especially that such law failed to provide a scheme to justly

compensate the discount.

GOVERNMENTAL POWERS and INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AND FREEDOM (THE BILL OF RIGHTS)

ISSUE: WON Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens

Act is unconstitutional or not violative of Article 3 Section 9 of
A. FUNDAMENTAL POWERS AND THE BILL OF the Constitution which provides that private property shall not
RIGHTS be taken for public use without just compensation and the
equal protection clause of Article 3 Section 1.

1. CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. vs. DSWD, ET. AL

FACTS: Petitioners, belonging to domestic corporations and
proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines, are
praying for preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality
of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise
known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.” On
February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432,
was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
and it became effective on March 21, 2004. Section 4(a) of the
Act states:
HELD: The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a
forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property
for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking
for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just
compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain but the
owner’s loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of
the word compensation, and to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be
real, substantial, full and ample.

SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The
senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from
all establishments relative to the utilization of
services in hotels and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of
medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use
or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and
burial services for the death of senior citizens;
The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a),
(f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the
goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of
the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income
for the same taxable year that the discount is granted.
Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax
deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be
included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and
shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions
of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
The DSWD, on May 8, 2004, approved and adopted the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 9275, Rule VI,
Article 8 which contains the proviso that the implementation of
the tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations
to be issued by the BIR and approved by the DOF. With the
new law, the Drug Stores Association of the Philippines
wanted a clarification of the meaning of tax deduction. The
DOF clarified that under a tax deduction scheme, the tax
deduction on discounts was subtracted from Net Sales
together with other deductions which are considered as
operating expenses before the Tax Due was computed based
on the Net Taxable Income. On the other hand, under a tax
credit scheme, the amount of discounts which is the tax credit
item, was deducted directly from the tax due amount.
The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for
medical and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory
fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls,
circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure
and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel;
utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and
purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of
senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides
that business establishments extending the twenty percent
discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax
deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar
to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its
object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but
has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest
benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as “the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending
as it does to all the great public needs.” It is “[t]he power
vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain,
and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the
good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects
of the same.”

The DOH issued an Administrative Order that the twenty

percent discount shall include both prescription and non-
prescription medicines, whether branded or generic. It stated
that such discount would be provided in the purchase of
medicines from all establishments supplying medicines for the
exclusive use of the senior citizens.

Drug store owners assail the law with the contention that
granting the discount would result to loss of profit and capital

Page 1 of 186
 2. Drug Stores Association of the Philippines vs
National Council on Disability Affairs
FACTS: On March 24, 1992, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7277,
entitled "An Act Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-
Development and Self-Reliance of Disabled Persons and their
Integration into the Mainstream of Society and for Other
Purposes," otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons," was passed into law. The law defines "disabled
persons", "impairment" and "disability" as follows:
SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of
this Act, these terms are defined as follows:
(a) Disabled Persons are those suffering from
restriction of different abilities, as a result of a mental,
physical or sensory impairment, to perform an
activity in the manner or within the range considered
normal for a human being;
(b) Impairment is any loss, diminution or aberration
of psychological, physiological, or anatomical
structure of function;
(c) Disability shall mean (1) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more
psychological, physiological or anatomical function
of an individual or activities of such individual; (2) a
record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded
as having such an impairment.
On April 30, 2007, Republic Act No. 9442[7] was enacted
amending R.A. No. 7277. The Title of R.A. No. 7277 was
amended to read as "Magna Carta for Persons with Disability"
and all references on the law to "disabled persons" were
amended to read as "persons with disability" (PWD).
Specifically, R.A. No. 9442 granted the PWDs a twenty (20)
percent discount on the purchase of medicine, and a tax
deduction scheme was adopted wherein covered
establishments may deduct the discount granted from gross
income based on the net cost of goods sold or services
rendered:
CHAPTER 8. Other Privileges and Incentives. SEC.
32. Persons with disability shall be entitled to the
following:
(d) At least twenty percent (20%) discount for the
purchase of medicines in all drugstores for the
exclusive use or enjoyment of persons with
disability;
The abovementioned privileges are available only to
persons with disability who are Filipino citizens upon
submission of any of the following as proof of his/her
entitlement thereto:
(i) An identification card issued by the city or
municipal mayor or the barangay captain of
the place where the person with disability
resides;
(ii) The passport of the person with disability
concerned; or
(iii) Transportation discount fare Identification
Card (ID) issued by the National Council for
the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP).
Page 2 of 186
The establishments may claim the discounts granted in
sub-sections (a), (b), (c), (f) and (g) as tax deductions based
on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered:
Provided, however, That the cost of the discount shall be
allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable
year that the discount is granted: Provided, further, That the
total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value-added
tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts
for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation
and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC), as amended.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
9442 was jointly promulgated by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), Department of Education,
Department of Finance (DOF), Department of Tourism,
Department of Transportation and Communication,
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) and
Department of Agriculture. Insofar as pertinent to this petition,
the salient portions of the IRR are hereunder quoted:
RULE IV. PRIVILEGES AND INCENTIVES FOR THE
PERSONS WITH DISABILITY
Section 6. Other Privileges and Incentives. Persons with
disability shall be entitled to the following:
6.1.d. Purchase of Medicine - at least twenty percent
(20%) discount on the purchase of medicine for the
exclusive use and enjoyment of persons with
disability. All drugstores, hospital, pharmacies,
clinics and other similar establishments selling
medicines are required to provide at least twenty
percent (20%) discount subject to the guidelines
issued by DOH and PHILHEALTH.
6.11 The abovementioned privileges are available
only to persons with disability who are Filipino
citizens upon submission of any of the following as
proof of his/her entitlement thereto subject to the
guidelines issued by the NCWDP in coordination with
DSWD, DOH and DILG.
6.11.1 An identification card issued by the city or
municipal mayor or the barangay captain of the place
where the person with disability resides;
6.11.2 The passport of the persons with disability
concerned; or
6.11.3 Transportation discount fare Identification
Card (ID) issued by the National Council for the
Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP). However,
upon effectivity of this Implementing Rules and
Regulations, NCWDP will already adopt the
Identification Card issued by the Local Government
Unit for purposes of uniformity in the implementation.
NCWDP will provide the design and specification of
the identification card that will be issued by the Local
Government Units.
6.14. Availment of Tax Deductions by Establishment
Granting Twenty Percent. 20% Discount - The
establishments may claim the discounts granted in
sub-sections (6.1), (6.2), (6.4), (6.5) and (6.6) as tax
deductions based on the net cost of the goods sold
or services rendered: Provided, however, that the
cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction
from gross income for the same taxable year that the
 discount is granted: Provided, further, That the total
amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value-
added tax if applicable, shall be included in their
gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be
subject to proper documentation and to the
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended.
On April 23, 2008, the National Council on Disability Affairs
(NCDA) issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of
2008, prescribing guidelines which should serve as a
mechanism for the issuance of a PWD Identification Card
(IDC) which shall be the basis for providing privileges and
discounts to bona fide PWDs in accordance with R.A. 9442:
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
can only deduct the 20% discount from their gross income
subject to some conditions.
On May 20, 2009, the DOH issued A.O. No. 2009-0011
specifically stating that the grant of 20% discount shall be
provided in the purchase of branded medicines and
unbranded generic medicines from all establishments
dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the PWDs. It
also detailed the guidelines for the provision of medical and
related discounts and special privileges to PWDs pursuant to
R.A. 9442.
On July 28, 2009, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition with
application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals to annul
and enjoin the implementation of the following laws:

The Local Government Unit of the City or Municipal Office 1) Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277 as amended by R.A.
shall implement these guidelines in the issuance of the PWD- No. 9442;
IDC
2) Section 6, Rule IV of the Implementing Rules and
D. Issuance of the appropriate document to confirm the Regulations of R.A. No. 9442;
medical condition of the applicant is as follows:
3) NCDA A.O. No. 1;
Disability Document Issuing Entity
Apparent Medical Licensed Private 4) DOF Revenue Regulation No. 1-2009;
Disability Certificate or Government
5) DOH A.O. No. 2009-0011.
Physician
School Licensed On July 26, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision upholding the
Assessment Teacher duly constitutionality of R.A. 7277 as amended, as well as the
signed by the
assailed administrative issuances. However, the CA
School Principal
suspended the effectivity of NCDA A.O. No. 1 pending proof
Certificate of Head of the of respondent NCDA's compliance with filing of said
Disability Business administrative order with the Office of the National
Establishment or Administrative Register (ONAR) and its publication in a
Head of Non- newspaper of general circulation. The dispositive portion of
Government the Decision states:
Organization
Non-Apparent Medical Licensed Private WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
Disability Certificate or Government The effectivity of NCDA Administrative Order No. 1 is
Physician hereby SUSPENDED pending Respondent's
compliance with the proof of filing of NCDA
Administrative Order No. 1 with the Office of the
E. PWD Registration Forms and ID Cards shall be issued and National Administrative Register and its publication
signed by the City or Municipal Mayor, or Barangay Captain. in a newspaper of general circulation.

Respondent NCDA filed a motion for reconsideration before

V. IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES
Any bonafide person with permanent disability can apply for
the issuance of the PWD-IDC. His/her caregiver can assist in
the application process. Procedures for the issuance of the ID
Cards are as follows:
A. Completion of the Requirements. Complete and/or
make available the following requirements:
Two "1x1" recent ID pictures with the names, and
signatures or thumbmarks at the back of the picture
One (1) Valid ID
Document to confirm the medical or disability
condition (See Section IV, D for the required
document).
On December 9, 2008, the DOF issued Revenue Regulations
No. 1-2009 prescribing rules and regulations to implement
R.A. 9442 relative to the tax privileges of PWDs and tax
incentives for establishments granting the discount. Section 4
of Revenue Regulations No. 001-09 states that drugstores
the CA to lift the suspension of the implementation of NCDA
A.O. No. 1 attaching thereto proof of its publication in the
Philippine Star and Daily Tribune on August 12, 2010, as well
as a certification from the ONAR showing that the same was
filed with the said office on October 22, 2009. Likewise,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA
Decision.
In a Resolution dated November 19, 2010, the CA dismissed
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and lifted the
suspension of the effectivity of NCDA A.O. No. 1 considering
the filing of the same with ONAR and its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE/S:
WHETHER OR NOT CA SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
MANDATED PWD DISCOUNT IS A VALID EXERCISE OF
POLICE POWER. ON THE CONTRARY, IT IS AN INVALID
EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

