in their favor. Respondents
appealed the decisions to the United States Court of
Appeals. USCA reversed the judgments of the District
Courts. USCA held that a State has no constitutional
obligation to license same-sex marriages or to recognize
same-sex marriages performed out of State. The petitioners sex couples out of a central institution of the Nation’s society,
sought certiorari before the SC of US. for they too may aspire to the transcendent purposes of
marriage.

ISSUE: WON the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to

license/recognize a same-sex marriage licensed and
performed in a State which does grant that right. YES

HELD: The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to

license a marriage between two people of the same sex.

The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to certain
personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy,
including intimate choices defining personal identity and
beliefs. Courts must exercise reasoned judgment in
identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the
State must accord them its respect. History and tradition
guide and discipline the inquiry but do not set its outer
boundaries. When new insight reveals discord between the
Constitution’s central protections and a received legal
stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.

Applying these tenets, the Court has long held the right to
marry is protected by the Constitution. For example, Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12, invalidated bans on interracial
unions, and Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 95, held that
prisoners could not be denied the right to marry. To be sure,
these cases presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex
partners, as did Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810, a one-line
summary decision issued in 1972, holding that the exclusion
of same-sex couples from marriage did not present a
substantial federal question. But other, more instructive
precedents have expressed broader principles. In assessing
whether the force and rationale of its cases apply to same-
sex couples, the Court must respect the basic reasons why
the right to marry has been long protected. This analysis
compels the conclusion that same-sex couples may exercise
the right to marry.

Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons

marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with
equal force to same-sex couples. First, the right to personal
choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of
individual autonomy. Decisions about marriage are among
the most intimate that an individual can make. This is true for
all persons, whatever their sexual orientation. Second, the
right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-
person union unlike any other in its importance to the
committed individuals. Same-sex couples have the same
right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association.
Third, right to marry safeguards children and families and
thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing,
13. WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM
procreation, and education. Without the recognition, stability,
CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
and predictability marriage offers, children suffer the stigma
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. CITY OF
of knowing their families are somehow lesser. They also
MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR
suffer the significant material costs of being raised by
ALFREDO S. LIM
unmarried parents, relegated to a more difficult and uncertain
family life. The marriage laws at issue thus harm and
humiliate the children of same-sex couples. Finally, the
Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make clear that FACTS: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim
marriage is a keystone of the Nation’s social order. States (Mayor Lim) signed into law Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An
have contributed to the fundamental character of marriage by Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time
placing it at the center of many facets of the legal and social Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels,
order. There is no difference between same and opposite- Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
sex couples with respect to this principle, yet same-sex Establishments in the City of Manila"
couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the
States have linked to marriage. It is demeaning to lock same-

Page 27 of 190
Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with the RTC praying that the
Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among
its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.
MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria
Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time
basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays
of only three hours.
Petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium
Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development
Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit
attached complaint-in-intervention7 on the ground that the
Ordinance directly affects their business interests as
operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. The three
companies are components of the Anito Group of
Companies which owns and operates several hotels and
motels in Metro Manila.
RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and
void.
Version of the Respondents
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the
Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to
Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which
confers on cities, among other local government units, the
power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments, including
tourist guides and transports.
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the
power of the City under Article III, Section 18(kk) of the
Revised Manila Charter, thus:
"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and
proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance
of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality,
peace, good order, comfort, convenience and
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and
such others as be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of
ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred
pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both
such fine and imprisonment for a single offense.
Version of the Petitioner
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and
void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of
movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is
an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their
business.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and
affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.
TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for
review on certiorari. In their petition and Memorandum,
petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made
Page 28 of 190
before the Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed
Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.
ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 7774 be declared void and
unconstitutional. YES
HELD: Ordinance N. 7774 is void and unconstitutional.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has
been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide
enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the
conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept
of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as
justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.
These range from the regulation of dance halls, movie
theaters, gas stations and cockpits. The awesome scope of
police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its
hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal system,
its use has rarely been denied.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not
eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves,
are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the
police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends
do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement.
Those means must align with the Constitution, and our
emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the
people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the
seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the
political majorities animated by his cynicism.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate
depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative
business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It
must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive of private rights.71 It must also be
evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of
the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More
importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of
police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or
property is affected. However, this is not in any way meant to
take it away from the vastness of State police power whose
exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact
already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by
applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as
curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers
through active police work would be more effective in easing
the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws
and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These
measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of
the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is
apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by
merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to
those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele
by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel
rooms and even apartments.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED.
Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
14. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
Cebu City Branch vs. MILAGROS O.
MONTESCLAROS, (G.R. No. 146494; July 14, 2004)
FACTS: Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros
married Milagros Orbiso on 10 July 1983. Nicolas was a 72-
year old widower when he married Milagros who was then 43
years old.
Nicolas filed with the GSIS an application for retirement
benefits under Presidential Decree No. 1146 or the Revised
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 ("PD 1146"). In
his retirement application, Nicolas designated his wife
Page 29 of 190
Milagros as his sole beneficiary. GSIS approved Nicolas'
application for retirement "effective 17 February 1984,"
granting a lump sum payment of annuity for the first five
years and a monthly annuity thereafter. Nicolas died on 22
April 1992. Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship
pension under PD 1146. On 8 June 1992, GSIS denied the
claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving
spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving
spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within
three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.
According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983,
less than one year from his date of retirement on "17
February 1984."
On 2 October 1992, Milagros filed with the trial court a
special civil action for declaratory relief questioning the
validity of Section 18 of PD 1146 disqualifying her from
receiving survivorship pension.
Trial court: rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for
survivorship pension.
CA: affirmed
ISSUE: WON Section 18 of PD 1146 violates due process.
YES
HELD: SEC. 18. Death of a Pensioner. Upon the death of a
pensioner, the primary beneficiaries shall receive the
applicable pension mentioned under paragraph (b) of section
seventeen of this Act: Provided, That, the dependent spouse
shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the
pensioner is contracted within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension. When the pensioner dies
within the period covered by the lump sum, the survivorship
pension shall be paid only after the expiration of the said
period. This shall also apply to the pensioners living as of the
effectivity of this Act, but the survivorship benefit shall be
based on the monthly pension being received at the time of
death. (Emphasis supplied)
Under PD 1146, the primary beneficiaries are (1) the
dependent spouse until such spouse remarries, and (2) the
dependent children.
Retirement Benefits as Property Interest
Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility
requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is
protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a
protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to
immediate payment under pre-existing law. Thus, a
pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have
become due as provided under the terms of the public
employees' pension statute. No law can deprive such person
of his pension rights without due process of law, that is,
without notice and opportunity to be heard.
In addition to retirement and disability benefits, PD 1146 also
provides for benefits to survivors of deceased government
employees and pensioners. Under PD 1146, the dependent
spouse is one of the beneficiaries of survivorship benefits. A
widow's right to receive pension following the demise of her
husband is also part of the husband's contractual
compensation.
 extending the compulsory coverage of these
programs to all government employees regardless
Denial of Due Process of employment status.
The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, which provides that "[n]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of PD 1146 has the following purposes:
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws." The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly a. to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of
denying a dependent spouse's claim for survivorship pension the funds administered by the System;
if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the
b. to guarantee to the government employee all the
pensioner within the three-year prohibited period. There is
benefits due him; and
outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse
without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be c. to expand, increase, and improve the social
heard. The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, security and insurance benefits made available to
which is to assure comprehensive and integrated social him and his dependents such as:
security and insurance benefits to government employees
and their dependents in the event of sickness, disability, - increasing pension benefits
death, and retirement of the government employees.
- expanding disability benefits
The "whereas" clauses of PD 1146 state:
- introducing survivorship benefits
WHEREAS, the Government Service Insurance
- introducing sickness income benefits
System in promoting the efficiency and welfare of
the employees of the Government of the - extending compulsory membership to all
Philippines, administers the laws that grant to its government employees irrespective of status25
members social security and insurance benefits;

WHEREAS, it is necessary to preserve at all times

the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by
the System; to guarantee to the government
employee all the benefits due him; and to expand
and increase the benefits made available to him
and his dependents to the extent permitted by
available resources;
The law extends survivorship benefits to the surviving and
qualified beneficiaries of the deceased member or pensioner
to cushion the beneficiaries against the adverse economic
effects resulting from the death of the wage earner or
pensioner.

WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws have

impeded the efficient and effective discharge by the
System of its functions and have unduly hampered
the System from being more responsive to the
dramatic changes of the times and from meeting the
increasing needs and expectations of the Filipino
public servant;

WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws that have

prejudiced, rather than benefited, the government
employee; restricted, rather than broadened, his
benefits, prolonged, rather than facilitated the
payment of benefits, must now yield to his
paramount welfare;

WHEREAS, the social security and insurance

benefits of government employees must be
continuously re-examined and improved to assure
comprehensive and integrated social security and
insurance programs that will provide benefits
responsive to their needs and those of their
dependents in the event of sickness, disability,
death, retirement, and other contingencies; and to 15. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LIBERTY D.
serve as a fitting reward for dedicated public ALBIOS (G.R. No. 198780; October 16, 2013)
service;

WHEREAS, in the light of existing economic

conditions affecting the welfare of government
employees, there is a need to expand and improve
the social security and insurance programs
administered by the Government Service Insurance
System, specifically, among others, by increasing
pension benefits, expanding disability benefits,
introducing survivorship benefits, introducing
sickness and income benefits, and eventually
FACTS: Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were
married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Mandaluyong City
(MeTC).
Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after
their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband
and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of their

Page 30 of 190
essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as
one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .

The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC was
of the view that the parties married each other for
convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of
Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a
marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that
in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States
and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn,
she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never
processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled
that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other
than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such
was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.

CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential

requisite of consent was lacking.

ISSUE: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of

acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00,
void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent? NO

HELD: Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be

valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent
requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately
enter into the marriage.

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between

Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it
was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of
consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as
they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing
impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such
plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter
into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a
full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the

Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and
family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might
have no real intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the
nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage 16. SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT
may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the NETWORK, INC., on behalf of the South-South
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a Network (SSN) for Non-State Armed Group
marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than Engagement, and ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR.
what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition vs. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE
of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE
not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE
shall be declared valid. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE CHIEF OF
STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE

Page 31 of 190
 PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE (G.R. No. 178552
October 5, 2010)
FACTS: Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed
challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise
known as the Human Security Act. Impleaded as
respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism
Councilcomposed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions,
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice
Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign
Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary
and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior
and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and
Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the
petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP)
Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
ISSUE: WON RA 9372 is unconstitutional. NO
HELD: Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and
impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism
under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and
"coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand"
are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no
standard to measure the prohibited acts.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The
overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the
overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will
understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly
refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is
protected.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers
only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is
an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the
parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or activities.
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his
concurring opinion that the vagueness and over-breadth
doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully
mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either
vagueness or over-breadth grounds. Since a penal statute
Page 32 of 190
may only be assailed for being vague as applied to
petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of
"terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an
actual or imminent charge against them.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the
law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of
"unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism must
necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression
protected by the free speech clause.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372,
there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to
trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the
other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the
government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the
presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition
cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected
speech.
Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely
inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an
element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime
entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like
in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in
haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in
negotiating a deceitful transaction.
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an
actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA
9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed
definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The
Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither
contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future
effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be
used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in
Congress.
NOTE: A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free
speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation
are rightly excepted.
In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan it was held that:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.
The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected
speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal
statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their
very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting
laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.
C. EQUAL PROTECTION
1. LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE
TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010. CONSOLIDATED
WITH G.R. No. 193036
FACTS: For consideration before the Court are two
consolidated cases both of which essentially assail the
validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated
July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010."
In, G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1
for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the
constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public
office and to appropriate funds therefor.
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C.
Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and
Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives.
The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc
body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their
co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding
and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an
"independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within
the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control.
Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is
one.
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of
an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of
the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-
judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle,
or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All
it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-
finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable
cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our
courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal,
civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.
ISSUES: WON EO No. 1 unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the
legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail
Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily
invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body
to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies
their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an
institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of
their power and rights as members of the legislature before
the Court.
As held in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez:
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired,
so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial
Page 33 of 190
injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress.
In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort
to the courts.
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution
in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to
question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the
creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to
reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised
Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates
"reorganization" as limited by the following functional and
structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of
the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any
function under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any
agency under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa.
Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions. These point to
situations where a body or an office is already existent but a
modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The
creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the
question is in the negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the
Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced
supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the
term "restructure" an "alteration of an existing structure."
Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office
of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order
No. 1.
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by
the Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the
power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the
latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from
the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in
the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid
delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully
execute the laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from
Congress, empowering the President to create a public
office? According to the OSG, the power to create a truth
commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory
basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as
a justification for the President to create a public office. Said
decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D.
No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
national government including the power to create offices
and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes
of the decree, embodied in its last "Whereas" clause:
WHEREAS, the transition towards the
parliamentary form of government will necessitate
flexibility in the organization of the national
government.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing
manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No.
1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio
upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly
provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to
primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to
recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no
quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it
cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it.
Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not
supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their
respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the two offices. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General, the recommendation to
prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the
commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation. The
actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less
adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, is
certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase,
"when in the course of its investigation," under Section 2(g),
highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary
interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate
complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and
the Ombudsman.
At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under
R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other
similarly authorized government agencies. The same holds
true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3
(2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative
Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared
with a body likewise tasked to investigate the commission of
crimes.
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within
the investigative power of the President, the Court finds
difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state
actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover
all the departments of the government including the political
and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a
state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever
agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.
The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
It applies equally to all members of the same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification."
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1
should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth
"concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
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the previous administration only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the
questioned executive order.
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo
administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class
of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to
include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial
Power that "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government."
Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the
power of judicial review which is the power to declare a
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty
to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or operation
of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions,
ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions,
however, have been fertile grounds of conflict between the
Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of
government, on the other. Many times the Court has been
accused of asserting superiority over the other departments.
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is
not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather
simply making sure that any act of government isdone in
consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by
the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no
constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more
authority of proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise,
the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void
and unconstitutional.
2. JESUS C. GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN
T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-
 Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-
GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor
children, : JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE
ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA
This is an appeal assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262
(An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes) as
being violative of the equal protection and due process
clauses of the Constitution
FACTS: Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed for herself and in behalf
of her minor children, a verified petition before the Regional
Trial Court of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C.
Garcia pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of
physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic
violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner. Private respondent described herself as a dutiful
and faithful wife. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of
Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and
demands absolute obedience from his wife and children.
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair
with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City.
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left
private respondent physically and emotionally wounded.
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent
danger of violence against respondent and her children
exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO on March
24, 2006 for thirty (30) days. The TPO has been continuously
extended and renewed by the RTC after appearing that the
hearing could not yet be finally terminated. During the
pendency of Civil Case, petitioner filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA) a petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due
process and the equal protection clauses, and the validity of
the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being an
unwanted product of an invalid law. On January 24, 2007,
the CA dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to raise
the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court
in the civil case, thus, appealing to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner contends that on the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, he is
stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job,
future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds,
without an inkling of what happened
ISSUE: WON R.A. 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and
violative of the equal protection clause. NO
HELD: The Supreme Court find that R.A. 9262 is based on a
valid classification, as such, did not violate the equal
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of
violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.
R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions - The unequal
power relationship between women and men; the fact that
women are more likely than men to be victims of violence;
and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against
Page 35 of 190
women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law.
Women are the usual and most likely victims of violence - At
the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official
statistics on violence against women and children shows that
female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of
abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported
cases were committed by the women's intimate partners
such as their husbands and live-in partners. On the other
hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic
abuse and violence against men in the Philippines because
incidents thereof are relatively low.
Gender Bias and Prejudices - From the initial report to the
police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes
against women are often treated differently and less
seriously than other crimes.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore,
be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just
like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without
notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will
take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or
dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC
may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the
hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice
and hearing were required before such acts could be
prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield
to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among
which is protection of women and children from violence and
threats to their personal safety and security.
The Court also pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex
parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be
immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an
opposition within five (5) days from service. The opposition to
the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must
be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall
show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order
should not be issued. It is clear from the foregoing rules that
the respondent of a petition for protection order should be
apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an
opportunity to present his side.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
 3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs MARELYN
TANEDO MANALO (G.R. No. 221029)
FACTS: Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for
cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San
Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce
rendered by a Japanese court. petitioner is previously
married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named
YOSHINO MINORO; That at present, by virtue of the said
divorce decree, petitioner and her divorced Japanese
husband are no longer living together; that this petition is
filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of
entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the said
Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. It opined
that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the
Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a
divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if
they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another
country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens
of another country.
CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable
even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes
the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to
remarry.
ISSUE: WON Article 26(2) of the Family Code violates the
equal protection clause. YES
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict
scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those basic
liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.
It includes the right to free speech, political expression,
press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to
vote. On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state
interest is measured by the scale rights and powers arrayed
in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual
liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public
interest, public safety or the general welfare. It essentially
involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy,
overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take
precedence over the latter.
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress,
the same principle applies with respect to the acts of the
President which have the force and effect of law unless
declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential
requisites of the equal protection clause. Particularly, the
limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree
initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based
on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly
situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen.
There are real, material and substantial differences between
them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are
political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as
well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too
unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien
spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a
divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another
Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an
alien against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in
accordance with the national law of the foreigner.

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference

HELD: Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is
between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the City
proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon
Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer
the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the
e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that
Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos
the State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover,
who have the same rights and obligations in an alien land.
blind adherence to the nationality principle must be
The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not
disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and
for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their
oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are
foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands.
equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce
Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on
the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they
the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce
are constitutional.
proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against
a valid classification and that its decision is accorded the other.
recognition and respect by the court of justice, such
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is
classification may be subjected to judicial review.44 The
arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a foreign
deference stops where the classification violates a
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be
protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations
recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35,
arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the
36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code. In filing for divorce based
vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter
on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of
and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.46
invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he
If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the
or she should be governed with whatever law he or she
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be
disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is
"reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the
required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the
severance of her martial ties before the RTC in accordance
burden is upon the government to prove that the
with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state
anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench and
interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect
the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in
such interest.
detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically

Page 36 of 190
apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly
situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no
assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same.
4. ANTONIO M. SERRANO, Petitioner, vs. Gallant
Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and
MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW
protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
NAVIGATION CO., INC., Respondents. (G.R. No.
167614; March 24, 2009 )

FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by

respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of
employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer, with the basic
monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay,
and 7 days paid vacation leave per month. On the date of his
departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract upon the assurance and representation
of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of
April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make

Serrano Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as
second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines,
serving only two months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired
portion of nine months and twenty-three days. Upon
complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the
dismissal was declared illegal. On appeal, the NLRC
modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA 8042.
Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this
time he questioned the constitutionality of the last clause in
the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.

ISSUE: WON the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section

10 of RA 8042 is constitutional. NO

HELD: The subject clause "or for three months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042

introduced a differentiated rule of computation of the money
claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their
employment periods, in the process singling out one
category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one
year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar
disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their
salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion thereof,
whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category
from such prejudice, simply because the latter's unexpired
contracts fall short of one year.

The subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination

among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one
year: those who are illegally dismissed with less than one
year left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for
the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are
illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining in their
contracts shall be covered by the subject clause, and their
monetary benefits limited to their salaries for three months
only.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10

of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and
other OFWs to equal protection.

Page 37 of 190
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive
governmental purpose; and it is for that precise reason that
the clause violates not just petitioner's right to equal
protection, but also her right to substantive due process
under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is

entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine 5. SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC.,
months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to vs. JOY C. CABILES (G.R. No. 170139 August 5,
law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 2014)
8042.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject

clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired FACTS: Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency,
term, whichever is less" in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.
Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004 Decision
from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was
and April 1, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
terminated and that “she should immediately report to their
MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is AWARDED his
office to get her salary and passport.” She was asked to
salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment
“prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy claims that she was
contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at
told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a
the rate of US$1,400.00 per month.
total of NT$9,000. According to her, Wacoal deducted
NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.

Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year

employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00.
Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd.
(Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her
employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control
for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.

On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal

dismissal with the NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal. LA
dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA
affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations
Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and
awarding her three months’ worth of salary, the
reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s
fees

ISSUE: WON Republic Act. No. 10022 which was declared

unconstitutional is a law. NO

HELD: A statute or provision which was declared

unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights; it imposes
no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.”

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No

branch or office of the government may exercise its powers
in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless
of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The
Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws
must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is
inconsistent with it is a nullity.

Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is

inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured
by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar
law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already
declared unconstitutional remains as such unless
circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse
conclusion.

The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as

provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96

Page 38 of 190
Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed to show
any compelling change in the circumstances that would
warrant us to revisit the precedent.

The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared 6. United States vs Windsor 570 U.S. 744, 26 June 2013
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

Facts: The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), enacted in

1996, states that, for the purposes of federal law, the words
"marriage" and "spouse" refer to legal unions between one
man and one woman. Since that time, some states have
authorized same-sex marriage. In other cases regarding the
DOMA, federal courts have ruled it unconstitutional under the
Fifth Amendment, but the courts have disagreed on the
rationale.

In 2007, Edith Windsor and Thea Clara Spyer, both residents

of New York, married in Toronto, Ontario, under the
provisions set forth in the Canadian Civil Marriage Act, after
40 years of romantic partnership. Canada's first openly gay
judge, Justice Harvey Brownstone, officiated. The State of
New York recognizes the marriage.

After Spyer's death in 2009, Edith Windsor as the widow and

sole executor of the estate of her late spouse was required to
pay $363,053 in federal estate taxes on her inheritance of
her wife's estate. Had federal law recognized the validity of
their marriage, Windsor would have qualified for an unlimited
spousal deduction and paid no federal estate taxes.

In May 2008, New York Governor David Paterson had

ordered state agencies to recognize same-sex marriages
performed in other jurisdictions. Some lower-level state
courts had made similar rulings, but whether the state's
highest court would give such a ruling the force of law, as
Windsor's claim for a refund required, remained uncertain
and was disputed throughout her lawsuit.

District Court
On November 9, 2010 Windsor filed suit in district court
seeking a declaration that the Defense of Marriage Act was
unconstitutional. At the time the suit was filed, the
government's position was that DOMA must be defended.
On February 23, 2011, the President and the Attorney
General announced that they would not defend DOMA. On
April 18, 2011, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG)
of the House of Representatives filed a petition to intervene
in defense of DOMA and motioned to dismiss the case. The
district court denied the motion, and later held that DOMA
was unconstitutional.

New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman filed a brief

supporting Windsor's claim on July 26, 2011, arguing that
DOMA Section 3 could not survive the scrutiny used for
classifications based on sex and constitutes "an intrusion on
the power of the state to define marriage". On June 6, 2012,
Judge Barbara S. Jones ruled that a rational basis review of
Section 3 of DOMA showed it to be unconstitutional, as it
violated plaintiff's rights under the equal protection
guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, and ordered that
Windsor receive the tax refund due to her. Where BLAG had
argued that the Spyer-Windsor marriage was not recognized
by New York law at the time of Spyer's death – a prerequisite
for Windsor's claim against the IRS – Jones cited the
"informal opinion letters" of the state's governor, attorney
general, and comptroller to the contrary along with several
opinions in New York appellate courts.

Court of Appeals

Page 39 of 190
On October 18, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed all persons
the lower court's ruling that Section 3 of DOMA is with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own
unconstitutional. The majority opinion stated, "It is easy to children, that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages
conclude that homosexuals have suffered a history of of others. The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate
discrimination." Thus they were part of a quasi-suspect class purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and
that deserves any law restricting its rights to be subjected to to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought
intermediate scrutiny. Because DOMA could not pass that to protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace
test, Judge Jacobs wrote, it is unconstitutional under the this protection and treating those persons as living in
equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. marriages less respected than others, the federal statute is in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.
On September 11, 2012, following Windsor's petition for
certiorari before judgment and before the Second Circuit's
ruling, the Department of Justice filed its own petition for
certiorari before judgment with the Supreme Court. After the
appellate ruling on October 18, the parties filed supplemental
briefs. On December 7, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in the case, now United States v. Windsor, accepting the
DOJ's petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Defense of Marriage Act, which

defines the term "marriage" under federal law as a "legal
union between one man and one woman" deprive same-sex
couples who are legally married under state laws of their
Fifth Amendment rights to equal protection under federal
law?

Held Yes. In a 5–4 decision issued on June 26, 2013, the

Supreme Court found Section 3 of DOMA to be
unconstitutional, "as a deprivation of the liberty of the person
protected by the Fifth Amendment". The Court held that
states have the authority to define marital relationships and
that DOMA goes against legislative and historical precedent
by undermining that authority. The result is that DOMA
denies same-sex couples the rights that come from federal
recognition of marriage, which are available to other couples
with legal marriages under state law. The Court held that the
purpose and effect of DOMA is to impose a "disadvantage, a
separate status, and so a stigma" on same-sex couples in
violation of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal
protection.

The Court held that the Constitution prevented the federal

government from treating state-sanctioned heterosexual
marriages differently from state-sanctioned same-sex
marriages, and that such differentiation "demean[ed] the
couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution
protects".

Justice Anthony Kennedy authored the majority opinion

which held that to strike down a central part of DOMA cited
the principles of state autonomy, equal protection and liberty,
but the constitutional basis for striking down the law was not
entirely clear, as it had elements of federalism, equal
protection and due process.

The answer may be found in Windsor's brief, in which she

argues that DOMA operates to say "that married gay couples
aren't genuinely married at all but are instead 'similarly
situated' to unmarried people"

The Court wrote:

DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to

protect. By doing so it violates basic due process and equal
protection principles applicable to the Federal Government.

When New York adopted a law to permit same-sex marriage,

it sought to eliminate inequality; but DOMA frustrates that
objective through a system-wide enactment with no identified
connection to any particular area of federal law. DOMA
writes inequality into the entire United States Code.

Page 40 of 190

D. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
1. UNITED STATES vs Jeffrey GRUBBS 547 U.S. 90
(2006)
FACTS: On April 17, 2002, United States Postal Inspector
Gary Welsh (“Welsh”) presented an “Application and Affidavit
for Anticipatory Search Warrant” to a federal magistrate
judge. The application sought authority to conduct a search
of Grubbs' residence on the basis of an order Grubbs
allegedly placed for a videotape entitled “Lolita Mother and
Daughter.” Grubbs allegedly ordered the videotape from a
website that advertised for sale numerous videos depicting
illegal child pornography. Welsh averred that Grubbs sent
him a letter which contained $45 in cash and a note stating:
 “I hope this makes it to you please send film asap thanks
Jeff Grubbs.” On the basis of this evidence, the magistrate
judge issued an anticipatory search warrant.
The face of the warrant stated:
Affidavit(s) having been made before me by _ who
has reason to believe that on the premises known
as residence of Jeffrey Grubbs, [Address] as more
particularly described in Attachment A to the
attached Affidavit, in the Eastern District of
California there is now concealed a certain person
or property, namely the records and materials
described in Attachment B to the attached Affidavit.
  I am satisfied that the affidavit(s) and any
recorded testimony establish probable cause to
believe that the person or property so described is
now concealed on the person or premises above-
described and establish grounds for the issuance of
this warrant.
As revealed by the “now concealed” language, the in artfully
drafted warrant approved by the magistrate was written on a
form “forthwith” search warrant.  The only indication that the
warrant was an anticipatory search warrant was the word
“ANTICIPATORY,” handwritten at the top of the page above
the words “SEARCH WARRANT.”   The warrant itself did not
state what triggering conditions needed to occur in order to
make the warrant valid; nor did it state the criminal activity of
which Grubbs was suspected.
The warrant relied on a 25-page affidavit to satisfy the
specificity and particularity requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.  According to the affidavit, the warrant would
become operative once the videotape Grubbs ordered was
“received by a person(s)” and “taken into the residence.”   engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Grubbs filed a motion
Pages five and nineteen of the affidavit set forth these
“triggering events,” or conditions precedent, upon which a
search would become authorized. The affidavit also had two
attachments:  Attachment A described the premises to be
searched; Attachment B listed the items to be seized,
including the videotape and packing material, Grubbs' Web
TV components, and various other items.
The search took place two days later. At approximately 7:20
A.M., an undercover postal inspector delivered the videotape
to Grubbs' residence. Grubbs' wife accepted the delivery of
the package, signed for it, and took it into the house. A few
minutes later, Postal Inspector Thomas Brucklacher saw
Grubbs leaving. At approximately 7:24 A.M., Brucklacher and
Page 41 of 190
Inspector Esteban approached Grubbs and, after identifying
themselves, told him to remain where he was standing.
Grubbs asked Brucklacher why he and the other inspectors
were there. Brucklacher did not answer, but instead referred
him to Inspector Welsh, who was then approaching the
residence. Meanwhile, Inspector Esteban performed a
patdown search of Grubbs.
Shortly after Grubbs was detained outside of the house,
Inspector Welsh arrived at the premises with a number of
other law enforcement personnel. In all, there were ultimately
ten officers and inspectors at the scene. Welsh allegedly
9971 announced “Police/Search Warrant” at the front door.
Grubbs' wife, Ms. Bradstreet, disputed hearing that
announcement, but did testify that she heard a knock and
answered the door. Welsh briefly entered the house to help
several other officers perform a “protective sweep.” During
that “protective sweep,” the officers searched the house for
other people and stopped to prepare sketches of the interior.
They permitted Grubbs' children to leave for school after
searching their backpacks. After assisting the officers inside,
Welsh went back outside to speak with Grubbs, who was on
the sidewalk with other officers. Welsh identified himself, and
stated either “You know why we're here” or “Do you know
why we're here?”  Grubbs replied “yeah,” and said that what
the officers were looking for was in the garage. Welsh told
Grubbs that he was not under arrest, but that they were there
to serve a search warrant, and that they should go inside the
house to talk.
Grubbs and Welsh, accompanied by Officer Esteban,
entered the house together and sat down at the dining room
table. It was not until 7:53 A.M., approximately 30 minutes
after the search began, that Welsh presented Grubbs with
the search warrant. The copy of the search warrant provided
to Grubbs included the two attachments, which described the
place to be searched and the items to be seized, but did not
include the affidavit that contained the “triggering events” or
conditions precedent that would serve to make the warrant
operative. Welsh contended that he had a copy of the
affidavit with him at all times during the search, and that his
team had all read the affidavit on the previous evening.
However, the government concedes that the affidavit was not
presented to Mr. Grubbs or Ms. Bradstreet, and that no copy
of the affidavit was left at the residence following the search.
After the warrant was presented, Welsh reminded Grubbs
that he was not under arrest, advised him of his Miranda
rights, and asked if he understood those rights. Grubbs said
that he did and agreed to speak to Welsh. The interview
lasted approximately 55 minutes. In it, Grubbs admitted that
he had ordered the pornography. He further admitted that he
possessed child pornography in various digital forms in his
home. At the conclusion of the interview, Grubbs was
arrested and handcuffed. The officers seized the videotape
in question along with several other items, including Grubbs'
computer and several computer diskettes.6
Within a few days, a grand jury returned an indictment
charging Grubbs with receiving a visual depiction of a minor
to suppress evidence, in which he challenged the
admissibility of all of the seized evidence and his statements
to Welsh. Grubbs made three principal claims:  (1) that the
agents' failure to present the affidavit to Grubbs or his wife
rendered the warrant inoperative; (2) that the agents violated
by failing to present the search warrant at the outset of the
search; and (3) that his statement that the video was in the
garage should be excluded as the product of an
impermissible custodial interrogation. The first and third
claims alleged constitutional violations.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the
motion to suppress in a written order. With respect to
Grubbs' first claim, the Fourth Amendment claim, the district
court held that the anticipatory warrant could constitutionally
be executed even though it failed to designate the triggering
event for the implementation of the anticipatory search. It did
so on the basis that the warrant incorporated the affidavit by
reference, and that the affidavit was in the immediate
presence of the officers while they searched Grubbs'
residence. The court did not consider the officers' failure to
present the affidavit to the residents of the home to be
searched as constituting a constitutional defect. The district
judge admitted that “it is logical that officers would be
required to actually present the affidavit setting forth the
triggering event to the people whose property they are
searching in order to provide those people with information
regarding the parameters of the search.” However, after
concluding that no case from our circuit had ruled on the
precise question, the court declined to apply that logic “in the
absence of specific guidance from the Ninth Circuit.”  Thus, it
upheld the search, even though none of the persons whose
residence was searched were shown the affidavit that
identified the triggering event.
After filing a motion for reconsideration, which the district
court denied, Grubbs entered a conditional guilty plea to the
sole charge of the indictment-receiving a visual depiction of a
minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. He reserved his
right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The
district court sentenced him to thirty-three months
imprisonment, a three-year term of supervised release, a fine
of $3,700, and a $100 special assessment. Grubbs timely
appealed.
Jeffrey Grubbs appeals following his conditional guilty plea
on a charge of receiving a visual depiction of a minor
engaged in sexually explicit conduct. He contends that the
district court should have granted his motion to suppress
evidence, including his statements, because the anticipatory
search warrant that authorized the search of his premises
was invalid under the Fourth Amendment. To resolve
Grubbs' claim, we must determine whether a facially
defective anticipatory search warrant may be cured by
information contained within an affidavit when that affidavit is
not presented to the person or persons whose property is to
be searched. We answer that question in the negative, and
hold that the search of Grubbs' premises violated the Fourth
Amendment.
ISSUE: Whether or not “anticipatory" search warrants under
the Fourth Amendment is constitutional
HELD: The Fourth Amendment states that “no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The
requirement that warrants “particularly describe the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” is most
often described as the “particularity requirement.” As the
Supreme Court has recently explained, that requirement
“applies with equal force to searches whose only defect is a
lack of particularity in the warrant.”
The Groh Court considered a warrant that “failed to identify
any of the items” to be seized. Despite the fact that the
officers conducting the search had presented to the
reviewing magistrate a detailed affidavit setting forth
sufficient probable cause for the search, the warrant itself did
not explicitly “incorporate by reference the itemized list [of
things to be seized] contained in the application.” The
officers in Groh left the residents of the searched home a
copy of the search warrant, “but not a copy of the application,
which had been sealed.”
Page 42 of 190
The Court found that the officers' conduct directly conflicted
with the purpose of the Fourth Amendment's particularity
requirement: The Fourth Amendment by its terms requires
particularity in the warrant, not in the supporting documents.
And for good reason:  “The presence of a search warrant
serves a high function,” and that high function is not
necessarily vindicated when some other document,
somewhere, says something about the objects of the search,
but the contents of that document are neither known to the
person whose home is being searched nor available for her
inspection․
We have long held, moreover, that the purpose of the
particularity requirement is not limited to the prevention of
general searches. A particular warrant also “assures the
individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful
authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the
limits of his power to search.”
Our cases have long been in accord with the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Groh. We have held that a search
warrant is invalid when it does not contain a specific
description of the types of items to be seized. And, while we
have permitted facially defective warrants to be “cured” by an
affidavit that (a) is incorporated within the four corners of the
warrant and (b) “accompanies” the warrant, we have
unequivocally held that the defect is not cured if the officers
fail to present the affidavit-that is, an affidavit that is not
shown to the persons being subjected to the search does not
have a curative effect on a facially defective warrant.
As we explained in McGrew, we require affidavits to
accompany warrants not only in order to limit officers'
discretion in conducting the search, but also in order to
“inform the person subject to the search what items the
officers executing the warrant can seize.” If the officers
conducting the search were not required to present the
affidavit to the residents of the house being searched, law
enforcement personnel would be free to search as they like,
and homeowners and others would have no effective way to
ensure that the search of their premises conformed to the
lawful constraints approved by an impartial magistrate.
Our cases have similarly held, without exception, that the
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies
with full force to the conditions precedent to an anticipatory
search warrant. An anticipatory search warrant is not valid
until the occurrence of one or more “triggering events”-in
other words, the predicted future events that the magistrate
determines will create sufficient probable cause to justify the
search. And, “when a warrant's execution is dependent on
the occurrence of one or more conditions, the warrant itself
must state the conditions precedent to its execution and
these conditions must be clear, explicit, and narrow.”
The rationale for this rule is simple:  “a warrant conditioned
on a future event presents a potential for abuse above and
beyond that which exists in more traditional settings:  
inevitably, the executing agents are called upon to determine
when and where the triggering event specified in the warrant
has actually occurred.”
We have, however, permitted the triggering conditions of an
anticipatory search warrant to appear either on the face of
the warrant itself, or in the “attachments to the warrant] that
those executing the search maintain in their immediate
possession in order to guide their actions and to provide
information to the person whose property is being searched.”
Still, while an affidavit may qualify as a valid curing
“attachment” to an otherwise defective warrant, it counts as
such only when the affidavit actually “accompanies” the
warrant.
The first requirement, that the application but not the warrant
itself identify the triggering event, does little if anything to
limit the discretion of the agents executing the warrant or to
inform the subject of the search whether it was authorized, if
the affidavit does not accompany the warrant. Indeed, that
the applicant and the magistrate may understand the
parameters of the search has no bearing on whether the
officers executing the warrant do, or whether the person to
be searched is properly advised of their authority.
The question in this case is whether a curative affidavit that
contains the conditions precedent to an anticipatory search
actually “accompanies” the warrant when the affidavit is not
shown to the person or persons being subjected to the
search. Given our prior holdings, and the Court's most recent
decision in Groh, the district court was correct when it opined
that “it is logical that officers would be required to actually
present the affidavit setting forth the triggering event to the
people whose property they are searching in order to provide
those people with information regarding the parameters of
the search.” Likewise, the district court was right to conclude
that the “underlying reasoning” of Hotal supports the rule that
“the affidavit setting forth the triggering event for an
anticipatory warrant must be presented to the people whose
property is being searched.” The district court, however, was
unwilling to impose such a requirement in this case without
further explicit guidance from us.
officers in this case did not execute a constitutionally valid
warrant, and that they, in effect, conducted a warrantless
search. As a result, all evidence obtained during that search,
and following Welsh's announcement of “Police/Search
Warrant,” must be suppressed. “All evidence” includes all of
the evidence seized after the initial entry, as well as all of
Grubbs' statements, all of which were taken either during the
illegal entry or as a direct causal result of it.
Thus, the failure to present the affidavit designating the
triggering events or conditions precedent to the operability of
the search warrant rendered the warrant constitutionally
invalid and the search illegal. Because Grubbs entered a
conditional guilty plea, we are required to remand and allow
him to withdraw his plea if he elects to do so. We therefore
reverse the denial of Grubbs' suppression motion and
remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We believe that our prior cases unambiguously require

officers to present any curative document-be it an affidavit,
attachment, or other instrument that supplies the particularity
and specificity demanded by the Fourth Amendment-to the
persons whose property is to be subjected to the search. To
the extent that there is any question that our cases have
adopted that rule, we do so explicitly now. Anticipatory
search warrants are invalid absent “clear, explicit, and
narrow” triggering conditions. Those triggering conditions
may be listed either in the warrant itself or in attached
documents, but whatever document contains them must be
presented to the person whose property is being searched.
Absent such presentation, individuals would “stand [no] real
chance of policing the officers' conduct,” because they would
have no opportunity to check whether the triggering events
by which the impartial magistrate has limited the officers'
discretion have actually occurred. In short, unless the officers
“present” the document containing the triggering events
necessary to render an anticipatory search warrant
operative, the search warrant is constitutionally invalid. In the
absence of a proper presentation, “the search is rendered
illegal because the warrant neither limits [the officers']
discretion nor gives the homeowner the required
information.”

In this case, there is no dispute that the officers failed to

present the affidavit-the only document in which the
triggering conditions were listed-to Grubbs or Bradstreet. At
no point before, during, or after the search did the officers
show or read the affidavit to either of them. The copy of the
warrant left with Ms. Bradstreet at the conclusion of the
search did not include the affidavit, nor did it otherwise
include a list of the triggering conditions. The warrant was
therefore inoperative, and the search was illegal.

Absent a constitutionally valid warrant, the officers lacked the

legal authority to enter the defendant's home. The fact that
the search ultimately may have been conducted in a manner
consistent with the application for the warrant is irrelevant. “If
a warrant fails for lack of particularity or specificity, it is
simply unconstitutional-without regard to what actually
occurred.” Nor is it significant that the officers may have
possessed curative documents during the search, unless
those documents were presented to the owners or occupants
of the property:  “that the applicant and the magistrate may
understand the parameters of the search has no bearing on
whether the person to be searched is properly advised of
[the officers'] authority.” We therefore conclude that the

Page 43 of 190

2. RETIRED SPO4 BIENVENIDO LAUD v. PEOPLE 741
SCRA 239 (2014)
FACTS: Philippine National Police (PNP), through Police
Senior Superintendent Fajardo, applied with the RTC for a
warrant to search three (3) caves located located inside the
Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Maa, Davao City,
where the alleged remains of the victims summarily executed
by the so-called “Davao Death Squad” may be found. In
support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola was
presented to the RTC and there testified that he personally
witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in December 2005,
and was, in fact, part of the group that buried the victims.
Judge Peralta, acting as Vice Executive Judge of the Manila-
RTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant, and thus, issued Search Warrant which was later
enforced by the elements of the PNP-Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group, in coordination with the members of
the Scene of the Crime Operatives on July 15, 2009. The
search of the Laud Compound caves yielded positive results
for the presence of human remains.
Petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud (Laud), filed an
Urgent Motion to Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized
Evidence premised on the following grounds: (a) Judge
Peralta had no authority to act on the application for a search
warrant since he had been automatically divested of his
position as Vice Executive Judge when several
administrative penalties were imposed against him by the
Court; (b) the ManilaRTC had no jurisdiction to issue the
Search Warrant which was to be enforced in Davao City; (e)
the search warrant was issued despite lack of probable
cause; and (g) there was a violation of the rule requiring one-
specific-offense and the proper specification of the place to
be searched and the articles to be seized.
Manila-RTC Ruling
The RTC granted the motion of Laud. Respondents filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was, however, denied. The
People failed to show any compelling reason to justify the
issuance of a search warrant by the Manila-RTC which was
to be implemented in Davao City where the offense was
allegedly committed, in violation of Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court. The fact that the alleged offense happened
almost four (4) years before the search warrant application
was filed rendered doubtful the existence of probable cause;
the applicant, i.e., the PNP, violated the rule against forum
shopping as the subject matter of the present search
warrant.
CA Ruling
CA granted the People's petition and thereby annulled and
set aside the Orders of the Manila-RTC for having been
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
 
ISSUE #1:
Page 44 of 190
WoN the administrative penalties imposed on Judge Peralta
invalidated the Search Warrant.
HELD #1:
No. Citing Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03802SC which
provides that “[t]he imposition upon an Executive Judge or
Vice Executive Judge of an administrative penalty of at least
a reprimand shall automatically operate to divest him of his
position as such”.
While the Court does agree that the imposition of said
administrative penalties did operate to divest Judge Peralta’s
authority to act as Vice Executive Judge, it must be qualified
that the abstraction of such authority would not, by and of
itself, result in the invalidity of Search Warrant considering
that Judge Peralta may be considered to have made the
issuance as a de facto officer whose acts would,
nonetheless, remain valid.
Undoubtedly, there is a de jure office of a 2nd Vice Executive
Judge. Judge Peralta also had a colorable right to the said
office as he was duly appointed to such position and was
only divested of the same by virtue of a supervening legal
technicality — that is, the operation of Section 5, Chapter III
of A.M. No. 03802SC; also, it may be said that there was
general acquiescence by the public since the search warrant
application was regularly endorsed to the sala of Judge
Peralta by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the ManilaRTC
under his apparent authority as 2nd Vice Executive Judge.
Finally, Judge Peralta’s actual physical possession of the
said office is presumed to be in good faith, as the contrary
was not established. Accordingly, Judge Peralta can be
considered to have acted as a de facto officer when he
issued Search Warrant, hence, treated as valid as if it was
issued by a de jure officer suffering no administrative
impediment.
ISSUE #2:
WoN the ManilaRTC had jurisdiction to issue the said
warrant despite non-compliance with the compelling reasons
requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
HELD #2:
Yes. Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03802SC states the
requirements for the issuance of search warrants in special
criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City.
These special criminal cases pertain to those “involving
heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions, as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of
2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other
relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress,
and included herein by the Supreme Court.”
Search warrant applications for such cases may be filed by
“the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine
National Police (PNP) and the AntiCrime Task Force
(ACTAF),” and “personally endorsed by the heads of such
agencies.” As in ordinary search warrant applications, they
“shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched
and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in
the Rules of Court.” “The Executive Judges [of these RTCs]
and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are
not physically present in the station, the Vice Executive
Judges” are authorized to act on such applications and “shall
issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.”
The Court observes that all the above stated requirements
were complied with in this case.
As the records would show, the search warrant application
was filed before the ManilaRTC by the PNP and was
endorsed by its head, PNP Chief Jesus Ame Versosa,
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized in connection with the heinous crime of
Murder. Finding probable cause therefor, Judge Peralta, in
his capacity as 2nd Vice Executive Judge, issued Search
Warrant which, as the rules state, may be served in places
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC.
Notably, the fact that a search warrant application involves a
“special criminal case” excludes it from the compelling
reason requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court.
As explicitly mentioned in Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No.
03802SC, the rule on search warrant applications before the
Manila and Quezon City RTCs for the above mentioned
special criminal cases “shall be an exception to Section 2 of
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.” Perceptibly, the fact that a
search warrant is being applied for in connection with a
special criminal case as above classified already presumes
the existence of a compelling reason; hence, any statement
to this effect would be superfluous and therefore should be
dispensed with. By all indications, Section 12, Chapter V of
A.M. No. 03802SC allows the Manila and Quezon City RTCs
to issue warrants to be served in places outside their
territorial jurisdiction for as long as the parameters under the
said section have been complied with, as in this case. Thus,
on these grounds, the Court finds nothing defective in the
preliminary issuance of Search Warrant.
ISSUE #3: WoN the requirements of probable cause and
particular description were complied with, and the one-
specific- offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court was violated.
HELD #3:
Requirements of Probable Cause –YES
In order to protect the people’s right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Philippine Constitution provides that no search warrant shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized:
Complementarily, Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
states that a search warrant shall not be issued except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense.
In this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of Search Warrant is evident from the firsthand account of
Avasola who, in his deposition, stated that he personally
witnessed the commission of the aforestated crime and was,
in fact, part of the group that buried the victims.
Verily, the facts and circumstances established from the
testimony of Avasola, who was personally examined by
Judge Peralta, sufficiently show that more likely than not the
crime of Murder of six (6) persons had been perpetrated and
that the human remains in connection with the same are in
the place sought to be searched.
In Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., the Court explained the
quantum of evidence necessary to establish probable cause
for a search warrant.
“Probable cause for a search warrant is
defined as such facts and circumstances
Page 45 of 190
which would lead a reasonably discrete
and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched. A
finding of probable cause needs only to
rest on evidence showing that, more likely
than not, a crime has been committed and
that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause demands more than bare
suspicion; it requires less than evidence
which would justify conviction. The
existence depends to a large degree upon
the finding or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination. However, the
findings of the judge should not disregard
the facts before him nor run counter to the
clear dictates of reason.”
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the quantum of
proof to establish the existence of probable cause had been
met. That a “considerable length of time” attended the search
warrant’s application from the crime’s commission does not,
by and of itself, negate the veracity of the applicant’s claims
or the testimony of the witness presented. As the CA
correctly observed, the delay may be accounted for by a
witness’s fear of reprisal and natural reluctance to get
involved in a criminal case. Ultimately, in determining the
existence of probable cause, the facts and circumstances
must be personally examined by the judge in their totality,
together with a judicious recognition of the variable
complications and sensibilities attending a criminal case. To
the Court’s mind, the supposed delay in the search warrant’s
application does not dilute the probable cause finding made
herein. In fine, the probable cause requirement has been
sufficiently met.
Requirements of Particularity of Description –YES
The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance with
the constitutional requirement that there be a particular
description of “the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.”
“[A] description of a place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with
the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place
intended and distinguish it from other
places in the community. Any
designation or description known to the
locality that points out the place to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry
leads the officers unerringly to it,
satisfies the constitutional
requirement.”
Search Warrant evidently complies with the foregoing
standard since it particularly describes the place to be
searched, namely, the 3 caves located inside the Laud
Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Maa, Davao City.
For further guidance in its enforcement, the search warrant
even made explicit reference to the sketch contained in the
application. These, in the Court’s view, are sufficient enough
for the officers to, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place to be searched, which they in fact did.
The things to be seized were also particularly described,
namely, the remains of six (6) victims who were killed and
buried in the aforesaid premises. Laud’s posturing that
human remains are not “personal property” and, hence,
could not be the subject of a search warrant deserves scant
consideration.
“Personal property” in Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court actually refers to the thing’s mobility, and not to its
capacity to be owned or alienated. Considering that human
remains can generally be transported from place to place,
and considering further that they qualify under the phrase
“subject of the offense” given that they prove the crime’s
corpus delicti, it follows that they may be valid subjects of a
search warrant under the above cited criminal procedure
provision.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the
things to be seized when the description therein is as specific
as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by
which the warrant officer may be guided in making the
search and seizure; or when the things described are limited
to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which
the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules
of Court) x x x If the articles desired to be seized have any
direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must
necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to
prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and
seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such
evidence.
Consequently, the Court finds that the particular description
requirement — both as to the place to be searched and the
things to be seized — had been complied with.
One-Specific-Offense Rule –No
The Court finds no violation of the one-specific-offense rule
under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which, to
note, was intended to prevent the issuance of scattershot
warrants, or those which are issued for more than one-
specific-offense.
In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA, the Court, however, settled
that a search warrant that covers several counts of a certain
specific offense does not violate the one-specific-offense
rule. Hence, given that Search Warrant was issued only for
one specific offense — that is, of Murder, albeit for six (6)
counts — it cannot be said that Section 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court had been violated.
Page 46 of 190
3. LOS ANGELES COUNTY. V. RETTELE 550 US 609;
MAY 21, 2007
FACTS: In 2001, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
Deputy Dennis Watters investigated a fraud and identity-theft
crime ring. There were 4 suspects of the investigation. One
had registered a 9-millimeter Glock handgun. The 4 suspects
were known to be African-Americans.
Watters obtained a search warrant for 2 houses in Lancaster,
California, where he believed he could find the suspects. The
warrant authorized him to search the homes and 3 of the
suspects for documents and computer files. In support of the
search warrant an affidavit cited various sources showing the
suspects resided at Retelle’s home.
[What Watters did not know was that one of the houses (the
first to be searched) had been sold in September to a Max
Rettele. He had purchased the home and moved into it 3
months earlier with his girlfriend Judy Sadler and Sadler’s 17
year-old son Chase Hall. All three, respondents here, are
Caucasians.]
Watters briefed the 6 other deputies in preparation for the
search of the houses. Watters informed them they would be
searching for 3 African-American suspects, one of whom
owned a registered handgun. Around 7:15am Watters and
six other deputies knocked on the door and announced their
presence. Chase Hall answered. The deputies entered the
house after ordering Hall to lie face down on the ground.
The deputies’ announcement awoke Rettele and Sadler. The
deputies entered their bedroom with guns drawn and ordered
them to get out of their bed and to show their hands. They
protested that they were not wearing clothes. Rettele stood
up and attempted to put on a pair of sweat pants, but
deputies told him not to move. Sadler also stood up and
attempted, without success, to cover herself with a sheet.
Rettele and Sadler were held at gunpoint for one to two
minutes before Rettele was allowed to retrieve a robe for
Sadler. He was then permitted to dress. Rettele and Sadler
left the bedroom within three to four minutes to sit on the
couch in the living room.
By that time the deputies realized they had made a mistake.
They apologized to Rettele and Sadler, thanked them for not
becoming upset, and left within five minutes. They
proceeded to the other house the warrant authorized them to
search, where they found 3 suspects. Those suspects were
arrested and convicted.
Rettele and Sadler, individually and as guardians ad litem for
Hall, filed this suit against Los Angeles County, the Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Deputy Watters, and
other members of the sheriff’s department. Respondents
alleged petitioners violated their Fourth Amendment rights by
obtaining a warrant in reckless fashion and conducting an
unreasonable search and detention.
The District Court held that the warrant was obtained by
proper procedures and the search was reasonable.
On appeal respondents did not challenge the validity of the
warrant; they did argue that the deputies had conducted the
search in an unreasonable manner.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
District Court’s decision.
The CA’s majority held that “because (1) no African-
Americans lived in respondents’ home; (2) respondents, a
Caucasian couple, purchased the residence several months
before the search and the deputies did not conduct an
ownership inquiry; (3) the African-American suspects were
not accused of a crime that required an emergency search;
and (4) respondents were ordered out of bed naked and held
at gunpoint while the deputies searched their bedroom for
the suspects and a gun, we find that a reasonable jury could
conclude that the search and detention were ‘unnecessarily
painful, degrading, or prolonged,’ and involved ‘an undue
invasion of privacy.”
Turning to whether respondents’ Fourth Amendment rights
were clearly established, the majority held that a reasonable
deputy should have known the search and detention were
unlawful. [main pinaglalaban talaga nila: Because
respondents were of a different race than the suspects the
deputies were seeking, the Court of Appeals held that “after
taking one look at respondents, the deputies should have
realized that respondents were not the subjects of the search
warrant and did not pose a threat to the deputies’ safety.]
ISSUE: WoN there was a violation of the 4th Amendment
Rights of the respondents.
HELD: No, When the deputies ordered respondents from
their bed, they had no way of knowing whether the African-
American suspects were elsewhere in the house. The
presence of some Caucasians in the residence did not
eliminate the possibility that the suspects lived there as well.
As the deputies stated in their affidavits, it is not uncommon
in our society for people of different races to live together.
Just as people of different races live and work together, so
too might they engage in joint criminal activity. The deputies,
who were searching a house where they believed a suspect
might be armed, possessed authority to secure the premises
before deciding whether to continue with the search.
In Michigan v. Summers, this Court held that officers
executing a search warrant for contraband may “detain the
occupants of the premises while a proper search is
conducted.” In weighing whether the search in Summers was
reasonable the Court first found that “detention represents
only an incremental intrusion on personal liberty when the
search of a home has been authorized by a valid warrant.”
Against that interest, it balanced “preventing flight in the
event that incriminating evidence is found”; “minimizing the
risk of harm to the officers”; and facilitating “the orderly
completion of the search.”
Page 47 of 190
In executing a search warrant officers may take reasonable
action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety
and the efficacy of the search. The test of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment is an objective one
(addressing the reasonableness of a seizure of the person).
Unreasonable actions include the use of excessive force or
restraints that cause unnecessary pain or are imposed for a
prolonged and unnecessary period of time.
The orders by the police to the occupants, in the context of
this lawful search, were permissible, and perhaps necessary,
to protect the safety of the deputies. Blankets and bedding
can conceal a weapon, and one of the suspects was known
to own a firearm, factors which underscore this point. The
Constitution does not require an officer to ignore the
possibility that an armed suspect may sleep with a weapon
within reach. The reports are replete with accounts of
suspects sleeping close to weapons.
The deputies needed a moment to secure the room and
ensure that other persons were not close by or did not
present a danger. Deputies were not required to turn their
backs to allow Rettele and Sadler to retrieve clothing or to
cover themselves with the sheets. Rather, “the risk of harm
to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the
officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the
situation.”
This is not to say, of course, that the deputies were free to
force Rettele and Sadler to remain motionless and standing
for any longer than necessary. We have recognized that
“special circumstances, or possibly a prolonged detention”
might render a search unreasonable. There is no accusation
that the detention here was prolonged. The deputies left the
home less than 15 minutes after arriving. The detention was
shorter and less restrictive than the 2- to 3-hour handcuff
detention. And there is no allegation that the deputies
prevented Sadler and Rettele from dressing longer than
necessary to protect their safety. Sadler was unclothed for
no more than two minutes, and Rettele for only slightly more
time than that. Sadler testified that once the police were
satisfied that no immediate threat was presented, “they
wanted us to get dressed and they were pressing us really
fast to hurry up and get some clothes on.”
The Fourth Amendment allows warrants to issue on probable
cause, a standard well-short of absolute certainty. Valid
warrants will issue to search the innocent, and people like
Rettele and Sadler unfortunately bear the cost. Officers
executing search warrants on occasion enter a house when
residents are engaged in private activity; and the resulting
frustration, embarrassment, and humiliation may be real, as
was true here. When officers execute a valid warrant and act
in a reasonable manner to protect themselves from harm,
however, the Fourth Amendment is not violated.

4. RODEL LUZ y ONG vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012)
FACTS: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned
at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a
traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003
at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, he saw the accused,
who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and
going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle
without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the
accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires
all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said
motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside
their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the
accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while
he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket
for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the
accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his
jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to
take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter
may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and
slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which
was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three
(3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair
of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the
said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the
accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover
and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the
accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table
which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of
which were empty while the other two (2) contained
suspected shabu.
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and
seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that
the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous,
since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with
violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a
valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the
search conducted upon him.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision, the RTC convicted
petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs
committed on 10 March 2003. It found the prosecution
evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully
arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid
Page 48 of 190
search, which led to the discovery on his person of two
plastic sachets later found to contain shabu.
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
ISSUE: Was the search and seizure of the alleged subject
shabu invalid thus acquitted?
HELD: Petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have
failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest
opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does
not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. The
Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained
in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may
at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law implemented without contravening the
constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no
statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the
basic principles of government. The subject items seized
during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the
very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes
conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was
flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not,
ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the
taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may
be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is
effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or
by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the
one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force,
manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a
formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that
there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to
arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the
other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary. Under R.A. 4136, or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for
dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender,
but the confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter. At the
time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation
ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been "under
arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to
arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into
custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during
which petitioner was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the
trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason
they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had
been flagged down "almost in front" of that place. Hence, it
was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting
there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger
that a person questioned will be induced "to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic
stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority
of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorist’s
expectations, when he sees a policeman’s light flashing
behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short
period of time answering questions and waiting while the
officer checks his license and registration, that he may then
be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be misdemeanors as they are by questioning of
allowed to continue on his way. In this respect, questioning persons suspected of felonies.
incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from
stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search
and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The following are the
continue until he provides his interrogators the answers they instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a
seek. See id., at 451. Second, circumstances associated warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of
with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv)
completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a
authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
knowledge that the officer has some discretion in deciding circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances,
whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable
pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other to this case.
aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged
Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at
to be inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain view." It was
least to some degree. x x x
actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent.
analogous to a so-called "Terry stop," see Terry v. Ohio, 392
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent
U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The
to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear
comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this
and convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in order to
sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions
validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must
that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda.
be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the
which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction
helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to
Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found
issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense that petitioner was merely "told" to take out the contents of
penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that his pocket.
neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk"
offense. This ruling does not imply that there can be no
rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer
arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent
observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him
on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of
to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk
liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be
is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for
deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however,
weapons. In Knowles v. Iowa, the U.S. Supreme Court held
the officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation
that when a police officer stops a person for speeding and
ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same
correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the
violation. Even if one were to work under the assumption that
latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to
petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon being flagged down
conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held that
for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his
there was no justification for a full-blown search when the
ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not
officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers
complied with.
may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown.
shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of
the reason for the arrest and must show that person the
warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that
any statement they might make could be used against them.
It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional
requirements were complied with by the police officers only
after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.

In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda

warnings must also be given to a person apprehended due
to a traffic violation:

The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by

Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce
or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve
the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by
the custodial setting itself," "which work to
undermine the individual’s will to resist," and as
much as possible to free courts from the task of
scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine,
after the fact, whether particular confessions were
voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much
by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of

Page 49 of 190

5. MARTINEZ vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 198694
February 13, 2013)
FACTS: At around 9:15PM of December 29, 2007, PO2
Soque, PO2 Cepe and PO3 Zeta, Police officers assigned to
the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID) Section of the Malate
Police Station 9 (Police Station 9), conducted a routine foot
patrol along Balingkit Street, Malate, Manila. In the process,
they heard a man shouting "Putanginamo! Limangdaan na
ba ito?"
For purportedly violating Section 844 of the Revised
Ordinance of the City of Manila which punishes breaches of
the peace, Ramon was apprehended and asked to empty his
pockets. In the course thereof, the police officers were able
to recover from him a small transparent plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance suspected to be
shabu. PO2 Soque confiscated the sachet and brought
Ramon to Police Station 9. Consequently, Ramon was
charged with possession of dangerous drugs under Section
11(3), Article II of RA 9165.
In defense, Ramon denied the charge and gave his version
of the incident. He narrated that while walking along Balingkit
Street to borrow a welding machine from one Paez Garcia, a
man in civilian clothing approached and asked him if he is
Ramon Goco. Upon affirming his identity, he was
immediately handcuffed by the man who eventually
introduced himself as a police officer. Together, they
boarded a tricycle (sidecar) where the said officer asked him
if he was carrying illegal drugs. Despite his denial, he was
still brought to a precinct to be detained. Thereafter, one of
the officers propositioned Ramon and asked for P20,000.00
in exchange for his release. When Ramon’s wife, Amalia
Goco, was unable to produce the P20,000.00, Ramon was
brought to the Manila City Hall for inquest proceedings.
RTC convicted Ramon as charged. CA affirmed the RTC
decision.
Page 50 of 190
ISSUE: Whether or not Ramon could be convicted of the
crime of possession of dangerous drugs provided that there’s
warrantless search conducted.
HELD: Ramon Martinez was acquitted since the subject
shabu purportedly seized is inadmissible in evidence for
being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.
Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution provides that any
evidence obtained in violation of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. However, such exclusionary rule is not absolute.
The following are the traditional exceptions: customs
searches, searches of moving vehicles, seizure of evidence
in plain view, consented searches, "stop and frisk" measures
and searches incidental to a lawful arrest. As to the last
exception, it requires that the apprehending officer must
have been spurred by probable cause to arrest a person
caught in flagrante delicto. The term probable cause is a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged.
Enshrined in the fundamental law is a person’s right against
unwarranted intrusions by the government. Accordingly, so
as to ensure that the same sacrosanct right remains revered,
effects secured by government authorities in contravention of
the foregoing are rendered inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose, in any proceeding.
Commonly known as the “exclusionary rule,” the proscription
is not, however, an absolute and rigid one. As found in
jurisprudence, the traditional exceptions are customs
searches, searches of moving vehicles, seizure of evidence
in plain view, consented searches, “stop and frisk” measures
and searches incidental to a lawful arrest.
A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent
search is one that is carried out under the parameters of
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which requires
that the apprehending officer must have been spurred by
probable cause to arrest a person caught in flagrante delicto.
To be sure, the term probable cause has been understood to
mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged. Specifically with respect to
arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested. In this light, the determination of the existence or
absence of probable cause necessitates a re-examination of
the factual incidents.
Records show that the Police officers arrested Ramon for
allegedly violating Section 844 of the Manila City Ordinance
which punishes Breaches of the Peace. The gravamen of the
offenses enumerated in the Ordinance is the disruption of
communal tranquillity. Thus, to justify a warrantless arrest
based thereon, it must be established that the apprehension
was effected after a reasonable assessment by the police
officer that a public disturbance is being committed.
The perusal of the testimony during the trial, negates the
presence of probable cause when the police officers
conducted their warrantless arrest of Ramon. Further, it
bears stressing that no one present at the place of arrest
ever complained that Ramon’s shouting disturbed the public.
On the contrary, a disinterested member of the community (a
certain Rosemarie Escobal) even testified that Ramon was
merely standing in front of the store of a certain Mang Romy
when a man in civilian clothes, later identified as the police
officer, approached Ramon, immediately handcuffed and
took him away.

In its totality, the Court observes that these facts and

circumstances could not have engendered a well-founded
belief that any breach of the peace had been committed by
Ramon at the time that his warrantless arrest was effected.
All told, no probable cause existed to justify Ramon’s
warrantless arrest.

Indeed, while it is true that the legality of arrest depends

upon the reasonable discretion of the officer or functionary to
whom the law at the moment leaves the decision to
characterize the nature of the act or deed of the person for
the urgent purpose of suspending his liberty, this should not
be exercised in a whimsical manner, else a person’s liberty
be subjected to ubiquitous abuse. As law enforcers, it is
largely expected of them to conduct a more circumspect
assessment of the situation at hand. The determination of
probable cause is not a blanket-license to withhold liberty or
to conduct unwarranted fishing expeditions. It demarcates
the line between legitimate human conduct on the one hand,
and ostensible criminal activity, on the other. In this respect,
it must be performed wisely and cautiously, applying the
exacting standards of a reasonably discreet and prudent
man. Surely, as constitutionally guaranteed rights lie at the
fore, the duty to determine probable cause should be clothed
with utmost conscientiousness as well as impelled by a
higher sense of public accountability.

Consequently, as it cannot be said that Ramon was validly

arrested, the warrantless search that resulted from it was
6. ONGCOMA HADJI HOMAR v. PEOPLE (GR No.
also illegal. Thus, the subject shabu purportedly seized from
182534, September 02, 2015)
Ramon is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial
fruit of the poisonous tree as mandated by the above-
discussed constitutional provisions. In this regard, The petitioner was charged for violation of Section 11, Article
considering that the confiscated shabu is the very corpus II of RA 9165. The Information states that on or about August
delicti of the crime charged, Ramon’s acquittal should 20, 2002, the petitioner was found to possess one heat-
therefore come as a matter of course. sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 grams of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known
as shabu. The petitioner pleaded not guilty during
arraignment.

PO1 Eric Tan (Tan) was the lone witness for the prosecution.
As stated in the RTC decision, he testified that on August 20,
2002, at around 8:50 in the evening, their Chief, P/Chief
Supt. Alfredo C. Valdez, ordered him and civilian agent (C/A)
Ronald Tangcoy (Tangcoy) to go to the South Wing, Roxas
Boulevard. While proceeding to the area onboard a mobile
hunter, they saw the petitioner crossing a "No Jaywalking"
portion of Roxas Boulevard. They immediately accosted him
and told him to cross at the pedestrian crossing area.

The petitioner picked up something from the ground,

prompting Tangcoy to frisk him resulting in the recovery of a
knife. Thereafter, Tangcoy conducted a thorough search on
the petitioner's body and found and confiscated a plastic
sachet containing what he suspected as shabu. Tangcoy and
Tan executed a sinumpaang salaysay on the incident.

The petitioner was the sole witness for the defense. He

testified that on August 20, 2002, he was going home at
around 6:30 p.m. after selling imitation sunglasses and other
accessories at the BERMA Shopping Center. After crossing
the overpass, a policeman and a civilian stopped and frisked
him despite his refusal. They poked a gun at him, accused
him of being a holdupper, and forced him to go with them.
They also confiscated the kitchen knife, which he carried to
cut cords. He was likewise investigated for alleged
possession of shabu and detained for one day. He was
criminally charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Parañaque City, Branch 77 for the possession of the kitchen
knife but he was eventually acquitted.