Page 3 of 186
BECAUSE IT FAILS TO PROVIDE JUST COMPENSATION
TO PETITIONERS AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED
DRUGSTORES;
WHETHER OR NOT CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
RULED THAT SECTION 32 OF RA 7277 AS AMENDED BY
RA 9442, NCDA AO 1 AND THE OTHER IMPLEMENTING
REGULATIONS DID NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE;
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE DEFINITIONS OF DISABILITIES UNDER
SECTION 4(A), SECTION 4(B) AND SECTION 4(C) OF RA
7277 AS AMENDED BY RA 9442, RULE 1 OF THE
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS[23] OF RA
7277, SECTION 5.1 OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF RA 9442, NCDA AO 1 AND DOH AO
2009-11 ARE NOT VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
WHETHER OR NOT CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE MANDATED PWD DISCOUNT DOES
NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
HELD: We deny the petition.
The CA is correct when it applied by analogy the case of
Carlos Superdrug Corporation et al. v. DSWD, et al. wherein
We pronounced that Section 4 of R.A. No. 9257 which grants
20% discount on the purchase of medicine of senior citizens
is a legitimate exercise of police power:
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar
to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its
object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but
has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest
benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending
as it does to all the great public needs. It is [t]he power vested
in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the
good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects
of the same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the
primacy of police power because property rights, though
sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good
would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners
that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned
provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence
demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision
in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the
presumption of validity which every law has in its favor.
Police power is the power of the state to promote public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property. On the other hand, the power of eminent domain is
the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which
the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private
property to public use upon payment of just compensation. In
the exercise of police power, property rights of private
Page 4 of 186
individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.
A legislative act based on the police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. In more
familiar words, (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, should justify
the interference of the state; and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
R.A. No. 7277 was enacted primarily to provide full support to
the improvement of the total well-being of PWDs and their
integration into the mainstream of society. The priority given
to PWDs finds its basis in the Constitution:
ARTICLE XII: NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY
xxxx
Section 6. The use of property bears a social
function, and all economic agents shall contribute to
the common good. Individuals and private groups,
including corporations, cooperatives, and similar
collective organizations, shall have the right to own,
establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject
to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice
and to intervene when the common good so
demands.
ARTICLE XIII: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS
xxxx
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods,
health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for
the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Thus, R.A. No. 7277 provides:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. The grant of the
rights and privileges for disabled persons shall be
guided by the following principles:
(a). Disabled persons are part of the Philippine
society, thus the Senate shall give full support to the
improvement of the total well-being of disabled
persons and their integration into the mainstream of
society.
Toward this end, the State shall adopt policies
ensuring the rehabilitation, self-development and
self-reliance of disabled persons.
It shall develop their skills and potentials to enable
them to compete favorably for available
opportunities.
(b). Disabled persons have the same rights as other
people to take their proper place in society. They
should be able to live freely and as independently as
possible. This must be the concern of everyone - the
family, community and all government and non-
government organizations.
 Disabled person's rights must never be perceived as
welfare services by the Government.
xxxx
(d). The State also recognizes the role of the private
sector in promoting the welfare of disabled persons
and shall encourage partnership in programs that
address their needs and concerns.
To implement the above policies, R.A. No. 9442 which
amended R.A. No. 7277 grants incentives and benefits
including a twenty percent (20%) discount to PWDs in the
purchase of medicines; fares for domestic air, sea and land
travels including public railways and skyways; recreation and
amusement centers including theaters, food chains and
restaurants. This is specifically stated in Section 4 of the IRR
of R.A. No. 9442:
Section 4. Policies and Objectives - It is the objective
of Republic Act No. 9442 to provide persons with
disability, the opportunity to participate fully into the
mainstream of society by granting them at least
twenty percent (20%) discount in all basic services.
It is a declared policy of RA 7277 that persons with
disability are part of Philippine society, and thus the
State shall give full support to the improvement of
their total wellbeing and their integration into the
mainstream of society. They have the same rights as
other people to take their proper place in society.
They should be able to live freely and as
independently as possible. This must be the concern
of everyone the family, community and all
government and non-government organizations.
Rights of persons with disability must never be
perceived as welfare services. Prohibitions on
verbal, non-verbal ridicule and vilification against
persons with disability shall always be observed at all
times.
Hence, the PWD mandatory discount on the purchase of
medicine is supported by a valid objective or purpose as
aforementioned. It has a valid subject considering that the
concept of public use is no longer confined to the traditional
notion of use by the public, but held synonymous with public
interest, public benefit, public welfare, and public
convenience. As in the case of senior citizens, the discount
privilege to which the PWDs are entitled is actually a benefit
enjoyed by the general public to which these citizens belong.
The means employed in invoking the active participation of the
private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of
the law, is reasonably and directly related. Also, the means
employed to provide a fair, just and quality health care to
PWDs are reasonably related to its accomplishment, and are
not oppressive, considering that as a form of reimbursement,
the discount extended to PWDs in the purchase of medicine
can be claimed by the establishments as allowable tax
deductions pursuant to Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 as
implemented in Section 4 of DOF Revenue Regulations No.
1-2009. Otherwise stated, the discount reduces taxable
income upon which the tax liability of the establishments is
computed.
Further, petitioners aver that Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277 as
amended by R.A. No. 9442 is unconstitutional and void for
violating the due process clause of the Constitution since
entitlement to the 20% discount is allegedly merely based on
any of the three documents mentioned in the provision,
namely: (i) an identification card issued by the city or municipal
mayor or the barangay captain of the place where the PWD
Page 5 of 186
resides; (ii) the passport of the PWD; or (iii) transportation
discount fare identification card issued by NCDA. Petitioners,
thus, maintain that none of the said documents has any
relation to a medical finding of disability, and the grant of the
discount is allegedly without any process for the determination
of a PWD in accordance with law.
Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277, as amended by R.A. No. 9442,
must be read with its IRR which stated that upon its effectivity,
NCWDP (which is the government agency tasked to ensure
the implementation of RA 7277), would adopt the IDC issued
by the local government units for purposes of uniformity in the
implementation. Thus, NCDA A.O. No. 1 provides the
reasonable guidelines in the issuance of IDCs to PWDs as
proof of their entitlement to the privileges and incentives under
the law and fills the details in the implementation of the law.
As stated in NCDA A.O. No. 1, before an IDC is issued by the
city or municipal mayor or the barangay captain, or the
Chairman of the NCDA,[42] the applicant must first secure a
medical certificate issued by a licensed private or government
physician that will confirm his medical or disability condition. If
an applicant is an employee with apparent disability, a
"certificate of disability" issued by the head of the business
establishment or the head of the non-governmental
organization is needed for him to be issued a PWD-IDC. For
a student with apparent disability, the "school assessment"
issued by the teacher and signed by the school principal
should be presented to avail of a PWD-ID.
Petitioners' insistence that Part IV (D) of NCDA Administrative
Order No. 1 is void because it allows allegedly non-competent
persons like teachers, head of establishments and heads of
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to confirm the
medical condition of the applicant is misplaced. It must be
stressed that only for apparent disabilities can the teacher or
head of a business establishment validly issue the mentioned
required document because, obviously, the disability is easily
seen or clearly visible. It is, therefore, not an unqualified grant
of authority for the said non-medical persons as it is simply
limited to apparent disabilities. For a non-apparent disability or
a disability condition that is not easily seen or clearly visible,
the disability can only be validated by a licensed private or
government physician, and a medical certificate has to be
presented in the procurement of an IDC. Relative to this issue,
the CA validly ruled, thus:
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General's (OSG)
ratiocination that teachers, heads of business establishments
and heads of NGOs can validly confirm the medical condition
of their students/employees with apparent disability for
obvious reasons as compared to non-apparent disability
which can only be determined by licensed physicians. Under
the Labor Code, disabled persons are eligible as apprentices
or learners provided that their handicap are not as much as to
effectively impede the performance of their job. We find that
heads of business establishments can validly issue
certificates of disability of their employees because aside from
the fact that they can obviously validate the disability, they also
have medical records of the employees as a pre-requisite in
the hiring of employees. Hence, Part IV (D) of NCDA AO No.
1 is logical and valid.
Furthermore, DOH A.O. No. 2009-11 prescribes additional
guidelines for the 20% discount in the purchase of all
medicines for the exclusive use of PWD. To avail of the
discount, the PWD must not only present his I.D. but also the
doctor's prescription stating, among others, the generic name
of the medicine, the physician's address, contact number and
professional license number, professional tax receipt number
and narcotic license number, if applicable. A purchase booklet
issued by the local social/health office is also required in the
purchase of over-the-counter medicines. Likewise, any single
dispensing of medicine must be in accordance with the
prescription issued by the physician and should not exceed a
one (1) month supply. Therefore, as correctly argued by the
respondents, Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277 as amended by R.A.
No. 9442 complies with the standards of substantive due
process.
We are likewise not persuaded by the argument of petitioners
that the definition of "disabilities" under the subject laws is
vague and ambiguous because it is allegedly so general and
broad that the person tasked with implementing the law will
undoubtedly arrive at different interpretations and applications
of the law. Aside from the definitions of a "person with
disability" or "disabled persons" under Section 4 of R.A. No.
7277 as amended by R.A. No. 9442 and in the IRR of RA
9442, NCDA A.O. No. 1 also provides:
Identification Cards shall be issued to any bonafide PWD with
permanent disabilities due to any one or more of the following
conditions: psychosocial, chronic illness, learning, mental,
visual, orthopedic, speech and hearing conditions. This
includes persons suffering from disabling diseases resulting to
the person's limitations to do day to day activities as normally
as possible such as but not limited to those undergoing
dialysis, heart disorders, severe cancer cases and such other
similar cases resulting to temporary or permanent disability.
Similarly, DOH A.O. No. 2009-0011 defines the different
categories of disability as follows:
Rule IV, Section 4, Paragraph B of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of this Act required the
Department of Health to address the health concerns
of seven (7) different categories of disability, which
include the following: (1) Psychological and
behavioral disabilities (2) Chronic illness with
disabilities (3) Learning (cognitive or intellectual)
disabilities (4) Mental disabilities (5) Visual/seeing
disabilities (6) Orthopedic/moving, and (7)
communication deficits.
Elementary is the rule that when laws or rules are clear, when
the law is unambiguous and unequivocal, application not
interpretation thereof is imperative. However, where the
language of a statute is vague and ambiguous, an
interpretation thereof is resorted to. A law is deemed
ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by
reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more
senses. The fact that a law admits of different interpretations
is the best evidence that it is vague and ambiguous.
In the instant case, We do not find the aforestated definition of
terms as vague and ambiguous. Settled is the rule that courts
will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of the government agency entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special and technical
training and knowledge of such agency.[48] As a matter of
policy, We accord great respect to the decisions and/or
actions of administrative authorities not only because of the
doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed
knowledge, ability, and expertise in the enforcement of laws
and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction. The rationale for
this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious
needs of a modern or modernizing society and the
establishment of diverse administrative agencies for
addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates to the
accumulation of experience and growth of specialized
Page 6 of 186
capabilities by the administrative agency charged with
implementing a particular statute.
Lastly, petitioners contend that R.A. No. 7227, as amended by
R.A. No. 9442, violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because it fairly singles out drugstores to bear the
burden of the discount, and that it can hardly be said to
"rationally" meet a legitimate government objective which is
the purpose of the law. The law allegedly targets only retailers
such as petitioners, and that the other enterprises in the drug
industry are not imposed with similar burden. This same
argument had been raised in the case of Carlos Superdrug
Corp., et al. v. DSWD, et al., and We reaffirm and apply the
ruling therein in the case at bar:
The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the
pharmaceutical industry and the competitive pricing
component of the business. While the Constitution
protects property rights, petitioners must accept the
realities of business and the State, in the exercise of
police power, can intervene in the operations of a
business which may result in an impairment of
property rights in the process.
Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While
Article XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for the
protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence,
particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts
and public utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that the
right to property can be relinquished upon the command of the
State for the promotion of public good.
Under the equal protection clause, all persons or things
similarly situated must be treated alike, both in the privileges
conferred and the obligations imposed. Conversely, all
persons or things differently situated should be treated
differently. In the case of ABAKADA Guro Party List, et al. v.
Hon. Purisima, et al.,We held:
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection
clause is equality under the same conditions and
among persons similarly situated; it is equality
among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons
who are classified based on substantial differences
in relation to the object to be accomplished. When
things or persons are different in fact or
circumstance, they may be treated in law differently.
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, this
Court declared:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
guaranty of equality in the application of the laws
upon all citizens of the State. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a
statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not
mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as
such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity
of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection
clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that
are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution
allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This
Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification
or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the
purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction,
the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion.
It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific
or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it
necessary that the classification be made with mathematical
nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases
properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection
guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing
degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils
as they may appear.
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification,
that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to R.A. No. 9442,
its expressed public policy is the rehabilitation, self-
development and self-reliance of PWDs. Persons with
disability form a class separate and distinct from the other
citizens of the country. Indubitably, such substantial distinction
is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law.
Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the PWDs
fully satisfy the demands of equal protection. Thus, Congress
may pass a law providing for a different treatment to persons
with disability apart from the other citizens of the country.
Subject to the determination of the courts as to what is a
proper exercise of police power using the due process clause
and the equal protection clause as yardsticks, the State may
interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this
particular, a large discretion is necessarily vested in the
legislature to determine, not only what interests of the public
require, but what measures are necessary for the protection
of such interests. Thus, We are mindful of the fundamental
criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.
The burden of proof is on him who claims that a statute is
unconstitutional. Petitioners failed to discharge such burden
of proof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated July 26, 2010, and the Resolution
dated November 19, 2010, in CA-G.R. SP No. 109903 are
AFFIRMED.
Page 7 of 186
3. Southern Luzon Drug Corporation vs. DSWD
FACTS: On April 23, 1992, R.A. No. 7432, entitled "An Act to
Maximize the Contribution of Senior Citizens to Nation-
Building, Grant Benefits and Special Privileges and For Other
Purposes," was enacted. Under the said law, a senior citizen,
who must be at least 60 years old and has an annual income
of not more than P60,000.00, may avail of the privileges
provided in Section 4 thereof, one of which is 20% discount on
the purchase of medicines. The said provision states:
Sec. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizen. – x x x:
a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all
establishments relative to utilization of transportation
services, hotels and similar lodging establishment,
restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of
medicine anywhere in the country: Provided, That
private establishments may claim the cost as tax
credit[.]
To recoup the amount given as discount to qualified senior
citizens, covered establishments can claim an equal amount
as tax credit which can be applied against the income tax due
from them.
On February 26, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo signed R.A. No. 9257, amending some provisions of
R.A. No. 7432. The new law retained the 20% discount on the
purchase of medicines but removed the annual income ceiling
thereby qualifying all senior citizens to the privileges under the
law. Further, R.A. No. 9257 modified the tax treatment of the
discount granted to senior citizens, from tax credit to tax
deduction from gross income, computed based on the net cost
of goods sold or services rendered. The pertinent provision,
as amended by R.A. No. 9257, reads as follows:
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The
senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from
all establishments relative to the utilization of
services in hotels and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of
medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use
or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and
burial services for the death of senior citizens;
The establishment may claim the discounts granted
under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on
the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered:
Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be
allowed as deduction from gross income for the
same taxable year that the discount is granted.
Provided, further, That the total amount of the
claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if
applicable, shall be included in their gross sales
receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to
proper documentation and to the provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
On May 28, 2004, the DSWD issued the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9257. Article 8 of Rule VI
of the said IRR provides:
Article 8. Tax Deduction of Establishments. - The
establishment may claim the discounts granted
under Rule V, Section 4 – Discounts for
Establishments; Section 9, Medical and Dental
Services in Private Facilities and Sections 10 and 11
 – Air, Sea and Land Transportation as tax deduction
based on the net cost of the goods sold or services
rendered. Provided, That the cost of the discount
shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for
the same taxable year that the discount is granted;
Provided, further, That the total amount of the
claimed tax deduction net of value-added tax if
applicable, shall be included in their gross sales
receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to
proper documentation and to the provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended;
Provided, finally, that the implementation of the tax
deduction shall be subject to the Revenue
Regulations to be issued by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and approved by the Department of
Finance (DOF).
The change in the tax treatment of the discount given to senior
citizens did not sit well with some drug store owners and
corporations, claiming it affected the profitability of their
business. Thus, on January 13, 2005, Carlos Superdrug
Corporation (Carlos Superdrug), together with other
corporation and proprietors operating drugstores in the
Philippines, filed a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary
Injunction before this Court, entitled Carlos Superdrug
Corporation v. DSWD,[5] docketed as G.R. No. 166494,
assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257
primarily on the ground that it amounts to taking of private
property without payment of just compensation. In a Decision
dated June 29, 2007, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the assailed provision, holding that the same is a legitimate
exercise of police power. The relevant portions of the decision
read, thus:
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power
which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. Police power is not
capable of an exact definition, but has been
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and
provide enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances, thus
assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has
been described as "the most essential, insistent and
the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to
all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in
the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain,
and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good
and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same."
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature, property rights must
bow to the primacy of police power because property
rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield
to general welfare.
Moreover, the right to property has a social
dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution
provides the precept for the protection of property,
various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on
agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts and
public utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that
the right to property can be relinquished upon the
command of the State for the promotion of public
good.
Page 8 of 186
Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens
program rests largely on the support imparted by
petitioners and the other private establishments
concerned. This being the case, the means
employed in invoking the active participation of the
private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or
objective of the law, is reasonably and directly
related. Without sufficient proof that Section 4(a) of
R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued
implementation of the same would be
unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court
will refrain from quashing a legislative act.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
On August 1, 2007, Carlos Superdrug filed a motion for
reconsideration of the foregoing decision. Subsequently, the
Court issued Resolution dated August 21, 2007, denying the
said motion with finality.
Meanwhile, on March 24, 1992, R.A. No. 7277 pertaining to
the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons" was enacted,
codifying the rights and privileges of PWDs. Thereafter, on
April 30, 2007, R.A. No. 9442 was enacted, amending R.A.
No. 7277. One of the salient amendments in the law is the
insertion of Chapter 8 in Title 2 thereof, which enumerates the
other privileges and incentives of PWDs, including the grant
of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines. Similar to R.A.
No. 9257, covered establishments shall claim the discounts
given to PWDs as tax deductions from the gross income,
based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered.
Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 reads:
CHAPTER 8. Other Privileges and Incentives
SEC. 32. Persons with disability shall be entitled to
the following:
xxxx
(c) At least twenty percent (20%) discount for the
purchase of medicines in all drugstores for the
exclusive use or enjoyment of persons with disability;
xxxx
The establishments may claim the discounts granted
in sub-sections (a), (b), (c), (e), (f) and (g) as tax
deductions based on the net cost of the goods sold
or services rendered: Provided, however, That the
cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction
from gross income for the same taxable year that the
discount is granted: Provided, further, That the total
amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value-
added tax if applicable, shall be included in their
gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be
subject to proper documentation and to the
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC), as amended.
Pursuant to the foregoing, the IRR of R.A. No. 9442 was
promulgated by the DSWD, Department of Education, DOF,
Department of Tourism and the Department of Transportation
and Communications. Sections 5.1 and 6.1.d thereof provide:
Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. For purposes of these
Rules and Regulations, these terms are defined as
follows:
5.1. Persons with Disability are those individuals
defined under Section 4 of RA 7277, "An Act
 Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-Development
and Self-Reliance of Persons with Disability as
amended and their integration into the Mainstream of
Society and for Other Purposes." This is defined as
a person suffering from restriction or different
abilities, as a result of a mental, physical or sensory
impairment, to perform an activity in a manner or
within the range considered normal for human being.
Disability shall mean: (1) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more
psychological, physiological or anatomical function
of an individual or activities of such individual; (2) a
record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded
as having such an impairment.
xxxx
6.1.d Purchase of Medicine – At least twenty percent
(20%) discount on the purchase of medicine for the
exclusive use and enjoyment of persons with
disability. All drug stores, hospital, pharmacies,
clinics and other similar establishments selling
medicines are required to provide at least twenty
percent (20%) discount subject to the guidelines
issued by DOH and PHILHEALTH.
On February 26, 2008, the petitioner filed a Petition for
Prohibition with Application for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with the CA, seeking to declare as unconstitutional
(a) Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257, and (b) Section 32 of R.A.
No. 9442 and Section 5.1 of its IRR, insofar as these
provisions only allow tax deduction on the gross income based
on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered as
compensation to private establishments for the 20% discount
that they are required to grant to senior citizens and PWDs.
Further, the petitioner prayed that the respondents be
permanently enjoined from implementing the assailed
provisions.
Ruling of the CA
On June 17, 2011, the CA dismissed the petition, reiterating
the ruling of the Court in Carlos Superdrug particularly that
Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 was a valid exercise of police
power. Moreover, the CA held that considering that the same
question had been raised by parties similarly situated and was
resolved in Carlos Superdrug, the rule of stare decisis stood
as a hindrance to any further attempt to relitigate the same
issue. It further noted that jurisdictional considerations also
compel the dismissal of the action. It particularly emphasized
that it has no original or appellate jurisdiction to pass upon the
constitutionality of the assailed laws, the same pertaining to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Even assuming that it had
concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC, the principle of hierarchy
of courts mandates that the case be commenced and heard
by the lower court. The CA further ruled that the petitioner
resorted to the wrong remedy as a petition for prohibition will
not lie to restrain the actions of the respondents for the simple
reason that they do not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial duties relative to the issuance or implementation of
the questioned provisions. Also, the petition was wanting of
the allegations of the specific acts committed by the
respondents that demonstrate the exercise of these powers
which may be properly challenged in a petition for prohibition.
The petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision dated June 17, 2011 of the CA, but the same was
denied in a Resolution dated November 25, 2011.
Page 9 of 186
Unyielding, the petitioner filed the instant petition, raising the
following assignment of errors, to wit:
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Petition for Prohibition may be filed to
question the constitutionality of a law
Whether or not the case constitute stare decisis
Whether or not the 20% Sales Discount for Senior Citizens
PWDs does not violate the petitioner’s right to equal protection
of the law
Whether or not the definitions of Disabilities and PWDs are
vague and violates the petitioners right to due process of law
RULING:
1. Yes. Prohibition may be filed to question the
constitutionality of a law. Generally, the office of
prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive
exercise of authority and is directed against
proceedings that are done without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there
being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is the remedy
to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or
persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or
power with which they have not been vested by the law.
This is, however, not the lone office of an action for
prohibition. In Diaz, et al. v. The Secretary of Finance,
et al., prohibition was also recognized as a proper
remedy to prohibit or nullify acts of executive officials
that amount to usurpation of legislative authority. And,
in a number of jurisprudence, prohibition was allowed
as a proper action to assail the constitutionality of a law
or prohibit its implementation.
2. No. The Court agrees that the ruling in Carlos
Superdrug does not constitute stare decisis to the
instant case, not because of the petitioner's submission
of financial statements which were wanting in the first
case, but because it had the good sense of including
questions that had not been raised or deliberated in the
former case of Carlos Superdrug, i.e., validity of the
20% discount granted to PWDs, the supposed
vagueness of the provisions of R.A. No. 9442 and
violation of the equal protection clause.
3. Yes. The subject laws do not violate the equal
protection clause. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class. If the groupings
are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from another." For a classification
to be valid, (1) it must be based upon substantial
distinctions, (2) it must be germane to the purposes of
the law, (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions
only, and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the
same class.
 4. No. The definitions of "disabilities" and "PWDs" are
clear and unequivocal. Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 7277,
the precursor of R.A. No. 94421 defines "disabled
persons" as follows:
(a) Disabled persons are those suffering from
restriction or different abilities, as a result of a mental,
physical or sensory impairment, to perform an activity
in the manner or within the range considered normal for
a human being[.]
On the other hand, the term "PWDs" is defined in
Section 5.1 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9442 as follows:
5.1. Persons with Disability are those individuals
defined under Section 4 of [R.A. No.] 7277 [or] An Act
Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-Development and
Self-Reliance of Persons with Disability as amended
and their integration into the Mainstream of Society and
for Other Purposes. This is defined as a person
suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result
of a mental, physical or sensory impairment, to perform
an activity in a manner or within the range considered
normal for human being. Disability shall mean (1) a
physical 1or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more psychological, physiological or anatomical
function of an individual or activities of such individual;
(2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) being
regarded as having such an impairment.
In view of the foregoing disquisition, Section 4(a) of Republic
Act No. 9257 and Section 32 of Republic Act No. 9442 are
hereby declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
Page 10 of 186
4. Crisostomo B. Aquino vs. Municipality Of Malay, Aklan
IN THE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER AND THE
GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE, PROPERTY RIGHTS OF
INDIVIDUALS MAY BE SUBJECTED TO RESTRAINTS AND
BURDENS IN ORDER TO FULFIL THE OBJECTIVES OF
THE GOVERNMENT.
FACTS: In a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,
petitioner Crisostomo Aquino, the president and chief
executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove, assailed the
decisions of the Municipality of Malay, Aklan for denying his
application for zoning compliance and issuing demolition
closure and demolition order and the CA for denying his
petition for certiorari for being the improper remedy.
Petitioner’s application for zoning compliance and building
permit covering the construction of an additional three-storey
hotel over a parcel of land covered by a Forest Land Use
Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) were denied by the
Municipal Zoning Administrator on the ground that the
proposed construction site was within the "no build zone"
demarcated in a Municipal Ordinance. Thereafter, the
respondent issued a 1) Cease and Desist Order enjoining the
expansion of the resort, and 2) EO No. 10 ordering the closure
and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel. EO 10 was
partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Also, respondents
demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay West
Cove.
Petitioner alleged that the order was issued and executed with
grave abuse of discretion. He argued that judicial proceedings
should first be conducted before the respondent mayor could
order the demolition of the company’s establishment.
On the other hand, respondents argued that the demolition
needed no court order because the municipal mayor has the
express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to
order the removal of illegally constructed buildings.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the procedural due process (of due notice and
hearing) was complied with.
Whether or not judicial proceedings should first be conducted
before the respondent mayor could order the demolition of the
company’s establishment.
RULING:
1. Yes, the procedural due process (of due notice and
hearing) was complied with.
First, basic is the rule that public officers enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties.
The burden is on the petitioner herein to prove that Boracay
West Cove was deprived of the opportunity to be heard before
EO 10 was issued. Regrettably, copies of the Cease and
Desist Order issued by the LGU and of the assailed EO 10
itself were never attached to the petition before this Court,
which documents could have readily shed light on whether or
not petitioner has been accorded the 10-day grace period
provided in Section 10 of the Ordinance. In view of this fact,
the presumption of regularity must be sustained.
Second, as quoted by petitioner in his petition before the CA,
the assailed EO 10 states that petitioner received notices from
the municipality government on March 7 and 28, 2011,
requiring Boracay West Cove to comply with the zoning
ordinance and yet it failed to do so. If such was the case, the
grace period can be deemed observed and the establishment
was already ripe for closure and demolition by the time EO 10
was issued in June.
2. No, petitioner’s right to due process was not violated for
lack of judicial proceedings prior to the issuance of
demolition order.
The government may enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations
to promote the general welfare. One such piece of legislation
is the Local Government Code (LGC), which authorizes city
and municipal governments, acting through their local chief
executives, to issue demolition orders and to hear issues
involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an
effective order or resolution thereon. Pertinent herein is Sec.
444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to
order the closure and removal of illegally constructed
establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits.
Though the court agreed with Petitioner’s contention that,
under the LGC, the Sanggunian does not have the power to
authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of a
nuisance per accidens, still the SC ruled that the LGU may
nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition without due
hearing thereon in a tribunal, because in the exercise of police
power and the general welfare clause provided in the
Constitution, property rights of individuals may be subjected
to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the
government.
Hence, the right to due process was satisfied in the case at
bar.
Page 11 of 186
5. FERRER, JR. v. BAUTISTA
FACTS: Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-
2095, S-2011, or the Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City
which allowed the imposition of special assessment (1/2 of the
assessed value of land in excess of P100k).
Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-20135 was enacted on December
16, 2013 and took effect ten days after when it was approved
by the City Mayor relative to Garbage Collection Fees
imposing fees depending on the amount of the land or floor
area.
Jose Ferrer, as a property in Quezon City questioned the
validity of the city ordinances. Ferrer claims that the city has
no power to impose the tax. The SH Tax violates the rule on
equality because it burdens real property owners with
expenses to provide funds for the housing of informal settlers.
The SH Tax is confiscatory or oppressive.
On the validity of the garbage fees imposition, Ferrer claims
that it violates the rule on double taxation. And it violates the
rule on equality because the fees are collected from only
domestic households and not from restaurants, food courts,
fast food chains, and other commercial dining places that
spew garbage much more than residential property owners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances were valid.
HELD:
1st ordinance: Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City is valid.
Cities have the power to tax
It must be noted that local government units such as cities has
the power to tax. The collection for the socialized housing tax
is valid. It must be noted that the collections were made to
accrue to the socialized housing programs and projects of the
city.
The imposition was for a public purpose (exercise of power of
taxation + police power)
In this case, there was both an exercise of the power to tax
(primary) and police power (incidental). Removing slum areas
in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the underprivileged and
homeless constituents but advantageous to the real property
owners as well.
The situation will improve the value of the their property
investments, fully enjoying the same in view of an orderly,
secure, and safe community, and will enhance the quality of
life of the poor, making them law-abiding constituents and
better consumers of business products.
There is no violation of the rule on equality
Note: There is a substantial distinction between: real property
owner and an informal settler. In fact, the Supreme Court said
that the disparity is so obvious. It is inherent in the power to
tax that a State is free to select the subjects of taxation.
Inequities which result from a singling out of one particular
class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional
limitation.
All these requisites are complied with: An ordinance based on
reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional
guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements
for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose
of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
imposed regardless of whether the resident is from a
condominium or from a socialized housing project.
The classifications are not germane to the purpose of the
ordinance

The ordinance is not oppressive or confiscatory
The ordinance is also not oppressive since the tax rate being
imposed is consistent with the UDHA (Urban Development
and Housing Act of 1992). While the law authorizes LGUs to
collect SHT on properties with an assessed value of more than
P50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only covers properties
with an assessed value exceeding P100,000.00. As well, the
ordinance provides for a tax credit equivalent to the total
amount of the special assessment paid by the property owner
beginning in the sixth (6th) year of the effectivity of the
ordinance.
The declared purpose is: "promoting shared responsibility with
the residents to attack their common mindless attitude in over-
consuming the present resources and in generating waste."
Instead of simplistically categorizing the payee into land or
floor occupant of a lot or unit of a condominium, socialized
housing project or apartment, respondent City Council should
have considered factors that could truly measure the amount
of wastes generated and the appropriate fee for its collection.
Factors include, among others, household age and size,
accessibility to waste collection, population density of the
barangay or district, capacity to pay, and actual occupancy of
the property.

2nd ordinance: The imposition of garbage fee is invalid.

SC:
Note: There was no violation of double taxation but there was
a violation of the rule on equity. → Validity of Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City is upheld.

There is no violation of double taxation: the garbage fees
are not taxes
In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, the
Court declared that:
→ Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an annual
garbage fee on all domestic households in Quezon City, is
unconstitutional and illegal

"if the generating of revenue is the primary purpose

and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is
a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact
that incidentally revenue is also obtained does not
make the imposition a tax."

Contention of Ferrer: That the imposition of garbage fee is

tantamount to double taxation because garbage collection is
a basic and essential public service that should be paid out
from property tax, business tax, transfer tax, amusement tax,
community tax certificate, other taxes, and the IRA of the
Quezon City Government. All these are valid taxes. The
garbage fees are license fees.

Footnote: In order to constitute double taxation in the

objectionable or prohibited sense the same property must be
taxed twice when it should be taxed but once; both taxes must
be imposed on the same property or subject-matter, for the
same purpose, by the same State, Government, or taxing
authority, within the same jurisdiction or taxing district, during
the same taxing period, and they must be the same kind or
character of tax.

There is a violation of the rule on equality: no substantial

distinction

There is no substantial distinction between an occupant of a

lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a condominium,
socialized housing project or apartment, on the other hand.

Most likely, garbage output produced by these types of

occupants is uniform and does not vary to a large degree;
thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and equitable.

The garbage fees or rates are unjust and inequitable

A resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or socialized

housing project has to pay twice the amount than a resident
of a lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all occupants of
a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed
rate of Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is

Page 12 of 186
 6. PHILIPPINE CARE HEALTH PROVIDERS, INC. v. equally and uniformly, lest the tax collector kill the
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNATL REVENUE "hen that lays the golden egg."

Legitimate enterprises enjoy the constitutional protection not

FACTS: On January 27, 2000, the respondent CIR sent
petitioner assessment of deficiency taxes, both Value-Added
Tax (VAT) and documentary stamp tax (DST) in the total
amount of P224,702,641.18 for taxable years 1996 and 1997.
Petitioner protested such assessment in a letter, but the
respondent did not act on the protest which led the petitioner
to file a petition in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) seeking the
cancellation of said assessments. CTA partially granted the
petition wherein the petitioner is ordered to pay the deficiency
VAT and set aside the DST deficiency tax.
Respondent appealed in Court of Appeals (CA) with regard to
the cancellation of DST assessment. CA granted the petition.
The Court affirmed CA’s decision. Hence, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration.
to be taxed out of existence. Incurring losses because of a tax
imposition may be an acceptable consequence but killing the
business of an entity is another matter and should not be
allowed. It is counter-productive and ultimately subversive of
the nation’s thrust towards a better economy which will
ultimately benefit the majority of our people.
Moreover, HMOs play an important role in society as partners
of the State in achieving its constitutional mandate of providing
citizens with affordable health services.
Also, the DST assessment of the petitioner for the years 1996
and 1997 became moot and academic since it availed tax
amnesty under RA 9480 on December 10, 2007. Thus,
petitioner is entitled to immunity from payment of taxes for
taxable year 2005 and prior years.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is liable to pay the DST

on its health care agreement pursuant to Sec.185 of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997

RULING: Petition granted. Petitioner is not contemplated to

be included in “or other branch insurance” covered by Section
185 of NIRC because it is a Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO) and not an insurance company. HMOs primary
purpose is rendering service to its member by lowering prices
and reducing the cost rather than the risk of medical health.
On the other hand, insurance businesses undertakes for a
consideration to indemnify its clients against loss, damage or
liability arising from unknown or contingent event. The term
“indemnify” therein presuppose that a liability or claim has
already been incurred. In HMOs, there is no indemnity
precisely because the member merely avails of medical
services to be paid or already paid in advance at a pre-agreed
price under the agreements.

The Power To Tax Is Not The Power To Destroy

As a general rule, the power to tax is an incident of sovereignty

and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very nature
no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be found only
in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax
on the constituency who is to pay it.51 So potent indeed is the
power that it was once opined that "the power to tax involves
the power to destroy."

Petitioner claims that the assessed DST to date which

amounts to ₱376 million53 is way beyond its net worth of ₱259
million.54 Respondent never disputed these assertions. Given
the realities on the ground, imposing the DST on petitioner
would be highly oppressive. It is not the purpose of the
government to throttle private business. On the contrary, the
government ought to encourage private enterprise.55
Petitioner, just like any concern organized for a lawful
economic activity, has a right to maintain a legitimate
business. As aptly held in Roxas, et al. v. CTA, et al.:

The power of taxation is sometimes called also the

power to destroy. Therefore it should be exercised
with caution to minimize injury to the proprietary
rights of a taxpayer. It must be exercised fairly,