Page 51 of 190
RTC Ruling precede the search. For this purpose, the law requires that
The RTC convicted the petitioner. It ruled that PO1 Tan and there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made —
C/A Tangcoy were presumed to have performed their duties the process cannot be reversed.
regularly in arresting and conducting a search on the
petitioner. The RTC also noted that PO1 Eric Tan was
straightforward in giving his testimony and he did not show
any ill motive in arresting the petitioner.

The RTC also did not believe the petitioner's defense of

denial and ruled that it is a common and standard defense
ploy in most prosecutions in dangerous drugs cases. This
defense is weak especially when it is not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence as in this case.

CA Ruling
The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC's
findings.
The arrest falls under valid warrantless arrest; when the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense in the presence of a
peace officer or a private person. In the present case, the
petitioner committed jaywalking in the presence of PO1 Tan
and C/A Tangcoy; hence, his warrantless arrest for
jaywalking was lawful. Consequently, the subsequent frisking
and search done on the petitioner's body which produced the
knife and the shabu were incident to a lawful arrest.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search was valid

HELD The prosecution failed to prove that a lawful
warrantless arrest preceded the search conducted on the
petitioner's body.
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence of or within the view of the
arresting officer.
The prosecution was not able to discharge this burden,
particularly that Homar was actually committing a crime.
They did not identify the place where Homar allegedly
crossed and that it was illegal to cross that area. He was also
not charged with jaywalking.
The police testified that they “accosted” Homar when he
jaywalked. However, this is different from an actual arrest as
contemplated by the Rules on warrantless arrests. No arrest
preceded the search because they did not intend to bring
him under custody or restrain his liberty. The lack of intent
was further proven by the absence of criminal charges
against him. Intent only came after they allegedly confiscated
the shabu. The shabu was not recovered immediately after
the alleged lawful arrest but only after the initial search.
Intent to arrest is indispensable because otherwise, any
evidence obtained in violation thereof will be inadmissible.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained
in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and
seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, the
exercise of this power and the implementation of the law
should not violate the constitutional rights of the citizens.
To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in
evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether or not the
search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.
There must be a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, which must
7. People v. Villareal 693 SCRA 549 (2013)
FACTS: As PO3 de Leon was driving his motorcycle on his
way home, he saw appellant from a distance of about 8 to 10
meters, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet
of shabu. Thus, PO3 de Leon, a member of the Station Anti-
Illegal Drugs Special Operation Unit (SAIDSOU) in Caloocan
City, alighted from his motorcycle and approached the
appellant whom he recognized as someone he had
previously arrested for illegal drug possession.
Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape but was
quickly apprehended with the help of a tricycle driver.
Despite appellant’s attempts to resist arrest, PO3 de Leon
was able to board appellant onto his motorcycle and
confiscate the plastic sachet of shabu in his possession.
When arraigned, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio,
entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged.
RTC ruled against Villareal. Moreover, the RTC found the
plain view doctrine to be applicable, as the confiscated item
was in plain view of PO3 de Leon at the place and time of
the arrest.
CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest
based on the police officers personal knowledge of the
criminal record of the appellant.
HELD: No, there was no valid warrantless arrest.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless
arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person.
For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5
to operate, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit

Page 52 of 190
a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand,
paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at
the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.
In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact
of the commission of an offense is absolutely required.
Under paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime
while under paragraph (b), he knows for a fact that a crime
has just been committed.
A punctilious assessment of the factual backdrop of this case
shows that there could have been no lawful warrantless
arrest.
The Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with
his presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with
reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about 8 to 10
meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a
negligible and minuscule amount of powdery substance
(0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by
appellant. That he had previously effected numerous arrests,
all involving shabu, is insufficient to create a conclusion that
what he purportedly saw in appellant’s hands was indeed
shabu. Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor
a lawful arrest, no other overt act could be properly attributed
to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de
Leon that he (appellant) had just committed, was committing,
or was about to commit a crime, for the acts per se of
walking along the street and examining something in one’s
hands cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact,
even if appellant had been exhibiting unusual or strange
acts, or at the very least appeared suspicious, the same
would not have been sufficient in order for PO3 de Leon to
effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of
Section 5, Rule 113.
Neither has it been established that the rigorous conditions
set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 have been
complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it. The
factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de
Leon had personal knowledge that a crime had been
indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough that
PO3 de Leon had reasonable ground to believe that
appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact
have been committed first, which does not obtain in this
case.
Without the overt act that would pin liability against appellant,
it is therefore clear that PO3 de Leon was merely impelled to
apprehend appellant on account of the latter’s previous
charge for the same offense.
However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even
for the same offense, will not suffice to satisfy the exacting
requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to
justify a lawful warrantless arrest. “Personal knowledge” of
the arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been
committed is required. To interpret “personal knowledge” as
referring to a person’s reputation or past criminal citations
would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily
stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect
warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a person’s
previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous
requisites laid out under Section 5.
In fine, appellant’s acts of walking along the street and
holding something in his hands, even if they appeared to be
dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the
same offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite
Page 53 of 190
suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause
enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5.
“Probable cause” has been understood to mean a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested, which
clearly do not obtain in appellant’s case.
Thus, while it is true that the legality of an arrest depends
upon the reasonable discretion of the officer or functionary to
whom the law at the moment leaves the decision to
characterize the nature of the act or deed of the person for
the urgent purpose of suspending his liberty, it cannot be
arbitrarily or capriciously exercised without unduly
compromising a citizen’s constitutionally-guaranteed right to
liberty.
Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the
shabu purportedly seized from appellant is rendered
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the
poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, appellant must be acquitted and
exonerated from all criminal liability.
8. JEFFREY MIGUEL y REMEGIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 227038; July 31, 2017)
FACTS: An Information was filed before the RTC charging
Jeffrey Miguel of illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. (RA) 9165 (Dangerous Drugs Act)
The prosecution alleged that at around 12:45 in the morning
of May 24, 2010, a Bantay Bayan operative of Barangay San
Antonio Village, Makati City named Reynaldo Bahoyo was
doing his rounds when he purportedly received a report of a
man showing off his private parts at Kaong Street. BB
Bahoyo and fellow Bantay Bayan operative Mark Anthony
Velasquez then went to the said street and saw a visibly
intoxicated person, which they later identified as herein
petitioner, urinating and displaying his private parts while
standing in front of a gate enclosing an empty lot.
Bahoyo and Velasquez approached petitioner and asked him
where he lived, and the latter answered Kaong Street.
Bahoyo then said that he also lived in the same street but
petitioner looked unfamiliar to him, so he asked for an
identification card, but petitioner failed to produce one.
Velasquez then repeated the request for an identification
card, but instead, petitioner emptied his pockets, revealing a
pack of cigarettes containing one (1) stick of cigarette and
two (2) pieces of rolled paper containing dried marijuana
leaves, among others. This prompted BB Bahoyo and
Velasquez to seize the foregoing items, take petitioner to the
police station, and turn him, as well as the seized items, over
to SP03 Rafael Castillo.
SP03 Castillo then inventoried, marked, and photographed
the seized items, all in the presence of Bahoyo and
Velasquez, and thereafter, prepared an inventory report and
a request for qualitative examination of the seized two pieces
of rolled paper and for petitioner to undergo drug testing.
After examination, it was confirmed that the aforesaid rolled
paper contained marijuana and that petitioner was positive
for the presence of methamphetamine but negative for THC-
metabolites, both dangerous drugs
Petitioner alleged that he was just urinating in front of his
workplace when two Bantay Bayan operatives approached
and asked him where he lived. Upon responding that he lived
in Kaong Street, Bahoyo and Velasquez then frisked him,
took away his belongings, and thereafter, handcuffed and
brought him to the barangay hall. He was then detained for
about an hour before being taken to the Ospital ng Makati
and to another office where a bald police officer questioned
him. Thereafter, he was taken back to the barangay hall
where they showed him two sticks of marijuana joints
allegedly recovered from him.
RTC found him guilty. It also found the warrantless arrest of
Miguel valid as petitioner was scandalously showing his
private parts at the time of his arrest. Therefore, the resultant
search incidental to such arrest which yielded the seized
marijuana in petitioner's possession was also lawful.
The CA ruled that the search made on petitioner which
yielded the seized marijuana was validly made as it was
done incidental to his arrest for exhibiting his private parts on
public. As such, the said seized marijuana is admissible in
evidence and, thus, sufficient to convict him for the crime
charged. The CA likewise held that the rule on chain of
custody was duly complied with and, thus, the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drugs were not compromised.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and
subsequent arrest was valid?
HELD: The Court ruled that the Bantay Bayan operatives
conducted an illegal search on the person of petitioner.
Consequently, the marijuana purportedly seized from him on
account of such search is rendered inadmissible in evidence.
Hence, Miguel is acquitted.
The Court is convinced that the acts of the Bantay Bayan - or
any barangay-based or other volunteer organizations in the
nature of watch groups - relating to the preservation of peace
and order in their respective areas have the color of a state-
related function. As such, they should be deemed as law
enforcement authorities for the purpose of applying the Bill of
Rights under Article III of the 1987 Constitution to them.
The law identifies three (3) instances when warrantless
arrests may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a
suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where,
based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a
crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final
judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his
case or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule
113, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the
other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its
application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in
fact just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had
committed it.
Page 54 of 190
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact
of the commission of an offense is essential. Under Section 5
(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b)
of the same, he knows for a fact that a crime has just been
committed.
The Court simply finds highly implausible the prosecution's
claim that a valid warrantless arrest was made on petitioner
on account of the alleged public display of his private parts
because if it was indeed the case, then the proper charge
should have been filed against him. However, records are
bereft of any showing that such charge was filed aside from
the instant criminal charge for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs - thereby strengthening the view that no
prior arrest was made on petitioner which led to a search
incidental thereto. As stressed earlier, there must first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made and that such
process cannot be reversed.
9. David Leon Riley vs California (2014)
FACTS: David Leon Riley belonged to the Lincoln Park gang
of San Diego, California. David Leon Riley was pulled over
on August 22, 2009, for expired registrations tags. During the
stop, the San Diego Police Officer also found that Riley was
driving with a suspended driver's license. The San Diego
Police Department's policy at the time was to tow and
impound a vehicle after stopping a driver with a suspended
license in order to prevent the driver from driving again.
Additionally, department policy required the officers to
perform an inventory search of the vehicle, which in this case
led to the discovery of two handguns under the hood of the
vehicle. Later ballistic testing would confirm that the
handguns were the weapons used in a gangland murder on
August 2, 2009, for which Riley had been a suspect.
Although eyewitnesses to the shooting claimed that Riley
could have been one of the shooters, they declined to give a
definitive positive identification of Riley as one of the
shooters. However, this was not known by Officer Dunnigan
at the time of Riley's traffic stop. Because of the discovery of
the concealed and loaded handguns, along with gang
paraphernalia, during the vehicle search, police placed Riley
under arrest and searched his cell phone without a warrant.
The cell phone search yielded information indicating that
Riley was a member of the Lincoln Park gang; evidence
included pictures, cell phone contacts, text messages, and
video clips. Included in the photos was a picture of a different
vehicle that Riley owned, which was also the vehicle involved
in the August 2nd gang shooting. Based in part on the
pictures and videos recovered from the cell phone, police
charged Riley in connection with the gang shooting and
sought an enhancement based on Riley's gang membership.
Riley's lawyer moved to suppress all the evidence the
officers had obtained during the search of his cell phone on
the grounds that the search violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. The trial court rejected this argument and held that the
search was legitimate under the SITA doctrine. At trial, a
gang expert testified to Riley's membership in the Lincoln
Park gang, the rivalry between the gangs involved, and why
the shooting could have been gang-related. The jury
convicted Riley on all three counts and sentenced to fifteen
years to life in prison.
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the
judgment based on the recent California Supreme Court
decision People v. Diaz. In Diaz, the court held that the
Fourth Amendment "search-incident-to-arrest" doctrine
permits the police to conduct a full exploratory search of a
cell phone (even if it is conducted later and at a different
location) whenever the phone is found near the suspect at
the time of arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence admitted at trial from
Riley's cell phone discovered through a search that violated
his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches?
HELD: Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote the
opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the
warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for
the purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving
evidence, neither of which is at issue in the search of digital
data. The digital data cannot be used as a weapon to harm
an arresting officer, and police officers have the ability to
preserve evidence while awaiting a warrant by disconnecting
the phone from the network and placing the phone in a
"Faraday bag." The Court characterized cell phones as
minicomputers filled with massive amounts of private
information, which distinguished them from the traditional
items that can be seized from an arrestee's person, such as
a wallet. The Court also held that information accessible via
the phone but stored using "cloud computing" is not even "on
the arrestee's person." Nonetheless, the Court held that
some warrantless searches of cell phones might be
permitted in an emergency: when the government's interests
are so compelling that a search would be reasonable.
Roberts wrote that it fails the warrantless search test
established in Chimel v. California:
“Digital data stored on a cell phone cannot
itself be used as a weapon to harm an
arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee's
escape. Law enforcement officers remain free
to examine the physical aspects of a phone to
ensure that it will not be used as a weapon--
say, to determine whether there is a razor
blade hidden between the phone and its case.
Once an officer has secured a phone and
eliminated any potential physical threats,
however, data on the phone can endanger no
one.”
Although possible evidence stored on a phone may be
destroyed with either remote wiping or data encryption,
Roberts noted that is "the ordinary operation of a phone's
security features, apart from any active attempt by a
defendant or his associates to conceal or destroy evidence
upon arrest." He then argues that a warrantless search is
unlikely to make much of a difference:
“Cell phone data would be vulnerable to
remote wiping from the time an individual
anticipates arrest to the time any eventual
Page 55 of 190
search of the phone is completed... likewise,
an officer who seizes a phone in an unlocked
state might not be able to begin his search in
the short time remaining before the phone
locks and data becomes encrypted.”
Roberts then cites several common examples to turn off or
prevent the phone's security features. Furthermore, Roberts
argued that cell phones differ both quantitatively and
qualitatively from other objects in a person's pocket:
“Modern cell phones are not just another
technological convenience. With all they
contain and all they may reveal, they hold for
many Americans “the privacies of life". The fact
that technology now allows an individual to
carry such information in his hand does not
make the information any less worthy of the
protection for which the Founders fought.”
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment in which he expressed
doubt that the warrantless search exception following an
arrest exists for the sole or primary purposes of protecting
officer safety and preserving evidence. In light of the privacy
interests at stake, however, he agreed that the majority's
conclusion was the best solution. Justice Alito also
suggested that the legislature enact laws that draw
reasonable distinctions regarding when and what information
within a phone can be reasonably searched following an
arrest.
10. BIRCHFIELD VS NORTH DAKOTA (2016)
FACTS: Birchfield was a consolidation of three cases:
Birchfield v. North Dakota, Bernard v. Minnesota, and
Beylund v. Levi. Birchfield.
Danny Birchfield drove into a ditch in Morton County, North
Dakota. When police arrived on the scene, they believed
Birchfield was intoxicated. Birchfield failed both the field
sobriety tests and the breath test. He was arrested, but he
refused to consent to a chemical test. Birchfield was charged
with a misdemeanor for refusing to consent to a chemical
test in violation of state law. He moved to dismiss the charge
and claimed that the state law violated his Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure.
In a similar case, police were called to the South St. Paul
boat launch where three men were attempting to pull their
boat out of the water and onto their truck. William Robert
Bernard, Jr., admitted he had been drinking and had the
truck keys in his hands, but he denied driving the truck and
refused to perform a field sobriety test. He was arrested on
suspicion of driving while impaired (DWI) and taken to the
police station, where he refused to consent to a chemical test
in violation of Minnesota state law. Bernard was charged with
two counts of first-degree test refusal pursuant to state law.
In a separate incident, Steve Beylund consented to a blood
alcohol to test to confirm he was driving under the influence
after being informed it was a criminal offense in North Dakota
to refuse a blood alcohol test. The test confirmed he was
over the legal limit, and Beylund was charged with driving
under the influence. Beylund underwent a blood alcohol test
consistent with North Dakota's implied consent law and
challenged the constitutionality of that law after an
administrative hearing based on the test results led to the
revocation of his license.
All three men challenged the state statutes criminalizing
refusal to submit to a chemical test and argued that the
statutes violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures when there was
no probable cause that would support a warrant for the test.
Both the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the Supreme
Court of North Dakota determined that criminalizing the
refusal to submit to a chemical test was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.
ISSUE: Is warrantless alcohol testing incident to drunk
driving arrests to determine blood alcohol content a violation
of the Fourth Amendment?
HELD: The Court held that both breath tests and blood tests
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.
A state statute may not criminalize the refusal to submit to a
blood test in the absence of a warrant because, while the
Fourth Amendment allows for warrantless breath tests
incident to an arrest for drunk driving, warrantless blood tests
incident to an arrest violate the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 7-1
majority. The Court held that warrantless breath tests are
permissible under the search incident to arrest exception to
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement because they
do not implicate significant privacy concerns. They involve
minimal physical intrusion to capture something that is
routinely exposed to the public, reveal a limited amount of
information, and do not enhance any embarrassment beyond
what the arrest itself causes. Blood tests, however, implicate
privacy interests because they are much more physically
invasive, they require the piercing of the skin, and they
produce a sample that can be preserved and used to obtain
further information beyond the subject’s blood alcohol level
at the time of the test. The Court also determined that
criminalizing refusal to submit to a breath test is designed to
serve the government’s interest in preventing drunk driving,
which is greater than merely keeping currently drunk drivers
off the roads, and does so better than other alternatives.
However, the same rationale did not apply to criminalizing
refusal to submit to a blood test because of the greater
degree of intrusion and the available alternative of the breath
test.
The Court ruled in favor of Birchfield who was prosecuted for
refusing a warrantless blood draw and ruled against Bernard
who refused a warrantless breath test. Beylund, on the other
hand consented to a blood test after police advised him that
he was required to do. The court therefore remanded
Beylund's case back to the state court "to reevaluate
Beylund's consent given the partial inaccuracy of the officer's
advisory." The Supreme Court of North Dakota court
subsequently avoided the issue by holding that, even
assuming the consent was involuntary, the Exclusionary
Rule does not apply in the administrative hearing context and
thus affirmed suspension of his license for testing over the
prohibited level set forth in the implied consent /
administrative license suspension statute.
In her partial concurrence and partial dissent, Justice Sonia
Sotomayor wrote that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
Page 56 of 190
against warrantless searches should apply to breath tests
unless exigent circumstances justify one in a particular case.
In establishing exceptions to the warrant requirement, the
Court has routinely examined whether a legitimate
government interest justified the search in light of the
individual’s privacy interest and whether that determination
should be made based on a case-by-case analysis or a
categorical rule. Based on this analysis, Justice Sotomayor
argued that a categorical rule allowing warrantless breath
tests incident to arrest was unnecessary to protect the
government interest of preventing drunk driving because at
that point the driver is off the road and a warrant could be
obtained if necessary. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in
the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that
the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement should apply categorically
to all blood alcohol tests, including blood tests. By drawing
an arbitrary line between blood tests and breath tests, the
majority destabilized the law of exceptions to the warrant
requirement and made the jobs of both police officers and
lower courts more difficult.
11. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) VS. DANGEROUS
DRUGS BOARD AND PHILIPPINE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (G.R. No. 157870,
November 03, 2008)
FACTS: In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65,
petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political
party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB)
and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from
enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA
9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm.
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36
of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers
and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses,
among other personalities, is put in issue. As far as pertinent,
the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—
Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of
the drug testing laboratories accredited and
monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality
 of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall
employ, among others, two (2) testing
methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the
type of drug used and the confirmatory test
which will confirm a positive screening test. x x
x The following shall be subjected to undergo
drug testing:
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.
—Students of secondary and tertiary schools
shall, pursuant to the related rules and
regulations as contained in the school’s
student handbook and with notice to the
parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and
private offices.—Officers and employees of
public and private offices, whether domestic or
overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a
random drug test as contained in the
company’s work rules and regulations, x x x for
purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace.
Any officer or employee found positive for use
of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with
administratively which shall be a ground for
suspension or termination, subject to the
provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and
pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s
office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less
than six (6) years and one (1) day shall
undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether
appointed or elected both in the national or
local government shall undergo a mandatory
drug test.
For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of
legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to
schools and employers to determine the manner of drug
testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal
protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a
student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third,
a person’s constitutional right against unreasonable
searches is also breached by said provisions.
(Pimentel v. COMELEC | G.R. No. 16158)
On Dec. 23, 2003, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
6486, prescribing the rules and regulations for the mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with
the May 2004 elections. Pimentel claims that Sec. 36 (g) of
RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally
impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator.
He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance
candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the
qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution,
to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4)
age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any
other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and
elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot
validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification
standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the
force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the
Constitution.
(SJS v. DDM & PDEA | G.R. 157870)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social
Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to
prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the
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Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing
paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the
ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the
provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power
when they give unbridled discretion to schools and
employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For
another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause
inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an
employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person’s
constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also
breached by said provisions.
(Atty. Laserna v. DDB & PDEA | G.R. 158633)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and
taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of
RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on
the constitutional right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-
incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and
equal protection guarantees.
ISSUE: Whether or not paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of
Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal
protection clause?
HELD: The Court  GRANTED the petition in G.R. No.
161658 and declared  Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165  and  COMELEC Resolution No.
6486  as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It also PARTIALLY
GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by
declaring  Sec.36(c)  and  (d) of  RA165  CONSTITUTIONAL,
but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The
Court thus permanently enjoined all the concerned agencies
from implementing  Sec. 36(f) and (g)  of RA 9165.
NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 are NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs (f) thereof is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
As to paragraph (c), covering students of secondary and
tertiary schools
Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton and Board of Education of Independent School District
No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the
Court deduced and applied the following principles: (1)
schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with
respect to their students; (2) minor students have
contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the
custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and
schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to
safeguard the health and well-being of their students and
may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary
to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to
impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair,
just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of Education, supra,
the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of
RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within
the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a
condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school
rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to
enrol is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements.
The Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of
RA 9165(c) requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within
the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a
condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school
rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to
enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements. A random drug testing of students in
secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable, but
may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the
student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the
government, are to be promoted and protected.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students,
the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of
RA 9165(d) for officers and employees of public and private
offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason.
The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than
saying that “subjecting almost everybody to drug testing,
without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted
intrusion of the individual right to privacy,” has failed to show
how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to
privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search
under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. Petitioner
Laserna’s lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and
gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration.
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In
context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion
into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities; and while
there has been general agreement as to the basic function of
the guarantee against unwarranted search, “translation of the
abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and
seizures’ into workable broad guidelines for the decision of
particular cases is a difficult task,” to borrow from C. Camara
v. Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that the
right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the
public and defers to the state’s exercise of police power.
As to paragraph (d), covering officers and employees of
public and private offices
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution
is couched and as has been held, “reasonableness” is the
touchstone of the validity of a government search or
intrusion. And whether a search at issue hews to the
reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the
government-mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy
interest against the promotion of some compelling state
interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness requires
showing of probable cause to be personally determined by a
judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employees—and
students for that matter—under RA 9165 is in the nature of
administrative search needing what was referred to in
Vernonia as “swift and informal disciplinary procedures,” the
probable-cause standard is not required or even practicable.
Be that as it may, the review should focus on the
reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in
question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is
the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing,
which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of
the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or
workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the
privacy expectation of the employees and the
reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees'
privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed
by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining
agreement, if any, entered into by management and the
bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to
maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their
privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in
Page 58 of 190
fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such
privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the
intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a
question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly
set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling
law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly
focused"?
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one,
Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and
regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically
directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly
embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating
experience. While every officer and employee in a private
establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he
or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is
really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to
discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when
and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d)
of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing
ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall
be subjected to “random drug test as contained in the
company’s work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of
reducing the risk in the work place.”
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken
under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible
the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of
the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ
two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the
confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible
the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important
consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted
by trained professionals in access-controlled laboratories
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard
against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of
custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides
that access to the drug results shall be on the “need to know”
basis; that the “drug test result and the records shall be
[kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to
protect the confidentiality of the test results.” Notably, RA
9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the
prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to
the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All
told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees’ privacy,
under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards,
particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results,
and is relatively minimal.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced
expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the
compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and
the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide
authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that
the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited
context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government
officials and employees also labor under reasonable
supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law
and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a
high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165
passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees,
the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants,
who, by constitutional command, are required to be
accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with
utmost responsibility and efficiency.
As to paragraph (f), covering persons charged before the
prosecutor’s office with a crime with an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day

Paragraph (f) of RA 9165 was declared unconstitutional by
the Court. Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d)
of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the
case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing for students
emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their
right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from
their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental
authority of school authorities. In the case of private and
public employees, the constitutional soundness of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds
from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and
requirement.
The Court finds the situation entirely different in the case of
persons charged before the public prosecutor’s office with
criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1)
day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory
drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the
case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's
office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being
suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants
in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked;
neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected
of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and
are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged,
by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office
and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that
be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let
alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the
stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case
would violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under
Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused
persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
12. JAIME D. DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 200748; July 23, 2014)
SERENO, CJ
Facts: Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with
violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.)
9165, by the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of
the Office of the Ombudsman – Visayas.
The prosecution reveals that the agents and special
investigators of the National Bureau of Investigation, Central
Visayas Regional Office (NBI-CEVRO) or simply NBI,
received a Complaint from Corazon Absin (Corazon) and
Charito Escobido (Charito). The complainants claimed that
Ariel Escobido (Ariel), the live-in partner of Corazon and son
of Charito, was picked up by several unknown male persons
believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. In
the police office, they met "James" who demanded from
them ₱100,000, later lowered to ₱40,000, in exchange for
the release of Ariel. After the meeting, the complainants
proceeded to the NBI-CEVRO to file a complaint and narrate
the circumstances of the meeting to the authorities. While at
the NBI-CEVRO, Charito even received calls supposedly
Page 59 of 190
from "James" instructing her to bring the money as soon as
possible.
The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text
messages received by the complainants. A team was
immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation,
which took place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner of
Gen. Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. Petitioner
was later brought to the forensic laboratory of the NBI-
CEVRO where forensic examination was done by forensic
chemist Rommel Paglinawan. Petitioner was required to
submit his urine for drug testing. It later yielded a positive
result for presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the
confirmatory test result labeled as Toxicology (Dangerous
Drugs) Report.
The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. He
denied the charges and testified that while eating at the said
Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by
NBI agents. When he was at the NBI Office, he was required
to extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying
he wanted it to be done by the (PNP) Crime Laboratory and
not by the NBI.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of
R.A. 9165. The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and
affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not the drug test conducted upon
the petitioner is legal.
OUR RULING: No. The drug test in Section 15 does not
cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act,
but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.
A person apprehended or arrested” cannot literally mean any
person apprehended or arrested for any crime. The phrase
must be read in context and understood in consonance with
R.A. No. 9165. Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or
apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the
law. Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are
apprehended or arrested for, among others, the
“importation,” “sale, trading, administration, dispensation,
delivery, distribution and transportation,” “manufacture” and
“possession” of dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals; possession thereof
“during parties, social gatherings or meetings”; being
“employees and visitors of a den, dive or resort”;
“maintenance of a den, dive or resort”; “illegal chemical
diversion of controlled precursors and essential chemicals”;
“manufacture or delivery” or “possession” of equipment,
instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential
chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs “during parties,
social gatherings or meetings”; “unnecessary” or “unlawful”
prescription thereof; “cultivation or culture of plants classified
as dangerous drugs or are sources thereof”; and
“maintenance and keeping of original records of transactions
on dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and
essential chemicals.” To make the provision applicable to all
persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed
under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its
meaning. Note that accused appellant here was arrested in
the alleged act of extortion.
Making the phrase “a person apprehended or arrested” in
Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended
for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other
crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all
persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. To
overextend the application of this provision would run
counter to our pronouncement in Social Justice Society v.
Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency, 570 SCRA 410 (2008), to wit: x x x [M]andatory drug
testing can never be random and suspicionless. The ideas of
randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their
being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not
randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When
persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they
are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The
persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before
the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves
to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily
consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is
a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s right
to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably
forced to incriminate themselves.

In the Gutang v. People, 335 SCRA 479 (2000) case, the

Court clarified that “what the Constitution prohibits is the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication
from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in
evidence, when it may be material.” The situation in Gutang
was categorized as falling among the exemptions under the
freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought
to be examined came from the body of the accused. The
Court said: This was a mechanical act the accused was
made to undergo which was not meant to unearth
undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes
determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record
shows that petitioner and his co-accused were not compelled
to give samples of their urine but they in fact voluntarily gave
the same when they were requested to undergo a drug test.
Assuming arguendo that the urine samples taken from the
petitioner are inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the
trial court that the record is replete with other pieces of
credible evidence including the testimonial evidence of the
prosecution which point to the culpability of the petitioner for
the crimes charged.

It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine

extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer
prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his
rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still
compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those
circumstances. The pertinent provisions in Article III of the
Constitution are clear: Section 2. The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. In the face of these constitutional
guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested
persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the
arrest is being made. Dela Cruz vs. People, 730 SCRA 655,
G.R. No. 200748 July 23, 2014
13. KYLLO v. UNITED STATES (CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT; No. 99-8508. Argued February 20,
200l-Decided June 11,2001)
Suspicious that marijuana was being grown in petitioner
Kyllo's home in a triplex, agents used a thermal-imaging
device to scan the triplex to determine if the amount of heat
emanating from it was consistent with the high-intensity
lamps typically used for indoor marijuana growth. The scan
showed that Kyllo's garage roof and a side wall were
relatively hot compared to the rest of his home and
substantially warmer than the neighboring units. Based in
part on the thermal imaging, a Federal Magistrate Judge
issued a warrant to search Kyllo's home, where the agents
found marijuana growing. Mter Kyllo was indicted on a
federal drug charge, he unsuccessfully moved to suppress
the evidence seized from his home and then entered a
conditional guilty plea. The Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed,

Page 60 of 190
upholding the thermal imaging on the ground that Kyllo had without the evidence it provided, the search warrant was
shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he had supported by probable cause-and if not, whether there is any
made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his other basis for supporting admission of that evidence. P. 40.
home. Even if he had, ruled the court, there was no 190 F.3d 1041, reversed and remanded.
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the
thermal imager did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's
life, only amorphous hot spots on his home's exterior.
Held: Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is
not in general public use, to explore details of a private home
that would previously have been unknowable without
physical intrusion, the surveillance is a Fourth Amendment
"search," and is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant. Pp. 31-41.

(a) The question whether a warrantless search of a home is

reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no in
most instances, but the antecedent question whether a
Fourth Amendment "search" has occurred is not so simple.
This Court has approved warrantless visual surveillance of a
home, see California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207, 213, ruling
that visual observation is no "search" at all, see Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U. S. 227, 234-235, 239.
In assessing when a search is not a search, the Court has
adapted a principle first enunciated in Katz v. United States,
389 U. S. 347, 361: A "search" does not occur-even when its
object is a house explicitly protected by the Fourth
Amendment-unless the individual manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy in the searched object, and society is
willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable, see, e.
g., California v. Ciraolo, supra, at 211. Pp. 31-33.

(b) While it may be difficult to refine the Katz test in some

instances, in the case of the search of a home's interior-the
prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of
protected privacy-there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in
the common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that
exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable. To
withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to
permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by
the Fourth Amendment. Thus, obtaining by sense-enhancing
technology any information regarding the home's interior that
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
"intrusion into a constitutionally protected area," Silverman v.
United States, 365 U. S. 505, 512, constitutes a search-at
least where (as here) the technology in question is not in
general public use. This assures preservation of that degree
of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted. Pp. 33-35.

(c) Based on this criterion, the information obtained by the

thermal imager in this case was the product of a search. The
Court rejects the Government's argument that the thermal
imaging must be upheld because it detected only heat
radiating from the home's external surface. Such a
mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment was
rejected in Katz, where the eavesdropping device in question
picked up only sound waves that reached the exterior of the
phone booth to which it was attached. Reversing that
approach would leave the homeowner at the mercy of
advancing technology-including imaging technology that
could discern all human activity in the home. Also rejected is
the Government's contention that the thermal imaging was
constitutional because it did not detect "intimate details."
Such an approach would be wrong in principle because, in
the sanctity of the home, all details are intimate details. See,
e. g., United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705; Dow Chemical,
supra, at 238, distinguished. It would also be impractical in
application, failing to provide a workable accommodation
between law enforcement needs and Fourth Amendment
interests. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, 181.
Pp. 35-40.
(d) Since the imaging in this case was an unlawful search, it
will remain for the District Court to determine whether,
14. UNITED STATES v. JONES (Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit No. 10–1259. Argued November 8, 2011—
Decided January 23, 2012)
The Government obtained a search warrant permitting it to
install a Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device on
a vehicle registered to respondent Jones’s wife. The warrant
authorized installation in the District of Columbia and within
10 days, but agents installed the device on the 11th day and
in Maryland. The Government then tracked the vehicle’s
movements for 28 days. It subsequently secured an
indictment of Jones and others on drug trafficking conspiracy
charges. The District Court suppressed the GPS data
obtained while the vehicle was parked at Jones’s residence,
but held the remaining data admissible because Jones had
no reasonable expectation of privacy when the vehicle was

Page 61 of 190
on public streets. Jones was convicted. The D. C. Circuit
reversed, concluding that admission of the evidence
obtained by warrantless use of the GPS device violated the
Fourth Amendment.

Held: The Government’s attachment of the GPS device to

the vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s
movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment. Pp. 3–12.

(a) The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” Here, the Government’s physical intrusion
on an “effect” for the purpose of obtaining information
constitutes a “search.” This type of encroachment on
an area enumerated in the Amendment would have
been considered a search within the meaning of the
Amendment at the time it was adopted. Pp. 3–4.

(b) This conclusion is consistent with this Court’s Fourth

Amendment jurisprudence, which until the latter half
of the 20th century was tied to common-law trespass.
Later cases, which have deviated from that
exclusively property-based approach, have applied
the analysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz
v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 , which said that the
Fourth Amendment protects a person’s “reasonable
expectation of privacy,” id., at 360. Here, the Court
need not address the Government’s contention that
Jones had no “reasonable expectation of privacy,”
because Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not
rise or fall with the Katz formulation. At bottom, the
Court must “assur[e] preservation of that degree of
privacy against government that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted.” Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U. S. 27 . Katz did not repudiate the
understanding that the Fourth Amendment embodies
a particular concern for government trespass upon
the areas it enumerates. The Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, but
not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.
See Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 ;
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56 . United States
v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 , and United States v. Karo,
468 U. S. 705 —post-Katz cases rejecting Fourth
Amendment challenges to “beepers,” electronic
tracking devices representing another form of
electronic monitoring—do not foreclose the
conclusion that a search occurred here. New York v.
Class, 475 U. S. 106 , and Oliver v. United States,
466 U. S. 170 , also do not support the Government’s
position. Pp. 4–12.

(c) The Government’s alternative argument—that if the

attachment and use of the device was a search, it
was a reasonable one—is forfeited because it was 15. BRICCIO "Ricky" A. POLLO vs. CHAIRPERSON
not raised below. P. 12. 615 F. 3d 544, affirmed. KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, DIRECTOR IV
RACQUEL DE GUZMAN BUENSALIDA, DIRECTOR
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which IV LYDIA A. CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III ENGELBERT
Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor, JJ., ANTHONY D. UNITE AND THE CIVIL SERVICE
joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a concurring opinion. Alito, J., COMMISSION (G.R. No. 181881 October 18, 2011;
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which VILLARAMA, JR., J.)
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, JJ., joined.

FACTS: This case involves a search of office computer

assigned to a government employee who was charged
administratively and eventually dismissed from the service.
The employee’s personal files stored in the computer were
used by the government employer as evidence of
misconduct.

Page 62 of 190
Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the
CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of
the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the
"Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na" program of the CSC.
On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned letter-
complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David which was marked "Confidential" and
sent through a courier service (LBC) from a certain "Alan
San Pascual" of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was received
by the Integrated Records Management Office (IRMO) at the
CSC Central Office. Following office practice in which
documents marked "Confidential" are left unopened and
instead sent to the addressee, the aforesaid letter was given
directly to Chairperson David.
Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four
personnel with background in information technology (IT),
and issued a memo directing them to conduct an
investigation and specifically "to back up all the files in the
computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and
Legal divisions."4 After some briefing, the team proceeded at
once to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City.
Upon their arrival thereat around 5:30 p.m., the team
informed the officials of the CSC-ROIV, respondents Director
IV Lydia Castillo (Director Castillo) and Director III Engelbert
Unite (Director Unite) of Chairperson David’s directive.
It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes
containing files copied from the computer assigned to and
being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42
documents, were draft pleadings or letters7 in connection
with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On
the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-
Cause Order8 dated January 11, 2007, requiring the
petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his
explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071420,
which found petitioner GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service and Violation of Republic Act 6713. He is meted the
penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its
accessory penalties.
ISSUE: On the paramount issue of the legality of the search
conducted on petitioner’s computer, the CSC noted the
dearth of jurisprudence relevant to the factual milieu of this
case where the government as employer invades the private
files of an employee stored in the computer assigned to him
for his official use, in the course of initial investigation of
possible misconduct committed by said employee and
without the latter’s consent or participation.
HELD: The CSC held that petitioner has no reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to the computer he was
using in the regional office in view of the CSC computer use
policy which unequivocally declared that a CSC employee
cannot assert any privacy right to a computer assigned to
him. Even assuming that there was no such administrative
policy, the CSC was of the view that the search of
petitioner’s computer successfully passed the test of
reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as
enunciated in the aforecited authorities. The CSC stressed
that it pursued the search in its capacity as government
employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an
investigation involving work-related misconduct, which
exempts it from the warrant requirement under the
Constitution. With the matter of admissibility of the evidence
having been resolved, the CSC then ruled that the totality of
evidence adequately supports the charges of grave
misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and violation of R.A. No. 6713 against
Page 63 of 190
the petitioner. These grave infractions justified petitioner’s
dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties.
Squarely raised by the petitioner is the legality of the search
conducted on his office computer and the copying of his
personal files without his knowledge and consent, alleged as
a transgression on his constitutional right to privacy.
Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on
petitioner’s computer was justified at its inception and scope.
Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the
Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any
possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same
date that the complaint was received, a search was forthwith
conducted involving the computer resources in the
concerned regional office. That it was the computers that
were subjected to the search was justified since these
furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and
store documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely
starting point in ferreting out incriminating evidence.
Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that
is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button,
necessitated drastic and immediate action. Pointedly, to
impose the need to comply with the probable cause
requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-
related investigation.
Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission
effected the warrantless search in an open and transparent
manner. Officials and some employees of the regional office,
who happened to be in the vicinity, were on hand to observe
the process until its completion. In addition, the respondent
himself was duly notified, through text messaging, of the
search and the concomitant retrieval of files from his
computer.
All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless
search done on computer assigned to Pollo was not, in any
way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable
exercise of the managerial prerogative of the Commission as
an employer aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness
and efficiency by going after the work-related misfeasance of
its employees. Consequently, the evidence derived from the
questioned search are deemed admissible
Petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to
privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument invoking
the privacy of communication and correspondence under
Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also
untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain
legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the
government workplace under the aforecited authorities. We
likewise find no merit in his contention that O’Connor and
Simons are not relevant because the present case does not
involve a criminal offense like child pornography. As already
mentioned, the search of petitioner’s computer was justified
there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files
stored therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to
the investigation being conducted by CSC as government
employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous
complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception to
the warrantless requirement in administrative searches
defined in O’Connor.
The above case is to be distinguished from the case at bar
because, unlike the former which involved a personal
computer of a court employee, the computer from which the
personal files of herein petitioner were retrieved is a
government-issued computer, hence government property
the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and
monitor. Such relationship of the petitioner with the item
seized (office computer) and other relevant factors and
circumstances under American Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, notably the existence of CSC MO 10, S. 2007
on Computer Use Policy, failed to establish that petitioner
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the office
computer assigned to him.

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this

jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: Sec. 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its
employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy
in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office
computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the
computer resources using both automated or human means.
This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to
ensure that the computer resources were used only for such
legitimate business purposes.

A search by a government employer of an employee’s office

is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds
for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee
is guilty of work-related misconduct. Thus, in the 2004 case
decided by the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, it was
held that where a government agency’s computer use policy
prohibited electronic messages with pornographic content
and in addition expressly provided that employees do not
have any personal privacy rights regarding their use of the
agency information systems and technology, the government
employee had no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the
use and contents of his office computer, and therefore
evidence found during warrantless search of the computer
was admissible in prosecution for child pornography. In that
case, the defendant employee’s computer hard drive was
first remotely examined by a computer information technician
after his supervisor received complaints that he was
inaccessible and had copied and distributed non-work-
related e-mail messages throughout the office. When the
supervisor confirmed that defendant had used his computer
to access the prohibited websites, in contravention of the
express policy of the agency, his computer tower and floppy
disks were taken and examined. A formal administrative
investigation ensued and later search warrants were secured
by the police department. The initial remote search of the
hard drive of petitioner’s computer, as well as the
subsequent warrantless searches was held as valid under
the O’Connor ruling that a public employer can investigate
work-related misconduct so long as any search is justified at
inception and is reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified it in the first place.

CARPIO, J., Separate Concurring Opinion: 16. JESSE U. LUCAS vs. JESUS S. LUCAS (G.R. No.
190710 June 6, 2011; NACHURA, J.)
Right to Privacy;

Any private use of a government property, like a
government-owned computer, is prohibited by law.
Consequently, a government employee cannot expect any
privacy when he uses a government-owned computer
because he knows he cannot use the computer for any
private purpose. The CSC regulation declaring a no-privacy
expectation on the use of government-owned computers
logically follows from the statutory rule that government-
owned property shall be used “solely” for a public purpose.
FACTS: Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court
can issue a DNA testing order? In this petition for review on
certiorari, we address this question to guide the Bench and
the Bar in dealing with a relatively new evidentiary tool.
Petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish
Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of
Parties to DNA Testing)2 before the (RTC) Valenzuela City.
Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie

Page 64 of 190
Uy (Elsie), migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a
certain "Ate Belen (Belen)" who worked in a prominent
nightspot in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen
to work. On one occasion, Elsie got acquainted with
respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belen’s workplace, and an
intimate relationship developed between the two. Elsie
eventually got pregnant and, on March 11, 1969, she gave
birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioner’s
father was not stated in petitioner’s certificate of live birth.
However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is
respondent. On August 1, 1969, petitioner was baptized at
San Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue, Pasay City. Respondent
allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and petitioner
for a period of about two years. When the relationship of
Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept
respondent’s offer of support and decided to raise petitioner
on her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made
several attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all
attempts were in vain.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition.
Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish
filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial court on
August 29, 2007 and obtained a copy of the petition.
The RTC held that the ruling on the grounds relied upon by
petitioner for filing the petition is premature considering that a
full-blown trial has not yet taken place. The court also
dismissed respondent’s arguments that there is no basis for
the taking of DNA test, and that jurisprudence is still
unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence. It noted that
the new Rule on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA
testing, whether at the court’s instance or upon application of
any person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On
September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition for
certiorari in favor of respondent.
The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish
illegitimate filiation, specifically seeking a DNA testing order
to abbreviate the proceedings
Finally, petitioner asserts that the motion for DNA testing
should not be a reason for the dismissal of the petition since
it is not a legal ground for the dismissal of cases. If the CA
entertained any doubt as to the propriety of DNA testing, it
should have simply denied the motion. Petitioner points out
that Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence does not require
that there must be a prior proof of filiation before DNA testing
can be ordered. He adds that the CA erroneously relied on
the four significant procedural aspects of a paternity case, as
enunciated in Herrera v. Alba. Petitioner avers that these
procedural aspects are not applicable at this point of the
proceedings because they are matters of evidence that
should be taken up during the trial.
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four
significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case
which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood
and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these
so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties
have presented their respective evidence. They are matters
of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of
the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation
has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to
establish a prima facie case—the first procedural aspect in a
paternity case—is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is
built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the
initiatory pleading.
Page 65 of 190
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss
the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA
testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by
petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss
whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is
warranted considering that no such order has yet been
issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the
said case for hearing.
At any rate, the CA’s view that it would be dangerous to
allow a DNA testing without corroborative proof is well taken
and deserves the Court’s attention. In light of this
observation, we find that there is a need to supplement the
Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions
for DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and other
filiation cases. We, thus, address the question of whether a
prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a
DNA testing order.
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench
and the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in
the judicial system. It provides the "prescribed parameters on
the requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the
proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports,
etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections
to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as
the probative value of DNA evidence." It seeks "to ensure
that the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA
analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall not be
misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue
to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and protects,
rather than prejudice the public."
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence
merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard
the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4
states:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The
appropriate court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any person who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA
testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing
and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the
case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously
subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested;
or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but
the results may require confirmation for good
reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to
produce new information that is relevant to the
proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the
court may consider as potentially affecting the
accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a
prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law
enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will
be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said
conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing
order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the
applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or
"good cause" for the holding of the test. 36 In these states, a
court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which,
under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a
finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility,
was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of
probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently
explained —
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is still applicable, and a
proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be
made before a court may order a compulsory blood
test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed
regarding the kind of procedures which are
required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing must
be made before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We
agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before
the court may issue an order for compulsory blood
testing, the moving party must show that there is a
reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested
and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily
undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must
be held in which the court can determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case which warrants issuance of a court order
for blood testing.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for
DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
Lucas vs. Lucas, 650 SCRA 667, G.R. No. 190710 June 6,
2011
17. MARYLAND v. KING (Certiorari to the court of
appeals of Maryland No. 12–207. Argued February
26, 2013—Decided June 3, 2013)
Page 66 of 190
After his 2009 arrest on first- and second-degree assault
charges, respondent King was processed through a
Wicomico County, Maryland, facility, where booking
personnel used a cheek swab to take a DNA sample
pursuant to the Maryland DNA Collection Act (Act). The
swab was matched to an unsolved 2003 rape, and King was
charged with that crime. He moved to suppress the DNA
match, arguing that the Act violated the Fourth Amendment,
but the Circuit Court Judge found the law constitutional. King
was convicted of rape. The Maryland Court of Appeals set
aside the conviction, finding unconstitutional the portions of
the Act authorizing DNA collection from felony arrestees.
Held: When officers make an arrest supported by probable
cause to hold for a serious offense and bring the suspect to
the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a
cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and
photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 3–28.
(a) DNA testing may “significantly improve both the criminal
justice system and police investigative practices,” District
Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.
S. 52 , by making it “possible to determine whether a
biological tissue matches a suspect with near certainty,” id.,
at 62. Maryland’s Act authorizes law enforcement authorities
to collect DNA samples from, as relevant here, persons
charged with violent crimes, including first-degree assault. A
sample may not be added to a database before an individual
is arraigned, and it must be destroyed if, e.g., he is not
convicted. Only identity information may be added to the
database. Here, the officer collected a DNA sample using the
common “buccal swab” procedure, which is quick and
painless, requires no “surgical intrusio[n] beneath the skin,”
Winston v. Lee, 470 U. S. 753 , and poses no threat to the
arrestee’s “health or safety,” id., at 763. Respondent’s
identification as the rapist resulted in part through the
operation of the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS),
which connects DNA laboratories at the local, state, and
national level, and which standardizes the points of
comparison, i.e., loci, used in DNA analysis. Pp. 3–7.
(b) The framework for deciding the issue presented is well
established. Using a buccal swab inside a person’s cheek to
obtain a DNA sample is a search under the Fourth
Amendment. And the fact that the intrusion is negligible is of
central relevance to determining whether the search is
reasonable, “the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a
governmental search,” Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U. S. 646 . Because the need for a warrant is greatly
diminished here, where the arrestee was already in valid
police custody for a serious offense supported by probable
cause, the search is analyzed by reference to
“reasonableness, not individualized suspicion,” Samson v.
California, 547 U. S. 843 , n. 4, and reasonableness is
determined by weighing “the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests” against “the degree to which [the
search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy,” Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U. S. 295 . Pp. 7–10.
(c) In this balance of reasonableness, great weight is given
to both the significant government interest at stake in the
identification of arrestees and DNA identification’s
unmatched potential to serve that interest. Pp. 10–23.
(1) The Act serves a well-established, legitimate
government interest: the need of law enforcement
officers in a safe and accurate way to process and
identify persons and possessions taken into custody.
“[P]robable cause provides legal justification for
arresting a [suspect], and for a brief period of
detention to take the administrative steps incident to
 arrest,” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 –114; and the
“validity of the search of a person incident to a lawful
arrest” is settled, United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S.
218 .
Individual suspicion is not necessary. The “routine
administrative procedure[s] at a police station house
incident to booking and jailing the suspect” have
different origins and different constitutional
justifications than, say, the search of a place not
incident to arrest, Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U. S. 640 ,
which depends on the “fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 . And when
probable cause exists to remove an individual from
the normal channels of society and hold him in legal
custody, DNA identification plays a critical role in
serving those interests. First, the government has an
interest in properly identifying “who has been arrested
and who is being tried.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.
Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty., 542 U. S. 177 . Criminal
history is critical to officers who are processing a
suspect for detention. They already seek identity
information through routine and accepted means:
comparing booking photographs to sketch artists’
depictions, showing mugshots to potential witnesses,
and comparing fingerprints against electronic
databases of known criminals and unsolved crimes.
The only difference between DNA analysis and
fingerprint databases is the unparalleled accuracy
DNA provides. DNA is another metric of identification
used to connect the arrestee with his or her public
persona, as reflected in records of his or her actions
that are available to the police. Second, officers must
ensure that the custody of an arrestee does not create
inordinate “risks for facility staff, for the existing
detainee population, and for a new detainee.”
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of
Burlington, 566 U. S. ___, ___. DNA allows officers to
know the type of person being detained. Third, “the
Government has a substantial interest in ensuring that
persons accused of crimes are available for trials.”
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520. An arrestee may be
more inclined to flee if he thinks that continued contact
with the criminal justice system may expose another
serious offense. Fourth, an arrestee’s past conduct is
essential to assessing the danger he poses to the
public, which will inform a court’s bail determination.
Knowing that the defendant is wanted for a previous
violent crime based on DNA identification may be
especially probative in this regard. Finally, in the
interests of justice, identifying an arrestee as the
perpetrator of some heinous crime may have the
salutary effect of freeing a person wrongfully
imprisoned. Pp. 10–18.
search. Rapid technical advances are also reducing
DNA processing times. Pp. 18–23.
(d) The government interest is not outweighed by
respondent’s privacy interests. Pp. 23–28.
(1) By comparison to the substantial government interest
and the unique effectiveness of DNA identification, the
intrusion of a cheek swab to obtain a DNA sample is
minimal. Reasonableness must be considered in the
context of an individual’s legitimate privacy
expectations, which necessarily diminish when he is
taken into police custody. Bell, supra, at 557. Such
searches thus differ from the so-called special needs
searches of, e.g., otherwise law-abiding motorists at
checkpoints. See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S.
32 . The reasonableness inquiry considers two other
circumstances in which particularized suspicion is not
categorically required: “diminished expectations of
privacy [and a] minimal intrusion.” Illinois v. McArthur,
531 U. S. 326 . An invasive surgery may raise privacy
concerns weighty enough for the search to require a
warrant, notwithstanding the arrestee’s diminished
privacy expectations, but a buccal swab, which
involves a brief and minimal intrusion with “virtually no
risk, trauma, or pain,” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.
S. 757 , does not increase the indignity already
attendant to normal incidents of arrest. Pp. 23–26.
(2) The processing of respondent’s DNA sample’s CODIS
loci also did not intrude on his privacy in a way that
would make his DNA identification unconstitutional.
Those loci came from noncoding DNA parts that do
not reveal an arrestee’s genetic traits and are unlikely
to reveal any private medical information. Even if they
could provide such information, they are not in fact
tested for that end. Finally, the Act provides statutory
protections to guard against such invasions of privacy.
Pp. 26–28.
425 Md. 550, 42 A. 3d 549, reversed.

(2) DNA identification is an important advance in the

techniques long used by law enforcement to serve
legitimate police concerns. Police routinely have used
scientific advancements as standard procedures for
identifying arrestees. Fingerprinting, perhaps the most
direct historical analogue to DNA technology, has,
from its advent, been viewed as a natural part of “the
administrative steps incident to arrest.” County of
Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44 . However,
DNA identification is far superior. The additional
intrusion upon the arrestee’s privacy beyond that
associated with fingerprinting is not significant, and
DNA identification is markedly more accurate. It may
not be as fast as fingerprinting, but rapid fingerprint
analysis is itself of recent vintage, and the question of
how long it takes to process identifying information 18. UNITED STATES v. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ(1990) No.
goes to the efficacy of the search for its purpose of 88-1353
prompt identification, not the constitutionality of the

Page 67 of 190
Argued: November 7, 1989Decided: February 28, 1990
After the Government obtained an arrest warrant for
respondent - a Mexican citizen and resident believed to be a
leader of an organization that smuggles narcotics into this
country - he was apprehended by Mexican police and
transported here, where he was arrested. Following his
arrest, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents,
working with Mexican officials, searched his Mexican
residences and seized certain documents. The District Court
granted his motion to suppress the evidence, concluding that
the Fourth Amendment - which protects "the people" against
unreasonable searches and seizures - applied to the
searches, and that the DEA agents had failed to justify
searching the premises without a warrant. The Court of
Appeals affirmed. Citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 - which
held that American citizens tried abroad by United States
military officials were entitled to Fifth and Sixth Amendment
protections - the court concluded that the Constitution
imposes substantive constraints on the Federal Government,
even when it operates abroad. Relying on INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 - where a majority assumed that
illegal aliens in the United States have Fourth Amendment
rights - the court observed that it would be odd to
acknowledge that respondent was entitled to trial-related
rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, but
not to Fourth Amendment protection.
Held: The Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search
and seizure by United States agents of property owned by a
nonresident alien and located in a foreign country. Pp. 264-
275.
(a) If there were a constitutional violation in this case, it
occurred solely in Mexico, since a Fourth Amendment
violation is fully accomplished at the time of an unreasonable
governmental intrusion whether or not the evidence seized is
sought for use in a criminal trial. Thus, the Fourth
Amendment functions differently from the Fifth Amendment,
whose privilege against self-incrimination is a fundamental
trial right of criminal defendants. P. 264.
(b) The Fourth Amendment phrase "the people" seems to be
a term of art used in select parts of the Constitution and
contrasts with the words "person" and "accused" used in
Articles of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments regulating
criminal procedures. This suggests that "the people" [494
U.S. 259, 260] refers to a class of persons who are part of a
national community or who have otherwise developed
sufficient connection with this country to be considered part
of that community. Pp. 264-266.
(c) The Fourth Amendment's drafting history shows that its
purpose was to protect the people of the United States
against arbitrary action by their own Government and not to
restrain the Federal Government's actions against aliens
outside United States territory. Nor is there any indication
that the Amendment was understood by the Framers'
contemporaries to apply to United States activities directed
against aliens in foreign territory or in international waters.
Pp. 266-268.
(d) The view that every constitutional provision applies
wherever the Government exercises its power is contrary to
this Court's decisions in the Insular Cases, which held that
not all constitutional provisions apply to governmental activity
even in territories where the United States has sovereign
power. See, e. g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 .
Indeed, the claim that extraterritorial aliens are entitled to
Page 68 of 190
rights under the Fifth Amendment - which speaks in the
relatively universal term of "person" - has been emphatically
rejected. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 . Pp.
268-269.
(e) Respondent's reliance on Reid, supra, is misplaced, since
that case stands only for the proposition that United States
citizens stationed abroad could invoke the protection of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Similarly, those cases in which
aliens have been determined to enjoy certain constitutional
rights establish only that aliens receive such protections
when they have come within the territory of, and have
developed substantial connections with, this country. See, e.
g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 . Respondent, however,
is an alien with no previous significant voluntary connection
with the United States, and his legal but involuntary presence
here does not indicate any substantial connection with this
country. The Court of Appeals' reliance on INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza, supra, is also misplaced, since that case assumed
that, but did not expressly address the question whether, the
Fourth Amendment applies to illegal aliens in the United
States. Even assuming such aliens - who are in this country
voluntarily and presumably have accepted some societal
obligations - would be entitled to Fourth Amendment
protections, their situation differs from that of respondent,
who had no voluntary connection with this country that might
place him among "the people." This Court's decisions
expressly according differing protection to aliens than to
citizens also undermine respondent's claim that treating
aliens differently under the Fourth Amendment violates the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Pp.
269-273.
(f) The Court of Appeals' rule would have significant and
deleterious consequences for the United States in
conducting activities beyond its [494 U.S. 259, 261]
borders. The rule would apply not only to law enforcement
operations abroad, but also to other foreign operations - such
as Armed Forces actions - which might result in "searches
and seizures." Under the rule, aliens with no attachment to
this country might bring actions for damages to remedy
claimed violations of the Fourth Amendment in foreign
countries or in international waters, and Members of the
Executive and Legislative Branches would be plunged into a
sea of uncertainty as to what might be reasonable in the way
of searches and seizures conducted abroad. Any restrictions
on searches and seizures incident to American action abroad
must be imposed by the political branches through diplomatic
understanding, treaty, or legislation. Pp. 273-275.
856 F.2d 1214, reversed.

E. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND
CORRESPONDENCE
1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) No. 35 (389
U.S. 347 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT)
Argued October 17, 1967
Decided December 18, 1967
Syllabus: Petitioner was convicted under an indictment
charging him with transmitting wagering information by
telephone across state lines in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1084.
Evidence of petitioner's end of the conversations, overheard
by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and
recording device to the outside of the telephone booth from
which the calls were made, was introduced at the trial. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that there
was no Fourth Amendment violation, since there was "no
physical entrance into the area occupied by" petitioner.
Held:
1. The Government's eavesdropping activities violated the
privacy upon which petitioner justifiably relied while
using the telephone booth, and thus constituted a
"search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Pp. 389 U. S. 350-353.
(a) The Fourth Amendment governs not only the
seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the
recording of oral statements. Silverman v. United
States, 365 U. S. 505, 365 U. S. 511. P. 389 U. S.
353.
(b) Because the Fourth Amendment protects people,
rather than places, its reach cannot turn on the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any
given enclosure. The "trespass" doctrine of
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, and
Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, is no
longer controlling. Pp. 389 U. S. 351, 389 U. S. 353.
2. Although the surveillance in this case may have been so
narrowly circumscribed that it could constitutionally have
been authorized in advance, it was not in fact conducted
pursuant to the warrant procedure which is a
constitutional precondition of such electronic
surveillance. Pp. 389 U. S. 354-359.
369 F.2d 130, reversed.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner was convicted in the District Court for the
Southern District of California under an eight-count
indictment charging him with transmitting wagering
information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and
Boston, in violation of a federal statute. [Footnote 1] At trial,
the Government was permitted, over the petitioner's
objection, to introduce evidence of the petitioner's end of
telephone conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had
attached an electronic listening and recording device to the
outside of the public telephone booth from which he had
placed his calls. In affirming his conviction, the Court of
Appeals rejected the contention that the recordings had been
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, because
"[t]here was no physical entrance into the area occupied by
Page 69 of 190
[the petitioner]." [Footnote 2] We granted certiorari in order to
consider the constitutional questions thus presented.
[Footnote 3]
The petitioner has phrased those questions as follows:
"A. Whether a public telephone booth is a
constitutionally protected area so that evidence
obtained by attaching an electronic listening
recording device to the top of such a booth is
obtained in violation of the right to privacy of the
user of the booth. "
"B. Whether physical penetration of a
constitutionally protected area is necessary before a
search and seizure can be said to be violative of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution."
We decline to adopt this formulation of the issues. In the first
place, the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is
not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase
"constitutionally protected area." Secondly, the Fourth
Amendment cannot be translated into a general
constitutional "right to privacy." That Amendment protects
individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental
intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have
nothing to do with privacy at all. [Footnote 4] Other
provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from
other forms of governmental invasion. [Footnote 5] But the
protection of a person's general right to privacy -- his right to
be let alone by other people [Footnote 6] -- is, like the
protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to
the law of the individual States. [Footnote 7]
Because of the misleading way the issues have been
formulated, the parties have attached great significance to
the characterization of the telephone booth from which the
petitioner placed his calls. The petitioner has strenuously
argued that the booth was a "constitutionally protected area."
The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was
not. [Footnote 8] But this effort to decide whether or not a
given "area," viewed in the abstract, is "constitutionally
protected" deflects attention from the problem presented by
this case. [Footnote 9] For the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United States,
385 U. S. 206, 385 U. S. 210; United States v. Lee, 274 U. S.
559, 274 U. S. 563. But what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected. See Rios v. United States, 364 U.
S. 253; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 96 U. S. 733.
The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth
from which the petitioner made his calls was constructed
partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he entered it as
he would have been if he had remained outside. But what he
sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the
intruding eye -- it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his
right to do so simply because he made his calls from a place
where he might be seen. No less than an individual in a
business office, [Footnote 10] in a friend's apartment,
[Footnote 11] or in a taxicab, [Footnote 12] a person in a
telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind
him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is
surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the
Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the
public telephone has come to play in private communication.
The Government contends, however, that the activities of its
agents in this case should not be tested by Fourth
Amendment requirements, for the surveillance technique
they employed involved no physical penetration of the
telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. It
is true that the absence of such penetration was at one time
thought to foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry,
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 277 U. S. 457,
277 U. S. 464, 277 U. S. 466; Goldman v. United States, 316
U. S. 129, 316 U. S. 134-136, for that Amendment was
thought to limit only searches and seizures of tangible
property. [Footnote 13] But "[t]he premise that property
interests control the right of the Government to search and
seize has been discredited." Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S.
294, 387 U. S. 304. Thus, although a closely divided Court
supposed in Olmstead that surveillance without any trespass
and without the seizure of any material object fell outside the
ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the
narrow view on which that decision rested. Indeed, we have
expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only
the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the
recording of oral statements, overheard without any
"technical trespass under . . . local property law." Silverman
v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 365 U. S. 511. Once this
much is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the
Fourth Amendment protects people -- and not simply "areas"
-- against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes
clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure.
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and
Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions
that the "trespass" doctrine there enunciated can no longer
be regarded as controlling. The Government's activities in
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words
violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while
using the telephone booth, and thus constituted a "search
and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that
end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can
have no constitutional significance. The question remaining
for decision, then, is whether the search and seizure
conducted in this case complied with constitutional
standards. In that regard, the Government's position is that
its agents acted in an entirely defensible manner: they did
not begin their electronic surveillance until investigation of
the petitioner's activities had established a strong probability
that he was using the telephone in question to transmit
gambling information to persons in other States, in violation
of federal law. Moreover, the surveillance was limited, both in
scope and in duration, to the specific purpose of establishing
the contents of the petitioner's unlawful telephonic
communications. The agents confined their surveillance to
the brief periods during which he used the telephone booth,
[Footnote 14] and they took great care to overhear only the
conversations of the petitioner himself. [Footnote 15]
Accepting this account of the Government's actions as
accurate, it is clear that this surveillance was so narrowly
circumscribed that a duly authorized magistrate, properly
notified of the need for such investigation, specifically
informed of the basis on which it was to proceed, and clearly
apprised of the precise intrusion it would entail, could
constitutionally have authorized, with appropriate
safeguards, the very limited search and seizure that the
Government asserts, in fact, took place. Only last Term we
sustained the validity of such an authorization, holding that,
under sufficiently "precise and discriminate circumstances," a
federal court may empower government agents to employ a
concealed electronic device "for the narrow and
particularized purpose of ascertaining the truth of the . . .
allegations" of a "detailed factual affidavit alleging the
commission of a specific criminal offense." Osborn v. United
States, 385 U. S. 323, 385 U. S. 329-330. Discussing that
holding, the Court in Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, said
that "the order authorizing the use of the electronic device" in
Page 70 of 190
Osborn "afforded similar protections to those . . . of
conventional warrants authorizing the seizure of tangible
evidence." Through those protections, "no greater invasion of
privacy was permitted than was necessary under the
circumstances." Id. at 388 U. S. 57. [Footnote 16] Here, too,
a similar judicial order could have accommodated "the
legitimate needs of law enforcement" [Footnote 17] by
authorizing the carefully limited use of electronic
surveillance.
The Government urges that, because its agents relied upon
the decisions in Olmstead and Goldman, and because they
did no more here than they might properly have done with
prior judicial sanction, we should retroactively validate their
conduct. That we cannot do. It is apparent that the agents in
this case acted with restraint. Yet the inescapable fact is that
this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by
a judicial officer. They were not required, before commencing
the search, to present their estimate of probable cause for
detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. They were not
compelled, during the conduct of the search itself, to observe
precise limits established in advance by a specific court
order. Nor were they directed, after the search had been
completed, to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all
that had been seized. In the absence of such safeguards,
this Court has never sustained a search upon the sole
ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of
a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to
the least intrusive means consistent with that end. Searches
conducted without warrants have been held unlawful
"notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable
cause," Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 269 U. S. 33,
for the Constitution requires "that the deliberate, impartial
judgment of a judicial officer . . . be interposed between the
citizen and the police. . . ." Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U. S. 471, 371 U. S. 481-482. "Over and again, this Court
has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth]
Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes,"
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 342 U. S. 51, and that
searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment [Footnote 18] --
subject only to a few specifically established and well
delineated exceptions. [Footnote 19]
It is difficult to imagine how any of those exceptions could
ever apply to the sort of search and seizure involved in this
case. Even electronic surveillance substantially
contemporaneous with an individual's arrest could hardly be
deemed an "incident" of that arrest. [Footnote 20] Nor could
the use of electronic surveillance without prior authorization
be justified on grounds of "hot pursuit." [Footnote 21] And, of
course, the very nature of electronic surveillance precludes
its use pursuant to the suspect's consent. [Footnote 22]
The Government does not question these basic principles.
Rather, it urges the creation of a new exception to cover this
case. [Footnote 23] It argues that surveillance of a telephone
booth should be exempted from the usual requirement of
advance authorization by a magistrate upon a showing of
probable cause. We cannot agree. Omission of such
authorization "bypasses the safeguards provided by an
objective predetermination of probable cause, and
substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-
the-event justification for the . . . search, too likely to be
subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight
judgment."
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 379 U. S. 96. And bypassing a
neutral predetermination of the scope of a search leaves
individuals secure from Fourth Amendment violations "only in
the discretion of the police." Id. at 379 U. S. 97.
These considerations do not vanish when the search in
question is transferred from the setting of a home, an office,
or a hotel room to that of a telephone booth. Wherever a
man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. The government
agents here ignored "the procedure of antecedent
justification . . . that is central to the Fourth Amendment,"
[Footnote 24] a procedure that we hold to be a constitutional
precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in
this case. Because the surveillance here failed to meet that
condition, and because it led to the petitioner's conviction,
the judgment must be reversed.
It is so ordered.
Page 71 of 190
2. CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ALFREDO MARTIN (G.R. No. 107383; February 20, 1996)
FACTS: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent
Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the
clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and
papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the
documents and papers and for damages against petitioner.
The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described
in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia
Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately
return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him damages.
In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the trial court's decision, petitioner's only ground is
that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled
that the documents and papers were admissible in evidence
and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso
Felix did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct, For
this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing
private respondent's complaint.
ISSUE: Were the documents indeed admissible in evidence?
HELD: No, the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence
[to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is
the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for
any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any
one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the
other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual
and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication
between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without
the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in confidence by
one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication;
quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the
duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
3. BLAS F. OPLE vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA (G.R. No. 127685
July 23, 1998)
FACTS: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation
of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of
privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be
vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against
further erosion. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a
system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope,
affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign
resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general
circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On
January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against
respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and
the heads of the government agencies, who as members of
the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with
the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its
implementation.
ISSUE: Is A.O. No. 308 not a mere administrative order but a
law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue?
HELD: A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
The Court rejects the argument that A.O. No. 308
implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code
of 1987. The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a
unified document the major structural, functional and
procedural principles of governance." and "embodies
changes in administrative structure and procedures designed
to serve the people."
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely
implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes
for the first time a National Computerized Identification
Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate
adjustment of various contending state policies — the
primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest
against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of
policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza
states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important
freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines
the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis
the State as well as the line that separates the administrative
power of the President to make rules and the legislative
power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a
subject that should be covered by law.
Page 72 of 190
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the
subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as
an administrative legislation because facially it violates the
right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let
alone." In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, we adopted the
Griswold ruling that there is a constitutional right to privacy.
Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique
Fernando, we held:
The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in
itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt:
"The concept of limited government has always
included the idea that governmental powers stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of
the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic
distinctions between absolute and limited
government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of
the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government safeguards a private sector, which
belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from
the public sector, which the state can control.
Protection of this private sector — protection, in
other words, of the dignity and integrity of the
individual — has become increasingly important as
modern society has developed.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in
our laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of
his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable
torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the
privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee
or any private individual liable for damages for any violation
of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes
the privacy of letters and other private communications. The
Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets
by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets,
and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in
special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of
Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The
Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise
recognize the privacy of certain information.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further
look will show that it does not state whether encoding of data
is limited to biological information alone for identification
purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the
adoption of the Identification Reference System will
contribute to the "generation of population data for
development planning." This is an admission that the PRN
will not be used solely for identification but the generation of
other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of
A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can
give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve
information for a purpose other than the identification of the
individual through his PRN. The potential for misuse of the
data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be
undarplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said
administrative order, an individual must present his PRN
everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of
basic services and security. His transactions with the
government agency will necessarily be recorded — whether
it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the
agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for
loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and
liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization,
etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the
chance of building a huge formidable information base
through the electronic linkage of the files.
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of
assuring that personal information which will be gathered
about our people will only be processed for unequivocally
specified purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this
regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's
liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track
down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and circumvent
the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for
"fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and
computer technology are accentuated when we consider that
the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed
on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data
encoded. 62 They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of
Rights seeks to prevent.
The Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's
abridgment of the right of privacy by using the rational
relationship test. 75 He stressed that the purposes of A.O.
No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the
implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate
fraud by avoiding duplication of services, and (3) generate
population data for development planning. He cocludes that
these purposes justify the incursions into the right to privacy
for the means are rationally related to the end. We are not
impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, we upheld
the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared
that the law, in compelling a public officer to make an annual
report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of
income and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's
right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in
public administration by curtailing and minimizing the
opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a
standard of honesty in the public service. The same
circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A.
3019 is a statute, not an administrative order. Secondly, R.A.
3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what
practices were prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly
drawn to avoid abuses. IN the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may
have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass
constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to
privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy.
The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological
advancements that enhance public service and the common
good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and
a compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into
the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and
well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions.
We reiterate that any law or order that invades individual
privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny.
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of
man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from
various sources — governments, journalists, employers,
social scientists, etc. In th case at bar, the threat comes from
the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O.
No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by
giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will
facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping
power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the
danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to
compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens.
It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin,
Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live
burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his
limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-
keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to
forget."
Page 73 of 190
4. KILUSANG MAYO UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION
OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-
KMU), et. al vs. DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NEDA and
Secretary of DBM (G.R. No. 167798 April 19, 2006)
FACTS: On April 13, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo issued EO No. 420, reads –
REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND
GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND
HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID)
SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH
PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
directing all government agencies and government-owned
and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data co
llection and format for their existing identification (ID)
systems.
The EO was assailed as unconstitutional based on the same
grounds used in the earlier case of Ople vs. Torres. EO 420
is a usurpation of legislative power by the President and that
it is an infringement on the citizen’s right to privacy and that
the implementation of the EO will use public funds not
appropriated by Congress for that purpose. EO 420 is vague
and without adequate safeguards or penalties for any
violation of its provisions. Granting without conceding that
the President may issue EO 420, the Executive Order was
issued without public hearing.
ISSUE:
1. WON EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the
President.
2. WON EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy.
RULING: No. EO 420 does not establish a national ID card
system. EO 420 does not compel all citizens to have an ID
card. EO 420 applies only to government entities that under
existing laws are already collecting data and issuing ID cards
as part of their governmental functions.
Section 2 of EO 420 provides, "Coverage. – All government
agencies and government-owned and controlled
corporations issuing ID cards to their members or
constituents shall be covered by this executive order." EO
420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards
as part of their functions under existing laws. These
government entities have already been issuing ID cards even
prior to EO 420. Examples of these government entities are
the GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, Mayor’s Office, LTO, PRC, and
similar government entities. Section 1 of EO 420 directs
these government entities to "adopt a unified multi-purpose
ID system." Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as
part of their functions under existing laws are required to
adopt a uniform data collection and format for their IDs. The
purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are
to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure
compatibility, and provide convenience to the people served
by government entities.
At present, government entities like LTO require
considerably more data from applicants for identification
purposes. EO 420 will reduce the data required to be
collected and recorded in the ID databases of the
government entities. Government entities cannot collect or
record data, for identification purposes, other than the 14
specific data. Various laws allow several government entities
to collect and record data for their ID systems, either
expressly or impliedly by the nature of the functions of these
government entities. Under their existing ID systems, some
government entities collect and record more data than what
EO 420 allows.
A unified ID system for all these government entities can be
achieved in either of two ways. First, the heads of these
existing government entities can enter into a memorandum
of agreement making their systems uniform. If the
government entities can individually adopt a format for their
own ID pursuant to their regular functions under existing
laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID
format, especially if the uniform format will result in
substantial savings, greater efficiency, and optimum
compatibility. This is purely an administrative matter, and
does not involve the exercise of legislative power. Second,
the President may by executive or administrative order direct
the government entities under the Executive department to
adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
"President shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices." The same Section also mandates the
President to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the
President can direct all government entities, in the exercise
of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID
data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency,
reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public.
The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that
the laws are faithfully executed. There are several laws
mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase
efficiency, and in general, improve public services. The
adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO
420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in
general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420,
the President is simply performing the constitutional duty to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Clearly, EO 420
is well within the constitutional power of the President to
promulgate. The President has not usurped legislative power
in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power
– the President’s constitutional power of control over the
Executive department.
What require legislation are three aspects of a government
maintained ID card system. First, when the implementation
of an ID card system requires a special appropriation
because there is no existing appropriation for such purpose.
Second, when the ID card system is compulsory on all
branches of government, including the independent
constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on all
citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third,
when the ID card system requires the collection and
recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or
usually required for such purpose, such that the citizen’s
right to privacy is infringed. In the present case, EO 420 does
not require any special appropriation because the existing ID
card systems of government entities covered by EO 420
have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not
compulsory on all branches of government and is not
Page 74 of 190
compulsory on all citizens. EO 420 requires a very narrow
and focused collection and recording of personal data while
safeguarding the confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data
collected and recorded under EO 420 are far less than the
data collected and recorded under the ID systems existing
prior to EO 420.
Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right
to privacy. Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere
facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly
draws the data collection, recording and exhibition while
prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Ople v. Torres is not
authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy
because in that case the assailed executive issuance,
broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely
on the ground that the subject matter required legislation.
5. MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA vs. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C.
CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director
of Ilocos Norte and WILLIAM O. FANG, in his
capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP
Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte (G.R. No. 193636; July
24, 2012)
FACTS: At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner
Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras.
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275),
"Creating an Independent Commission to Address the
Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country." The
body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa
Commission, was formed to investigate the existence of
private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to
eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and
dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon the
conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission
released and submitted to the Office of the President a
confidential report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.:
The Independent Commission Against Private Armies’
Report to the President" (the Report). Gamboa alleged that
the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos
Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against
her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps
a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification,
PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her
to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion
in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening
news program the portion of the Report naming Gamboa as
one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG.
Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also
appeared on print media. Thus, she was publicly tagged as
someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified
information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and
forwarded to the Zeñarosa Commission. As a result, she
claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the
enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published
in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters and
other people identified with her, susceptible to harassment
and police surveillance operations.
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her
reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition
dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against respondents in their capacities as officials of the
PNP-Ilocos Norte. The case was docketed as Special Proc.
No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br. 13, which issued the
corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the Petition
meritorious on its face. However, RTC dismissed the Petition
on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through
substantial evidence that the subject information originated
from respondents, and that they forwarded this database to
the Zeñarosa Commission without the benefit of prior
verification. The trial court also ruled that even before
respondents assumed their official positions, information on
her may have already been acquired. The trial court
categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of
persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the Report,
constituted a violation of her right to privacy.
ISSUE: Was there a violation of Gamboa’s right to privacy?
HELD: This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently
establish that the data contained in the Report listing her as
a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of
the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the
PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act
that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty
or security.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of
private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the
duly constituted authority. It also provides for the
establishment of one police force that is national in scope
and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered
by a national police commission. Taking into account these
constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275
articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the
existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling
them permanently.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share
intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically
created for the purpose of investigating the existence of
these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa
Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police
force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had
the power to request assistance from the latter. Following the
pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the
PNP released information to the Zeñarosa Commission
without prior communication to Gamboa and without
affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be
interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy
since that act is an inherent and crucial component of
intelligence-gathering and investigation. Additionally,
Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation
system, which was used to update information on individuals
associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored
the situation on the field. Thus, safeguards were put in place
to make sure that the information collected maintained its
integrity and accuracy.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of
protection established in existing law and jurisprudence, this
Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these
investigating entities that information-sharing must observe
strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released
exclusively to the authorities empowered to receive the
relevant information. After all, inherent to the right to privacy
is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of one’s
person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a
way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary
sensibilities."
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has
long been recognized as a constitutional right. This Court, in
Morfe v. Mutuc, thus enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged
deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long
way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff
that the provision on the periodical submission of a
sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative
Page 75 of 190
of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much
to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty
in the constitutional sense must mean more than
freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it
must include privacy as well, if it is to be a
repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is
indeed the beginning of all freedom." As a matter of
fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr.
Justice Brandeis "the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men."
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it
does not likewise compel respect for his personality
as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and
interference demands respect.
The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is
fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of
Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that governmental
powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life
of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions
between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is
the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of
limited government, safeguards a private sector, which
belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the
public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this
private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and
integrity of the individual — has become increasingly
important as modern society has developed.
The right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that
must be protected from intrusion or constraint. However, in
Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,
this Court underscored that the right to privacy is not
absolute, viz:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners
claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that
privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution,
guarantees respect for the rights of persons
affected by the legislative investigation, not every
invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed
to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In
Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the
people to access information on matters of public
concern generally prevails over the right to privacy
of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we
declared that the right to privacy is not absolute
where there is an overriding compelling state
interest. Employing the rational basis relationship
test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no
infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as
the requirement to disclosure information is for a
valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the
government agencies involved in regulating banking
transactions adequately protect the public who
invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that
this purpose constitutes a reason compelling
enough to proceed with the assailed legislative
investigation.
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary
remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and
to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It
must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ
to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to
privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or
security on the other.

The notion of informational privacy is still developing in

Philippine law and jurisprudence. Considering that even the
Latin American habeas data, on which our own Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the
European tradition of data protection, this Court can be
guided by cases on the protection of personal data decided
by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR
ruled that the storage in the secret police register of
information relating to the private life of Leander, coupled
with the refusal to allow him the opportunity to refute the
same, amounted to an interference in his right to respect for
private life. However, the ECHR held that the interference
was justified on the following grounds: (a) the personnel
control system had a legitimate aim, which was the
protection of national security, and (b) the Personnel Control
Ordinance gave the citizens adequate indication as to the
scope and the manner of exercising discretion in the 6. RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and
collection, recording and release of information by the DAVID SUZARA vs ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE
authorities. RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES (G.R. No.
202666  September 29, 2014)
 
TOPIC: right to informational privacy, writ of habeas data

PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.

PREFATORY: The individual’s desire for privacy is never

absolute, since participation in society is an equally powerful
desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a
personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire
for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication
of himself to others, in light of the environmental conditions
and social norms set by the society in which he lives. – Alan
Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

FACTS: Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating

high school students at St. Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu
City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their
swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia
and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures
of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These
pictures were then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook
profile.

At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high

school department, learned from her students that some
seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves
from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres.  Escudero then
asked her students if they knew who the girls in the photos
are. In turn, they readily identified Julia and Julienne, among
others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to

their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed
her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia
and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes
inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of
Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the
entirety of their black brassieres.

Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times

when access to or the availability of the identified students’
photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but
were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.
Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other
students involved were barred from joining the
commencement exercises.

Page 76 of 190
Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors,
filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data.
RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data on the following
grounds:
1. Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an
actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to
privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of
the writ of habeas data.
2. The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook
without restrictions as to who may view them, lost
their privacy in some way.
3. STC gathered the photographs through legal
means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
implementation of the school’s policies and rules on
discipline.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was indeed an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty,
or security of the minors involved in this case. (Is there a
right to informational privacy in online social network
activities of its users?)
HELD: (Note that you can skip the preliminary discussions
and check the ruling at the latter part)
Nature of Writ of Habeas Data
It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy
in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.
It is an independent and summary remedy designed to
protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom
of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to
enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It
seeks to protect a person’s right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends.
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to
protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, among
others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined
habeas data as “a procedure designed to safeguard
individual freedom from abuse in the information age.”
Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements
1. The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy
2. An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim (proven by at least
substantial evidence)
Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an
alleged unauthorized access to information about a person.
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent
remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically
the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the
violation of such right can include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database or information or
files in possession or in control of respondents. Clearly then,
the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed
of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information
Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or
omissions of public officials and of private individuals or
entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data
Page 77 of 190
about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences,
or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not
be in the business of collecting or storing data.
To “engage” in something is different from undertaking
a business endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or
take part in something.” It does not necessarily mean
that the activity must be done in pursuit of a
business. What matters is that the person or entity must be
gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about
the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such
undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one
pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal
endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all,
is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to
said person or entity.
As such, the writ of habeas data may be issued against a
school like STC.
Right to informational privacy
Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals
to control information about themselves. Several
commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites,
however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, “in
this Social Networking environment, privacy is no longer
grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some
theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.” So the
underlying question now is: Up to what extent is the right
to privacy protected in OSNs?
 
Facebook Privacy Tools
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its
purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools
designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile as
well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the
South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the
users to “customize their privacy settings,” but did so with
this caveat: “Facebook states in its policies that, although it
makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these
privacy settings are not foolproof.”
For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and
accessibility of digital images (photos), posted on his or her
personal bulletin or “wall,” except for the user’s profile picture
and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
1. Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view
the photo;
2. Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and
their friends can view the photo;
3. Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the
photo;
4. Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular
friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and
5. Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the
user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users,
designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of
his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos,
among others, from another user’s point of view. In other
words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make
the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their
choice as to “when and to what extent to disclose facts
about themselves – and to put others in the position of
receiving such confidences.”
LONE ISSUE:
NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate
petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy as the subject digital
photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook
friends, or by the public at large.
 the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and
Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement palpable.
that the images were visible only to the five of them, and
without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other
students were able to view the photos, their statements are,
at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed

Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are the
minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using
their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no
special means to be able to view the allegedly private posts
were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it is
reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in
reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2)
by the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is

“Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in question
were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof
that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of
the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke
the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.
US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on
the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all
privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under
circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not
employ protective measures or devices that would have
controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.
United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of
transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect.
Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-
mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent
loses any semblance of privacy.
The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that
setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no
assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user
who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content.
The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or
tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or
not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a
person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the
person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the
post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.” Thus,
it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with
visibility set at “Friends Only” cannot easily, more so
automatically, be said to be “very private,” contrary to
petitioners’ argument.
No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of
minors
Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the
perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook
friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were
mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to
any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was
voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate
access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with
the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither
the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy
against the students who showed the images to Escudero.
Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or
“Custom”
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted
were limited to the original uploader, through the “Me Only”
privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been
screened to limit access to a select few, through the
“Custom” setting, the result may have been different, for in
such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular
post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all
7. LEE v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN (G.R. No. 203254,
October 08, 2014)
FACTS: In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas
Data, Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate
Lee were former common law partners. Sometime in July
2011, he visited Lee at the latter’s condominium, Ilagan
noticed that his digital camera was missing. Lee confronted
Ilagan at the latter’s office regarding a purported sex video
she discovered from the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan
and another woman.  
Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the
camera, but to no avail.  During the confrontation, Ilagan
allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a wall inside his office
and walked away.
Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in
filing various complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a
criminal complaint for violation of R.A. 9262; and (b) an
administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the
NAPOLCOM.  
Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject
video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper
echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet
violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy
but also that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a
writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted.
The RTC granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data in
Ilagan’s favor, and ordered the implementing officer to turn-
over copies of the subject video to him, and enjoined Lee
from further reproducing the same.
Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the
privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.
RULING: The petition is meritorious.
The Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was conceived as a
response, given the lack of effective and available remedies,
to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial
remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the

Page 78 of 190
right to informational privacy of individuals, which is defined
as “the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and
dissemination of data about oneself.”
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of
habeas data now stands as “a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home, and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.”  
Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such
writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires
that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he
manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how
it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party.” Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be
supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim.
In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas
data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to
sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or
security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex
video.
As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke,
alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s
privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are
crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on
either account certainly renders a habeas data petition
dismissible, as in this case.
Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as
the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it
proper to reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas
data petition.
Page 79 of 190
F. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND
CORRESPONDENCE
1. Francisco Chavez vs. Raul M. Gonzales and NTC
(G.R. No. 168338 | February 15, 2008)
Facts: As a consequence of the public release of copies of
the “Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes involving a
wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-
President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned
reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those
broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable
under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons
possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing
offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that
he had ordered the NBI to go after media organizations
“found to have caused the spread, the playing and the
printing of the contents of a tape.” Meanwhile, respondent
NTC warned TV and radio stations that their broadcast/airing
of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation
shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the
said media establishments. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition
under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and
the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.
Issues: (1) Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-
Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of
freedom of speech and of the press?
(2) Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ
Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of content-based
prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution? 
Held: (1) No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-
Wiretapping Law will not justify straitjacketing the exercise of
freedom of speech and of the press. A governmental action
that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on
content is given the strictest scrutiny, with
the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger
rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of
media, including broadcast media. Respondents, who have
the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of
speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and
present danger test. For this failure of the respondents alone
to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the
Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech
and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation
of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national
security of the State.
(2) Yes, the mere press statements of respondents
DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of content-
based prior restraint that has transgressed the
Constitution. It is not decisive that the press statements
made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up
with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press
statements were made by respondents while in the exercise
of their official functions. Any act done, such as a speech
uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official
capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint.  The
concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts already
converted to a formal order or official circular.  Otherwise, the
non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will
result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior
restraint.  
2. DISINI v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE (G.R. No.
203335)
IMPORTANT LAWS/STATUTES/PROVISIONS/SECTIONS
R.A. 10175
Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center.–
There is hereby created, within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as
the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center
(CICC), under the administrative supervision of the Office of
the President, for policy coordination among concerned
agencies and for the formulation and enforcement of the
national cybersecurity plan.
Sec. 26. Powers and Functions.– The CICC shall have the
following powers and functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend
immediate assistance of real time commission of cybercrime
offenses through a computer emergency response team
(CERT); x x x.
Art. 1, Sec. 6 Philippine Constitution
Sec 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress
of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS: These consolidated petitions seek to declare

several provisions of R.A. 10175, known as The Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012 unconstitutional and void. This case
holds a handful of petitions seeking the removal of different
sections deemed to be infringing on privacy rights and more.

For this instance, the focus is the creation of the “Cybercrime

Investigation and Coordinating Center” which, in the same
breath, promulgates powers and functions to the agents of
the said center. “Petitioners mainly contend that Congress
invalidly delegated its power when it gave the Cybercrime
Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to
formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient
standards or parameters for it to follow.”

“Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk

management approaches, actions, training, best practices,
assurance and technologies that can be used to protect
cyber environment and organization and user’s assets. This
definition serves as the parameters within which CICC
should work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the CICC is constitutional for it to

operate under delegated powers by Congress

HELD: YES. “In order to determine whether there is undue

delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two
tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when
it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce The second test mandates adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot.

Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed

the CICC to formulate and implement a national
cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the
petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to
follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.”

Page 80 of 190

3. MTRCB vs ABS CBN (G.R. No. 155282; January 17,
2005)
FACTS: On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening,
respondent ABS-CBN aired "Prosti-tuition," an episode of the
television (TV) program "The Inside Story" produced and
hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students
moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their
tuition fees. In the course of the program, student prostitutes,
pimps, customers, and some faculty members were
interviewed. The Philippine Women’s University (PWU) was
named as the school of some of the students involved and
the facade of PWU Building at Taft Avenue, Manila
conspicuously served as the background of the episode. The
showing of "The Inside Story" caused uproar in the PWU
community. Dr. Leticia P. de Guzman, Chancellor and
Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU Parents and Teachers
Association filed letter-complaints3 with petitioner MTRCB.
Acting on the letter-complaints, the MTRCB Legal Counsel
initiated a formal complaint with the MTRCB Investigating
Committee, alleging among others, that respondents (1) did
not submit "The Inside Story" to petitioner for its review and
(2) exhibited the same without its permission, thus, violating
Section 74 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 19865 and
Section 3,6 Chapter III and Section 7,7 Chapter IV of the
MTRCB Rules and Regulations respondents explained that
the "The Inside Story" is a "public affairs program, news
documentary and socio-political editorial," the airing of which
is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of
expression and of the press. Accordingly, petitioner has no
power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior
restraint upon respondents
ISSUE: Whether or not the “inside story” is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the
press
HELD: Respondents claim that the showing of "The Inside
Story" is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom
of speech and of the press. However, there has been no
declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that
freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred
status. If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt
religious programs from the jurisdiction and review power of
petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there is no justification
to exempt therefrom "The Inside Story" which, according to
respondents, is protected by the constitutional provision on
Page 81 of 190
freedom of expression and of the press, a freedom bearing
no preferred status. The only exceptions from the MTRCB’s
power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7
of P. D. No. 1986, such as (1) television programs imprinted
or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its
departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels.
4. Lester Packingham v. North Carolina, No. 15-1194,
June 19, 2017
FACTS: Lester Packingham was convicted of taking
“indecent liberties” with a minor in 2002, as a 21-year-old
college student. Per North Carolina law, he was sentenced to
a standard 10-12 month imprisonment, followed by a 24-
month supervised release. Aside from being told to “remain
away from” the minor, his conviction entailed no special
stipulations. Packingham was arrested in 2010 after
authorities came across a post on his Facebook profile,
thanking God for having a parking ticket dismissed. He was
arrested for violating North Carolina’s laws regarding
convicted sex offenders, which barred the offender’s access
to social media websites.
In his defense, Packingham argued that the law violated his
First Amendment rights. He was convicted in trial court,
which found that the state had a weighty interest in keeping
sexual predators off of social media websites for the
“protection of minors.” The North Carolina Court of Appeals
reversed and held that the social media website provision of
the law was unconstitutional. The North Carolina Supreme
Court reversed and held that the law was constitutional by
finding that the law was a “limitation on conduct” and not a
restriction of free speech. The court found that the state had
a sufficient interest in “forestalling the illicit lurking and
contact” of registered sex offenders and their potential future
victims.
ISSUE: Does the North Carolina Law violate the First
Amendment (Right to Freedom of Speech)?
HELD: YES. In order to be valid under the First Amendment,
a content-neutral regulation of speech must be narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest. In other
words, the law cannot burden substantially more speech
than necessary to advance the government’s legitimate
interest. In this case, although the government has a
legitimate interest in protecting children from abuse, this law
too broadly restricted access to all sorts of websites. Even if
it were limited only to social media websites, the law would
still unconstitutionally restrict speech because of the vast
number of functions that social media websites perform in
the modern world. First Amendment jurisprudence has never
allowed for such a broad regulation of speech, and similarly
broad restrictions have been struck down. However, a state
could accomplish the same goal by enacting a more narrowly
written statute.

Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., concurring in the judgment,

argued that the majority opinion erred in equating the entire
internet with a traditionally public forum instead of
recognizing the importance of allowing states to regulate
certain types of websites. The government certainly has a
compelling interest in protecting children from potential
sexual predation, and the internet is a place that allows
sexual offenders to contact children in ways that they might
not otherwise be able, so the government should be able to
regulate sex offenders’ use of the internet to an extent.
However, the North Carolina law at issue here went too far
because it encompassed websites that were unlikely to
facilitate a sex crime against a child. Because the North
Carolina law prohibited more speech than necessary to
further the government’s significant interest, it violated the
First Amendment.

Page 82 of 190
 5. Osmeña v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 132231, March 31,
1998
FACTS: Petitioners Emilio Osmeña is candidate for
President of the Philippines, while petitioner Pablo Garcia is
governor of Cebu Province, seeking reelection. They
contend that events after the ruling in National Press Club v.
COMELEC “have called into question the validity of the very
premises of that decision.” They seek a reexamination of the
validity of Sec. 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms
Law of 1987) which prohibits mass media from selling or
giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or
other political purposes, except to COMELEC.
Petitioners claim that experience in the last five years since
the decision shown the “undesirable effects” of the law
because “the ban on political advertising has not only failed
to level the playing field, but actually worked to the grave
disadvantage of the poor candidates” by depriving them of a
medium which they can afford to pay for while their more
affluent rivals can always resort to other means of reaching
voters like airplanes, boats, rallies, parades, and handbills.
No empirical data have been presented by petitioners to
back up their claim, however.
Unable to show the “experience” and “subsequent events”
which they claim invalidate the major premise of said
decision, petitioners now say “there is no need for ‘empirical
data’ to determine whether the political ad ban offends the
Constitution or not.” Instead they make arguments from
which it is clear that their disagreement is with the opinion of
the Court on the constitutionality of §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646
and that what they seek is a reargument on the same issue
already decided in that case.
ISSUE: Does Sec. 11(b) of RA 6646 violate the right to
freedom of expression of political ads?
HELD: NO. The term political “ad ban,” when used to
describe §11(b) of RA 6646, is misleading, for even as
§11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air
time to political candidates, it mandates the COMELEC to
procure and itself allocate to the candidates space and time
in the media. There is no suppression of political ads but only
a regulation of the time and manner of advertising. The law’s
concern is not with the message or content of the ad but with
ensuring media equality between candidates with “deep
pockets,” and those with less resources.
Thus, §11(b) states: “Prohibited Forms of Election
Propaganda.—In addition to the forms of election
propaganda prohibited in Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, it shall be unlawful:
(b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or
television station, or other mass media, or any
person making use of the mass media to sell or to
give free of charge print space or air time for
campaign or other political purposes except to the
Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality
who is a candidate for any elective public office
shall take a leave of absence from his work as such
during the campaign period.
On the other hand, the Omnibus Election Code provisions
referred to in §11(b) read:
SEC. 90. Comelec space.—The Commission shall
procure space in at least one newspaper of general
Page 83 of 190
circulation in every province or city: Provided,
however, That in the absence of said newspaper,
publication shall be done in any other magazine or
periodical in said province or city, which shall be
known as “Comelec Space” wherein candidates can
announce their candidacy. Said space shall be
allocated, free of charge, equally and impartially by
the Commission among all candidates within the
area in which the newspaper is circulated.
SEC. 92. Comelec time.—The Commission shall
procure radio and television time to be known as
“Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally
and impartially among the candidates within the
area of coverage of all radio and television stations.
For this purpose, the franchise of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time,
free of charge, during the period of the campaign.
In this case, there is no total ban on political ads, much less
restriction on the content of the speech. Given the fact that
print space and air time can be controlled or dominated by
rich candidates to the disadvantage of poor candidates, there
is a substantial or legitimate governmental interest justifying
exercise of the regulatory power of the COMELEC under Art.
IX-C, §4 of the Constitution, which provides:
The commission may, during the election period, supervise
or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
permits for the operation of transportation and other public
utilities, media of communication or information, all grants,
special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation
shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and
the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor,
for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
In short, the law only prohibits the sale or donation of print
space and air time to candidates but require the COMELEC
instead to procure space and time in the mass media for
allocation, free of charge, to the candidates. In effect, during
the election period, the COMELEC takes over the advertising
page of newspapers or the commercial time of radio and TV
stations and allocates these to the candidates. The main
purpose of §11(b) is regulatory. Any restriction on speech is
only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to
achieve its purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in
the use of mass media for political advertising. The
restriction on speech, as pointed out in NPC, is limited both
as to time and as to scope.
What petitioners seem to miss is that the prohibition against
paid or sponsored political advertising is only half of the
regulatory framework, the other half being the mandate of
the COMELEC to procure print space and air time so that
these can be allocated free of charge to the candidates.
It is finally argued by the petitioners that COMELEC Space
and COMELEC Time are ineffectual. It is claimed that people
hardly read or watch or listen to them. Again, this is a factual
assertion without any empirical basis to support it. To be
sure, this Court did not hold in PPI v. COMELEC that it
should not procure newspaper space for allocation to
candidates. What it ruled is that the COMELEC cannot
procure print space without paying just compensation.
Whether by its manifestation the COMELEC meant it is not
going to buy print space or only that it will not require
newspapers to donate free of charge print space is not clear
from the manifestation. It is to be presumed that the
COMELEC, in accordance with its mandate under §11(b)of
R.A. No. 6646 and §90 of the Omnibus Election Code, will
procure print space for allocation to candidates, paying just
compensation to newspapers providing print space.
In any event, the validity of a law cannot be made to depend
on the faithful compliance of those charged with its
enforcement but by appropriate constitutional provisions.
There is a remedy for such lapse if it should happen. In
addition, there is the COMELEC Time during which
candidates may advertise themselves. Resolution No. 2983-
A of the COMELEC provides:
SEC. 2. Grant of “Comelec Time.”—Every radio broadcasting
and television station operating under franchise shall grant
the Commission, upon payment of just compensation, at
least thirty (30) minutes of prime time daily, to be known as
“Comelec Time,” effective February 10, 1998 for candidates
for President, Vice-President and Senators, and effective
March 27, 1998, for candidates for local elective offices, until
May 9, 1998.
In Adiong v. COMELEC, the Test for Content-Neutral
Restrictions was quoted by the Court from the decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court sustaining a Los Angeles City ordinance
which prohibited the posting of campaign signs on public
property:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
It is an appropriate test for restrictions on speech which, like
§11(b), are content-neutral. Unlike content-based
restrictions, they are not imposed because of the content of
the speech. For this reason, content-neutral restrictions are
tests demanding standards. For example, a rule such as that
involved in Sanidad v. COMELEC, prohibiting columnists,
commentators, and announcers from campaigning either for
or against an issue in a plebiscite must have a compelling
reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict
scrutiny. These restrictions, it will be seen, are censorial and
therefore they bear a heavy presumption of constitutional
invalidity. In addition, they will be tested for possible
overbreadth and vagueness. It is apparent that these
doctrines have no application to content-neutral regulations
which, like §11(b), are not concerned with the content of the
speech. These regulations need only a substantial
governmental interest to support them. A deferential
standard of review will suffice to test their validity. Petition is
DISMISSED.
Page 84 of 190
6. Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC (G.R. No.
147571, May 5, 2001)
FACTS: Petitioner Social Weather Stations is a social
research institution conducting surveys in various fields,
including economics, politics, demography, and social
development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and
publicly reporting the results thereof. On the other hand,
petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the
Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which
features newsworthy items of information including election
surveys. Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to
enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006
(Fair Election Act), which provides:
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published
fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting
local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before
an election.
The term “election surveys” is defined in §5.1 of the law as
follows: “Election surveys refer to the measurement of
opinions and perceptions of the voters as regards a
candidate’s popularity, qualifications, platforms or a matter of
public discussion in relation to the election, including voters’
preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during
the campaign period.” To implement §5.4, Resolution 3636,
§24(h), COMELEC enjoins these Surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published 15 days before an election
and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published
7 days before an election.
Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election
survey throughout the period of the elections both at the
national and local levels and release to the media the results
of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioner
Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the other hand, states
that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last
day of the elections on May 14, 2001.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of
election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present
danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and
other pollsters conducted and published the results of
surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as
close as two days before the election day without causing
confusion among the voters and that there is neither
empirical nor historical evidence to support the conclusion
that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to the voting
process posed by election surveys. They point out that no
similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining
their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from
writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up
to the day of the election. Consequently, they contend that
there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to
the results of election surveys which are relatively objective.
Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the
restrictions in §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent
the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by
unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election.
It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of
election survey results during the period proscribed by law
bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e.,
the prevention of the debasement of the electoral process
resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and
absence of reply; (2) it narrowly tailored to meet the “evils”
sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of
expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in
duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the national election
and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it
does not prohibit election survey results but only require
timeliness. Respondent claims that in National Press Club v.
COMELEC, a total ban on political advertisements, with
candidates being merely allocated broadcast time during the
so-called COMELEC space or COMELEC hour, was upheld
by this Court. In contrast, according to respondent, it states
that the prohibition in §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 is much more
limited.
ISSUE: Is §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 unconstitutional for violating
the right to freedom of speech?
HELD: YES. §5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of
speech, expression, and the press by prohibiting the
publication of election survey results affecting candidates
within the prescribed periods. Because of the preferred
status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and
the press, such a measure is vitiated by a presumption of
invalidity. Indeed, “any system of prior restraints of
expression bearing a presumption against its constitutional
validity. . . . The Government ‘carries a heavy burden of
showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint.’
The test employed to determine the constitutional validity of
§5.4 is enunciated in United States v. O’Brien:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3]
if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and
press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest. Under this test, even if a law furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest, it should be
invalidated if such governmental interest is “not unrelated to
the suppression of free expression.” Moreover, even if the
purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the
law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on
freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to
achieve the governmental purpose in question.
First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet third criterion of the O’Brien test
because the causal connection of expression to the asserted
governmental interest makes such interest “not unrelated to
the suppression of free expression.” By prohibiting the
publication of election survey results because of the
possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity
of the election, §5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of
expression, while allowing the expression of opinion
concerning the same subject matter by newspaper
columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists,
and other opinion makers. In effect, §5.4 shows a bias for a
particular subject matter by preferring personal opinion to
statistical results. The inhibition of speech should be upheld
only if the expression falls within one of the few unprotected
categories dealt with in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, thus:
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace.
Contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the prohibition
imposed by §5.4 cannot be justified on the ground that it is
only for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition
may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of
expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes
a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made
less so because it is only for a period of 15 days immediately
before a national election and 7 days immediately before a
local election.
Page 85 of 190
This sufficiently distinguishes §5.4 from R.A. No. 6646, §ll(b),
which this Court found to be valid in National Press Club v.
COMELEC and Osmeña v. COMELEC. For the ban imposed
by R.A. No. 6646, §11(b) is not only authorized by a specific
constitutional provision, but it also provided an alternative so
that, as this Court pointed out in Osmeña, there was actually
no ban but only a substitution of media advertisements by
the COMELEC space and COMELEC hour.
Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be
promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the
resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, §5.4
nonetheless fails to meet fourth criterion of the O’Brien test.
As already stated, §5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute
pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect,
“junking” of weak or “losing” candidates, and resort to the
form of election cheating called “dagdag-bawas.”
Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they
cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of
expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued
by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of
apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such
evils. Thus, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
COMELEC is given the power:
To stop any illegal activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop
any unlawful, libelous, misleading or false election
propaganda, after due notice and hearing.
This is surely a less restrictive means than the prohibition
contained in §5.4. Pursuant to this power of the COMELEC,
it can confiscate bogus survey results calculated to mislead
voters. Candidates can have their own surveys conducted.
No right of reply can be invoked by others. No principle of
equality is involved. As for the purpose of the law to prevent
bandwagon effects, it is doubtful whether the Government
can deal with this natural-enough tendency of some voters.
To summarize then, §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a
prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct
and total suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3)
the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be
achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of
expression. Hence, petition for prohibition is GRANTED and
§5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 and §24(h) of COMELEC Resolution
3636 are declared unconstitutional.
 7. Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC (G.R. No.
208062, April 7, 2015)
FACTS: COMELEC Resolution No. 9674 directed Social
Weather Stations and Pulse Asia to submit to COMELEC the
names of all commissioners and payors of all surveys
published from February 12, 2013 to April 23, 2013, including
those of their “subscribers.” As recounted by SWS and Pulse
Asia, on February 15 to February 17, 2013, SWS conducted
a pre-election survey on voters’ preferences for senatorial
candidates. Thereafter, it published its findings. The following
question was asked in the survey:
Kung ang eleksyon ay gaganapin ngayon, sino ang
pinakamalamang ninyong iboboto bilang mga SENADOR ng
PILIPINAS? Narito ang listahan ng mga kandidato. Paki-
shade o itiman po ang naaangkop na oval katabi ng
pangalan ng mga taong pinakamalamang ninyong iboboto.
Maaari po kayong pumili ng hanggang labindalawang (12)
kandidato.
Rep. Tobias Tiangco, Secretary-General of the United
Nationalist Alliance (UNA), wrote Atty. Esmeralda Ladra,
Director of COMELEC’s Law Department asking COMELEC
to “compel SWS to either comply with the directive in the Fair
Elections Act and COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 and give
the names or identities of the subscribers who paid for the
pre-election survey conducted from February 15 to February
17, 2013, or be liable for the violation thereof, an act
constitutive of an election offense.” Tiangco recounted that
he wrote to SWS requesting that he be furnished the identity
of persons who paid for the pre-election survey. SWS
supposedly replied to Tiangco, “furnishing him with some
particulars about the survey but without disclosing the
identity of the persons who commissioned or subscribed to
the survey.”
Acting on Tiangco’s letter and on the COMELEC Law
Department’s recommendation, the COMELEC En Banc
issued the Order setting the matter for hearing and directed
SWS and Pulse Asia to submit its Comment within three (3)
days of receipt. During the hearing, Chairman Sixto Brillantes
stated that the proceeding was merely a clarificatory hearing
and not a formal hearing or an investigation. On April 23,
2013, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution No. 9674.
As basis for Resolution No. 9674, COMELEC cited Article IX-
C, Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Sections 5.1 to
5.3 of Republic Act No. 9006, otherwise known as the Fair
Elections Act, as implemented by COMELEC Resolution No.
9615.
SWS and Pulse Asia alleged that following the issuance of
Resolution No. 9674, they have not been furnished copies of
Resolution No. 9674. They also articulated their view that
Resolution No. 9674 was tainted with irregularities, having
been issued ultra vires and in violation of the non-impairment
of contracts clause of the Constitution. Thus, they requested
that COMELEC defer or hold in abeyance Resolution No.
9674’s enforcement.
COMELEC Law Department issued a Notice to SWS and
Pulse Asia directing it to furnish COMELEC with a list of the
names of all commissioners, subscribers, and payors of
surveys published and failure to comply with the Notice shall
constitute an election offense punishable under the Omnibus
Election Code. COMELEC then issued a Subpoena notifying
SWS and Pulse Asia that a Complaint “for violation of
Section 264, pars. 1 and 2 of the Omnibus Election Code in
relation to R.A. No. 9006” was filed against them. SWS and
Pulse Asia maintained that before receiving the Subpoena,
they were never informed that a criminal case had been filed
against them. They added that they were never furnished
copies of the relevant criminal Complaint. Hence, the case.
Page 86 of 190
The petitioners are of the position that Resolution No. 9674,
in requiring the submission of information on subscribers, is
in excess of what the Fair Elections Act requires.
ISSUE: Is Resolution No. 9674 invalid for requiring the
disclosure of the names of “subscribers” of election surveys
as curtailment of the rights of petitioners to free speech?
HELD: NO. The names of those who commission or pay for
election surveys, including subscribers of survey firms, must
be disclosed pursuant to Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Elections
Act. This requirement is a valid regulation in the exercise of
police power and effects the constitutional policy of
“guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public
service.” Section 5.2(a)’s requirement of disclosing
subscribers neither curtails petitioners’ free speech rights nor
violates the constitutional proscription against the impairment
of contracts.
Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Elections Act, read in a manner
consistent not only with its text but also with the purpose for
which it, along with the Fair Elections Act, was adopted,
sustains COMELEC’s position. Republic Act No. 9006 was
adopted with the end in mind of “guaranteeing or ensuring
equal opportunity for public service” and to this end,
stipulates mechanisms for the “supervision or regulation of
the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the
operation of media of communication or information.”
The Fair Elections Act provides means to realize the policy
articulated in Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution to
“guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service.”
Article II, Section 26 models an understanding of Philippine
political and electoral reality as it sums up an aversion to the
perpetuation of political power through electoral contests
skewed in favor of those with resources to dominate the
deliberative space in any media.
Moreover, the constitutional desire to “guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service” is the same intent
that animates the Constitution’s investiture in COMELEC of
the power to “supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges,
or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
GOCC or its subsidiary.”
The Fair Elections Act also governs published surveys during
elections. Section 5.1 defines election surveys as “the
measurement of opinions and perceptions of the voters as
regards a candidate’s popularity, qualifications, platforms or
a matter of public discussion in relation to the election,
including voters’ preference for candidates or publicly
discussed issues during the campaign period.” Sections 5.2
and 5.3 provide regulations that facilitate transparency with
respect to election surveys. Section 5.2 enumerates the
information that a person publishing an election survey must
publish along with the survey itself.
The inclusion of election surveys in the list of items regulated
by the Fair Elections Act is a recognition that election
surveys are not a mere descriptive aggregation of data.
Publishing surveys are a means to shape the preference of
voters, inform the strategy of campaign machineries, and
ultimately, affect the outcome of elections. Election surveys
have a similar nature as election propaganda. They are
expensive, normally paid for by those interested in the
outcome of elections, and have tremendous consequences
on election results.

The bandwagon effect in election surveys published during
election periods create the “politics of expectations.” Voters
act in accordance with what is perceived to be an existing or
emerging state of affairs with respect to how candidates are
faring. Surveys can warp existing public opinion and can
mold public opinion. Published election surveys offer
valuable insight into public opinion not just because they
represent it but more so because they also tend to make it.
Appreciating this tendency to both entrench and marginalize
is of relevance in the context of Philippine political reality.
This is the same reality that our policymakers, primarily the
framers of the Constitution, have seen fit to address.
To reiterate, the inclusion of published election surveys in a
statute that regulates election propaganda and other means
through which candidates may shape voter preferences is
itself telling of the recognition that published election
surveys, too, may influence voter preferences. This inclusion
is similarly telling of a recognition that, left unregulated,
election surveys can undermine the purposes of ensuring
“fair” elections. It is necessary that the Fair Elections Act be
appreciated for what it is: a mechanism for ensuring equality.
The Fair Elections Act is a means to effect the “necessary
condition” to a genuine democratic dialogue, to realizing a
deliberative democracy.
In any case, the requirement of disclosing subscribers is
neither unduly burdensome nor onerous. Prior to the
promulgation of Resolution No. 9674, survey firms are
already understood to be bound by the requirement to
disclose those who commission or pay for published election
surveys. Petitioners have been complying with this without
incident since the Fair Elections Act was enacted in 2001.
After more than a decade of compliance, it is odd for
petitioners to suddenly assail the disclosure requirement as
unduly burdensome or onerous.
However, it is evident that Resolution No. 9674 was
promulgated in violation of the period set by the Fair
Elections Act. Petitioners were also not served a copy of
Resolution No. 9674 with which it was asked to comply. They
were neither shown nor served copies of the criminal
Complaint subject of E.O. Case No. 13-222. Petitioners’ right
to due process was, thus, violated.

What is involved here is petitioners’ freedom of speech and

of expression, that is, to publish their findings. More
specifically, what is involved here is their right to political
speech, that which “refers to speech ‘both intended and
received as a contribution to public deliberation about some
issue,’ ‘fostering informed and civic-minded deliberation.’ The
nature of the speech involved, as well as the Fair Elections
Act’s purpose of ensuring political equality, calls into
operation the equality-based approach to weighing liberty to
express vis-à-vis equality of opportunities.

Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns

made by persons who are not candidates or who do not
speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a
whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the public
must consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such
regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of according the
fullest possible range of opinions coming from the electorate
including those that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and
robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.

Concededly, what are involved here are not election

propaganda per se. Election surveys, on their face, do not
state or allude to preferred candidates. Election surveys
become unambiguous only when viewed in relation to the
end for which they are employed. To those whose end is to
get a candidate elected, election surveys, when limited to
their own private consumption, are a means to formulate
strategy. When published, however, the tendency to shape
voter preferences comes into play. In this respect, published
election surveys partake of the nature of election
propaganda. It is then declarative speech in the context of an
electoral campaign properly subject to regulation. Hence,
Section 5.2 of the Fair Elections Act’s regulation of published
surveys.

While it does regulate expression (i.e., petitioners’

publication of election surveys), it does not go so far as to
suppress desired expression. There is neither prohibition nor
censorship specifically aimed at election surveys. The
freedom to publish election surveys remains. All Resolution
No. 9674 does is articulate a regulation as regards the
manner of publication, that is, that the disclosure of those
who commissioned and/or paid for, including those
subscribed to, published election surveys must be made.

Page 87 of 190
 8. GMA Network v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 205357,
September 2, 2014)
FACTS: The heart of the controversy revolves upon the
proper interpretation of the limitation on the number of
minutes that candidates may use for television and radio
advertisements, as provided in Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006,
(Fair Election Act):
Sec. 6. Equal Access to Media Time and Space.—All
registered parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal
access to media time and space. The following guidelines
may be amplified on by the COMELEC:
6.2 (a) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party
for a nationally elective office shall be entitled to not more
than one hundred twenty (120) minutes of television
advertisement and one hundred eighty (180) minutes of radio
advertisement whether by purchase or donation.
(b) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a
locally elective office shall be entitled to not more than sixty
(60) minutes of television advertisement and ninety (90)
minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or
donation.
For this purpose, the COMELEC shall require any broadcast
station or entity to submit to the COMELEC a copy of its
broadcast logs and certificates of performance for the review
and verification of the frequency, date, time and duration of
advertisements broadcast for any candidate or political party.
During the previous elections of May 14, 2007 and May 10,
2010, COMELEC issued Resolutions implementing and
interpreting Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006, regarding airtime
limitations, to mean that a candidate is entitled to the stated
number of minutes “per station.” For the May 2013 elections,
however, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution
No. 9615 changing the interpretation of said candidates’ and
political parties’ airtime limitation for political campaigns or
advertisements from a “per station” basis, to a “total
aggregate” basis.
Petitioners ABS-CBN, ABC, GMA, MBC, NBN, and RMN,
owners/operators of radio and television networks in the
Philippines, and petitioner Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng
Pilipinas (KBP), the national organization of broadcasting
companies in the Philippines representing operators of radio
and television stations and said stations themselves, sent
their respective letters to the COMELEC questioning the
provisions of the aforementioned Resolution, thus, the
COMELEC held public hearings. Thereafter, respondent
issued Resolution No. 9631 amending provisions of
Resolution No. 9615. Nevertheless, petitioners still found the
provisions objectionable and oppressive.
Petitioners posit that Section 9(a) of the assailed Resolution
provides for a very restrictive aggregate airtime limit and a
vague meaning for a proper computation of “aggregate total”
airtime, and violates the equal protection guarantee, thereby
defeating the intent and purpose of R.A. No. 9006.
Petitioners contend that Section 9(a), which imposes a notice
requirement, is vague and infringes on the constitutionally
protected freedom of speech, of the press and of expression,
and on the right of people to be informed on matters of public
concern Also, Section 9(a) is a cruel and oppressive
regulation as it imposes an unreasonable and almost
impossible burden on broadcast mass media of monitoring a
candidate’s or political party’s aggregate airtime, otherwise, it
may incur administrative and criminal liability.
Respondent maintains that the per candidate rule or total
aggregate airtime limit is in accordance with R.A. No. 9006
Page 88 of 190
as this would give life to the constitutional objective to
equalize access to media during elections. It sees this as a
more effective way of levelling the playing field between
candidates/political parties with enormous resources and
those without much. Moreover, the COMELEC’s issuance of
the assailed Resolution is pursuant to Section 4, Article IX(C)
of the Constitution which vests on the COMELEC the power
to supervise and regulate, during election periods,
transportation and other public utilities, as well as mass
media.
Respondent also sees no prior restraint in the provisions
requiring notice to the COMELEC for appearances or
guestings of candidates in bona fide news broadcasts. It
points out that the fact that notice may be given 24 hours
after first broadcast only proves that the mechanism is for
monitoring purposes only, not for censorship. Further,
respondent argues, that for there to be prior restraint, official
governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression must be done in advance of actual publication or
dissemination. Moreover, petitioners are only required to
inform the COMELEC of candidates’/parties’ guestings, but
there is no regulation as to the content of the news or the
expressions in news interviews or news documentaries.
Respondent then emphasized that the Supreme Court has
held that freedom of speech and the press may be limited in
light of the duty of the COMELEC to ensure equal access to
opportunities for public service.
ISSUE: Does Section 9(a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
9615 violate the petitioners’ right of speech?
HELD: YES. The authority of the COMELEC to impose
airtime limits directly flows from the Fair Election Act—120
minutes of television advertisement and 180 minutes for
radio advertisement. For the 2013 elections, the COMELEC,
through Resolution No. 9615, chose to aggregate the total
broadcast time among the different broadcast media, thus:
Section 9. Requirements and/or Limitations on the Use of
Election Propaganda through Mass Media.—All parties and
bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media time
and space for their election propaganda during the campaign
period subject to the following requirements and/or
limitations:
a. Broadcast Election Propaganda
The duration of an airtime that a candidate, or party may use
for their broadcast advertisements or election propaganda
shall be, as follows: In cases where two or more candidates
or parties whose names, initials, images, brands, logos,
insignias, color motifs, symbols, or forms of graphical
representations are displayed, exhibited, used, or mentioned
together in the broadcast election propaganda or
advertisements, the length of time during which they appear
or are being mentioned or promoted will be counted against
the airtime limits allotted for the said candidates or parties
and the cost of the said advertisement will likewise be
considered as their expenditures, regardless of whoever paid
for the advertisements or to whom the said advertisements
were donated.
From the foregoing, it appears that COMELEC did not have
any other basis for coming up with a new manner of
determining allowable time limits except its own idea as to
what should be the maximum number of minutes based on
its exercise of discretion as to how to level the playing field.
COMELEC is duty bound to come up with reasonable basis
for changing the interpretation and implementation of the
airtime limits It could not simply adopt measures or
regulations just because it feels that it is the right thing to do,
insofar as it might be concerned. It does have discretion, but
such discretion is something that must be exercised within
the bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is not free
to simply change the rules especially if it has consistently
interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the
past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same must be
properly explained with sufficient basis.
What the COMELEC came up with does not measure up to
that level of requirement and accountability which elevates
administrative rules to the level of respectability and
acceptability. Those governed by administrative regulations
are entitled to a reasonable and rational basis for any
changes in those rules by which they are supposed to live
by, especially if there is a radical departure from the previous
ones. The COMELEC went beyond the authority granted it
by the law in adopting “aggregate” basis in the determination
of allowable airtime. The law, on its face, does not justify a
conclusion that the maximum allowable airtime should be
based on the totality of possible broadcast in all television or
radio stations.
Section 9(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its
adoption of the “aggregate-based” airtime limits
unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech
and of the press. Political speech is one of the most
important expressions protected by the Fundamental Law. In
regard to limitations on political speech relative to other state
interests, an American case observed:
increase in television exposure can significantly boost a
candidate’s popularity, name recall and electability.” If that be
so, then drastically curtailing the ability of a candidate to
effectively reach out to the electorate would unjustifiably
curtail his freedom to speak as a means of connecting with
the people.
It should be understandable that when an administrative rule
is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs
nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative
rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can
facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of
the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of
those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to
those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter
to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the
force and effect of law.
However, the legal duty of monitoring lies with the Comelec.
Broadcast stations are merely required to submit certain
documents to aid the Comelec in ensuring that candidates
are not sold airtime in excess of the allowed limits. Further,
pursuant to Resolution No. 9631, the respondent revised the
third paragraph of Section 9(a).

A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can

spend on political communication during a campaign
necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is
because virtually every means of communicating ideas in
today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money. The
electorate’s increasing dependence on television, radio, and
other mass media for news and information has made these
expensive modes of communication indispensable
instruments of effective political speech.

The assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is

unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and
constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to
reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the
adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime
limits — leveling the playing field — does not constitute a
compelling state interest which would justify such a
substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and
political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies,
platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially
so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of
such a prohibitive measure. In this particular instance, what
the COMELEC has done is analogous to letting a bird fly
after one has clipped its wings.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt

the aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time when we
consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so
many islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects
spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly,
for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the
electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that
he conveys his message through his advertisements in
languages and dialects that the people may more readily
understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in
different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such
candidate to express himself — a form of suppression of his
political speech.

Respondent itself states that “television is arguably the most

cost-effective medium of dissemination. Even a slight

Page 89 of 190

9. Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, 747 SCRA SCRA
1 (2015) Ponente: Justice Leonen
FACTS: This is a case centered on whether the COMELEC
has the competence to limit expressions made by citizens –
who are not candidates – during elections.
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted 2 tarpaulins within
a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately 6 feet by 10 feet
in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within the public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message “IBASURA RH Law”. The second tarpaulin is the
subject of the present case. This second tarpaulin contains
the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either
“(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “Pro-RH)
Team Patay” with an “X” mark. Basically, the electoral
candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of RH Law.
TEAM BUHAY TEAM PATAY
Estrada, JV Angara, Juan Edgardo
Honasan, Gregorio Casiño, Teddy
Magsaysay, Mitos Cayetano, Alan Peter
Pimentel, Koko Enrile, Jackie
Trillanes, Antonio Escudero, Francis
Villar, Cynthia Hontiveros, Risa
Party List Buhay Legarda, Loren
Party List Ang Pamilya Party List Gabriela
Party List Akbayan
Party List Bayan Muna
Party List Anak Pawis
During oral arguments, respondents conceded that the
tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin
contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but not
of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but
were not candidates for that election.
On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon
as Election Officer of Bacolod City issued a notice to
Remove Campaign Materials within 3 days from receipt “for
being oversized” addressed to Rev. Bishop Vicente M.
Navarra. COMELEC Resolution No. 9165 provides for the
size requirement of 2 feet by 3 feet.
On February 25, 2013, petitioners replied requesting that 1)
petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by the COMELEC
Law Department regarding the tarpaulin, and that 2) pending
this opinion and the availment of legal remedies, the
tarpaulin be allowed to remain.
COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the
immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be
constrained to file an election offense against petitioners.
Concerned about an imminent threat of prosecution for their
exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case. They
question the respondent’s notice and letter. They also prayed
for:
1) the grant of their petition,
2) temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining respondents from
further proceeding in enforcing their orders for the removal of
the Team Patay tarpaulin and that
3) after notice and hearing, a decision be rendered declaring
the questioned orders of respondents as unconstitutional and
void, and permanently restraining respondents from
enforcing them or any other similar order.
Page 90 of 190
Trial Court: Issued a TRO enjoining respondents from
enforcing the assailed notice and letter.
One of the arguments of the respondents is that the tarpaulin
is an election propaganda subject to regulation by
COMELEC pursuant to its mandate under Article IX-C,
Section 4 of the Constitution. Hence, the respondents claim
that the issuances ordering its removal for being oversized
are valid and constitutional.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC has legal basis to
regulate expressions made by private citizens (No)
2. Whether or not the petitioner’s fundamental right to
freedom of speech was violated by the issuance of
notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin (Yes)
3. Whether or not large tarpaulins are part of expression
protected under Art. III, Sec. 4 of the Constitution (Yes)
4. Whether or not the tarpaulin is an election propaganda,
being petitioner’s way of endorsing candidates who
voted against the RH Law (No)
5. Whether or not the COMELEC Law Department’s
notice and letter removing petitioner’s tarpaulin valid
and constitutional (No)
RULING:
PROCEDURAL ISSUES – Rule 65 is proper. This case may
be heard and ruled by the Supreme Court.
Respondent assails that the notice and letter are not final
orders of the COMELEC En Banc in the exercise of its
adjudicatory powers, reviewable via Rule 64 of the ROC.
The Court ruled that in the present case, petitioners are not
candidates seeking for public office. Their petition is filed to
assert their fundamental right to expression.
Furthermore, all these cases cited by respondents pertained
to COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
power. This case pertains to acts of COMELEC in the
implementation of its regulatory powers. When it issued the
notice and letter, the COMELEC was allegedly enforcing
election laws.
It is clear that the subject matter of the controversy is the
effect of COMELEC’s notice and letter on free speech.
Certainly, a breach of the fundamental right of expression by
COMELEC is a gave abuse of discretion. Thus, the
constitutionality of the notice and letter coming from
COMELEC is within this court’s power to review.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES –
1. No. The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC had no
legal basis to regulate expressions made by private
citizens. Provisions [in the Constitution], laws and
jurisprudence pertain to candidates and political
parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do
they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not
have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by
a non-candidate in this case.
Respondents considered the tarpaulin as a campaign
material in their issuances. The provisions asserted by the
respondents regulating the posting of campaign materials
only apply to candidates and political parties, and petitioners
are neither of the two.
Furthermore, the tarpaulin was not paid for by any candidate
or political party. There was no allegation that petitioners
coordinated with any of the persons named in the tarpaulin
regarding its posting. On the other hand, petitioners posted
the tarpaulin as part of their advocacy against the RH Law.
In this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of
public concern, that is, a statement of either appreciation or
criticism on votes made in the passing of the RH law. Thus,
petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression.
2. Yes. The Court ruled that:
Fundamental to the consideration of this issue is Article III,
Section 4 of the Constitution:
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
No law. . .
While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but
an opinion by the COMELEC Law Department, this court has
applied Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution even to
governmental acts.
Our Constitution has also explicitly included the freedom of
expression, separate and in addition to the freedom of
speech and of the press provided in the US Constitution. The
word "expression" was added in the 1987 Constitution by
Commissioner Brocka for having a wider scope:
MR. BROCKA: This is a very minor amendment,
Mr. Presiding Officer. On Section 9, page 2, line 29,
it says: "No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech." I would like to recommend to
the Committee the change of the word "speech" to
EXPRESSION; or if not, add the words AND
EXPRESSION after the word "speech," because it
is more expansive, it has a wider scope, and it
would refer to means of expression other than
speech.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): What
does the Committee say?
FR. BERNAS: "Expression" is more broad than
speech. We accept it.
MR. BROCKA: Thank you.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): Is it
accepted?
FR. BERNAS: Yes.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): Is there
any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the
amendment is approved.
FR. BERNAS: So, that provision will now read: "No
law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, expression or of the press . . . ." Speech
may be said to be inextricably linked to freedom
itself as "[t]he right to think is the beginning of
freedom, and speech must be protected from the
government because speech is the beginning of
thought."
Communication and Speech
Page 91 of 190
Communication is an essential outcome of protected speech.
Communication exists when "(1) a speaker, seeking to signal
others, uses conventional actions because he or she
reasonably believes that such actions will be taken by the
audience in the manner intended; and (2) the audience so
takes the actions." "[I]n communicative action[,] the hearer
may respond to the claims by . . . either accepting the
speech act’s claims or opposing them with criticism or
requests for justification."
Speech is not limited to vocal communication. "[C]onduct is
treated as a form of speech sometimes referred to as
‘symbolic speech[,]’" such that "‘when ‘speech’ and
‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of
conduct,’ the ‘communicative element’ of the conduct may be
‘sufficient to bring into play the [right to freedom of
expression].’"
The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire
continuum of speech from utterances made to conduct
enacted, and even to inaction itself as a symbolic manner of
communication.
Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it
been said that the Bill of Rights that guarantees to the
individual the liberty to utter what is in his mind also
guarantees to him the liberty not to utter what is not in his
mind. The salute is a symbolic manner of communication
that conveys its message as clearly as the written or spoken
word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot be compelled
any more than it can be prohibited in the face of valid
religious objections like those raised in this petition. To
impose it on the petitioners is to deny them the right not to
speak when their religion bids them to be silent. This
coercion of conscience has no place in the free society.
The democratic system provides for the accommodation of
diverse ideas, including the unconventional and even the
bizarre or eccentric. The will of the majority prevails, but it
cannot regiment thought by prescribing the recitation by rote
of its opinions or proscribing the assertion of unorthodox or
unpopular views as in this case. The conscientious
objections of the petitioners, no less than the impatience of
those who disagree with them, are protected by the
Constitution. The State cannot make the individual speak
when the soul within rebels.
Even before freedom "of expression" was included in Article
III, Section 4 of the present Constitution, this court has
applied its precedent version to expressions other than
verbal utterances.
3. Yes. The Court ruled that size does matter. The form
of expression is just as important as the information
conveyed that it forms part of the expression.
The court ruled that size matters because:
A) It enhances efficiency in communication.
B) The size of tarpaulin may underscore the importance of
the message to the reader
C) Lager spaces allow for more messages. Larger spaces
may translate to more opportunities to amplify and argue
points which the speakers might want to communicate.
These points become more salient when it is the electorate,
not the candidates or the political parties, that speaks. Too
often, the terms of public discussion during elections are
framed and kept hostage by brief and catchy but
meaningless sound bites extolling the character of the
candidate. Worse, elections sideline political arguments and
privilege the endorsement by celebrities. Rather than provide
obstacles to their speech, government should in fact
encourage it. Between the candidates and the electorate, the
latter have the better incentive to demand discussion of the
more important issues. Between the candidates and the
electorate, the former have better incentives to avoid difficult
political standpoints and instead focus on appearances and
empty promises.
Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and
place. They are fundamentally part of expression protected
under Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution.
4. No. The Supreme Court held that the tarpaulin is not
an election propaganda.
“The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda"
refers to any matter broadcasted, published, printed,
displayed or exhibited, in any medium, which contain the
name, image, logo, brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and
other symbol or graphic representation that is capable of
being associated with a candidate or party, and is intended
to draw the attention of the public or a segment thereof to
promote or oppose, directly or indirectly, the election of the
said candidate or candidates to a public office.” It is clear that
this paragraph suggests that personal opinions are not
included, while sponsored messages are covered.
While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of
the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin
was not paid for or posted "in return for consideration" by any
candidate, political party, or party-list group.
Long Note:
Speech and equality:
Some considerations We first establish that there are two
paradigms of free speech that separate at the point of giving
priority to equality vis-à-vis liberty.
In an equality-based approach, "politically disadvantaged
speech prevails over regulation[,] but regulation promoting
political equality prevails over speech." This view allows the
government leeway to redistribute or equalize ‘speaking
power,’ such as protecting, even implicitly subsidizing,
unpopular or dissenting voices often systematically subdued
within society’s ideological ladder. This view acknowledges
that there are dominant political actors who, through
authority, power, resources, identity, or status, have
capabilities that may drown out the messages of others. This
is especially true in a developing or emerging economy that
is part of the majoritarian world like ours.
The question of libertarian tolerance:
This balance between equality and the ability to express so
as to find one’s authentic self or to participate in the self
determination of one’s communities is not new only to law. It
has always been a philosophical problematique.
In his seminal work, Repressive Tolerance, philosopher and
social theorist Herbert Marcuse recognized how
institutionalized inequality exists as a background limitation,
rendering freedoms exercised within such limitation as
merely "protect[ing] the already established machinery of
discrimination." In his view, any improvement "in the normal
course of events" within an unequal society, without
subversion, only strengthens existing interests of those in
power and control.
In other words, abstract guarantees of fundamental rights
like freedom of expression may become meaningless if not
taken in a real context. This tendency to tackle rights in the
abstract compromises liberties. In his words:
Page 92 of 190
Liberty is self-determination, autonomy—this is
almost a tautology, but a tautology which results
from a whole series of synthetic judgments. It
stipulates the ability to determine one’s own life: to
be able to determine what to do and what not to do,
what to suffer and what not. But the subject of this
autonomy is never the contingent, private individual
as that which he actually is or happens to be; it is
rather the individual as a human being who is
capable of being free with the others. And the
problem of making possible such a harmony
between every individual liberty and the other is not
that of finding a compromise between competitors,
or between freedom and law, between general and
individual interest, common and private welfare in
an established society, but of creating the society in
which man is no longer enslaved by institutions
which vitiate self-determination from the beginning.
In other words, freedom is still to be created even
for the freest of the existing societies.277
(Emphasis in the original)
Marcuse suggests that the democratic argument — with all
opinions presented to and deliberated by the people —
"implies a necessary condition, namely, that the people must
be capable of deliberating and choosing on the basis of
knowledge, that they must have access to authentic
information, and that, on this basis, their evaluation must be
the result of autonomous thought."278 He submits that
"[d]ifferent opinions and ‘philosophies’ can no longer
compete peacefully for adherence and persuasion on
rational grounds: the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is organized and
delimited by those who determine the national and the
individual interest."279 A slant toward left manifests from his
belief that "there is a ‘natural right’ of resistance for
oppressed and overpowered minorities to use extralegal
means if the legal ones have proved to be inadequate."280
Marcuse, thus, stands for an equality that breaks away and
transcends from established hierarchies, power structures,
and indoctrinations. The tolerance of libertarian society he
refers to as "repressive tolerance."
Long Note #2:
There says that there are two views, right?
The first one is: “we have acknowledged the Constitution’s
guarantee for more substantive expressive freedoms that
take equality of opportunities into consideration during
elections.”
The other view is: that considerations of equality of
opportunity or equality in the ability of citizens as speakers
should not have a bearing in free speech doctrine. Under this
view, "members of the public are trusted to make their own
individual evaluations of speech, and government is
forbidden to intervene for paternalistic or redistributive
reasons . . . [thus,] ideas are best left to a freely competitive
ideological market." This is consistent with the libertarian
suspicion on the use of viewpoint as well as content to
evaluate the constitutional validity or invalidity of speech.
When private speech amounts to election paraphernalia
The traditional view has been to tolerate the viewpoint of the
speaker and the content of his or her expression. This view,
thus, restricts laws or regulation that allows public officials to
make judgments of the value of such viewpoint or message
content. This should still be the principal approach.
However, the requirements of the Constitution regarding
equality in opportunity must provide limits to some
expression during electoral campaigns.
Thus clearly, regulation of speech in the context of electoral
campaigns made by candidates or the members of their
political parties or their political parties may be regulated as
to time, place, and manner. This is the effect of our rulings in
Osmeña v. COMELEC and National Press Club v.
COMELEC.
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns
made by persons who are not candidates or who do not
speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a
whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the public
must consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such
regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of according the
fullest possible range of opinions coming from the electorate
including those that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and
robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.
What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech
forms: expression by the electorate that tends to rouse the
public to debate contemporary issues. This is not speech by
candidates or political parties to entice votes. It is a portion of
the electorate telling candidates the conditions for their
election. It is the substantive content of the right to suffrage.
This. is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy
that we should all deserve. It is protected as a fundamental
and primordial right by our Constitution. The expression in
the medium chosen by petitioners deserves our protection.
Petition GRANTED.