Page 13 of 186
 7. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. CITY OF
CABANATUAN
FACTS: Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled
corporation created under Commonwealth Act No. 120, as
amended.
For many years now, petitioner sells electric power to the
residents of Cabanatuan City, posting a gross income of
P107,814,187.96 in 1992.7 Pursuant to section 37 of
Ordinance No. 165-92,8 the respondent assessed the
petitioner a franchise tax amounting to P808,606.41,
representing 75% of 1% of the latter’s gross receipts for the
preceding year.
Petitioner refused to pay the tax assessment arguing that the
respondent has no authority to impose tax on government
entities. Petitioner also contended that as a non-profit
organization, it is exempted from the payment of all forms of
taxes, charges, duties or fees in accordance with sec. 13 of
Rep. Act No. 6395, as amended.
The respondent filed a collection suit in the RTC, demanding
that petitioner pay the assessed tax due, plus surcharge.
Respondent alleged that petitioner’s exemption from local
taxes has been repealed by section 193 of the LGC, which
reads as follows:
“Sec. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges.-
Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax
exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently
enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical,
including government owned or controlled
corporations, except local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938,
non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational
institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity
of this Code.”
RTC upheld NPC’s tax exemption. On appeal the CA reversed
the trial court’s Order on the ground that section 193, in
relation to sections 137 and 151 of the LGC, expressly
withdrew the exemptions granted to the petitioner.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent city government has the authority
to issue Ordinance No. 165-92 and impose an annual tax on
“businesses enjoying a franchise
HELD: YES. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government, for
without taxes, the government can neither exist nor endure. A
principal attribute of sovereignty, the exercise of taxing power
derives its source from the very existence of the state whose
social contract with its citizens obliges it to promote public
interest and common good. The theory behind the exercise of
the power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes,
government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general
welfare and well-being of the people.
Section 137 of the LGC clearly states that the LGUs can
impose franchise tax “notwithstanding any exemption granted
by any law or other special law.” This particular provision of
the LGC does not admit any exception. In City Government of
San Pablo, Laguna v. Reyes, MERALCO’s exemption from
the payment of franchise taxes was brought as an issue before
this Court. The same issue was involved in the subsequent
case of Manila Electric Company v. Province of Laguna.75
Page 14 of 186
Ruling in favor of the local government in both instances, we
ruled that the franchise tax in question is imposable despite
any exemption enjoyed by MERALCO under special laws, viz:
“It is our view that petitioners correctly rely on
provisions of Sections 137 and 193 of the LGC to
support their position that MERALCO’s tax
exemption has been withdrawn. The explicit
language of section 137 which authorizes the
province to impose franchise tax ‘notwithstanding
any exemption granted by any law or other special
law’ is all-encompassing and clear. The franchise tax
is imposable despite any exemption enjoyed under
special laws.
Section 193 buttresses the withdrawal of extant tax exemption
privileges. By stating that unless otherwise provided in this
Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently
enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including
government-owned or controlled corporations except (1) local
water districts, (2) cooperatives duly registered under R.A.
6938, (3) non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational
institutions, are withdrawn upon the effectivity of this code, the
obvious import is to limit the exemptions to the three
enumerated entities. It is a basic precept of statutory
construction that the express mention of one person, thing,
act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the
familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. In the
absence of any provision of the Code to the contrary, and we
find no other provision in point, any existing tax exemption or
incentive enjoyed by MERALCO under existing law was
clearly intended to be withdrawn.
Reading together sections 137 and 193 of the LGC, we
conclude that under the LGC the local government unit may
now impose a local tax at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of
the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar based on
the incoming receipts realized within its territorial jurisdiction.
The legislative purpose to withdraw tax privileges enjoyed
under existing law or charter is clearly manifested by the
language used on (sic) Sections 137 and 193 categorically
withdrawing such exemption subject only to the exceptions
enumerated. Since it would be not only tedious and
impractical to attempt to enumerate all the existing statutes
providing for special tax exemptions or privileges, the LGC
provided for an express, albeit general, withdrawal of such
exemptions or privileges. No more unequivocal language
could have been used.” (emphases supplied)
Doubtless, the power to tax is the most effective instrument to
raise needed revenues to finance and support myriad
activities of the local government units for the delivery of basic
services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and
the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the
people. As this Court observed in the Mactan case, “the
original reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges
granted to government-owned or controlled corporations and
all other units of government were that such privilege resulted
in serious tax base erosion and distortions in the tax treatment
of similarly situated enterprises.” With the added burden of
devolution, it is even more imperative for government entities
to share in the requirements of development, fiscal or
otherwise, by paying taxes or other charges due from them.
 B. DUE PROCESS
1. REPUBLIC v. CAGANDAHAN
FACTS: On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer
Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13,
1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live
Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a... condition where
persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to
have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six,
underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has
small ovaries. At age... thirteen, tests revealed that her
ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing
and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then
alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in
mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she
prayed that... her birth certificate be corrected such that her
gender be changed from female to male and her first name be
changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the
testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General
Hospital.
He explained that genetically respondent is female but
because her body secretes male hormones, her female
organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs
- female and male. He testified that this condition is very rare,
that respondent's uterus is not fully developed... because of
lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period.
He further testified that respondent's condition is permanent
and recommended the change of gender because respondent
has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male,
and the gender change would be... advantageous to her.
Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the
following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer
Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:... a) By
changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF
CAGANDAHAN; and... b) By changing the gender from
female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioner's school records, voter's
registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are
hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.
this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE
RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT
ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT'S MEDICAL
CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA
DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE."... respondent counters
that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was
not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of
Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was
furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on
December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in
Page 15 of 186
the course of the proceedings, respondent is actually a male
person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to
reflect his true sex/gender, change of sex or... gender is
allowed under Rule 108, and respondent substantially
complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court.
Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all
persons who have or... claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings.
Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a party
in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry.
He is an indispensable party without whom no final...
determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible
indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings,
the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the
requirements of the rules.
ISSUE: Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred
in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male,
on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and
her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff,"... under Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court.
RULING: The determination of a person's sex appearing in his
birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has
not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he
was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his
life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone
treatment and taken steps, like taking... lifelong medication, to
force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did
not. He chose not to do so.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity
of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has
handed out. In other words, we respect respondent's
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life
is already difficult for the... ordinary person. We cannot but
respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and
thus help make his life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case.
As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this
Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right
but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.
Considering the consequence that respondent's change of
name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in
respondent's change of name. Such a... change will conform
with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female
to male.
Republic's petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January
12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna, is AFFIRMED
ISSUE: Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her
birth certificate be changed.
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
lower court. It held that, in deciding the case, the Supreme
Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of
the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not
be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court made use
of the available evidence presented in court including the fact
that private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to
the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s body
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is
preponderant biological support for considering him as being
male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1)
the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with
what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court
respects the respondent’s congenital condition and his mature
decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
person.
The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right
but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons and the consequences that will follow.
Page 16 of 186
2. BRIGIDO B. QUIAO v. RITA C. QUIAO
FACTS: Respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for
legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao
(Brigido). The judgment finds petitioner-husband as the guilty
party and forfeited his share in the conjugal property in favor
of the common children.
The petitioner is saying that since the property relations
between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner
acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the
Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the
Civil Code, which provides: All property of the conjugal
partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and
wife.[60] Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties
covered by the conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested
right over half of the said properties, even after the
promulgation of the Family Code; and he insisted that no
provision under the Family Code may deprive him of this
vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which
prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it will
prejudice a person's vested right.
ISSUE: WON the forfeiture violated the vested right of the
petitioner?
HELD: NO.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent
do not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or
to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
contingency. The term vested right expresses the concept of
present fixed interest which, in right reason and natural justice,
should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an
innately just and imperative right which enlightened free
society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights,
cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a title legal or
equitable to the present or future enjoyment of property.
The concept of vested right is a consequence of the
constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a
present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice
is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only
legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created after the right has
become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right
to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional,
and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be
deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is
due process and such deprivation is founded in law and
jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to
due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent
prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be
awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed
that the trial court divide the community assets between the
petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence
warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the
community properties of the parties. Second, when the
Decision dated October 10, 2005 was promulgated, the
petitioner never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting
what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article
129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim
being deprived of his right to due process.
Also, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis
considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his
share of the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he
is the guilty party in a legal separation case.
Page 17 of 186
3. ANONYMOUS v. RADAM
FACTS: Ma. Victoria Radam, utility worker in the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos City in
Pangasinan, was charged with immorality. The unnamed
complainant alleged that respondent was unmarried but got
pregnant and gave birth outside wedlock. The complainant
claimed that respondent’s behavior tainted the image of the
judiciary.
In connection with the complaint, Judge Abella conducted a
discreet investigation to verify the allegations against
respondent. He find out that truthfulness of the allegation. He
was told by the respondent that they are unable to marry
because they plan to migrate to Canada. In a further
investigation it was revealed that the father of her son is
unknown, as shown by the child’s Certificate of Live Birth.
In this connection, Judge Abella recommends that respondent
MA. VICTORIA RADAM be accordingly found GUILTY of
IMMORAL CONDUCT or ACT UNBECOMING A COURT
EMPLOYEE. A suspension of one (1) month or a fine of
Php5,000.00 is respectfully recommended, with warning that
a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt
with more severely. After reviewing the findings and
recommendation of Judge Abella, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) recommended that, respondent be
absolved of the charge of immorality because her alleged
misconduct (that is, giving birth out of wedlock) did not affect
the character and nature of her position as a utility worker.
However, it proposed that she be held liable for conduct
unbecoming a court employee and imposed a fine ofP5,000
for stating in the birth certificate of her child Christian Jeon that
the father was "unknown" to her.
ISSUE: whether or not respondent may be held liable in
relation to her entry in her child’s birth certificate regarding her
son’s father?
RULING: No. The essence of due process in an
administrative proceeding is the opportunity to explain one’s
side, whether written or verbal.
This presupposes that one has been previously apprised of
the accusation against him or her. Here, respondent was
deprived of both with regard to her alleged unbecoming
conduct in relation to a certain statement in the birth certificate
of her child. She was indicted only for alleged immorality for
giving birth out of wedlock. It was the only charge of which she
was informed. Judge Abella’s investigation focused solely on
that matter. She was neither confronted with it nor given the
chance to explain it. To hold her liable for a totally different
charge of which she was totally unaware will violate her right
to due process. Case dismissed
 4. MACIAS v. MACIAS
FACTS: This involves an administrative complaint filed by
complainant Margie C. Macias charging her husband, Mariano
Joaquin S. Macias (Judge Macias), with immorality and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The
complaint was filed on March 7, 2001, when respondent
was still sitting as the presiding judge of Branch 28 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Liloy, Zamboanga del
Norte.
Complainant alleged that sometime in 1998, respondent
engaged in an illicit liaison and immoral relationship with
a certain Judilyn Seranillos (Seranillos), single and in her
early 20s. The relationship continued until the time of the
filing of the complaint.
The witness for respondent was Judge Macias himself. He
denied the allegations of Mutia and Zozobrado. He said that
complainant also filed a complaint for concubinage against
him, but the same was dismissed by the Regional State
Prosecutor for lack of sufficient evidence. He believed
that complainant’s accusations were brought about by her
psychiatric condition characterized as severe paranoia.
judge who cannot live up to this exacting requirement has
no business sitting on the bench. Considering the
proliferation of complaints of abuses and immorality
committed by judges, it is only proper that the Court be
ever vigilant in requiring impeccable conduct from the
members of its bench.
However, in this case, we are not convinced that
complainant was able to prove, by substantial evidence,
that respondent committed the acts complained of. Basic
is the rule that in administrative proceedings, complainant
bears the onus of establishing the averments of her
complaint. If complainant fails to discharge this burden,
respondent cannot be held liable for the charge.
Under Sections 8 and 11 of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, a judge found guilty of immorality can be dismissed
from the service, if still in the active service, or may forfeit
all or part of his retirement benefits, if already retired,
and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office including government-owned or controlled
corporations. We have already ruled that if a judge is to
be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against
him should be competent and derived from direct
knowledge. This quantum of evidence, complainant failed to
satisfy.

Nevertheless, we agree with the findings of the

Issue: Whether or not substantial evidence is sufficient to Investigating Justice that although the charges of
establish the guilt of a judge charged with a grave offense immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service were not satisfactorily proven by complainant,
respondent cannot be completely exonerated. Mutia’s
testimony that he saw Judge Macias having dinner with
Ruling: Yes. While substantial evidence would ordinarily
Seranillos and entering a bedroom with her may not
suffice to support a finding of guilt, the rule is a bit
satisfactorily prove the charge of immorality, but this act
different where the proceedings involve judges charged
certainly suggested an appearance of impropriety, Judge
with grave offense. Administrative proceedings against
Macias being a married man. Such behavior undeniably
judges are, by nature, highly penal in character and are
constituted unbecoming conduct, a light offense punishable
to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases.
by a fine not less than ₱1,000.00 but not more than
In more recent rulings, however, the Court applied ₱10,000.00. In light of the circumstances affecting not only
substantial evidence as the normative quantum of proof the reputation of Judge Macias himself but the image and
necessary in resolving administrative complaints against reputation of the whole judiciary as well, we find it
judges. In order to diffuse confusion, a clarification has to be reasonable to impose upon him the maximum fine of
made. First, the pronouncements in Horilleno and Alcuizar ₱10,000.00.
may be said to have been superseded by the Court’s
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative
recent rulings in Gutierrez v. Belen, Reyes v. Paderanga,
complaint for immorality and conduct prejudicial to the
and Naval v. Panday.
best interest of the service against respondent Judge
Second, members of the judiciary are not a class of their Mariano Joaquin S. Macias of RTC, Branch 28, of Liloy,
own, sui generis, in the field of public service as to Zamboanga del Norte is DISMISSED for insufficiency of
require a higher degree of proof for the administrative evidence. However, respondent is held administratively
cases filed against them other than, perhaps, the fact liable for UNBECOMING CONDUCT and FINED in the
that because of the nature of the responsibility judges amount of ₱10,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement
have, they are required to live up to a higher standard benefits.
of integrity, probity and morality. When we dismiss a public
officer or employee from his position or office for the
commission of a grave offense in connection with his
office, we merely require that the complainant prove
substantial evidence. When we disbar a disgraceful lawyer,
we require that complainant merely prove a clear
preponderance of evidence to establish liability. There
appears no compelling reason to require a higher degree
of proof when we deal with cases filed against judges.

Judges play a vital role in the dispensation of justice. In this

jurisdiction, the integrity demanded of a judge does not
commence only when he dons the habiliments of a
magistrate or ends when he sheds off his judicial robe.
The nature of the position requires nothing less than a
24-hour daily obeisance to this mandate of integrity. Any

Page 18 of 186
5. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. INDAR
FACTS: This is an administrative complaint for gross
misconduct and dishonesty against respondent Judge Cader
P. Indar, Al Haj (Judge Indar).
There have been reports by the Local Civil Registrars of
Manila and Quezon City to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) that they have received an alarming
number of decisions, resolutions, and orders on annulment of
marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Indar.
The Audit Team found that the list of cases submitted by the
Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City do not
appear in the records of cases received, pending or disposed
by RTC.
Likewise, the annulment decisions did not exist in the records
of RTC-Cotabato, Branch 14. The Audit Team further
observed that the case numbers in the list submitted by the
Local Civil Registrars are not within the series of case
numbers recorded in the docket books
The audit team asked for confirmation on the authenticity of
Judge Indar’s decision, dated 23 May 2007, in Spec. Proc. No.
06-581, entitled “Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling,”
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. As regards this case, the
Audit Team found that Spec. Proc. No. 06-584 does not exist
in the records of cases filed, pending or disposed by RTC-
Shariff Aguak.
Meanwhile, in compliance with DCA Villasor’s Indorsement
and in response to the Australian Embassy letter, Judge Indar
explained, in a Letter dated 10 March 2010, that “this court is
a Court of General Jurisdiction and can therefore act even on
cases involving Family Relations. Hence, the subject decision
rendered by this Court annulling the marriage of your client is
VALID and she is free to marry.”
In a Resolution dated 4 May 2010, the Court En Banc
preventively suspended Judge Indar pending investigation of
this case.
Judge Indar failed to attend the hearing as rescheduled and
to submit the affidavit as required.
Justice Borreta proceeded to determine Judge Indar’s
administrative liability, and found the latter guilty of serious
misconduct and dishonesty.
According to Justice Borreta, Judge Indar’s act of issuing
decisions on annulment of marriage cases without complying
with the stringent procedural and substantive requirements of
the Rules of Court for such cases clearly violates the Code of
Judicial Conduct. Judge Indar made it appear that the
annulment cases underwent trial, when the records show no
judicial proceedings occurred.
Moreover, Judge Indar’s act of affirming in writing before the
Australian Embassy the validity of a decision he allegedly
rendered, when in fact that case does not appear in the court’s
records, constitutes dishonesty. Justice Borreta
recommended the dismissal of Judge Indar from service, and
the investigation of Atty. Silongan, who is not included as
respondent in this case, on her participation in the certification
of the authenticity of the spurious Decisions.
Page 19 of 186
ISSUE: Whether or not there was due process when the court
handled Judge Indar’s case.
RULING: Yes. It is settled that technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative
proceedings. Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. It is
enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before
the case against him is decided.
In this case, Judge Indar was given ample opportunity to
controvert the charges against him. While there is no proof
that Judge Indar personally received the notices of hearing
issued by the Investigating Justices, the first two notices of
hearing were received by one Mustapha Randang of the Clerk
of Court, RTC-Cotabato, while one of the notices was received
by a certain Mrs. Asok, who were presumably authorized and
capable to receive notices on behalf of Judge Indar.
The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, which govern the conduct of disciplinary and
nondisciplinary proceedings in administrative cases, clearly
provide that technical rules of procedure and evidence do not
strictly apply to administrative proceedings.
“Section 3. Technical Rules in Administrative
Investigations.· Administrative investigations shall be
conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the
technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to
judicial proceedings.”
In other words, Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold
the law, issued decisions on the questioned annulment of
marriage cases, without any showing that such cases
underwent trial and complied with the statutory and
jurisprudential requisites for voiding marriages. Such act
undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct.
In this case, Judge Indar issued Decisions on numerous
annulment of marriage cases when in fact he did not conduct
any judicial proceedings on the cases. Not even the filing of
the petitions occurred. Judge Indar made it appear in his
Decisions that the annulment cases complied with the
stringent requirements of the Rules of Court and the strict
statutory and jurisprudential conditions for voiding marriages,
when quite the contrary is true, violating Canon 3 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge perform
official duties honestly.
Considering that Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and
dishonesty, constituting violations of the Lawyer’s Oath, and
Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Judge Indar deserves disbarment.
 6. GO v. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN
FACTS: October 2001, Mr. George Isleta, the Head of
Letran’s Auxiliary Services Department, received information
that certain fraternities were recruiting new members among
Letran’s high school students. He also received a list of the
students allegedly involved. School authorities started an
investigation, including the conduct of medical examinations
on the students whose names were on the list.
The school physician, reported that six (6) students bore
injuries, probable signs of blunt trauma of more than two
weeks, on the posterior portions of their thighs. Mr. Rosarda,
the Assistant Prefect for Discipline, conferred with the
students and asked for their explanations in writing.
Four (4) students, namely admitted that they were neophytes
of the Tau Gamma Fraternity and were present in a hazing rite
held on October 3, 2001 in the house of one Dulce in Tondo,
Manila. They also identified the senior members of the
fraternity present at their hazing. These included Kim Go, then
a fourth year high school student.
At the Parents-Teachers Conference, Rosarda informed Kim’s
mother, petitioner Mrs. Angelita Go (Mrs. Go), that students
had positively identified Kim as a fraternity member. Mrs. Go
expressed disbelief as her son was supposedly under his
parents’ constant supervision.
Mr. Rosarda thereafter spoke to Kim and asked him to explain
his side. Kim responded through a written statement; he
denied that he was a fraternity member. He stated that at that
time, he was at Dulce’s house to pick up a gift, and did not
attend the hazing. On the same day, Mr. Rosarda requested
Kim’s parents (by notice) to attend a conference on January
8, 2002 to address the issue of Kim’s fraternity membership.
Both Mrs. Go and petitioner Mr. Eugene Go (Mr. Go) did not
attend the conference.
The respondents found substantial basis in the neophytes’
statements that Kim was a senior fraternity member. Letran
decided to allow the fourth year students to graduate from
Letran. Students who were not in their fourth year were
allowed to finish the current school year but were barred from
subsequent enrollment in Letran.
Mr. Rosarda conveyed to Mrs. Go and Kim, in their conference
on January 15, 2002, the decision to suspend Kim from
January 16, 2002 to February 18, 2002. Incidentally, Mr. Go
did not attend this conference. On even date, Mrs. Go
submitted a request for the deferment of Kim’s suspension to
January 21, 2002 so that he could take a previously scheduled
examination. The request was granted.
The respondents proposed that the students and their parents
sign a pro-forma agreement to signify their conformity with
their suspension. Mr. and Mrs. Go refused to sign. They also
refused to accept the respondents’ finding that Kim was a
fraternity member. They likewise insisted that due process
had not been observed.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for damages
before the RTC of Caloocan City claiming that the
respondents had unlawfully dismissed Kim. Mr. and Mrs. Go
also sought compensation for the “business opportunity
losses” they suffered while personally attending to Kim’s
disciplinary case.
Page 20 of 186
ISSUE: WON petitionser’s right to due process was violated.
RULING: NO. In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, the
Court held that Guzman v. National University, is the authority
on the procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases. In
Guzman, we laid down the minimum standards in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, as
follows:
[I]t bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases
involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings
similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in
courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases
may be summary; and crossexamination is not, contrary to
petitioners’ view, an essential part thereof. There are withal
minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands
of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students
must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to
answer the charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence
against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence
in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case.
Since disciplinary proceedings may be summary, the
insistence that a “formal inquiry” on the accusation against
Kim should have been conducted lacks legal basis. It has no
factual basis as well. While the petitioners state that Mr. and
Mrs. Go were “never given an opportunity to assist Kim,”56
the records show that the respondents gave them two (2)
notices, dated December 19, 2001 and January 8, 2002, for
conferences on January 8, 2002 and January 15, 2002.57 The
notices clearly state: “Dear Mr./Mrs. Go, We would like to seek
your help in correcting Kim’s problem on: Discipline & Conduct
Offense: Membership in Fraternity.” Thus, the respondents
had given them ample opportunity to assist their son in his
disciplinary case. “Where a party was afforded an opportunity
to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot
[thereafter] complain of deprivation of due process.”
The petitioners nevertheless argue that the respondents
defectively observed the written notice rule because they had
requested, and received, Kim’s written explanation at a time
when the respondents had not yet issued the written notice of
the accusation against him.
We see no merit in this argument as the petitioners apparently
hew to an erroneous view of administrative due process.
Jurisprudence has clarified that administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in the strict judicial
sense. The very nature of due process negates any concept
of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every
imaginable situation. Thus, we are hard pressed to believe
that Kim’s denial of his fraternity membership before formal
notice was given worked against his interest in the disciplinary
case. What matters for due process purpose is notice of what
is to be explained, not the form in which the notice is given.
The raison d’etre of the written notice rule is to inform the
student of the disciplinary charge against him and to enable
him to suitably prepare a defense. We are not convinced that
Kim’s right to explain his side as exercised in his written denial
had been violated or diminished. The essence of due process,
it bears repeating, is simply the opportunity to be heard. And
Kim had been heard. His written explanation was received,
indeed even solicited, by the respondents. Thus, he cannot 7. CUDIA v. SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
claim that he was denied the right to adduce evidence in his MILITARY ACADEMY
behalf.

FACTS: Cadet 1 CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa

Class of 2014 of the PMA, the country's premiere military
academy located at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio City. He
belonged to the "A" Company and was the Deputy Baron of
his class. As claimed by petitioners and petitioner-intervenor
(hereinafter collectively called "petitioners," unless otherwise
indicated), he was supposed to graduate with honors as the
class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the
top Navy cadet graduate, and be commissioned as an ensign
of the Philippine Navy.

Professor Juanita Beron 5th period class issued a

Delinquency Report (DR) against Cadet 1 CL Cudia because
he was "late for two (2) minutes in his Eng 412 class. the DRs
reached the Department of Tactical Officers. They were
logged and transmitted to the Company Tactical Officers
(CTO) for explanation of the concerned cadets. Two days
later, Cadet lCL Cudia received his DR. Cadet lCL Cudia was
informed that Maj. Hindang reported him to the HC21 for
violation of the Honor Code. the HC constituted a team to
conduct a preliminary investigation on the reported honor
violation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. The formal investigation against
Cadet 1 CL Cu di a then ensued. the OIC of the HC forwarded
the Formal Investigation Report to the Staff Judge Advocate
(SJA) for review. Special Orders No. 26 was issued by the
PMA Headquarters placing Cadet 1 CL Cudia on indefinite
leave of absence without pay and allowances effective
February 10, 2014 pending approval of his separation by the
AFPGHQ, barring him from future appointment and/or
admission as cadet, and not permitting him to qualify for any
entrance requirements to the PMA. Vice Admiral Abogado
approved the recommendation to dismiss Cadet 1 CL Cudia.
Cadet lCL Cudia submitted a letter to the Office of the
Commandant of Cadets requesting for reinstatement by the
PMA of his status as a cadet.