This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech

by a private citizen which will not amount to an election
paraphernalia to be validly regulated by law.

Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be

constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who
are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a
political party if they are not candidates, only if what is
regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has
for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only.
The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable,
(c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the
opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the
primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d)
demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that
object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time,
place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no
situation may the speech be prohibited or censored on the
basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter
whether the speech is made with or on private property.

This is not the situation, however, in this case for two

reasons. First, as discussed, the principal message in the
twin tarpaulins of petitioners consists of a social advocacy.
Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice
Antonio Carpio, the present law — Section 3.3 of Republic
Act No. 9006 and Section 6(c) of COMELEC Resolution No.
9615 — if applied to this case, will not pass the test of
reasonability. A fixed size for election posters or tarpaulins
without any relation to the distance from the intended
average audience will be arbitrary. At certain distances,
posters measuring 2 by 3 feet could no longer be read by the
general public and, hence, would render speech
meaningless. It will amount to the abridgement of speech
with political consequences.

5. No. The Court ruled that the COMELEC Law

Department’s notice and letter removing petitioner’s
tarpaulin is not valid and is unconstitutional.

COMELEC’s general role includes a mandate to ensure

equal opportunities and reduce spending among candidates
and their registered political parties. It is not to regulate or
limit the speech of the electorate as it strives to participate in
the electoral exercise.

Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed

by petitioners. It is a specie of expression protected by our
fundamental law. It is an expression designed to invite
attention, cause debate, and hopefully, persuade. It may be
motivated by the interpretation of petitioners of their
ecclesiastical duty, but their parishioner’s actions will have
very real secular consequences. Certainly, provocative
messages do matter for the elections.

Page 93 of 190

10. 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-Utak) vs.
COMELEC, 755 SCRA 441 Ponente: Justice Reyes
FACTS: On February 12, 2001, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9006, otherwise known as the "Fair Elections Act", was
passed. Section 9 thereof provides:
Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. - The
COMELEC may authorize political parties and
party-list groups to erect common poster areas for
their candidates in not more than ten (10) public
places such as plazas, markets, barangay centers
and the like, wherein candidates can post, display
or exhibit election propaganda: Provided that the
size of the poster areas shall not exceed twelve (12)
by sixteen (16) feet or its equivalent.
Independent candidates with no political parties
may likewise be authorized to erect common poster
areas in not more than ten (10) public places, the
size of which shall not exceed four (4) by six (6) feet
or its equivalent.
Candidates may post any lawful propaganda
material in private places with the consent of the
owner thereof, and in public places or property
which shall be allocated equitably and impartially
among the candidates.
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the rules
implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13,
2013 national and local elections and subsequent elections.
Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the prohibited forms of
election propaganda, pertinently provides:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. -
During the campaign period, it is unlawful:
xxxx
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign
or propaganda material outside of authorized
common poster areas, in public places, or in private
properties without the consent of the owner thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous
subsection (f) include any of the following:
xxxx
5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys,
trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles,
whether motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such
as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers, train
stations, and the like.
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall
be a cause for the revocation of the public utility franchise
and will make the owner and/or operator of the
transportation service and/or terminal liable for an election
offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as
implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules.
Page 94 of 190
In its letter dated January 30, 2013, the petitioner, through its
president, Melencio F. Vargas, sought clarification from the
COMELEC as regards the application of Resolution No.
9615, particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to
Section 7(f), vis-a-vis privately owned public utility vehicles
(PUVs) and transport terminals. The petitioner explained that
the prohibition stated in the aforementioned provisions
impedes the right to free speech of the private owners of
PUVs and transport terminals. The petitioner then requested
the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the
assailed provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and
transport terminals to post election campaign materials on
their vehicles and transport terminals.
On February 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute
Resolution No. 13-0214,5 which denied the petitioner's
request to reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g)
items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615.
The COMELEC en banc opined that Under the Constitution
itself, Section 6, Article XII, the use of property bears a social
function and all economic agents shall contribute to the
common good; and there is no higher Common good than
that as espoused in RA. 9006 – the equalization of
opportunities for all candidates for political office during
elections – a policy which Res. No. 9615 merely implements.
The exact purpose for placing political advertisements on a
PUV or in transport terminals is exactly because it is public
and can be seen by all; and although it is true that private
vehicles ply the same route as public vehicles, the exposure
of a [PUV] servicing the general, riding public is much more
compared to private vehicles. Categorizing PUVs and
transport terminals as 'public places' under Section 7 (f) of
Reso. No. 9615 is therefore logical. The same reasoning for
limiting political advertisements in print media, in radio, and
in television therefore holds true for political advertisements
in PUVs and transport terminals.
Petitioner’s argument: The petitioner maintains that Section
7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 violate the right to free speech of the
owners of PUVs and transport terminals; that the prohibition
curtails their ideas of who should be voted by the public.
Further, assuming that substantial public interest exists in the
said prohibition imposed under Resolution No. 9615, the
petitioner claims that the curtailment of the right to free
speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals is
much greater than is necessary to achieve the desired
governmental purpose, i.e., ensuring equality of opportunity
to all candidates in elective office.
Respondent’s argument: COMELEC points out that PUVs
and private transport terminals hold a captive audience - the
commuters, who have no choice but be subjected to the
blare of political propaganda. Thus, the COMELEC avers, it
is within its constitutional authority to prevent privately-owned
PUVs and transport terminals from concurrently serving
campaign materials to the captive audience that they
transport.
The COMELEC further claims that Resolution No. 9615 is a
valid content-neutral regulation and, thus, does not impinge
on the constitutional right to freedom of speech. It avers that
the assailed regulation is within the constitutional power of
the COMELEC pursuant to Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution. The COMELEC alleges that the regulation
simply aims to ensure equal campaign opportunity, time, and
space for all candidates - an important and substantial
governmental interest, which is totally unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; that any restriction on free
speech is merely incidental and is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of the said governmental
interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in
relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 which
prohibits the posting of any election campaign or propaganda
material in PUVs and public transport terminals are
constitutional.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of
Resolution No. 9615 are null and void for being repugnant to
Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 are prior restraints on speech
Free speech may be identified with the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without
prior restraint or censorship and subsequent punishment.
Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on
the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is
largely freedom from government censorship of publications,
whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether
it is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of
the government. Any system of prior restraints of expression
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
validity.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right
of the people to freedom of speech. Central to the
prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of
PUVs and private transport terminals, to express their
preference, through the posting of election campaign
material in their property, and convince others to agree with
them.
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615,
posting an election campaign material during an election
period in PUVs and transport terminals carries with it the
penalty of revocation of the public utility franchise and shall
make the owner thereof liable for an election offense.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right
to free expression of the owners of PUVs and transport
terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and
transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited
from expressing their preferences under the pain of
indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their
franchise or permit to operate.
The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign
materials is an invalid content-neutral regulation repugnant to
the free speech clause.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned
with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls
the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards,
is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to
free speech, provided that the following requisites concur:
1. The government regulation is within the
constitutional power of the Government;
2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest;
3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and
4. The incidental restriction on freedom of expression
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are
content-neutral regulations since they merely control the
Page 95 of 190
place where election campaign materials may be posted.
However, the prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech
clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid
content-neutral regulation.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615, are not within the constitutionally
delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4, Article
IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no
necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of
PUVs and transport terminals.
The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to
operate and not the ownership per se of PUVs and transport
terminals.
In the instant case, the Court further delineates the
constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to
the COMELEC during an election period. As worded,
Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution only grants
COMELEC supervisory and regulatory powers over the
enjoyment or utilization “of all franchises or permits for the
operation,” inter alia, of transportation and other public
utilities. The COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated powers
of supervision and regulation do not extend to the ownership
per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the
franchise or permit to operate the same.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not
within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC
to supervise or regulate the franchise or permit to operate of
transportation utilities. The posting of election campaign
material on vehicles used for public transport or on transport
terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also
an act of ownership – it has nothing to do with the franchise
or permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not
justified under the captive-audience doctrine.
The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener
cannot, as a practical matter, escape from intrusive speech,
the speech can be restricted. The “captive-audience”
doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to be
exposed to an unwanted message in circumstances in which
the communication cannot be avoided.
A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the
guise of censorship, which undertakes selectively to shield
the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they
are more offensive than others. Such selective restrictions
have been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the
privacy of the home or the degree of captivity makes it either
impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to
avoid exposure.
Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-
audience doctrine may not be justified if the supposed
“captive audience” may avoid exposure to the otherwise
intrusive speech. The prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5)
and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under the
captive-audience doctrine; the commuters are not forced or
compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on
PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of
declining to receive the messages contained in the posted
election campaign materials since they may simply avert
their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive.
Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from
posting election campaign materials violates the equal
protection clause.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not
only run afoul of the free speech clause, but also of the equal
protection clause. One of the basic principles on which this
government was founded is that of the equality of right,
which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. "Equal protection requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar
subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so
as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate
against others.”
In order that there can be valid classification so that a
discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional
norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four
requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely: (1)
it must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the class.46
It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items
(5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not limited to existing
conditions and applies equally to the members of the
purported class. However, the classification remains
constitutionally impermissible since it is not based on
substantial distinction and is not germane to the purpose of
the law.
NOTE:
On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to
advertise one's political candidacy is clearly a significant part
of our freedom of expression. A restriction on this freedom
without rhyme or reason is a violation of the most valuable
feature of the democratic way of life.
Page 96 of 190
11. United States vs. Alvarez, 567 U.S. (No. 11-210, 28
June 2012)
FACTS: In 2007, Xavier Alvarez, an elected member of a
water district board in California, identified himself at a public
meeting as a retired U.S. Marine who had been wounded in
combat many times and had received the Congressional
Medal of Honor.
"I'm a retired Marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001,"
Mr. Alvarez said at a public meeting of the board. "Back in
1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. I
got wounded many times by the same guy."
None of Alvarez's claims was true. He never served in the
Marine Corps or any branch of the military, was never
wounded in combat, and has never received a medal of any
kind, including the nation's highest military award – the
Medal of Honor. Alvarez had previously boasted, untruly, that
he played hockey for the Detroit Red Wings and that he once
married a starlet from Mexico.
After FBI agents obtained a tape recording of the meeting,
federal prosecutors charged Alvarez with two counts of
violating the Stolen Valor Act (Act punishing lying about
receiving military medals or honors).
Alvarez's lawyer argued that the Stolen Valor Act was invalid
under the First Amendment and, therefore, the case should
be dismissed.
The trial court rejected this argument. Alvarez was tried and
convicted in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California. He was sentenced to probation for three
years and ordered to pay a $5,000 fine. He was the first
person convicted under the Stolen Valor Act.
Alvarez appealed the First Amendment issue, claiming that
the Stolen Valor law violated the First Amendment’s
guarantee of the right to free speech and, therefore, his
conviction was unlawful. A three-judge panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with
Alvarez and reversed his conviction, declaring the Stolen
Valor Act unconstitutional in a vote of 2-to-1.
The government appealed the case to the Supreme Court of
the United States, which agreed to hear it. After the Court
agreed to hear the case, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit, ruling in a different case, declared the
Stolen Valor Act constitutional in a vote of 2-to-1.
Oral arguments were heard on February 22, 2012.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Stolen Valor Act, which makes it
a crime to lie about receiving military medals or honors,
violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of the right to free
speech
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Stolen
Valor’s Act’s prohibition against making false statements of
having been awarded a military medal violated the First
Amendment. However, 6 justices in the majority could not
agree on a single rationale for the decision.
JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE,
JUSTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR,
concluded that the Act infringes upon speech protected by
the First Amendment. Pp. 3–18.
(a) The Constitution “demands that content-based
restrictions on speech be presumed invalid . . . and
that the Government bear the burden of showing
their constitutionality.” Ashcroft v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 542 U. S. 656, 660.
Content-based restrictions on speech have been permitted
only for a few historic categories of speech, including
incitement, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal
conduct, so-called “fighting words,” child pornography, fraud,
true threats, and speech presenting some grave and
imminent threat the Government has the power to prevent.
Absent from these few categories is any general exception
for false statements. The Government argues that cases
such as Hustler Magazine, Inc., v. Falwell, 485 U. S. 46, 52,
support its claim that false statements have no value and
hence no First Amendment protection. But all the
Government’s quotations derive from cases discussing
defamation, fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm
associated with a false statement.
In those decisions the falsity of the speech at issue was not
irrelevant to the Court’s analysis, but neither was it
determinative. These prior decisions have not confronted a
measure, like the Stolen Valor Act, that targets falsity and
nothing more.
Even when considering some instances of defamation or
fraud, the Court has instructed that falsity alone may not
suffice to bring the speech outside the First Amendment; the
statement must be a knowing and reckless falsehood.
Page 97 of 190
12. Reno vs. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S.
844 (1997)
FACTS: Several litigants challenged the constitutionality of
two provisions in the 1996 Communications Decency Act.
Intended to protect minors from unsuitable internet material,
the Act criminalized the intentional transmission of “obscene
or indecent” messages as well as the transmission of
information which depicts or describes “sexual or excretory
activities or organs” in a manner deemed “offensive” by
community standards. After being enjoined by a District
Court from enforcing the above provisions, except for the
one concerning obscenity and its inherent protection against
child pornography, Attorney General Janet Reno appealed
directly to the Supreme Court as provided for by the Act’s
special review provisions.
ISSUE: Whether certain provisions of the 1996
Communications Decency Act violate the First and Fifth
Amendments by being overly broad and vague in their
definitions of the types of internet communications which
they criminalized.
RULING: Yes. The Court held that the Act violated the First
Amendment because its regulations amounted to a content-
based blanket restriction of free speech. The Act failed to
clearly define “indecent” communications, limit its restrictions
to particular times or individuals (by showing that it would not
impact adults), provide supportive statements from an
authority on the unique nature of internet communications, or
conclusively demonstrate that the transmission of “offensive”
material is devoid of any social value. The Court added that
since the First Amendment distinguishes between “indecent”
and “obscene” sexual expressions, protecting only the
former, the Act could be saved from facial overbreadth
challenges if it dropped the words “or indecent” from its text.
The Court refused to address any Fifth Amendment issues.
 with the judges” – in light of this fact, of which judicial notice
is taken, that said report came out at a time when there
already was widespread publicity adverse to the judiciary,
there can be no doubt of its clear tendency to degrade the
administration of justice.

Thus, Judge Asuncion can hardly be faulted for what, at a

minimum, he must have felt duty-bound to do in the
circumstances. No question of prior restraint or violation of
the guarantee of free speech arises here, what he did being,
in essence, merely to initiate an inquiry into the source and
basis of the derogatory news report. And he forthwith abated
the proceedings upon receiving an explanation he deemed
satisfactory.
13. Social Weather Stations, Inc. vs. Asuncion, 288 Upon the facts, and under applicable laws and principles, the
SCRA xi (1993) complaint fails to make a prima facie showing of the charges
made therein, and must perforce be as it is thereby,
FACTS: Published under the by-line of one Marichu DISMISSED.
Villanueva and titled “Judiciary worse than PNP”, an item in
that June 17, 1993 issue of the Manila Standard, a
metropolitan daily, reported that the results of the latest
opinion polls conducted by the Ateneo Social Weather
Station, as Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is also
known, showed the Judiciary to have an even lower
satisfaction rating than the PNP. The item went on to state
that the President and his Cabinet had been briefed on the
results of the survey by the Professors Mahar Mangahas and
Felipe Miranda of the SWS, and that Malacanang had
expressed concern over the Judiciary’s law standing. Press
Secretary Jesus Sison was also quoted as saying that this
was “most puzzling”, although he could not recall the exact
rating, noting only that the PNP had “a better image than the
judiciary”.

Said report appears to have prompted Judge Maximiano C.

Asuncion, presiding judge of Branch 104 of the RTC at
Quezon City, motu proprio to initiate on the same date of
June 17, 1993 proceedings ordering the President of the
SWS to “explain why you should not be held in contempt or
distributing to the general public without prior permission
from any court your findings that the people have more
confidence with the police than with judges thereby tending
directly or indirectly to degrade the administration of justice.”

On June 21, 1993, Prof. Mahar Mangahas through Atty.

Antonio M. Abad, Jr. submitted his comment and explanation
that it was not true that the SWS distributed to the general
public the alleged survey. Said survey was privately given to
Pres. Ramos and the Cabinet and was not intended for
publication nor for public consumption and that if ever it
reaches the media, he had not authorized anyone to do so.
The hearing was scheduled on June 23, 1993, after
which Judge Asuncion promulgated an Order dated July 2,
1993, finding Professor Mangahas’ explanation satisfactory
and dismissing the contempt charge against him.

After three weeks or so, or more precisely on July 26, 1993,

Professor Managahas addressed a a letter to the Chief
Justice intended “as a formal complaint against Honorable
Maximiano C. Asuncion for grave abuse of authority and
gross ignorance of the law, in connection with his issuance of
an Order dated June 17, 1993.

ISSUE: Whether the Order dated June 17, 1993 is violative

of the constitutional guaranteed of freedom of speech and
freedom from prior restraint.

RULING: No.

What was clearly implicit in the newspaper report about the

results of the SWS poll – in the words of Judge Asuncion,
“that the people have more confidence with the police than

Page 98 of 190

14. RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED
"RESTORING INTEGRITY” (A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC.
March 8, 2011)
FACTS: On 28 April 2010, the decision of the case Vinuya v
Executive Secretary was promulgated with Justice Mariano
del Castillo as its ponente. Motion for reconsideration was
filed by the petitioner’s counsel on various grounds but most
notably on the ground that not only did the ponente of the
case plagiarised at least 3 books and articles in discussing
the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes, but have also
twisted such quotations making it appear contrary to the
intent of the original works. The authors and their
purportedly plagiarized articles are: 1) Evan J Criddle and
Evan Fox-Decent’s A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens
published in 2009 in the Yale Journal of International Law; 2)
Christian J. Tams’ Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in
Internation Law published by the Cambridge University Press
in 2005; and 3) Mark Ellis’ Breaking the Silence: On Rape as
an International Crime published in the Case Western
Reserve Journal of Internation Law in 2006. Thereafter,
news regarding the plagiarism by the Supreme Court spread
over the media and the original authors wrote letters to the
Chief Justice expressing discontent by the questioned act of
Justice del Castillo.
On 27 July 2010, the UP College of Law faculty members
gave their opinion on the matter of plagiarism by issuing an
article titled “Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty
of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the
Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court” signed overall 37 faculty members. In said
article, the faculty expressly gave their dismay saying that
the court had the hopes of relief from those “comfort women”
during the war “crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of
dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of
the Land.”
In the article, it was stated that plagiarism, as appropriation
and misrepresentation of another person’s work as one’s
own, is considered as “dishonesty, pure and simple.” Hence,
it was argued that since the decision in the Vinuya case form
part of the Philippine judicial system, the Court, in fine, is
allowing dishonesty to be promulgated. Furthermore, the
plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Vinuya case
undermines the judicial system of our country and is a dirt on
the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court, the article
sought for the resignation of Associate Justice Mariano del
Castillo.
In response to the said article, the Court issued a resolution
stating that the remarks and choice of words used were such
a great insult to the members of the Court and a threat to the
independence of the judiciary, a clear violation of Canons 1,
11 and 13 and the Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Page 99 of 190
Professional Responsibility. Thereafter, the Court ordered
the signatories to show cause on why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for such alleged
violations.
In fulfillment of the directive by the Court, the signatories
passed a Common Compliance stating therein that their
intention in issuing the article in question “was not to malign
the Court but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and
to ensure continued confidence in the legal system” by the
words used therein as “focusing on constructive action.”
Also, it was alleged that the respondents are correct in
seeking responsibility from Justice del Castillo for he, indeed,
committed plagiarism thus, rectifying their issuance of the
article. Furthermore, the respondents argued that the article
in question is a valid exercise of the freedom of expression
as citizens of a democracy, and an exercise of academic
freedom.
ISSUE: Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents
their freedom of expression?
HELD: No.
It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the
issuance of the Show Cause Resolution, has interfered with
respondents’ constitutionally mandated right to free speech
and expression. It appears that the underlying assumption
behind respondents’ assertion is the misconception that this
Court is denying them the right to criticize the Court’s
decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence"
respondent law professors’ dissenting view on what they
characterize as a "legitimate public issue."
This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause
Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact that
respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that
they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that
motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the
criticism and the contumacious language by which
respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya
case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners
in the said pending case for the "proper disposition" and
consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution.
The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the
statements that the Court considered excessive and uncalled
for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance,
publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP Law
faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement. To reiterate, it was
not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief
that Justice Del Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather
their expression of that belief as "not only as an established
fact, but a truth" when it was "[o]f public knowledge [that
there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to determine
the truth of such allegations." It was also pointed out in the
Show Cause Resolution that there was a pending motion for
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. The Show Cause
Resolution made no objections to the portions of the
Restoring Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be
"constructive" but only asked respondents to explain those
portions of the said Statement that by no stretch of the
imagination could be considered as fair or constructive.
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized
respondents’ freedom of expression when it stated that:
 While most agree that the right to criticize the
judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and
democratic society, there is also a general
consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far.
Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross
the line to become harmful and irresponsible
attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and
unjust criticism can threaten the independence of
the judiciary. The court must "insist on being
permitted to proceed to the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner, free from outside
interference obstructive of its functions and tending
to embarrass the administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable
purpose for the faculty’s less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010
Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the
Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in
addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if
the case on the comfort women’s claims is not
controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan
the flames and invite resentment against a
resolution that would not reverse the said decision.
This runs contrary to their obligation as law
professors and officers of the Court to be the first to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to
which they owe fidelity according to the oath they
have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust
in the administration of justice.
In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, cited in the Common
Compliance and the Vasquez Compliance, was an instance
where the Court indefinitely suspended a member of the Bar
for filing and releasing to the press a "Petition to Surrender
Lawyer’s Certificate of Title" in protest of what he claimed
was a great injustice to his client committed by the Supreme
Court. It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively
discussed foreign jurisprudence on the principle that a
lawyer, just like any citizen, has the right to criticize and
comment upon actuations of public officers, including judicial
authority. However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such
criticism of the courts, whether done in court or outside of it,
must conform to standards of fairness and propriety. This
case engaged in an even more extensive discussion of the
legal authorities sustaining this view. To quote from that
decision:
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism
that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the
other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a
misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person
obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession
places upon his shoulders no burden more basic,
more exacting and more imperative than that of
respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows
solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity x
x x to the courts;" and the Rules of Court constantly
remind him "to observe and maintain the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officer.
Page 100 of 190
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an
officer of the court, he cannot criticize the courts. That is his
right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the
court to avail of such right. Thus, in In Re: Almacen, this
Court explicitly declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a
lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No
law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally
answerable to a scrutiny into the official conduct of
the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am
Dec. 657, 665).
xxxx
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this
Court warned in Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that
it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the
other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a
misconduct, that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by
the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights
of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every
right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is
not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility.
Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free
speech" defense in other bar discipline cases, academic
freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in
this case. The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence discussed
above is that the constitutional right to freedom of expression
of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical
duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to
uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the
justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of
expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers
applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law
professors.
It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in
view of the broad definition in Cayetano v. Monsod, lawyers
when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice
of law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than
lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by
their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal
profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be
measured against the same canons of professional
responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the
fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with
the fact that they are lawyers.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’
proposition in the Common Compliance that their issuance of
the Statement was in keeping with their duty to "participate in
the development of the legal system by initiating or
supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of
the administration of justice" under Canon 4 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have
fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of
Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal processes
and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence
the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be selective regarding
which canons to abide by given particular situations. With
more reason that law professors are not allowed this
indulgence, since they are expected to provide their students
exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a
whole and not just their preferred portions thereof.
15. PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN vs. PRIMA JESUSA B.
QUINSAYAS, MA. GEMMA OQUENDO et al. (G.R. No.
194578; February 13, 2013)
FACTS: On 23 November 2009, a convoy of seven vehicles
carrying the relatives of then Maguindanao vice-mayor
Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu, as well as lawyers and
journalists, was on their way to the Commission on Elections
office in Shariff Aguak to file Mangudadatu’s Certificate of
Candidacy when they were accosted by a group of about
100 armed men at a checkpoint in Sitio Malating, Ampatuan
town. The gruesome aftermath of the hostage-taking was
later discovered and shocked the world. The hostages were
systematically killed by shooting them at close range with
automatic weapons, and their bodies and vehicles were
dumped in mass graves and covered with the use of a
backhoe. These gruesome killings became known as the
Maguindanao Massacre. A total of 57 victims were killed, 30
of them journalists. Subsequently, criminal cases for Murder
were filed and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. Petitioner is the counsel for Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr.
(Ampatuan, Jr.), the principal accused in the murder cases.
In November 2010, Atty. Quinsayas, et al. filed a disbarment
complaint against petitioner before this Court, docketed as
Bar Matter No. A.C. 8827. The disbarment case is still
pending. Petitioner alleged that on 22 November 2010, GMA
News TV internet website posted an article, written by
Dedace, entitled "Mangudadatu, others seek disbarment of
Ampatuan lawyer". On even date, Inquirer.net, the website of
PDI, also published an article, written by Torres, which
according to petitioner also stated details of the disbarment
case. Petitioner further alleged that on 23 November 2010,
PhilStar published an article, written by Punay, which gave
details of the disbarment allegations. Further, petitioner
alleged that on 23 November 2010, Channel 23 aired on
national television a program entitled "ANC Presents: Crying
for Justice: the Maguindanao Massacre." Drilon, the
program’s host, asked questions and allowed Atty.
Quinsayas to discuss the disbarment case against petitioner,
including its principal points.
Petitioner alleged that the public circulation of the disbarment
complaint against him exposed this Court and its
investigators to outside influence and public interference.
Petitioner alleged that opinion writers wrote about and
commented on the disbarment complaint which opened his
professional and personal reputation to attack. He alleged
Page 101 of 190
that the purpose of respondents in publishing the disbarment
complaint was to malign his personal and professional
reputation.
ISSUE: whether respondents violated the confidentiality rule
in disbarment proceedings, warranting a finding of guilt for
indirect contempt of court.
HELD: The Court recognizes that "publications which are
privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech."22 As a
general rule, disbarment proceedings are confidential in
nature until their final resolution and the final decision of this
Court. In this case, however, the filing of a disbarment
complaint against petitioner is itself a matter of public
concern considering that it arose from the Maguindanao
Massacre case. The interest of the public is not on petitioner
himself but primarily on his involvement and participation as
defense counsel in the Maguindanao Massacre case.
Indeed, the allegations in the disbarment complaint relate to
petitioners supposed actions involving the Maguindanao
Massacre case.
Since the disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest,
legitimate media had a right to publish such fact under
freedom of the press. The Court also recognizes that
respondent media groups and personalities merely acted on
a news lead they received when they reported the filing of
the disbarment complaint.
The distribution by Atty. Quinsayas to the media of the
disbarment complaint, by itself, is not sufficient to absolve
the media from responsibility for violating the confidentiality
rule. However, since petitioner is a public figure or has
become a public figure because he is representing a matter
of public concern, and because the event itself that led to the
filing of the disbarment case against petitioner is a matter of
public concern, the media has the right to report the filing of
the disbarment case as legitimate news.
Defenses and Court’s answer:
GMA Network’s defense is that it has no newspaper or any
publication where the article could be printed; it did not
broadcast the disbarment complaint in its television station;
and that the publication was already completed when Atty.
Quinsayas distributed copies of the disbarment complaint to
the media. – Online posting, however, is already publication
considering that it was done on GMA Network’s online news
website.
PDI averred that it only shares its contents with Inquirer.net
through a syndication. PDI attached a photocopy of the
syndication page stating that "[d]ue to syndication
agreements between PDI and Inquirer.net, some articles
published in PDI may not appear in Inquirer.net." – PDI was
not able to fully establish that it has a separate personality
from Inquirer.net.
ABS-CBN alleged that SNN is its subsidiary and although
they have interlocking directors, SNN has its own juridical
personality separate from its parent company. ABS-CBN
alleged that SNN controls the line-up of shows of ANC. –
Court agrees. A subsidiary has an independent and separate
juridical personality distinct from that of its parent company
and that any suit against the the latter does not bind the
former and vice-versa.

Respondent Ressa alleged that she was on terminal leave

when the program about the Maguindanao Massacre was
aired on ANC and that she had no hand in its production. –
Ressa’s defense was supported by a certification from the
Human Resource Account Head of ABS-CBN.

Basically, the defense of respondents Dedace, Torres,

Drilon, and Punay was that the disbarment complaint was
published without any comment, in good faith and without
malice; that petitioner is a public figure; that the
Maguindanao Massacre is a matter of public interest; and
that there was no conspiracy on their part in publishing the
disbarment complaint. They also argued that the news
reports were part of privileged communication.

Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against

attorneys shall be private and confidential.
However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall
be published like its decisions in other cases.

The Court explained the purpose of the rule, as follows:

x x x. The purpose of the rule is not only to enable

this Court to make its investigations free from any
extraneous influence or interference, but also to
protect the personal and professional reputation of
attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of
disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and
litigants; it is also to deter the press from publishing
administrative cases or portions thereto without
authority.
Petitioner also failed to substantiate his claim that
respondent media groups and personalities acted in bad faith
and that they conspired with one another in their postings
and publications of the filing of a disbarment complaint
against him. Respondent media groups and personalities
reported the filing of the disbarment complaint without any
comments or remarks but merely as it was – a news item.
Petitioner failed to prove that respondent media groups and
personalities acted with malicious intent. Respondent media
groups and personalities made a fair and true news report
and appeared to have acted in good faith in publishing and
posting the details of the disbarment complaint. In the
televised broadcast of the commemoration of the
Maguindanao Massacre over ANC, the disbarment case was
briefly discussed but petitioner was not named. There was
also no proof that respondent media groups and
personalities posted and published the news to influence this
Court on its action on the disbarment case or to deliberately
destroy petitioner’s reputation.
16. PHARMACEUTICAL and HEALTH CARE
ASSOCIATION of the PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs.
HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III
et.al
FACTS: Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive Order No.
51, Otherwise Known as The Milk Code, Relevant
International Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof, and
for Other Purposes (RIRR).Petitioner posits that the RIRR is
not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional
and go beyond the law it is supposed to implement.
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President
Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the
legislative powers granted to the president under the
Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the
Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article
11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA
adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding
should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it
should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not
permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention
on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument
provides that State Parties should take appropriate
measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure
that all segments of society, specially parents and children,
are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15,
2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to
take effect on July 7, 2006.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents officers of the DOH

acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and

Page 102 of 190

in violation of the provisions of the Constitution in
promulgating the RIRR
HELD: When it comes to information regarding nutrition of
infants and young children, however, the Milk Code
specifically delegated to the Ministry of Health (hereinafter
referred to as DOH) the power to ensure that there is
adequate, consistent and objective information on
breastfeeding and use of breastmilk substitutes,
supplements and related products; and the power to control
such information. Further, DOH is authorized by the Milk
Code to control the content of any information on breastmilk
vis-à-vis breastmilk substitutes, supplement and related
products The DOH is also authorized to control the purpose
of the information and to whom such information may be
disseminated under Sections 6 through 9 of the Milk Code to
ensure that the information that would reach pregnant
women, mothers of infants, and health professionals and
workers in the health care system is restricted to scientific
and factual matters and shall not imply or create a belief that
bottle-feeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding.
It bears emphasis, however, that the DOH's power under the
Milk Code to control information regarding breastmilk vis-a-
vis breastmilk substitutes is not absolute as the power to
control does not encompass the power to absolutely prohibit
the advertising, marketing, and promotion of breastmilk
substitutes.
Sections 13 on "total effect" and 26 of Rule VII of the RIRR
contain some labeling requirements, specifically: a) that
there be a statement that there is no substitute to breastmilk;
and b) that there be a statement that powdered infant
formula may contain pathogenic microorganisms and must
be prepared and used appropriately. Section 16 of the RIRR
prohibits all health and nutrition claims for products within the
scope of the Milk Code, such as claims of increased
emotional and intellectual abilities of the infant and young
child. These requirements and limitations are consistent with
the provisions of Section 8 of the Milk Code and Section
10(d) which bars the use on containers and labels of the
terms "humanized," "maternalized," or similar terms. These
provisions of the Milk Code expressly forbid information that
would imply or create a belief that there is any milk product
equivalent to breastmilk or which is humanized or
maternalized, as such information would be inconsistent with
the superiority of breastfeeding.
Section 11 of the RIRR, to wit:
SECTION 11. Prohibition – No advertising,
promotions, sponsorships, or marketing materials
and activities for breastmilk substitutes intended for
infants and young children up to twenty-four (24)
months, shall be allowed, because they tend to
convey or give subliminal messages or impressions
that undermine breastmilk and breastfeeding or
otherwise exaggerate breastmilk substitutes and/or
replacements, as well as related products covered
within the scope of this Code.
prohibits advertising, promotions, sponsorships or marketing
materials and activities for breastmilk substitutes in line with
the RIRR’s declaration of principle under Section 4(f), to wit:
SECTION 4. Declaration of Principles –
Page 103 of 190
xxxx
(f) Advertising, promotions, or sponsorships of
infant formula, breastmilk substitutes and other
related products are prohibited.
The DOH, through its co-respondents, evidently arrogated to
itself not only the regulatory authority given to the IAC but
also imposed absolute prohibition on advertising, promotion,
and marketing.
Yet, oddly enough, Section 12 of the RIRR reiterated the
requirement of the Milk Code in Section 6 thereof for prior
approval by IAC of all advertising, marketing and promotional
materials prior to dissemination. Even respondents, through
the OSG, acknowledged the authority of IAC, and repeatedly
insisted, during the oral arguments on June 19, 2007, that
the prohibition under Section 11 is not actually operational.
Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of the
Milk Code.
However, although it is the IAC which is authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations for the approval or rejection
of advertising, promotional, or other marketing materials
under Section 12(a) of the Milk Code, said provision must be
related to Section 6 thereof which in turn provides that the
rules and regulations must be "pursuant to the applicable
standards provided for in this Code." Said standards are set
forth in Sections 5(b), 8(b), and 10 of the Code.
Thus, the DOH has the significant responsibility to translate
into operational terms the standards set forth in Sections 5,
8, and 10 of the Milk Code, by which the IAC shall screen
advertising, promotional, or other marketing materials. It is
pursuant to such responsibility that the DOH correctly
provided for Section 13 in the RIRR which reads as follows:
SECTION 13. "Total Effect" - Promotion of products
within the scope of this Code must be objective and
should not equate or make the product appear to be
as good or equal to breastmilk or breastfeeding in
the advertising concept. It must not in any case
undermine breastmilk or breastfeeding. The "total
effect" should not directly or indirectly suggest that
buying their product would produce better
individuals, or resulting in greater love, intelligence,
ability, harmony or in any manner bring better
health to the baby or other such exaggerated and
unsubstantiated claim.
Such standards bind the IAC in formulating its rules and
regulations on advertising, promotion, and marketing.
Through that single provision, the DOH exercises control
over the information content of advertising, promotional and
marketing materials on breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk
substitutes, supplements and other related products. It also
sets a viable standard against which the IAC may screen
such materials before they are made public.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, Section 22 of the RIRR does
not prohibit the giving of information to health professionals
on scientific and factual matters. What it prohibits is the
involvement of the manufacturer and distributor of the
products covered by the Code in activities for the promotion,
education and production of Information, Education and
Communication (IEC) materials regarding breastfeeding that
are intended for women and children. Said provision cannot
be construed to encompass even the dissemination of
information to health professionals, as restricted by the Milk
Code.

17. Pleasant Grove City, Utah et al. vs. Summum 555 US
_ (2009)
FACTS: Summum, a religious organization, sent a letter to
the mayor of Pleasant Grove, Utah asking to place a
monument in one of the city's parks. Although the park
already housed a monument to the Ten Commandments, the
mayor denied Summum's request because the monument
did not "directly relate to the history of Pleasant Grove."
Summum filed suit against the city in federal court citing,
among other things, a violation of its First Amendment free
speech rights. The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah
denied Summum's request for a preliminary injunction.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the
district court and granted Summum's injunction request. The
Tenth Circuit held that the park was in fact a "public" forum,
not a non-public forum as the district court had held.
Furthermore, Summum demonstrated that it would suffer
irreparable harm if the injunction were to be denied, and the
interests of the city did not outweigh this potential harm. The
injunction, according to the court, was also not against the
public interest.
ISSUE: Does a city's refusal to place a religious
organization's monument in a public park violate that
organization's First Amendment free speech rights when the
park already contains a monument from a different religious
group?
HELD: No. The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit
holding that the placement of a monument in a public park is
a form of government speech and therefore not subject to
scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause of the First
Page 104 of 190
Amendment. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the
majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and
Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M.
Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and
Stephen G. Breyer, the Court reasoned that since Pleasant
Grove City had retained final authority over which
monuments were displayed, the monuments represented an
expression of the city's viewpoints and thus government
speech.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote a
separate concurring opinion that largely embraced the
majority's reasoning. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, also wrote a separate concurring opinion. Agreeing
with the Court's reasoning, he also noted that there were
likely no violations of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment on the part of Pleasant Grove City. He argued
that displays of the Ten Commandments had been construed
by the Court as "having an undeniable historical meaning"
and thus did not attempt to establish a religion. Justice
Breyer also wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he
noted that "government speech" should be considered a rule
of thumb and not a rigid category. He stated that sometimes
the Court should ask "whether a government's actions
burdens speech disproportionately in light of the action's
tendency to further a legitimate government objective."
Justice Souter also wrote separately, concurring in the
judgment, but warning that public monuments should not be
considered government speech categorically.
18. John Walker, III, et al. vs. Texas Division, Sons of
Confederate Veterans, Inc., et al. 576 US _ (2015)
FACTS: In August 2009, the Texas division of the Sons of
Confederate Veterans (Texas SCV), a non-profit
organization that works to preserve the memory and
reputation of soldiers who fought for the confederacy in the
Civil War, applied to have a new specialty license plate
issued by the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (TDMV).
The proposed license plate had two confederate flags on it:
one in the organization's logo, and one faintly making up the
background of the plate. The TDMV had a policy stating that
it "may refuse to create a new specialty license plate if the
design might be offensive to any member of the public." The
board in charge of approving new specialty plates received
multiple negative comments from the public regarding this
plate and ultimately voted to deny Texas SCV's application.
Texas SCV sued in federal district court claiming their First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The TDMV
argued that the Free Speech Clause did not apply in this
case because license plates are a form of government
speech; therefore, they were within their rights to choose
which messages and views they wanted to express on the
plates. The district court disagreed and held that the plates
were private, non-governmental speech, and that the
TDMV's denial was a reasonable, content-based restriction
of speech in a non-public forum. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that TDMV's
denial was a form of viewpoint discrimination that
"discriminated against Texas SCV's view that the
Confederate flag is a symbol of sacrifice, independence, and
Southern heritage."
ISSUE:
1. Do specialty license plates constitute government speech
that is immune from any requirement of viewpoint neutrality?
(YES)
2. Does preventing the confederate flag from appearing on
license plates constitute viewpoint discrimination? (NO)
HELD: Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of
the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the government
choosing the content of its speech is not unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination because that expression is the
product of the democratic electoral process. Based on the
analysis from Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, Texas’s
specialty license plate is an example of such government
speech (as opposed to a forum open for private expression)
because Texas and other states have long used license
plates to convey messages. Moreover, the public associates
license plates with the State. Finally, Texas maintains direct
control over the messages on its specialty plates from design
to final approval.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., wrote a dissent in which he
argued that, with over 350 varieties of specialty plates, an
observer would think that the plates were the expression of
the individual drivers, not Texas. Because the specialty
license plates are a limited public forum for private
expression, Texas rejecting the confederate flag design
because it might be offensive is unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice
Antonin Scalia, and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in
the dissent.
19. Bayan et.al. vs. Ermita
Facts: Petitioners come in three groups – Bayan, et al, Jess
del Prado, et al, , Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al, KMU, et
al.,
The rally was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in
front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards
Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta
Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They
were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of
them. Three other rallyists were arrested
in the case of Bayan, et al allege that they are citizens and
taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as
organizations and individuals were violated when the rally
they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently
dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) No. 880
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of
them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and
14(a), as well as the policy of CPR, "Calibrated Preemptive
Response". They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies
under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy
recently announced.
Bayan et al argued that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit
before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also
curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the
freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a
Page 105 of 190
public assembly form part of the message for which the
expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral
as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the
government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting
or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not
espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum
tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against
the government because they are being tolerated. As a
content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny
test.
Issue: Whether or not the implementation of B.P. No. 880
volated their rights as organizations and individuals when the
rally they participated in on October 6, 2005
Held: Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged.
Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and
exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the
Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which
requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the
nation’s streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely
engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to
press their claim that no such permit can be validly required
without violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents,
on the other hand, have challenged such action as contrary
to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the
permit.
Sec. 4 Art. III Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of
grievances
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble
and petition for redress of grievances is, together with
freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right
that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection.
For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional
democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected
Rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a
redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or
form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as
to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are
guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly
Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article
IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with
hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the
people’s exercise of these rights
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute
ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply
regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies, it as
a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner
of holding public assemblies
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily
shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies22 that
would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause"
does not make it content-based because assemblies really
have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
"peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words
"opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of
public assembly content based, since they can refer to any
subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of
grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its
use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the
protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of
the content of the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no
place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a
darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our
people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses.
On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as
unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict
freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to
the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being
insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists,
not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the
power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to
the constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger"
standard.
In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in
safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline
of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks
as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such
parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the
law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city
concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior
permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an
assembly therein. The only requirement will be written
notices to the police and the mayor’s office to allow proper
coordination and orderly activities.
20. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
represented by its National President, Jose Anselmo
I. Cadiz, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, and JOEL RUIZ
BUTUYAN vs. HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE
"LITO" ATIENZA (G.R. No. 175241; February 24,
2010)
FACTS: On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then
National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz (Cadiz), filed with
the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application4 for
a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22,
2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP
officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral
organizations. Respondent issued a permit dated June 16,
2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but
indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of
Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP received on June 19,
2006.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 94949. The petition having been unresolved
within 24 hours from its filing, petitioners filed before this
Court on June 22, 2006 a petition for certiorari docketed as
G.R. No. 172951 which assailed the appellate court’s
inaction or refusal to resolve the petition within the period
provided under the Public Assembly Act of 1985.
Page 106 of 190
The Court, by Resolutions of July 26, 2006, August 30, 2006
and November 20, 2006, respectively, denied the petition for
being moot and academic, denied the relief that the petition
be heard on the merits in view of the pendency of CA-G.R.
SP No. 94949, and denied the motion for reconsideration.
The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola
Bridge, after Cadiz discussed with P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan
whose contingent from the Manila Police District (MPD)
earlier barred petitioners from proceeding thereto. Petitioners
allege that the participants voluntarily dispersed after the
peaceful conduct of the program. The MPD thereupon
instituted on June 26, 2006 a criminal action, docketed as
I.S. No. 06I-12501, against Cadiz for violating the Public
Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in
the permit, to which charge Cadiz filed a Counter-Affidavit of
August 3, 2006.
ISSUE: whether the appellate court erred in holding that the
modification of the venue in IBP’s rally permit does not
constitute grave abuse of discretion.
HELD: Yes, in modifying the permit outright, respondent
gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately
inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the
matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue.
The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the
permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an
unfavorable action on the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at
modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a
clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an
indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the
issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification would,
when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have
it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas
(KMP) v. Ermita, the Court reiterated:
x x x Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the
people to meet peaceably for consultation and
discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled
to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It
is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing, as is the case with freedom of expression,
of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to
the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had
occasion to stress that it is a necessary
consequence of our republican institutions and
complements the right of free speech. To
paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge,
speaking for the majority of the American Supreme
Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or
coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech
and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee
with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble
and to petition the government for redress of
grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are
inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is
a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the
judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the
challenged governmental actuation. The sole
 justification for a limitation on the exercise of this
right, so fundamental to the maintenance of
democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character
both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health, or any other
legitimate public interest.
It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is
not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a
permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered
discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic
appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may
probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the
assumption – especially so where the assembly is scheduled
for a specific public place – is that the permit must be for the
assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in
the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American
Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may
be exercised in some other place.
G. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
1. RENATO V. PERALTA, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE
POSTAL CORPORATION (PHILPOST) (G.R. No.
223395, December 04, 2018)
FACTS: Philippine Postal Corporation (PhilPost) issued a
stamp commemorating Iglesia ni Cristo's (INC's) Centennial
Celebration. The design of the stamp showed a photo of INC
founder, the late Felix Y. Manalo (Manalo) with the
designation on the left side containing the words "Felix Y.
Manalo, 1886-1963 First Executive Minister of Iglesia ni
Cristo", with the Central Temple of the religious group at the
background.
On June 16, 2014, petitioner Renato V. Peralta (petitioner)
filed a complaint for injunction with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Br. 33 of Manila, assailing the constitutionality of the
printing, issuance and distribution of the INC commemorative
centennial stamps, allegedly paid for by respondent PhilPost
using public funds. In his complaint, petitioner alleged that
the printing and issuance of the INC commemorative stamp
involved disbursement of public funds, and violated. Section
29(2) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. He argued that
Page 107 of 190
respondents' act of releasing the said stamps was
unconstitutional because it was tantamount to sponsorship of
a religious activity; it violated the separation of the Church
and the State; and the non-establishment of religion clause.
Respondents filed their Answer, maintaining that no public
funds were disbursed in the printing of the INC
commemorative stamps. They alleged that there was a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated May 7, 2014
executed between PhilPost and INC, where it was provided
that the costs of printing will be borne by INC. They claimed
that the proceeds of the sale of the stamps will not redound
to the sole benefit of INC. The printing, according to them, is
part of PhilPost's philatelic products, which will promote
tourism in the country because it will attract people from all
over the world.
On July 25, 2014, the RTC issued an Order, denying
petitioner's application for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction and dismissing the action. It ruled that it was not a
taxpayer's suit and that it did not violate Section 29 (2),
Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Petitioner
appealed the RTC's decision with the CA, but the same was
denied in its July 24, 2015 decision.
ISSUE: Was the selling of the postage stamps
commemorating the INC’s centennial celebration
constitutional?
HELD: There is no quibbling that as to the 50,000 stamps
ordered, printed and issued to INC, the same did not violate
the Constitutional prohibitions separating State matters from
religion.
The non-establishment of religion clause is not equivalent to
indifference to religion
True, fundamental to the resolution of this case is the policy
of the State on the inviolability of the principle of separation
of the church and the state. Justice Isagani Cruz explained
the rationale of this principle in this wise:
The rationale of the rule is summed up in the
familiar saying, "Strong fences make good
neighbors." The idea is to delineate the boundaries
between the two institutions and, thus, avoid
encroachments by one against the other because of
a misunderstanding of the limits of their respective
exclusive jurisdictions. The demarcation line calls
on the entities to "render therefore unto Caesar the
things that are Caesar's and unto God the things
that are God's."
In upholding the issuance of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress commemorative stamp, this Court in
Aglipay v. Ruiz recognized how religion is integrated in the
Filipino way of life:
The more important question raised refers to the
alleged violation of the Constitution by the
respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of
the respondent is violative of the provisions of
section 13, subsection 3, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as
follows:
 "No public money or property shall ever be
appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly,
for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, secretarian institution, or system of
religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher
or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage,
or leprosarium."
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional
mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not denial of its influence in human
affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds
the purest principles of morality, its influence is
deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the
Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution,
implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to
establish a government that shall embody their
ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the
nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to
themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy," they thereby manifested their intense
religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance
upon Him who guides the destinies of men and
nations. The elevating influence of religion in human
society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact,
certain general concessions are indiscriminately
accorded to religious sects and denominations.
Religious Profession and Worship
The right to religious profession and worship has a twofold
aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's
beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined
within the realm of thought. The second is subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts
that affect the public welfare.
(1) Freedom to Believe
The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases
concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his own theories
about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at
all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity
of God or of any being that appeals to his reverence;
recognize or deny the immortality of his soul - in fact, cherish
any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However
absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile
and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe
as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs.
He may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion,
after all, is a matter of faith. Men may believe what they
cannot prove. Every one has a right to his beliefs and he
may not be called to account because he cannot prove what
he believes.
(2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs
But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or
omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so
becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as
this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the other rights
guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a
proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to think that
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the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the
State and render it impotent in protecting the general
welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to
prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true
even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious
conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the
reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.
By adopting the above constitutional provisions on religion,
the Filipinos manifested their adherence to the benevolent
neutrality approach in interpreting the religion clauses, an
approach that looks further than the secular purposes of
government action and examines the effect of these actions
on religious exercise. Benevolent neutrality recognizes the
religious nature of the Filipino people and the elevating
influence of religion in society; at the same time, it
acknowledges that government must pursue its secular
goals. In pursuing these goals, however, government might
adopt laws or actions of general applicability which
inadvertently burden religious exercise. Benevolent neutrality
gives room for accommodation of these religious exercises
as required by the Free Exercise Clause.
We adopt the benevolent neutrality approach not only
because of its merits as discussed above, but more
importantly, because our constitutional history and
interpretation indubitably show that benevolent neutrality is
the launching pad from which the Court should take off in
interpreting religion clause cases.
Where the Court has been asked to determine whether there
has been an undue encroachment of this Constitutionally
forged "wall", this Court has adopted a stance of "benevolent
neutrality". Rightfully so, for this incorporates the
Constitutional principle of separation of the Church and the
State while recognizing the people's right to express their
belief or non-belief of a Supreme Being.
Even in the U. S., whose jurisprudence are of persuasive
weight in this jurisdiction, it can be gleaned that the religious
nature of certain governmental acts does not automatically
result in striking them as unconstitutional for violation of the
non-establishment clause, particularly if the act involves
constitutionally protected form of exercise of religious
freedom. The "Lemon test", which has been extensively
applied by the U. S. Supreme Court in issues involving the
determination of non-establishment of religion clause
originated from the case of Lemon vs. Kurtzman. In that
case, the Court used a three-pronged test to adjudge
whether the assailed governmental act violated the First
Amendment, as follows:
1. The statute must have a secular legislative
purpose;
2. Its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and,
3. The statute must not foster "an excessive
government entanglement with religion."
It is plain, that the costs for the printing and issuance of the
aforesaid 50,000 stamps were all paid for by INC. Any
perceived use of government property, machines or
otherwise, is de minimis and certainly do not amount to a
sponsorship of a specific religion. Also, We see no violation
of the Constitutional prohibition on establishment of religion,
insofar as the remaining 1,150,000 pieces of stamps printed
and distributed by PhilPost. First, there is no law mandating
anyone to avail of the INC commemorative stamps, nor is
there any law purporting to require anyone to adopt the INC's
teachings. Arguably, while then President Aquino issued Adopting the stance of benevolent neutrality, this Court
Proclamation No. 815, s. 2014, authorizing the issuance of deems the design of the INC commemorative stamp
the INC commemorative stamp, the same did not contain constitutionally permissible. As correctly held by the CA,
any legal mandate endorsing or requiring people to conform there is an intrinsic historical value in the fact that Felix Y
to the INC's teachings. Manalo is a Filipino and that the INC is a Filipino institution.
Thus, this Court sees no religious overtones surrounding the
As to the use of the government's machinery in printing and commemorative stamps, as insisted upon by the petitioner.
distribution of the 1.2 million stamps, this Court does not find the design depicted in the INC commemorative stamp is
that the same amounted to sponsorship of INC as a religion merely a recognition of the continuous existence of a group
considering that the same is no different from other stamps that is strictly Filipino. As compared to major religious groups
issued by PhilPost acknowledging persons and events of established in the country, Felix Y. Manalo, and the INC, are
significance to the country. not plain religious symbols, but also a representation of a
group that is distinctly unique to the Philippines. To the mind
In the same vein, We do not find that there was illegal
of this Court, the use of the facade of the Church and the
disbursement of funds under Section 29(2) of Article VI of the
image of Felix Y. Manalo is nothing more than an
Constitution. The application of this prohibition towards
acknowledgment of a historical milestone. It does not
government acts was already clarified by the Court in Re:
endorse, establish or disparage other religious groups and
Letter of Tony Q. Valenciana, Holding Of Religious Rituals At
even non-believers, especially considering the fact that
The Hall Of Justice Building In Quezon City:
PhilPost also print stamps with symbols which can arguably
Section 29 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution be connected to religion.
provides, "No public money or property shall be
appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any
sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or
system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as
such, except when such priest, preacher, minister,
or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to
any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium."

The word "apply" means "to use or employ for a

particular purpose." "Appropriate" means "to
prescribe a particular use for particular moneys or
to designate or destine a fund or property for a
distinct use, or for the payment of a particular
demand." Under the principle of noscitur a sociis,
where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings,
its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in
which it is found with or with which it is associated.
This is because a word or phrase in a statute is
always used in association with other words or
phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or
restricted by the latter. The particular words,
clauses and phrases should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
and every part of the statute must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to
produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so
construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its
provisions whenever possible.
Thus, the words "pay" and "employ" should be
understood to mean that what is prohibited is the
use of public money or property for the sole
purpose of benefiting or supporting any church. The
prohibition contemplates a scenario where the
appropriation is primarily intended for the
furtherance of a particular church.
It has also been held that the aforecited
constitutional provision "does not inhibit the use of
public property for religious purposes when the
religious character of such use is merely incidental
to a temporary use which is available
indiscriminately to the public in general."
2. ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR A.M. No. P-02-1651
August 4, 2003 J. PUNO
FACTS: In a sworn letter-complaint, Estrada wrote to Judge
Caoibes, Jr. requesting for an investigation of rumors that
Escritor, court interpreter in said court, is living with a man
not her husband. They allegedly have a child of 18 to 20
years old. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor
or her partner and is a resident not of Las Piñas City but of
Bacoor, Cavite. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against
Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act
that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be
allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that
the court condones her act.
Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999,
she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998.
She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio,
Jr. without the benefit of marriage for 20 years and that they
have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as
the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible
Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity
with their religious beliefs and it does not consider it immoral.
In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed a
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness”. Quilapio also

Page 109 of 190

executed a similar pledge on the same day. At the time
Escritor executed her pledge, her husband was still alive but
living with another woman. Quilapio was likewise married at
that time, but had been separated in fact from his wife.
Estrada argued, through counsel, that the Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness recognizes the supremacy of the
“proper public authorities” such that she bound herself “to
seek means to . . . legalize their union.” Thus, even
assuming arguendo that the declaration is valid and binding
in her congregation, it is binding only to her co-members in
the congregation and serves only the internal purpose of
displaying to the rest of the congregation that she and her
mate are a respectable and morally upright couple. Their
religious belief and practice, however, cannot override the
norms of conduct required by law for government
employees. To rule otherwise would create a dangerous
precedent as those who cannot legalize their live-in
relationship can simply join the Jehovah’s Witnesses
congregation and use their religion as a defense against
legal liability.
ISSUE: WoN Escritor’s right to religious freedom should
carve out an exception from the prevailing jurisprudence on
illicit relations for which government employees are held
administratively liable. (WoN Escritor should be found guilty
of the administrative charge of “gross and immoral conduct.”)
HELD: Yes. The Philippine constitution’s religion clauses
prescribe the benevolent neutrality approach not the strict
neutrality approach. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that
government must pursue its secular goals and interests but
at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the
greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits.
Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular,
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.
With benevolent neutrality as a framework, the Court cannot
simply reject respondent’s plea of religious freedom without
even subjecting it to the “compelling state interest” test that
would balance her freedom with the paramount interests of
the state.
Application of Benevolent Neutrality and the Compelling
State Interest Test to the Case at Bar.
Escritor’s claim of religious freedom (the possibility that the
claim to religious freedom would warrant carving out an
exception from the Civil Service Law) versus government’s
showing of compelling interest.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondent’s
right to religious freedom has been burdened. There is no
doubt that choosing between keeping her employment and
abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on
the one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping
her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a
burden on her free exercise of religion. The burden on
respondent in the case at bar is even greater as the price
she has to pay for her employment is not only her religious
precept but also her family which, by the Declaration
Pledging Faithfulness, stands “honorable before God and
men.”
The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her
religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her
religious belief and practice and is not merely using the
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” to avoid punishment
for immorality. She did not secure the Declaration only after
Page 110 of 190
entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict
and defined, much less only after an administrative case for
immorality was filed against her. The Declaration was issued
to her by her congregation after ten years of living together
with her partner, Quilapio, and ten years before she entered
the judiciary. Ministers from her congregation testified on the
authenticity of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ practice of securing
a Declaration and their doctrinal or scriptural basis for such a
practice. As the ministers testified, the Declaration is not
whimsically issued to avoid legal punishment for illicit
conduct but to make the “union” of their members under
respondent’s circumstances “honorable before God and
men.” It is also worthy of notice that the Report and
Recommendation of the investigating judge annexed letters
of the OCA to the respondent regarding her request to be
exempt from attending the flag ceremony after Circular No.
62-2001 was issued requiring attendance in the flag
ceremony. The OCA’s letters were not submitted by
respondent as evidence but annexed by the investigating
judge in explaining that he was caught in a dilemma whether
to find respondent guilty of immorality because the Court
Administrator and Deputy Court Administrator had different
positions regarding respondent’s request for exemption from
the flag ceremony on the ground of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’
contrary belief and practice. Respondent’s request for
exemption from the flag ceremony shows her sincerity in
practicing the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ beliefs and not using
them merely to escape punishment. She is a practicing
member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Jehovah
ministers testified that she is a member in good standing.
GUYS THE CASE WAS REMANDED TO THE OCA KASI DI
NAGPARTICIPATE SI SOLGEN. SO INORDER SYA TO
INTERVENE AND TO SHOW THE STATES’ COMPELLING
REASON…. In the final decision on the case, Estrada v.
Escritor, 492 SCRA 1 (2006), the Court then went on to allow
a court interpreter to continue with her conjugal arrangement
with a married man not her husband, since the same was
sanctioned by her religion and there was no compelling state
interest that would have warranted overriding her religion-
grounded practice – “we find that in this particular case and
under these distinct circumstances, respondent Escritor’s
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made
out a case for exemption from the law based on her
fundamental right to freedom of religion.”
[RELEVANT DEFINITONS]
 FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE accords absolute protection
to individual religious convictions and beliefs and
proscribes government from questioning a person’s
beliefs or imposing penalties or disabilities based solely
on those beliefs—it extends to both beliefs and
unbeliefs. i. e. religious speech and expressive religious
conduct o BELIEF-ACTION TEST which allows absolute
protection to belief but not to action.
o DELIBERATE-INADVERTENT DISTINCTION -
the distinction between deliberate state
interference of religious exercise for religious
reasons which was plainly unconstitutional and
government’s inadvertent interference with
religion in pursuing some secular objective.
o BALANCING TEST - a two-part balancing test of
validity where the first step was for plaintiff to
show that the regulation placed a real burden on
his religious exercise. Next, the burden would be
upheld only if the state showed that it was
pursuing an overriding secular goal by the means
which imposed the least burden on religious
practices.
o COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST –
stresses that the state interest is not merely any
colorable state interest, but must be paramount
 and compelling to override the free exercise
claim.
o EXEMPTION DOCTRINE - Under the exemption
doctrine when general laws conflict with scruples
of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted
unless some “compelling state interest”
intervenes.

 NON ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE creates “a wall of

separation between church and state”. o NEUTRALITY
AND BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY STANDARDS - Two
main standards used by the U.S. Supreme Court in
deciding religion clause cases—separation (in the form
of strict separation or the tamer version of strict
neutrality or separation) and benevolent neutrality or
accommodation.
o The STRICT SEPARATIONIST VIEW holds that
the “wall of separation” is meant to protect the
state from the church.
o Under BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY, which gives
room for accommodation, the wall of separation is
meant to protect the church from the state.
o An ACCOMMODATIONIST holds that it is good
public policy, and sometimes constitutionally
required, for the state to make conscious and
deliberate efforts to avoid interference with
religious freedom.
o A STRICT NEUTRALITY ADHERENT believes
that it is good public policy, and also
constitutionally required, for the government to
avoid religion-specific policy even at the cost of
inhibiting religious exercise.

 PHILIPPINE RELIGION CLAUSES CASE LAW A close

scrutiny of the Philippine cases involving the religion
clauses would reveal that while U.S. jurisprudence on
religion clauses flows into two main streams of
interpretation—separation and benevolent neutrality—
the well-spring of Philippine jurisprudence on this
subject is for the most part benevolent neutrality which
gives room for accommodation. o The Philippine
Supreme Court has adopted a posture of not invalidating
a law offensive to religious freedom, but carving out an
exception or upholding an exception to accommodate
religious exercise where it is justified.
o How the tension between the Non Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause will be
resolved is a question for determination in the
actual cases that come to the Court—the two
clauses should be balanced against each other.
o Although our constitutional history and
interpretation mandate benevolent neutrality, it
does not mean that the Court ought to grant
exemptions every time a free exercise claim
comes before it, but that the Court will not look
with hostility or act indifferently towards religious 3. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC (G.R. No.
beliefs and practices and that it will strive to 190582, April 8, 2010)
accommodate them when it can within flexible
constitutional limits; it does mean that the Court
will not simply dismiss a claim under the Free FACTS: Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men
Exercise Clause. and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
o When the law speaks of “immorality” in the Civil bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
Service Law or “immoral” in the Code of Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration
Professional Responsibility for lawyers, or “public with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation
morals” in the Revised Penal Code, or “morals” in was denied on the ground that the organization had no
the New Civil Code, or “moral character” in the substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang
Constitution, the distinction between public and Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the
secular morality on the one hand, and religious COMELEC. Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the
morality, on the other, should be kept in mind— LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented
the morality referred to in the law is public and sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their
necessarily secular, not religious. sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are
victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that
because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are

Page 111 of 190

constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang
Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by
this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national
membership base consisting of individual members and
organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of
governance. On November 11, 2009, after admitting the
petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division)
dismissed the Petition on moral grounds –
a marginalized and under-represented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that
which:
x x x refers to a person’s capacity for profound
emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and
intimate and sexual rela tions with, individuals of a
different gender, of the same gender, or more than
one gender.
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal
clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which
offends religious beliefs.
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual
immorality as indicated in the Petition’s par. 6F:
‘Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays
and lesbians who are already of age’. It is further
indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for
the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or
MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000
(Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and
Gomorrah). Laws are deemed incorporated in every
contract, permit, license, relationship, or
accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are
deemed part of the requirement to be complied with
for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil
Code which defines nuisance as ‘Any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or
disregards decency or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code:
‘The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides
that ‘Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy’ are inexistent and void from the
beginning.
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three
commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed
Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V.
Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three
commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlad’s Motion for
Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer,
Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC
Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in
his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution –
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral
party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it
has properly proven its under-representation and
marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad’s
expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit
the nation as a whole.
Page 112 of 190
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states
that the purpose of the party-list system of electing
congressional representatives is to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and under-
represented sectors, organizations and parties, and
who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. If entry into the party-list
system would depend only on the ability of an
organization to represent its constituencies, then all
representative organizations would have found
themselves into the party-list race. But that is not
the intention of the framers of the law. The party-list
system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and
acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of
persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for
the realization of aspirations of marginalized
individuals whose interests are also the nation’s—
only that their interests have not been brought to
the attention of the nation because of their under
representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is
able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations
and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation,
its application for accreditation under the party-list
system will remain just that.
Even if society’s understanding, tolerance, and
acceptance of LGBT’s is elevated, there can be no
denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males
and females, and they will remain either male or
female protected by the same Bill of Rights that
applies to all citizens alike.
What are being adopted as moral parameters and
precepts are generally accepted public morals.
They are possibly religious-based, but as a society,
the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500
years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that
some moral precepts espoused by said religions
have sipped [sic] into society and these are not
publicly accepted moral norms.
But above morality and social norms, they have
become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of
the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of
prision mayor upon “Those who shall publicly
expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to
public morals.” It penalizes “immoral doctrines,
obscene publications and exhibition and indecent
shows.” “Ang Ladlad” apparently falls under these
legal provisions.
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying
that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the
COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for
accreditation. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of
accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. The OSG concurred
with Ang Ladlad’s petition and argued that the COMELEC
erred in denying petitioner’s application for registration since
there was no basis for COMELEC’s allegations of immorality.
It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests
and concerns which should have been recognized by the
COMELEC as a separate classification.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner
does not have a concrete and genuine national political
agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time
that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated
by the Constitution and RA 7941

ISSUE: Whether Ang Ladlad party-list should be given
accreditation
RULING: Yes as they have sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong
Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors
(labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered
under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive.” The crucial element is
not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether
a particular organization complies with the requirements of
the Constitution and RA 7941.
The Court finds that there has been no misrepresentation. A
cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’sinitial petition shows that it
never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines.
Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the
Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000
persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around
the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion
group. Ang Ladladalso represented itself to be “a national
LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the
Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks XXX”
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG
LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they
found that petitioner had no presence in any of these
regions. In fact, if COMELEC’s findings are to be believed,
petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is
registered as Ang Ladlad’s principal place of business.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our
non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality
in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on
religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible
and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. The
government must act for secular purposes and in ways that
have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v.
Escritor:
if government relies upon religious beliefs in
formulating public policies and morals, the resulting
policies and morals would require conformity to
what some might regard as religious programs or
agenda. The non-believers would therefore be
compelled to conform to a standard of conduct
buttressed by a religious belief.
government action, including its proscription of
immorality as expressed in criminal law like
concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is,
the government proscribes this conduct because it
is “detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions
upon which depend the existence and progress of
human society” and not because the conduct is
proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other.
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation
of homosexuality and homosexual conduct may be religion-
Page 113 of 190
based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted
public morals. We are not blind to the fact that, through the
years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals
themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It
is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure—
religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of
marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle.
Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to
criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these
“generally accepted public morals” have not been
convincingly transplanted into the realm of law. The Assailed
Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act
performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that “there
should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the
group’s members have committed or are committing immoral
acts.” Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are
sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required
for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to
justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list
system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the
moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported
violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines
a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or
disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are
a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be
emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not
proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a
judicial determination of liability or culpability.
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our
Constitution, which provides “nor shall any person be denied
equal protection of the laws,” courts have never interpreted
the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification.
“Equality,” said Aristotle, “consists in the same treatment of
similar persons.” The equal protection clause guarantees
that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or
other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we
will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end. The
COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine
population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and
unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to
disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the
Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law
exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or
parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were
to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes
it, the asserted state interest here—that is, moral disapproval
of an unpopular minority—is not a legitimate state interest
that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the
equal protection clause. The COMELEC’s differentiation, and
its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute
to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation,
furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of
or dislike for a disfavored group.
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to
promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the
validity of its position through normal democratic means. It is
in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing
opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. Freedom
of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of
a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to
those that are favorably received but also to those that
offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this
sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the
COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace.
Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to
interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an
approved message or discouraging a disfavored one. We do
not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that
homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant.
They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other
hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe
with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the
same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual
relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that
view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our
democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of
one part of the community to exclude from consideration the
values of other members of the community. The OSG argues
that since there has been neither prior restraint nor
subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its
members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily
associate, then there has been no restriction on their
freedom of expression or association. The OSG fails to recall
that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to
participate in the party-list system, and—as advanced by the
OSG itself—the moral objection offered by the COMELEC
was not a limitation imposed by law.
an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it
protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic
government based on the consent of the people
and in conformity with the principles of the
Covenant.
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to
assume the responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines’
international law obligations, the blanket invocation of
international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer
now to the petitioner’s invocation of the Yogyakarta
Principles (the Application of International Human Rights
Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),
which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of
international law. At this time, we are not prepared to declare
that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are
obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and
obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective
of the current state of international law, and do not find basis
in any of the sources of international law enumerated under
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta
Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various
international law professors, are—at best—de lege ferenda
—and do not constitute binding obligations on the
Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international
law is characterized by the “soft law” nomenclature, i.e.,
international law is full of principles that promote international
cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of
which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without
the support of either State practice or opinio juri.