Cadet lCL Cudia made his personal appeal letter to Maj. Gen.
Lopez. On even date, the AFP Chief of Staff ordered a
reinvestigation following the viral Facebook post of Annavee
demanding the intervention of the military leadership. Cadet 1
CL Cudia and his family engaged the services of the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO) in Baguio City. the Spouses Cudia
filed a letter-complaint before the CHR-Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR) Office against the HC members
and Maj. Gracilla for alleged violation of the human rights of
Cadet lCL Cudia, particularly his rights to due process,
education, and privacy of communication. CHR-CAR issued
its Resolution with respect to CHR-CAR Case.The
Commission on Human Rights-CAR Office finds PROBABLE
CAUSE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS against the
officers and members of the PMA Honor Committee and ..
certain PMA officials, specifically for violations of the rights of
CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA to dignity, due process,
education, privacy/privacy of communication, and good life

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the PMA committed grave abuse of

discretion in dismissing Cudia in utter disregard of his right to
due process and in holding that he violated the (Honor
Codethrough lying

Page 21 of 186
2. Whether or not the court can interfere ,with military affair
RULING:
1.No. The determination of ,whether the PMA cadet has rights
to due process, education,and property should be placed in
the context of the Honor Code.All the administrative
reremedies ,were exhausted. A student of a military academy
must be prepared to subordinate his private interest for the
proper functioning of the institution" The PMA may impose
disciplinary measures and punishments as it deems fit and
consistent ,with the peculiar needs of the institution" PMA
hasre!ulatory authority to administratively dismiss erring
cadets. PMA has a right to invoke academic freedom in the
enforcement of the internal rules and regulations.
2. Yes. The court is part of the checks and balance machinery
mandated by Article VIII of the Constitution. The courts
mandate according to Section 1 Article 8 is expanded that the
duty of the courts is not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights ,which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine ,whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government even if the latter does not
exercise judicial' quasi-judicial' or ministerial functions. No one
is above the law' including the military' especially in violations
of Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Page 22 of 186
8. AGABON v. NLRC
FACTS: Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the
business of selling and installing ornamental and construction
materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny
Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2,
1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for
abandonment of work. Thus, Petitioners then filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims. Petitioners
also claim that private respondent did not comply with the twin
requirements of notice and hearing. Private respondent, on
the other hand, maintained that petitioners were not dismissed
but had abandoned their work
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.
RULING: Petitioners’ dismissal was for a just cause. They had
abandoned their employment and were already working for
another employer. Abandonment is the deliberate and
unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment.
It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for
termination of employment by the employer.
To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the
existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins the
employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and
to defend himself. Thus, the procedures for dismissal should
be observed. Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a
just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the
employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to
be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the
employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which
dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard
and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the
decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on
authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer
must give the employee and the Department of Labor and
Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of
his separation.
From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be
derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article 282
of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article 283,
or for health reasons under Article 284, and due process was
observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause
but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just
or authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4)
the dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due process
was not observed.
The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The
dismissal should be upheld because it was established that
the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another
company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the
notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices
to the last known addresses would have been useless
because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for
the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the
law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee’s
last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-
compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.
That in cases involving dismissals for cause but without
observance of the twin requirements of notice and hearing, the
better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine and to follow
Wenphil by holding that the dismissal was for just cause but
imposing sanctions on the employer. Such sanctions,
however, must be stiffer than that imposed in Wenphil.
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case,
the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the
dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the
employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of
his statutory rights in the form of nominal damages, i.e.
P30,000.00.
Page 23 of 186
9. MICHAEL H. v. GERALD D.
FACTS: Gerald D. was the presumptive father of Victoria D.
since she was born to his wife Carole D.. However, Carole had
an adulterous partner, Michael H., who obtained blood tests
indicating that he was likely the biological father. When
Michael obtained visitation rights in a California state court,
Gerald argued that Michael had no ground under California
law to challenge Gerald's paternity since more than two years
had passed since Victoria's birth. According to Cal. Evid. Code
621, the child is "presumed to be a child of the marriage" and
another man can only challenge this presumption within two
years of birth. The court ruled in favor of Gerald and canceled
Michael's visitation rights. Michael claimed that Code 621
violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by
denying him an opportunity to establish his paternity. A
California Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of
Code 621.
ISSUE: Does Cal. Evid. Code 621 violate the Due Process
Clause by denying a possible biological father the chance to
establish his paternity of a child after two years have passed
since the child's birth?
RULING: NO. Based on its analysis of common-law tradition,
the plurality opinion found that a possible biological father
does not have a fundamental right to obtain parental rights
after the presumptive father has exercised significant
responsibility over the child. Therefore due process protection
does not apply. Code 621 was based on common-law
precedent which showed "an aversion to declaring children
illegitimate" and supported "the interest in promoting the
'peace and tranquility of States and families.'" Restricting
Michael's parental rights achieved this by granting Gerald the
sole responsibility to play the role of Victoria's father.
 10. WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG, 521 U.S. 702
(1997)
FACTS: It as always been a crime to assist a suicide in the
State of Washington. The State's present law makes
"[p]romoting a suicide attempt" a felony, and provides: "A
person is guilty of [that crime] when he knowingly causes or
aids another person to attempt suicide." Dr. Harold
Glucksberg -- along with four other physicians who
occasionally treat terminally ill, suffering patients, declare that
they would assist these patients in ending their lives if not for
the State's assisted suicide ban. They, along with three
gravely ill plaintiffs who have since died and a nonprofit
organization that counsels people considering physician
assisted suicide, filed this suit against petitioners, the State
and its Attorney General, seeking a declaration that the ban
is, on its face, unconstitutional. They assert a liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause which extends to a personal choice by a mentally
competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician assisted
suicide. The Federal District Court agreed, concluding that
Washington's assisted suicide ban is unconstitutional
because it places an undue burden on the exercise of that
constitutionally protected liberty interest. The en banc Ninth
Circuit affirmed.
asserted right has no place in our Nation's traditions, given the
country's consistent, almost universal, and continuing
rejection of the right, even for terminally ill, mentally competent
adults. To hold for respondents, the Court would have to
reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike
down the considered policy choice of almost every State.
The constitutional requirement that Washington's assisted
suicide ban be rationally related to legitimate government
interests is unquestionably met here. These interests include
prohibiting intentional killing and preserving human life;
preventing the serious public health problem of suicide,
especially among the young, the elderly, and those suffering
from untreated pain or from depression or other mental
disorders; protecting the medical profession's integrity and
ethics and maintaining physicians' role as their patients'
healers; protecting the poor, the elderly, disabled persons, the
terminally ill, and persons in other vulnerable groups from
indifference, prejudice, and psychological and financial
pressure to end their lives; and avoiding a possible slide
towards voluntary and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia.
The relative strengths of these various interests need not be
weighed exactingly, since they are unquestionably important
and legitimate, and the law at issue is at least reasonably
related to their promotion and protection.

ISSUE: WON Washington's ban on physician assisted-suicide

violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by
denying competent terminally ill adults the liberty to choose
death over life. NO

HELD: An examination of our Nation's history, legal traditions,

and practices demonstrates that Anglo American common law
has punished or otherwise disapproved of assisting suicide for
over 700 years; that rendering such assistance is still a crime
in almost every State; that such prohibitions have never
contained exceptions for those who were near death; that the
prohibitions have in recent years been reexamined and, for
the most part, reaffirmed in a number of States; and that the
President recently signed the Federal Assisted Suicide
Funding Restriction Act of 1997, which prohibits the use of
federal funds in support of physician assisted suicide.

In light of that history, this Court's decisions lead to the

conclusion that respondents' asserted "right" to assistance in
committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause. The Court's established
method of substantive due process analysis has two primary
features: First, the Court has regularly observed that the
Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and
liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition. Second, the Court has required a "careful
description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. The
Ninth Circuit's and respondents' various descriptions of the
interest here at stake--e.g., a right to "determin[e] the time and
manner of one's death," the "right to die," a "liberty to choose
how to die," a right to "control of one's final days," "the right to
choose a humane, dignified death," and "the liberty to shape
death"--run counter to that second requirement. Since the
Washington statute prohibits "aiding another person to
attempt suicide," the question before the Court is more
properly characterized as whether the "liberty" specially
protected by the Clause includes a right to commit suicide
which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so. This

Page 24 of 186
 11. LAWRENCE et al. v. TEXAS 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
Argued March 26, 2003—Decided June 26, 2003;
JUSTICE KENNEDY
FACTS: In Houston, Texas, officers of the Harris County
Police Department were dispatched to a private residence in
response to a reported weapons disturbance. They entered
an apartment where one of the petitioners, John Geddes
Lawrence, resided. The right of the police to enter does not
seem to have been questioned. The officers observed
Lawrence and another man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a
sexual act. The two petitioners were arrested, held in custody
over night, and charged and convicted before a Justice of the
Peace.
The complaints described their crime as "deviate sexual
intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the same sex
(man)." The applicable state law is Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
21.06(a). It provides: "A person commits an offense if he
engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual
of the same sex." The statute defines "[d]eviate sexual
intercourse" as follows: (A) any contact between any part of
the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another
person; or (B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of
another person with an object." § 21.01(1).
The petitioners exercised their right to a trial de novo in Harris
County Criminal Court. They challenged the statute as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and of a like provision of the Texas Constitution.
Those contentions were rejected. The petitioners, having
entered a plea of nolo contendere, were each fined $200 and
assessed court costs of $141.25.
The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District
considered the petitioners' federal constitutional arguments
under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment. After hearing the case en banc
the court, in a divided opinion, rejected the constitutional
arguments and affirmed the convictions. In affirming, the
State Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that the statute was not
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Then, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.
ISSUES: (1) WON the petitioners' criminal convictions under
the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law—which criminalizes
sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical
behavior by different-sex couples—violate the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
(2) WON the petitioners' criminal convictions for adult
consensual sexual intimacy in their home violate their vital
interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
(3) WON Bowers v. Hardwick should be overruled.
HELD: The main question before the Court is the validity of a
Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same
sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. On June 26,
2003, the Supreme Court released its 6–3 decision striking
down the questioned Texas statute. Five justices held it
violated due process guarantees, and a sixth, Sandra Day
O'Connor, held it violated equal protection guarantees. The
five-member majority opinion overruled Bowers v. Hardwick
Page 25 of 186
and implicitly invalidated similar sodomy statutes in 13 other
states.
Resolution of this case depends on whether petitioners were
free as adults to engage in private conduct in the exercise of
their liberty under the Due Process Clause. For this inquiry the
US Supreme Court deems it necessary to reconsider its
Bowers holding. The Bowers Court's initial substantive
statement-"The issue presented is whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy ... ," To say that the issue in Bowers was
simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans
the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a
married couple were it said that marriage is just about the right
to have sexual intercourse. Although the laws involved in
Bowers and here purport to do no more than prohibit a
particular sexual act, their penalties and purposes have more
far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private
human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of
places, the home. They seek to control a personal relationship
that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is
within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished
as criminals. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows
homosexual persons the right to choose to enter upon
relationships in the confines of their homes and their own
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.
Having misapprehended the liberty claim presented to it, the
Bowers Court stated that proscriptions against sodomy have
ancient roots. It should be noted, however, that there is no
longstanding history in U.S. of laws directed at homosexual
conduct as a distinct matter. Early American sodomy laws
were not directed at homosexuals as such but instead sought
to prohibit non-procreative sexual activity more generally,
whether between men and women or men and men.
Moreover, early sodomy laws seem not to have been enforced
against consenting adults acting in private. Instead, sodomy
prosecutions often involved predatory acts against those who
could not or did not consent: relations between men and minor
girls or boys, between adults involving force, between adults
implicating disparity in status, or between men and animals.
The longstanding criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy
upon which Bowers placed such reliance is as consistent with
a general condemnation of non-procreative sex as it is with an
established tradition of prosecuting acts because of their
homosexual character. The Bowers Court was, of course,
making the broader point that for centuries there have been
powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral,
but the US Supreme Court's obligation is to define the liberty
of all, not to mandate its own moral code. The Nation's laws
and traditions in the past half century are most relevant here.
They show an emerging awareness that liberty gives
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.
Bowers' deficiencies became even more apparent in the years
following its announcement. The 25 States with laws
prohibiting the conduct referenced in Bowers are reduced now
to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual
conduct. In those States, including Texas, that still proscribe
sodomy (whether for same-sex or heterosexual conduct),
there is a pattern of nonenforcement with respect to
consenting adults acting in private. Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992)
confirmed that the Due Process Clause protects personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education-and Romer
v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 624-which struck down class-based
legislation directed at homosexuals-cast Bowers' holding into
even more doubt. The stigma the Texas criminal statute
imposes, moreover, is not trivial.
Although the offense is but a minor misdemeanor, it remains
a criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of the
persons charged, including notation of convictions on their
records and on job application forms, and registration as sex
offenders under state law. Where a case's foundations have
sustained serious erosion, criticism from other sources is of
greater significance. In the United States, criticism of Bowers
has been substantial and continuing, disapproving of its
reasoning in all respects, not just as to its historical
assumptions. And, to the extent Bowers relied on values
shared with a wider civilization, the case's reasoning and
holding have been rejected by the European Court of Human
Rights, and that other nations have taken action consistent
with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults
to engage in intimate, consensual conduct. There has been
no showing that in this country the governmental interest in
circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or
urgent. Stare decisis is not an inexorable command. Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828. Bowers' holding has not
induced detrimental reliance of the sort that could counsel
against overturning it once there are compelling reasons to do
so. Bowers causes uncertainty, for the precedents before and
after it contradict its central holding.
In his dissenting opinion in Bowers, JUSTICE STEVENS
concluded that (1) the fact a State's governing majority has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice,
and (2) individual decisions concerning the intimacies of
physical relationships, even when not intended to produce
offspring, are a form of “liberty” protected by due process. That
analysis should have controlled Bowers, and it controls here.
Bowers was not correct when it was decided, is not correct
today, and is hereby overruled. This case does not involve
minors, persons who might be injured or coerced, those who
might not easily refuse consent, or public conduct or
prostitution. It does involve two adults who, with full and
mutual consent, engaged in sexual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle. Petitioners' right to liberty under the Due
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in private
conduct without government intervention. Casey, supra, at
847. The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest
which can justify its intrusion into the individual's personal and
private life.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Texas
Fourteenth District was reversed, and the case was remanded
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this (US Supreme
Court’s) opinion.
Page 26 of 186
12. OBERGEFELL ET AL. v. HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL.
FACTS: The petitioners, 14 same-sex couples and two men
whose same-sex partners are deceased, filed suits in Federal
District Courts in their home States, claiming that respondent
state officials violate the Fourteenth Amendment by denying
them the right to marry or to have marriages lawfully
performed in another State given full recognition. Each District
Court ruled in their favor. Respondents appealed the
decisions to the United States Court of Appeals. USCA
reversed the judgments of the District Courts. USCA held that
a State has no constitutional obligation to license same-sex
marriages or to recognize same-sex marriages performed out
of State. The petitioners sought certiorari before the SC of US.
ISSUE: WON the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to
license/recognize a same-sex marriage licensed and
performed in a State which does grant that right. YES
HELD: The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to
license a marriage between two people of the same sex.
The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to certain personal
choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including
intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs. Courts
must exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of
the person so fundamental that the State must accord them
its respect. History and tradition guide and discipline the
inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. When new insight
reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections
and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be
addressed.
Applying these tenets, the Court has long held the right to
marry is protected by the Constitution. For example, Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12, invalidated bans on interracial
unions, and Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 95, held that
prisoners could not be denied the right to marry. To be sure,
these cases presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex
partners, as did Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810, a one-line
summary decision issued in 1972, holding that the exclusion
of same-sex couples from marriage did not present a
substantial federal question. But other, more instructive
precedents have expressed broader principles. In assessing
whether the force and rationale of its cases apply to same-sex
couples, the Court must respect the basic reasons why the
right to marry has been long protected. This analysis compels
the conclusion that same-sex couples may exercise the right
to marry.
Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons
marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with
equal force to same-sex couples. First, the right to personal
choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of
individual autonomy. Decisions about marriage are among the
most intimate that an individual can make. This is true for all
persons, whatever their sexual orientation. Second, the right
to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person
union unlike any other in its importance to the committed
individuals. Same-sex couples have the same right as
opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association. Third, right
to marry safeguards children and families and thus draws
meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and
education. Without the recognition, stability, and predictability
marriage offers, children suffer the stigma of knowing their
families are somehow lesser. They also suffer the significant
material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated
to a more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws
at issue thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex
couples. Finally, the Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions
make clear that marriage is a keystone of the Nation’s social
order. States have contributed to the fundamental character
of marriage by placing it at the center of many facets of the
legal and social order. There is no difference between same
and opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle, yet
same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that
the States have linked to marriage. It is demeaning to lock
same-sex couples out of a central institution of the Nation’s
society, for they too may aspire to the transcendent purposes
of marriage.
Page 27 of 186
13. WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM
CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. CITY OF
MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR
ALFREDO S. LIM
FACTS: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim
(Mayor Lim) signed into law Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An
Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time
Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels,
Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila"
Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with the RTC praying that the
Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.
MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria
Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time
basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays
of only three hours.
Petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium
Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development
Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit
attached complaint-in-intervention7 on the ground that the
Ordinance directly affects their business interests as
operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. The three
companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies
which owns and operates several hotels and motels in Metro
Manila.
RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and
void.
Version of the Respondents
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the
Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to
Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which
confers on cities, among other local government units, the
power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses
and other similar establishments, including tourist
guides and transports.
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the
power of the City under Article III, Section 18(kk) of the
Revised Manila Charter, thus:
"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and
proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance
of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality,
peace, good order, comfort, convenience and
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and
such others as be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of
ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred
pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such
fine and imprisonment for a single offense.

Version of the Petitioner
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and
void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of
movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is
an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their
business.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and
affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.
TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review
on certiorari. In their petition and Memorandum, petitioners in
essence repeat the assertions they made before the Court of
Appeals. They contend that the assailed Ordinance is an
invalid exercise of police power.
ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 7774 be declared void and
unconstitutional. YES
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure
shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private
rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power
is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is
affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take it away
from the vastness of State police power whose exercise
enjoys the presumption of validity.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact
already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by
applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as
curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers
through active police work would be more effective in easing
the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws
and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These
measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of
the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is
apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by
merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to
those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele
by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel
rooms and even apartments.

HELD: Ordinance N. 7774 is void and unconstitutional. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED.
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the
conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of
necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect
itself and its people. Police power has been used as
justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.
These range from the regulation of dance halls, movie
theaters, gas stations and cockpits. The awesome scope of
police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its
hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal system,
its use has rarely been denied.

The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not

eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves,
are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the
police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do
not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those
means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging
sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill
of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of
Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities
animated by his cynicism.

That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate

depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative
business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It
must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive of private rights.71 It must also be
evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More
importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Page 28 of 186
 14. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
Cebu City Branch vs. MILAGROS O.
MONTESCLAROS, (G.R. No. 146494; July 14, 2004)
FACTS: Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros
married Milagros Orbiso on 10 July 1983. Nicolas was a 72-
year old widower when he married Milagros who was then 43
years old.
Nicolas filed with the GSIS an application for retirement
benefits under Presidential Decree No. 1146 or the Revised
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 ("PD 1146"). In his
retirement application, Nicolas designated his wife Milagros as
his sole beneficiary. GSIS approved Nicolas' application for
retirement "effective 17 February 1984," granting a lump sum
payment of annuity for the first five years and a monthly
annuity thereafter. Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros
filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under PD
1146. On 8 June 1992, GSIS denied the claim because under
Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to
survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the
marriage with the pensioner within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension. According to GSIS,
Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from
his date of retirement on "17 February 1984."
On 2 October 1992, Milagros filed with the trial court a special
civil action for declaratory relief questioning the validity of
Section 18 of PD 1146 disqualifying her from receiving
survivorship pension.
Trial court: rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for
survivorship pension.
CA: affirmed
ISSUE: WON Section 18 of PD 1146 violates due process.
YES
HELD: SEC. 18. Death of a Pensioner. Upon the death of a
pensioner, the primary beneficiaries shall receive the
applicable pension mentioned under paragraph (b) of section
seventeen of this Act: Provided, That, the dependent spouse
shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the
pensioner is contracted within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension. When the pensioner dies
within the period covered by the lump sum, the survivorship
pension shall be paid only after the expiration of the said
period. This shall also apply to the pensioners living as of the
effectivity of this Act, but the survivorship benefit shall be
based on the monthly pension being received at the time of
death. (Emphasis supplied)
Under PD 1146, the primary beneficiaries are (1) the
dependent spouse until such spouse remarries, and (2) the
dependent children.
Retirement Benefits as Property Interest
Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility
requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is
protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a
protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to
immediate payment under pre-existing law. Thus, a pensioner
Page 29 of 186
acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as
provided under the terms of the public employees' pension
statute. No law can deprive such person of his pension rights
without due process of law, that is, without notice and
opportunity to be heard.
In addition to retirement and disability benefits, PD 1146 also
provides for benefits to survivors of deceased government
employees and pensioners. Under PD 1146, the dependent
spouse is one of the beneficiaries of survivorship benefits. A
widow's right to receive pension following the demise of her
husband is also part of the husband's contractual
compensation.
Denial of Due Process
The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, which provides that "[n]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws." The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying
a dependent spouse's claim for survivorship pension if the
dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner
within the three-year prohibited period. There is outright
confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without
giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard. The
proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to
assure comprehensive and integrated social security and
insurance benefits to government employees and their
dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, and
retirement of the government employees.
The "whereas" clauses of PD 1146 state:
WHEREAS, the Government Service Insurance
System in promoting the efficiency and welfare of the
employees of the Government of the Philippines,
administers the laws that grant to its members social
security and insurance benefits;
WHEREAS, it is necessary to preserve at all times
the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by
the System; to guarantee to the government
employee all the benefits due him; and to expand
and increase the benefits made available to him and
his dependents to the extent permitted by available
resources;
WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws have
impeded the efficient and effective discharge by the
System of its functions and have unduly hampered
the System from being more responsive to the
dramatic changes of the times and from meeting the
increasing needs and expectations of the Filipino
public servant;
WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws that have
prejudiced, rather than benefited, the government
employee; restricted, rather than broadened, his
benefits, prolonged, rather than facilitated the
payment of benefits, must now yield to his paramount
welfare;
WHEREAS, the social security and insurance
benefits of government employees must be
continuously re-examined and improved to assure
comprehensive and integrated social security and
insurance programs that will provide benefits
responsive to their needs and those of their
 dependents in the event of sickness, disability,
death, retirement, and other contingencies; and to
serve as a fitting reward for dedicated public service;
WHEREAS, in the light of existing economic
conditions affecting the welfare of government
employees, there is a need to expand and improve
the social security and insurance programs
administered by the Government Service Insurance
System, specifically, among others, by increasing
pension benefits, expanding disability benefits,
introducing survivorship benefits, introducing
sickness and income benefits, and eventually
extending the compulsory coverage of these
programs to all government employees regardless of
employment status.
PD 1146 has the following purposes:
a. to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of
the funds administered by the System;
b. to guarantee to the government employee all the
benefits due him; and
c. to expand, increase, and improve the social
security and insurance benefits made available to
him and his dependents such as:
- increasing pension benefits
- expanding disability benefits
- introducing survivorship benefits
- introducing sickness income benefits
- extending compulsory membership to
government employees irrespective of status25
The law extends survivorship benefits to the surviving and
qualified beneficiaries of the deceased member or pensioner
to cushion the beneficiaries against the adverse economic
effects resulting from the death of the wage earner or
pensioner.
15. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LIBERTY D.
ALBIOS (G.R. No. 198780; October 16, 2013)
FACTS: Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were
married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Mandaluyong City
(MeTC).
Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after
their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband
and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of their
essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as
one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC was
of the view that the parties married each other for convenience
only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that
she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her
to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof,
she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer
returned to the United States and never again communicated
with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00
because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The
RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family
life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its
inception.
CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential
requisite of consent was lacking.
ISSUE: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
all acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00,
void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent? NO
HELD: Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be
valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence
of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that
the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios
and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their
consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood
the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences
of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully
comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship.
There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie
that would be created between them, since it was that precise
legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family
Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life.
The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no
real intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the
nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are
Page 30 of 186
governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage 16. SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT
may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the NETWORK, INC., on behalf of the South-South
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a Network (SSN) for Non-State Armed Group
marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what Engagement, and ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR.
the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of vs. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE
foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE
void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE
declared valid. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE CHIEF OF
STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE (G.R. No. 178552
October 5, 2010)

FACTS: Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed

challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known
as the Human Security Act. Impleaded as respondents in the
various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Councilcomposed of,
at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul
Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary
Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National
Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local
Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary
Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of
the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and
Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.

ISSUE: WON RA 9372 is unconstitutional. NO

HELD: Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and

impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism
under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and
"coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are
nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard
to measure the prohibited acts.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it

lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The overbreadth
doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the

overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand
what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is protected.

Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers

only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is
an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the

Page 31 of 186
parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or activities.
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his
concurring opinion that the vagueness and over-breadth
doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable
to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a
facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness
or over-breadth grounds. Since a penal statute may only be
assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited
vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372
is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge
against them.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law
penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of
"unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism must
necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression
protected by the free speech clause.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372,
there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to
trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other
elements of the crime, including the coercion of the
government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the
presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition
cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected
speech.
Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely
inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an
element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime
entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like
in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in
haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in
negotiating a deceitful transaction.
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an
actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA
9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed
definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The
Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither
contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future
effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be
used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in
Congress.
NOTE: A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free
speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation
are rightly excepted.
In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan it was held that:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The
possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed
by the possibility that the protected speech of others
may be deterred and perceived grievances left to
fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal
statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their
very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting
laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
Page 32 of 186
C. EQUAL PROTECTION
1. LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE
TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010. CONSOLIDATED
WITH G.R. No. 193036
FACTS: For consideration before the Court are two
consolidated cases both of which essentially assail the validity
and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30,
2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010."
In, G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1
for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the
constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public
office and to appropriate funds therefor.
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman,
Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando
B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of
the House of Representatives.
The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body
formed under the Office of the President with the primary task
to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by
third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an
"independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within
the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control.
Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is
one.
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of
an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of
the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-
judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle,
or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All
it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-
finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable
cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our
courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil
or administrative penalties or sanctions.
ISSUES: WON EO No. 1 unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the
legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail Executive
Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes
usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which
they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve
to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present
the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as
members of the legislature before the Court.
As held in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez:
 To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired,
so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial
injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In
such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to
the courts.
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution
in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to
question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the
creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to
reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised
Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates
"reorganization" as limited by the following functional and
structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of
the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating
or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit
to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the
President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or
(3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President
to any other Department/Agency or vice versa.
Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations
where a body or an office is already existent but a modification
or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an
office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said
provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the
negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office
of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition,
even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term
"restructure" an "alteration of an existing structure." Evidently,
the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the
President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1.
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the
Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.
Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power
to create public offices. The former is inherent in the
Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid
delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully
execute the laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from
Congress, empowering the President to create a public office?
According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission
pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis under
P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as
a justification for the President to create a public office. Said
decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D.
No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
national government including the power to create offices and
transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the
decree, embodied in its last "Whereas" clause:
Page 33 of 186
WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary
form of government will necessitate flexibility in the
organization of the national government.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing
manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No.
1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio
upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly
provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to
primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to
recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no
quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it
cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it.
Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not
supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission
will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the
Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a
consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct
a fact-finding investigation. The actual prosecution of
suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of
the charges against them, is certainly not a function given to
the commission. The phrase, "when in the course of its
investigation," under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and
gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the
petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the
filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains
to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.
At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A.
No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly
authorized government agencies. The same holds true with
respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter
1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by
no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body
likewise tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the
investigative power of the President, the Court finds difficulty
in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in
view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection
clause.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state
actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover
all the departments of the government including the political
and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state
denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever
agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply
requires is equality among equals as determined according to
a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It
is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification."
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1
should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission
is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has
been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order.
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo
administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class
of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to
include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial
Power that "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government."
Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the
power of judicial review which is the power to declare a treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on
the constitutionality of the application, or operation of
presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions,
ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions,
however, have been fertile grounds of conflict between the
Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of
government, on the other. Many times the Court has been
accused of asserting superiority over the other departments.
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is
not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather
simply making sure that any act of government isdone in
consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by
the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no
constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more
authority of proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise,
the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void
and unconstitutional.
Page 34 of 186
2. JESUS C. GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN
T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-
Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-
GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children,
: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all
surnamed GARCIA
This is an appeal assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262
(An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes) as being violative
of the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Constitution
FACTS: Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed for herself and in behalf of
her minor children, a verified petition before the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia
pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical
abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a
result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner. Private
respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife. On
the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent,
is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience
from his wife and children. Things turned for the worse when
petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's
Bank, Bacolod City. Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of
fights that left private respondent physically and emotionally
wounded.
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger
of violence against respondent and her children exists or is
about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO on March 24, 2006 for
thirty (30) days. The TPO has been continuously extended
and renewed by the RTC after appearing that the hearing
could not yet be finally terminated. During the pendency of
Civil Case, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a
petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary
restraining order, challenging the constitutionality of R.A. 9262
for being violative of the due process and the equal protection
clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil
case for being an unwanted product of an invalid law. On
January 24, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition for failure of
petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings
before the trial court in the civil case, thus, appealing to the
Supreme Court. Petitioner contends that on the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to
respond, he is stripped of family, property, guns, money,
children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter
of seconds, without an inkling of what happened
ISSUE: WON R.A. 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative
of the equal protection clause. NO
HELD: The Supreme Court find that R.A. 9262 is based on a
valid classification, as such, did not violate the equal
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of
violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.
R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions - The unequal
power relationship between women and men; the fact that
women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and
the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all
make for real differences justifying the classification under the
law.
Women are the usual and most likely victims of violence - At
the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official
statistics on violence against women and children shows that
female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of
abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported
cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such
as their husbands and live-in partners. On the other hand, no
reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and
violence against men in the Philippines because incidents
thereof are relatively low.
Gender Bias and Prejudices - From the initial report to the
police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes
against women are often treated differently and less seriously
than other crimes.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore,
be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like
a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice
and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take
could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or
dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC
may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the
hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and
hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It
is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is
protection of women and children from violence and threats to
their personal safety and security.
The Court also pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex
parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately
given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition
within five (5) days from service. The opposition to the petition
which the respondent himself shall verify, must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show
cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should
not be issued. It is clear from the foregoing rules that the
respondent of a petition for protection order should be
apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an
opportunity to present his side.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Page 35 of 186
3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs MARELYN
TANEDO MANALO (G.R. No. 221029)
FACTS: Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for
cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San
Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce
rendered by a Japanese court. petitioner is previously married
in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO
MINORO; That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree,
petitioner and her divorced Japanese husband are no longer
living together; that this petition is filed principally for the
purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the marriage
between the petitioner and the said Japanese national,
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. It opined
that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine
law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce,
whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are
married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that
unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country.
CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable
even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes
the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to
remarry.
ISSUE: WON Article 26(2) of the Family Code violates the
equal protection clause. YES
HELD: Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is
erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the City
Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer
e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the
State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind
adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it
would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain
classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by
law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce
as written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for
a valid classification and that its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the court of justice, such
classification may be subjected to judicial review.44 The
deference stops where the classification violates a
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise,
this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more
exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If a
legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is
required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden
is upon the government to prove that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is
the least restrictive means to protect such interest.
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict
scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those basic
liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.
It includes the right to free speech, political expression, press, courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such
assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote. proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the
On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest prejudice of our kababayan.
is measured by the scale rights and powers arrayed in the
Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual
liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public
interest, public safety or the general welfare. It essentially
involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy,
overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take
precedence over the latter.

Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress,

the same principle applies with respect to the acts of the
President which have the force and effect of law unless
declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential
requisites of the equal protection clause. Particularly, the
limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree
initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly

situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen.
There are real, material and substantial differences between
them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are
political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well
as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar,
that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has
to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree
obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null
and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his
her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with
the national law of the foreigner.

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference

between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings
a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of
his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and
foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the
same rights and obligations in an alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their
foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands.
Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on
the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce
proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment
gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the
other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is

arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino
citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized
even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38
of the Family Code. In filing for divorce based on these
grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking
foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she
should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The
dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is
not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial
ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanism now
existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been
better if the dissent discussed in detail what these
"mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's
case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent
refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our

Page 36 of 186
 4. ANTONIO M. SERRANO, Petitioner, vs. Gallant The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled
MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months
NAVIGATION CO., INC., Respondents. (G.R. No. and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and
167614; March 24, 2009 ) jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject

FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents
Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co.,
Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12
months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of
US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid
vacation leave per month. On the date of his departure,
Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract upon the assurance and representation
of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of
April 1998.
clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less" in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
and the December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1, 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to the effect
that petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for the entire
unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of
nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of
US$1,400.00 per month.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano

Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second
Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving only two
months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine
months and twenty-three days. Upon complaint filed by
Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was
declared illegal. On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA
decision based on the provision of RA 8042. Serrano filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned
the constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of RA 8042.

ISSUE: WON the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section

10 of RA 8042 is constitutional. NO

HELD: The subject clause "or for three months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in the 5th paragraph
of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042

introduced a differentiated rule of computation of the money
claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their
employment periods, in the process singling out one category
whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or
more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of
having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3
months or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less,
but all the while sparing the other category from such
prejudice, simply because the latter's unexpired contracts fall
short of one year.

The subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination

among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one
year: those who are illegally dismissed with less than one year
left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the
entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally
dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts
shall be covered by the subject clause, and their monetary
benefits limited to their salaries for three months only.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of

R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other
OFWs to equal protection.

The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive

governmental purpose; and it is for that precise reason that
the clause violates not just petitioner's right to equal
protection, but also her right to substantive due process under
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

Page 37 of 186
 5. SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and,
vs. JOY C. CABILES (G.R. No. 170139 August 5, therefore, null and void.
2014)

FACTS: Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency,

Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.

Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang

from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was
terminated and that “she should immediately report to their
office to get her salary and passport.” She was asked to
“prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy claims that she was
told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total
of NT$9,000. According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to
cover her plane ticket to Manila.

Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year

employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00.
Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd.
(Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her
employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for
one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.

On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal

with the NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed
the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA affirmed the
ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding
respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three
months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her
repatriation, and attorney’s fees

ISSUE: WON Republic Act. No. 10022 which was declared

unconstitutional is a law. NO

HELD: A statute or provision which was declared

unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights; it imposes
no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.”

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No

branch or office of the government may exercise its powers in
any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of
the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The
Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws
must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is
inconsistent with it is a nullity.

Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is

inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured
by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law
or provision. A law or provision of law that was already
declared unconstitutional remains as such unless
circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse
conclusion.

The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as

provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96
Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed to show
any compelling change in the circumstances that would
warrant us to revisit the precedent.

The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section

Page 38 of 186
6. United States vs Windsor 570 U.S. 744, 26 June 2013
Facts: The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), enacted in
1996, states that, for the purposes of federal law, the words
"marriage" and "spouse" refer to legal unions between one
man and one woman. Since that time, some states have
authorized same-sex marriage. In other cases regarding the
DOMA, federal courts have ruled it unconstitutional under the
Fifth Amendment, but the courts have disagreed on the
rationale.
In 2007, Edith Windsor and Thea Clara Spyer, both residents
of New York, married in Toronto, Ontario, under the provisions
set forth in the Canadian Civil Marriage Act, after 40 years of
romantic partnership. Canada's first openly gay judge, Justice
Harvey Brownstone, officiated. The State of New York
recognizes the marriage.
After Spyer's death in 2009, Edith Windsor as the widow and
sole executor of the estate of her late spouse was required to
pay $363,053 in federal estate taxes on her inheritance of her
wife's estate. Had federal law recognized the validity of their
marriage, Windsor would have qualified for an unlimited
spousal deduction and paid no federal estate taxes.
In May 2008, New York Governor David Paterson had ordered
state agencies to recognize same-sex marriages performed in
other jurisdictions. Some lower-level state courts had made
similar rulings, but whether the state's highest court would give
such a ruling the force of law, as Windsor's claim for a refund
required, remained uncertain and was disputed throughout
her lawsuit.
District Court
On November 9, 2010 Windsor filed suit in district court
seeking a declaration that the Defense of Marriage Act was
unconstitutional. At the time the suit was filed, the
government's position was that DOMA must be defended. On
February 23, 2011, the President and the Attorney General
announced that they would not defend DOMA. On April 18,
2011, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) of the
House of Representatives filed a petition to intervene in
defense of DOMA and motioned to dismiss the case. The
district court denied the motion, and later held that DOMA was
unconstitutional.
New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman filed a brief
supporting Windsor's claim on July 26, 2011, arguing that
DOMA Section 3 could not survive the scrutiny used for
classifications based on sex and constitutes "an intrusion on
the power of the state to define marriage". On June 6, 2012,
Judge Barbara S. Jones ruled that a rational basis review of
Section 3 of DOMA showed it to be unconstitutional, as it
violated plaintiff's rights under the equal protection guarantees
of the Fifth Amendment, and ordered that Windsor receive the
tax refund due to her. Where BLAG had argued that the Spyer-
Windsor marriage was not recognized by New York law at the
time of Spyer's death – a prerequisite for Windsor's claim
against the IRS – Jones cited the "informal opinion letters" of
the state's governor, attorney general, and comptroller to the
contrary along with several opinions in New York appellate
courts.
Court of Appeals
On October 18, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the lower court's ruling that Section 3 of DOMA is
unconstitutional. The majority opinion stated, "It is easy to
conclude that homosexuals have suffered a history of
discrimination." Thus they were part of a quasi-suspect class
that deserves any law restricting its rights to be subjected to
intermediate scrutiny. Because DOMA could not pass that
Page 39 of 186
test, Judge Jacobs wrote, it is unconstitutional under the equal
protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.
On September 11, 2012, following Windsor's petition for
certiorari before judgment and before the Second Circuit's
ruling, the Department of Justice filed its own petition for
certiorari before judgment with the Supreme Court. After the
appellate ruling on October 18, the parties filed supplemental
briefs. On December 7, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in the case, now United States v. Windsor, accepting the
DOJ's petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Defense of Marriage Act, which
defines the term "marriage" under federal law as a "legal union
between one man and one woman" deprive same-sex couples
who are legally married under state laws of their Fifth
Amendment rights to equal protection under federal law?
Held Yes. In a 5–4 decision issued on June 26, 2013, the
Supreme Court found Section 3 of DOMA to be
unconstitutional, "as a deprivation of the liberty of the person
protected by the Fifth Amendment". The Court held that states
have the authority to define marital relationships and that
DOMA goes against legislative and historical precedent by
undermining that authority. The result is that DOMA denies
same-sex couples the rights that come from federal
recognition of marriage, which are available to other couples
with legal marriages under state law. The Court held that the
purpose and effect of DOMA is to impose a "disadvantage, a
separate status, and so a stigma" on same-sex couples in
violation of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal
protection.
The Court held that the Constitution prevented the federal
government from treating state-sanctioned heterosexual
marriages differently from state-sanctioned same-sex
marriages, and that such differentiation "demean[ed] the
couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution
protects".
Justice Anthony Kennedy authored the majority opinion which
held that to strike down a central part of DOMA cited the
principles of state autonomy, equal protection and liberty, but
the constitutional basis for striking down the law was not
entirely clear, as it had elements of federalism, equal
protection and due process.
The answer may be found in Windsor's brief, in which she
argues that DOMA operates to say "that married gay couples
aren't genuinely married at all but are instead 'similarly
situated' to unmarried people"
The Court wrote:
DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to
protect. By doing so it violates basic due process and equal
protection principles applicable to the Federal Government.
When New York adopted a law to permit same-sex marriage,
it sought to eliminate inequality; but DOMA frustrates that
objective through a system-wide enactment with no identified
connection to any particular area of federal law. DOMA writes
inequality into the entire United States Code.
DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed all persons
with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own
children, that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages
of others. The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate
purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and
to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought
to protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace
this protection and treating those persons as living in
marriages less respected than others, the federal statute is in D. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
violation of the Fifth Amendment.

1. UNITED STATES vs Jeffrey GRUBBS 547 U.S. 90

(2006)

FACTS: On April 17, 2002, United States Postal Inspector

Gary Welsh (“Welsh”) presented an “Application and Affidavit
for Anticipatory Search Warrant” to a federal magistrate judge.
The application sought authority to conduct a search of
Grubbs' residence on the basis of an order Grubbs allegedly
placed for a videotape entitled “Lolita Mother and Daughter.”
Grubbs allegedly ordered the videotape from a website that
advertised for sale numerous videos depicting illegal child
pornography. Welsh averred that Grubbs sent him a letter
which contained $45 in cash and a note stating:  “I hope this
makes it to you please send film asap thanks Jeff Grubbs.” On
the basis of this evidence, the magistrate judge issued an
anticipatory search warrant.

The face of the warrant stated:

Affidavit(s) having been made before me by _ who
has reason to believe that on the premises known as
residence of Jeffrey Grubbs, [Address] as more
particularly described in Attachment A to the
attached Affidavit, in the Eastern District of California
there is now concealed a certain person or property,
namely the records and materials described in
Attachment B to the attached Affidavit. I am
satisfied that the affidavit(s) and any recorded
testimony establish probable cause to believe that
the person or property so described is now
concealed on the person or premises above-
described and establish grounds for the issuance of
this warrant.

As revealed by the “now concealed” language, the in artfully

drafted warrant approved by the magistrate was written on a
form “forthwith” search warrant. The only indication that the
warrant was an anticipatory search warrant was the word
“ANTICIPATORY,” handwritten at the top of the page above
the words “SEARCH WARRANT.” The warrant itself did not
state what triggering conditions needed to occur in order to
make the warrant valid; nor did it state the criminal activity of
which Grubbs was suspected.

The warrant relied on a 25-page affidavit to satisfy the

specificity and particularity requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. According to the affidavit, the warrant would
become operative once the videotape Grubbs ordered was
“received by a person(s)” and “taken into the residence.”
Pages five and nineteen of the affidavit set forth these
“triggering events,” or conditions precedent, upon which a
search would become authorized. The affidavit also had two
attachments:  Attachment A described the premises to be
searched; Attachment B listed the items to be seized,
including the videotape and packing material, Grubbs' Web TV
components, and various other items.

The search took place two days later. At approximately 7:20

A.M., an undercover postal inspector delivered the videotape
to Grubbs' residence. Grubbs' wife accepted the delivery of
the package, signed for it, and took it into the house. A few
minutes later, Postal Inspector Thomas Brucklacher saw
Grubbs leaving. At approximately 7:24 A.M., Brucklacher and
Inspector Esteban approached Grubbs and, after identifying
themselves, told him to remain where he was standing.
Grubbs asked Brucklacher why he and the other inspectors
were there. Brucklacher did not answer, but instead referred
him to Inspector Welsh, who was then approaching the
residence. Meanwhile, Inspector Esteban performed a
patdown search of Grubbs.

Page 40 of 186
Shortly after Grubbs was detained outside of the house,
Inspector Welsh arrived at the premises with a number of
other law enforcement personnel. In all, there were ultimately
ten officers and inspectors at the scene. Welsh allegedly 9971
announced “Police/Search Warrant” at the front door. Grubbs'
wife, Ms. Bradstreet, disputed hearing that announcement, but
did testify that she heard a knock and answered the door.
Welsh briefly entered the house to help several other officers
perform a “protective sweep.” During that “protective sweep,”
the officers searched the house for other people and stopped
to prepare sketches of the interior. They permitted Grubbs'
children to leave for school after searching their backpacks.
After assisting the officers inside, Welsh went back outside to
speak with Grubbs, who was on the sidewalk with other
officers. Welsh identified himself, and stated either “You know
why we're here” or “Do you know why we're here?”  Grubbs
replied “yeah,” and said that what the officers were looking for
was in the garage. Welsh told Grubbs that he was not under
arrest, but that they were there to serve a search warrant, and
that they should go inside the house to talk.
Grubbs and Welsh, accompanied by Officer Esteban, entered
the house together and sat down at the dining room table. It
was not until 7:53 A.M., approximately 30 minutes after the
search began, that Welsh presented Grubbs with the search
warrant. The copy of the search warrant provided to Grubbs
included the two attachments, which described the place to be
searched and the items to be seized, but did not include the
affidavit that contained the “triggering events” or conditions
precedent that would serve to make the warrant operative.
Welsh contended that he had a copy of the affidavit with him
at all times during the search, and that his team had all read
the affidavit on the previous evening. However, the
government concedes that the affidavit was not presented to
Mr. Grubbs or Ms. Bradstreet, and that no copy of the affidavit
was left at the residence following the search.
After the warrant was presented, Welsh reminded Grubbs that
he was not under arrest, advised him of his Miranda rights,
and asked if he understood those rights. Grubbs said that he
did and agreed to speak to Welsh. The interview lasted
approximately 55 minutes. In it, Grubbs admitted that he had
ordered the pornography. He further admitted that he
possessed child pornography in various digital forms in his
home. At the conclusion of the interview, Grubbs was arrested
and handcuffed. The officers seized the videotape in question
along with several other items, including Grubbs' computer
and several computer diskettes.6
Within a few days, a grand jury returned an indictment
charging Grubbs with receiving a visual depiction of a minor
engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Grubbs filed a motion to
suppress evidence, in which he challenged the admissibility of
all of the seized evidence and his statements to Welsh.
Grubbs made three principal claims:  (1) that the agents'
failure to present the affidavit to Grubbs or his wife rendered
the warrant inoperative; (2) that the agents violated by failing
to present the search warrant at the outset of the search; and
(3) that his statement that the video was in the garage should
be excluded as the product of an impermissible custodial
interrogation. The first and third claims alleged constitutional
violations.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the
motion to suppress in a written order. With respect to Grubbs'
first claim, the Fourth Amendment claim, the district court held
that the anticipatory warrant could constitutionally be executed
even though it failed to designate the triggering event for the
implementation of the anticipatory search. It did so on the
basis that the warrant incorporated the affidavit by reference,
and that the affidavit was in the immediate presence of the
officers while they searched Grubbs' residence. The court did
not consider the officers' failure to present the affidavit to the
residents of the home to be searched as constituting a
Page 41 of 186
constitutional defect. The district judge admitted that “it is
logical that officers would be required to actually present the
affidavit setting forth the triggering event to the people whose
property they are searching in order to provide those people
with information regarding the parameters of the search.”
However, after concluding that no case from our circuit had
ruled on the precise question, the court declined to apply that
logic “in the absence of specific guidance from the Ninth
Circuit.”  Thus, it upheld the search, even though none of the
persons whose residence was searched were shown the
affidavit that identified the triggering event.
After filing a motion for reconsideration, which the district court
denied, Grubbs entered a conditional guilty plea to the sole
charge of the indictment-receiving a visual depiction of a minor
engaged in sexually explicit conduct. He reserved his right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court
sentenced him to thirty-three months imprisonment, a three-
year term of supervised release, a fine of $3,700, and a $100
special assessment. Grubbs timely appealed.
Jeffrey Grubbs appeals following his conditional guilty plea on
a charge of receiving a visual depiction of a minor engaged in
sexually explicit conduct. He contends that the district court
should have granted his motion to suppress evidence,
including his statements, because the anticipatory search
warrant that authorized the search of his premises was invalid
under the Fourth Amendment. To resolve Grubbs' claim, we
must determine whether a facially defective anticipatory
search warrant may be cured by information contained within
an affidavit when that affidavit is not presented to the person
or persons whose property is to be searched. We answer that
question in the negative, and hold that the search of Grubbs'
premises violated the Fourth Amendment.
ISSUE: Whether or not “anticipatory" search warrants under
the Fourth Amendment is constitutional
HELD: The Fourth Amendment states that “no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The
requirement that warrants “particularly describe the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” is most
often described as the “particularity requirement.” As the
Supreme Court has recently explained, that requirement
“applies with equal force to searches whose only defect is a
lack of particularity in the warrant.”
The Groh Court considered a warrant that “failed to identify
any of the items” to be seized. Despite the fact that the officers
conducting the search had presented to the reviewing
magistrate a detailed affidavit setting forth sufficient probable
cause for the search, the warrant itself did not explicitly
“incorporate by reference the itemized list [of things to be
seized] contained in the application.” The officers in Groh left
the residents of the searched home a copy of the search
warrant, “but not a copy of the application, which had been
sealed.”
The Court found that the officers' conduct directly conflicted
with the purpose of the Fourth Amendment's particularity
requirement: The Fourth Amendment by its terms requires
particularity in the warrant, not in the supporting documents.
And for good reason:  “The presence of a search warrant
serves a high function,” and that high function is not
necessarily vindicated when some other document,
somewhere, says something about the objects of the search,
but the contents of that document are neither known to the
person whose home is being searched nor available for her
inspection․
We have long held, moreover, that the purpose of the
particularity requirement is not limited to the prevention of
general searches. A particular warrant also “assures the
individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful
authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the
limits of his power to search.”
Our cases have long been in accord with the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Groh. We have held that a search warrant is
invalid when it does not contain a specific description of the
types of items to be seized. And, while we have permitted
facially defective warrants to be “cured” by an affidavit that (a)
is incorporated within the four corners of the warrant and (b)
“accompanies” the warrant, we have unequivocally held that
the defect is not cured if the officers fail to present the affidavit-
that is, an affidavit that is not shown to the persons being
subjected to the search does not have a curative effect on a
facially defective warrant.
As we explained in McGrew, we require affidavits to
accompany warrants not only in order to limit officers'
discretion in conducting the search, but also in order to “inform
the person subject to the search what items the officers
executing the warrant can seize.” If the officers conducting the
search were not required to present the affidavit to the
residents of the house being searched, law enforcement
personnel would be free to search as they like, and
homeowners and others would have no effective way to
ensure that the search of their premises conformed to the
lawful constraints approved by an impartial magistrate.
Our cases have similarly held, without exception, that the
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies
with full force to the conditions precedent to an anticipatory
search warrant. An anticipatory search warrant is not valid
until the occurrence of one or more “triggering events”-in other
words, the predicted future events that the magistrate
determines will create sufficient probable cause to justify the
search. And, “when a warrant's execution is dependent on the
occurrence of one or more conditions, the warrant itself must
state the conditions precedent to its execution and these
conditions must be clear, explicit, and narrow.”
The rationale for this rule is simple:  “a warrant conditioned on
a future event presents a potential for abuse above and
beyond that which exists in more traditional settings:
 inevitably, the executing agents are called upon to determine
when and where the triggering event specified in the warrant
has actually occurred.”
We have, however, permitted the triggering conditions of an
anticipatory search warrant to appear either on the face of the
warrant itself, or in the “attachments to the warrant] that those
executing the search maintain in their immediate possession
in order to guide their actions and to provide information to the
person whose property is being searched.” Still, while an
affidavit may qualify as a valid curing “attachment” to an
otherwise defective warrant, it counts as such only when the
affidavit actually “accompanies” the warrant.
The first requirement, that the application but not the warrant
itself identify the triggering event, does little if anything to limit
the discretion of the agents executing the warrant or to inform
the subject of the search whether it was authorized, if the
affidavit does not accompany the warrant. Indeed, that the
applicant and the magistrate may understand the parameters
of the search has no bearing on whether the officers executing
the warrant do, or whether the person to be searched is
properly advised of their authority.
The question in this case is whether a curative affidavit that
contains the conditions precedent to an anticipatory search
actually “accompanies” the warrant when the affidavit is not
shown to the person or persons being subjected to the search.
Given our prior holdings, and the Court's most recent decision
Page 42 of 186
in Groh, the district court was correct when it opined that “it is
logical that officers would be required to actually present the
affidavit setting forth the triggering event to the people whose
property they are searching in order to provide those people
with information regarding the parameters of the search.”
Likewise, the district court was right to conclude that the
“underlying reasoning” of Hotal supports the rule that “the
affidavit setting forth the triggering event for an anticipatory
warrant must be presented to the people whose property is
being searched.” The district court, however, was unwilling to
impose such a requirement in this case without further explicit
guidance from us.
We believe that our prior cases unambiguously require
officers to present any curative document-be it an affidavit,
attachment, or other instrument that supplies the particularity
and specificity demanded by the Fourth Amendment-to the
persons whose property is to be subjected to the search. To
the extent that there is any question that our cases have
adopted that rule, we do so explicitly now. Anticipatory search
warrants are invalid absent “clear, explicit, and narrow”
triggering conditions. Those triggering conditions may be
listed either in the warrant itself or in attached documents, but
whatever document contains them must be presented to the
person whose property is being searched. Absent such
presentation, individuals would “stand [no] real chance of
policing the officers' conduct,” because they would have no
opportunity to check whether the triggering events by which
the impartial magistrate has limited the officers' discretion
have actually occurred. In short, unless the officers “present”
the document containing the triggering events necessary to
render an anticipatory search warrant operative, the search
warrant is constitutionally invalid. In the absence of a proper
presentation, “the search is rendered illegal because the
warrant neither limits [the officers'] discretion nor gives the
homeowner the required information.”
In this case, there is no dispute that the officers failed to
present the affidavit-the only document in which the triggering
conditions were listed-to Grubbs or Bradstreet. At no point
before, during, or after the search did the officers show or read
the affidavit to either of them. The copy of the warrant left with
Ms. Bradstreet at the conclusion of the search did not include
the affidavit, nor did it otherwise include a list of the triggering
conditions. The warrant was therefore inoperative, and the
search was illegal.
Absent a constitutionally valid warrant, the officers lacked the
legal authority to enter the defendant's home. The fact that the
search ultimately may have been conducted in a manner
consistent with the application for the warrant is irrelevant. “If
a warrant fails for lack of particularity or specificity, it is simply
unconstitutional-without regard to what actually occurred.” Nor
is it significant that the officers may have possessed curative
documents during the search, unless those documents were
presented to the owners or occupants of the property:  “that
the applicant and the magistrate may understand the
parameters of the search has no bearing on whether the
person to be searched is properly advised of [the officers']
authority.” We therefore conclude that the officers in this case
did not execute a constitutionally valid warrant, and that they,
in effect, conducted a warrantless search. As a result, all
evidence obtained during that search, and following Welsh's
announcement of “Police/Search Warrant,” must be
suppressed. “All evidence” includes all of the evidence seized
after the initial entry, as well as all of Grubbs' statements, all
of which were taken either during the illegal entry or as a direct
causal result of it.
Thus, the failure to present the affidavit designating the
triggering events or conditions precedent to the operability of
the search warrant rendered the warrant constitutionally
invalid and the search illegal. Because Grubbs entered a
conditional guilty plea, we are required to remand and allow
him to withdraw his plea if he elects to do so. We therefore
reverse the denial of Grubbs' suppression motion and remand 2. RETIRED SPO4 BIENVENIDO LAUD v. PEOPLE 741
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. SCRA 239 (2014)