The Court explicitly recognize the principle of non-

discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral
participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR. The
principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the
ICCPR, as follows:

All persons are equal before the law and are

entitled without any discrimination to the equal
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires

that laws of general application relating to elections be
applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual
orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically
enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article
26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has
opined that the reference to “sex” in Article 26 should be
construed to include “sexual orientation.” As stated by the
CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to
electoral participation is elaborated by the Human Rights
Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in 4. RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. V ALENCIANO, HOLDING
Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows: OF RELIGIOUS RITUALS AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE
BUILDING IN QUEZON CITY (A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC)
“1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and
protects the right of every citizen to take part in the
conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be
elected and the right to have access to public FACTS: This controversy originated from a series of letters,
service. Whatever form of constitution or written by Tony Q. Valenciano (Valenciano) and addressed
government is in force, the Covenant requires to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (Chief Justice Puno).
States to adopt such legislative and other measures
as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have

Page 114 of 190

In his first Letter, Valenciano reported that the basement of
the Hall of Justice of Quezon City (QC) had been converted
into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with offertory table,
images of Catholic religious icons, a canopy, an electric
organ, and a projector. He believed that such practice
violated the constitutional provision on the separation of
Church and State and the constitutional prohibition against
the appropriation of public money or property for the benefit
of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system of
religion.
Valenciano further averred that the holding of masses at the
basement of the QC Hall of Justice showed that it tended to
favor Catholic litigants; that the rehearsals of the choir
caused great disturbance to other employees; that the public
could no longer use the basement as resting place; that the
employees and litigants of the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO), RTC, Legal Library, Philippine Mediation Center, and
Records Section of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC)
could not attend to their personal necessities such as going
to the lavatories because they could not traverse the
basement between 12:00 o'clock noontime and 1: 15 o'clock
in the afternoon; that the court employees became hostile
toward each other as they vied for the right to read the
epistle; and that the water supply in the entire building was
cut off during the mass because the generator was turned off
to ensure silence.
Valenciano wrote another letter, praying that rules be
promulgated by the Court to put a stop to the holding of
Catholic masses, or any other religious rituals, at the QC Hall
of Justice and in all other halls of justice in the country.
The Court noted the letter of Valenciano and referred the
matter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
In its Memorandum, the OCA believed that the practical
inconveniences cited by Valenciano were unfounded. It,
thus, recommended that his letter-complaints be dismissed
for lack of merit.
ISSUE: WON the holding of masses at the basement of the
Quezon City Hall of Justice violates the constitutional
principle of separation of church and state as well as the
constitutional prohibition against appropriation of public
money or property for the benefit of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion. NO
HELD: Rituals in the Halls of Justice does not Amount to a
Union of Church and State
The State still recognizes the inherent right of the people to
have some form of belief system, whether such may be
belief in a Supreme Being, a certain way of life, or even an
outright rejection of religion.
Thus, the right to believe or not to believe has again been
enshrined in Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 5. xxx. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. xxx.
"The right to religious profession and worship has a
two-fold aspect - freedom to believe and freedom to
act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as
Page 115 of 190
the belief is confined within the realm of thought.
The second is subject to regulation where the belief
is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare."
Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of
separation of Church and State. In fact, these two principles
are in perfect harmony with each other.
Clearly, allowing the citizens to practice their religion is not
equivalent to a fusion of Church and State.
No Compelling State Interest
Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have
its way if there is a compelling state interest. To successfully
invoke compelling state interest, it must be demonstrated
that the masses in the QC Hall of Justice unduly disrupt the
delivery of public services or affect the judges and
employees in the performance of their official functions.
As reported by the Executive Judges of Quezon City, the
masses were being conducted only during noon breaks and
were not disruptive of public services. The court proceedings
were not being distracted or interrupted and that the
performance of the judiciary employees were not being
adversely affected. Moreover, no Civil Service rules were
being violated. As there has been no detrimental effect on
the public service or prejudice to the State, there is simply no
state interest compelling enough to prohibit the exercise of
religious freedom in the halls of justice.
Accommodation, Not Establishment of Religion
In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of
religion, the State adopts a policy of accommodation.
Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some
governmental measures may not be imposed on a certain
portion of the population for the reason that these measures
are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be
shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the
public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit
such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.
Establishment entails a positive action on the part of the
State. Accommodation, on the other hand, is passive. In the
former, the State becomes involved through the use of
government resources with the primary intention of setting up
a state religion. In the latter, the State, without being
entangled, merely gives consideration to its citizens who
want to freely exercise their religion.
Guided by the foregoing, it is our considered view that the
holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of
Justice is not a case of establishment, but merely
accommodation. First, there is no law, ordinance or circular
issued by any duly constitutive authorities expressly
mandating that judiciary employees attend the Catholic
masses at the basement. Second, when judiciary employees
attend the masses to profess their faith, it is at their own
initiative as they are there on their own free will and volition,
without any coercion from the judges or administrative
officers. Third, no government funds are being spent
because the lightings and airconditioning continue to be
operational even if there are no religious rituals there. Fourth,
the basement has neither been converted into a Roman
Catholic chapel nor has it been permanently appropriated for
the exclusive use of its faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the
masses has not prejudiced other religions.
No Appropriation of Public Money or Property for the Benefit
of any Church
Here, the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not
appropriated, applied or employed for the sole purpose of
supporting the Roman Catholics.
Further, it has not been converted into a Roman Catholic
chapel for the exclusive use of its faithful contrary to the
claim of Valenciana. Judge Maceren reported that the
basement is also being used as a public waiting area for
most of the day and a meeting place for different employee
organizations. The use of the area for holding masses is
limited to lunch break period from twelve (12) o'clock to one
(1) o'clock in the afternoon. Further, Judge Sagun, Jr. related
that masses run for just a little over thirty (30) minutes. It is,
therefore, clear that no undue religious bias is being
committed when the subject basement is allowed to be
temporarily used by the Catholics to celebrate mass, as the
same area can be used by other groups of people and for
other purposes.49 Thus, the basement of the QC Hall of
Justice has remained to be a public property devoted for
public use because the holding of Catholic masses therein is
a mere incidental consequence of its primary purpose.
Conclusion
Directing the Executive Judges of the RTC and MeTC to
regulate and closely monitor the holding of masses and other
religious practices within the courts does not promote
excessive collaboration between courts and various
religions. On the contrary, this is necessary to ensure that
there would be no excessive entanglement.
To disallow the holding of religious rituals within halls of
justice would set a dangerous precedent and commence a
domino effect. Strict separation, rather than benevolent
neutrality/accommodation, would be the norm. Thus, the
establishment of Shari'a courts, the National Commission for
Muslim Filipinos, and the exception of Muslims from the
provisions of the RPC relative to the crime of bigamy would
all be rendered nugatory because of strict separation. The
exception of members of Iglesia ni Cristo from joining a union
or the non-compulsion recognized in favor of members of the
Jehovah's Witnesses from doing certain gestures during the
flag ceremony, will all go down the drain simply because we
insist on strict separation.
That the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall
of Justice may offend non-Catholics is no reason to proscribe
it. Our Constitution ensures and mandates an unconditional
tolerance, without regard to whether those who seek to
profess their faith belong to the majority or to the minority. It
is emphatic in saying that "the free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship shall be without
discrimination or preference." Otherwise, accommodation or
tolerance would just be mere lip service.
5. DENMARK S. V ALMORES vs. DR. CRISTINA
ACHACOSO, in her capacity as Dean of the College
of Medicine, and DR. GIOVANNI CABILDO, Faculty
of the Mindanao State University (G.R. No. 217453)
Page 116 of 190
FACTS: Petitioner Denmark S. Valmores (Valmores) is a
member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, whose
fundamental beliefs include the strict observance of the
Sabbath as a sacred day. As such, petitioner Valmores joins
the faithful in worshipping and resting on Saturday, the
seventh day of the week, and refrains from non-religious
undertakings from sunset of Friday to sunset of Saturday.
Prior to the instant controversy, petitioner Valmores was
enrolled as a first-year student at the MSU-College of
Medicine. Some of petitioner Valmores' classes and
examinations were moved from weekdays to Saturdays. In
one instance, petitioner Valmores was unable to take his
Risto-Pathology laboratory examination held on a Saturday.
Respondent Cabildo was his professor for the said subject.
Despite his request for exemption, no accommodation was
given by either of the respondents. As a result, petitioner
Valmores received a failing grade of 5 for that particular
module and was considered ineligible to retake the exam.
Thereafter, several pastors and officers of the Seventh-day
Adventist Church sent a letter to respondent Achacoso,
requesting for a possible audience with the members of the
MSU school board. In addition, the church, through Pastor
Hanani P. Nietes, issued a Certification in connection with
petitioner Valmores' request for exemption.
Despite the foregoing communications, petitioner Valmores'
requests fell on deaf ears.
Petitioner Valmores elevated the matter before the CHED. In
an Indorsement, the CHED Regional Office referred the
matter directly to the President of MSU as well as
respondent Achacoso and requested that the office be
advised of the action thus taken.
Dr. Muslim, President of MSU, instructed respondent
Achacoso to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum. Despite
the foregoing correspondence, petitioner Valmores' request
still went unheeded.
ISSUE: WON mandamus lies to compel respondents to
enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum in the case of
petitioner Valmores. YES
HELD: In 2010, the CHED institutionalized the framework for
operationalizing Section 5, Article Ill of the 1987 Constitution
vis-a-vis the academic freedom of higher education
institutions (HEis ), pursuant to its statutory power to
formulate policies, priorities, and programs on higher
education in both public and private HEIs.
In the 2010 CHED Memorandum, the CHED laid down
guidelines for the exemption of teachers, personnel, and
students from participating in school or related activities due
to compliance with religious obligations.
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a
ministerial duty by a tribunal, board, officer, or person.48
Case law requires that the petitioner should have a right to
the thing demanded and that it must be the imperative duty
of the respondent to perform the act required; such duty
need not be absolutely expressed, so long as it is clear.49 In
this regard, a duty is considered ministerial where an officer
is required to perform an act not requiring the exercise of
official discretion or judgment in a given state of facts.50
Conversely, if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer
and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall respondents herein were duty-bound to protect and preserve
be performed, such duty is discretionary. petitioner Valmores' religious freedom.

MSU is an HEI created by legislative charter under Republic
Act No. 1387, as amended, and was established "to better
implement the policy of the Government in the intensification
of the education of the Filipino youth, especially among the
Muslims and others belonging to the national minorities."52
Thus, respondents herein, as faculty members of MSU, fall
under the policy-making authority of the CHED and therefore
bound to observe the issuances promulgated by the latter.
At once, a plain reading of the memorandum reveals the
ministerial nature of the duty imposed upon HEIs. Its policy is
crystal clear: a student's religious obligations takes
precedence over his academic responsibilities, consonant
with the constitutional guarantee of free exercise and
enjoyment of religious worship. Accordingly, the CHED
imposed a positive duty on all HEIs to exempt students, as
well as faculty members, from academic activities in case
such activities interfere with their religious obligations.
Although the said memorandum contains the phrase "within
the bounds of school rules and regulations," the same relates
only to the requirement of remedial work, which, based on
the language used, is merely optional on the part of the HEI.
Neither can such phrase be said to have conferred discretion
as the use of the words "shall be enjoined" and "strict
compliance" denote a mandatory duty on the part of the HEI
to excuse its students upon submission of the certification
prescribed in the same memorandum.
While in some cases the Court has sustained government
regulation of religious rights, the Court fails to see in the
present case how public order and safety will be served by
the denial of petitioner Valmores' request for exemption.
Neither is there any showing that petitioner Valmores'
absence from Saturday classes would be injurious to the
rights of others. Precisely, the 2010 CHED Memorandum
was issued to address such conflicts and prescribes the
action to be taken by HEIs should such circumstance arise.
What is certain, as gathered from the foregoing, is that
respondents' concerted refusal to accommodate petitioner
Valmores rests mainly on extralegal grounds, which cannot,
by no stretch of legal verbiage, defeat the latter's
constitutionally-enshrined rights. That petitioner Valmores is
being made by respondents to choose between honoring his
religious obligations and finishing his education is a patent
infringement of his religious freedoms. As the final bulwark of
fundamental rights, this Court will not allow such violation to
perpetuate any further.

Clearly, under the 2010 CHED Memorandum, HEIs do not

possess absolute discretion to grant or deny requests for
exemption of affected students. Instead, the memorandum
only imposes minimum standards should HEIs decide to
require remedial work, i.e., that the same is within the
bounds of school rules and regulations and that the grades
of the students will not be affected.

As a condition for exemption, the 2010 CHED Memorandum

simply requires the submission of "a certification or proof of
attendance/participation duly signed by their pastor, priest,
minister or religious leader for periods of absence from
classes, work or school activities."

The certification submitted to the private respondents needs

little or no interpretation: petitioner Valmores, as a bona fide
member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, is expected to
miss "all his Sabbath x x x classes [and] exams" due to his
observance of the Sabbath day as a day of worship. There is
nothing in the 2010 CHED Memorandum that prohibits the
certification from being issued before the period of absence
from class. Even then, the Certification dated September 15,
2014 is broad enough to cover both past and future Sabbath
days for which petitioner Valmores would be absent.

For these reasons, the Court finds that respondents were

duty bound to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum insofar
as it requires the exemption of petitioner Valmores from
academic responsibilities that conflict with the schedule of
his Saturday worship. Their failure to do so is therefore
correctible by mandamus.

Without more, respondents' bare arguments crumble against

constitutional standards. As discussed above, the Bill of H. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND FREEDOM OF
Rights guarantees citizens the freedom to act on their MOVEMENT
individual beliefs and proscribes government intervention
unless necessary to protect its citizens from injury or when
public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience requires it. 1. B/GEN. (RET.) FRANCISCO V. GUDANI AND LT.
Thus, as faculty members of the MSU-College of Medicine, COL. ALEXANDER F. BALUTAN vs. LT./GEN.

Page 117 of 190

 GENEROSO S. SENGA CORONA, AS CHIEF OF
STAFF OF THE CARPIO-MORALES, ARMED
FORCES OF THE CALLEJO, SR., PHILIPPINES, COL.
GILBERTO AZCUNA, JOSE C. ROA AS THE PRE-
TRIAL TINGA, INVESTIGATING OFFICER, THE
CHICO-NAZARIO, PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL
GARCIA, and OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL
(G.R. No. 170165 August 15, 2006)
FACTS: The petitioners are high-ranking officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Both petitioners,
Brigadier General Francisco Gudani (Gen. Gudani) and
Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Balutan (Col. Balutan),
belonged to the Philippine Marines.
Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several senior
officers of the AFP to appear at a public hearing before the
Senate Committee. The hearing was scheduled after topics
concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the
public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating and
the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a
phone conversation between President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo and an official of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) widely reputed as then COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. At the time of the 2004
elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander,
and Col. Balutan a member, of "Joint Task Force Ranao" by
the AFP Southern Command. "Joint Task Force Ranao" was
tasked with the maintenance of peace and order during the
2004 elections in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and
Lanao del Sur.
Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan, and AFP Chief of Staff
Lieutenant General Generoso Senga (Gen. Senga) were
among the several AFP officers who received a letter
invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend the hearing.
The Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a
Memorandum. Noting that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan
had been invited to attend the Senate Committee hearing,
the Memorandum directed the two officers to attend the
hearing. Conformably, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan filed
their respective requests for travel authority addressed to the
PMA Superintendent.
Gen. Senga sent a letter to Sen. Biazon, informing the
senator that "no approval has been granted by the President
to any AFP officer to appear" before the hearing scheduled
on that day. Nonetheless, both Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan were present as the hearing started, and they both
testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections.
Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had
appeared before the Senate Committee "in spite of the fact
that a guidance has been given that a Presidential approval
should be sought prior to such an appearance;" that such
directive was "in keeping with the time[-]honored principle of
the Chain of Command;" and that the two officers "disobeyed
a legal order, in violation of A[rticles of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully
Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to
General Court Martial proceedings x x x" Both Gen. Gudani
and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments
then.
Subsequently, petitioners were charged of violating Articles
of War 65 and 97.
Page 118 of 190
It was from these premises that the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition was filed.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners' right to travel and movement
can be restricted by the President (Commander-in-Chief).
YES
HELD: The vitality of the tenet that the President is the
commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is most crucial to
the democratic way of life, to civilian supremacy over the
military, and to the general stability of our representative
system of government. The Constitution reposes final
authority, control and supervision of the AFP to the
President, a civilian who is not a member of the armed
forces, and whose duties as commander-in-chief represent
only a part of the organic duties imposed upon the office, the
other functions being clearly civil in nature. Civilian
supremacy over the military also countermands the notion
that the military may bypass civilian authorities, such as civil
courts, on matters such as conducting warrantless searches
and seizures.
The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is
denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins with the
simple declaration that "[t]he President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines x
x x"37 Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as
those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief
clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief,
absolute authority over the persons and actions of the
members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the
ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and
speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be
sanctioned under civilian law.
Of possibly less gravitas, but of equal importance, is the
principle that mobility of travel is another necessary
restriction on members of the military. A soldier cannot leave
his/her post without the consent of the commanding officer.
The reasons are self-evident. The commanding officer has to
be aware at all times of the location of the troops under
command, so as to be able to appropriately respond to any
exigencies. For the same reason, commanding officers have
to be able to restrict the movement or travel of their soldiers,
if in their judgment, their presence at place of call of duty is
necessary. At times, this may lead to unsentimental, painful
consequences, such as a soldier being denied permission to
witness the birth of his first-born, or to attend the funeral of a
parent. Yet again, military life calls for considerable personal
sacrifices during the period of conscription, wherein the
higher duty is not to self but to country.
Indeed, the military practice is to require a soldier to obtain
permission from the commanding officer before he/she may
leave his destination. A soldier who goes from the properly
appointed place of duty or absents from his/her command,
guard, quarters, station, or camp without proper leave is
subject to punishment by court-martial. It is even clear from
the record that petitioners had actually requested for travel
authority from the PMA in Baguio City to Manila, to attend
the Senate Hearing. Even petitioners are well aware that it
was necessary for them to obtain permission from their
superiors before they could travel to Manila to attend the
Senate Hearing.
It is clear that the basic position of petitioners impinges on
these fundamental principles we have discussed. They seek
to be exempted from military justice for having traveled to the
Senate to testify before the Senate Committee against the
express orders of Gen. Senga, the AFP Chief of Staff. If
petitioners’ position is affirmed, a considerable exception
would be carved from the unimpeachable right of military
officers to restrict the speech and movement of their juniors.
The ruinous consequences to the chain of command and
military discipline simply cannot warrant the Court’s
imprimatur on petitioner’s position.
2. LEAVE DIVISION, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICES-Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),
vs. WILMA SALVACION P. HEUSDENS, Clerk IV
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tagum City (A.M. No.
P-11-2927 ; December 13, 2011 [Formerly A.M. OCA
IPI No. 10-3532-P])
Page 119 of 190
FACTS: This case stemmed from the leave application for
foreign travel sent through mail by Wilma Salvacion P.
Heusdens (respondent), Staff Clerk IV of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Tagum City, Davao del Norte.
Records disclose that on July 10, 2009, the Employees
Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA), received respondent’s leave
application for foreign travel from September 11, 2009 to
October 11, 2009. Respondent left for abroad without waiting
for the result of her application. It turned out that no travel
authority was issued in her favor because she was not
cleared of all her accountabilities as evidenced by the
Supreme Court Certificate of Clearance. Respondent
reported back to work on October 19, 2009.
The OCA, in its Memorandum dated November 26, 2009,
recommended the disapproval of respondent’s leave
application. It further advised that respondent be directed to
make a written explanation of her failure to secure authority
to travel abroad in violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003.
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno approved the OCA
recommendation.
Respondent admitted having travelled overseas without the
required travel authority. She explained that it was not her
intention to violate the rules as she, in fact, mailed her leave
application which was approved by her superior, Judge
Arlene Lirag-Palabrica. She honestly believed that her leave
application would be eventually approved by the Court.
The OCA found respondent to have violated OCA Circular
No. 49-2003 for failing to secure the approval of her
application for travel authority.
Hence, the OCA recommended that the administrative
complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter
and that respondent be deemed guilty for violation of OCA
Circular No. 49-2003 and be reprimanded with a warning that
a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future would
be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE: WON the requirements under OCA Circular No. 49-
2003 on vacation leave to be spent abroad unduly restricts a
citizen’s right to travel guaranteed by Section 6, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.
HELD: NO.
Section 6 of Article III of the 1987 Constitition reads:
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law.
[Emphases supplied]
The exercise of one’s right to travel or the freedom to move
from one place to another, as assured by the Constitution, is
not absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and inherent
limitations regulating the right to travel. Section 6 itself
provides that "neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health, as may be provided by law."
Inherent limitations on the right to travel are those that
naturally emanate from the source. These are very basic and
are built-in with the power.
Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all courts
and the personnel thereof.
With respect to the power of the Court, Section 5 (6), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the "Supreme
Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts
and the personnel thereof." This provision empowers the
Court to oversee all matters relating to the effective
supervision and management of all courts and personnel
under it. Recognizing this mandate, Memorandum Circular
No. 26 of the Office of the President, dated July 31, 1986,
considers the Supreme Court exempt and with authority to
promulgate its own rules and regulations on foreign travels.
Thus, the Court came out with OCA Circular No. 49-2003
(B).
Where a person joins the Judiciary or the government in
general, he or she swears to faithfully adhere to, and abide
with, the law and the corresponding office rules and
regulations. These rules and regulations, to which one
submits himself or herself, have been issued to guide the
government officers and employees in the efficient
performance of their obligations. When one becomes a
public servant, he or she assumes certain duties with their
concomitant responsibilities and gives up some rights like the
absolute right to travel so that public service would not be
prejudiced.
As earlier stated, with respect to members and employees of
the Judiciary, the Court issued OCA Circular No. 49-2003 to
regulate their foreign travel in an unofficial capacity. Such
regulation is necessary for the orderly administration of
justice. If judges and court personnel can go on leave and
travel abroad at will and without restrictions or regulations,
there could be a disruption in the administration of justice. A
situation where the employees go on mass leave and travel
together, despite the fact that their invaluable services are
urgently needed, could possibly arise. For said reason,
members and employees of the Judiciary cannot just invoke
and demand their right to travel.
To permit such unrestricted freedom can result in disorder, if
not chaos, in the Judiciary and the society as well. In a
situation where there is a delay in the dispensation of justice,
litigants can get disappointed and disheartened. If their
expectations are frustrated, they may take the law into their
own hands which results in public disorder undermining
public safety. In this limited sense, it can even be considered
that the restriction or regulation of a court personnel’s right to
travel is a concern for public safety, one of the exceptions to
the non-impairment of one’s constitutional right to travel.
Given the exacting standard expected from each individual
called upon to serve in the Judiciary, it is imperative that
every court employee comply with the travel notification and
authority requirements as mandated by OCA Circular No. 49-
2003. A court employee who plans to travel abroad must file
his leave application prior to his intended date of travel with
sufficient time allotted for his application to be processed and
approved first by the Court. He cannot leave the country
without his application being approved, much less assume
that his leave application would be favorably acted upon. In
the case at bench, respondent should have exercised
Page 120 of 190
prudence and asked for the status of her leave application
before leaving for abroad.
WHEREFORE, respondent Wilma Salvacion P. Heusdens,
Clerk IV Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tagum City, is
hereby ADMONISHED for traveling abroad without any travel
authority in violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003, with a
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense
would be dealt with more severely.
NOTE: DISSENTING OPINION CARPIO, J.:
(1) Respondent’s leave application for travel abroad was
received by the OCA on 10 July 2009, or two months before
her intended leave from 11 September 2009 to 11 October
2009. However, it was only on 26 November 2009, or after
respondent’s intended leave, that the OCA issued a
memorandum recommending disapproval of her leave
application. Furthermore, it was only in a letter dated 6
January 2010 that the OCA informed respondent of the
disapproval of her leave application. Clearly, the OCA’s letter
dated 6 January 2010 disapproving the leave application
came too late. Although OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not
provide for the time frame within which to act on the leave
application, it is understood that it should be prior to the
applicant’s intended leave. The requirement that the leave
application be submitted to the OCA at least two weeks
before the intended leave for travel is to give sufficient time
for its approval or disapproval before the intended leave.
Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292,
a leave application should be acted upon within five (5)
working days after its receipt, otherwise the leave application
is deemed approved.
In this case, where the leave application was received by the
OCA two months before the intended leave but was only
acted upon after the intended leave. Thus, respondent’s
leave of absence was deemed approved as of 15 July 2009
pursuant to Section 49, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on
Leave.
(2) The majority states that although respondent submitted
her leave application for foreign travel, she failed to comply
with the clearance and accountability requirements because
she "failed to secure clearance from the Supreme Court
Savings and Loan Association (SCSLA) where she had an
outstanding loan." Thus, since OCA Circular No. 49-2003
specifically provides that "no action shall be taken on
requests for travel authority with incomplete requirements,"
the majority rationalizes that respondent should have
expected that her leave application would be disapproved.
I disagree with the majority’s view that clearance from the
SCSLA is required before a court employee can exercise his
or her constitutional right to travel abroad. The SCSLA is a
private association with private funds, even if some of its
investors are Supreme Court officials. The OCA has no
power to enforce the collection of loans extended by a
private lender, under pain of denying a constitutional right of
a citizen if he does not secure clearance from the private
lender. Although OCA Circular No. 49-2003 provides that
"clearance as to money and property accountability" is one of
the requirements to be submitted, this refers to accountability
to the government, not to a private company like the SCSLA.
Even if the OCA’s Certificate of Clearance Form requires the
SCSLA’s conformity, such requirement has no legal basis.
The OCA does not have jurisdiction to require such
clearance because that would be tantamount to making the
Court a collecting agent of the SCSLA which is a private
association.
Indeed, the OCA has no right to deny a court employee’s
constitutional right to travel just to enforce collection of the
SCSLA’s loans to its members. There is no law prohibiting a
person from traveling abroad just because he has an existing
debt or financial obligation. Requiring the court employee
clearance from the SCSLA is no different from requiring the
court employee to secure a clearance from his or her creditor
banks before he or she can travel abroad. That would unduly
restrict a citizen’s right to travel which is guaranteed by
Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Although the constitutional right to travel is not absolute, it
can only be restricted in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The SCSLA clearance is not required by any law before a
court employee can travel abroad. The SCSLA clearance is
not even specifically required under OCA Circular No. 49-
2003. Clearly, respondent has submitted to the OCA all the
requirements for her leave application two months prior to
her intended leave. Thus, respondent’s leave application was
deemed approved as of 15 July 2009 pursuant to Section 49,
Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave and the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292.
3. OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-OFFICE
OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE
Page 121 of 190
IGNACIO B. MACARINE, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Gen. Luna, Surigao del Norte (A.M. No. MTJ-
10-1770; July 18, 2012 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No.
10-2255-MTJ)
FACTS: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) filed
the present administrative case against Judge Ignacio B.
Macarine (respondent) for violation of OCA Circular No. 49-
2003.
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires that all foreign travels of
judges and court personnel, regardless of the number of
days, must be with prior permission from the Court. A travel
authority must be secured from the OCA Judges must submit
the following requirements:
(1.) application or letter-request addressed to the Court
Administrator stating the purpose of the travel abroad;
(2.) application for leave covering the period of the travel
abroad, favorably recommended by the Executive Judge;
and
(3.) certification from the Statistics Division, Court
Management Office, OCA as to the condition of the docket.
The complete requirements should be submitted to and
received by the OCA at least two weeks before the intended
time of travel. No action shall be taken on requests for travel
authority with incomplete requirements.
Judges and personnel who shall leave the country without
travel authority issued by the OCA shall be subject to
disciplinary action.
On August 13, 2009, the respondent wrote then Court
Administrator, now Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez,
requesting for authority to travel to Hongkong with his family
for the period of September 10 - 14, 2009 where he would
celebrate his 65th birthday. The respondent stated that his
travel abroad shall be charged to his annual forced leave.
However, he did not submit the corresponding application for
leave. For his failure to submit the complete requirements,
his request for authority to travel remained unacted upon.
The respondent proceeded with his travel abroad without the
required travel authority from the OCA.
On January 28, 2010, the respondent was informed by the
OCA that his leave of absence for the period of September
9-15, 2009 had been disapproved and his travel considered
unauthorized by the Court.
In his letter-explanation, the respondent narrated that his
daughter, a nurse working in New Jersey, USA, gave him a
trip to Hongkong as a gift for his 65th birthday. In the first
week of September 2009, he received a call from his
daughter that she had already booked him, together with his
wife and two sons, in a hotel in Hongkong from September
13 to 15, 2009. They flew in to Manila from Surigao City on
September 9, 2009, intending to prepare the necessary
papers for his authority to travel at the Supreme Court the
following day. However, sensing time constraint and thinking
of the futility of completing the requirements before their
scheduled flight, he opted not to immediately complete the
requirements and simply went ahead with their travel abroad.
He thought of submitting his compliance upon his return to
Manila. He acknowledged his mistake and regretted his
failure to comply with OCA Circular No. 49-2003. He
promised not to commit the same infraction again. He further
requested for reconsideration of the OCA’s intended action
to deduct his salary corresponding to the seven (7) days that
he was absent, instead of charging his absences to his leave
credits.
by the attendant mitigating circumstances. He is also
WARNED that the commission of a similar violation in the
future will merit a more severe penalty.

OCA found the respondent guilty of violation of OCA Circular

No. 49-2003 for traveling out of the country without filing the
NOTE: DISSENTING AND CONCURRING OPINION
necessary application for leave and without first securing a
SERENO, J.:
travel authority from the Court.
I agree with the imposition of a penalty on Judge Macarine
for his failure to (a) file an application for leave and (b)
ISSUE: WON OCA Circular No. 49-2003 violates Section 6 submit a report on the conditions of the docket pending in his
of Article III of the 1987 Constitution. NO sala prior to his travel abroad. However, I do not agree that
he should be penalized for his failure to request a travel
authority from the OCA.

HELD: True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the The policy of the Court requiring judges and court personnel
Constitution.1âwphi1 However, the exercise of such right is to secure a travel authority must be re-examined.
not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
allows restrictions on one’s right to travel provided that such Requiring judges and court personnel prior submission of a
restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety request for travel authority impairs their right to travel, a
or public health as may be provided by law. This, however, constitutional right that cannot be unduly curtailed. During
should by no means be construed as limiting the Court’s the approved leave of absence of a judge or court personnel,
inherent power of administrative supervision over lower he or she should be accorded the liberty to travel within the
courts. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but country or abroad, as any other citizen, without this Court
merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by imposing a requirement to secure prior permission therefor.
judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave to
Thus, Judge Macarine should not be held administratively
travel abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person
liable for his failure to secure a permit to travel prior to his
from doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or direct
intended departure, as such action would amount to an
according to rule.
unjustified restriction to his constitutional right to travel.
To ensure management of court dockets and to avoid However, on account of his failure to file (a) an application
disruption in the administration of justice, OCA Circular No. for leave and (b) a report on his caseload prior to his travel
49-2003 requires a judge who wishes to travel abroad to abroad, I agree that he should be admonished.
submit, together with his application for leave of absence
duly recommended for approval by his Executive Judge, a
certification from the Statistics Division, Court Management
Office of the OCA, as to the condition of his docket, based on
his Certificate of Service for the month immediately
preceding the date of his intended travel, that he has decided
and resolved all cases or incidents within three (3) months
from date of submission, pursuant to Section 15(1) and (2),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

For traveling abroad without having been officially allowed by

the Court, the respondent is guilty of violation of OCA
Circular No. 49-2003.

The Court had in several instances refrained from imposing

the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating facts, such
as the employee’s length of service, acknowledgement of his
or her infractions and feelings of remorse for the same,
advanced age, family circumstances, and other humanitarian
and equitable considerations.

In the present case, the respondent regretted his failure to

comply with the requirements of OCA Circular No. 49-2003.
He acknowledged his mistake and promised not to commit
the same infraction in the future.

We consider the outlined circumstances as mitigating.

Following judicial precedents, the respondent deserves some
degree of leniency in imposing upon him the appropriate
penalty.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Ignacio B. Macarine,

Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Gen. Luna, Surigao del Norte,
is hereby given the ADMONITION that he acted irresponsibly
when he opted not to immediately secure a travel authority
and is saved only from the full force that his violation carries

Page 122 of 190

4. Marcos v. Manglapus 177 SCRA 669, G.R. No. 88211
(1989)
FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was
deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people
power” revolution and was forced into exile. In his stead,
Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic
under a revolutionary government.
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to
the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return
at a time when the stability of government is threatened from
various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise
and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the
return of Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats
& following supervening events listed as follows:
• The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by
political leaders of Mr. Marcos
• the takeover of television station Channel 7 by
rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of
"Marcos loyalists"
• the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to
surreptitiously return from Hawii with mercenaries
aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms
dealer Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987
• On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one
of the major players in the February Revolution, led
a failed coup that left scores of people, both
combatants and civilians, dead signifying a split in
the ranks of the military establishment that
threatened civilian supremacy over military and
brought to the fore the realization that civilian
government could be at the mercy of a fractious
military
• communist insurgency and the seccessionist
movement in Mindanao to the extent that the
communists have set up a parallel government of
their own on the areas they effectively control while
the separatist are virtually free to move about in
armed bands
• The accumulated foreign debt, and
• the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos
and his cronies left the economy devastated
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to
order the respondents to issue them their travel documents
and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s
decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines.
Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the
country. He also questioned the claim of the President that
the decision was made in the interest of national security,
public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the
President acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their
right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal
protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of
their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of
the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Page 123 of 190
Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return to
the Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions
of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law.
Furthermore, they contend that the President is without
power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because
only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.”
Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no
law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that
before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or
agency of the government, there must be legislation to that
effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the
right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines
is guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each
state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:
Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State
shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject
to any restrictions except those which are provided
by law, are necessary to protect national security,
public order (order public), public health or morals
or the rights and freedoms of others, and are
consistent with the other rights recognized in the
present Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to
enter his own country.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the President has the power under the
Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the
 Marcose’s to the Philippines poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and decided to bar their
return.
HELD: No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
1. The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute.
They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The
request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and
the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case
law which clearly never contemplated situations even
remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a
matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual
unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such
request or demand should submit to the exercise of a
broader discretion on the part of the President to determine
whether it must be granted or denied.
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not
the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or
within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel
would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the
right to return to one’s country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the
right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode
within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and
the right to enter one’s country as separate and distinct
rights. The Declaration speaks of the “right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each state”
Art. 13(l) separately from the “right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country.” Art. 13(2). On
the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the “right to liberty
of movement and freedom to choose his residence” Art. 12(l)
and the right to “be free to leave any country, including his
own.” Art. 12(2) which rights may be restricted by such laws
as “are necessary to protect national security, public order,
public health or morals or enter qqqs own country” of which
one cannot be “arbitrarily deprived.” Art. 12(4). It would
therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the
right to return to one’s country in the same context as those
pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights
specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only
of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-
considered view that the right to return may be considered,
as a generally accepted principle of international law and,
under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land Art. II,
Sec. 2 of the Constitution. However, it is distinct and
separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different
protection under the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, i.e., against being “arbitrarily deprived”
thereof Art. 12 (4).
Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains
intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
“executive power.” Corollarily, the powers of the President
cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive
Page 124 of 190
power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated.
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general
welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights
of certain individuals. The power involved is the President’s
residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It
is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the
people.
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that
“the prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the
people” and that “the maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of
the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the
people of the blessings of democracy.” Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the
President’s powers as protector of the peace. The power of
the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of
emergency or to leading the State against external and
internal threats to its existence. The President is not only
clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but
is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of
maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic
tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the
horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling
presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way
diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in
the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the
President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers
that follow cannot be said to exclude the President’s
exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the
calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to
keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and
pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a
well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist
movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power,
urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men,
police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcose’s and
their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated
in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the
Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify
the violence directed against the State and instigate more
chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded
from taking pre- emptive action against threats to its
existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to
become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the
essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the
State the fruition of the people’s sovereignty is an obligation
in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and
defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the
laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only
now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about
by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses
and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are
still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the
country, while the Government has barely scratched the
surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous
wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.
Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing burden admits that it’s under control. Filipinos would know how to
imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing handle Marcos’ return.
during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates
development and is one of the root causes of widespread
poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious
state of our economy is of common knowledge and is easily
within the ambit of judicial notice. Padilla, Dissenting

Sarmiento, Dissenting
2. The question for the court to determine is whether or not President’s determination that Marcos’ return would threaten
there exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it national security should be agreed upon by the court. Such
was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses threat must be clear & present.
in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in
her decision. The supervening events that happened before
her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive
measures for the self-preservation of the country &
protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.

Fernan, Concurring

• The president’s power is not fixed. Limits would depend on

the imperatives of events and not on abstract theories of law.
We are undergoing a critical time and the current problem
can only be answerable by the President.

• Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear &

present danger. Thus, it’s the executive’s responsibility &
obligation to prevent a grave & serious threat to its safety
from arising.

• We can’t sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political

& economic gains to give in to Marcos’ wish to die in the
country. Compassion must give way to the other state
interests.

Cruz, Dissenting

• As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ right to return, live

& die in his own country. It is a right guaranteed by the
Consti to all individuals, whether patriot, homesick, prodigal,
tyrant, etc.

• Military representatives failed to show that Marcos’ return

would pose a threat to national security. Fears were mere
conjectures.

• Residual powers – but the executive’s powers were

outlined to limit her powers & not expand.

Paras, Dissenting

• AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to

impair Marcos’ right to return to the Philippines. .

• Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that
one dies, he/she should be buried w/in 10 days.

• Untenable that without a legislation, right to travel is

absolute & state is powerless to restrict it. It’s w/in police
power of the state to restrict this right if national security,
public safety/health demands that such be restricted. It can’t
be absolute & unlimited all the time. It can’t be arbitrary &
irrational.

• No proof that Marcos’ return would endanger national

security or public safety. Fears are speculative & military

Page 125 of 190

 4.1 Marcos vs Manglapus (G.R. No. 88211, October 27,
1989)
FACTS: In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court
by a vote of eight to seven, dismissed the petition, after
finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former
President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the
Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in
Honolulu, Hawaii.
President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in
the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of
Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for
the tranquility and order of the state and society, she did not
allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in the
Philippines.
A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners
raising the following arguments:
Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as
citizens to return to their country of birth and all other rights
guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos. The President
has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she
has, she had exercised it arbitrarily. There is no basis for
barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that
the Marcoses be allowed to return in the Philippines be
granted.
HELD: No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion
for Reconsideration denied because of lack of merit.
Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant
reconsideration. Factual scenario during the time Court
rendered its decision has not changed. The threats to the
government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been
viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to
have ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino
“illegal” claiming that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal
president.
President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of
executive power. Enumerations are merely for specifying
principal articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest to
flow from general grant that power, interpreted in conformity
with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton). Executive
unlike Congress can exercise power from sources not
enumerates so long as not forbidden by constitutional text
(Myers vs. US). This does not amount to dictatorship.
Amendment No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of
legislation whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino with
implied powers. It is within Aquino’s power to protect &
promote interest & welfare of the people. She bound to
comply w/ that duty and there is no proof that she acted
arbitrarily
Page 126 of 190
5. SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN
(SPARK) vs QUEZON CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY
MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, AS
REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, AND
NAVOTAS CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOHN
REY TIANGCO (G.R. No. 225442, August 08, 2017)
FACTS: Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several
local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly
implement their curfew ordinances on minors through police
operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan
Rody."
Among those local governments that implemented curfew
ordinances were respondents:
(a) Navotas City - "Nagtatakda ng 'Curfew' ng mga
Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong
Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila,";
(b) City of Manila - "An Ordinance Declaring the
Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00A.M. of the Following
Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and
Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age;
Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other
Purposes"; and
(c) Quezon City - "An Ordinance Setting for a
Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from
10:00 P.M. to 5:00A.M., Providing Penalties for
Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other
Purposes".
Petitioners, spearheaded by SPARK - an association of
young adults and minors for the protection of the rights and
welfare of the youth and minors - filed this present petition,
arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional
because they:
(a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for
vagueness doctrine;
(b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during
curfew hours;
(c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right
to travel without substantive due process; and
(d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right
in rearing the youth without substantive due
process.
Petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement as there are no
detailed standards on how law enforcers should apprehend
and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew
violators since law enforcer's apprehension depends only on
his physical assessment, and, thus, subjective.
Likewise, although the curfew ordinances exempt working
students or students with evening class, they contend that
the lists of exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of
legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be
out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate
activities of minors during curfew hours.
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances:
(a) are unconstitutional as they deprive minors of
the right to liberty and the right to travel without
substantive due process; and
(b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being
narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear
no reasonable relation to their purpose.
Furthermore, petitioners claim that Section 4 of Manila
Ordinance contravenes Section RA 9344 given that the cited
curfew provision imposes on minors the penalties of
imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition.
Lastly, there is no compelling State interest to impose
curfews contrary to the parents' prerogative to impose them
in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing
of the youth. In this regard, they suggest massive street
lighting programs, installation of CCTVs (closed-circuit
televisions) in public streets, and regular visible patrols by
law enforcers as other viable means of protecting children
and preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the
government can impose more reasonable sanctions, i.e.,
mandatory parental counseling and education seminars
informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and
that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who
allowed their children to be out during curfew hours.
ISSUE: whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional.
HELD The petition is partly granted.
A. Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
A direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
especially set out in the petition." This Court is tasked to
resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at
the first instance if it is of paramount importance and
immediately affects the social, economic, and moral well-
being of the people," as in this case. Hence, petitioners'
direct resort to the Court is justified.
Requisites of Judicial Review. - (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case." In this case, respondents assail
the existence of the first two (2) requisites.
Actual Case or Controversy.
This Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable
controversy in this case given the evident clash of the
Page 127 of 190
parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the Curfew
Ordinances impair the minors' and parents' constitutional
rights, and whether the Manila Ordinance goes against the
provisions of RA 9344.
Legal Standing.
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce
Villegas has legal standing to raise the issue affecting the
minor's right to travel, because: (a) she was still a minor at
the time the petition was filed before this Court, and, hence,
a proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as
alleged, she travels from Manila to Quezon City at night after
school and is, thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by
virtue of the Curfew Ordinances. On the other hand,
petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro
Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan, and Mark Leo Delos Reyes
admitted in the petition that they are all of legal age, and
therefore, beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are
not proper subjects of the Curfew Ordinances, hence has no
legal standing to raise the issue, for which they could base
any direct injury as a consequence thereof.
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and,
consequently, has no legal personality to bring an action in
court. Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK
still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was
authorized by its members who were affected by the Curfew
Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on their behalf.
Hence, except Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required
personal interest in the controversy. However, Clarissa has
standing only on the issue of the alleged violation of the
minors' right to travel, but not on the alleged violation of the
parents' right.
Accordingly, this case is of overarching significance to the
public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural
rules, including, among others, the standing requirement.
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances
are void for vagueness. They claim that the lack of
procedural guidelines in these issuances led to the
questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even though
they were already of legal age. They maintain that the
enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected curfew
offenders based only on their physical appearances and,
thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded
that the Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to
determine the age of the child, they submit that nowhere
does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for
proof or identification of the child to show his age.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application.
It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially
the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle."
They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the
subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to
the ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any
ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew
Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the
age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus,
without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the
Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void
for vagueness doctrine.
While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly
state these parameters, law enforcement agents are still
bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory
law when implementing ordinances.
Note that RA 10630 (the law that amended RA 9344) repeals
all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law. Pursuant to
Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630, minors
caught in violation of curfew ordinances are children at risk
and, therefore, covered by its provisions.
B. Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their
natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without
substantive due process.
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the
State's policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of
their children. Parents are not only given the privilege of
exercising their authority over their children; they are equally
obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously.
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, the
State may act to promote legitimate interests." Thus, "in
cases in which harm to the physical or mental health of the
child or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare is
demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override
the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their
children."
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty
to aid parents in the moral development of their children,
and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their
parental obligations.
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew
Ordinances apply only when the minors are not - whether
actually or constructively - accompanied by their parents.
Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over their
children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to
supervise them. The Curfew Ordinances only amount to a
minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a parent's
right to bring up his or her child.
C. Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the
Curfew Ordinances based on the minors' right to travel. They
claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which,
therefore, necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny.
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the
overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners have not
claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or
any inhibition of speech-related conduct. This Court
explained that "the application of the overbreadth doctrine is
limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given
rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech
cases.
Page 128 of 190
This Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth
analysis in this case, there being no claimed curtailment of
free speech. On the contrary, however, this Court finds
proper to examine the assailed regulations under the strict
scrutiny test.
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a
fundamental right under Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law.
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to
move freely from the Philippines to other countries or within
the Philippines. It is a right embraced within the general
concept of liberty (such as to exercise the right to education,
free expression, assembly, association, and religion.)
As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may impose
limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1)
serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health; and (2) are provided by law.
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically
the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile
crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The
restriction on the minor's movement and activities within the
confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity
during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the
probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting
involved in crimes and criminal activities.
As to the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be
provided by law," our legal system is replete with laws
emphasizing the State's duty to afford special protection to
children, particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD
603, which explicitly authorizes local government units,
through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours
for children.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply
solely to minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In
this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess
and enjoy constitutional rights, but the exercise of these
rights is not co-extensive as those of adults.
The US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for
the differential treatment of the minors' constitutional rights.
These are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second,
their inability to make critical decisions in an informed and
mature manner; and third, the importance of the parental role
in child rearing:
Three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the
reasonableness of classifications
1. Strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i)
interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including
the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii)
burdens suspect classes.
2. Intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification
does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but
requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based
on gender and legitimacy.
3. Rational basis test applies to all other subjects not
covered by the first two tests.
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right
under the Constitution, the strict scrutiny test is the
applicable test.
a. Compelling State Interest.
Respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate
objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised
minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas,
so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their exposure to
potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal
pressure and influences which may even include
themselves.
The local governments of Quezon City and Manila presented
statistical data in their respective pleadings showing the
alarming prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either as
victims or perpetrators, in their respective localities. Based
on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to
enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power under
the general welfare clause.
b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective
provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon City
Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while
the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions,
namely:
(a) Minors accompanied by their parents, family
members of legal age, or guardian;
(b) Those running lawful errands such as buying of
medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for
emergency purposes and the like;
(c) Night school students and those who, by virtue
of their employment, are required in the streets or
outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and
(d) Those working at night.
The Navotas Ordinance, to wit:
(a) Minors with night classes;
(b) Those working at night;
(c) Those who attended a school or church activity,
in coordination with a specific barangay office;
(d) Those traveling towards home during the curfew
hours;
(e) Those running errands under the supervision of
their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age
having authority over them
(f) Those involved in accidents, calamities, and the
like, and
(g) during these specific occasions: Christmas eve,
Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day,
the night before the barangay fiesta, the day of the
Page 129 of 190
fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday,
Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not
narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate and
therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors'
fundamental freedoms.
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church
activities, it hinders them from engaging in legitimate non-
school or non-church activities in the streets or going to and
from such activities; thus, their freedom of association is
effectively curtailed.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose
the curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it
effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious
activities (such as simbang gabi) at night without
accompanying adults, Third, the Navotas Ordinance does
not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political
rallies or attend city council meetings to voice out their
concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble and to
free expression.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be
completely stricken down since their exceptions, which are
essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the
curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of
the above-mentioned fundamental rights.
On the other hand, the list of exceptions under the Quezon
City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect
the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion,
travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of
exceptions guarantees the protection of these
aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of
association by enabling minors to attend both official and
extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church
but also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to
peaceably assemble and of free expression are also covered
by these items given that the minors' attendance in the
official activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed
during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance,
the right to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently
safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance
Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions
to the minor based on the age and frequency of violations, to
wit:
SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any
child or youth violating this ordinance shall be
sanctioned/punished as follows:
(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and
below, the sanction shall consist of a REPRIMAND
for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the
offender's parent, guardian or person exercising
parental authority.
(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and
under Eighteen (18) years of age, the
sanction/penalty shall be: For the FIRST
OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition; For the
SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition,
and a warning about the legal impostitions in case
of a third and subsequent violation; and For the
THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES,
Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10) days, or a
 Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00),
or both at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED,
That the complaint shall be filed by the Punong
Barangay with the office of the City Prosecutor.

Thus springs the question of whether local governments

could validly impose on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a)
community service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine;
and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of
RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on
minors for status offenses such as curfew violations, viz.:
what they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on minors for
violations of these regulations.

In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community

service is a valid form of intervention program that a local
government (such as Navotas City in this case) could
appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of
minors.

The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is
likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as
it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing
disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor.
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-
based programs and admonition are clearly not penalties -
as they are not punitive in nature - and are generally less
intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be clear,
their objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor,
and for the latter to understand, what actions must be
avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably
constitute penalties - as provided in our various criminal and
administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of
RA 9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew
Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny
test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a
compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent
juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon
City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict
scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which
provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this
interest.
In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for
adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise
their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours,
and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's
purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "those
accompanied by their parents or guardian", has also been
construed to include parental permission as a constructive
form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception
to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however,
is left to the discretion of the local government unit. In fine,
the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared
unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the Quezon
City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in
accordance with this Decision.
6. EFRAIM C. GENUINO, ERWIN F. GENUINO and
SHERYL G. SEE, et.al, vs. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in
her capacity as Secretary of Justice, and RI CARDO V.
PARAS III, in his capacity as Chief State Counsel,
CRISTINO L. NAGUIAT, JR. and the BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION
FACTS: On March 19, 1998, then DOJ Secretary Silvestre
H. Bello III issued DOJ Circular No. 17, prescribing rules and
regulations governing the issuance of Hold Departure Orders
(HDO). The said issuance was intended to restrain the
indiscriminate issuance of HDOs which impinge on the
people's right to travel.
On April 23, 2007, former DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez
issued DOJ Circular No. 18, prescribing rules and
regulations governing the issuance and implementation of
watchlist orders. In particular, it provides for the power of the
DOJ Secretary to issue a Watchlist Order (WLO) against
persons with criminal cases pending preliminary investigation
or petition for review before the DOJ. Further, it states that
the DOJ Secretary may issue an Allow Departure Order
(ADO) to a person subject of a WLO who intends to leave
the country for some exceptional reasons. On May 25, 2010,
then Acting DOJ Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued the
assailed DOJ Circular No. 41, consolidating DOJ Circular
Nos. 17 and 18, which will govern the issuance and
implementation of HDOs, WLOs, and ADOs.
After the expiration of GMA's term as President of the
Republic of the Philippines and her subsequent election as
Pampanga representative, criminal complaints were filed
against her before the DOJ.
Following the filing of criminal complaints, De Lima issued
DOJ WLO No. 2011-573 against GMA and Miguel Arroyo on
October 27, 2011, with a validity period of 60 days, or until
December 26, 2011, unless sooner terminated or otherwise
extended.
In three separate letters dated October 20, 2011, October
21, 2011, and October 24, 2011, GMA requested for the
issuance of an ADO, pursuant to Section 7 of DOJ Circular
No. 41, so that she may be able to seek medical attention
from medical specialists abroad for her hypoparathyroidism
and metabolic bone mineral disorder. She mentioned six
different countries where she intends to undergo
consultations and treatments: United States of America,
Germany, Singapore, Italy, Spain and Austria. She likewise

Page 130 of 190

undertook to return to the Philippines, once her treatment
abroad is completed, and participate in the proceedings
before the DOJ.
To determine whether GMA's condition necessitates medical
attention abroad, the Medical Abstract prepared by Dr.
Mirasol was referred to then Secretary of the Department of
Health, Dr. Enrique Ona (Dr. Ona) for his expert opinion as
the chief government physician. Dr. Ona visited GMA at her
residence in La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City. After the
visit, Dr. Ona noted that "Mrs. Arroyo is recuperating
reasonably well after having undergone a series of three
major operations.
GMA Filed for TRO
On November 8, 2011, before the resolution of her
application for ADO, GMA filed the present Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, to annul and set aside DOJ Circular
No. 41 and WLOs issued against her for allegedly being
unconstitutional.
Also, on November 8, 2011, De Lima issued an Order,
denying GMA's application for an ADO because based on
the medical condition of Secretary Ona, (1) there appears to
be no urgent and immediate medical emergency situation for
Applicant to seek medical treatment abroad; (2) Applicant
lists several countries as her destination, some of which
were not for purposes of medical consultation, but for
attending conferences; (3) while the Applicant's undertaking
is to return to the Philippines upon the completion of her
medical treatment, this means that her return will always
depend on said treatment, which, based on her presentation
of her condition, could last indefinitely; (4) Applicant has
chosen for her destination five (5) countries, namely,
Singapore, Germany, Austria, Spain and Italy, with which the
Philippines has no existing extradition treaty.
SC Issued TRO
The Court likewise resolved to issue a TRO in the
consolidated petitions, enjoining the respondents from
enforcing or implementing DOJ Circular No. 41 and WLOs
subject to the following conditions, to wit: (i) The petitioners
shall post a cash bond of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00)
payable to this Court within five (5) days from notice hereof.
Failure to post the bond within the aforesaid period will result
in the automatic lifting of the temporary restraining order; (ii)
The petitioners shall appoint a legal representative common
to both of them who will receive subpoena, orders and other
legal processes on their behalf during their absence. The
petitioners shall submit the name of the legal representative,
also within five (5) days from notice hereof; and (iii) If there is
a Philippine embassy or consulate in the place where they
will be traveling, the petitioners shall inform said embassy or
consulate by personal appearance or by phone of their
whereabouts at all times;
On the very day of the issuance of the TRO, the petitioners
tendered their compliance with the conditions set forth in the
Resolution.
At around 8:00 p.m. on the same day, the petitioners
proceeded to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA),
with an aide-de-camp and a private nurse, to take their flights
to Singapore. However, the BI officials at NAIA refused to
process their travel documents which ultimately resulted to
them not being able to join their flights.
Page 131 of 190
On November 17, 2011, GMA, through counsel, filed an
Urgent Motion for Respondents to Cease and Desist from
Preventing Petitioner GMA from Leaving the Country. She
strongly emphasized that the TRO issued by the Court was
immediately executory and that openly defying the same is
tantamount to gross disobedience and resistance to a lawful
order of the Court.
Respondent’s Contentions
On November 16, 2011, the respondents filed a
Consolidated Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or to
Lift TRO, praying that the Court reconsider and set aside the
TRO issued in the consolidated petitions until they are duly
heard on the merits.
While the petitioners anchor their right in esse on the right to
travel under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the
said right is not absolute. One of the limitations on the right
to travel is DOJ Circular No. 41, which was issued pursuant
to the rule-making powers of the DOJ in order to keep
individuals under preliminary investigation within the
jurisdiction of the Philippine criminal justice system.
On November 18, 2011, the Court issued a Resolution,
requiring De Lima to show cause why she should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt of court for failure
to comply with the TRO. She was likewise ordered to
immediately comply with the TRO by allowing the petitioners
to leave the country. At the same time, the Court denied the
Consolidated Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or to
Lift TRO dated November 16, 2011 filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General.
Petitioner’s Contention
Petitioner opined that DOI Circular No. 41 was validly issued
pursuant to the agency's rule-making powers provided in
Sections 1 and 3, Book IV, Title III Chapter 1 of E.O. No. 292
and Section 50, Chapter 11, Book IV of the mentioned Code.
ISSUE NO. 1
Whether or not the DOJ has the power to issue a Hold
Departure Order
HELD NO. 1
NO.
Guided by the foregoing disquisition, the Court is in quandary
of identifying the authority from which the DOJ believed its
power to restrain the right to travel emanates. To begin with,
there is no law particularly providing for the authority of the
secretary of justice to curtail the exercise of the right to
travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health. As it is, the only ground of the former DOJ
Secretary in restraining the petitioners, at that time, was the
pendency of the preliminary investigation of the Joint DOJ-
COMELEC Preliminary Investigation Committee on the
complaint for electoral sabotage against them.
To be clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a
legislative enactment which underwent the scrutiny and
concurrence of lawmakers, and submitted to the President
for approval. It is a mere administrative issuance apparently
designed to carry out the provisions of an enabling law which
the former DOJ Secretary believed to be Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 292, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code
of 1987."
Indeed, administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or
rule-making powers, among others. It is the "power to make
rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation
that is within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers." In
the exercise of this power, the rules and regulations that
administrative agencies promulgate should be within the
scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to
the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not
in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by law. They must conform to and be consistent
with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such
rule or regulation to be valid.
It is, however, important to stress that before there can even
be a valid administrative issuance, there must first be a
showing that the delegation of legislative power is itself valid.
It is valid only if there is a law that (a) is complete in itself,
setting forth the policy therein to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate: and (b) fixes a standard the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable
to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.
A painstaking examination of the provisions being relied
upon by the former DOJ Secretary will disclose that they do
not particularly vest the DOJ the authority to issue DOJ
Circular No. 41 which effectively restricts the right to travel
through the issuance of WLOs and HDOs. Sections 1 and 3,
Book IV, Title III, Chapter 1 of E.O. No. 292 reads:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy.- It is the declared
policy of the State to provide the government with a
principal law agency which shall be both its legal
counsel and prosecution arm; administer the
criminal justice system in accordance with the
accepted processes thereof consisting in the
investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders
and administration of the correctional system;
implement the laws on the admission and stay of
aliens, citizenship, land titling system, and
settlement of land problems involving small
landowners and member of indigenous cultural
minorities; and provide free legal services to
indigent members of the society.
Section 3. Powers and Functions. - to accomplish its
mandate, the Department shall have the following powers
and functions:
(1) Act as principal law agency of the government
and as legal counsel and representative thereof,
whenever so required;
(2) investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute
offenders and administer the probation and
correction system;
A plain reading of the foregoing provisions shows that they
are mere general provisions designed to lay down the
purposes of the enactment and the broad enumeration of the
powers and functions of the DOJ. In no way can they be
interpreted as a grant of power to curtail a fundamental right
as the language of the provision itself does not lend to that
stretched construction.
Page 132 of 190
In the same way, Section 3 does not authorize the DOJ to
issue WLOs and HDOs to restrict the constitutional right to
travel. There is even no mention of the exigencies stated in
the Constitution that will justify the impairment. The provision
simply grants the DOJ the power to investigate the
commission of crimes and prosecute offenders, which are
basically the functions of the agency. However, it does not
carry with it the power to indiscriminately devise all means it
deems proper in performing its functions without regard to
constitutionally-protected rights.
The DOJ cannot also rely on Section 50, Chapter 1 l, Book
JV of E.O. No. 292, which simply provides for the types of
issuances that administrative agencies, in general, may
issue. It does not speak of any authority or power but rather
a mere clarification on the nature of the issuances that may
be issued by a secretary or head of agency.
In the same manner, Section 7, Chapter 2, Title III, Book IV
of E.O. 292 cited in the memorandum of the former DOJ
Secretary cannot justify the restriction on the right to travel in
DOJ Circular No. 41. It is indisputable that the secretaries of
government agencies have the power to promulgate rules
and regulations that will aid performance in the performance
of their functions. This is adjunct to the power of
administrative agencies to execute laws and does not require
the authority of a law. This is, however, different from the
delegated legislative power to promulgate rules of
government agencies.
The questioned circular does not come under the inherent
power of the executive department to adopt rules and
regulations as clearly the issuance of HDO and WLO is not
the DOJ's business. As such, it is a compulsory requirement
that there be an existing law, complete and sufficient in itself,
conferring the expressed authority to the concerned agency
to promulgate rules.
Consistent with the foregoing, there must be an enabling law
from which DOJ Circular No. 41 must derive its life.
Unfortunately, all of the supposed statutory authorities relied
upon by the DOJ did not pass the completeness test and
sufficient standard test. The DOJ miserably failed to
establish the existence of the enabling law that will justify the
issuance of the questioned circular.
Petitioner Contends
The DOJ stresses the necessity of the restraint imposed in
DOJ Circular No. 41 in that to allow the petitioners, who are
under preliminary investigation, to exercise an untrammeled
right to travel, especially when the risk of flight is distinctly
high will surely impede the efficient and effective operation of
the justice system. The absence of the petitioners, it
asseverates, would mean that the farthest criminal
proceeding they could go would be the filing of the criminal
information since they cannot be arraigned in absentia.
ISSUE NO 2
Whether or not allowing the accused the right to travel when
the risk of flight is extremely high will surely impede the
efficient and effective operation of the justice system.
HELD NO. 2
NO.
It bears emphasizing that the conduct of a preliminary
investigation is an implement of due process which
essentially benefits the accused as it accords an opportunity
for the presentation of his side with regard to the accusation.
The accused may, however, opt to waive his presence in the
preliminary investigation. In any case, whether the accused
responds to a subpoena, the investigating prosecutor shall
resolve the complaint within 10 days after the filing of the
same.
The point is that in the conduct of a preliminary investigation,
the presence of the accused is not necessary for the
prosecutor to discharge his investigatory duties. If the
accused chooses to waive his presence or fails to submit
countervailing evidence, that is his own lookout. Ultimately,
he shall be bound by the determination of the prosecutor on
the presence of probable cause and he cannot claim denial
of due process. The DOJ therefore cannot justify the restraint
in the liberty of movement imposed by DOJ Circular No. 41
on the ground that it is necessary to ensure presence and
attendance in the preliminary investigation of the complaints.
There is also no authority of law granting it the power to
compel the attendance of the subjects of a preliminary
investigation, pursuant to its investigatory powers under E.O.
No. 292. Its investigatory power is simply inquisitorial and,
unfortunately, not broad enough to embrace the imposition of
restraint on the liberty of movement.
That there is a risk of flight does not authorize the DOJ to
take the situation upon itself and draft an administrative
issuance to keep the individual within the Philippine
jurisdiction so that he may not be able to evade criminal
prosecution and consequent liability. It is an arrogation of
power it does not have; it is a usurpation of function that
properly belongs to the legislature.
Without a law to justify its action, the issuance of DOJ
Circular No. 41 is an unauthorized act of the DOJ of
empowering itself under the pretext of dire exigency or
urgent necessity. This action runs afoul the separation of
powers between the three branches of the government and
cannot be upheld. Even the Supreme Court, in the exercise
of its power to promulgate rules is limited in that the same
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
This should have cautioned the DOJ, which is only one of the
many agencies of the executive branch, to be more
scrutinizing in its actions especially when they affect
substantive rights, like the right to travel.
ISSUE NO 3
Whether or not the DOJ’s Power to issue Hold Departure
Order is pursuant to its police power.
HELD NO 3
NO.
The DOJ's reliance on the police power of the state cannot
also be countenanced. Police power pertains to the "state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."
"It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society." Verily, the exercise
of this power is primarily lodged with the legislature but may
be wielded by the President and administrative boards, as
well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels,
including the barangay, by virtue of a valid delegation of
Page 133 of 190
power. It bears noting, however, that police power may only
be validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought
to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
On its own, the DOJ cannot wield police power since the
authority pertains to Congress. Even if it claims to be
exercising the same as the alter ego of the President, it must
first establish the presence of a definite legislative enactment
evidencing the delegation of power from its principal. This,
the DOJ failed to do. There is likewise no showing that the
curtailment of the right to travel imposed by DOJ Circular No.
41 was reasonably necessary in order for it to perform its
investigatory duties.
ISSUE NO. 4
Whether or not the DOJ Circular violates due process
HELD NO. 4
YES.
Apart from lack of legal basis, DOJ Circular No. 41 also
suffers from other serious infirmities that render it invalid.
The apparent vagueness of the circular as to the distinction
between a HDO and WLO is violative of the due process
clause. An act that is vague "violates due process for failure
to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid and leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."
Here, the distinction is significant as it will inform the
respondents of the grounds, effects and the measures they
may take to contest the issuance against them. Verily, there
must be a standard by which a HDO or WLO may be issued,
particularly against those whose cases are still under
preliminary investigation, since at that stage there is yet no
criminal information against them which could have
warranted the restraint.
Further, a reading of the introductory provisions of DOJ
Circular No. shows that it emanates from the DOJ's
assumption of powers that is not actually conferred to it.
ISSUE NO. 5
Whether or not a Watch List Order is constitutional
HELD NO 5
NO.
It is apparent in Section 7 of the same circular that the
subject of a HDO or WLO cannot leave the country unless he
obtains an ADO. The said section reads as follows:
Section 7. Allow Departure Order (ADO)- Any
person subject of HDO/WLO issued pursuant to this
Circular who intends, for some exceptional reasons,
to leave the country may, upon application under
oath with the Secretary of Justice, be issued an
ADO.
The ADO may be issued upon submission of the following
requirements:
(a) Affidavit stating clearly the purpose, inclusive
period of the date of travel, and containing an
undertaking to immediately report to the DOJ upon
return; and
(b) Authority to travel or travel clearance from the
court or appropriate government office where the
case upon which the issued HDO/WLO was based
is pending, or from the investigating prosecutor in
charge or the subject case.
By requiring an ADO before the subject of a HDO or WLO is
allowed to leave the country, the only plausible conclusion
that can be made is that its mere issuance operates as a
restraint on the right to travel. To make it even more difficult,
the individual will need to cite an exceptional reason to justify
the granting of an ADO.
The WLO also does not bear a significant distinction from a
HDO, thereby giving the impression that they are one and
the same or, at the very least, complementary such that
whatever is not covered in Section 1, which pertains to the
issuance of HDO, can conveniently fall under Section 2,
which calls for the issuance of WLO. In any case, there is an
identical provision in DOJ Circular No. 41 which authorizes
the Secretary of Justice to issue a HDO or WLO against
anyone, motu proprio, in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health. With this all-encompassing
provision, there is nothing that can prevent the Secretary of
Justice to prevent anyone from leaving the country under the
guise of national security, public safety or public health.
Petitioner’s Contention
The DOJ argues that Section 6, Article III of the Constitution
is not an exclusive enumeration of the instances wherein the
right to travel may be validly impaired. It cites that this Court
has its own administrative issuances restricting travel of its
employees and that even lower courts may issue HDO even
on grounds outside of what is stated in the Constitution.
ISSUE NO. 6
Whether or not the enumeration of the instances wherein the
right to travel may be validly impaired is exclusive.
HELD NO. 6
YES.
It bears reiterating that the power to issue HDO is inherent to
the courts. The courts may issue a HDO against an accused
in a criminal case so that he may be dealt with in accordance
with law. It does not require legislative conferment or
constitutional recognition; it co-exists with the grant of judicial
power. The inherent powers of the courts are essential in
upholding its integrity and largely beneficial in keeping the
people's faith in the institution by ensuring that it has the
power and the means to enforce its jurisdiction.
As regards the power of the courts to regulate foreign
travels, by virtue of its administrative supervision over all
courts and personnel that this Court came out with OCA
Circular No. 49-2003, which provided for the guidelines that
must be observed by employees of the judiciary seeking to
travel abroad. Specifically, they are required to secure a
leave of absence for the purpose of foreign travel from this
Page 134 of 190
Court through the Chief Justice and the Chairmen of the
Divisions, or from the Office of the Court Administrator, as
the case maybe. This is "to ensure management of court
dockets and to avoid disruption in the administration of
justice.
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 is therefore not a restriction, but
more properly, a regulation of the employee's leave for
purpose of foreign travel which is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit
a person from doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or
direct according to rule. This regulation comes as a
necessary consequence of the individual's employment in
the judiciary, as part and parcel of his contract in joining the
institution. For, if the members of the judiciary are at liberty to
go on leave any time, the dispensation of justice will be
seriously hampered. Short of key personnel, the courts
cannot properly function in the midst of the intricacies in the
administration of justice. At any rate, the concerned
employee is not prevented from pursuing his travel plans
without complying with OCA Circular No. 49-2003 but he
must be ready to suffer the consequences of his non-
compliance.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition,
Department of Justice Circular No. 41 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All issuances which were released
pursuant thereto are hereby declared NULL and VOID.
 
I. RIGHT TO INFORMATION
1. NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG,
INC. vs MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE
VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE (G.R. No. 187587; June 5, 2013)
FACTS: By virtue of Proclamation 423, Former President
Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the
Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque, Province of Rizal
and Pasay City for military reservation. The military
reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later
on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No.
208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a
certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national
shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga
Bayani, which is under the administration of herein
respondent MSS-PVAO.
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No.
423, which excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper
Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition
under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and
730.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos
made a handwritten addendum which includes Western
Bicutan for the disposition of the area. The proclamation was
published in the Official Gazette without the handwritten
addendum
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172
which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as
published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western
Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and
declared the said lots open for disposition under the
provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation
No. 172, was issued on the same day.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied
some areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions of the
Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito
Bautista issued General Order No. 1323 creating TFB,
primarily to prevent further unauthorized occupation and to
cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
Demolition of illegal structures existed to prevent the area
from the increasing number of informal settlers.
Members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio
Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) and Western Bicutan Lot Owners
Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed for a Petition with
Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP)
praying for the reclassification of the areas they are
occupying as is already alienable and disposable, where it
was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-434.
Specifically, the Petition prayed for the following:
• the reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot
3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land
to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation
No. 2476;
• the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands;
and
• the Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the
distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona fide
occupants.
Petitioner (WBLOAI) filed a Petition-in-Intervention
substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for
by NMSMI with regard to the area the former then occupied.
COSLAP issued a Resolution granting the Petition and
declaring the portions of land in question alienable and
disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-
General dissenting.
COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President
Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and
was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President
could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of
others. Further, considering that Proclamation No. 2476 was
done while the former President was exercising legislative
powers, it could not be amended, repealed or superseded,
by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172
could not have superseded much less displaced
Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued on October
16, 1987 when President Aquino’s legislative power had
ceased.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied by the COSLAP in a
Resolution dated 24 January 2007.
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking
to reverse the COSLAP Resolutions dated 1 September
2006 and 24 January 2007.
Page 135 of 190
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First
Division rendered the assailed Decision granting MSS-
PVAO’s Petition.
Both NMSMI and WBLOAI appealed the said Decision by
filing their respective Petitions for Review with this Court
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of
Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos was not included in the
publication of the said law.
HELD: NO.
Applying the foregoing ruling in Tanada vs Tuvera to the
instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note
that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published.
The handwritten addendum of President Marcos did not have
the force and effect law since it was not included in the
publication. We agree that the publication must be in full or it
is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public
of the contents of the laws.
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the
Administrative Code, "the publication of any law, resolution
or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be
prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not
President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not
only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may
not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature
apart from the words appearing in the law.
This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when,
evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon.
Trajano, we ruled that ' This does not mean, however, that
courts can create law. The courts exist for inter"under Article
8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines. This does not mean, however, that
courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the
law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative
of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the
sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws,
particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities
becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of
legislating." The remedy sought in these Petitions is not
judicial interpretation, but another legislation that would
amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots in the
reclassification.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions
are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29
April 2009 is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court's
status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED.
Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in contempt
is DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.
 

2. In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents
and the Attendance of Court officials and employees as
witnesses under the subpoenas of February 10, 2012
and the various letters for the Impeachment Prosecution
Panel dated January 19 and 25, 2012
FACTS: During the impeachment proceedings against Chief
Justice Corona, the prosecution Panel manifested in a
COMPLIANCE that it would present about 100 witnesses
which included Justices of the Supreme Court, and Court
officials and employees who will testify on matters internal to
the Court and almost a thousand documents
In separate letters to the Supreme Court in January,
members of the prosecution panel requested the following:
- the rollo and certified true copies of the agenda and
deliberations of Flight Attendants and Stewards Association
of the Philippines (FASAP) vs. Philippine Airlines Inc.;
- the rollo of Navarro vs. Ermita;
- the rollo of Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez vs. The House of
Representatives Committee on Justice; and
- the rollo of League of Cities vs. Comelec.
The Impeachment Court, on the other hand, issued a
subpoena ad testificandum et duces tecum dated February
9, 2012 directing the attendance of Clerk of Court Enriqueta
Vidal and Deputy Clerk of Court Felipa Anama, and the
production of documents involving FASAP vs. PAL, such as:
Page 136 of 190
- records/logbook of the Raffle Committee showing the
assignment of the FASAP case; and
- letters of PAL counsel Estelito Mendoza addressed to the
Clerk of Court dated Sept. 13, 2011; Sept. 16, 2011; Sept.
20, 2011; and Sept. 22, 2011;
Another subpoena dated Feb. 10 directed Vidal the following
in the case of former first couple Gloria and Mike Arroyo:
- Supreme Court received (with time and date stamp)
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by Mrs. Arroyo, including
annexes;
- Supreme Court received (with time and date stamp)
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed
by Mr. Arroyo;
- Chief Justice Corona's travel order or leave applied for
within the month of November 2011;
- minutes of the Raffle Committee which handled the Arroyo
petitions;
- appointment or assignment of the Member(Justice)-in-
charge of the Arroyo petitions;
- Resolution dated Nov. 15, 2011 in the Arroyo petitions;
- Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) dated November 15,
2011 issued in the Arroyo petitions;
- logbook or receiving copy showing the time the TRO was
issued to the counsel of the Arroyos, and the date and time
the TRO was received by the Sheriff for service to the
parties;
- Special Power of Attorney dated Nov. 15, 2011 submitted
by the Arroyos in favor of Attys. Ferdinand Topacio and
Anacleto Diaz in compliance with the TRO;
- official receipt dated Nov. 15, 2011 issued by the Supreme
Court for the P2-million cash bond posted by Mr. and Mrs.
Arroyo, with the official date and time stamp;
- Nov. 15 and 16, 2011 Sheriff's Return for the service of the
TRO to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG);
- certification from the Fiscal Management and Budget Office
of the Supreme Court dated Nov. 15, 2011, with the date and
time it was received by the Clerk of Court showing it to be
Nov. 16, 2011 at 8:55 am;
- Resolution dated Nov. 18, 2011 issued in the Arroyo TRO
petitions;
- Resolution dated Nov. 22, 2011 on the Arroyo petitions;
- logbook showing the date and time Associate Justice Ma.
Lourdes Sereno's dissent to the Nov. 22 Resolution was
received by the Clerk of Court en banc;
- Dissenting Opinions dated Nov. 13 and 18, 2011 of
Associate Justice Antonio Carpio on the Arroyo TRO
petitions;
- Separate Opinion dated Dec. 13, 2011 of Associate Justice
Presbitero Velasco, Jr. on the Arroyo TRO petitions;
- Concurring Opinion dated Dec. 13, 2011 of Associate
Justice Roberto Abad on the Arroyo petitions;
- Official Appointment of Chief Justice Corona as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court; and
- Official Appointment of Chief Justice Corona as Chief
Magistrate.
Subpoena Ad Testificandum et Duces TecumAnd Subpoena
Ad Testificandum were also issued against Clerks of Court of
the SC.
In light of the subpoenas served, the urgent need for a court
ruling and based on the Constitution, the pertinent laws and
of the Court’s rules and policies, we shall now determine how
the Court will comply with the subpoenas and the letters of
the Prosecution Impeachment Panel.
ISSUE NO. 1
What is Judicial Privilege?
HELD NO.
In fine, there are Philippine laws, rules and jurisprudence
prohibiting the revelation of confidential or “secret”
information that causes damage to public interest even in
judicial and other proceedings such as the sui generis
impeachment trial. As far as the Court is concerned, its
Members and officials involved in all proceedings are duty-
bound to observe the privileged communication and
confidentiality rules if the integrity of the administration of
justice were to be preserved – i.e., not even Members of the
Court, on their own and without the consent of the Supreme
Court, can testify on matters covered by the prohibitions and
exclusions, particularly with respect to matters pending
resolution before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE NO. 2
Whether or not Court Records are considered Confidential or
privileged.
HELD NO. 2
In the Judiciary, privileges against disclosure of official
records “create a hierarchy of rights that protect certain
confidential relationships over and above the public’s
evidentiary need” or “right to every man’s evidence.”
Accordingly, certain information contained in the records of
cases before the Supreme Court are considered confidential
and are exempt from disclosure. To reiterate, the need arises
from the dictates of the integrity of the Court’s decision-
making function which may be affected by the disclosure of
information.
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) prohibits the
disclosure of
(1) the result of the raffle of cases,
(2) the actions taken by the Court on each case included in
the agenda of the Court’s session,
(3) the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on
cases and matters pending before it.
Page 137 of 190
Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC10 declares that the results of
the raffle of cases shall only be available to the parties and
their counsels, unless the cases involve bar matters,
administrative cases and criminal cases involving the penalty
of life imprisonment, which are treated with strict
confidentiality and where the raffle results are not disclosed
even to the parties themselves.
Rule 10, Section 2 of the IRSC provides that the actions
taken in each case in the Court’s agenda, which are noted by
the Chief Justice or the Division Chairman, are also to be
treated with strict confidentiality. Only after the official
release of the resolution embodying the Court action may
that action be made available to the public. A resolution is
considered officially released once the envelope containing
its final copy, addressed to the parties, has been transmitted
to the process server for personal service or to the mailing
section of the Judicial Records Office.
Court deliberations are traditionally recognized as privileged
communication. Section 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC provides:
Section 2. Confidentiality of court sessions. – Court
sessions are executive in character, with only the
Members of the Court present. Court deliberations
are confidential and shall not be disclosed to
outside parties, except as may be provided herein
or as authorized by the Court.
Justice Abad discussed the rationale for the rule in his
concurring opinion to the Court Resolution in Arroyo v. De
Lima13 (TRO on Watch List Order case): the rules on
confidentiality will enable the Members of the Court to “freely
discuss the issues without fear of criticism for holding
unpopular positions” or fear of humiliation for one’s
comments. The privilege against disclosure of these kinds of
information/communication is known as deliberative process
privilege, involving as it does the deliberative process of
reaching a decision. “Written advice from a variety of
individuals is an important element of the government’s
decision-making process and that the interchange of advice
could be stifled if courts forced the government to disclose
those recommendations;” the privilege is intended “to
prevent the ‘chilling’ of deliberative communications.”
The privilege is not exclusive to the Judiciary. We have in
passing recognized the claim of this privilege by the two
other branches of government in Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority17 (speaking through J. Carpio) when the Court
declared that -
[t]he information x x x like internal deliberations of the
Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive
sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as
confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by
a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of
exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of
publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to
protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked
to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.
Justice Brion noted this fact in his Separate Concurring
Opinion in Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations:
Significantly, this type of privilege is not for the Executive to
enjoy alone. All the great branches of government are
entitled to this treatment for their own decision and policy
making conversations and correspondence. It is unthinkable
that the disclosure of internal debates and deliberations of
the Supreme Court or the executive sessions of either
Houses of Congress can be compelled at will by outside
parties.
Thus, a Senator may invoke legislative privilege when he or
she is questioned outside the Senate about information
gathered during an executive session of the Senate’s
legislative inquiry in aid of legislation. In the same manner, a
justice of the court or a judge may invoke judicial privilege in
the Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court, for proceedings
in the performance of his or her own judicial functions. What
applies to magistrates applies with equal force to court
officials and employees who are privy to these deliberations.
They may likewise claim exemption when asked about this
privileged information.
While Section 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC cited above speaks
only of the confidentiality of court deliberations, it is
understood that the rule extends to documents and other
communications which are part of or are related to the
deliberative process. The deliberative process privilege
protects from disclosure documents reflecting advisory
opinions, recommendations and deliberations that are
component parts of the process for formulating governmental
decisions and policies. Obviously, the privilege may also be
claimed by other court officials and employees when asked
to act on these documents and other communications.
The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel in fact provides
that access shall be denied with respect to information or
records relating to drafts of decisions, rulings, orders, or
internal memoranda or internal reports. In the 2007
Resolution on Access to Justice for the Poor Project, the
Court excluded the same information and records from the
public by classifying them as confidential:
Article 1. Definition of Terms.
2. Confidential information generally refers to
information not yet made a matter of public record
relating to pending cases, such as notes, drafts,
research papers, internal discussion, internal
memoranda, records of internal deliberations, and
similar papers. Even after the decision, resolution,
or order is made public, such information that a
justice or judge uses in preparing a decision,
resolution, or order shall remain confidential.
To qualify for protection under the deliberative process
privilege, the agency must show that the document is both
(1) predecisional and (2) deliberative.
A document is “predecisional” under the deliberative process
privilege if it precedes, in temporal sequence, the decision to
which it relates. In other words, communications are
considered predecisional if they were made in the attempt to
reach a final conclusion.
A material is “deliberative,” on the other hand, if it reflects the
giveand- take of the consultative process. The key question
in determining whether the material is deliberative in nature
is whether disclosure of the information would discourage
candid discussion within the agency. If the disclosure of the
information would expose the government’s decision making
process in a way that discourages candid discussion among
the decision-makers (thereby undermining the courts’ ability
to perform their functions), the information is deemed
privileged.
Page 138 of 190
Court records which are “predecisional” and “deliberative” in
nature are thus protected and cannot be the subject of a
subpoena if judicial privilege is to be preserved. The privilege
in general insulates the Judiciary from an improper intrusion
into the functions of the judicial branch and shields justices,
judges, and court officials and employees from public
scrutiny or the pressure of public opinion that would impair a
judge’s ability to render impartial decisions. The deliberative
process can be impaired by undue exposure of the decision-
making process to public scrutiny before or even after the
decision is made, as discussed below.
Additionally, two other grounds may be cited for denying
access to court records, as well as preventing members of
the bench, from being subjected to compulsory process:
(1) the disqualification by reason of privileged
communication and
(2) the pendency of an action or matter.
The prohibition against disclosure of confidential information
is required to be observed by members of the Court under
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary. Section 9, Canon 4 (Propriety) states:
Section 9. Confidential information acquired by
judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or
disclosed for any other purpose related to their
judicial duties.
This rule of judicial ethics complements the rule of evidence
that disqualifies public officials from testifying on information
they acquire in confidence in the course of their duties:
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 24. Disqualification by
reason of privileged communication. – The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his
term of office or afterwards, as to communications
made to him in official confidence, when the court
finds that the public interest would suffer by the
disclosure.
Under the law, therefore, the Members of the Court may not
be compelled to testify in the impeachment proceedings
against the Chief Justice or other Members of the Court
about information they acquired in the performance of their
official function of adjudication, such as information on how
deliberations were conducted or the material inputs that the
justices used in decision-making, because the end-result
would be the disclosure of confidential information that could
subject them to criminal prosecution. Such act violates
judicial privilege (or the equivalent of executive privilege) as
it pertains to the exercise of the constitutional mandate of
adjudication.
Jurisprudence implies that justices and judges may not be
subject to any compulsory process in relation to the
performance of their adjudicatory functions. In Senate of the
Philippines v. Exec. Sec. Ermita,31 the Court declared that
members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from [the
Congress’] power of inquiry [in aid of legislation]. Unlike the
Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body;
hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only
of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and
the constitutional independence of the judiciary.
This ruling was dictated in no small measure by the principle
of comity mentioned above. Inter-departmental courtesy
demands that the highest levels of each department be
exempt from the compulsory processes of the other
departments on matters related to the functions and duties of
their office.
With respect to Court officials and employees, the same
rules on confidentiality that apply to justices and judges apply
to them. They are barred from disclosing (1) the result of the
raffle of cases, (2) the actions taken by the Court on each
case included in the agenda of the Court’s session, and (3)
the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases
and matters pending before it. They are subject as well to the
disqualification by reason of privileged communication and
the sub judice rule. As stated above, these rules extend to
documents and other communications which cannot be
disclosed.
These privileges, incidentally, belong to the Judiciary and are
for the Supreme Court (as the representative and entity
speaking for the Judiciary), and not for the individual justice,
judge, or court official or employees to waive. Thus, every
proposed waiver must be referred to the Supreme Court for
its consideration and approval.
In fine, there are Philippine laws, rules and jurisprudence
prohibiting the revelation of confidential or “secret”
information that causes damage to public interest even in
judicial and other proceedings such as the sui generis
impeachment trial. As far as the Court is concerned, its
Members and officials involved in all proceedings are duty-
bound to observe the privileged communication and
confidentiality rules if the integrity of the administration of
justice were to be preserved – i.e., not even Members of the
Court, on their own and without the consent of the Supreme
Court, can testify on matters covered by the prohibitions and
exclusions, particularly with respect to matters pending
resolution before the Supreme Court.
To state the rule differently, Justices of the Court cannot be
compelled to testify on matters relating to the internal
deliberations and actions of the Court, in the exercise of their
adjudicatory functions and duties. This is to be differentiated
from a situation where the testimony is on a matter which is
external to their adjudicatory functions and duties.
When court records are considered confidential
The "deliberative process privilege" was also stressed,
where Justices of the High Court freely discuss and
deliberate cases and matters "without fear of criticism for
holding unpopular positions or fear of humiliation for one's
comments."
The Resolution stated that deliberations in closed-door
sessions must remain executive in nature, as the same is
also granted the Executive and Legislative branches of
government as stated in Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority
where executive sessions of the Senate and the Lower
House are recognized as confidential, and in Neri vs. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations where it was held that the privilege is enjoyed
by all the branches of government "for their own decision and
policy-making conversation and correspondence."
Page 139 of 190
Court records considered 'matter of public record' allowed to
be released
As to Court Records:
While the High Court refused the requested examination by
the Prosecution of the rollos of the FASAP vs. PAL, Navarro
vs. Ermita, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez vs. The House of
Representatives, and League of Cities vs. Comelec, it
allowed the issuance of certified true copies of the Decisions,
Orders, and Resolutions it issued in these cases and which
have already been released to the parties, including the
certified true copies of the parties' pleadings.
The High Court also allowed the release of certified true
copies of the letters of Atty. Mendoza.
As to the Senate Impeachment Court's subpoena, all
documents subpoenaed pertaining to the FASAP vs. PAL
case were not allowed to be released citing the pendency of
the case.
Vidal, however, was directed to provide the impeachment
court with certified true copies of the Decisions, Orders and
Resolutions furnished to the parties, parties' pleadings, and
Mendoza's letters.
As for the subpoena on court records pertaining to the
Arroyo TRO petitions, the High Court allowed the release of
certified true copies only of the following on the basis that
these are matters of public record (the rest, privileged and
confidential):
- Supreme Court received (with time and date stamp)
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by Mrs. Arroyo, including
annexes;
- Supreme Court received (with time and date stamp)
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed
by Mr. Arroyo;
- Official Leave of Chief Justice Corona's travel order or
leave applied in Nov. 2011;
- Resolution dated Nov. 15, 2011 in the Arroyo petitions, as
published;
- TRO dated November 15, 2011 issued in the Arroyo
petitions;
- official receipt dated Nov. 15, 2011 issued by the Supreme
Court for the P2 M cash bond posted by Mr. and Mrs. Arroyo,
with the official date and time stamp;
- Resolution dated Nov. 18, 2011 issued in the Arroyo TRO
petitions, as published;
- Resolution dated Nov. 22, 2011 on the Arroyo petitions;
- Official Appointment of Chief Justice Corona as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court; and
- Official Appointment of Chief Justice Corona as Chief
Justice.
The High Court allowed the release of certified true copies of
the subpoenaed Opinions of Justices Carpio, Sereno,
Velasco and Abad, however, reservations were made as it
was pointed out that as an institution, the Supreme Court is
entitled to the deliberative process privilege and "cannot
waive the confidentiality of certain portions" of the Opinions.
The Resolution also pointed out that the attendance of court
officials and employees in the impeachment trial should be
excused "if the intent only is for them to identify and certify to
the existence and genuineness of documents within their
custody or control that are not otherwise confidential or
privileged."
SC Justices, officials, employees not compelled to testify on
'adjudicatory' incidents
may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under
such a degree of caution as the nature and circumstances of
each case may appear to require. Thus, “[t]he
trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to
the entries made therein could be grounded on: 1) the sense
of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2)
the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty,
3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such
statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more
likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have
occurred.”

In its Resolution, the High Court held that "Philippine laws,

rules and jurisprudence prohibit the disclosure of confidential The independence of the Judiciary, separation of powers
or privileged information under well-defined rules" and
stressed that "Justices and judges may not be subject to any The High Court stressed that the doctrine of separation of
compulsory process in relation to the performance of their powers "is an essential component of our democratic and
adjudicatory functions." republican system of government" and system of checks and
balances.
"Under the law... the Members of the Court may not be
compelled to testify in the impeachment proceedings against The High Court maintained that its mandate, "in so far as
the Chief Justice or other Members (Justices) of the Court these constitutional principles are concerned, is to keep the
about information they acquired in the performance of their different branches within the exercise of their respective
official function of adjudication, such as information on how powers and prerogatives through the Rule of Law."
deliberations were conducted or the material inputs that the
Justices used in decision-making, because the end-result
would be the disclosure of confidential information that could
Principle of comity
subject them to criminal prosecution.
Inter-branch and inter-departmental comity was also
"Such act violates judicial privilege (or the equivalent of
stressed as the High Court held that while voluntary, is
executive privilege) as it pertains to the exercise of the
established practice, for each branch to perform its assigned
constitutional mandate of adjudication," the Resolution read.
constitutional duties.
As a penultimate point, witnesses need not be summoned to
"The Judiciary applies the principle of comity at the first
testify on matters of public record. These are the records that
instance in its interpretation and application of laws... the
a government unit is required by law to keep or which it is
courts tread carefully; they exercise restraint and intervene
compelled to keep in the discharge of duties imposed by law.
only when the grave abuse of discretion is clear and even
A record is a public record within the purview of a statute
then must act with carefully calibrated steps, safely and
providing that books and records required by law to be kept
surely made within constitutional bounds," the Resolution
by a clerk may be received in evidence in any court if it is a
read.
record which a public officer is required to keep and if it is
filled in such a manner that it is subject to public inspection. The High Court recognized that the trial on matters of
Under the Rules of Court, the rule on public records is impeachment "has been specifically assigned by the
embodied in Section 44, Rule 130. Constitution to the Senate," however, it also held that "where
doubt exists in an impeachment case, a standard that should
To restate the rule, entries in official records may be
not be forgotten is the need to preserve the structure of a
presented without the necessity of presenting in court the
democratic and republican government, particularly the
officer or person who made the entries. Entries in public or
check and balance that should prevail."
official books or records may be proved by the production of
the books or records themselves or by a copy certified by the As a last point and mainly for purposes of stress, the
legal keeper thereof. These records, however, may be privileges discussed above that apply to justices and judges
presented and marked in evidence only where they are not apply mutatis mutandis to court officials and employees with
excluded by reasons of privilege and the other reasons respect to their official functions. If the intent only is for them
discussed above. to identify and certify to the existence and genuineness of
documents within their custody or control that are not
The reasons for this rule are necessity and trustworthiness.
otherwise confidential or privileged under the above
Necessity consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of
discussed rules, their presence before the Impeachment
requiring the official’s attendance as a witness to testify to
Court can be and should be excused where certified copies
the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. A
of these non-privileged and non-confidential documents can
public officer is excused from appearing in court in order that
be provided.
public business may not be interrupted, hampered or
delayed. Where there is no exception for official statements,
hosts of officials would be found devoting the greater part of
their time attending as witnesses in court, delivering their
deposition before an officer. Trustworthiness is a reason
because of the presumption of regularity of performance of
official duty. The law reposes a particular confidence in
public officers that it presumes that they will discharge their
several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and therefore,
whatever acts they do in the discharge of their public duty

Page 140 of 190


3. HAZEL MA. C. ANTOLIN vs. ABELARDO T.
DOMONDON, JOSE A. GANGAN, and VIOLETA J.
JOSEF (G.R. No. 165036; July 5, 2010)
FACTS: Antolin took the accountancy licensure
examinations conducted by the Board of Accountancy (the
Board) in October 1997.1 The examination results were
released and out of 6,481 examinees, only 1,171 passed.
Unfortunately, petitioner did not make it. When the results
were released, she received failing grades in four out of the
seven subjects.2
Convinced that she deserved to pass the examinations, she
wrote to respondent Abelardo T. Domondon (Domondon),
Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy, and
requested that her answer sheets be re-corrected.3 The
petitioner was shown her answer sheets, but these consisted
merely of shaded marks, so she was unable to determine
why she failed the exam.4 Thus, she again wrote to the
Board to request for copies of (a) the questionnaire in each
Page 141 of 190
of the seven subjects (b) her answer sheets; (c) the answer
keys to the questionnaires, and (d) an explanation of the
grading system used in each subject
Acting Chairman Domondon denied petitioner’s request.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages, with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction, against the
Board and its members before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), praying that the Board provide her with all documents
that would show whether the Board fairly administered the
exam and correctly graded her answers, and if warranted, to
issue to her a certificate of registration as a CPA. She later
amended her Petition to clarify that she only wanted access
to the documents requested, not recorrection of her exam,
deleting in the process her original prayer for issuance of a
certificate of registration as CPA.
Petitioner passed the May 1998 CPA Licensure Exam and
took her oath as a CPA. Consequently, the RTC denied her
application for mandatory injunction for being moot. She
amended her Petition a second time to implead the PRC and
to ask, in addition to access to the documents she had
requested, that if warranted, appropriate revisions in the
October 1997 Exam results be made by the Board and the
PRC. The RTC considered the matter moot and dismissed
the petition. On her motion, however, the RTC reconsidered
the dismissal, holding that her passing of the subsequent
CPA examination did not render the petition moot because
the relief “and if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of
registration as Certified Public Accountant” was deleted from
the original petition. As regards whether she had the
constitutional right to have access to the documents she
requested, the RTC resolved to let the parties first adduce
evidence, and to have PRC air its side of the case. The RTC
also ordered the PRC to preserve and safeguard the
questionnaire, petitioner’s answer sheets, and the answer
keys for the October 1997 CPA Licensure Exam.
When their motion for reconsideration was denied,
respondents brought the case to the Court of Appeals (CA)
which set aside the RTC’s decision and ordered the
dismissal of the case because: (1) the petition was mooted
when petitioner passed the May 1998 CPA exam; (2) Section
20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994,
constituted a valid limitation on her right to information and
access to government documents; (3) the Examination
Documents were not of public concern, because she merely
sought review of her failing marks; (4) it was not the
ministerial or mandatory function of the respondents to
review and reassess the answers to examination questions
of a failing examinee; and (5) she failed to exhaust
administrative remedies when she did not elevate the matter
to the PRC before seeking judicial intervention. Petitioner,
thus, brought the matter to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioner may seek judicial intervention to compel
the re-correction of her examination;
2. WON petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies;
3. WON the case was mooted by petitioner’s passing the
May 1998 CPA Licensure Examination; and
4. WON petitioner has the constitutional right to have
access to the Examination Papers. (MAIN ISSUE)

HELD:
1. Any claim for re-correction or revision of petitioner’s 1997
examination cannot be compelled by mandamus. In
AgustinRamos vs. Sandoval[G.R. No. 84470, February 2,
1989 (Minute Resolution)], where therespondent Judge was
questioned for dismissing therein petitioners’ mandamus
action to compel the Medical Board of Examiners and the
Professional Regulation Commission to re-correct their
ratings, the Supreme Court held that “(t)he function of
reviewing and re-assessing the petitioners’ answers to the
examination questions, in the light of the facts and
arguments presented by them x x x is a discretionary
function of the Medical Board, not a ministerial and
mandatory one, hence, not within the scope of thewrit of
mandamus.”
For a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a
well-defined, clear, and certain legal right to the thing
demanded. The corresponding duty of the respondent to
perform the required act must be equally clear. No such
clarity exists here. And despite petitioner’s assertion that she
did not demand re-correction, the most cursory perusal of
her Second Amended Petition and her prayer that
respondents “make the appropriate revisions on the results
of her examination” belied this claim.
2. Like the claimants in Agustin, petitioner’s remedy from the
Board’s refusal to release the Examination Papers should
have been through an appeal to the PRC. Under Section 5(c)
of Presidential Decree No. 223, the PRC has the power to
review and approve the policies, resolutions, rules and
regulations, orders and decisions of the various professional
Boards, including the results of their licensure examinations,
and the decisions of the Boards on administrative cases shall
be final and executory unless appealed to the PRC within 30
days from promulgation. Contrary’s to petitioner’s claim, this
power is not limited to administrative investigations but
encompasses requests for documents. And since the PRC
itself issued the resolution (PRC Resolution No. 338)
questioned by petitioner, it was in the best position to resolve
questions addressed to its area of expertise. One of the
reasons for exhaustion of administrative remedies is thewell-
entrenched doctrine on separation of powers, which enjoins
upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference
with matters falling primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the
competence of other departments. However, the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to
exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is
involved. Whether or not petitioner had a constitutional right
to demand access to the Examination Papers was one such
question of law which cannot be resolved with finality by the
administrative officer.
3. An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to
present a justiciable controversy, so that a declaration on the
issue would be of no practical use or value. In this
jurisdiction, any citizen may challenge any attempt to
obstruct the exercise of his or her right to information and
may seek its enforcement by mandamus. And since every
citizen possesses the inherent right to be informed by the
mere fact of citizenship, petitioner’s belated passing of the
CPA Board Exams did not automatically mean that her
interest in the Examination Papers had become mere
superfluity. Undoubtedly, the constitutional question
Page 142 of 190
presented, in view of the likelihood that the issues in this
case would be repeated, warranted review.
4. Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to
information is not absolute; it is limited to “matters of
public concern” and is further “subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law” (Section 7,
Article III, 1987 Constitution). Similarly, the State’s policy
of full disclosure is limited to “transactions involving
public interest,” and is “subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law” (Sec. 28, Art. II, 1987
Constitution). The Court has always grappled with the
meanings of “public interest” and “public concern”
which “embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters
naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen,” and
which are, in the final analysis, up to the courts to
determine on a case by case basis [Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, 234 Phil. 521, 535 (1987)]. National
board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are
matters of public concern. The populace in general, and
the examinees in particular, would understandably be
interested in the fair and competent administration of
these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified
are admitted into the accounting profession. And as with
all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be
not merely quantitative means of assessment, but also
means to further improve the teaching and learning of
the art and science of accounting. The Court,
nonetheless, realizes that there may be valid reasons to
limit access to the Examination Papers in order to
properly administer the exam. More than the mere
convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there
exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation,
encoding, administration, and checking of these multiple
choice exams that require that the questions and
answers remain confidential for a limited duration. The
PRC, however, had not been given an opportunity to
explain the reasons behind their regulations or articulate
the justification for keeping the Examination Papers
confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications of
this case, which may impact on every board examination
administered by the PRC, and in order that all relevant
issues may be ventilated, the Court deemed it best to
remand the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
4. AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION v. PENNSWELL,
INC. (G.R. NO. 172835 : December 13, 2007)
FACTS: Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of air transportation
services. On the other hand, respondent Pennswell, Inc. was
organized to engage in the business of manufacturing and
selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants.
On various dates, respondent delivered and sold to petitioner
sundry goods in trade. Under the contracts, petitioner's total
outstanding obligation amounted to P449,864.98 with
interest at 14% per annum until the amount would be fully
paid. For failure of the petitioner to comply with its obligation
under said contracts, respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum
of Money with the RTC.
In its Answer, petitioner contended that its refusal to pay was
not without valid and justifiable reasons. In particular,
petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in the amount
of P592,000.00 by respondent for its previous sale of four
items. Said items were misrepresented by respondent as
belonging to a new line, but were in truth and in fact, identical
with products petitioner had previously purchased from
respondent. Petitioner asserted that it was deceived by
respondent which merely altered the names and labels of
such goods.
Petitioner alleged that when the purported fraud was
discovered, a conference was held between petitioner and
respondent, whereby the parties agreed that respondent
would return to petitioner the amount it previously paid.
However, petitioner was surprised when it received a letter
from the respondent, demanding payment of the amount
of P449,864.94, which later became the subject of
respondent's Complaint for Collection of a Sum of Money
against petitioner.
During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to
Compel respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients
and chemical components of the following products. The
RTC rendered an Order granting the petitioner’s motion.
Respondent sought reconsideration of the foregoing Order,
contending that it cannot be compelled to disclose the
chemical components sought because the matter is
confidential. It argued that what petitioner endeavored to
inquire upon constituted a trade secret which respondent
cannot be forced to divulge.
The RTC gave credence to respondent’s reasoning, and
reversed itself. Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, which
denied the Petition and affirmed the Order dated 30 June
2004 of the RTC. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
was denied. Unyielding, petitioner brought the instant
Petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON THE CHEMICAL COMPONENTS OR
INGREDIENTS OF RESPONDENT'S PRODUCTS ARE
TRADE SECRETS OR INDUSTRIAL SECRETS THAT ARE
NOT SUBJECT TO COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE.
HELD: The products are covered by the exception of trade
secrets being divulged in compulsory disclosure. The Court
affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals which upheld the
finding of the RTC that there is substantial basis for
respondent to seek protection of the law for its proprietary
rights over the detailed chemical composition of its products.
The Supreme Court has declared that trade secrets and
banking transactions are among the recognized restrictions
to the right of the people to information as embodied in the
Constitution. SC said that the drafters of the Constitution also
unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security
matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial
secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other
related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act), are also exempted from
compulsory disclosure.
A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool,
mechanism or compound known only to its owner and those
Page 143 of 190
of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. The
definition also extends to a secret formula or process not
patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in
compounding some article of trade having a commercial
value. American jurisprudence has utilized the following
factors to determine if an information is a trade secret, to wit:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of
the employer’s business; (2) the extent to which the
information is known by employees and others involved in
the business; (3) the extent of measures taken by the
employer to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the
value of the information to the employer and to competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the company
in developing the information; and (6) the extent to which the
information could be easily or readily obtained through an
independent source.
Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things that may be produced and inspected should
not be privileged. The documents must not be privileged
against disclosure. On the ground of public policy, the rules
providing for production and inspection of books and papers
do not authorize the production or inspection of privileged
matter; that is, books and papers which, because of their
confidential and privileged character, could not be received
in evidence. Such a condition is in addition to the requisite
that the items be specifically described, and must constitute
or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the
action and which are in the party’s possession, custody or
control.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot rely on Section 77of
Republic Act 7394, or the Consumer Act of the Philippines, in
order to compel respondent to reveal the chemical
components of its products. While it is true that all consumer
products domestically sold, whether manufactured locally or
imported, shall indicate their general make or active
ingredients in their respective labels of packaging, the law
does not apply to respondent. Respondent’s specialized
lubricants — namely, Contact Grease, Connector Grease,
Thixohtropic Grease, Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating,
Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound — are not
consumer products.
What is clear from the factual findings of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals is that the chemical formulation of
respondent’s products is not known to the general public and
is unique only to it. Both courts uniformly ruled that these
ingredients are not within the knowledge of the public. Since
such factual findings are generally not reviewable by this
Court, it is not dutybound to analyze and weigh all over again
the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.
The revelation of respondent’s trade secrets serves no better
purpose to the disposition of the main case pending with the
RTC, which is on the collection of a sum of money. As can
be gleaned from the facts, petitioner received respondent’s
goods in trade in the normal course of business. To be sure,
there are defenses under the laws of contracts and sales
available to petitioner. On the other hand, the greater interest
of justice ought to favor respondent as the holder of trade
secrets. Weighing the conflicting interests between the
parties, SC rules in favor of the greater interest of
respondent. Trade secrets should receive greater protection
from discovery, because they derive economic value from
being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by
the public.

J. RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
1. Boy Scouts of America et al. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640
(2000)
FACTS: The Boy Scouts of America is a private, non-profit
organization engaged in instilling its system of values in
young people. At the time of the case, it asserted
that homosexuality was inconsistent with those values.
When Dale was a student at Rutgers University, he became
co-president of the Lesbian/Gay student alliance. In July
1990, he attended a seminar on the health needs of lesbian
and gay teenagers, where he was interviewed. An account of
Page 144 of 190
the interview was published and in a local newspaper and
Dale was quoted as stating he was gay. BSA officials read
the interview and expelled Dale from his position as
assistant Scoutmaster of a New Jersey troop.
Dale, an Eagle Scout, filed suit in the New Jersey Superior
Court, alleging, among other things, that the Boy Scouts had
violated the state statute prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation in places of public
accommodation.
The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled against the Boy
Scouts, saying that they violated the State's public
accommodations law by revoking Dale's membership based
on his homosexuality.
Among other rulings, the court
(1) held that application of that law did not violate the Boy
Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association
because Dale's inclusion would not significantly affect
members' ability to carry out their purposes;
(2) determined that New Jersey has a compelling interest in
eliminating the destructive consequences of discrimination
from society, and that its public accommodations law
abridges no more speech than is necessary to accomplish its
purpose; and
(3) held that Dale's reinstatement did not compel the Boy
Scouts to express any message.
The Boy Scouts appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, which granted certiorari to determine whether the
application of New Jersey's public accommodations law
violated the First Amendment.
ISSUE: WON BSA has a right to revoke the membership of
a gay assistant scoutmaster after he publicly announced his
sexual orientation.
HELD: YES. Chief Justice William Rehnquist's majority
opinion relied upon Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 622 (1984), in which the Supreme Court said:
"Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in the
right to engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
educational, religious, and cultural ends." This right,
the Roberts decision continues, is crucial in preventing the
majority from imposing its views on groups that would rather
express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas. Government
actions that may unconstitutionally burden this freedom may
take many forms, one of which is "intrusion into the internal
structure or affairs of an association" like a "regulation that
forces the group to accept members it does not desire".
Forcing a group to accept certain members may impair the
ability of the group to express those views, and only those
views, that it intends to express. Thus, "freedom of
association ... plainly presupposes a freedom not to
associate."
However, to determine whether a group is protected by the
First Amendment's expressive associational right, it must first
be determined whether the group engages in "expressive
association." After reviewing the Scout Oath and Scout
Law the court decided that the general mission of the Boy
Scouts is clear—it is "to instill values in young people". The
Boy Scouts seek to instill these values by having its adult
leaders spend time with the youth members, instructing and
engaging them in activities like camping, fishing, etc. During
the time spent with the youth members, the Scoutmasters
and assistant Scoutmasters inculcate them with the Boy
Scouts' values—both expressly and by example. An
association that seeks to transmit such a system of values
engages in expressive activity.
 First, associations do not have to associate for the
"purpose" of disseminating a certain message in order
to be entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.
An association must merely engage in expressive
activity that could be impaired in order to be entitled to
protection.
 Second, even if the Boy Scouts discourages Scout
leaders from disseminating views on sexual issues, the
First Amendment protects the Boy Scouts' method of
expression. If the Boy Scouts wishes Scout leaders to
avoid questions of sexuality and teach only by example,
this fact does not negate the sincerity of its belief
discussed above.
 Regarding whether the Boy Scouts as a whole had
an expressive policy against homosexuality, the Court
gave deference to the organization's own assertions of
the nature of its expressions, as well as what would
impair them. The Boy Scouts asserts that it "teach[es]
that homosexual conduct is not morally straight", and
that it does "not want to promote homosexual conduct
as a legitimate form of behavior".While the policy may
not represent the views of all Boy Scouts, the First
Amendment "does not require that every member of a
group agree on every issue in order for the group's
policy to be expressive association." The Court deemed
it sufficient that the Boy Scouts had taken an official
position with respect to same-sex relationships. The
presence of an openly gay activist in an assistant
Scoutmaster's uniform sends a distinctly different
message from the presence of a heterosexual assistant
Scoutmaster who is on record as disagreeing with Boy
Scouts policy. The Boy Scouts has a First Amendment
right to choose to send one message but not the other.
The fact that the organization does not trumpet its views
from the housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its
ranks, does not mean that its views receive no First
Amendment protection.
2. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. BPI
EMPLOYEES UNION-DAVAO CHAPTER-FEDERATION
OF UNIONS IN BPI UNIBANK (G.R. No. 164301 : August
10, 2010)
FACTS: On March 23, 2000, the BSP approved the Articles
of Merger executed 2000 by and between BPI, herein
petitioner, and FEBTC.5 This Article and Plan of Merger was
approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Page 145 of 190
Pursuant to the Article and Plan of Merger, all the assets and
liabilities of FEBTC were transferred to and absorbed by BPI
as the surviving corporation. FEBTC employees, including
those in its different branches across the country, were hired
by petitioner as its own employees, with their status and
tenure recognized and salaries and benefits maintained.
Respondent BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter -
Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank is the exclusive
bargaining agent of BPI’s rank and file employees in Davao
City. The former FEBTC rank-and-file employees in Davao
City did not belong to any labor union at the time of the
merger. Prior to the effectivity of the merger, respondent
Union invited said FEBTC employees to a meeting regarding
the Union Shop Clause (Article II, Section 2) of the existing
CBA between petitioner BPI and respondent Union.7
After the meeting called by the Union, some of the former
FEBTC employees joined the Union, while others refused.
Later, however, some of those who initially joined retracted
their membership.9
Respondent Union then sent notices to the former FEBTC
employees who refused to join, as well as those who
retracted their membership, and called them to a hearing
regarding the matter. When these former FEBTC employees
refused to attend the hearing, the president of the Union
requested BPI to implement the Union Shop Clause of the
CBA and to terminate their employment pursuant thereto.10
After two months of management inaction on the request,
respondent Union informed petitioner BPI of its decision to
refer the issue of the implementation of the Union Shop
Clause of the CBA to the Grievance Committee. However,
the issue remained unresolved at this level and so it was
subsequently submitted for voluntary arbitration by the
parties.11
After two months of management inaction on the request,
respondent Union informed petitioner BPI of its decision to
refer the issue of the implementation of the Union Shop
Clause of the CBA to the Grievance Committee.  However,
the issue remained unresolved at this level and so it was
subsequently submitted for voluntary arbitration by the
parties.
The Voluntary Arbitrator concluded that the former FEBTC
employees could not be compelled to join the Union, as it
was their constitutional right to join or not to join any
organization.
CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: WON “absorbed” FEBTC employees fell within the
definition of “new employees” under the Union Shop Clause.
HELD: YES. All employees in the bargaining unit covered by
a Union Shop Clause in their CBA with management are
subject to its terms. However, under law and
jurisprudence, the following kinds of employees are
exempted from its coverage, namely, employees who at
the time the union shop agreement takes effect are bona fide
members of a religious organization which prohibits its
members from joining labor unions on religious
grounds; employees already in the service and already
members of a union other than the majority at the time
the union shop agreement took effect;22 confidential
employees who are excluded from the rank and file
bargaining unit;23 and employees excluded from the union
shop by express terms of the agreement.
When certain employees are obliged to join a particular
union as a requisite for continued employment, as in the
case of Union Security Clauses, this condition is a valid
restriction of the freedom or right not to join any labor
organization because it is in favor of unionism. This Court, on
occasion, has even held that a union security clause in a
CBA is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association
guaranteed by the Constitution.24
Moreover, a closed shop agreement is an agreement
whereby an employer binds himself to hire only members of
the contracting union who must continue to remain members
in good standing to keep their jobs. It is "the most prized
achievement of unionism." It adds membership and
compulsory dues. By holding out to loyal members a promise
of employment in the closed shop, it wields group
solidarity.25
Indeed, the situation of the former FEBTC employees in this
case clearly does not fall within the first three exceptions to
the application of the Union Shop Clause discussed earlier.
No allegation or evidence of religious exemption or prior
membership in another union or engagement as a
confidential employee was presented by both parties. The
sole category therefore in which petitioner may prove its
claim is the fourth recognized exception or whether the
former FEBTC employees are excluded by the express
terms of the existing CBA between petitioner and
respondent.
employee’s permanent and regular employment status in
itself does not necessarily exempt him from the coverage of
a union shop clause.
In the past this Court has upheld even the more stringent
type of union security clause, i.e., the closed shop provision,
and held that it can be made applicable to old employees
who are already regular and permanent but have chosen not
to join a union. In the early case of Juat v. Court of Industrial
Relations,38 the Court held that an old employee who had no
union may be compelled to join the union even if the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) imposing the closed
shop provision was only entered into seven years after of the
hiring of the said employee. To quote from that decision:
A closed-shop agreement has been considered as one form
of union security whereby only union members can be hired
and workers must remain union members as a condition of
continued employment. The requirement for employees or
workers to become members of a union as a condition for
employment redounds to the benefit and advantage of said
employees because by holding out to loyal members a
promise of employment in the closed-shop the union wields
group solidarity. In fact, it is said that "the closed-shop
contract is the most prized achievement of unionism."

To reiterate, petitioner insists that the term "new employees,"

as the same is used in the Union Shop Clause of the CBA at
issue, refers only to employees hired by BPI as non-regular
employees who later qualify for regular employment and
become regular employees, and not those who, as a legal
consequence of a merger, are allegedly automatically
deemed regular employees of BPI. However, the CBA does
not make a distinction as to how a regular employee attains
such a status. Moreover, there is nothing in the Corporation
Law and the merger agreement mandating the automatic
employment as regular employees by the surviving
corporation in the merger.

In sum, this Court finds it reasonable and just to conclude

that the Union Shop Clause of the CBA covers the former
FEBTC employees who were hired/employed by BPI during
the effectivity of the CBA in a manner which petitioner
describes as "absorption." A contrary appreciation of the
facts of this case would, undoubtedly, lead to an inequitable
and very volatile labor situation which this Court has
consistently ruled against.1avvphi1

In the case of former FEBTC employees who initially joined

the union but later withdrew their membership, there is even
greater reason for the union to request their dismissal from
the employer since the CBA also contained a Maintenance of
Membership Clause.

Right of an Employee not to Join a Union is not Absolute

and Must Give Way to the Collective Good of All
Members of the Bargaining Unit K. EMINENT DOMAIN

The dissenting opinions place a premium on the fact that 1. MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE
even if the former FEBTC employees are not old employees, CORPORATION vs. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT,
they nonetheless were employed as regular and permanent CORPORATION (G.R. No. 123346; March 31, 2009)
employees without a gap in their service. However, an

Page 146 of 190

FACTS: In 1992, CLT Realty Development Corporation
(CLT) sought to recover from Manotok Realty, Inc. (MRI) and
Manotok Estate Corporation (MEC) (collectively, Manotoks)
the possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate in an action
filed before the RTC of Caloocan City.
CLT claims it is the owner of Lot 26 covered by TCT No. T-
177013 issued in its name by the Caloocan City Register of
Deeds, which title was derived from Estelita Hipolito.
Hipolito’s title in turn emanated from Jose Dimson, the
registered owner of TCT No. 15166, the latter having
acquired the same by virtue of a Court Order in 1966 issued
by the court in a Civil Case. Dimson’s title appears to have
been sourced from OCT No. 994
Manotoks claimed that Dimson’s title, the proximate source
of CLT’s title, was irregularly issued and, hence, the same
and subsequent titles flowing therefrom are likewise void.
Like CLT, the Manotoks likewise traced its title to OCT No.
994. TCT No. 4210, which cancelled OCT No. 994, had been
issued to Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio who had
previously acquired the property in 1918 by virtue of an
“Escritura de Venta” executed by Don Tomas Arguelles and
Don Enrique Lopes. In 1920, Ruiz and Leuterio sold the
property to Francisco Gonzalez who held title thereto until
1938 when the property was subdivided amongst the
Gonzalez children.
The properties covered by said seven certificates of title
(TCT Nos. 1368-1374) were expropriated by the Republic of
the Philippines. These properties were then later subdivided
by the National Housing Authority [NHA] into 77 lots and
thereafter sold to qualified vendees. A number of said
vendees sold 19 of these lots to Manotok Realty, Inc. while 1
lot was purchased by the Manotok Estate Corporation.
The trial court, found in favor of CLT by adopting the factual
findings arrived at by the majority commissioners appointed
to resolve the conflict of titles. It was found that that there
were inherent technical infirmities or defects on the face of
TCT No. 4211 (4210), from which the Manotoks derived their
titles
In annulling the Manotok titles, focus was laid on the alleged
defects of TCT No. 4211 issued in September of 1918.
However, TCT No. 4211 was issued decades before the
property was expropriated. Thus, any and all defects that
may have attended that particular title would have been
purged when the property covered by it was subsequently
acquired by the State through eminent domain.
The majority report focused on the alleged flaws and
inherent technical defects of TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and
35486, ranging from the language of the technical
descriptions, absence of subdivision plan, lot number and
survey plan. The imputed flaws affect only those certificates
of title issued prior to those registered in the name of the
Republic. Remarkably, no specific flaw was found on the
MANOTOKS' titles indicating any irregularity on their
issuance.
As it is, the validity of most of MRI’s certificates of title should
be upheld because they were derived from the Republic’s
valid certificates of title. In fact, some of the MANOTOKS’
titles can be traced back to the Government’s titles as a
result of the expropriation in 1947.
Relevantly, the titles of the Republic, as the predecessor-in-
interest of the MANOTOKS, are presumed valid by virtue of
their acquisition resulting from the exercise of its inherent
power of eminent domain that need not be granted even by
the fundamental law. Thus, the alleged flaws concerning the
certificates of title issued previous to the exercise of the
State of its inherent power did not affect or render invalid the
subsequent transfers after the forced sale. Indeed, when
land has been acquired for public use in fee simple
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or
by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land,
and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be
devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the
estate or title acquired or any reversion to the former owner.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Hence, the Manotoks filed a petition for review with the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: What are the titles acquired by the Government and

whether any of the parties is able to trace its title to the title
acquired by the Government through expropriation.

HELD: Titles acquired by the State by way of expropriation

are deemed cleansed of whatever previous flaws may have
attended these titles.

As mentioned above, the properties covered by TCT Nos.

1368-1374 were expropriated by the Republic of the
Philippines and were eventually subdivided and sold to
various vendees. The fact of expropriation is extremely
significant, for titles acquired by the State by way of
expropriation are deemed cleansed of whatever previous
flaws may have attended these titles.

In an rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property.

After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under
2. Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI), petitioner, versus
a new and independent title; thus, by giving notice to all
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC);
claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings
Secretary Nasser Pangandaman of the Department
provide a judicial process for securing better title against all
of Agrarian Reform (DAR); Alyansa ng mga
the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance."
Manggagawang Bukid ng Hacienda Luisita
(AMBALA), Rene Galang, Noel Mallari, and Julio

Page 147 of 190

 Suniga and his Supervisory Group of the HLI and
Windsor Andaya, respondents. (G.R. No. 171101)
FACTS: On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted
unanimously (11-0) to dismiss the petition filed by HLI and
affirm with modifications the resolutions of the PARC
revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the
subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution.
Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that
occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly
ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the
SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give
way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-
beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain
as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It
thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to
“immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs
and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or
practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs
will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the
ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks,
as the case may be, over their printed names.”
On November 22, 2011, the Court recalled and set aside the
option to remain as stockholders of HLI, while maintaining
that all benefits received shall be respected with no
obligation to refund or return them.
On December 9, 2011, a Motion for
Reconsideration/Clarification by private respondents Mallari,
Suniga, Supervisory Group of HLI, and Andaya (Mallari, et al
On December 16, 2011, a Motion to Clarify and Reconsider
Resolution of November 22, 2011 was filed by HLI.
ISSUES:
A. Whether or not SC erred in determining just compensation
by considering the date of taking as November 21, 1989
when PARC approved the SDP (already revoked) since the
Notice of Coverage of January 2, 2006 may be considered
as time FWBs owned and possess the agricultural lands of
Hacienda Luisita because it was the only time when the latter
was placed under Compulsory Acquisition in view of failure
to perform their obligations under the SDP, or SDOA, when
the owner is ACTUALLY deprived or dispossessed of his
property, and considering taking from November 21, 1989 is
a deprivation of landowner’s property WITHOUT due process
of law; and HLI is entitled to be paid interest on the just
compensation.
B. Whether or not Just Compensation for the Homelots be
given to FWBs as it does not form part of the 4,915.75
hectares covered by the SDP, and hence, the value of these
homelots should, with the revocation of the SDP, be paid to
Tadeco as the landowner.
HELD:
A. The Court stressed that “just compensation has been
defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is
Page 148 of 190
not the takers gain, but the owner’s loss. Hence, in
determining just compensation, the price or value of the
property at the time it was taken from the owner and
appropriated by the government shall be the basis. If the
government takes possession of the land before the
institution of expropriation proceedings, the value should
be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession,
not of the filing of the complaint.”
The SC, citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioc, said
that taking is when the landowner was deprived of the use
and benefit of his property, such as when the title is
transferred to the Republic. It also noted that taking
also occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by
a landowner and approved by PARC for CARP coverage
through the stock distribution scheme, as in the case of HLI
earlier decided. Thus, HLI submitting its SDP for approval is
an acknowledgment on its part that the agricultural lands of
Hacienda Luisita are covered by CARP. However, the PARC
approval should be considered as the effective date of taking
because it was only during that time that the government
officially confirmed the CARP coverage of these lands.
Accordingly, Stock distribution and compulsory acquisition
are two modalities sharing the same end goal of having a
more equitable distribution of land ownership, without
ignoring such right to just compensation. Also, since it is only
upon the approval of the SDP that the agricultural lands
actually came under CARP coverage, such approval
operates and takes the place of a notice of coverage
ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition.
What the SC found notable, however, is that the divestment
by Tadeco of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita and
the giving of the shares of stock for free is nothing but an
enticement or incentive for the FWBs to agree with the stock
distribution option scheme and not further push for land
distribution. And the stubborn fact is that the “man days”
scheme of HLI impelled the FWBs to work in the hacienda in
exchange for such shares of stock.
The Court ruled that taking only when the landowner is
deprived of the use and benefit of his property is not
incompatible with the earlier conclusion that taking took
place on November 21, 1989, and since even from the start,
TADECO seemed to already favour Stock Distribution
Scheme when complying with the CARP when it organized
the HLI as its spin-off corporation which facilitated stock
acquisition of FWBs. Tadeco assigned and conveyed
4,915.75 has to HLI the agricultural lands of Hacienda
Luisita. These agricultural lands constituted as the capital
contribution of the FWBs in HLI. This, in effect, deprived
TADECO itself of the ownership over these lands when it
transferred the same to HLI.
When the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita were
transferred by Tadeco to HLI in order to comply with CARP
through the stock distribution option scheme under PARC
Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989, Tadeco
was consequently dispossessed of the ownership of the
same.
Furthermore, adherence to the suggestion of HLI that the
Notice of Coverage issued on January 2, 2006 should be
considered as date of taking would in effect penalize the
qualified FWBs twice for acceding to the Stock Distribution
Scheme, (1) depriving them of the agricultural lands they
should have gotten earlier, if it were not for this SDP and (2)
making them pay higher amortization for the agricultural
lands that should have been given to them decades ago.
The SC maintained that, as it has in fact already ruled on its
reckoning date, that is, November 21, 1989, the date of
issuance of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2, based on the
above-mentioned disquisitions.
On side note, the SC added that “even though the
compensation due to HLI will still be preliminarily determined
by DAR and LBP, subject to review by the RTC acting as a
SAC, the fact that the reckoning point of taking is already
fixed at a certain date should already hasten the proceedings
and not further cause undue hardship on the parties,
especially the qualified FWBs.”
B. The court ruled in the negative. As reiterated in the earlier
decision, the distribution of homelots is required under RA
6657 only for corporations or business associations owning
or operating farms which opted for land distribution.
Corporations are not obliged to provide for homelots.
Nonetheless, HLI undertook to subdivide and allocate for
free and without charge among the qualified family-
beneficiaries 240 sq. m. of homelots to some, if not all of the
qualified beneficiaries.
The Supreme Court, by a unanimous vote, resolved to
maintain its ruling that the FWBs shall retain ownership of
the homelots given to them with no obligation to pay for the
value of said lots. Also, since the SDP was already revoked
with finality in th earlier discussion of the decision, the Court
directs the government through the DAR to pay HLI the just
compensation for said homelots in consonance with Sec. 4,
Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution that the taking of land for
use in the agrarian reform program is subject to the payment
of just compensation.
The Motions of both parties were DENIED with qualification.
The July 5, 2011, Decision was modified by the November
21, 2011 Resolution which ordered the government, through
the DAR, to pay just compensation for the 240 sq. m.
homelots distributed to FWBs. This RESOLUTION is now
declared FINAL and EXECUTORY.
3. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT ENGINEER
CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS vs. SPOUSES
HERACLEO and RAMONA TECSON, (2013
DECISION)
Page 149 of 190
FACTS: Respondent spouses Heracleo and Ramona
Tecson (respondents) are co-owners of a parcel of land with
an area of 7,268 square meters located in San Pablo,
Malolos, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-43006of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Said
parcel of land was among the properties taken by the
government sometime in 1940 without the owners consent
and without the necessary expropriation proceedings and
used for the construction of the MacArthur Highway.
In 1940, the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) took respondents-movants' subject property without
the benefit of expropriation proceedings for the construction
of the MacArthur Highway. In a letter dated December 15,
1994,respondents-movants demanded the payment of the
fair market value of the subject parcel of land. Celestino R.
Contreras (Contreras), then District Engineer of the First
Bulacan Engineering District of the DPWH, offered to pay for
the subject land at the rate of Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per
square meter, per Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal
Committee (PAC) of Bulacan. Unsatisfied with the offer,
respondents-movants demanded the return of their property,
or the payment of compensation at the current fair market
value. Hence, the complaint for recovery of possession with
damages filed by respondents-movants. Respondents-
movants were able to obtain favorable decisions in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA),
with the subject property valued at One Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (₱1,500.00) per square meter, with interest
at six percent (6%) per annum. Aggrieved, petitioners come
before the Court assailing the CA decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the just compensation should be
based on the value of the property at the time of taking in
1940 and not at the time of payment?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is modified. The instant
case stemmed from an action for recovery of possession
with damages filed by respondents against petitioners. It,
however, revolves around the taking of the subject lot by
petitioners for the construction of the MacArthur Highway.
There is taking when the expropriator enters private property
not only for a momentary period but for a permanent
duration, or for the purpose of devoting the property to public
use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him
of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
When a property is taken by the government for public use,
jurisprudence clearly provides for the remedies available to a
landowner. The owner may recover his property if its return
is feasible or, if it is not, the aggrieved owner may demand
payment of just compensation for the land taken.For failure
of respondents to question the lack of expropriation
proceedings for a long period of time, they are deemed to
have waived and are estopped from assailing the power of
the government to expropriate or the public use for which the
power was exercised. What is left to respondents is the right
of compensation.The trial and appellate courts found that
respondents are entitled to compensation. The only issue left
for determination is the propriety of the amount awarded to
respondents.
Just compensation is "the fair value of the property as
between one who receives, and one who desires to sell,
fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government." This
rule holds true when the property is taken before the filing of
an expropriation suit, and even if it is the property owner who
brings the action for compensation.
The Court in the several cases was confronted with common
factual circumstances where the government took control
and possession of the subject properties for public use
without initiating expropriation proceedings and without
payment of just compensation, while the landowners failed
for a long period of time to question such government act
and later instituted actions for recovery of possession with
damages. The Court thus determined the landowners right to
the payment of just compensation and, more importantly, the
amount of just compensation. The Court has uniformly ruled
that just compensation is the value of the property at the time
of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation As
in said cases, just compensation due respondents in this
case should, therefore, be fixed not as of the time of
payment but at the time of taking, that is, in 1940.
The reason for the rule has been clearly explained in
Republic v. Lara, et al.,and repeatedly held by the Court in
recent cases, thus:
"The value of the property should be fixed as of the date
when it was taken and not the date of the filing of the
proceedings." For where property is taken ahead of the filing
of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be
enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the
entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated
its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase
in the value of the property from the time it is taken to the
time the complaint is filed, due to general economic
conditions. The owner of private property should be
compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not
intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss
or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his
property at the time it is taken.
Both the RTC and the CA recognized that the fair market
value of the subject property in 1940 wasP0.70/sq m. Hence,
it should, therefore, be used in determining the amount due
respondents instead of the higher value which isP1,500.00.
While disparity in the above amounts is obvious and may
appear inequitable to respondents as they would be
receiving such outdated valuation after a very long period, it
is equally true that they too are remiss in guarding against
the cruel effects of belated claim. The concept of just
compensation does not imply fairness to the property owner
alone. Compensation must be just not only to the property
owner, but also to the public which ultimately bears the cost
of expropriation.
Clearly, petitioners had been occupying the subject property
for more than fifty years without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings. In taking respondents property without the
benefit of expropriation proceedings and without payment of
just compensation, petitioners clearly acted in utter disregard
of respondents proprietary rights which cannot be
countenanced by the Court.For said illegal taking,
respondents are entitled to adequate compensation in the
form of actual or compensatory damages which in this case
should be the legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum on
the value of the land at the time of taking in 1940 until full
payment. This is based on the principle that interest runs as
a matter of law and follows from the right of the landowner to
be placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as
of the date of taking.
2015 DECISION
Page 150 of 190
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by
respondents-movants spouses Heracleo and Ramona
Tecson imploring the Court to take a second look at its July
1, 2013 Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated July 31, 2007 in CAG.R. CV No. 77997 is MODIFIED,
in that the valuation of the subject property owned by
respondents shall be P0.70 instead of ₱1,500.00 per square
meter, with interest at six percent (6%) per annum from the
date of taking in 1940 instead of March 17, 1995, until full
payment.
In view of the contrasting opinions of the members of the
Third Division on the instant motion, and the transcendental
importance of the issue raised herein, the members of the
Third Division opted to refer the issue to the En Banc for
resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of private property without
due process should be nullified?
HELD: No. The government’s failure to initiate the necessary
expropriation proceedings prior to actual taking cannot
simply invalidate the State’s exercise of its eminent domain
power, given that the property subject of expropriation is
indubitably devoted for public use, and public policy imposes
upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services to
the public. To hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise of
lack of due process would certainly diminish or weaken one
of the State’s inherent powers, the ultimate objective of
which is to serve the greater good. Thus, the non-filing of the
case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return
of the property to the landowner. What is left to the
landowner is the right of compensation.
While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to
receive an outdated valuation, the long-established rule is
that the fair equivalent of a property should be computed not
at the time of payment, but at the time of taking. This is
because the purpose of ‘just compensation’ is not to reward
the owner for the property taken but to compensate him for
the loss thereof. The owner should be compensated only for
what he actually loses, and what he loses is the actual value
of the property at the time it is taken. The Court must adhere
to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the
application of the law according to its express terms,
interpretation being called for only when such literal
application is impossible. To entertain other formula for
computing just compensation, contrary to those established
by law and jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation
of economic policies – a matter which this Court has no
competence to take cognizance of. Equity and equitable
principles only come into full play when a gap exists in the
law and jurisprudence.
Velasco Dissent:
The State’s power of eminent domain is not absolute; the
Constitution is clear that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty and property without due process of law. As such,
failure of the government to institute the necessary
proceedings should lead to failure of taking an individual’s
property. In this case, since the property was already taken,
the complainants must be equitably compensated for the
loss thereof.
For purposes of “just” compensation, the value of the land
should be determined from the time the property owners filed
the initiatory complaint, earning interest therefrom. To hold
otherwise would validate the State’s act as one of
expropriation in spite of procedural infirmities which, in turn,
would amount to unjust enrichment on its part. To continue
condoning such acts would be licensing the government to
continue dispensing with constitutional requirements in
taking private property.
Page 151 of 190
4. PATRICIA I. TIONGSON VS NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY (558 SCRA 56 (2008)
FACTS:
The present Petition for Review on Certiorari raises the
question of from what date should just compensation of the
subject properties sought to be expropriated be reckoned -
whether it is from the taking of the property or on the filing of
the complaint.
Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) took
possession in 1978, for purposes of expropriation, of
properties belonging to petitioners Patricia L. Tiongson, et al.
pursuant to P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670. "An Act Providing for
the Expropriation of the Property Known as the 'Tambunting
Estate' Registered Under TCT Nos. 119059, 122450,
122459, 122452 And Lot Nos. 1-A, 1-C, 1-D, 1-E, 1-F, 1-G
And 1-H Of (LRC) PSD-230517 (Previously Covered By TCT
No. 119058) of the Register of Deeds of Manila and for The
Sale at Cost of the Lots Therein to the Bona Fide Occupants
and Other Squatters Families and to Upgrade the Same, and
Authorizing the Appropriation of Funds For The Purpose"
(underscoring supplied), and of properties belonging to
Patricia Tiongson, et al. pursuant to P.D. No. 1670, "An Act
Providing For The Expropriation of the Property Along the
Estero De Sunog-Apog Formerly Consisting of Lots Nos. 55-
A, 55-B And 55-C, Block 2918 of the Subdivision Plan Psd-
11746, Covered by TCT Nos. 49286, 49287 and 49288,
Respectively, of the Register of Deeds of Manila and for The
Sale at Cost of the Lots Therein to the Bona Fide Occupants
and Other Squatter Families and to Upgrade The Same, and
Authorizing The Appropriation of Funds For The Purpose".
The two P.D.’s were thereafter declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court they being violative of the therein
petitioners' right to due process of law. On September 14,
1987, the NHA filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a
complaint against Tiongson, et al. for expropriation of parcels
of land which were covered by P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670.
The RTC held that the determination of just compensation of
the properties should be reckoned from the date of filing of
NHA’s petition or on September 14, 1987. However, on
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial
court’s orders and held that the just compensation should be
based on the actual taking of the property in 1978. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not just compensation should be reckoned from
the time of the taking of the property or on the filing of the
complaint
HELD:
In several aforementioned cases, in a situation where a
government agency, in this case the National Housing
Authority, took possession of properties belonging to private
individuals for purposes of expropriation and the laws by
virtue of which such government agency expropriated the
subject properties were subsequently declared to be
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, the determination of
just compensation should be reckoned from the date of filing
the complaint for expropriation and not from the time of
actual taking of the properties.
In declaring, in its challenged Decision, that the
determination of just compensation should be reckoned from
NHA’s taking of the properties in 1978, the appellate court
simply relied on Annex ―C of NHA’s petition before it, the
Order dated June 15, 1988 of the then Presiding Judge of
the trial court, and thus concluded that ―the parties admitted
that [NHA] took possession of the subject properties as early
as 1978. The appellate court reached that conclusion,
despite its recital of the antecedents of the case including
Tiongson, sustained moves, even before the trial court, in
maintaining that the reckoning of just compensation should
be from the date of filing of the petition for expropriation on
September 14, 1987.
The earlier-quoted allegations of the body and prayer in
NHA’s Petition for Expropriation filed before the RTC
constitute judicial admissions of NHA—that it possessed the
subject properties until this Court’s declaration, in its above-
stated Decision in G.R. No. L-55166 promulgated on May 21,
1987, that P.D. No. 1669 pursuant to which NHA took
possession of the properties of petitioners in 1978 was
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. These
admissions, the appellate court either unwittingly failed to
consider or escaped its notice.
Following then Rule 67, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
reading:
SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. - If the objections to and the
defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the
property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend
as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of
expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to
take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public
use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the
date of the taking of the property or the filing of the
complaint, whichever came first.
Page 152 of 190
5. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH THE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROSARIO
RODRIGUEZ REYES CARPIO, J.)
FACTS: Private respondent Rosario Rodriguez Reyes is the
absolute owner of a parcel of land identified as Lot 849-B
and covered by TCT No. T-7194. The 1,043-square meter lot
is situated on Claro M. Recto and Osmeña Streets, Cagayan
de Oro City.
On 6 November 1990, private respondent received a letter
from petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
requesting permission to enter into a portion of private
respondent’s lot consisting of 663 square meters, and to
begin construction of the Osmeña Street extension road.
On 20 December 1990, petitioner took possession of private
respondent’s property without initiating expropriation
proceedings. Consequently, on 4 and 7 January 1991,
private respondent sent letters to the DPWH stating her
objection to the taking of her property. Private respondent
sent a letter to the City Appraisal Committee (CAC) rejecting
the latter’s appraisal of the subject property. In the same
letter, private respondent requested the City Assessor for a
reappraisal of her property, but said request was denied.
On 17 March 1992, private respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City a
complaint claiming just compensation and damages against
petitioner.
On 30 June 1993, the RTC appointed three commissioners
to determine the subject property’s fair market value, as well
as the consequential benefits and damages of its
expropriation. The RTC deemed it just, fair and reasonable
to adopt the market value of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS
(₱4,000.00) per square meter as the highest price obtaining
and prevailing in 1990, the time of the taking of the property.
On 13 April 1994, the scheduled hearing was reset to 19
May 1994, to give private respondent (plaintiff) time to
consider the offer of petitioner (defendant) to amicably settle
the case and to accept the just compensation of ₱3,200 per
square meter, or a total of ₱2,212,600, for the 663-square
meter portion of private respondent’s lot. On 16 May 1994,
private respondent filed with the RTC an "Urgent Motion to
Deposit The Amount of ₱2,121,600 in Court. RTC ordered
the commissioners to submit their report as soon as
possible, but until the scheduled hearing on 15 July 1994,
the commissioners still failed to submit their report. Upon
motion of private respondent, the RTC issued an order
appointing a new set of commissioners.
On 11 October 1994, the new commissioners submitted their
report, the pertinent facts are as follows:
Taking into consideration, among others, the location of the
property and a research of the prevailing prices of lots
proximate to and/or near the vicinity of plaintiff's property, the
undersigned Commissioners respectfully recommend to the
Honorable Court the following valuation, to wit:
1. Front portion along Recto Avenue with a measurement of
21.52 meters from south to north with an area of 347.66
square meters at ₱18,000.00 to ₱20,000.00 per square
meter;
2. Middle portion with a measurement of 21.52 meters
containing an area of 347.66 square meters at ₱16,000.00 to
₱18,000.00 per square meter;
3. Rear/back portion measuring 21.52 meters with an area of
347.66 square meters at ₱14,000.00 to ₱16,000.00 per
square meter;
On the other hand, the remaining portion left to the plaintiff,
Lot No. 849-B-3 will not actually be 297 square meters. If we
deduct the setback area from Osmeña Extension Street, the
usable/buildable area left to the plaintiff would only be a little
over 50 square meters. This portion would not command a
good price if sold. Neither is it ideal for purposes of any
building construction because aside from its being a very
small strip of land, the shape is triangular.
On 2 June 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants, declaring the former as
having the right to retain 590 square meters of the property
covered by TCT No. T-7194, and ordering the latter to return
293 square meters of the 746 square meters taken. Plaintiff
herein is ordered to forthwith defray the expenses to be
incurred in undertaking the road construction of the 293
square meters which the defendants will later on provide
along the right portion of her property.
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment affirming with modifications the decision of the
RTC. The Court of Appeals found that the commissioners’
recommendations on just compensation were not supported
by valid documents. Also, it was unclear in the RTC decision
whether the trial court merely adopted the commissioners’
recommendations or the court made its own independent
valuation of the subject property. Thus, the Court of Appeals
held that a reconvening of the commissioners or an
appointment of new commissioners to determine just
compensation was necessary. The appellate court further
held that the trial court’s order for petitioner’s return of the
293-square meter lot had no legal basis and was no longer
feasible since the lot was already part of the completed
Sergio Osmeña extension road. Moreover, consequential
damages should be awarded in lieu of actual damages for
private respondent’s alleged loss of income from the
remaining 297-square meter lot.
The case is remanded to the trial court which is ordered to
reconvene the commissioners or appoint new commissioners
to determine, in accordance with this Decision, the amount of
just compensation due to plaintiff-appellee Rosario
Rodriguez Reyes for the 746 square meters of land taken
from her and consequential damages to the 297-square
meter portion left. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
A. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the
remand of the case to the trial court, to order the
reconvening of the commissioners or appointment of new
commissioners to determine the consequential damages for
the remaining 297- square meter lot; and
B. Whether or not the Court erred in awarding consequential
damages.
HELD:
Page 153 of 190
A. On whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the
remand of the case to the trial court to order the reconvening
of the commissioners or appointment of new commissioners
to determine the consequential damages for the remaining
297-square meter lot
Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as
sovereign, to take private property for public use upon
observance of due process of law and payment ofjust
compensation. The Constitution provides that, "[p]rivate
property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation."
Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the
property sought to be expropriated. Among the factors to be
considered in arriving at the fair market value of the property
are the cost of acquisition, the current value of like
properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular
case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax
declarations thereon. The measure is not the taker’s gain but
the owner’s loss. To be just, the compensation must be fair
not only to the owner but also to the taker.
Just compensation is based on the price or value of the
property at the time it was taken from the owner and
appropriated by the government. However, if the government
takes possession before the institution of expropriation
proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the
taking of said possession, not of the filing of the complaint.
The value at the time of the filing of the complaint should be
the basis for the determination of the value when the taking
of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to
the commencement of the proceedings.
However, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals that Rule
67 presupposes a prior filing of complaint for eminent domain
with the appropriate court by the expropriator. If no such
complaint is filed, the expropriator is considered to have
violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived the
usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the
appointment of commissioners to ascertain just
compensation.
In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we
clarified that when there is no action for expropriation and the
case involves only a complaint for damages or just
compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on
ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule
67) are no longer applicable, and a trial before
commissioners is dispensable.
In this case, petitioner took possession of the subject
property without initiating expropriation proceedings.
Consequently, private respondent filed the instant case for
just compensation and damages. To determine just
compensation, the trial court appointed three commissioners
pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. None of the parties objected to such
appointment.
The trial court’s appointment of commissioners in this
particular case is not improper. The appointment was done
mainly to aid the trial court in determining just compensation,
and it was not opposed by the parties. Besides, the trial court
is not bound by the commissioners’ recommended valuation
of the subject property. The court has the discretion on
whether to adopt the commissioners’ valuation or to
substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the
records.
However, we agree with the appellate court that the trial
court’s decision is not clear as to its basis for ascertaining
just compensation. The trial court mentioned in its decision
the valuations in the reports of the City Appraisal Committee
and of the commissioners appointed pursuant to Rule 67.
But whether the trial court considered these valuations in
arriving at the just compensation, or the court made its own
independent valuation based on the records, was obscure in
the decision. The trial court simply gave the total amount of
just compensation due to the property owner without laying
down its basis. Thus, there is no way to determine whether
the adjudged just compensation is based on competent
evidence.
For this reason alone, a remand of the case to the trial court
for proper determination of just compensation is in order. In
National Power Corporation v. Bongbong, we held that
although the determination of just compensation lies within
the trial court’s discretion, it should not be done arbitrarily or
capriciously. The decision of the trial court must be based on
all established rules, correct legal principles, and competent
evidence. The court is proscribed from basing its judgment
on speculations and surmises.
An award of consequential damages for property not taken is
not tantamount to unjust enrichment of the property owner.
There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a
benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity and good conscience."38 Article
22 of the Civil Code provides that "[e]very person who
through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him." The principle of unjust enrichment
under Article 22 requires two conditions: (1) that a person is
benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that
such benefit is derived at another’s expense or damage.39
There is no unjust enrichment when the person who will
benefit has a valid claim to such benefit. As stated,
consequential damages are awarded if as a result of the
expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers
from an impairment or decrease in value. Thus, there is a
valid basis for the grant of consequential damages to the
property owner, and no unjust enrichment can result
therefrom.