FACTS: Philippine National Police (PNP), through Police

Senior Superintendent Fajardo, applied with the RTC for a
warrant to search three (3) caves located located inside the
Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Maa, Davao City,
where the alleged remains of the victims summarily executed
by the so-called “Davao Death Squad” may be found. In
support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola was
presented to the RTC and there testified that he personally
witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in December 2005, and
was, in fact, part of the group that buried the victims.

Judge Peralta, acting as Vice Executive Judge of the Manila-

RTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant, and thus, issued Search Warrant which was later
enforced by the elements of the PNP-Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group, in coordination with the members of the
Scene of the Crime Operatives on July 15, 2009. The search
of the Laud Compound caves yielded positive results for the
presence of human remains.

Petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud (Laud), filed an

Urgent Motion to Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized
Evidence premised on the following grounds: (a) Judge
Peralta had no authority to act on the application for a search
warrant since he had been automatically divested of his
position as Vice Executive Judge when several administrative
penalties were imposed against him by the Court; (b) the
ManilaRTC had no jurisdiction to issue the Search Warrant
which was to be enforced in Davao City; (e) the search warrant
was issued despite lack of probable cause; and (g) there was
a violation of the rule requiring one-specific-offense and the
proper specification of the place to be searched and the
articles to be seized.

Manila-RTC Ruling
The RTC granted the motion of Laud. Respondents filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was, however, denied. The
People failed to show any compelling reason to justify the
issuance of a search warrant by the Manila-RTC which was to
be implemented in Davao City where the offense was
allegedly committed, in violation of Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court. The fact that the alleged offense happened
almost four (4) years before the search warrant application
was filed rendered doubtful the existence of probable cause;
the applicant, i.e., the PNP, violated the rule against forum
shopping as the subject matter of the present search warrant.

CA Ruling
CA granted the People's petition and thereby annulled and set
aside the Orders of the Manila-RTC for having been tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE #1:
WoN the administrative penalties imposed on Judge Peralta
invalidated the Search Warrant.

HELD #1:
No. Citing Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03802SC which
provides that “[t]he imposition upon an Executive Judge or
Vice Executive Judge of an administrative penalty of at least
a reprimand shall automatically operate to divest him of his
position as such”.

While the Court does agree that the imposition of said

administrative penalties did operate to divest Judge Peralta’s
authority to act as Vice Executive Judge, it must be qualified
that the abstraction of such authority would not, by and of
itself, result in the invalidity of Search Warrant considering that

Page 43 of 186
Judge Peralta may be considered to have made the issuance
as a de facto officer whose acts would, nonetheless, remain
valid.
Undoubtedly, there is a de jure office of a 2nd Vice Executive
Judge. Judge Peralta also had a colorable right to the said
office as he was duly appointed to such position and was only
divested of the same by virtue of a supervening legal
technicality — that is, the operation of Section 5, Chapter III of
A.M. No. 03802SC; also, it may be said that there was general
acquiescence by the public since the search warrant
application was regularly endorsed to the sala of Judge
Peralta by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the ManilaRTC
under his apparent authority as 2nd Vice Executive Judge.
Finally, Judge Peralta’s actual physical possession of the said
office is presumed to be in good faith, as the contrary was not
established. Accordingly, Judge Peralta can be considered to
have acted as a de facto officer when he issued Search
Warrant, hence, treated as valid as if it was issued by a de
jure officer suffering no administrative impediment.
ISSUE #2:
WoN the ManilaRTC had jurisdiction to issue the said warrant
despite non-compliance with the compelling reasons
requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
HELD #2:
Yes. Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03802SC states the
requirements for the issuance of search warrants in special
criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City. These
special criminal cases pertain to those “involving heinous
crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions, as well as violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code,
the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and
Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may
hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the
Supreme Court.”
Search warrant applications for such cases may be filed by
“the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine
National Police (PNP) and the AntiCrime Task Force
(ACTAF),” and “personally endorsed by the heads of such
agencies.” As in ordinary search warrant applications, they
“shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched
and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the
Rules of Court.” “The Executive Judges [of these RTCs] and,
whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not
physically present in the station, the Vice Executive Judges”
are authorized to act on such applications and “shall issue the
warrants, if justified, which may be served in places outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.”
The Court observes that all the above stated requirements
were complied with in this case.
As the records would show, the search warrant application
was filed before the ManilaRTC by the PNP and was endorsed
by its head, PNP Chief Jesus Ame Versosa, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized in connection with the heinous crime of Murder. Finding
probable cause therefor, Judge Peralta, in his capacity as 2nd
Vice Executive Judge, issued Search Warrant which, as the
rules state, may be served in places outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the said RTC.
Notably, the fact that a search warrant application involves a
“special criminal case” excludes it from the compelling reason
requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
As explicitly mentioned in Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No.
03802SC, the rule on search warrant applications before the
Manila and Quezon City RTCs for the above mentioned
Page 44 of 186
special criminal cases “shall be an exception to Section 2 of
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.” Perceptibly, the fact that a
search warrant is being applied for in connection with a special
criminal case as above classified already presumes the
existence of a compelling reason; hence, any statement to this
effect would be superfluous and therefore should be
dispensed with. By all indications, Section 12, Chapter V of
A.M. No. 03802SC allows the Manila and Quezon City RTCs
to issue warrants to be served in places outside their territorial
jurisdiction for as long as the parameters under the said
section have been complied with, as in this case. Thus, on
these grounds, the Court finds nothing defective in the
preliminary issuance of Search Warrant.
ISSUE #3: WoN the requirements of probable cause and
particular description were complied with, and the one-
specific- offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court was violated.
HELD #3:
Requirements of Probable Cause –YES
In order to protect the people’s right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Philippine Constitution provides that no search warrant shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized:
Complementarily, Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
states that a search warrant shall not be issued except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense.
In this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of Search Warrant is evident from the firsthand account of
Avasola who, in his deposition, stated that he personally
witnessed the commission of the aforestated crime and was,
in fact, part of the group that buried the victims.
Verily, the facts and circumstances established from the
testimony of Avasola, who was personally examined by Judge
Peralta, sufficiently show that more likely than not the crime of
Murder of six (6) persons had been perpetrated and that the
human remains in connection with the same are in the place
sought to be searched.
In Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc., the Court explained the
quantum of evidence necessary to establish probable cause
for a search warrant.
“Probable cause for a search warrant is
defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discrete and
prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that, more likely than not,
a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused. Probable cause
demands more than bare suspicion; it
requires less than evidence which would
justify conviction. The existence depends to
a large degree upon the finding or opinion
of the judge conducting the examination.
However, the findings of the judge should
not disregard the facts before him nor run
counter to the clear dictates of reason.”
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the quantum of
proof to establish the existence of probable cause had been
met. That a “considerable length of time” attended the search
warrant’s application from the crime’s commission does not,
by and of itself, negate the veracity of the applicant’s claims or
the testimony of the witness presented. As the CA correctly
observed, the delay may be accounted for by a witness’s fear
of reprisal and natural reluctance to get involved in a criminal
case. Ultimately, in determining the existence of probable
cause, the facts and circumstances must be personally
examined by the judge in their totality, together with a judicious
recognition of the variable complications and sensibilities
attending a criminal case. To the Court’s mind, the supposed
delay in the search warrant’s application does not dilute the
probable cause finding made herein. In fine, the probable
cause requirement has been sufficiently met.
Requirements of Particularity of Description –YES
The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance with
the constitutional requirement that there be a particular
description of “the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.”
offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should
come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence.
Consequently, the Court finds that the particular description
requirement — both as to the place to be searched and the
things to be seized — had been complied with.
One-Specific-Offense Rule –No
The Court finds no violation of the one-specific-offense rule
under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which, to note,
was intended to prevent the issuance of scattershot warrants,
or those which are issued for more than one-specific-offense.
In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA, the Court, however, settled
that a search warrant that covers several counts of a certain
specific offense does not violate the one-specific-offense rule.
Hence, given that Search Warrant was issued only for one
specific offense — that is, of Murder, albeit for six (6) counts
— it cannot be said that Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court had been violated.

“[A] description of a place to be

searched is sufficient if the officer with
the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place
intended and distinguish it from other
places in the community. Any
designation or description known to the
locality that points out the place to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry
leads the officers unerringly to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement.”

Search Warrant evidently complies with the foregoing

standard since it particularly describes the place to be
searched, namely, the 3 caves located inside the Laud
Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Maa, Davao City.

For further guidance in its enforcement, the search warrant

even made explicit reference to the sketch contained in the
application. These, in the Court’s view, are sufficient enough
for the officers to, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify
the place to be searched, which they in fact did.

The things to be seized were also particularly described,

namely, the remains of six (6) victims who were killed and
buried in the aforesaid premises. Laud’s posturing that human
remains are not “personal property” and, hence, could not be
the subject of a search warrant deserves scant consideration.

“Personal property” in Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of

Court actually refers to the thing’s mobility, and not to its
capacity to be owned or alienated. Considering that human
remains can generally be transported from place to place, and
considering further that they qualify under the phrase “subject
of the offense” given that they prove the crime’s corpus delicti,
it follows that they may be valid subjects of a search warrant
under the above cited criminal procedure provision.

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the

things to be seized when the description therein is as specific
as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by
which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search
and seizure; or when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant
is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court) x x
x If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to
an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have
some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said

Page 45 of 186
 3. LOS ANGELES COUNTY. V. RETTELE 550 US 609;
MAY 21, 2007
FACTS: In 2001, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
Deputy Dennis Watters investigated a fraud and identity-theft
crime ring. There were 4 suspects of the investigation. One
had registered a 9-millimeter Glock handgun. The 4 suspects
were known to be African-Americans.
Watters obtained a search warrant for 2 houses in Lancaster,
California, where he believed he could find the suspects. The
warrant authorized him to search the homes and 3 of the
suspects for documents and computer files. In support of the
search warrant an affidavit cited various sources showing the
suspects resided at Retelle’s home.
[What Watters did not know was that one of the houses (the
first to be searched) had been sold in September to a Max
Rettele. He had purchased the home and moved into it 3
months earlier with his girlfriend Judy Sadler and Sadler’s 17
year-old son Chase Hall. All three, respondents here, are
Caucasians.]
Watters briefed the 6 other deputies in preparation for the
search of the houses. Watters informed them they would be
searching for 3 African-American suspects, one of whom
owned a registered handgun. Around 7:15am Watters and six
other deputies knocked on the door and announced their
presence. Chase Hall answered. The deputies entered the
house after ordering Hall to lie face down on the ground.
The deputies’ announcement awoke Rettele and Sadler. The
deputies entered their bedroom with guns drawn and ordered
them to get out of their bed and to show their hands. They
protested that they were not wearing clothes. Rettele stood up
and attempted to put on a pair of sweat pants, but deputies
told him not to move. Sadler also stood up and attempted,
without success, to cover herself with a sheet. Rettele and
Sadler were held at gunpoint for one to two minutes before
Rettele was allowed to retrieve a robe for Sadler. He was then
permitted to dress. Rettele and Sadler left the bedroom within
three to four minutes to sit on the couch in the living room.
By that time the deputies realized they had made a mistake.
They apologized to Rettele and Sadler, thanked them for not
becoming upset, and left within five minutes. They proceeded
to the other house the warrant authorized them to search,
where they found 3 suspects. Those suspects were arrested
and convicted.
Rettele and Sadler, individually and as guardians ad litem for
Hall, filed this suit against Los Angeles County, the Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Deputy Watters, and
other members of the sheriff’s department. Respondents
alleged petitioners violated their Fourth Amendment rights by
obtaining a warrant in reckless fashion and conducting an
unreasonable search and detention.
The District Court held that the warrant was obtained by
proper procedures and the search was reasonable.
On appeal respondents did not challenge the validity of the
warrant; they did argue that the deputies had conducted the
search in an unreasonable manner.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District
Court’s decision.
The CA’s majority held that “because (1) no African-
Americans lived in respondents’ home; (2) respondents, a
Caucasian couple, purchased the residence several months
before the search and the deputies did not conduct an
ownership inquiry; (3) the African-American suspects were not
Page 46 of 186
accused of a crime that required an emergency search; and
(4) respondents were ordered out of bed naked and held at
gunpoint while the deputies searched their bedroom for the
suspects and a gun, we find that a reasonable jury could
conclude that the search and detention were ‘unnecessarily
painful, degrading, or prolonged,’ and involved ‘an undue
invasion of privacy.”
Turning to whether respondents’ Fourth Amendment rights
were clearly established, the majority held that a reasonable
deputy should have known the search and detention were
unlawful. [main pinaglalaban talaga nila: Because
respondents were of a different race than the suspects the
deputies were seeking, the Court of Appeals held that “after
taking one look at respondents, the deputies should have
realized that respondents were not the subjects of the search
warrant and did not pose a threat to the deputies’ safety.]
ISSUE: WoN there was a violation of the 4th Amendment
Rights of the respondents.
HELD: No, When the deputies ordered respondents from their
bed, they had no way of knowing whether the African-
American suspects were elsewhere in the house. The
presence of some Caucasians in the residence did not
eliminate the possibility that the suspects lived there as well.
As the deputies stated in their affidavits, it is not uncommon in
our society for people of different races to live together. Just
as people of different races live and work together, so too
might they engage in joint criminal activity. The deputies, who
were searching a house where they believed a suspect might
be armed, possessed authority to secure the premises before
deciding whether to continue with the search.
In Michigan v. Summers, this Court held that officers
executing a search warrant for contraband may “detain the
occupants of the premises while a proper search is
conducted.” In weighing whether the search in Summers was
reasonable the Court first found that “detention represents
only an incremental intrusion on personal liberty when the
search of a home has been authorized by a valid warrant.”
Against that interest, it balanced “preventing flight in the event
that incriminating evidence is found”; “minimizing the risk of
harm to the officers”; and facilitating “the orderly completion of
the search.”
In executing a search warrant officers may take reasonable
action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety
and the efficacy of the search. The test of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment is an objective one (addressing
the reasonableness of a seizure of the person). Unreasonable
actions include the use of excessive force or restraints that
cause unnecessary pain or are imposed for a prolonged and
unnecessary period of time.
The orders by the police to the occupants, in the context of
this lawful search, were permissible, and perhaps necessary,
to protect the safety of the deputies. Blankets and bedding can
conceal a weapon, and one of the suspects was known to own
a firearm, factors which underscore this point. The
Constitution does not require an officer to ignore the possibility
that an armed suspect may sleep with a weapon within reach.
The reports are replete with accounts of suspects sleeping
close to weapons.
The deputies needed a moment to secure the room and
ensure that other persons were not close by or did not present
a danger. Deputies were not required to turn their backs to
allow Rettele and Sadler to retrieve clothing or to cover
themselves with the sheets. Rather, “the risk of harm to both
the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers
routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.”

This is not to say, of course, that the deputies were free to
force Rettele and Sadler to remain motionless and standing
for any longer than necessary. We have recognized that
“special circumstances, or possibly a prolonged detention”
might render a search unreasonable. There is no accusation
that the detention here was prolonged. The deputies left the
home less than 15 minutes after arriving. The detention was
shorter and less restrictive than the 2- to 3-hour handcuff
detention. And there is no allegation that the deputies
prevented Sadler and Rettele from dressing longer than
necessary to protect their safety. Sadler was unclothed for no
more than two minutes, and Rettele for only slightly more time
than that. Sadler testified that once the police were satisfied
that no immediate threat was presented, “they wanted us to
get dressed and they were pressing us really fast to hurry up
and get some clothes on.”
The Fourth Amendment allows warrants to issue on probable
cause, a standard well-short of absolute certainty. Valid
warrants will issue to search the innocent, and people like
Rettele and Sadler unfortunately bear the cost. Officers
executing search warrants on occasion enter a house when
residents are engaged in private activity; and the resulting
frustration, embarrassment, and humiliation may be real, as
was true here. When officers execute a valid warrant and act
in a reasonable manner to protect themselves from harm,
however, the Fourth Amendment is not violated.
Page 47 of 186
4. RODEL LUZ y ONG vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012)
FACTS: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned
at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic
enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at
around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, he saw the accused, who
was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going
to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a
helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for
violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle
drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle;
that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station
since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost
in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1
Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of
municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy
and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was
alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of
the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside
it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of
the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal
container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including
two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss
knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the
accused to open it; that after the accused opened the
container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath
it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the
contents of the container on the table which turned out to be
four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while
the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure,
because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding
that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not
even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the
city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he
claims that he had never consented to the search conducted
upon him.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision, the RTC convicted petitioner
of illegal possession of dangerous drugs committed on 10
March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to
show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation
and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the
discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to
contain shabu.
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
ISSUE: Was the search and seizure of the alleged subject
shabu invalid thus acquitted?
HELD: Petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed
to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity,
a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however,
mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during
the illegal warrantless arrest. The Constitution guarantees the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the
power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the
public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government. The subject items seized during the illegal arrest
are inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the
crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their
inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal
of the accused.
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was
flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso
facto and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking
of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound
to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by
an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one
making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force,
manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an
intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other,
and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit,
under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation
is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the
driver’s license of the latter. At the time that he was waiting for
PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be
said to have been "under arrest." There was no intention on
the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty,
or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the
period during which petitioner was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the
trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason
they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had
been flagged down "almost in front" of that place. Hence, it
was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting
there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger
that a person questioned will be induced "to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic
stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority
of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorist’s
expectations, when he sees a policeman’s light flashing
behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short period
of time answering questions and waiting while the officer
checks his license and registration, that he may then be given
a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to
continue on his way. In this respect, questioning incident to an
ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse
interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the
detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he
provides his interrogators the answers they seek. See id., at
451. Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic
stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the
mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of authority
surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge
that the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to
issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the
detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of the
situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most
importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some
degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more
analogous to a so-called "Terry stop," see Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively
nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the
absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are
subject to the dictates of Miranda.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012,
which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash
helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only.
Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be
Page 48 of 186
issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense
penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that
neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a
traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part
of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take
the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have
arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officer’s
issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the
possibility of an arrest for the same violation. Even if one were
to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed
"arrested" upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and
while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements
for a valid arrest were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it
shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of
the reason for the arrest and must show that person the
warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that
any statement they might make could be used against them.
It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional
requirements were complied with by the police officers only
after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda
warnings must also be given to a person apprehended due to
a traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by
Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce
or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve
the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by
the custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine
the individual’s will to resist," and as much as
possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing
individual cases to try to determine, after the fact,
whether particular confessions were voluntary.
Those purposes are implicated as much by in-
custody questioning of persons suspected of
misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons
suspected of felonies.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search
that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The following are the
instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of
evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv)
consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop
and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances,
especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable
to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to
be inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain view." It was
actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s
pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent.
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent
to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and
convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate
an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be
unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated
by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that
petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this
alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and
intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was
merely "told" to take out the contents of his pocket.
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule.
While the rule normally applies when a police officer observes
suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe
that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a
limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons. In
Knowles v. Iowa, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a
police officer stops a person for speeding and correspondingly
issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure
does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the
car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a
full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist.
Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions,
such as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a
patdown.
Page 49 of 186
5. MARTINEZ vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 198694
February 13, 2013)
FACTS: At around 9:15PM of December 29, 2007, PO2
Soque, PO2 Cepe and PO3 Zeta, Police officers assigned to
the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID) Section of the Malate
Police Station 9 (Police Station 9), conducted a routine foot
patrol along Balingkit Street, Malate, Manila. In the process,
they heard a man shouting "Putanginamo! Limangdaan na ba
ito?"
For purportedly violating Section 844 of the Revised
Ordinance of the City of Manila which punishes breaches of
the peace, Ramon was apprehended and asked to empty his
pockets. In the course thereof, the police officers were able to
recover from him a small transparent plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. PO2
Soque confiscated the sachet and brought Ramon to Police
Station 9. Consequently, Ramon was charged with
possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11(3), Article II
of RA 9165.
In defense, Ramon denied the charge and gave his version of
the incident. He narrated that while walking along Balingkit
Street to borrow a welding machine from one Paez Garcia, a
man in civilian clothing approached and asked him if he is
Ramon Goco. Upon affirming his identity, he was immediately
handcuffed by the man who eventually introduced himself as
a police officer. Together, they boarded a tricycle (sidecar)
where the said officer asked him if he was carrying illegal
drugs. Despite his denial, he was still brought to a precinct to
be detained. Thereafter, one of the officers propositioned
Ramon and asked for P20,000.00 in exchange for his release.
When Ramon’s wife, Amalia Goco, was unable to produce the
P20,000.00, Ramon was brought to the Manila City Hall for
inquest proceedings.
RTC convicted Ramon as charged. CA affirmed the RTC
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ramon could be convicted of the crime
of possession of dangerous drugs provided that there’s
warrantless search conducted.
HELD: Ramon Martinez was acquitted since the subject
shabu purportedly seized is inadmissible in evidence for being
the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.
Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution provides that any
evidence obtained in violation of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. However, such exclusionary rule is not absolute.
The following are the traditional exceptions: customs
searches, searches of moving vehicles, seizure of evidence in
plain view, consented searches, "stop and frisk" measures
and searches incidental to a lawful arrest. As to the last
exception, it requires that the apprehending officer must have
been spurred by probable cause to arrest a person caught in
flagrante delicto. The term probable cause is a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.
Enshrined in the fundamental law is a person’s right against
unwarranted intrusions by the government. Accordingly, so as
to ensure that the same sacrosanct right remains revered,
effects secured by government authorities in contravention of
the foregoing are rendered inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose, in any proceeding.
Commonly known as the “exclusionary rule,” the proscription
is not, however, an absolute and rigid one. As found in
jurisprudence, the traditional exceptions are customs
searches, searches of moving vehicles, seizure of evidence in
plain view, consented searches, “stop and frisk” measures
and searches incidental to a lawful arrest.
Ramon is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial
fruit of the poisonous tree as mandated by the above-
discussed constitutional provisions. In this regard, considering
that the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the
crime charged, Ramon’s acquittal should therefore come as a
matter of course.

A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search

is one that is carried out under the parameters of Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which requires that the
apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable
cause to arrest a person caught in flagrante delicto. To be
sure, the term probable cause has been understood to mean
a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. In this light,
the determination of the existence or absence of probable
cause necessitates a re-examination of the factual incidents.

Records show that the Police officers arrested Ramon for

allegedly violating Section 844 of the Manila City Ordinance
which punishes Breaches of the Peace. The gravamen of the
offenses enumerated in the Ordinance is the disruption of
communal tranquillity. Thus, to justify a warrantless arrest
based thereon, it must be established that the apprehension
was effected after a reasonable assessment by the police
officer that a public disturbance is being committed.

The perusal of the testimony during the trial, negates the

presence of probable cause when the police officers
conducted their warrantless arrest of Ramon. Further, it bears
stressing that no one present at the place of arrest ever
complained that Ramon’s shouting disturbed the public. On
the contrary, a disinterested member of the community (a
certain Rosemarie Escobal) even testified that Ramon was
merely standing in front of the store of a certain Mang Romy
when a man in civilian clothes, later identified as the police
officer, approached Ramon, immediately handcuffed and took
him away.

In its totality, the Court observes that these facts and

circumstances could not have engendered a well-founded
belief that any breach of the peace had been committed by
Ramon at the time that his warrantless arrest was effected. All
told, no probable cause existed to justify Ramon’s warrantless
arrest.

Indeed, while it is true that the legality of arrest depends upon

the reasonable discretion of the officer or functionary to whom
the law at the moment leaves the decision to characterize the
nature of the act or deed of the person for the urgent purpose
of suspending his liberty, this should not be exercised in a
whimsical manner, else a person’s liberty be subjected to
ubiquitous abuse. As law enforcers, it is largely expected of
them to conduct a more circumspect assessment of the
situation at hand. The determination of probable cause is not
a blanket-license to withhold liberty or to conduct unwarranted
fishing expeditions. It demarcates the line between legitimate
human conduct on the one hand, and ostensible criminal
activity, on the other. In this respect, it must be performed
wisely and cautiously, applying the exacting standards of a
reasonably discreet and prudent man. Surely, as
constitutionally guaranteed rights lie at the fore, the duty to
determine probable cause should be clothed with utmost
conscientiousness as well as impelled by a higher sense of
public accountability.

Consequently, as it cannot be said that Ramon was validly

arrested, the warrantless search that resulted from it was also
illegal. Thus, the subject shabu purportedly seized from

Page 50 of 186
 6. ONGCOMA HADJI HOMAR v. PEOPLE (GR No.
182534, September 02, 2015)
The petitioner was charged for violation of Section 11, Article
II of RA 9165. The Information states that on or about August
20, 2002, the petitioner was found to possess one heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 grams of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known
as shabu. The petitioner pleaded not guilty during
arraignment.
PO1 Eric Tan (Tan) was the lone witness for the prosecution.
As stated in the RTC decision, he testified that on August 20,
2002, at around 8:50 in the evening, their Chief, P/Chief Supt.
Alfredo C. Valdez, ordered him and civilian agent (C/A)
Ronald Tangcoy (Tangcoy) to go to the South Wing, Roxas
Boulevard. While proceeding to the area onboard a mobile
hunter, they saw the petitioner crossing a "No Jaywalking"
portion of Roxas Boulevard. They immediately accosted him
and told him to cross at the pedestrian crossing area.
The petitioner picked up something from the ground,
prompting Tangcoy to frisk him resulting in the recovery of a
knife. Thereafter, Tangcoy conducted a thorough search on
the petitioner's body and found and confiscated a plastic
sachet containing what he suspected as shabu. Tangcoy and
Tan executed a sinumpaang salaysay on the incident.
The petitioner was the sole witness for the defense. He
testified that on August 20, 2002, he was going home at
around 6:30 p.m. after selling imitation sunglasses and other
accessories at the BERMA Shopping Center. After crossing
the overpass, a policeman and a civilian stopped and frisked
him despite his refusal. They poked a gun at him, accused him
of being a holdupper, and forced him to go with them. They
also confiscated the kitchen knife, which he carried to cut
cords. He was likewise investigated for alleged possession
of shabu and detained for one day. He was criminally charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch
77 for the possession of the kitchen knife but he was
eventually acquitted.
RTC Ruling
The RTC convicted the petitioner. It ruled that PO1 Tan and
C/A Tangcoy were presumed to have performed their duties
regularly in arresting and conducting a search on the
petitioner. The RTC also noted that PO1 Eric Tan was
straightforward in giving his testimony and he did not show
any ill motive in arresting the petitioner.
The RTC also did not believe the petitioner's defense of denial
and ruled that it is a common and standard defense ploy in
most prosecutions in dangerous drugs cases. This defense is
weak especially when it is not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence as in this case.
CA Ruling
The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC's
findings.
The arrest falls under valid warrantless arrest; when the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense in the presence of a
peace officer or a private person. In the present case, the
petitioner committed jaywalking in the presence of PO1 Tan
and C/A Tangcoy; hence, his warrantless arrest for jaywalking
was lawful. Consequently, the subsequent frisking and search
done on the petitioner's body which produced the knife and
the shabu were incident to a lawful arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search was valid
Page 51 of 186
HELD The prosecution failed to prove that a lawful
warrantless arrest preceded the search conducted on the
petitioner's body.
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence of or within the view of the
arresting officer.
The prosecution was not able to discharge this burden,
particularly that Homar was actually committing a crime. They
did not identify the place where Homar allegedly crossed and
that it was illegal to cross that area. He was also not charged
with jaywalking.
The police testified that they “accosted” Homar when he
jaywalked. However, this is different from an actual arrest as
contemplated by the Rules on warrantless arrests. No arrest
preceded the search because they did not intend to bring him
under custody or restrain his liberty. The lack of intent was
further proven by the absence of criminal charges against him.
Intent only came after they allegedly confiscated the shabu.
The shabu was not recovered immediately after the alleged
lawful arrest but only after the initial search. Intent to arrest is
indispensable because otherwise, any evidence obtained in
violation thereof will be inadmissible.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained
in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and
seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, the
exercise of this power and the implementation of the law
should not violate the constitutional rights of the citizens.
To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence,
it is indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which
yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. There must be a
valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally
valid warrantless arrest, which must precede the search. For
this purpose, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest
before a search can be made — the process cannot be
reversed.
 7. People v. Villareal 693 SCRA 549 (2013)
FACTS: As PO3 de Leon was driving his motorcycle on his
way home, he saw appellant from a distance of about 8 to 10
meters, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of
shabu. Thus, PO3 de Leon, a member of the Station Anti-
Illegal Drugs Special Operation Unit (SAIDSOU) in Caloocan
City, alighted from his motorcycle and approached the
appellant whom he recognized as someone he had previously
arrested for illegal drug possession.
Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape but was
quickly apprehended with the help of a tricycle driver. Despite
appellant’s attempts to resist arrest, PO3 de Leon was able to
board appellant onto his motorcycle and confiscate the plastic
sachet of shabu in his possession. When arraigned, appellant,
assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to
the offense charged.
RTC ruled against Villareal. Moreover, the RTC found the
plain view doctrine to be applicable, as the confiscated item
was in plain view of PO3 de Leon at the place and time of the
arrest.
CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest
based on the police officers personal knowledge of the
criminal record of the appellant.
HELD: No, there was no valid warrantless arrest.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless
arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person.
For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to
operate, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand,
paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at
the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.
In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact
of the commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under
paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime while
under paragraph (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just
been committed.
A punctilious assessment of the factual backdrop of this case
shows that there could have been no lawful warrantless arrest.
The Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with
his presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with
reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters
and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible
and minuscule amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram)
inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by appellant. That he
had previously effected numerous arrests, all involving shabu,
is insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly
saw in appellant’s hands was indeed shabu. Absent any other
circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other
overt act could be properly attributed to appellant as to rouse
suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he (appellant) had
just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime, for the acts per se of walking along the street and
examining something in one’s hands cannot in any way be
Page 52 of 186
considered criminal acts. In fact, even if appellant had been
exhibiting unusual or strange acts, or at the very least
appeared suspicious, the same would not have been sufficient
in order for PO3 de Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest
under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Neither has it been established that the rigorous conditions set
forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 have been
complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it. The
factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de
Leon had personal knowledge that a crime had been
indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough that
PO3 de Leon had reasonable ground to believe that appellant
had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact have been
committed first, which does not obtain in this case.
Without the overt act that would pin liability against appellant,
it is therefore clear that PO3 de Leon was merely impelled to
apprehend appellant on account of the latter’s previous
charge for the same offense.
However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even
for the same offense, will not suffice to satisfy the exacting
requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to
justify a lawful warrantless arrest. “Personal knowledge” of the
arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been committed
is required. To interpret “personal knowledge” as referring to
a person’s reputation or past criminal citations would create a
dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority
and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests
based solely on knowledge of a person’s previous criminal
infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out
under Section 5.
In fine, appellant’s acts of walking along the street and holding
something in his hands, even if they appeared to be dubious,
coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same
offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of
criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to justify
a warrantless arrest under Section 5. “Probable cause” has
been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Specifically with
respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed by the person sought to
be arrested, which clearly do not obtain in appellant’s case.
Thus, while it is true that the legality of an arrest depends upon
the reasonable discretion of the officer or functionary to whom
the law at the moment leaves the decision to characterize the
nature of the act or deed of the person for the urgent purpose
of suspending his liberty, it cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously
exercised without unduly compromising a citizen’s
constitutionally-guaranteed right to liberty.
Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the
shabu purportedly seized from appellant is rendered
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the
poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, appellant must be acquitted and
exonerated from all criminal liability.
8. JEFFREY MIGUEL y REMEGIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 227038; July 31, 2017)
FACTS: An Information was filed before the RTC charging
Jeffrey Miguel of illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. (RA) 9165 (Dangerous Drugs Act)
The prosecution alleged that at around 12:45 in the morning
of May 24, 2010, a Bantay Bayan operative of Barangay San
Antonio Village, Makati City named Reynaldo Bahoyo was
doing his rounds when he purportedly received a report of a
man showing off his private parts at Kaong Street. BB Bahoyo
and fellow Bantay Bayan operative Mark Anthony Velasquez
then went to the said street and saw a visibly intoxicated
person, which they later identified as herein petitioner,
urinating and displaying his private parts while standing in
front of a gate enclosing an empty lot.
Bahoyo and Velasquez approached petitioner and asked him
where he lived, and the latter answered Kaong Street. Bahoyo
then said that he also lived in the same street but petitioner
looked unfamiliar to him, so he asked for an identification card,
but petitioner failed to produce one. Velasquez then repeated
the request for an identification card, but instead, petitioner
emptied his pockets, revealing a pack of cigarettes containing
one (1) stick of cigarette and two (2) pieces of rolled paper
containing dried marijuana leaves, among others. This
prompted BB Bahoyo and Velasquez to seize the foregoing
items, take petitioner to the police station, and turn him, as
well as the seized items, over to SP03 Rafael Castillo.
SP03 Castillo then inventoried, marked, and photographed
the seized items, all in the presence of Bahoyo and
Velasquez, and thereafter, prepared an inventory report and a
request for qualitative examination of the seized two pieces of
rolled paper and for petitioner to undergo drug testing. After
examination, it was confirmed that the aforesaid rolled paper
contained marijuana and that petitioner was positive for the
presence of methamphetamine but negative for THC-
metabolites, both dangerous drugs
Petitioner alleged that he was just urinating in front of his
workplace when two Bantay Bayan operatives approached
and asked him where he lived. Upon responding that he lived
in Kaong Street, Bahoyo and Velasquez then frisked him, took
away his belongings, and thereafter, handcuffed and brought
him to the barangay hall. He was then detained for about an
hour before being taken to the Ospital ng Makati and to
another office where a bald police officer questioned him.
Thereafter, he was taken back to the barangay hall where they
showed him two sticks of marijuana joints allegedly recovered
from him.
RTC found him guilty. It also found the warrantless arrest of
Miguel valid as petitioner was scandalously showing his
private parts at the time of his arrest. Therefore, the resultant
search incidental to such arrest which yielded the seized
marijuana in petitioner's possession was also lawful.
The CA ruled that the search made on petitioner which yielded
the seized marijuana was validly made as it was done
incidental to his arrest for exhibiting his private parts on public.
As such, the said seized marijuana is admissible in evidence
and, thus, sufficient to convict him for the crime charged. The
CA likewise held that the rule on chain of custody was duly
complied with and, thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized drugs were not compromised.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and
subsequent arrest was valid?
Page 53 of 186
HELD: The Court ruled that the Bantay Bayan operatives
conducted an illegal search on the person of petitioner.
Consequently, the marijuana purportedly seized from him on
account of such search is rendered inadmissible in evidence.
Hence, Miguel is acquitted.
The Court is convinced that the acts of the Bantay Bayan - or
any barangay-based or other volunteer organizations in the
nature of watch groups - relating to the preservation of peace
and order in their respective areas have the color of a state-
related function. As such, they should be deemed as law
enforcement authorities for the purpose of applying the Bill of
Rights under Article III of the 1987 Constitution to them.
The law identifies three (3) instances when warrantless
arrests may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a
suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where,
based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a
crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final
judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his
case or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule
113, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand,
Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the
time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed
and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the accused had committed it.
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact
of the commission of an offense is essential. Under Section 5
(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of
the same, he knows for a fact that a crime has just been
committed.
The Court simply finds highly implausible the prosecution's
claim that a valid warrantless arrest was made on petitioner
on account of the alleged public display of his private parts
because if it was indeed the case, then the proper charge
should have been filed against him. However, records are
bereft of any showing that such charge was filed aside from
the instant criminal charge for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs - thereby strengthening the view that no prior arrest was
made on petitioner which led to a search incidental thereto. As
stressed earlier, there must first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made and that such process cannot be
reversed.
 9. David Leon Riley vs California (2014)
FACTS: David Leon Riley belonged to the Lincoln Park gang
of San Diego, California. David Leon Riley was pulled over on
August 22, 2009, for expired registrations tags. During the
stop, the San Diego Police Officer also found that Riley was
driving with a suspended driver's license. The San Diego
Police Department's policy at the time was to tow and impound
a vehicle after stopping a driver with a suspended license in
order to prevent the driver from driving again. Additionally,
department policy required the officers to perform an inventory
search of the vehicle, which in this case led to the discovery
of two handguns under the hood of the vehicle. Later ballistic
testing would confirm that the handguns were the weapons
used in a gangland murder on August 2, 2009, for which Riley
had been a suspect. Although eyewitnesses to the shooting
claimed that Riley could have been one of the shooters, they
declined to give a definitive positive identification of Riley as
one of the shooters. However, this was not known by Officer
Dunnigan at the time of Riley's traffic stop. Because of the
discovery of the concealed and loaded handguns, along with
gang paraphernalia, during the vehicle search, police placed
Riley under arrest and searched his cell phone without a
warrant. The cell phone search yielded information indicating
that Riley was a member of the Lincoln Park gang; evidence
included pictures, cell phone contacts, text messages, and
video clips. Included in the photos was a picture of a different
vehicle that Riley owned, which was also the vehicle involved
in the August 2nd gang shooting. Based in part on the pictures
and videos recovered from the cell phone, police charged
Riley in connection with the gang shooting and sought an
enhancement based on Riley's gang membership.
Riley's lawyer moved to suppress all the evidence the officers
had obtained during the search of his cell phone on the
grounds that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
The trial court rejected this argument and held that the search
was legitimate under the SITA doctrine. At trial, a gang expert
testified to Riley's membership in the Lincoln Park gang, the
rivalry between the gangs involved, and why the shooting
could have been gang-related. The jury convicted Riley on all
three counts and sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison.
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the
judgment based on the recent California Supreme Court
decision People v. Diaz. In Diaz, the court held that the Fourth
Amendment "search-incident-to-arrest" doctrine permits the
police to conduct a full exploratory search of a cell phone
(even if it is conducted later and at a different location)
whenever the phone is found near the suspect at the time of
arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence admitted at trial from
Riley's cell phone discovered through a search that violated
his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches?
HELD: Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote the
opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the
warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the
purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence,
neither of which is at issue in the search of digital data. The
digital data cannot be used as a weapon to harm an arresting
officer, and police officers have the ability to preserve
evidence while awaiting a warrant by disconnecting the phone
from the network and placing the phone in a "Faraday bag."
The Court characterized cell phones as minicomputers filled
with massive amounts of private information, which
distinguished them from the traditional items that can be
seized from an arrestee's person, such as a wallet. The Court
also held that information accessible via the phone but stored
Page 54 of 186
using "cloud computing" is not even "on the arrestee's
person." Nonetheless, the Court held that some warrantless
searches of cell phones might be permitted in an emergency:
when the government's interests are so compelling that a
search would be reasonable.
Roberts wrote that it fails the warrantless search test
established in Chimel v. California:
“Digital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself
be used as a weapon to harm an arresting
officer or to effectuate the arrestee's escape.
Law enforcement officers remain free to
examine the physical aspects of a phone to
ensure that it will not be used as a weapon--say,
to determine whether there is a razor blade
hidden between the phone and its case. Once
an officer has secured a phone and eliminated
any potential physical threats, however, data on
the phone can endanger no one.”
Although possible evidence stored on a phone may be
destroyed with either remote wiping or data encryption,
Roberts noted that is "the ordinary operation of a phone's
security features, apart from any active attempt by a
defendant or his associates to conceal or destroy evidence
upon arrest." He then argues that a warrantless search is
unlikely to make much of a difference:
“Cell phone data would be vulnerable to remote
wiping from the time an individual anticipates
arrest to the time any eventual search of the
phone is completed... likewise, an officer who
seizes a phone in an unlocked state might not
be able to begin his search in the short time
remaining before the phone locks and data
becomes encrypted.”
Roberts then cites several common examples to turn off or
prevent the phone's security features. Furthermore, Roberts
argued that cell phones differ both quantitatively and
qualitatively from other objects in a person's pocket:
“Modern cell phones are not just another
technological convenience. With all they contain
and all they may reveal, they hold for many
Americans “the privacies of life". The fact that
technology now allows an individual to carry
such information in his hand does not make the
information any less worthy of the protection for
which the Founders fought.”
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment in which he expressed doubt
that the warrantless search exception following an arrest
exists for the sole or primary purposes of protecting officer
safety and preserving evidence. In light of the privacy interests
at stake, however, he agreed that the majority's conclusion
was the best solution. Justice Alito also suggested that the
legislature enact laws that draw reasonable distinctions
regarding when and what information within a phone can be
reasonably searched following an arrest.
 10. BIRCHFIELD VS NORTH DAKOTA (2016)
FACTS: Birchfield was a consolidation of three cases:
Birchfield v. North Dakota, Bernard v. Minnesota, and Beylund
v. Levi. Birchfield.
Danny Birchfield drove into a ditch in Morton County, North
Dakota. When police arrived on the scene, they believed
Birchfield was intoxicated. Birchfield failed both the field
sobriety tests and the breath test. He was arrested, but he
refused to consent to a chemical test. Birchfield was charged
with a misdemeanor for refusing to consent to a chemical test
in violation of state law. He moved to dismiss the charge and
claimed that the state law violated his Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable search and seizure.
In a similar case, police were called to the South St. Paul boat
launch where three men were attempting to pull their boat out
of the water and onto their truck. William Robert Bernard, Jr.,
admitted he had been drinking and had the truck keys in his
hands, but he denied driving the truck and refused to perform
a field sobriety test. He was arrested on suspicion of driving
while impaired (DWI) and taken to the police station, where he
refused to consent to a chemical test in violation of Minnesota
state law. Bernard was charged with two counts of first-degree
test refusal pursuant to state law.
In a separate incident, Steve Beylund consented to a blood
alcohol to test to confirm he was driving under the influence
after being informed it was a criminal offense in North Dakota
to refuse a blood alcohol test. The test confirmed he was over
the legal limit, and Beylund was charged with driving under the
influence. Beylund underwent a blood alcohol test consistent
with North Dakota's implied consent law and challenged the
constitutionality of that law after an administrative hearing
based on the test results led to the revocation of his license.
All three men challenged the state statutes criminalizing
refusal to submit to a chemical test and argued that the
statutes violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures when there was no
probable cause that would support a warrant for the test. Both
the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the Supreme Court of
North Dakota determined that criminalizing the refusal to
submit to a chemical test was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
ISSUE: Is warrantless alcohol testing incident to drunk driving
arrests to determine blood alcohol content a violation of the
Fourth Amendment?
HELD: The Court held that both breath tests and blood tests
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.
A state statute may not criminalize the refusal to submit to a
blood test in the absence of a warrant because, while the
Fourth Amendment allows for warrantless breath tests
incident to an arrest for drunk driving, warrantless blood tests
incident to an arrest violate the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 7-1
majority. The Court held that warrantless breath tests are
permissible under the search incident to arrest exception to
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement because they
do not implicate significant privacy concerns. They involve
minimal physical intrusion to capture something that is
routinely exposed to the public, reveal a limited amount of
information, and do not enhance any embarrassment beyond
what the arrest itself causes. Blood tests, however, implicate
privacy interests because they are much more physically
invasive, they require the piercing of the skin, and they
Page 55 of 186
produce a sample that can be preserved and used to obtain
further information beyond the subject’s blood alcohol level at
the time of the test. The Court also determined that
criminalizing refusal to submit to a breath test is designed to
serve the government’s interest in preventing drunk driving,
which is greater than merely keeping currently drunk drivers
off the roads, and does so better than other alternatives.
However, the same rationale did not apply to criminalizing
refusal to submit to a blood test because of the greater degree
of intrusion and the available alternative of the breath test.
The Court ruled in favor of Birchfield who was prosecuted for
refusing a warrantless blood draw and ruled against Bernard
who refused a warrantless breath test. Beylund, on the other
hand consented to a blood test after police advised him that
he was required to do. The court therefore remanded
Beylund's case back to the state court "to reevaluate
Beylund's consent given the partial inaccuracy of the officer's
advisory." The Supreme Court of North Dakota court
subsequently avoided the issue by holding that, even
assuming the consent was involuntary, the Exclusionary Rule
does not apply in the administrative hearing context and thus
affirmed suspension of his license for testing over the
prohibited level set forth in the implied consent / administrative
license suspension statute.
In her partial concurrence and partial dissent, Justice Sonia
Sotomayor wrote that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
against warrantless searches should apply to breath tests
unless exigent circumstances justify one in a particular case.
In establishing exceptions to the warrant requirement, the
Court has routinely examined whether a legitimate
government interest justified the search in light of the
individual’s privacy interest and whether that determination
should be made based on a case-by-case analysis or a
categorical rule. Based on this analysis, Justice Sotomayor
argued that a categorical rule allowing warrantless breath
tests incident to arrest was unnecessary to protect the
government interest of preventing drunk driving because at
that point the driver is off the road and a warrant could be
obtained if necessary. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in
the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the
search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement should apply categorically
to all blood alcohol tests, including blood tests. By drawing an
arbitrary line between blood tests and breath tests, the
majority destabilized the law of exceptions to the warrant
requirement and made the jobs of both police officers and
lower courts more difficult.
11. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) VS. DANGEROUS
DRUGS BOARD AND PHILIPPINE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (G.R. No. 157870,
November 03, 2008)
FACTS: In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner
Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks
to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing
paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the
ground that they are constitutionally infirm.
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among
other personalities, is put in issue. As far as pertinent, the
challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized
drug testing shall be done by any government
forensic laboratories or by any of the drug
testing laboratories accredited and monitored
by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test
results. x x x The drug testing shall employ,
among others, two (2) testing methods, the
screening test which will determine the positive
result as well as the type of drug used and the
confirmatory test which will confirm a positive
screening test. x x x The following shall be
subjected to undergo drug testing:
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary
schools.—Students of secondary and tertiary
schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and
regulations as contained in the school’s student
handbook and with notice to the parents,
undergo a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private
offices.—Officers and employees of public and
private offices, whether domestic or overseas,
shall be subjected to undergo a random drug
test as contained in the company’s work rules
and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing
the risk in the workplace. Any officer or
employee found positive for use of dangerous
drugs shall be dealt with administratively which
shall be a ground for suspension or termination,
subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the
Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil
Service Law;
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s
office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less
than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo
a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether
appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug
test.
For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of
legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to
schools and employers to determine the manner of drug
testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal
protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a
student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third,
Page 56 of 186
a person’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches
is also breached by said provisions.
(Pimentel v. COMELEC | G.R. No. 16158)
On Dec. 23, 2003, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
6486, prescribing the rules and regulations for the mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with
the May 2004 elections. Pimentel claims that Sec. 36 (g) of
RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose
an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points
out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a
candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid
down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1)
citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements,
candidates for senator need not possess any other
qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected
as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly
amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it
cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a
constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
(SJS v. DDM & PDEA | G.R. 157870)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social
Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to
prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs
(c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that
they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions
constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they
give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the
provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as
they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed
undesirable. And for a third, a person’s constitutional right
against unreasonable searches is also breached by said
provisions.
(Atty. Laserna v. DDB & PDEA | G.R. 158633)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and
taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of
RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on
the constitutional right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-
incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and
equal protection guarantees.
ISSUE: Whether or not paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec.
36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection
clause?
HELD: The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No. 161658
and declared Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It
also PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870
and 158633 by
declaring Sec.36(c) and (d) of RA165 CONSTITUTIONAL,
but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court
thus permanently enjoined all the concerned agencies from
implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.
NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 are NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs (f) thereof is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
As to paragraph (c), covering students of secondary and
tertiary schools
Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton
and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92
of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court
deduced and applied the following principles: (1) schools and
their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights
than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision
of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in
loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-
being of their students and may adopt such measures as may
reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4)
schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for
admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of Education, supra,
the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA
9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a
condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school
rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to
enrol is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements.
The Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA
9165(c) requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a
condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school
rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to
enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements. A random drug testing of students in
secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable, but may
even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student
population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the
government, are to be promoted and protected.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students,
the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of
RA 9165(d) for officers and employees of public and private
offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The
Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than
saying that “subjecting almost everybody to drug testing,
without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted
intrusion of the individual right to privacy,” has failed to show
how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to
privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search
under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. Petitioner
Laserna’s lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and
gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration.
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context,
the right to privacy means the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into
one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation
to a person’s ordinary sensibilities; and while there has been
general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee
against unwarranted search, “translation of the abstract
prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into
workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases
is a difficult task,” to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal
Court. Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy
yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to
the state’s exercise of police power.
As to paragraph (d), covering officers and employees of public
and private offices
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution
is couched and as has been held, “reasonableness” is the
touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion.
And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness
standard is judged by the balancing of the government-
Page 57 of 186
mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against
the promotion of some compelling state interest. In the
criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of
probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given
that the drug-testing policy for employees—and students for
that matter—under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative
search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as “swift and
informal disciplinary procedures,” the probable-cause
standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may,
the review should focus on the reasonableness of the
challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is
the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing,
which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of
the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace
serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy
expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug
testing requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an
office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work
policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered
into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent
right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in
the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement
upon such privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the
intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a
question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly
set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling
law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly
focused"?
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one,
Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed
towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass
the employees or place them under a humiliating experience.
While every officer and employee in a private establishment is
under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a
possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in
advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use
by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested.
And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself
prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by
providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to
“random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules
and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
work place.”
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken
under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the
employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the
test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two
testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory
test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the
trustworthiness of the results. But the more important
consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted
by trained professionals in access-controlled laboratories
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard
against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of
custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that
access to the drug results shall be on the “need to know”
basis; that the “drug test result and the records shall be [kept]
confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect
the confidentiality of the test results.” Notably, RA 9165 does
not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting
agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a
result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore,
the intrusion into the employees’ privacy, under RA 9165, is
accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against
embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively
minimal.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced
expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the
compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and
the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide
authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that
the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited
context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government
officials and employees also labor under reasonable
supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law
and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high
standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165
passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the
more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who,
by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at
all times to the people and to serve them with utmost
responsibility and efficiency.
As to paragraph (f), covering persons charged before the
prosecutor’s office with a crime with an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day
Paragraph (f) of RA 9165 was declared unconstitutional by the
Court. Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA
9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug
testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students,
the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily
from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when
they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily
submitting their persons to the parental authority of school
authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the
constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness
of the drug test policy and requirement.
The Court finds the situation entirely different in the case of
persons charged before the public prosecutor’s office with
criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug
testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the case of
persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless.
The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal
complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they
beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a
crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact
of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do
not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their
right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a
tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives
of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s
right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably
forced to incriminate themselves.
Page 58 of 186
12. JAIME D. DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 200748; July 23, 2014)
SERENO, CJ
Facts: Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with
violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.)
9165, by the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the
Office of the Ombudsman – Visayas.
The prosecution reveals that the agents and special
investigators of the National Bureau of Investigation, Central
Visayas Regional Office (NBI-CEVRO) or simply NBI,
received a Complaint from Corazon Absin (Corazon) and
Charito Escobido (Charito). The complainants claimed that
Ariel Escobido (Ariel), the live-in partner of Corazon and son
of Charito, was picked up by several unknown male persons
believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. In the
police office, they met "James" who demanded from them
₱100,000, later lowered to ₱40,000, in exchange for the
release of Ariel. After the meeting, the complainants
proceeded to the NBI-CEVRO to file a complaint and narrate
the circumstances of the meeting to the authorities. While at
the NBI-CEVRO, Charito even received calls supposedly from
"James" instructing her to bring the money as soon as
possible.
The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text
messages received by the complainants. A team was
immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation,
which took place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner of Gen.
Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. Petitioner was
later brought to the forensic laboratory of the NBI-CEVRO
where forensic examination was done by forensic chemist
Rommel Paglinawan. Petitioner was required to submit his
urine for drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for
presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the confirmatory
test result labeled as Toxicology (Dangerous Drugs) Report.
The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. He
denied the charges and testified that while eating at the said
Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI
agents. When he was at the NBI Office, he was required to
extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying he
wanted it to be done by the (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not
by the NBI.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of
R.A. 9165. The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and
affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
THE ISSUE: Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the
petitioner is legal.
OUR RULING: No. The drug test in Section 15 does not cover
persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but
only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.
A person apprehended or arrested” cannot literally mean any
person apprehended or arrested for any crime. The phrase
must be read in context and understood in consonance with
R.A. No. 9165. Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or
apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law.
Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are
apprehended or arrested for, among others, the “importation,”
“sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery,
distribution and transportation,” “manufacture” and
“possession” of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors
and essential chemicals; possession thereof “during parties,
social gatherings or meetings”; being “employees and visitors
of a den, dive or resort”; “maintenance of a den, dive or resort”;
“illegal chemical diversion of controlled precursors and
essential chemicals”; “manufacture or delivery” or
“possession” of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals; possession of dangerous
drugs “during parties, social gatherings or meetings”;
“unnecessary” or “unlawful” prescription thereof; “cultivation or
culture of plants classified as dangerous drugs or are sources
thereof”; and “maintenance and keeping of original records of
transactions on dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors
and essential chemicals.” To make the provision applicable to
all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed
under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning.
Note that accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged
act of extortion.
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. Section 17.
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot
condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the
crime or offense for which the arrest is being made. Dela Cruz
vs. People, 730 SCRA 655, G.R. No. 200748 July 23, 2014