B. Petitioner contends that no consequential damages may

be awarded as the remaining lot was "not actually taken" by
the DPWH, and to award consequential damages for the lot
which was retained by the owner is tantamount to unjust
enrichment on the part of the latter. Petitioner’s contention is
unmeritorious.

No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real property

is necessary to grant consequential damages. If as a result
of the expropriation made by petitioner, the remaining lot
(i.e., the 297-square meter lot) of private respondent suffers
from an impairment or decrease in value, consequential
damages may be awarded to private respondent. On the
other hand, if the expropriation results to benefits to the
remaining lot of private respondent, these consequential
benefits36 may be deducted from the awarded consequential
damages, if any, or from the market value of the expropriated
property. We held in B.H. Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of
Appeals that:

To determine just compensation, the trial court should first

ascertain the market value of the property, to which should
be added the consequential damages after deducting
therefrom the consequential benefits which may arise from
the expropriation. If the consequential benefits exceed the
consequential damages, these items should be disregarded
altogether as the basic value of the property should be paid
in every case.

Section 6 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Civil Procedure

provides:

x x x The commissioners shall assess the

consequential damages to the property not taken
and deduct from such consequential damages the
consequential benefits to be derived by the owner
from the public use or purpose of the property
taken, the operation of its franchise by the
corporation or the carrying on of the business of the
corporation or person taking the property. But in no
case shall the consequential benefits assessed
exceed the consequential damages assessed, or
the owner be deprived of the actual value of his
property so taken.

Page 154 of 190


6. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. APOLONIO
V. MARASIGAN, FRANCISCO V. MARASIGAN, LILIA
V. MARASIGAN, BENITO V. MARASIGAN, JR., and
ALICIA V. MARASIGAN, (November 20, 2017 Tijam
J)
Facts: NPC filed an expropriation committee against
Marasigan in order to construct Steel Transmission Lines
and Wooden electric poles. NPC sought an easement of
right of way over the subject properties. Based on the tax
declaration which classified the properties as agricultural and
based on the BIR zoning valuations, NPC offered to pay Php
299,550.50
Marasigan did not object to the expropriation but opposed
the classification since they allege that it is classified as
industrial, commercial, and residential since 1993. They then
claim Php 47,064,400 for the affected properties. As
counterclaim, they also seek payment of consequential
damages for the areas in between the transmission lines
(dangling portions). RTC issued an Expropriation order and
fixed the value of the properties at Php 47,064,400 which
was deposited by NPC with Landbank. RTC then issued a
writ of possession in favor of NPC . An appraisal committee
was formed by the RTC for purposes of determining just
compensation. A reverse trial thereafter ensued.
Marasigan presented the Chairman of the appraisal
committee who testified that the appraisal committee
recommended the total valuation of PhP 49,064,400 based
on the assessor's data and the BIR zonal valuations as
indicated on the 1997 tax declarations. Also presented was
the succeeding Chairman of the appraisal committee who
testified that the properties suffered consequential damages
which the appraisal committee recommended to be
computed at 50% of the BIR zonal value per square meter or
for a total amount of PhP 22,227,800.
On ocular inspection, the appraisal committee found that the
existence of the transmission lines hampered the properties'
potential use such that while the areas before and after the
transmission lines could still be used, the areas it between
could no longer be utilized. The appraisal committee also
noted that the transmission lines produced considerable
noise making the area unsuitable for residential purposes.
NPC, presented its right-of-way officers whose testimonies
sought to establish that the lots being claimed by Marasigan
as dangling areas were classified as agricultural under the
tax declarations and that NPC negotiated with Marasigan,
and that NPC took the properties between 1996 and 1998.
NPC’s officers alleged that the dangling areas could still be
used for agricultural purposes but agreed that the lines may
endanger people and animals.
On cross-examination, the right of way officer admitted that
the properties were classified as agro industrial as stated in
the 1998 tax declarations. He admitted that the classification
of the properties as agricultural which was used as basis for
computing its value was erroneous.
RTC affirmed the recommendation of the appraisal
committee for payment of the Just compensation in the
Page 155 of 190
amount of 47,064,400 based on the BIR zonal valuation as
of the time of the filing of the complaint on Jan 23, 2006. It
also affirmed that payment of the consequential damages for
the properties that were rendered useless. RTC rejected
NPC’s claim that it took the properties in 1972 when NPC
was allegedly allowed by Marasigan to construct the lines.
NPC’s MR was denied by RTC but the court made
modifications by including interest (6%, 12%) On their appeal
to the CA, they alleged that the award was based on the
premise that it sought to acquire ownership when it merely
sought to acquire right-of-way; the payment of which is only
10% of the market-value of the properties. The CA held that
payment of the full value was Just Compensation. It was also
held that NPC failed to allege the issue of taking in its
complaint nor was it raised during pre-trial or even proved
during trial. The CA denied their appeal and affirmed the
RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reckoning point of the market
value of the properties was during the taking of the property
HELD: The court ruled in the affirmative. The general rule is
that it should be reckoned at the time of actual taking when it
preceded the filing of the complaint. Under Rule 67, Sec 4;
the value of just compensation is to be determined as of the
date of the taking of the property or the filing of the
complaint, whichever came first. In NTC v. Oroville: it was
settled that just compensation should be reckoned from the
date of actual taking when such preceded the filing of the
complaint for expropriation. The State is only obliged to
make good the loss sustained by the landowner and
considering the circumstances availing at the time the
property was taken In some cases, there were deviations
from the general rule due to special circumstances as it
necessitated a valuation at the time the landowners initiated
proceedings after the taking of the properties.
In the case at bar, NPC insists that it took the properties in
the 1970s despite initiating the complaint only on Jan 23,
2006 which is why they allege that it should be reckoned in
the 1970s. NPC's action relative to the acquisition of an
easement of right-of-way made prior to the filing of its
expropriation complaint was limited only to the conduct of
negotiations with respondents. The negotiations pertained to
the construction of transmission lines not among the
transmission lines subject of the complaint. This was alleged
by NPC and was testified to by their right-of-way officer.
There being no sufficient proof that NPC actually took the
subject properties at a date preceding the filing of the
expropriation complaint, the time of the taking should be
taken to mean as coinciding with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings on January 23, 2006.
The determination of just compensation in expropriation
cases is a function addressed to the discretion of the courts
owing to the constitutional mandate that no private property
shall be taken for public use without payment of just
compensation. As such, legislative enactments, as well as
executive issuances, fixing or providing for the method of
computing just compensation are tantamount to
impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. As
such, they are not binding on courts and are treated as mere
guidelines in ascertaining the amount of just compensation
The tax declarations presented by NPC is only of of the
several factors which the court may consider to facilitate the
determination of just compensation as they enjoy judicial
discretion to determine the classification of lands. The
court's discretion in classifying the expropriated land is only
for the purpose of determining just compensation and is not
meant to substitute that of the local government's power to
reclassify and convert lands through local ordinance
7. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LIM (G.R. No.
161656, June 29, 2005)
FACTS: In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action
for expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu City for the
purpose of establishing a military reservation for the
Philippine Army. The said lots were registered in the name of
Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic deposited
P9,500 in the PNB then took possession of the lots.
Thereafter, on May 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision
ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of
P4,062.10 as just compensation. The Denzons appealed to
the CA but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of
judgment was made on April 5, 1948.
In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the
National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two
lots, but it "denied knowledge of the matter." On September
6, 1961, Lt. Cabal rejected the claim but expressed
willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a
reasonable time.
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September
20, 1961, the Denzons· successors-in-interest,Valdehueza
and Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery
of possession with damages against the Republic and AFP
officers in possession of the property.
On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the
names of Valdehueza and Panerio with the annotation
"subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to
acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and939 upon previous
payment of a reasonable market value".
On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of
Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners
and have retained their right as such over lots because of the
Republic’s failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged
in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the
annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute
a deed of sale in favor of the Republic.
They appealed the CFI·s decision to the SC. The latter held
that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners
of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just
compensation by the Republic. SC still ruled that they are not
entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only
demand the payment of their fair market value.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot
932 to Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as security for their
loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had
the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lot title was issued in
his name.
On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title
with the RTC against the petitioners herein. On 2001, the
RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim, declaring that he is
the absolute and exclusive owner of the lot with all the rights
of an absolute owner including the right to possession.
Page 156 of 190
Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In its Decision dated
September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC Decision saying:
´... This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the
concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the
land,but also the payment for the land within a reasonable
time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered "just"...”
Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for
review alleging that they remain as the owner of Lot 932.
ISSUE: Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot
932 despite its failure to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-
interest the just compensation pursuant to the judgment of
the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940.
HELD: No.
No person shall be deprived of his private property without
due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential
element of due process is that there must be just
compensation whenever private property is taken for public
use. Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution
mandates: “Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.”
The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it
failed and refused to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-
interest the just compensation. The length of time and the
manner with which it evaded payment demonstrate its
arbitrary highhandedness and confiscatory attitude. More
than half of a century has passed, yet, to this day, the
landowner, now respondent, has remained empty-handed.
Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed payment cannot, in
any way, be viewed as fair. This is more so when such delay
is accompanied by bureaucratic hassles.
The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republic’s
delay is contrary to the rules of fair play, as “just
compensation embraces not only the correct determination
of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also
the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its
taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered ‘just.’” In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an
entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of
compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is
not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a
trespasser ab initio.
While it is true that all private properties are subject to the
need of government, and the government may take them
whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion
demands, however, the Constitution guarantees that when
this governmental right of expropriation is exercised, it shall
be attended by compensation. From the taking of private
property by the government under the power of eminent
domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the
owner for his loss. Significantly, the above-mentioned
provision of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a
grant but a limitation of power. This limiting function is in
keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against the
arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of
the individual’s rights. Given this function, the provision
should therefore be strictly interpreted against the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without
expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just.”
property owner.

The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated

shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full
payment of the just compensation. Although the right to
appropriate and use land is complete at the time of entry, title
to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is
actually made. Clearly, without full payment of just
compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the
landowner to the expropriator. Otherwise stated, the
Republic’s acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon the
full payment of just compensation within a reasonable time.

Of course the Court is aware of the doctrine that

“nonpayment of just compensation (in an expropriation
proceedings) does not entitle the private landowners to
recover possession of the expropriated lots.” However, the
facts of the present case do not justify its application. It bears
stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just
compensation twice, the first was in the expropriation
proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57)
years have passed since then. We cannot but construe the
Republic’s failure to pay just compensation as a deliberate
refusal on its part. Under such circumstance, recovery of
possession is in order. In several jurisdictions, the courts
held that recovery of possession may be had when property
has been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained by one
claiming to act under the power of eminent domain or where
a rightful entry is made and the party condemning refuses to
pay the compensation which has been assessed or agreed
upon; or fails or refuses to have the compensation assessed
and paid.
It must be emphasized that an individual cannot be deprived
of his property for the public convenience. One of the basic
principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of
the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the
means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is
also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in
keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not
excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not
even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public
need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse
the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration
to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article
III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the
rest of the nation who would deny him that right.
Besides, practically speaking, the reversion of Lot 932 to
respondent will only affect a handful of military personnel. It
will not result to “irreparable damage” or “damage beyond
pecuniary estimation,” as what the Republic vehemently
claims.In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that “the
nonpayment of just compensation does not entitle the private
landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots,
however, in cases where the government failed to pay just
compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the
judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners
concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their
property. This is in consonance with the principle that “the
government cannot keep the property and dishonor the
judgment.” To be sure, the five-year period limitation will
encourage the government to pay just compensation
punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all,
it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property
from private persons against their will, to facilitate the
payment of just compensation. We defined just
compensation as not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the property owner but also the
8. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EUGENIO
DALAUTA (G.R. No. 190004, August 08, 2017)
FACTS: Eugenio Dalauta (Dalauta) was the registered
owner of an agricultural land in Florida, Butuan City, with an
area of 25.2160 hectares and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-1624. The land was placed by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under compulsory
acquisition of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) as reflected in the Notice of Coverage, dated
January 17, 1994, which Dalauta received on February 7,
1994. Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered
P192,782.59 as compensation for the land, but Dalauta
rejected such valuation for being too low. The case was
referred to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) through the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Butuan
City. A summary administrative proceeding was conducted to
determine the appropriate just compensation for the subject
property. In its Resolution,5 dated December 4, 1995, the
PARAD affirmed the valuation made by LBP in the amount of
P192,782.59. On February 28, 2000, Dalauta filed a petition
for determination of just compensation with the RTC, sitting
as SAC. He alleged that LBP's valuation of the land was
inconsistent with the rules and regulations prescribed in DAR
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 06, series of 1992, for
determining the just compensation of lands covered by
CARP's compulsory acquisition scheme.
Dalauta argued that the valuation of his land should be
determined using the formula in DAR A.O. No. 6, series of
1992, which was Land Value (LV) = Capitalized Net Income
(CNI) x 0.9 + Market Value (MV) per tax declaration x 0.1, as
he had a net income of 350,000.00 in 1993 from the sale of
the trees that were grown on the said land. LBP argued that
the valuation of Dalauta's land should be determined using
the formula LV= MV x 2, which yielded a total value of
P192,782.59 for the 25.2160 hectares of Dalauta's land. LBP
claimed that during the ocular inspection/investigation, only
36 coconut trees existed on the subject land; that three (3)
hectares of it were planted with com; and the rest was idle
with few second-growth trees.
The SAC explained its decision in this wise:
Going over the records of this case, taking into consideration
the Commissioners Report which is replete with pictures of
the improvements introduced which pictures are admitted
into evidence not as illustrated testimony of a human witness
but as probative evidence in itself of what it shows (Basic
Evidence, Bautista, 2004 Edition), this Court is of the
considered view that the Report (Commissioners) must be
given weight.

Page 157 of 190

While LBP's witness Ruben P. Penaso may have gone to the
area, but he did not, at least, list down the improvements.
The members of the Board of Commissioners on the other
hand, went into the area, surveyed its metes and bounds and
listed the improvements they found including the farmhouse
made of wood with galvanized iron roofing (Annex "C",
Commissioner's Report, p. 132, Record)
All told, the basic formula for the valuation of lands covered
by Voluntary Offer to Sell and Compulsory Acquisition is:
LV = (CNI X 0.6) + (CS X 0.3) + (MV X 0.1)
Where: LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula is used if all the three (3) factors are
present, relevant and applicable. In any case, the resulting
figure in the equation is always multiplied to the number of
area or hectarage of land valued for just compensation.
Whenever one of the factors in the general formula is not
available, the computation of land value will be any of the
three (3) computations or formulae:
LV (CNI x 0.9) + (MVx 0.1) (If the comparable sales
factor is missing)
LV (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1) (If the capitalize net
income is unavailable)
LV = MV x 2 (If only the market value factor is
available)
Since the Capitalized Net Income in this case is available,
the formula to be used is:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
Whence:
LV = (P350,000.00/.12 x 0.9) + (P145,570 x 0.1)
= (P2,916,666.67 x 0.9) + (P145,557.00) [sic]
= P2,625,000.00 + P14,557.00
= P2,639,557.00 plus P100,000.00 for the Farmhouse
The CA sustained the valuation by the SAC for being well
within R.A. No. 6657, its implementing rules and regulations,
and in accordance with settled jurisprudence. The factors
laid down under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, which were
translated into a basic formula in DAR A.O. No. 6, series of
1992, were used in determining the value of Dalauta's
property. It stated that the courts were not at liberty to
disregard the formula which was devised to implement
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657. The CA, however, disagreed
with the SAC's valuation of the farmhouse, which was made
of wood and galvanized iron, for it was inexistent during the
taking of the subject land – (1) the compensation for the
farmhouse (P100,000.00), as well as the awards for
Page 158 of 190
attorney's fees (P150,000.00) and litigation expenses
(P50,000.00), are hereby DELETED
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court correctly computed the
just compensation of the subject property.
HELD: Upon an assiduous assessment of the different
valuations arrived at by the DAR, the SAC and the CA, the
Court agrees with the position of Justice Francis Jardeleza
that just compensation for respondent Dalauta's land should
be computed based on the formula provided under DAR-LBP
Joint Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 2003 (JMC No.
11 (2003)). This Memorandum Circular, which provides for
the specific guidelines for properties with standing
commercial trees, explains:
The Capitalized Net Income (CNI) approach to land
valuation assumes that there would be uniform
streams of future income that would be realized in
perpetuity from the seasonal/permanent crops
planted to the land. In the case of commercial trees
(hardwood and soft wood species), however, only a
one-time income is realized when the trees are due
for harvest. The regular CNI approach in the
valuation of lands planted to commercial trees
would therefore not apply.
Dalauta's sale of falcata trees indeed appears to be a one-
time transaction. He did not claim to have derived any other
income from the property prior to receiving the Notice of
Coverage from the DAR in February 1994. For this reason,
his property would be more appropriately covered by the
formula provided under JMC No. 11 (2003).
Applying the above formula to compute just compensation
for respondent's land would be the most equitable course of
action under the circumstances. Without JMC No. 11 (2003),
Dalauta's property would have to be valued using the
formula for idle lands, the CNI and CS factors not being
applicable. Following this formula, just compensation for
Dalauta's property would only amount to 225,300.00,
computed as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
LV = MV x 2
Where:
LV = Land Value
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration*
• For the area planted to com, P7,740.00/hectare
• For idle/pasture land, P3,890/hectare
Thus:
For the 4 hectares planted to corn:
LV = (P7,740/hectare x 4 hectares) x 2
= P61,920.00
For the 21 hectares of idle/pasture land:
 LV = (P3,890/hectare x 21) x 2
= P163,380.00
Total Land Value = P61,920.00 + P163,380.00
= P225,300.00
As above stated, the amount would be more equitable if it
would be computed pursuant to JMC No. 11 (2003).
Moreover, the award shall earn legal interest. Pursuant to
Nacar v. Gallery Frames, the interest shall be computed from
the time of taking at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, the rate shall be six
percent (6%) per annum until fully paid.
9. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs.
Lozada, Sr. (G.R. No. 176625 February 25, 2010
Nachura,)
DOCTRINE: It is well settled that the taking of private
property by the Governments power of eminent domain is
subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a
particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be
paid to the property owner. These requirements partake of
the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with
to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.
FACTS: Subject of this case is a lot (Lot 88) located in
Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was Anastacio
Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation
proceedings, initiated by the Republic, represented by the
then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the
expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. During the
pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent
Lozada acquired Lot 88 from Deiparine. The trial court ruled
for the Republic and ordered the Deiparine to pay Lozada
the fair market value of the land.
However, the projected improvement and expansion plan of
the old Lahug Airport was not pursued. The plaintiff-
respondents initiated a complaint for the recovery of
possession and conveyance of ownership on the subject lot.
On the other hand, petitioners asked for the immediate
dismissal of the complaint. They specifically denied that the
Government had made assurances to reconvey Lot 88 to
respondents in the event that the property would no longer
be needed for airport operations. Petitioners instead
asserted that the judgment of condemnation was
unconditional, and respondents were, therefore, not entitled
to recover the expropriated property notwithstanding non-use
or abandonment thereof. The trial court ruled for herein
plaintiff-respondents, which decision was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid exercise of power of
eminent domain.
HELD: No. The acquisition by the Republic of the
expropriated lots was subject to the condition that the Lahug
Airport would continue its operation. The condition not having
materialized because the airport had been abandoned, the
Page 159 of 190
former owner should then be allowed to reacquire the
expropriated property. It is well settled that the taking of
private property by the Governments power of eminent
domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it
is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just
compensation be paid to the property owner. These
requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that
should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep
the property expropriated.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use,
the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant
to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed,
failing which, it should file another petition for the new
purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to
return the said property to its private owner, if the latter
desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of
expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power
of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for
which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private
property owner would be denied due process of law, and the
judgment would violate the property owner’s right to justice,
fairness, and equity.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the
taking of private property, consequent to the Governments
exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to
the condition that the property be devoted to the specific
public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this
particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all
pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former
owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the
property, subject to the return of the amount of just
compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the
power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of
the required factual justification.• The right of respondents to
repurchase Lot No. 88 may be enforced based on a
constructive trust constituted on the property held by the
government in favor of the former.
 In constructive trusts, the arrangement is temporary and
passive in which the trustees sole duty is to transfer the
title and possession over the property to the plaintiff-
beneficiary.
 Of course, the wronged party seeking the aid of a court
of equity in establishing a constructive trust must himself
do equity. Accordingly, the court will exercise its
discretion in deciding what acts are required of the
plaintiff-beneficiary as conditions precedent to obtaining
such decree and has the obligation to reimburse the
trustee the consideration received from the latter just as
the plaintiff-beneficiary would if he proceeded on the
theory of rescission. In the good judgment of the court,
the trustee may also be paid the necessary expenses he
may have incurred in sustaining the property, his fixed
costs for improvements thereon, and the monetary value
of his services in managing the property to the extent
that plaintiff-beneficiary will secure a benefit from his
acts.

10. Vda de Ouano vs. Republic (G.R. No. 168770
February 9, 2011 Velasco, Jr., J.)
DOCTRINE: A condemnor should commit to use the
property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for
the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to
return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so
desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property
it expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process,
dishonor the judgment of expropriation.
FACTS: In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC),
MCIAAs predecessor agency, pursued a program to expand
the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Through its team of
negotiators, NAC met and negotiated with the owners of the
properties situated around the airport, which included Lot
Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942, and
947 of the Banilad Estate. As the landowners would later
claim, the government negotiating team, as a sweetener,
assured them that they could repurchase their respective
lands should the Lahug Airport expansion project do not
push through or once the Lahug Airport closes or its
operations transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport. Some of the
landowners accepted the assurance and executed deeds of
sale with a right of repurchase. Others, however, including
the owners of the aforementioned lots, refused to sell
because the purchase price offered was viewed as way
below market, forcing the hand of the Republic, represented
by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), as
successor agency of the NAC, to file a complaint for the
expropriation of Lot Nos. 744-A, 745A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-
A, 763-A, 942, and 947, among others, docketed as Civil
Case No. R-1881 entitled Republic v. Damian Ouano, et al.
Soon after the MCIAA jettisoned the Lahug Airport expansion
project, informal settlers entered and occupied Lot No. 763-A
which, before its expropriation, belonged to the Ouanos. The
Ouanos then formally asked to be allowed to exercise their
right to repurchase the aforementioned lot, but the MCIAA
ignored the demand. On August 18, 1997, the Ouanos
instituted a complaint before the Cebu City RTC against the
Republic and the MCIAA for reconveyance.
Answering, the Republic and MCIAA averred that the
Ouanos no longer have enforceable rights whatsoever over
Page 160 of 190
the condemned Lot No. 763-A, the decision in Civil Case No.
R-1881 not having found any reversionary condition.
ISSUE: Whether or not former owners of lots acquired for the
expansion of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City have the right to
repurchase or secure reconveyance of their respective
properties.
HELD: Yes. Providing added support to the Ouanos and the
Inocians right to repurchase is what in Heirs of Moreno was
referred to as constructive trust, one that is akin to the
implied trust expressed in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code, the
purpose of which is to prevent unjust enrichment. In the case
at bench, the Ouanos and the Inocians parted with their
respective lots in favor of the MCIAA, the latter obliging itself
to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport; failing
to keep its end of the bargain, MCIAA can be compelled by
the former landowners to reconvey the parcels of land to
them, otherwise, they would be denied the use of their
properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived nor
contemplated when the expropriation was authorized. In
effect, the government merely held the properties
condemned in trust until the proposed public use or purpose
for which the lots were condemned was actually
consummated by the government. Since the government
failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the
transfer of the property, then the lot owners Ouanos and
Inocians can demand the reconveyance of their old
properties after the payment of the condemnation
price.Constructive trusts are fictions of equity that courts
Respondents demanded hat NAPOCOR pay damages use
as devices to remedy any situation in which the holder of the
legal title, MCIAA in this case, may not, in good conscience,
retain the beneficial interest. We add, however, as in Heirs of
Moreno, that the party seeking the aid of equity the
landowners in this instance, in establishing the trust must
himself do equity in a manner as the court may deem just
and reasonable.
Expropriation is forced private property taking, the landowner
being really without a ghost of a chance to defeat the case of
the expropriating agency. In other words, in expropriation,
the private owner is deprived of property against his will.
Withal, the mandatory requirement of due process ought to
be strictly followed, such that the state must show, at the
minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose to
take private property, the purpose to be specifically alleged
or least reasonably deducible from the complaint.

11. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. HEIRS OF
SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND COURT OF
APPEALS (G.R. No. 165354 ; January 12, 2015)
FACTS: In February 1993, NAPOCOR entered a property
located in Barangay San Isidro, Batangas City in order to
construct and maintain transmission lines for the 230 KV
Mahabang Parang-Pinamucan Power Transmission Project.
Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the
property, with a total area of 14,257 square meters, which
was registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9696
of the Registry of Deeds of Batangas.
On May 26, 1995, NAPOCOR filed a complaint for
expropriation in the Regional Trial Court in Batangas City
(RTC), seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way
over a portion of the property involving an area of only 6,326
square meters, more or less, alleging that it had negotiated
with the respondents for the acquisition of the easement but
they had failed to reach any agreement; and that,
nonetheless, it was willing to deposit the amount of
₱9,790.00 representing the assessed value of the portion
sought to be expropriated. It prayed for the issuance of a writ
of possession upon deposit to enable it to enter and take
possession and control of the affected portion of the
property; to demolish all improvements existing thereon; and
to commence construction of the transmission line project.
In their answer with motion to dismiss, the respondents
staunchly maintained that NAPOCOR had not negotiated
with them before entering the property and that the entry was
done without their consent in the process, destroying some
fruit trees without payment, and installing five transmission
line posts and five woodpoles for its project; that the area
being expropriated only covered the portion directly affected
by the transmission lines; that the remaining portion of the
property was also affected because the transmission line
passed through the center of the land, thereby dividing the
land into three lots; that the presence of the high tension
transmission line had rendered the entire property inutile for
any future use and capabilities; that, nonetheless, they
tendered no objection to NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would
pay just compensation not only for the portion sought to be
expropriated but for the entire property whose potential was
Page 161 of 190
greatly diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project; and
that their property was classified as industrial land.
In the judgment dated November 27, 2000, the RTC adopted
the recommendation contained in the joint report, and ruled
thusly:
The price to be paid for an expropriated land is its
value at the time of taking, which is the date when
the plaintiff actually entered the property or the date
of the filing of the complaint for expropriation. In this
case, there is no evidence as to when the plaintiff
actually entered the property in question, so the
reference point should be the date of filing of the
complaint, which is May 5, 1995.
Accordingly, the RTC ordered NAPOCOR to pay the
respondents: (1) just compensation for the whole area of
14,257 square meters at the rate of ₱550.00/square meter;
(2) legal rate of interest from May 5, 1995 until full payment;
and (3) the costs of suit.
The CA made some modification on RTC’s ruling stating
that plaintiff-appellant shall pay only for the occupied 6,326
square meters of the subject real property at the rate of
₱550.00 per square meter and to pay legal interest therefrom
until fully paid.
On January 3, 2014, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and
Motion to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings, informing
that the parties failed to reach an amicable agreement; that
the property sought to be expropriated was no longer
necessary for public purpose because of the intervening
retirement of the transmission lines installed on the
respondents’ property; that because the public purpose for
which such property would be used thereby ceased to exist,
the proceedings for expropriation should no longer continue,
and the State was now duty-bound to return the property to
its owners; and that the dismissal or discontinuance of the
expropriation proceedings was in accordance with Section 4,
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Hence, NAPOCOR prayed
that the proceedings be discontinued "under such terms as
the court deems just and equitable," and that the
compensation to be awarded the respondents be reduced by
the equivalent of the benefit they received from the land
during the time of its occupation, for which purpose the case
could be remanded to the trial court for the determination of
reasonable compensation to be paid to them.
ISSUE: whether or not the expropriation proceedings should
be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal
HELD: The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at
the instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but, conformably with
Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal or
discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms
as the court deems just and equitable.
NAPOCOR entered the property without the owners’ consent
and without paying just compensation to the respondents.
Neither did it deposit any amount as required by law prior to
its entry. The Constitution is explicit in obliging the
Government and its entities to pay just compensation before
depriving any person of his or her property for public use.
Considering that in the process of installing transmission
lines, NAPOCOR destroyed some fruit trees and plants
without payment, and the installation of the transmission
lines went through the middle of the land as to divide the
property into three lots, thereby effectively rendering the
entire property inutile for any future use, it would be unfair for
NAPOCOR not to be made liable to the respondents for the
disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry until
the time of restoration of the possession of the property.
There should be no question about the taking. There is a
sufficient showing that NAPOCOR entered into and took
possession of the respondents’ property as early as in March
1993 without the benefit of first filing a petition for eminent
domain. For all intents and purposes, therefore, March 1993
is the reckoning point of NAPOCOR’s taking of the property,
instead of May 5, 1995, the time NAPOCOR filed the petition
for expropriation.

In the context of the State's inherent power of eminent

domain, there is a "taking" when the owner is actually
deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a
practical destruction or a material impairment of the value of
his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use
thereof. There is a "taking" in this sense when the
expropriator enters private property not only for a momentary
period but for a more permanent duration, for the purpose of
devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof. For ownership, after all, "is nothing without the
inherent rights of possession, control and enjoyment. Where
the owner is deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of 12. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES
his property or of its value by its being diverted to public use, RODOLFO ZABALA and LILIA BAYLON (G.R. No.
there is taking within the Constitutional sense." x x x. 173520; January 30, 2013)

In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the FACTS:

eventual return of the property to the respondents, there is
no need to pay "just compensation" to them because their
property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full
market value of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR should
compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their
property rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until the
time of restoration of the possession by paying to them
actual or other compensatory damages.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the
taking of private property, consequent to the Government’s
exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to
the condition that the property be devoted to the specific
public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this
particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all
pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former
owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the
property, subject to the return of the amount of just
compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the
power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of
the required factual justification. This should mean that the
compensation must be based on what they actually lost as a
result and by reason of their dispossession of the property
and of its use, including the value of the fruit trees, plants
and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR’s construction of the
transmission lines. Considering that the dismissal of the
expropriation proceedings is a development occurring during
the appeal, the Court now treats the dismissal of the
expropriation proceedings as producing the effect of
converting the case into an action for damages. For that
purpose, the Court remands the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings, with instruction to the court of origin to
enable the parties to fully litigate the action for damages by
giving them the opportunity to re-define the factual and legal
issues by the submission of the proper pleadings on the
extent of the taking, the value of the compensation to be paid
to the respondents by NAPOCOR, and other relevant
matters as they deem fit.
On October 27, 1994, plaintiff-appellant National Power
Corporation (Napocor) filed a complaint for Eminent Domain
against defendants-appellees Sps. R. Zabala & L. Baylon,
before the RTC, Balanga City, Bataan alleging that Spouses
Zabala and Baylon own parcels of land located in Balanga
City, Bataan and that it urgently needed an easement of right
of way over the affected areas for its 230 KV Limay-Hermosa
Transmission Lines. The Commissioners submitted their
Report/ Recommendation fixing the just compensation at
P150.00 per square meter. Napocor prayed that the report
be recommitted to the commissioners for the modification of
the report and the substantiation of the same with reliable
and competent documentary evidence based on the value of
the property at the time of its taking. The Commissioners
submitted their Final Report fixing the just compensation at
P500.00 per square meter.
On June 28, 2004, the RTC rendered its Partial Decision and
ordered Napocor to pay Php150.00 per square meter for the
6,820 square meters determined as of the date of the taking
of the property.
Napocor appealed to the CA arguing that the Commissioners
reports are not supported by documentary evidence.
Napocor argued that the RTC did not apply Section 3A of
R.A. No. 6395 which limits its liability to easement fee of not
more than 10% of the market value of the property traversed
by its transmission lines. CA affirmed the RTCs Partial
Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in fixing the amount of
Php150.00 per square meter as the fair market value of
the property subject of the easement right of way of
Napocor?
HELD:
The petition is partially meritorious. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: just compensation

Page 162 of 190

Sec. 3A of RA No. 6395 cannot restrict the constitutional
power of the courts to determine just compensation. The
payment of just compensation for private property taken for
public use is guaranteed no less by our Constitution and is
included in the Bill of Rights. As such, no legislative
enactments or executive issuances can prevent the courts
from determining whether the right of the property owners to
just compensation has been violated. It is a judicial function
that cannot be usurped by any other branch or official of the
government. Statutes and executive issuances fixing or
providing for the method of computing just compensation are
not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere
guidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof.
The Supreme Court has held in a long line of cases that
since the high- tension electric current passing through the
transmission lines will perpetually deprive the property
owners of the normal use of their land, it is only just and
proper to require Napocor to recompense them for the full
market value of their property.
The just compensation of P150.00 per square meter as fixed
by the RTC is not supported by evidence. Just compensation
cannot be arrived at arbitrarily. Several factors must be
considered, such as, but not limited to, acquisition cost,
current market value of like properties, tax value of the
condemned property, its size, shape, and location. But
before these factors can be considered and given weight, the
same must be supported by documentary evidence.
Under Section 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the trial court
may accept or reject, whether in whole or in part, the
commissioners report which is merely advisory and
recommendatory in character. It may also recommit the
report or set aside the same and appoint new
commissioners. In this case, however, in spite of the
insufficient and flawed reports of the Commissioners and
Napocors objections thereto, the RTC eventually adopted the
same. It shrugged off Napocors protestations and limited
itself to the reports submitted by the Commissioners.
Lastly, it should be borne in mind that just compensation
should be computed based on the fair value of the subject
property at the time of its taking or the filing of the complaint,
whichever came first. Since in this case the filing of the
eminent domain case came ahead of the taking, just
compensation should be based on the fair market value of
spouses Zabalas property at the time of the filing of
Napocors Complaint on October 27, 1994 or thereabouts.
Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Case is REMANDED
to the RTC for the proper determination of just
compensation.
Page 163 of 190
13. Cabahug v. National Power Corporation (698 SCRA
666), GR No. 186069, Jan 30, 2013
Facts:
Spouses Cabahug are the owners of two parcels of land in
Leyte. They were among the defendants in a Special Civil
Action suit for expropriation earlier filed by NPC before the
RTC.
The suit was later dismissed when NPC opted to settle with
the landowners by paying an easement fee equivalent to
10% of value of their property in Accordance with RA 6395,
“An Act Revising the Charter of the NPC”.
Leyte Provincial Appraisal Committee fixed the valuation of
the affected properties at P45.00 per square meter. Jesus
Cabahug executed two documents denominated as Right of
Way Grant in favor of NPC. For and in consideration of the
easement fees Jesus Cabahug also granted NPC a
continuous easement of right of way for the latter’s
transmissions lines and their appurtenances.
Jesus Cabahug agreed not to construct any building or
structure whatsoever, nor plant in any area within the Right
of Way that will adversely affect or obstruct the transmission
line of NPC, except agricultural crops, the growth of which
will not exceed three meters high.
Jesus Cabahug reserved the option to seek additional
compensation for easement fee, based on the Supreme
Court’s 18 January 1991 Decision.
Spouses Cabahug filed the complaint for the payment of just
compensation, damages, and attorney’s fees against NPC,
claiming to have been totally deprived of the use of the
portions of land covered by their TCTs.
NPC’s answer: they already paid full easement fee
RTC ruled for the Spouses Cabahug. NPC’s easement of
right of way which indefinitely deprives the owner of their
propriety rights over their property falls within the purview of
the power of eminent domain.
CA: reversed and set aside the RTC decision finding that the
RA 6395 only allows NPC to acquire an easement right of
way over properties traversed by its transmission lines. MR
denied for lack of merit.
Issue 1:
Whether or not CA reversibly erred in sustaining NPC’s
reliance on Section 3-A of RA 6395 which states that only
10% of the market value of the property is due to the owner
of the property subject to an easement of right of way. (YES)
Held 1:
Since said easement falls within the purview of the power of
eminent domain, NPC’s utilization of said provision has been
repeatedly struck down by this Court in a number of cases.
The determination of just compensation in eminent domain
proceedings is a judicial function and no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall
prevail over the court’s findings. Any valuation for just
compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a
guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own
judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to
arrive at such amount. Hence, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395,
as amended, is not binding upon this Court.
Issue 2:
Whether or not NPC may still be held liable to pay for the full
market value of the affected property despite the fact transfer
of title thereto was not required by the easement.
Held 2:
The power of Eminent Domain may be exercised although
title is not transferred to the expropriator in easement of right
of way. Just compensation which should be neither more nor
less than the money equivalent of the property is, moreover,
due where the nature and effect of the easement is to
impose limitations against the use of the land for an indefinite
period and deprive the landowner if ordinary use.
The owner should be compensated for the monetary
equivalent of the land if the easement is intended to
perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary
rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the
ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of the property or
through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with
the exercise of the attributes of ownership, or when the
introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature,
create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or
destruction of life and property found on the land is
necessary.
DISPOSITIVE: petition is GRANTED and the CA’s assailed
Decision and Resolution are, accordingly, REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
Page 164 of 190
14. National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, G.R. No.
168732. June 29, 2007
DOCTRINE: In determining the just compensation, the
valuation of the property should be based on the value on
the date when the landowners discovered the presence of
the huge underground tunnels beneath their lands, not the
value on the date on which the latter constructed the tunnels.
Facts:
Respondent Lucman G. Ibrahim, in his personal capacity and
in behalf of his co-heirs instituted an action against petitioner
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for recovery of
possession of land and damages before the RTC of Lanao
del Sur.
Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they were owners of
several parcels of land described in Survey Plan FP (VII-5)
2278 consisting of 70,000 square meters, divided into three
(3) lots, i.e. Lots 1, 2, and 3 consisting of 31,894, 14,915,
and 23,191 square meters each respectively. NAPOCOR,
through alleged stealth and without respondents’ knowledge
and prior consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area of
their lands and constructed therein underground tunnels. The
existence of the tunnels was only discovered sometime in
July 1992 by respondents and then later confirmed on
November 13, 1992 by NAPOCOR itself through a
memorandum issued by the latter’s Acting Assistant Project
Manager. The tunnels were apparently being used by
NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the
operation of NAPOCOR’s Agus II, III, IV, V, VI, VII projects
located in Saguiran, Lanao del Sur; Nangca and Balo-i in
Lanao del Norte; and Ditucalan and Fuentes in Iligan City.
Respondents demanded that NAPOCOR pay damages and
vacate the sub-terrain portion of their lands but the latter
refused to vacate much less pay damages. Respondents
further averred that the construction of the underground
tunnels has endangered their lives and properties as Marawi
City lies in an area of local volcanic and tectonic activity.
This case revolves around the propriety of paying just
compensation to respondents, and, by extension, the basis
for computing the same.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents are entitled to just compensation
hinges upon who owns the sub-terrain area occupied by
Petitioner.
Held:
The Court sustains the finding of the lower courts that the
sub-terrain portion of the property similarly belongs to
respondents.
Thus, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as
to the subsoil under it. This principle was applied to show
that rights over lands are indivisible and, consequently,
require a definitive and categorical classification.
Registered landowners may even be ousted of ownership
and possession of their properties in the event the latter are
reclassified as mineral lands because real properties are
characteristically indivisible. For the loss sustained by such
owners, they are entitled to just compensation under the
Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.
Moreover, petitioner’s argument that the landowners’ right
extends to the sub-soil insofar as necessary for their
practical interests serves only to further weaken its case. The
theory would limit the right to the sub-soil upon the economic
utility, which such area offers to the surface owners.
Presumably, the landowners’ right extends to such height or
depth where it is possible for them to obtain some benefit or
enjoyment, and it is extinguished beyond such limit as there
would be no more interest protected by law.
The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents’
use of the property for an indefinite period and deprive them
of its ordinary use. Based upon the foregoing, respondents
are clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation.
The entitlement of respondents to just compensation having
been settled, the issue now is on the manner of computing
the same.
The general rule in determining “just compensation” in
eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of
the filing of the complaint.
The general rule, however, admits of an exception: where
this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was
taken and not the date of the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings.
The exception finds the application where the owner would
be given undue incremental advantages arising from the use
to which the government devotes the property expropriated.
In the present case, to allow petitioner to use the date it
constructed the tunnels as the date of valuation would be
grossly unfair. First, it did not enter the land under warrant or
color of legal authority or with intent to expropriate the same.
In fact, it did not bother to notify the owners and wrongly
assumed it had the right to dig those tunnels under their
property. Secondly, the “improvements” introduced by
petitioner, namely, the tunnels, in no way contributed to an
increase in the value of the land. The trial court, therefore,
as affirmed by the CA, rightly computed the valuation of the
property as of 1992, when respondents discovered the
construction of the huge underground tunnels beneath their
lands and petitioner confirmed the same and started
negotiations for their purchase but no agreement could be
reached.
Page 165 of 190
15. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of
Macabangkit Sangkay, G.R. No. 165828. August 24,
2011.
DOCTRINE: The Court of Appeals’ restrictive construal of
Section 3(i) of R.A. No. 6395 as exclusive of tunnels was
obviously unwarranted, for the provision applies not only to
development works easily discoverable or on the surface of
the earth but also to subterranean works like tunnels—when
the law does not distinguish, so must we not, and when the
language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and
expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that
meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that
the Congress intended to convey.
The prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i)
of Republic Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an action for
damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just
compensation.
Facts:
Pursuant to its legal mandate under Republic Act
No. 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the National
Power Corporation), NPC undertook the Agus River
Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the 1970s to generate
electricity for Mindanao. The project included the
construction of several underground tunnels to be used in
diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the
hydroelectric plants.
The respondents (Heirs of Macabangkit), as the
owners of land with an area of 221,573 square meters
situated in Ditucalan, Iligan City, sued NPC in the RTC for
the recovery of damages and of the property, with the
alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation.
They alleged that they had belatedly discovered that one of
the underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow
of the Agus River for the operation of the Hydroelectric
Project in Agus V, Agus VI and Agus VII traversed their land;
that their discovery had occurred in 1995 after Atty. Saidali
C. Gandamra, had rejected their offer to sell the land
because of the danger the underground tunnel might pose to
the proposed Arabic Language Training Center and Muslims
Skills Development Center; that such rejection had been
followed by the withdrawal by Global Asia Management and
Resource Corporation from developing the land into a
housing project for the same reason; that Al-Amanah Islamic
Investment Bank of the Philippines had also refused to
accept their land as collateral because of the presence of
the underground tunnel; that the underground tunnel had
been constructed without their knowledge and consent; that
the presence of the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural,
commercial, industrial and residential value of their land; and
that their land had also become an unsafe place for
habitation because of the loud sound of the water rushing
through the tunnel and the constant shaking of the ground,
forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer grounds.
NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had
no right to compensation under section 3(f) of Republic Act
No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land
was established; that their cause of action, should they be
entitled to compensation, already prescribed due to the
tunnel having been constructed in 1979; and that by reason
of the tunnel being an apparent and continuous easement,
any action arising from such easement prescribed in five
years.
Issue:
Whether the Heirs of Macabangkit’s right to claim
just compensation had prescribed under section 3(i) of
Republic Act No. 6395, or, alternatively, under Article 620
and Article 646 of the Civil Code.
Held:
 The Court upholds the liability of NPC for payment
of just compensation.
Five-year prescriptive period under Section 3(i) of Republic
Act No. 6395 does not apply to claims for just compensation.
A cursory reading shows that Section 3(i) covers
the construction of “works across, or otherwise, any stream,
watercourse, canal, ditch, flume, street, avenue, highway or
railway of private and public ownership, as the location of
said works may require.” It is notable that Section 3(i)
includes no limitation except those enumerated after the
term works. Accordingly, we consider the term works as
embracing all kinds of constructions, facilities, and other
developments that can enable or help NPC to meet its
objectives of developing hydraulic power expressly provided
under paragraph (g) of Section 3. The CA’s restrictive
construal of Section 3(i) as exclusive of tunnels was
obviously unwarranted, for the provision applies not only to
development works easily discoverable or on the surface of
the earth but also to subterranean works like tunnels. Such
interpretation accords with the fundamental guideline in
statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, so must we not. Moreover, when the language
of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and
expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that
meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that
the Congress intended to convey.
We rule that the prescriptive period provided under
Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an
action for damages, and does not extend to an action to
recover just compensation like this case. Consequently,
NPC cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of
Macabangkit to recover just compensation for their land.
Page 166 of 190
16. National Power Corporation vs. Tarcelo, G.R. No.
198139. September 8, 2014.
DOCTRINE: Execution must therefore conform to that
ordained or decreed in the dispositive part of the decision.
Facts:
Respondents Felicisimo Tarcelo (Tarcelo) and the heirs of
Comia Santos (Santos heirs) are the owners of two lots
measuring 4,404 and 2,611 square meters, respectively,
which are situated in Brgy. Tabangao-Ambulong, Batangas
City.
Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) filed Civil Case
No. 5785 with the Batangas City RTC, seeking to
expropriate portions of Tarcelo and the Santos heirs’ lots to
the extent of 1,595.91 square meters which are affected by
the construction and maintenance of NPC’s 1,200 MW Ilijan
Natural Gas Pipeline Project. In other words, NPC’s natural
gas pipeline shall traverse respondents’ lands to such
extent.
The Decision of the appellate court which defendants-
appellees are entitled for just compensation to the full market
value of their property not just ten percent (10%) of it, and
just compensation was fixed at P1,000.00 per square meter
only for the affected area of 1,591.91 square meters, and not
for the whole of respondents’ respective lots became final
and executory, and entry of judgment was done accordingly.
Respondents moved for execution.
A Notice of Garnishment was served on the Manager of the
Land Bank of the Philippines, NPC Branch, Quezon City for
the satisfaction of the amount of P5,594,462.50 representing
just compensation for the whole of respondents’ 4,404- and
2,611-square meter lots — or 7,015 square meters — and
not merely the supposedly affected portions thereof totaling
1,595.91 square meters as NPC originally sought to acquire.
NPC filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion seeking to quash the
Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents are entitled for just
compensation for the whole lots and not only the affected
portions thereof.
Held:
The Court held that the respondents are entitled to just
compensation for the affected portions of their land only.
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly
by the State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in
derogation of private rights. It is one of the harshest
proceedings known to the law. x x x The authority to
condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and
against the condemnor. When the power is granted, the
extent to which it may be exercised is limited to the express
terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant is
contained.
Corollarily, it has been held that trial courts should exercise
care and circumspection in the resolution of just
compensation cases, considering that they involve the
expenditure of public funds.
The Commissioners’ Reports in Civil Case No. 5785 indicate
that only the affected areas were intended to be acquired
and compensated.
It has always been the rule that “the only portion of the
decision that may be the subject of execution is that which is
ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion. Whatever
may be found in the body of the decision can only be
considered as part of the reasons or conclusions of the court
and serve only as guides to determine the ratio decidendi.”
“Where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion of
the decision and the body thereof, the dispositive portion
controls irrespective of what appears in the body of the
decision. While the body of the decision, order or resolution
might create some ambiguity in the manner of the court’s
reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof
that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for
the exercise of those rights, and imposes corresponding
duties or obligation.” Thus, with the decretal portion of the
trial court’s November 7, 2005 Decision particularly stating
that NPC shall have the lawful right to enter, take
possession and acquire easement of right-of-way over the
affected portions of respondents’ properties upon the
payment of just compensation, any order executing the trial
court’s Decision should be based on such dispositive
portion. “An order of execution is based on the disposition,
not on the body, of the decision.”
Execution must therefore conform to that ordained or
decreed in the dispositive part of the decision. Since there is
a disparity between the dispositive portion of the trial court’s
November 7, 2005 Decision as affirmed with modification by
the final and executory June 26, 2007 Decision of the CA in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 86712 — which decreed that respondents
be paid just compensation only for the affected portions of
their properties, totaling 1,595.91 square meters — and the
Notice of Garnishment — for the satisfaction of the amount
of P5,594,462.50 representing just compensation for the
whole 7,015 square meters — the latter must be declared
null and void. It is a settled general principle that a writ of
execution must conform substantially to every essential
particular of the judgment promulgated. Execution not in
harmony with the judgment is bereft of validity. It must
conform, more particularly, to that ordained or decreed in the
dispositive portion of the decision.
Page 167 of 190
L. CONTRACT CLAUSE
1. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO. VS. WMC
RESOURCES INT’L G.R. NO. 162331 NOVEMBER 20,
2006 J. CHICO-NAZARIO
FACTS: On 22 March 1995, the Philippine Government and
WMC Philippines executed a Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement, denominated as the Columbio FTAA
for the purpose of large scale exploration, development, and
commercial exploration of possible mineral resources in
accordance with EO 279 and DAO No. 63, Series of 1991.
The Columbio FTAA is covered in part by 156 mining claims
held under various Mineral Production Sharing Agreements
(MPSA) by Southcot Mining Corporation, Tampakan Mining
Corporation, and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (collectively called
the Tampakan Companies), in accordance with the
Tampakan Option Agreement. The Option Agreement
provides for the grant of the right of first refusal to the
Tampakan Companies in case WMC Philippines desires to
dispose of its rights and interests in the mining claims
covering the area subject of the agreement.
WMC Resources subsequently divested itself of its rights
and interests in the Columbio FTAA, executed a Sale and
Purchase Agreement with Lepanto over its entire
shareholdings in WMC Philippines, subject to the exercise of
the Tampakan Companies’ right of first refusal to purchase
the subject shares. Lepanto sought the approval of the Sale
and Purchase Agreement from the DENR Secretary.
The Tampakan Companies sought to exercise its right of
first refusal. Thus, Lepanto assailed the Tampakan
Companies’ exercise of its right of first refusal, alleging that
the Tampakan
Companies failed to match the terms and conditions set
forth in the Sale and Purchase Agreement.
Lepanto filed a case for Injunction, Specific Performance,
Annulment of Contracts and Contractual Interference with
the RTC against WMC Philippines and the Tampakan
Companies. Respondents moved for the dismissal of said
case, but was denied.
In the interim, contending that the Sale and Purchase
Agreement between Lepanto and WMC Philippines had
expired due to failure to meet the necessary preconditions
for its validity, WMC and the Tampakan Companies
executed another Sale and Purchase Agreement, where
Sagittarius Mines, Inc. was designated assignee and
corporate vehicle which would acquire the shareholdings
and undertake the Columbio FTAA activities.
After due consideration and evaluation of the financial and
technical qualifications of Sagittarius Mines, Inc., the DENR
Secretary approved the transfer of the Columbio FTAA from
WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines, Inc.
Aggrieved by the transfer of the Columbio FTAA in favor of
Sagittarius Mines, Inc., Lepanto filed a Petition for Review of
the Order of the DENR Secretary with the OP. The OP
dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: WoN Sec. 40 of RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995 which took effect on 14 April 1995, requiring the
approval of the President of the assignment or transfer of
FTTAs, is applicable as contended by Lepanto.
HELD: No. The Columbio FTAA was entered into by the
Philippine Government and WMC Philippines on 22 March
1995, undoubtedly before the Philippine Mining Act of 1995
took effect on 14 April 1995.
Furthermore, it is undisputed that said FTAA was granted in
accordance with EO 279 and DAO No. 63, Series of 1991,
which does not contain any similar condition on the transfer
or assignment of FTTAs.
There is also an absence of either an express declaration or
an implication in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 that the
provisions of said law shall be made to apply retroactively,
therefore, any section of said law must be made to apply
only prospectively, in view of the rule that a statute ought not
to receive a construction making it act retroactively, unless
the words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no
other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the
intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied.
Assuming for the sake of argument that We are to apply the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 retrospectively to the
Columbio FTAA, the lack of presidential approval will not be
fatal as to render the transfer illegal, especially since the
alleged lack of presidential approval has been remedied
when Lepanto appealed the matter to the OP which
approved the Order of the DENR Secretary granting the
application for transfer of the Columbio FTAA to Sagittarius
Mines, Inc.
Furthermore, if Lepanto was indeed of the mind that Section
40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is applicable to the
Columbio FTAA, thus necessitating the approval of the
President for the validity of its transfer or assignment, it
would seem contradictory that Lepanto sought the approval
of the DENR Secretary, and not that of the President, of its
Sale and Purchase Agreement with WMC Resources.
Hence, it may be glimpsed from the very act of Lepanto that
it recognized that the provision of the Columbio FTAA
regarding the consent of the DENR Secretary with respect to
the transfer of said FTAA must be upheld.
The constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the
obligation of contract does not prohibit every change in
existing laws, and to fall within the prohibition, the change
must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract,
but the impairment must be substantial. Substantial
impairment as conceived in relation to impairment of
contracts has been explained in the case of Clemons v.
Nolting, which stated that: a law which changes the terms of
a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode
of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses
with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction
something different from that provided in its terms, is law
which impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore
null and void. Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995
requiring the approval of the President with respect to
assignment or transfer of FTAAs, if made applicable
retroactively to the Columbio FTAA, would be tantamount to
an impairment of the obligations under said contract as it
would effectively restrict the right of the parties thereto to
assign or transfer their interests in the said FTAA.
By imposing a new condition apart from those already
contained in the agreement, before the parties to the
Columbio FTAA may assign or transfer its rights and interest
in the said agreement, Section 40 of the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995, if made to apply to the Columbio FTAA, will
effectively modify the terms of the original contract and thus
impair the obligations of the parties thereto and restrict the
exercise of their vested rights under the original agreement.
Such modification to the Columbio FTAA, particularly in the
conditions imposed for its valid transfer is equivalent to an
impairment of said contract violative of the Constitution.
Page 168 of 190
M. FREE ACCESS TO COURTS
1. RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE
EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND FILING FEES OF THE
GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC.
(Dahil taga Baguio ako, alam ko to. Hahaha. Yung Good
Shepherd kasi sa Baguio ung gumagawa ng Ubeng Halaya,
peanut brittle etc. Ung workers nila indigent in a way. So pag
nagwork ka dun ung tipong taga-pack ka or parang factory
worker, pagaaralin ka ng Good Shepherd. Yung funds ng
scholars nila nakukuha sa profits nung pagbenta ng Good
Shepherd)
Can the Courts grant to our Foundation who works for
indigent and underprivileged people, the same option
granted to indigent people?
To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Courts cannot
grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation,
Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted
to indigent litigants even if the foundations are working for
indigent and underprivileged people.
The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the
free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987
Constitution, thus:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi
judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
The importance of the right to free access to the courts and
quasi judicial bodies and to adequate legal assistance
cannot be denied. A move to remove the provision on free
access from the Constitution on the ground that it was
already covered by the equal protection clause was defeated
by the desire to give constitutional stature to such specific
protection of the poor.
The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted
provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that only a natural
party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The
Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation
invested by the State with a juridical personality separate
and distinct from that of its members,[4] is a juridical person.
Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess
property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring
civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and
regulations of their organization.[5] As a juridical person,
therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal
and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.
That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for
indigent and underprivileged people is of no moment.
Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free
access clause on a persons poverty, a condition that only a
natural person can suffer.
There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the
request for exemption in favor of a juridical person. For one,
extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground
that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be
prone to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid
documentation requirements), particularly by corporations
and entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of
the fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance with the
documentation requirements may prove too time-consuming
and wasteful for the courts.
1. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)
Facts:
During questioning about a robbery he was connected to,
Charles Dickerson made statements to authorities admitting
that he was the getaway driver in a series of bank robberies.
Dickerson was then placed under arrest. The timing of his
statement is disputed. The FBI and local detectives testified
that Dickerson was advised of his Miranda rights,
established in Miranda v. Arizona, and waived them before
he made his statement. Dickerson said he was not read his
Miranda warnings until after he gave his statement. After his
indictment for bank robbery, Dickerson filed a motion to
suppress the statement that he made on the ground that he
had not received Miranda warnings before being
interrogated. The government argued that even if the
Miranda warnings were not read, the statement was
voluntary and therefore admissible under 18 USC Section
3501, which provides that “a confession shall be admissible
in evidence if it is voluntarily given.” The District Court
granted Dickerson’s motion, finding that he had not been
read his Miranda rights or signed a waiver until after he
made his statement, but the Court did not address section
3501. In reversing, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that
Dickerson had not received Miranda warnings, but held that
section 3501 was satisfied because his statement was
voluntary. The Court held that “Congress enacted section
3501 with the express purpose of legislatively overruling
Miranda and restoring voluntariness as the test for admitting
confessions in federal court.”
Issue:
Whether or not the Congress may legislatively overrule
Miranda vs. Arizona and its warnings that govern the
admissibility of statements made during custodial
investigation.
Held:
NO. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Miranda governs
the admissibility of statements made during custodial
interrogation in both state and federal courts. “Miranda has
become embedded in routine police practice to the point
where the warnings have become part of our national
culture,” wrote Rehnquist. “Miranda announced a
constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede
legislatively. We decline to overrule Miranda ourselves.”
Dissenting, Justice Antolin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence
Thomas, blasted the Court’s
Page 169 of 190
2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- appellee, vs.
DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN ARNALDO y AVENA
and JOSELITO FLORES y VICTORIO, accused-
appellants. G.R. No. 178300. March 17, 2009.
Facts:
DOCTRINE: Right to Counsel; The mantle of protection
afforded by Art. III, Sec. 12 of the 1987 Constitution covers
the period from the time a person is taken into custody for
the investigation of his possible participation in the
commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as
a suspect in the commission of the offense although not yet
in custody.
The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an
accused from saying anything which might incriminate him,
but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude
the slightest coercion on the accused to admit something
false—the counsel should never prevent an accused from
freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
Facts:
An Information was filed before the RTC charging appellants
with the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom
with homicide. During their arraignment, appellants, assisted
by a counsel de oficio, pleaded “Not guilty” to the charge.
Trial on the merits thereafter followed. Appellants, however,
challenge the legality and admissibility of the written
extrajudicial confessions. Appellants claim that their alleged
participation in the kidnapping of the Yao family was based
solely on the written extrajudicial confessions of appellants
Arnaldo and Flores. They maintain, however, that said
extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence,
because they were obtained in violation of his co-appellants’
constitutional right to have an independent counsel of their
own choice during custodial investigation.
BACKGROUND: The Yao family owns and operates a
poultry farm in Barangay Santo Cristo, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan. On 16 July 1999, at about 11:00 p.m., the Yao
family, on board a Mazda MVP van, arrived at their poultry
farm in Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
Yao San alighted from the van to open the gate of the farm,
appellant Reyes and a certain Juanito Pataray (Pataray)
approached, poked their guns at Yao San, and dragged him
inside the van. Appellant Reyes and Pataray also boarded
the van. Thereupon, appellants Arnaldo and Flores, with two
male companions, all armed with guns, arrived and
immediately boarded the van. Appellant Flores took the
driver’s seat and drove the van. Appellants Reyes and
Arnaldo and their cohorts then blindfolded each member of
the Yao family inside the van with packaging tape.
Appellant Flores and his male companion told Yao San to
produce the amount of five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) as
ransom in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim,
Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Thereafter, appellant
Flores and his male companion left the van and fled; while
Yao San, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and Josephine
remained inside the van. Upon sensing that the kidnappers
had already left, Yao San drove the van towards the poultry
farm and sought the help of relatives. Meanwhile, Chua Ong
Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan were taken on
foot by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one male
companion to a safe-house situated in the mountainous part
of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan where they spent the whole
night.
On the morning of 19 July 1999, appellants again called Yao
San via a cellular phone and threatened to kill Chua Ong
Ping Sim and Raymond because of newspaper and radio
reports regarding the incident. Yao San clarified to
appellants that he did not report the incident to the police
and also pleaded with them to spare the life of Chua Ong
Ping Sim and Raymond. Appellants then instructed Yao San
to appear and bring with him the ransom of P5 million at
3:00 p.m. in the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview,
Quezon City. Yao San arrived at the designated place of the
pay-off at 4:00 p.m., but none of the appellants or their
cohorts showed up. Yao San waited for appellant’s call, but
none came. Thus, Yao San left. The corpses of Chua Ong
Ping Sim and Raymond were found at the La Mesa Dam.
Novaliches, Quezon City. Both died of asphyxia by
strangulation. On 26 July 1999, appellant Arnaldo
surrendered.
Issue:
NO. The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is
intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the
accused to admit something false. The right to counsel
attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information and/or confessions or admissions from the
accused. The lawyer called to be present during such
investigation should be, as far as reasonably possible, the
choice of the accused. If the lawyer is one furnished in
behalf of accused, he should be competent and
independent; that is, he must be willing to fully safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused. A competent and
independent counsel is logically required to be present and
able to advice and assist his client from the time the latter
answers the first question asked by the investigator until the
signing of the confession. Moreover, the lawyer should
ascertain that the confession was made voluntarily, and that
the person under investigation fully understood the nature
and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession vis-a-vis
his constitutional rights.
However, the foregoing rule is not intended to deter
to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntarily and
intelligently so desires, but to protect him from admitting
what he is being coerced to admit although untrue. To be an
effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the
questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a
lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying
anything which might incriminate him; but, rather, it was
adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion
on the accused to admit something false. The counsel
should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily
telling the truth.
We have gone over the records and found that the PAOCTF
investigators have duly apprised appellants Arnaldo and
Flores of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel of their own
choice during their respective custodial investigations.
In the case at bar, appellants Arnaldo and Flores failed to
discharge their burden of proving that they were forced or
coerced to make their respective confessions. Other than
their self-serving statements that they were maltreated by
the PAOCTF officers/agents, they did not present any
plausible proof to substantiate their claims. They did not
submit any medical report showing that their bodies were
subjected to violence or torture. Neither did they file
complaints against the persons who had allegedly beaten or
forced them to execute their respective confessions despite
several opportunities to do so. Appellants Arnaldo and
Flores averred that they informed their family
members/relatives of the alleged maltreatment, but the
latter did not report such allegations to proper authorities.
Page 170 of 190
3. PEOPLE vs. CHAVEZ, G.R. No. 207950, September 22,
2014.
Facts:
When Peñamante (witness) arrived home from work, around
2:45am, he saw a person wearing a black, long-sleeved shirt
and black pants and holding something while leaving the
house/parlor of Elmer Duque aka Barbie (victim).
There was a light at the left side of the house/parlor of
Barbie, his favorite haircutter, so Peñamante was able to
see the face of Chavez (accused).
The following day, Barbie was found dead, due to stab
wounds, in the parlor and the place was in disarray. In a
line-up to identify the person he saw leaving Barbie’s
house/parlor that early morning of October 28, 2006,
Peñamante immediately pointed to and identified Chavez
and thereafter executed his written statement.
Chavez was charged with robbery with homicide.
LC: Guilty as charged, based on circumstantial evidence.
CA: Affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Chavez is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery with homicide.
Held:
No. There was no robbery. “What is imperative and essential
for a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide is for
the prosecution to establish the offender’s intent to take
personal property before the killing, regardless of the time
when the homicide is actually carried out.” In cases when
the prosecution failed to conclusively prove that homicide
was committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, no
accused can be convicted of robbery with homicide.
The circumstantial evidence relied on by the lower courts do
not satisfactorily establish an original criminal design by
Chavez to commit robbery.
At most, the intent to take personal property was mentioned
by Chavez’s mother in her statement as follows: “Na sinabi
niya sa akin na wala siyang intensyon na patayin [sic] si
Barbie kundi ay pagnakawan lamang.” However, this
statement is considered as hearsay, with no evidentiary
value, since Chavez’s mother was never presented as a
witness during trial to testify on her statement.
An original criminal design to take personal property is also
inconsistent with the infliction of no less than 21 stab
wounds in various parts of Barbie’s body. The sheer number
of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie makes it difficult to
conclude an original criminal intent of merely taking Barbie’s
personal property.
Homicide – All these circumstances taken together establish
Chavez’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
homicide:
1. The alibi of Chavez still places him at the scene of the
crime that early morning of October 28, 2006. This court has
considered motive as one of the factors in determining the
presence of an intent to kill, and a confrontation with the
victim immediately prior to the victim’s death has been
considered as circumstantial evidence for homicide.
2. The number of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie
strengthens an intention to kill and ensures his death.
3. Peñamante’s positive identification of Chavez as the
person leaving Barbie’s house that early morning of October
28, 2006.
4. The medico-legal’s testimony establishing Barbie’s time
of death as 12 hours prior to autopsy at 1:00 p.m., thus,
narrowing the time of death to approximately 1:00 a.m. of
the same day, October 28, 2006.
DECISION. Judgment by lower court is MODIFIED. Chavez
is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the separate and
distinct crime of HOMICIDE.
Page 171 of 190
4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDNA
MALNGAN y MAYO, G.R. No. 170470. September
26,2006.
DOCTRINE: Rights of Suspects; Miranda Doctrine;
Extrajudicial Confessions; Requisites for Admissibility.—We
have held that the above quoted provision applies to the
stage of custodial investigation—when the investigation is
no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts
to focus on a particular person as a suspect. Said
constitutional guarantee has also been extended to
situations in which an individual has not been formally
arrested but has merely been “invited" for questioning. To
be admissible in evidence against an accused, the
extrajudicial confessions made must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made
with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
(3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
Facts:
An Information was filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch
41, charging accused-appellant with the crime of Arson with
Multiple Homicide. When arraigned, accused-appellant with
assistance of counsel de officio, pleaded “Not Guilty” to the
crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued. The RTC
considered accused-appellant to have waived her right to
present evidence, having filed the Demurrer to Evidence
without leave of court. Accused- appellant has not shown
any compelling reason why the witnesses presented would
openly, publicly and deliberately lie or concoct a story, to
send an innocent person to jail all the while knowing that the
real malefactor remains at large. Such proposition defies
logic. And where the defense failed to show any evil or
improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses,
the presumption is that their testimonies are true and thus
entitled to full faith and credence.
Accused-appellant questions the admissibility of her
uncounselled extrajudicial confession given to prosecution
witnesses, namely Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza,
and to the media. Accused-appellant Edna contends that
being uncounselled extrajudicial confession, her admissions
to having committed the crime charged should have been
excluded in evidence against her for being violative of Article
III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution.
BACKGROUND: From the personal account of Remigio
Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman in the area, as well as the
personal account of the pedicab driver named Rolando
Gruta, it was at around 4:45 a.m. on January 2, 2001 when
Remigio Bernardo and his tanods saw the accused-appellant
EDNA, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr.,
with her head turning in different directions, hurriedly leaving
the house of her employer at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut,
Tondo, Manila. She was seen to have boarded a pedicab
which was driven by a person later identified as Rolando
Gruta. She was heard by the pedicab driver to have
instructed that she be brought to Nipa Street, but upon her
arrival there, she changed her mind and asked that she be
brought instead to Balasan Street where she finally alighted,
after paying for her fare.
Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay
Chairman Bernardo’s group later discovered that a fire
gutted the house of the employer of the housemaid.
Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods responded to
the fire upon hearing shouts from the residents and
thereafter, firemen from the Fire District 1-NCR arrived at
the fire scene to contain the fire.
When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the
Barangay Hall, he received a report from pedicab driver
Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, that shortly before
the occurrence of the fire, he saw a woman (the housemaid)
coming out of the house at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut,
Tondo, Manila and he received a call from his wife telling killed the whole family of Roberto Separa, Sr. She was,
him of a woman (the same housemaid) who was acting therefore, already under custodial investigation and the
strangely and suspiciously on Balasan Street. Barangay rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of the
Chairman Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and the other tanods Constitution should have already been observed or applied
proceeded to Balasan Street and found the woman who was to her. Accused- appellant’s confession to Barangay
later identified as the accused- appellant. After Rolando Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the
Gruta positively identified the woman as the same person “interrogation” made by the latter —admittedly conducted
who left No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila, without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under
Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods apprehended the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this
her and brought her to the Barangay Hall for investigation. reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to
At the Barangay Hall, Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter
Roberto Separa, Sr. and whose house was also burned, found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence
identified the woman as accused-appellant EDNA who was against her as such were obtained in violation of her
the housemaid of Roberto Separa, Sr. Upon inspection, a constitutional rights.
disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant
EDNA’s bag. Thereafter, accused-appellant EDNA Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellant’s
confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo in the presence confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and
of multitudes of angry residents outside the Barangay Hall the lighter as evidence do not automatically lead to her
that she set her employer’s house on fire because she had acquittal. It should well be recalled that the constitutional
not been paid her salary for about a year and that she safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to
wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her those not elicited through questioning by the police or their
to just ride a broomstick in going home. agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the
accused verbally admits to having committed the offense as
Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over to arson what happened in the case at bar when accused-appellant
investigators headed by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of
brought her to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta. Cruz, Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started the fire in the
Manila where she was further investigated and then Separas’ house. The testimony of Mercedita Mendoza
detained.When Mercedita Mendoza went to the San Lazaro recounting said admission is, unfortunately for accused-
Fire Station to give her sworn statement, she had the appellant, admissible in evidence against her and is not
opportunity to ask accused-appellant EDNA at the latter’s covered by the aforesaid constitutional guarantee. Article III
detention cell why she did the burning of her employer’s of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the
house and accused-appellant EDNA replied that she set the relationship between the individual on one hand and the
house on fire because when she asked permission to go State (and its agents) on the other; it does not concern itself
home to her province, the wife of her employer Roberto with the relation between a private individual and another
Separa, Sr., named Virginia Separa shouted at her: “Sige private individual—as both accused-appellant and prose
umuwi ka, pagdating mo maputi ka na. Sumakay ka sa ution witness Mercedita Mendoza undoubtedly are. Here,
walis, pagdating mo maputi ka na” (“Go ahead, when you there is no evidence on record to show that said witness was
arrive your color would be fair already. Ride a broomstick, acting under police authority, so appropriately, accused-
when you arrive your color would be fair already.”) And appellant’s uncounselled extrajudicial confession to said
when Mercedita Mendoza asked accused-appellant EDNA witness was properly admitted by the RTC.
how she burned the house, accused-appellant EDNA told
her: “Naglukot ako ng maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng
disposable lighter at hinagis ko sa ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob
ng bahay” (“I crumpled newspapers, lighted them with a
disposable lighter and threw them on top of the table inside
the house.”)
When interviewed by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS-
CBN Network, accused-appellant
EDNA while under detention was heard by SFO4 Danilo
Talusan as having admitted the crime and even narrated the
manner how she accomplished it. SFO4 Danilo Talusan was
able to hear the same confession, this time at his home,
while watching the television program “True Crime” hosted
by Gus Abelgas also of ABS-CBN Network.
The fire resulted in [the] destruction of the house of Roberto
Separa, Sr. and other adjoining houses and the death of
Roberto Separa, Sr. and Virginia Separa together with their
four (4) children, namely: Michael, Daphne, Priscilla and
Roberto, Jr.”
Issue:
Whether or not the uncounselled extrajudicial confession
given to prosecution witnesses was admissible in evidence.
Held:
NO. Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay
Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III,
Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-
appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of
2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only
one, in the fire that destroyed several houses as well as

Page 172 of 190

5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- appellee, vs. NO. Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan,
ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO, accused- this Court needs to ascertain whether or not a “ bantay
appellant. G.R. No. 186228. March 15, 2010. bayan” may be deemed a law enforcement officer with in the
contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution. In
DOCTRINE: Bantay Bayan; Words and Phrases; A “bantay People of the Philippines v. Buendia, 382 SCRA 714 (2002),
bayan" is a group of male residents living in an area this Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a
organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their “bantay bayan,” that is, “a group of male residents living in
community. the area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their
Barangay-based volunteer organization in the nature of community, which is an accredited auxiliary of the x x x
watch groups, as in the case of the “bantay bayan," are PNP.” Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to
recognized by the local government unit to perform Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11
functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order
the barangay level; Any inquiry a bantay bayan makes has Committee in each barangay shall be organized “to serve as
the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order
the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights Council at the Barangay level.” The composition of the
provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong
otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned, and Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the
an extrajudicial confession taken from a suspect by such Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon
bantay bayan without a counsel is inadmissible in evidence. Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least
three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime
Facts: or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government
The appellant was accused of the crime of QUALIFIED Organization Representative well-known in his community.
RAPE. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty. This case is a The Court is convinced that barangay-based volunteer
review of a conviction for the rape of the accused’s 13 year nature of watch groups, as in the case of the “bantay
old daughter. bayan,” are recognized by the local government unit to
BACKGROUND: In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and
was left alone at home. AAA’s father, the appellant, as order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the
having a drinking spree at the neighbor’s place. Her mother legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the
decided to leave because when appellant get drunk, he has specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a
the habit of mauling AAA’s mother. Her only brother BBB “bantay bayan,” particularly on the authority to conduct a
also went out in the company of some neighbors. custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color
of a state-related function and objective insofar as the
At around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, appellant woke AAA entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided
up; removed his pants, slid inside the blanket co ering AAA for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise
and removed her pants and underwear; warned her not to known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. We, therefore,
shout for help while threatening her with his fist; and tol her find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was
that he had a knife placed above her head. He proceeded to taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and “inserted his penis
inside her vagina.”
Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying. Appellant
claimed he scolded her for staying out late. BBB decided to
take AAA with him. While on their way to their maternal
grandmother’s house, AAA ecounted her harrowing
experience with their father. Upon reaching their
grandmother’s house, they told their grandmother and uncle
of the incident, after which, they sought the assistance of
Moises Boy Banting.Moises Boy Banting found appellant in
his house wearing only his und rwear. He invited appellant to
the police station, to which appellant obliged. At the police
outpost, he admitted to him that he raped. AAA because he
was unable to control himself. The following day, AAA
submitted herself to physical examination.
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense.
He believed that the charge against him was ill-motivated
because he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front o
their children after engaging in a heated argu ent, and beats
the children as a disciplinary measure. He went further to
narrate how his day was on the date of the alleged rape.
Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3
o’clock in the afternoon. Finding nobody at home, he
prepared his dinner and went to sleep. Later in the evening,
he was awakened by the members of the “Bantay Bayan”
headed by Moises Boy Banting. They asked him to go with
them to discuss some matters. He later learned that he was
under detention because AAA charged him of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not the confession of the accused with a “bantay
bayan” is admissible in evidence.
Held:

Page 173 of 190

6. Miguel vs. People, 833 SCRA 139, 2017
FACTS:
An information was filed before the RTC charging Jeffrey
Miguel (petitioner) of illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
penalized under 9165 or the “Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002”
Prosecution alleged that (prosecution version of facts):
Around 12:45 am of May 24, 2010, a Bantay Bayan
operative of Brgy. San Antonio Village, Makati, named
Reynaldo Bahoyo was doing his rounds when he received a
report of a man showing off his private parts at Kaong Street!
Bahoyo and fellow Bantay Bayan operative Mark Velasquez
then went to said street and saw a visible intoxicated person,
which they later identified as petitioner, urinating and
displaying his private parts while standing in front of a gate
enclosing an empty lot
When they asked petitioner where he lived, the latter
answered “Kaong Street”
Bahoyo then said he lived on the same street but petitioner
looked unfamiliar to him, so he asked for an ID, but petitioner
failed to produce one
Velasquez repeated the for an ID, but instead, petitioner
emptied his pockets, revealing a pack of cigarettes
containing one stick and two pieces of rolled paper
containing dried marijuana leaves
This prompted the Bantay Bayans to seize the items, take
petitioner to the police station, and turn him, as well as the
items, over to SPO3 Rafael Castillo
SPO3 Castillo then inventoried the items, and prepared a
request for qualitative examination of the rolled paper and for
petitioner to undergo drug testing
Tests confirmed it was marijuana and that petitioner was
positive for the presence of Methamphetamine but negative
for THC-metabolites
Petitioner pleaded not guilty, and presented a different
version of facts (petitioner version of facts):
He was just urinating in from of his workplace when 2 Bantay
Bayan operatives approached him and asked him where he
lived
Upon responding that he lived in Kaong Street, they frisked
him, took away his belongings, and thereafter handcuffed
and brought him to the Brgy. Hall
He was detained for about an hour before being taken to the
Ospital ng Makati and to another office where a bald officer
questioned him
He was then taken back to the Brgy. Hall where they showed
him 2 sticks of marijuana joints allegedly recovered from him
RTC Ruling
RTC found petitioner guilty for the crime charged
They ruled that the Bahoyo and Velasques conducted a valid
warrantless arrest, as petitioner was scandalously showing
his private parts at the time of his arrest
Thus, the incidental search which yielded the seized
marijuana was also lawful
Petitioner appealed to the CA
CA Ruling
CA affirmed conviction
Page 174 of 190
It held that search made on petitioner was valid as it was
done incidental to his arrest for exhibiting his private parts on
public
As such, said marijuana is admissible in evidence and
sufficient to convict him for the crime charged
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence
the petition to the SC
Petitioner argues that the search and arrest was illegal and,
thus, the marijuana purportedly seized from him is
inadmissible in evidence
ISSUE:
Whether or not the there was a valid search incidental to a
lawful warrantless arrest
HELD:
NO
(First, the Court established that the Bill of Rights apply to
Bantay Bayan operatives)
The Bantay Bayan operatives are not government agents
like the PNP or the NBI in charge of law enforcement, but are
civilian volunteers who act as “force multipliers” to assist the
law enforcement agencies in maintaining peace and security.
The Bill of Rights generally cannot be invoked against the
acts of private individuals, however, they may be applicable if
such individuals act under the color of a state-related
function
In this case, the acts of the Bantay Bayan relating to the
preservation of peace and order in their respective areas
have the color of a state-related function. As such, the Bill of
Rights may be applied to the Bantay Bayan operatives who
arrested and subsequently searched petitioner.
(Next, the court determined that the arrest and search was
NOT validly made)
The Bill of Rights provides that evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding, being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. The law requires that
there first be a lawful arrest first before a search can be
made – this process cannot be reversed.
A lawful arrest may be made without a warrant, provided the
parameters defined in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure are complied with.
In Section 5(a), or in flagrante delicto arrests, 2 elements
must concur, namely:
a. The person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime
b. Such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer
Section 5(b), requires that at the time of the arrest, an
offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting
officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
accused had committed it
In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of
the fact of the commission of an offense is essential
On the basis of the testimonies, the Court is inclined to
believe that petitioner went out to the street to urinate (note
that there was no CR in his workplace) when the Bantay
Bayan operatives chanced upon him. That latter then
approached and questioned petitioner, and thereafter went
on to search his person, which purportedly yielded the
marijuana.
Verily, the prosecution’s claim that petitioner was showing off
his private parts was belied by the testimonies (important
note: the Bantay Bayans testified in the cross examination
that petitioner was showing off his private parts while
urinating and turning his back from them. How the hell can
you show off your private parts when you are turning your
back and urinating? lol)
Clearly, these circumstances do not justify the conduct
of an in flagrante delicto arrest, considering that there
was NO overt act constituting a crime committed by
petitioner in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer
Neither do these circumstances necessitate a “hot pursuit”
warrantless arrest as the arresting operatives do not have
any personal knowledge of facts that petitioner had just
committed an offense
Moreover, if the arrest was made because of the alleged
display of private parts, then the proper charge should have
been filed against him. However, records are bereft of any
showing that such charge was filed aside from the instant
criminal charge for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
This strengthens the view that no prior lawful arrest was
made which led to a valid search incidental thereto.
There must be a lawful arrest FIRST, before a search can be
made, the process cannot be reversed.
Page 175 of 190
7. People vs. Dacanay, 807 SCRA 130, 2016
Facts:
In 1985, petitioner was the vice-president of the National
Sugar Trading Corporation (NASUTRA). In 1986, a criminal
complaint for economic sabotage through smuggling, with
regard to the importation of raw sugar in 1983 and 1984 by
NASUTRA, was filed with the Tanodbayan against the
principal officers of the said corporation including petitioner.
On October 10, 1986, the Tanodbayan approved the
resolution of the team of Special Prosecutors who
investigated the case. It found sufficient prima
facie evidence against petitioner and his co-accused to
warrant the filing of an information with respondent
Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended. The corresponding information was
filed with the Sandiganbayan. On November 20, petitioner
filed a motion to quash but he later withdrew the same. On
October 14, 1988, a resolution was issued by Special
Prosecutors Margarito P. Gervacio and Robert E. Kallos,
recommending the dismissal of the complaint against
petitioner and his co-accused for lack of sufficient evidence
and the withdrawal of the information filed in court. The
resolution was approved by Acting Special Prosecutor Jose
Ferrer. On January 6, 1989, the resolution issued by
Prosecutors Gervacio and Kallos was reviewed by Special
Prosecutor Wilfredo Orencia, who recommended its
disapproval. The recommendation of Prosecutor Orencia
was approved by Acting Special Prosecutor Jose F.
Guerrero and by Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez. On
February 22, Jose Unson, a co-accused of petitioner, filed a
motion to quash the information in the Sandiganbayan. The
motion was adopted by petitioner. On December 12, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. Likewise, the
motion for reconsideration filed by Unson and adopted by
petitioner was denied.
On April 3, 1991 petitioner filed a motion for immediate and
separate trial invoking his constitutional right to a speedy
trial.
On April 23, respondent People of the Philippines opposed
the said motion on the ground that a separate trial for
petitioner would entail a lengthy and repetitious proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a separate trial.
Held:
Yes.
A separate trial necessarily requires a repetition of the
presentation of the same evidence. But the resulting in
convenience and expense on the part of the Government
cannot be given preference over the right to speedy trial and
the protection to a person's life, liberty or property accorded
by the Constitution. This is particularly true in the case of
petitioner where the prosecutors' opposition to the request
for separate trial was based on the ground that the principal
accused in the case, the former President of NASUTRA,
was abroad and was not yet arrested. If an accused cannot
be placed under arrest because he remains outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, with more reason
should his co-accused, who are under arrest, be entitled to a
separate trial.
A separate trial is in consonance with the right of an
accused to a speedy trial as guaranteed to him by the
1987 Constitution, more specifically under Section 14(2)
of Article III thereof. As defined in the case of Flores v.
People, 61 SCRA 331 (1974), a speedy trial is one
"conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and
the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays." The primordial purpose of this
constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of an
accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite
period of time. Likewise, it is intended to prevent delays in
the administration of justice by requiring judicial tribunals to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal
prosecutions.
WHEREFORE, respondents are ORDERED to proceed
with the trial of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 11957,
separately if it need be.
Page 176 of 190
O. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
LUZVIMINDA S. VALDEZ and THE SANDIGANBAYAN
(FIFTH DIVISION), respondents, G.R. Nos. 216007-09.
December 8, 2015.
DOCTRINE: Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification
of Official/Public Documents; Manalac, Jr. v. People, G.R.
Nos. 206194-206207, July 3, 2013, already resolved that an
accused charged with Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents where the amount
involved exceeds P22,000.00 is not entitled to bail as a
matter of right because it has an actual imposable penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Facts:
The case stemmed from the Joint Affidavit executed by
Sheila S. Velmonte-Portal and Mylene T. Romero, both
State Auditors of the Commission on Audit Region VI in
Pavia, Iloilo, who conducted a post- audit of the
disbursement vouchers (D.V.) of the Bacolod City
Government. Among the subjects thereof were the
reimbursements of expenses of private respondent
Luzviminda S. Valdez (Valdez), a former mayor of Bacolod
City.
Based on the verification conducted in the establishments
that issued the official receipts, it was alleged that the cash
slips were altered/falsified to enable Valdez to claim/receive
reimbursement from the Government the total amount of
P279,150.00 instead of only P4,843.25; thus, an aggregate
overclaim of P274,306.75.
Valdez was charged with eight cases four of which (SB - 14-
CRM-0317 to 0320) were for Violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, while the remaining half (SB-14-
CRM-0321 to 0324) were for the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents under Articles 217 and 171, in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to bail as a matter of
right.
Held:
No. The controversy is, in fact, not one of first impression.
Manalac, Jr. v. People already resolved that an accused
charged with Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification
of Official/Public Documents where the amount involved
exceeds P22,000.00 is not entitled to bail as a matter of right
because it has an actual imposable penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The Sandiganbayan thus gravely erred in setting aside the
“No Bail” recommendation of the Special Prosecutor and
fixing the amount of bail as prayed for by Valdez. It is settled
that the grant of bail to an accused charged with an offense
that carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
discretionary on the part of the trial court, i.e., accused is still
entitled to bail but no longer as a matter of right. Indeed, the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong is a matter of judicial discretion. This discretion, by
the nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the
evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. The
Prosecution must be given a chance to show strength of its
evidence; otherwise, a violation of due process occurs. As
the rule now stands, a hearing upon notice is mandatory
before the grant of bail, whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion.
2. Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region v. Olalia. G.R. No. 153675; April 19, 2007, 521
SCRA 470, (2007)
Private respondent Munoz was charged before the Hong
Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting
an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of
the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong
Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of
conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of
Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999,
warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he
faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each
charge.
The DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of
Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private
respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed
with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC issued an
Order of Arrest. The CA declared the Order of Arrest void.
On certiorari, the SC sustained the validity of the Order and
this decision became final and executory.
Meanwhile, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the
extradition of private respondent. Private respondent filed, in
the same case a petition for bail. Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued
an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no
Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that
private respondent is a high "flight risk.” Judge Bernardo
later inhibited himself from the case. It was then raffled off to
Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. On motion for
reconsideration, respondent judge allowed private
respondent to post bail.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order,
but it was denied by respondent judge. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether a potential extraditee has the right to bail.
Held:
Yes.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the
right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon.
Guillermo G. Purganan, this Court, held that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition
proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings,"
thus:
As suggested by the use of the word "conviction,"
the constitutional provision on bail quoted above,
as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from
the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
Page 177 of 190
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt". It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like
extradition, where the presumption of innocence is
not at issue.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private
respondent's case. However, this Court cannot ignore the
following trends in international law: (1) the growing
importance of the individual person in public international
law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global
recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human
rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty
of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court
to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental
law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy
placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity
of human rights. Significant events show that the individual
person is now a valid subject of international law. In facts,
the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty
and all the other fundamental rights of every person were
proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in
the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily
binding upon the members of the international community.
The principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law
of our land.
Thus, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this
Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various
international treaties giving recognition and protection to
human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a
reexamination of this Court's ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State's power to
deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited
to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative
proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have
likewise been detained. Second, to limit bail to criminal
proceedings would be to close our eyes to our
jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not
limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons
who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail
has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention
during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking
into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under
international conventions to uphold human rights.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no
justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no
reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After
all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail
in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various
treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for
the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these
treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus,
the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of
every individual is not impaired.
Concept of Extradition
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object
of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the
the requesting state or government to hold him in connection proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
with any criminal investigation directed against him or the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or cases. While administrative in character, the standard of
criminal law of the requesting state or government." substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot
likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to
It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then
its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and
generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in
between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be
guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full- lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must
character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a
accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of
the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or the extradition court.
punishment.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial
liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the court to determine whether private respondent may be
means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
"the machinery of criminal law." Obviously, an extradition
proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all
earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may
be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and
forced to transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings." Temporary detention" may be a necessary
step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of
the detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on
September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his
admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for
over two (2) years without having been convicted of any
crime. By any standard, such an extended period of
detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to
liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty
which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of
bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to
due process under the Constitution.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands
that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these
obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats
the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily
mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the
Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee's rights to
life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights
are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party.
Burden of Proof
The applicable standard of due process, however, should
not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter,
the standard of due process is premised on the presumption
of innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points
out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary
presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in
mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise
behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary
detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential
extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such
extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the
prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of
showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be
granted bail.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of

Page 178 of 190

3. Alejano vs. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792; August 25, 2005.
Facts:
After the Oakwood Mutiny, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff
of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service
Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers
involved to the ISAFP Detention Center. The government
prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup d'etat as defined
and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal
Code of the Philippines, as amended. The trial court later
issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior
officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV ("Trillanes") and Capt.
Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP.
Petitioners later filed a petition for habeas corpus with the
Supreme Court. The Court issued a
Writ of Habeas Corpus directing respondents to make a
return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of
the detainees before the Court of Appeals on the scheduled
date for hearing and further proceedings. Respondents
submitted their Return of the Writ and Answer to the petition
and produced the detainees before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the
petition on the ground that habeas corpus is not available as
the detainees’ confinement is under a valid indictment.
Nonetheless, the appellate court ordered Gen. Cabuay, who
was in charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP
Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the
detainees. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners admit that they do not question the legality of the
detention of the detainees. Neither do they dispute the lawful
indictment of the detainees for criminal and military offenses.
What petitioners bewail is the regulation adopted by Gen.
Cabuay in the ISAFP Detention Center preventing
petitioners as lawyers from seeing the detainees - their
clients - any time of the day or night. The regulation
allegedly curtails the detainees' right to counsel and violates
Republic Act No. 7438. Petitioners also point out that the
officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the
detainees' right to privacy of communication when the
ISAFP officials opened and read the personal letters of
Trillanes and Capt. Milo Maestrecampo. Petitioners further
claim that the ISAFP officials violated the detainees' right
against cruel and unusual punishment when the ISAFP
officials prevented the detainees from having contact with
their visitors. Moreover, the ISAFP officials boarded up with
iron bars and plywood slabs the iron grills of the detention
cells, limiting the already poor light and ventilation in the
detainees' cells.
Issue no.1:
Whether the detainees are entitled to the writ of habeas
corpus.
Held 1:
No, neither is the prior granting of the SC of the privilege of
the writ determinative of this case.
In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an
individual before the court is a preliminary step in the
hearing of the petition. The respondent must produce the
person and explain the cause of his detention. However, this
order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the
substantive matters covered by the remedy. Thus, the
Court's order to the Court of Appeals to conduct a factual
hearing was not an affirmation of the propriety of the remedy
of habeas corpus.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of
habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to address the
detainees' complaint against the regulations and conditions
in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas
corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of
detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to
Page 179 of 190
determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his
liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the
court orders the release of the person. If, however, the
detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus
proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus
very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute
for an appeal.
Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writ's application
to circumstances where there is deprivation of a person's
constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person
continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due
process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but
are also unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom
originally valid has later become arbitrary.
However, a mere allegation of a violation of one's
constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will extend the
scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is
present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court
had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an
excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as
to the excess. Whatever situation the petitioner invokes, the
threshold remains high. The violation of constitutional right
must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings.
Issue no. 2:
Whether there has been a violation of detainees’ rights when
respondent regulated their visits.
Held no 2:
No.
Petitioners contend that there was an actual prohibition of
the detainees' right to effective representation when
petitioners' visits were limited by the schedule of visiting
hours. Petitioners assert that the violation of the detainees'
rights entitle them to be released from detention. This is not
correct.
It is true that pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their
constitutional rights upon confinement. However, the fact
that the detainees are confined makes their rights more
limited than those of the public. RA 7438, which specifies
the rights of detainees and the duties of detention officers,
expressly recognizes the power of the detention officer to
adopt and implement reasonable measures to secure the
safety of the detainee and prevent his escape.
Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides:
b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits
any lawyer, any member of the immediate family of
a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or
religious minister or by his counsel, from visiting
and conferring privately chosen by him or by any
member of his immediate family with him, or from
examining and treating him, or from ministering to
his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in
urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor
more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand
pesos (P4,000.00).
The provisions of the above Section
notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial
responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may
undertake such reasonable measures as may be
necessary to secure his safety and prevent his
escape.
The schedule of visiting hours does not render void the
detainees' indictment for criminal and military offenses to
warrant the detainees' release from detention. The ISAFP
officials did not deny, but merely regulated, the detainees'
right to counsel. The purpose of the regulation is not to
render ineffective the right to counsel, but to secure the
safety and security of all detainees.
In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA
7438 provides the standard to make regulations in detention
centers allowable: "such reasonable measures as may be
necessary to secure the detainee's safety and prevent his
escape." In the present case, the visiting hours accorded to
the lawyers of the detainees are reasonably connected to
the legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing
the escape of all detainees.
While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they
want, the fact that the detainees still have face- to-face
meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly shows
that there is no impairment of detainees' right to counsel.
Petitioners as counsels could visit their clients between 8:00
a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00 p.m. Clearly,
the visiting hours pass the standard of reasonableness.
Moreover, in urgent cases, petitioners could always seek
permission from the ISAFP officials to confer with their
clients beyond the visiting hours.
Issue no. 3:
Whether respondents violated the detainees' right against
cruel and unusual punishment when the ISAFP officials
prevented the detainees from having contact with their
visitors anf boarded up with iron bars and plywood slabs the
iron grills of the detention cells, limiting the already poor light
and ventilation in the detainees' cells.
Held:
No.
An American case, Bell v. Wolfish, pointed out that while a
detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of
guilt in accordance with due process of law, detention
inevitably interferes with a detainee's desire to live
comfortably. The fact that the restrictions inherent in
detention intrude into the detainees' desire to live
comfortably does not convert those restrictions into
punishment. It is when the restrictions are arbitrary and
purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish. Courts will
also infer intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be
related rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction
appears excessive in relation to that purpose. Jail officials
are thus not required to use the least restrictive security
measure. They must only refrain from implementing a
restriction that appears excessive to the purpose it serves.
An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action
causes the inmate to suffer some harm or "disability," and
(2) the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate.
Punishment also requires that the harm or disability be
significantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent
discomforts of confinement. In the present case, we cannot
infer punishment from the separation of the detainees from
their visitors by iron bars, which is merely a limitation on
contact visits. The iron bars separating the detainees from
their visitors prevent direct physical contact but still allow the
detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited
physical contact with their visitors. The arrangement is not
unduly restrictive. In fact, it is not even a strict noncontact
visitation regulation. The limitation on the detainees' physical
contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response
to valid security concerns.
The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of
security within the ISAFP Detention Center. This measure
intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the
detainees from passing on contraband and weapons from
one cell to another. The boarded grills ensure security and
prevent disorder and crime within the facility. The diminished
illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in
Page 180 of 190
the fact of detention, and do not constitute punishments on
the detainees.
Issue no 4:
Whether respondents violated the detainees' right to privacy
of communication when the ISAFP officials opened and read
the personal letters of Trillanes and Capt. Milo
Maestrecampo.
Held no 4:
No.
American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-
trial detainees' non-privileged mail poses a genuine threat to
jail security. Hence, when a detainee places his letter in an
envelope for nonprivileged mail, the detainee knowingly
exposes his letter to possible inspection by jail officials. A
pretrial detainee has no reasonable expectation of privacy
for his incoming mail. However, incoming mail from lawyers
of inmates enjoys limited protection such that prison officials
can open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not
read the contents without violating the inmates' right to
correspond with his lawyer. The inspection of privileged mail
is limited to physical contraband and not to verbal
contraband.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening
and reading of the detainees' letters in the present case
violated the detainees' right to privacy of communication.
The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of
the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same
purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of
contraband.
Besides, the letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP
authorities were not confidential letters between the
detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the
letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was
merely acting as the detainees' personal courier and not as
their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the
present case, since the letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the
officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the
letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication
between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention
officials should not read the letters but only open the
envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.
That a law is required before an executive officer could
intrude on a citizen's privacy rights is a guarantee that is
available only to the public at large but not to persons who
are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those
detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the
limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By
the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and
convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of
privacy rights.
The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right
of detainees and convicted prisoners from petitioning the
courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and
conditions in detention and prison facilities that violate the
Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be
reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts
could afford injunctive relief or damages to the detainees
and prisoners subjected to arbitrary and inhumane
conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode
to question conditions of confinement. The writ of habeas
corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the fact or
duration of confinement.
4. Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847; August 18,
2015.
Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several
others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of
their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF). Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion
and Supplemental Opposition, praying, among others, that
he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found
against him. The Sandiganbayan issued its resolution
denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on
the ground of its prematurity. Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile. Enrile
voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of
the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in
Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at the
Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following
his medical examination.
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP
General Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail. Enrile argued
that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the
Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his
guilt was strong;
(b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to
him would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion
perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and
physical condition must further be seriously considered.
The Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motion, hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether Enrile is entitled to post bail.
Held:
Yes.
Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to
be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. The presumption of
innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on
bail, and further binds the court to wait until after trial to
impose any punishment on the accused.
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the
accused from committing additional crimes. The purpose of
bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the
trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount
of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts
as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the
accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or during
the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s
presence at trial.
Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article
III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:
All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable
by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule
Page 181 of 190
114 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. — No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of
the stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to
an offense that, under the law existing at the time
of its commission and the application for admission
to bail, may be punished with death.
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless
he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and
the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment
he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the
officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his
provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his
right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or
with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it
has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no
right to bail shall be recognized.
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary:
(1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment; or
(2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the
circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5,
Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by
the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life
imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is subject to judicial
discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases
involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the
discretion of the trial court. Such discretion may be
exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or
not he should be granted provisional liberty.” It is axiomatic,
therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a
matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there
has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the
presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for the
prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and
circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the
accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the
probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or
not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not
the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule
114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can
appreciate these guidelines in an ex- parte determination
where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard. The hearing,
which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion
of the court, should primarily determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to
comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to
wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8,
supra)
Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
3. If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition
should be denied.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari,
the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal
purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court.
The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility
in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as
value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty
and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested
can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable
it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and
order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every
person under detention such remedies which safeguard
their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail.
In our view, his social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being
charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape
from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal
disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder,
formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for
the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore
that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been
charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of
respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during
the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight
risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his
Page 182 of 190
private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s
judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another
compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which
the Sandiganbayan did not recognize. Dr. Gonzales attested
that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively,
could pose significant risks to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1)
uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or
heart complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2)
arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal
cardiovascular events, especially under stressful conditions;
(3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary artery
disease, because they could indicate a future risk for heart
attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of
ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain
circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or
allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration in
patients with asthma or COPD. Based on foregoing, there is
no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill health
required special medical attention.
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of
the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the
merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is
clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his
life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health
and life would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not
unprecedented. The Court has already held in Dela Rama v.
The People’s Court: [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden
by law in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner,
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance,
and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration which
should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the
proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to
admit the prisoner to bail.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial
to finish before a meaningful consideration of the application
for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is
to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial.
There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail -
whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is
properly the subject of judicial notice - that the courts can
already consider in resolving the application for bail without
awaiting the trial to finish. The Court thus balances the
scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People
through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at
the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due
process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily
ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the
accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the
clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of
Enrile.
4.2 Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847; July 12, mechanism to accommodate both the accused's interest in
2016 pretrial liberty and society's interest in assuring his presence
at trial
Facts:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the People of
the Philippines on the previous case. People asserts that the
decision unduly and radically modified constitutional and
procedural principles governing bail.
Issue:
Whether Enrile is entitled to bail.
Held:
Yes.
The Court finds no compelling or good reason to reverse its
decision.
Firstly, the People were not denied the reasonable
opportunity to challenge or refute the allegations about his
advanced age and the instability of his health even if the
allegations had not been directly made in connection with
his Motion to Fix Bail.
Secondly, the imputation of "preferential treatment" in
"undue favor" of the petitioner is absolutely bereft of basis. A
reading of the decision of August 18, 2015 indicates that the
Court did not grant his provisional liberty because he was a
sitting Senator of the Republic. It did so because there were
proper bases - legal as well as factual - for the favorable
consideration and treatment of his plea for provisional liberty
on bail. By its decision, the Court has recognized his right to
bail by emphasizing that such right should be curtailed only
if the risks of flight from this jurisdiction were too high. In our
view, however, the records demonstrated that the risks of
flight were low, or even nil. The Court has taken into
consideration other circumstances, such as his advanced
age and poor health, his past and present disposition of
respect for the legal processes, the length of his public
service, and his individual public and private reputation.
There was really no reasonable way for the Court to deny
bail to him simply because his situation of being 92 years of
age when he was first charged for the very serious crime in
court was quite unique and very rare. To ignore his
advanced age and unstable health condition in order to deny
his right to bail on the basis alone of the judicial discretion to
deny bail would be probably unjust. To equate his situation
with that of the other accused indicted for a similarly serious
offense would be inherently wrong when other conditions
significantly differentiating his situation from that of the
latter's unquestionably existed.
Section 2, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court expressly states
that one of the conditions of bail is for the accused to
"appear before the proper court whenever required by the
court or these Rules." The practice of bail fixing supports this
purpose.
Bail exists to ensure society's interest in having the accused
answer to a criminal prosecution without unduly restricting
his or her liberty and without ignoring the accused's right to
be presumed innocent. It does not perform the function of
preventing or licensing the commission of a crime. The
notion that bail is required to punish a person accused of
crime is, therefore, fundamentally misplaced. Indeed, the
practice of admission to bail is not a device for keeping
persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found
convenient to give them a trial. The spirit of the procedure is
rather to enable them to stay out of jail until a trial with all the
safeguards has found and adjudged them guilty. Unless
permitted this conditional privilege, the individuals wrongly
accused could be punished by the period of imprisonment
they undergo while awaiting trial, and even handicap them in
consulting counsel, searching for evidence and witnesses,
and preparing a defense. Hence, bail acts as a reconciling

Page 183 of 190

Admission to bail always involves the risk that the accused
will take flight. This is the reason precisely why the
probability or the improbability of flight is an important factor
to be taken into consideration in granting or denying bail,
even in capital cases. The exception to the fundamental right
to bail should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of the
probability of evasion of prosecution. Apparently, an
accused's official and social standing and his other personal
circumstances are considered and appreciated as tending to
render his flight improbable.
The petitioner has proven with more than sufficient evidence
that he would not be a flight risk. For one, his advanced age
and fragile state of health have minimized the likelihood that
he would make himself scarce and escape from the
jurisdiction of our courts.
Page 184 of 190
5. Qui vs. People, G.R. No. 196161; September 26, 2012.
Facts:
Petitioner Cyril Calpito Qui was convicted by the RTC of
violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. (RA)
7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act and sentenced
her to two equal periods of imprisonment for an
indeterminate penalty of five (5) years, four (4) months and
twenty one (21) days of prision correccional in its maximum
period, as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision mayor in its minimum period, as
maximum. Petitioner filed her Notice of Appeal. With the
perfection of her appeal and the consequent elevation of the
case records to the CA, petitioner posthaste filed before the
appellate court an Urgent Petition/Application for Bail
Pending Appeal. The CA denied petitioner’s application for
bail pending appeal on the basis of Sec. 5(d) of Rule 114,
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Issue:
Whether Qui is entitled to bail pending appeal.
Held:
Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of
discretion upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, as here.
In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be
guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of
bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but
with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering
that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.
The CA properly exercised its discretion in denying
petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal. The CA’s
determination as to petitioner being a high risk for flight is
not without factual mooring. Indeed, the undisputed fact that
petitioner did not attend the hearings before the RTC, which
compelled the trial court to issue warrants for her arrest, is
undeniably indicative of petitioner’s propensity to trifle with
court processes. This fact alone should weigh heavily
against a grant of bail pending appeal.
Petitioner’s argument that she has the constitutional right to
bail and that the evidence of guilt against her is not strong is
spurious. Certainly, after one is convicted by the trial court,
the presumption of innocence, and with it, the constitutional
right to bail, ends.
6. Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion Angeles, A.M. No.
06-9-545-RTC; January 31, 2008.
Facts:
The RTC convicted Judge Angeles of violation of Republic
Act (RA) No. 7610. Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y.
Velasco (SSP Velasco) of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
wrote a letter to then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban
inquiring whether it is possible for this Court, in the public
interest, motu proprio to order the immediate suspension of
the respondent in view of the aforementioned RTC Decision.
On the basis of SSP Velasco's letter, the OCA
recommended that she be indefinitely suspended pending
the outcome of the case or until further orders from the
Court.
Issue:
Whether Judge Angeles should be suspended pending the
determination of her criminal case.
Held:
No.
The Court cannot fully agree with the recommendation of the
OCA.
It is settled that conviction in the criminal case will not
automatically warrant a finding of guilt in the administrative
case. Criminal and civil cases are altogether different from
administrative matters, and each must be disposed of
according to the facts and the law applicable to it.
In Nunez v. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga, the Court held that the
mere existence of pending criminal charges against the
respondent-lawyer cannot be a ground for disbarment or
suspension of the latter. To hold otherwise would open the
door to harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of
numerous criminal cases against them.
By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent’s conviction by
the RTC does not necessarily warrant her suspension. We
agree with respondent's argument that since her conviction
of the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the
CA, the same has not yet attained finality. As such, she still
enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence. It must
be remembered that the existence of a presumption
indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy
the constitutional presumption of innocence unless the
inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or
the lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the
accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the
accused's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of
innocence continues
Page 185 of 190
7. People vs. Caoili, G.R. No. 196342. August 8, 2017,
G.R. No. 196848. August 8, 2017.
Doctrines:
Variance Doctrine; By jurisprudence, an accused charged in
the Information with rape by sexual intercourse cannot be
found guilty of rape by sexual assault, even though the latter
crime was proven during trial. —The language of
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC, as
amended by R.A. No. 8353, provides the elements that
substantially differentiate the two forms of rape, i.e., rape by
sexual intercourse and rape by sexual assault. It is through
legislative process that the dichotomy between these two
modes of rape was created. To broaden the scope of rape
by sexual assault, by eliminating its legal distinction from
rape through sexual intercourse, calls for judicial legislation
which We cannot traverse without violating the principle of
separation of powers. The Court remains steadfast in
confining its powers within the constitutional sphere of
applying the law as enacted by the Legislature. In fine, given
the material distinctions between the two modes of rape
introduced in R.A. No. 8353, the variance doctrine cannot be
applied to convict an accused of rape by sexual assault if
the crime charged is rape through sexual intercourse, since
the former offense cannot be considered subsumed in the
latter.
Leonen, Dissenting
Constitutional Law; Right to be Informed; View that the right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations
against a person need not be alleged with the highest
degree of particularity. It is satisfied as long as facts are
alleged with sufficient clarity that allows the accused to
understand what acts he is being made liable for in order to
enable him to make a defense.—The accused may be
convicted of rape by sexual intercourse without violating his
due process rights and his right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusations against him as provided in
Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution and
reproduced in Rule 115, Section 1(b) of our Rules of
Procedure. The importance and purpose of this rule has
been explained by this Court in People v. Quitlong, 292
SCRA 360 (1998): First. To furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him as will enable him to
make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause, and third, to inform the
court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they
are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be
had. The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusations against a person need not be alleged with the
highest degree of particularity. It is satisfied as long as facts
are alleged with sufficient clarity that allows the accused to
understand what acts he is being made liable for in order to
enable him to make a defense.
Facts:
On June 22, 2006, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Raul
O. Nasayao filed an Information against Caoili, charging him
with the crime of rape through sexual intercourse in violation
of Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC as
amended by R.A. No. 8353, and R.A. No. 7610. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 23rd day of October 2005, at 7:00
o’clock in the evening, more or less, in Purok [III], Barangay
[JJJ], [KKK], [LLL], Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with full
freedom and intelligence, with lewd design, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had sexual
intercourse with one [AAA],7 a minor, fifteen (15) years of
age and the daughter of the herein accused, through force,
threat and intimidation and against her will, to her damage
and prejudice in the amount as may be allowed by law.
CONTRARY TO Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B of
R.A. 8353, with the aggravating circumstance that the
accused is the father of the victim and R.A. 7610[.]
The RTC declared Caoili guilty of rape by sexual assault.
Thereafter, Caoili filed his appeal before the CA.
The CA held that although Caoili is clearly guilty of rape by
sexual assault, what the trial court should have done was to
direct the State Prosecutor to file a new Information charging
the proper offense, and after compliance therewith, to
dismiss the original Information. The appellate court found it
“imperative and morally upright” to set the judgment aside
and to remand the case for further proceedings pursuant to
Section 14, Rule 110.
Issue:
WHETHER RAPE BY SEXUAL ASSAULT IS
NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN RAPE BY SEXUAL
INTERCOURSE.
Ruling:
Rape by sexual assault is not subsumed in rape through
sexual intercourse.
The Court did not accept the OSG’s argument that based on
the variance doctrine, Caoili can be convicted of rape by
sexual assault because this offense is necessarily included
in the crime of rape through sexual intercourse.
The variance doctrine, which allows the conviction of an
accused for a crime proved which is different from but
necessarily included in the crime charged, is embodied in
Section 4, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court which reads:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation
and proof.—When there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and
the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes
the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or
of the offense charged which is included in the offense
proved. (Emphasis ours)
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.
— An offense charged necessarily includes the offense
proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients
of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter.
By jurisprudence, however, an accused charged in the
Information with rape by sexual intercourse cannot be found
guilty of rape by sexual assault, even though the latter crime
was proven during trial. This is due to the substantial
distinctions between these two modes of rape.
In the first mode (rape by sexual intercourse): (1) the
offender is always a man; (2) the offended party is always a
woman; (3) rape is committed through penile penetration of
the vagina; and (4) the penalty is reclusion perpertua.
In the second mode (rape by sexual assault): (1) theoffender
may be a man or a woman; (2) the offended party may be a
man or a woman; (3) rape is committed by inserting the
penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another
person; and (4) the penalty is prisión mayor.
Given the material distinctions between the two modes of
rape introduced in R.A. No. 8353, the variance doctrine
cannot be applied to convict an accused of rape by sexual
assault if the crime charged is rape through sexual
intercourse, since the former offense cannot be considered
subsumed in the latter.
Page 186 of 190
The Court, thus, took the occasion to once again remind
public prosecutors of their crucial role in drafting criminal
complaints or Information. They have to be more judicious
and circumspect in preparing the Information since a
mistake or defect therein may not render full justice to the
State, the offended party and even the offender.
Variance Doctrine Applied
Caoili had been charged with rape through sexual
intercourse in violation of Article 266-A of the RPC and R.A.
No. 7610. Applying the variance doctrine under Section 4, in
relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Caoili can be held guilty of the lesser
crime of acts of lasciviousness performed on a child, i.e.,
lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610,
which was the offense proved, because it is included in
rape, the offense charged. This echoes the Court’s
pronouncement in Leonardo, viz.:
This Court holds that the lower courts properly convicted the
appellant in Criminal Case Nos. 546-V-02, 547-V-02, 548-V-
02, 554-V-02 and 555-V-02 for five counts of sexual abuse
under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 even
though the charges against him in the aforesaid criminal
cases were for rape in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.
The lower court[’s] ruling is in conformity with the variance
doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule
120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, x x x:
This Court holds that the lower courts properly convicted the
appellant in Criminal Case Nos. 546-V-02, 547-V-02, 548-V-
02, 554-V-02 and 555-V-02 for five counts of sexual abuse
under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 even
though the charges against him in the aforesaid criminal
cases were for rape in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.
The lower court[’s] ruling is in conformity with the variance
doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule
120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, x x x:
xxxx
With the aforesaid provisions, the appellant can be held
guilty of a lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness performed
on a child, i.e., sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610, which was the offense proved
because it is included in rape, the offense charged.
The due recognition of the constitutional right of an accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
through the criminal complaint or information is decisive of
whether his prosecution for a crime stands or not.
Nonetheless, the right is not transgressed if the information
sufficiently alleges facts and omissions constituting an
offense that includes the offense established to have been
committed by the accused, which, in this case, is lascivious
conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
8. RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION
COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES
AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY
AMPATUAN, ET AL.
FACTS:
On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists
and media practitioners were killed on their way to Shariff
Aguak in Maguindanao. This tragic incident came to be
known as Maguindanao massacre" spawned charges for 57
counts of murder and additional charges of rebellion against
197 accused, commonly entitled People v. Datu Andal
Ampatuan, Jr., et al. Following the transfer of venue and the
re-raffling of the cases, the cases are being tried by
Presiding Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of RTC
Quezon City. Almost a year later, the National Union of
Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABSCBN
Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network Inc., relatives of
the victims, individual journalists from various media entities
and members of the academe filed a petition before this
court praying that live television and radio coverage of the
trial in this criminal cases be allowed, recording devises be
permitted inside the court room to assist the working
journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to
govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices.
President Benigno
S. Aquino III, letter addressed to Chief Justice Renato
Corona, came out in support of those who have petitioned
this Court to permit television and radio broadcast of the
trial. Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao
Massacre cases has attracted intense media coverage due
to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the
accused, and the number of media personnel killed. They
inform that reporters are being frisked and searched for
cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and
that under strict orders of the trial court against live
broadcast coverage, the number of media practitioners
allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one
reporter for each media institution. Hence, the present
petitions which assert the exercise of right to a fair and
public trial and the lifting of the absolute ban on live
television and radio coverage of court proceedings. They
principally urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re:
Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President
Corazon C. Aquinos Libel Case and the 2001 ruling in Re:
Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the
Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former
President Joseph E. Estrada which rulings, they contend,
violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on
constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed and
outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable
alternative.
ISSUE:
WON the petition for radio and television coverage of the
Maguindanao Massacre should be allowed
HELD:
The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners’ prayer
for a live broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to
guidelines. Respecting the possible influence of media
coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners
correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it
undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the totality of
circumstances test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and
Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused to a fair trial
is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is
not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial,
and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear
of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual
prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.
Page 187 of 190
On public trial, Estrada basically discusses: An accused has
a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him,
more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held
critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is
fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and
that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of
long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized
trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to
those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.
The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm. A trial of any
kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all
concerned and should not be treated as a means of
entertainment, and to so treat it deprives the court of the
dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and
serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are
formulated. The observation that massive intrusion of
representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so
alter and destroy the constitutionally necessary atmosphere
and decorum stands. The Court had another unique
opportunity in Estrada to revisit the question of live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings in a criminal case.
It held that the propriety of granting or denying the instant
petition involves the weighing out of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public
information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of
the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional
power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair
and impartial trial In so allowing pro hac vice the live
broadcasting by radio and television of the Maguindanao
Massacre cases.
RESOLUTION October 23
Petitioners Tiamzon and Legarta take issue on provisos (g)
and (h) of the enumerated guidelines in the June 14, 2011
Resolution and allege that these must be struck down for
being unconstitutional, as they constitute prior restraint on
free expression because they dictate what media can and
cannot report about the "Maguindanao massacre" trial.
(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio
output from the on-going proceedings, the proceedings shall
be broadcast without any voiceovers, except brief
annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary
to explain them at the start or at the end of the scene. Any
commentary shall observe the sub judice rule and be subject
to the contempt power of the court;
(h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall
be allowed until after the finality of judgment, except brief
footages and still images derived from or cartographic
sketches of scenes based on the recording, only for news
purposes, which shall likewise observe the sub-judice rule
and be subject to the contempt power of the court
Accused Ampatuan also filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
alleging that the June 14, 2011 Resolution "deprives him of
his rights to due process, equal protection, presumption of
innocence, and to be shielded from degrading psychological
punishment." This Court partially grants reconsideration of
the June 14, 2011 Resolution and deny the Partial Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioners Editha Mirandilla Tiamzon and
Glenna Legarta. The Court is now disallowing the live media
broadcast of the trial of the "Maguindanao massacre" cases
but is still allowing the filming of the proceedings for (1) the
real-time transmission to specified viewing areas, and
(2) documentation. In a constitutional sense, public trial is
not synonymous with publicized trial. The right to a public
trial belongs to the accused. The requirement of a public trial
is satisfied by the opportunity of the members of the public
and the press to attend the trial and to report what they have
observed. The accused's right to a public trial should not be
confused with the freedom of the press and the public's right
to know as a justification for allowing the live broadcast of
the trial. The tendency of a high profile case like the subject
case to generate undue publicity with its concomitant
undesirable effects weighs heavily against broadcasting the
trial. Moreover, the fact that the accused has legal remedies
after the fact is of no moment, since the damage has been
done and may be irreparable. It must be pointed out that the
fundamental right to due process of the accused cannot be
afforded after the fact but must be protected at the first
instance.
Page 188 of 190
9. Go v. People, 677 SCRA 213, 2012
Facts:
Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go
were charged before MeTC of Manila for Other Deceits
under Article 318 of the RPC. Sometime in August 1996
accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one
another defraud Highdone Company Ltd. Represented by Li
Luen Ping. Made Li Luen Ping believed that they have
chattels such as machinery, spare parts, equipment and raw
materials installed and fixed in the premises of BGB
Industrial Textile Mills Factory located in the Bataan Export
Processing Zone (BEPZ) in Mariveles, Bataan, executed a
Deed of Mortgage for a consideration of the amount of
P21M more or less in favor of ML Resources and Highdone
Company Ltd. Representing that the said deed is a FIRST
MORTGAGE when in truth and in fact the accused well
knew that the same had been previously encumbered,
mortgaged and foreclosed by CHINA BANK
CORPORATION as early as September 1994 thereby
causing damage and prejudice to said HIGHDONE
COMPANY LTD. The prosecution's complaining witness, Li
Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia,
traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in
order to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004.
However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to
his unavailability. The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC
a Motion to Take Oral Deposition6 of Li Luen Ping, alleging
that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia
Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon doctor's
advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines
by reason of ill health. Notwithstanding petitioners'
Opposition, the MeTC granted the motion after the
prosecution complied with the directive to submit a Medical
Certificate of Li Luen Ping. Petitioners sought its
reconsideration which the MeTC denied, prompting
petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC.
Upon denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration
through an Order dated March 5, 2006, the prosecution
elevated the case to the CA. the CA denied petitioners'
motion for Reconsideration.
Issue:
WON CA erred in sustaining the judicial legislation
committed by the MeTC in applying the ruled on deposition-
taking in civil case to criminal cases.
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a
judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal cases
where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a
public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to
face. The requirement is the “safest and most satisfactory
method of investigating facts” as it enables the judge to test
the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment
while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the
Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of
witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial
evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court
allows the taking of depositions in civil cases, either upon
oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge,
notary public or person authorized to administer oaths at any
time or place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine
consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized
to administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no
additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to
the other party.
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases,
more particularly of a prosecution witness who would
foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial
examination should be made before the court, or at least
before the judge, where the case is pending as required by
the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads
thus:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. - When
it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is
too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the
court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before
the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in
the presence of the accused, or in his absence after
reasonable notice to attend the examination has been
served on him shall be conducted in the same manner as an
examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to
attend the examination after notice shall be considered a
waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or
against the accused.
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness
elsewhere and not before the very same court where the
case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused
of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the
trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution
witness' deportment and properly assess his credibility,
which is especially intolerable when the witness' testimony is
crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused. This is
the import of the Court's ruling in Vda. de Manguerra where
we further declared that
While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the
testimony of its witness in order to prove its case, we cannot
disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the
protection of the accused's constitutional rights. The giving
of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional
examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an
exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the
rules.
Page 189 of 190
9. Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan, 746 SCRA 452 (2015)
Facts:
In a decision dated April 17 2007, the Sandiganbayan found
petitioners Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona and Habalo guilty of
homicide. During the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan’s
judgment, none of the accused appeared despite notice.
Thus, the decision was promulgated in absentia and the
judgment entered in the criminal docket. Their bail bonds
were also cancelled and warrants for their arrest issued.
The petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
the abovementioned decision, but the Sandiganbayan took
no action on said motion and ordered the implementation of
the arrest warrants, holding that the 15-dayh period from the
promulgation of the judgment had long passed without any
of the accused giving any reason for their non-appearance
during the promulgation. Applying Section 6, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court, the Sandiganbayan held that the accused
have lost the remedies available to them under the Rules of
Court against the Sandiganbayan’s judgment of conviction,
including the filing of a motion for reconsideration. The
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court, arguing that Section 6, Rule 120 cannot diminish,
modify or increase substantive rights like the filing of an MR
under P.D. 1606. Petitioners also argued that even if Section
6, Rule 120 were applied, the conditions under which the
said rules may be applied do not obtain in this case because
it was “it was incumbent upon the Sandiganbayan to take
pains to find out whether their absence at the promulgation
was without justifiable cause, and only then could the court
conclude that petitioners have lost the remedies available in
the Rules of Court against the judgment of conviction.”.
Issue:
1. WON the petitioners, who failed to appear at the
promulgation of judgment, has any standing in court and has
the right to seek relief?
2. WON Section 6, Rule 120 diminished or modified
the substantive rights of the petitioners?
3. WON Section 6, Rule 120 applies to this case?
Held:
1. No. Section 6, Rule 120 provides that an accused
who failed to an accused who failed to appear at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the
remedies available against the said judgment.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear
was without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose the
remedies available in the Rules of Court against the
judgment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to appear
on the scheduled date of promulgation, because it
determines the availability of their possible remedies against
the judgment of conviction. When the accused fail to present
themselves at the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction, they lose the remedies of filing a motion for a
new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from
the judgment of conviction (Rule 122). The reason is simple.
When the accused on bail fail to present themselves at the
promulgation of a judgment of conviction, they are
considered to have lost their standing in court. Without any
standing in court, the accused cannot invoke its jurisdiction
to seek relief.
2. No. Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court,
does not take away per se the right of the convicted accused
to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of
the accused to appear without justifiable cause on the
scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of
conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the
remedies against the judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules
of Court diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of
petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the
Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases." This
provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy
disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the simple
expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the
scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction.
In this case, petitioners have just shown their lack of faith in
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by not appearing
before it for the promulgation of the judgment on their cases.
Surely they cannot later on expect to be allowed to invoke
the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to grant them relief from its
judgment of conviction.
3. YES. It is well to note that Section 6, Rule 120, of the
Rules of Court also provides the remedy by which the
accused who were absent during the promulgation may
reverse the forfeiture of the remedies available to them
against the judgment of conviction. In order to regain their
standing in court, the accused must do as follows: 1)
surrender and 2) file a motion for leave of court to avail of
the remedies, stating the reasons for their absence, within
15 days from the date of the promulgation of judgment.
In Villena v. People, we stated that the term "surrender"
contemplates the act by the convicted accused of physically
and voluntarily submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of
the court to suffer the consequences of the judgment against
them. Upon surrender, the accused must request permission
of the court to avail of the remedies by making clear the
reasons for their failure to attend the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction.
Clearly, the convicted accused are the ones who should
show that their reason for being absent at the promulgation
of judgment was justifiable. If the court finds that the reasons
proffered justify their nonappearance during the
promulgation of judgment, it shall allow them to avail of the
remedies. Thus, unless they surrender and prove their
justifiable reason to the satisfaction of the court, their
absence is presumed to be unjustified.

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