Making the phrase “a person apprehended or arrested” in

Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended
for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other
crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all
persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. To
overextend the application of this provision would run counter
to our pronouncement in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, 570
SCRA 410 (2008), to wit: x x x [M]andatory drug testing can
never be random and suspicionless. The ideas of randomness
and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly
picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons
suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled
out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the
prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to
drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to
the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug testing in
this case would violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate
themselves.

In the Gutang v. People, 335 SCRA 479 (2000) case, the

Court clarified that “what the Constitution prohibits is the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from
the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence,
when it may be material.” The situation in Gutang was
categorized as falling among the exemptions under the
freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought
to be examined came from the body of the accused. The Court
said: This was a mechanical act the accused was made to
undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but
to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple
observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and his
co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine
but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were
requested to undergo a drug test. Assuming arguendo that the
urine samples taken from the petitioner are inadmissible in
evidence, we agree with the trial court that the record is replete
with other pieces of credible evidence including the testimonial
evidence of the prosecution which point to the culpability of
the petitioner for the crimes charged.

It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine

extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer
prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights,
but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still
compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those
circumstances. The pertinent provisions in Article III of the
Constitution are clear: Section 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or

Page 59 of 186
 13. KYLLO v. UNITED STATES (CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT; No. 99-8508. Argued February 20,
200l-Decided June 11,2001)
Suspicious that marijuana was being grown in petitioner
Kyllo's home in a triplex, agents used a thermal-imaging
device to scan the triplex to determine if the amount of heat
emanating from it was consistent with the high-intensity lamps
typically used for indoor marijuana growth. The scan showed
that Kyllo's garage roof and a side wall were relatively hot
compared to the rest of his home and substantially warmer
than the neighboring units. Based in part on the thermal
imaging, a Federal Magistrate Judge issued a warrant to
search Kyllo's home, where the agents found marijuana
growing. Mter Kyllo was indicted on a federal drug charge, he
unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from
his home and then entered a conditional guilty plea. The Ninth
Circuit ultimately affirmed, upholding the thermal imaging on
the ground that Kyllo had shown no subjective expectation of
privacy because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat
escaping from his home. Even if he had, ruled the court, there
was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because
the thermal imager did not expose any intimate details of
Kyllo's life, only amorphous hot spots on his home's exterior.
Held: Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is
not in general public use, to explore details of a private home
that would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion, the surveillance is a Fourth Amendment "search,"
and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. Pp. 31-
41.
where the eavesdropping device in question picked up only
sound waves that reached the exterior of the phone booth to
which it was attached. Reversing that approach would leave
the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology-
including imaging technology that could discern all human
activity in the home. Also rejected is the Government's
contention that the thermal imaging was constitutional
because it did not detect "intimate details." Such an approach
would be wrong in principle because, in the sanctity of the
home, all details are intimate details. See, e. g., United States
v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705; Dow Chemical, supra, at 238,
distinguished. It would also be impractical in application,
failing to provide a workable accommodation between law
enforcement needs and Fourth Amendment interests. See
Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, 181. Pp. 35-40.
(d) Since the imaging in this case was an unlawful search, it
will remain for the District Court to determine whether, without
the evidence it provided, the search warrant was supported by
probable cause-and if not, whether there is any other basis for
supporting admission of that evidence. P. 40. 190 F.3d 1041,
reversed and remanded.

(a) The question whether a warrantless search of a home is

reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no in
most instances, but the antecedent question whether a Fourth
Amendment "search" has occurred is not so simple. This
Court has approved warrantless visual surveillance of a home,
see California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207, 213, ruling that visual
observation is no "search" at all, see Dow Chemical Co. v.
United States, 476 U. S. 227, 234-235, 239. In assessing
when a search is not a search, the Court has adapted a
principle first enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S.
347, 361: A "search" does not occur-even when its object is a
house explicitly protected by the Fourth Amendment-unless
the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy
in the searched object, and society is willing to recognize that
expectation as reasonable, see, e. g., California v. Ciraolo,
supra, at 211. Pp. 31-33.

(b) While it may be difficult to refine the Katz test in some

instances, in the case of the search of a home's interior-the
prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of
protected privacy-there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in
the common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that
exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable. To
withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to
permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by
the Fourth Amendment. Thus, obtaining by sense-enhancing
technology any information regarding the home's interior that
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
"intrusion into a constitutionally protected area," Silverman v.
United States, 365 U. S. 505, 512, constitutes a search-at
least where (as here) the technology in question is not in
general public use. This assures preservation of that degree
of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted. Pp. 33-35.

(c) Based on this criterion, the information obtained by the

thermal imager in this case was the product of a search. The
Court rejects the Government's argument that the thermal
imaging must be upheld because it detected only heat
radiating from the home's external surface. Such a mechanical
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment was rejected in Katz,

Page 60 of 186
 14. UNITED STATES v. JONES (Certiorari to the United a reasonable one—is forfeited because it was not
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia raised below. P. 12. 615 F. 3d 544, affirmed.
Circuit No. 10–1259. Argued November 8, 2011—
Decided January 23, 2012) Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor, JJ.,
joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a concurring opinion. Alito, J., filed
The Government obtained a search warrant permitting it to an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Ginsburg,
install a Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device on Breyer, and Kagan, JJ., joined.
a vehicle registered to respondent Jones’s wife. The warrant
authorized installation in the District of Columbia and within 10
days, but agents installed the device on the 11th day and in
Maryland. The Government then tracked the vehicle’s
movements for 28 days. It subsequently secured an
indictment of Jones and others on drug trafficking conspiracy
charges. The District Court suppressed the GPS data
obtained while the vehicle was parked at Jones’s residence,
but held the remaining data admissible because Jones had no
reasonable expectation of privacy when the vehicle was on
public streets. Jones was convicted. The D. C. Circuit
reversed, concluding that admission of the evidence obtained
by warrantless use of the GPS device violated the Fourth
Amendment.

Held: The Government’s attachment of the GPS device to the

vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s
movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment. Pp. 3–12.

(a) The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” Here, the Government’s physical intrusion
on an “effect” for the purpose of obtaining information
constitutes a “search.” This type of encroachment on
an area enumerated in the Amendment would have
been considered a search within the meaning of the
Amendment at the time it was adopted. Pp. 3–4.

(b) This conclusion is consistent with this Court’s Fourth

Amendment jurisprudence, which until the latter half of
the 20th century was tied to common-law trespass.
Later cases, which have deviated from that exclusively
property-based approach, have applied the analysis of
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States,
389 U. S. 347 , which said that the Fourth Amendment
protects a person’s “reasonable expectation of
privacy,” id., at 360. Here, the Court need not address
the Government’s contention that Jones had no
“reasonable expectation of privacy,” because Jones’s
Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the
Katz formulation. At bottom, the Court must “assur[e]
preservation of that degree of privacy against
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment
was adopted.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27 .
Katz did not repudiate the understanding that the
Fourth Amendment embodies a particular concern for
government trespass upon the areas it enumerates.
The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has
been added to, but not substituted for, the common-
law trespassory test. See Alderman v. United States,
394 U. S. 165 ; Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56 .
United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 , and United
States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705 —post-Katz cases
rejecting Fourth Amendment challenges to “beepers,”
electronic tracking devices representing another form
of electronic monitoring—do not foreclose the
conclusion that a search occurred here. New York v.
Class, 475 U. S. 106 , and Oliver v. United States, 466
U. S. 170 , also do not support the Government’s
position. Pp. 4–12.

(c) The Government’s alternative argument—that if the

attachment and use of the device was a search, it was

Page 61 of 186
 15. BRICCIO "Ricky" A. POLLO vs. CHAIRPERSON
KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, DIRECTOR IV
RACQUEL DE GUZMAN BUENSALIDA, DIRECTOR
IV LYDIA A. CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III ENGELBERT
ANTHONY D. UNITE AND THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION (G.R. No. 181881 October 18, 2011;
VILLARAMA, JR., J.)
FACTS: This case involves a search of office computer
assigned to a government employee who was charged
administratively and eventually dismissed from the service.
The employee’s personal files stored in the computer were
used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct.
Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the
CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of
the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the
"Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na" program of the CSC.
On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned letter-
complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David which was marked "Confidential" and sent
through a courier service (LBC) from a certain "Alan San
Pascual" of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was received by
the Integrated Records Management Office (IRMO) at the
CSC Central Office. Following office practice in which
documents marked "Confidential" are left unopened and
instead sent to the addressee, the aforesaid letter was given
directly to Chairperson David.
Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four
personnel with background in information technology (IT), and
issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and
specifically "to back up all the files in the computers found in
the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions."4 After
some briefing, the team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV
office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City. Upon their arrival
thereat around 5:30 p.m., the team informed the officials of the
CSC-ROIV, respondents Director IV Lydia Castillo (Director
Castillo) and Director III Engelbert Unite (Director Unite) of
Chairperson David’s directive.
It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing
files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by
the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were
draft pleadings or letters7 in connection with administrative
cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this
finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order8
dated January 11, 2007, requiring the petitioner, who had
gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-
affidavit within five days from notice.
On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071420,
which found petitioner GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service and Violation of Republic Act 6713. He is meted the
penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its
accessory penalties.
ISSUE: On the paramount issue of the legality of the search
conducted on petitioner’s computer, the CSC noted the dearth
of jurisprudence relevant to the factual milieu of this case
where the government as employer invades the private files
of an employee stored in the computer assigned to him for his
official use, in the course of initial investigation of possible
misconduct committed by said employee and without the
latter’s consent or participation.
HELD: The CSC held that petitioner has no reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to the computer he was
using in the regional office in view of the CSC computer use
policy which unequivocally declared that a CSC employee
Page 62 of 186
cannot assert any privacy right to a computer assigned to him.
Even assuming that there was no such administrative policy,
the CSC was of the view that the search of petitioner’s
computer successfully passed the test of reasonableness for
warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the
aforecited authorities. The CSC stressed that it pursued the
search in its capacity as government employer and that it was
undertaken in connection with an investigation involving work-
related misconduct, which exempts it from the warrant
requirement under the Constitution. With the matter of
admissibility of the evidence having been resolved, the CSC
then ruled that the totality of evidence adequately supports the
charges of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service and violation of R.A. No.
6713 against the petitioner. These grave infractions justified
petitioner’s dismissal from the service with all its accessory
penalties.
Squarely raised by the petitioner is the legality of the search
conducted on his office computer and the copying of his
personal files without his knowledge and consent, alleged as
a transgression on his constitutional right to privacy.
Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on
petitioner’s computer was justified at its inception and scope.
Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the
Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any
possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same
date that the complaint was received, a search was forthwith
conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned
regional office. That it was the computers that were subjected
to the search was justified since these furnished the easiest
means for an employee to encode and store documents.
Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in
ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the
ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they could easily
be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and
immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply
with the probable cause requirement would invariably defeat
the purpose of the wok-related investigation.
Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission
effected the warrantless search in an open and transparent
manner. Officials and some employees of the regional office,
who happened to be in the vicinity, were on hand to observe
the process until its completion. In addition, the respondent
himself was duly notified, through text messaging, of the
search and the concomitant retrieval of files from his
computer.
All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless
search done on computer assigned to Pollo was not, in any
way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable
exercise of the managerial prerogative of the Commission as
an employer aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness
and efficiency by going after the work-related misfeasance of
its employees. Consequently, the evidence derived from the
questioned search are deemed admissible
Petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to
privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument invoking the
privacy of communication and correspondence under Section
3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable
considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate
intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government
workplace under the aforecited authorities. We likewise find
no merit in his contention that O’Connor and Simons are not
relevant because the present case does not involve a criminal
offense like child pornography. As already mentioned, the
search of petitioner’s computer was justified there being
reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein
would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation
being conducted by CSC as government employer of such
misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This
situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless
requirement in administrative searches defined in O’Connor.
The above case is to be distinguished from the case at bar
because, unlike the former which involved a personal
computer of a court employee, the computer from which the
personal files of herein petitioner were retrieved is a
government-issued computer, hence government property the
use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and
monitor. Such relationship of the petitioner with the item
seized (office computer) and other relevant factors and
circumstances under American Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, notably the existence of CSC MO 10, S. 2007
on Computer Use Policy, failed to establish that petitioner had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the office computer
assigned to him.
CARPIO, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Right to Privacy;
Any private use of a government property, like a government-
owned computer, is prohibited by law. Consequently, a
government employee cannot expect any privacy when he
uses a government-owned computer because he knows he
cannot use the computer for any private purpose. The CSC
regulation declaring a no-privacy expectation on the use of
government-owned computers logically follows from the
statutory rule that government-owned property shall be used
“solely” for a public purpose.

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this

jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: Sec. 2. The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its
employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy
in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office
computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the
computer resources using both automated or human means.
This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to
ensure that the computer resources were used only for such
legitimate business purposes.

A search by a government employer of an employee’s office

is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct. Thus, in the 2004 case
decided by the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, it was held
that where a government agency’s computer use policy
prohibited electronic messages with pornographic content and
in addition expressly provided that employees do not have any
personal privacy rights regarding their use of the agency
information systems and technology, the government
employee had no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the
use and contents of his office computer, and therefore
evidence found during warrantless search of the computer
was admissible in prosecution for child pornography. In that
case, the defendant employee’s computer hard drive was first
remotely examined by a computer information technician after
his supervisor received complaints that he was inaccessible
and had copied and distributed non-work-related e-mail
messages throughout the office. When the supervisor
confirmed that defendant had used his computer to access the
prohibited websites, in contravention of the express policy of
the agency, his computer tower and floppy disks were taken
and examined. A formal administrative investigation ensued
and later search warrants were secured by the police
department. The initial remote search of the hard drive of
petitioner’s computer, as well as the subsequent warrantless
searches was held as valid under the O’Connor ruling that a
public employer can investigate work-related misconduct so
long as any search is justified at inception and is reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances that justified it in the first
place.

Page 63 of 186
 16. JESSE U. LUCAS vs. JESUS S. LUCAS (G.R. No.
190710 June 6, 2011; NACHURA, J.)
FACTS: Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court
can issue a DNA testing order? In this petition for review on
certiorari, we address this question to guide the Bench and the
Bar in dealing with a relatively new evidentiary tool.
Petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish
Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties
to DNA Testing)2 before the (RTC) Valenzuela City. Petitioner
narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie),
migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain "Ate
Belen (Belen)" who worked in a prominent nightspot in Manila.
Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen to work. On one
occasion, Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S.
Lucas, at Belen’s workplace, and an intimate relationship
developed between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant
and, on March 11, 1969, she gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U.
Lucas. The name of petitioner’s father was not stated in
petitioner’s certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told
petitioner that his father is respondent. On August 1, 1969,
petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue,
Pasay City. Respondent allegedly extended financial support
to Elsie and petitioner for a period of about two years. When
the relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused
to accept respondent’s offer of support and decided to raise
petitioner on her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie
made several attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent,
but all attempts were in vain.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition.
Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish
filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial court on August
29, 2007 and obtained a copy of the petition.
The RTC held that the ruling on the grounds relied upon by
petitioner for filing the petition is premature considering that a
full-blown trial has not yet taken place. The court also
dismissed respondent’s arguments that there is no basis for
the taking of DNA test, and that jurisprudence is still unsettled
on the acceptability of DNA evidence. It noted that the new
Rule on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing,
whether at the court’s instance or upon application of any
person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On
September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition for certiorari
in favor of respondent.
The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish
illegitimate filiation, specifically seeking a DNA testing order to
abbreviate the proceedings
Finally, petitioner asserts that the motion for DNA testing
should not be a reason for the dismissal of the petition since it
is not a legal ground for the dismissal of cases. If the CA
entertained any doubt as to the propriety of DNA testing, it
should have simply denied the motion. Petitioner points out
that Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence does not require
that there must be a prior proof of filiation before DNA testing
can be ordered. He adds that the CA erroneously relied on the
four significant procedural aspects of a paternity case, as
enunciated in Herrera v. Alba. Petitioner avers that these
procedural aspects are not applicable at this point of the
proceedings because they are matters of evidence that should
be taken up during the trial.
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant
procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties
Page 64 of 186
have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied
in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called
procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have
presented their respective evidence. They are matters of
evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the
proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has
been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to
establish a prima facie case—the first procedural aspect in a
paternity case—is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is
built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the
initiatory pleading.
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the
lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing
since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.
More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the
circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering
that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In
fact, the latter has just set the said case for hearing.
At any rate, the CA’s view that it would be dangerous to allow
a DNA testing without corroborative proof is well taken and
deserves the Court’s attention. In light of this observation, we
find that there is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA
Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions for DNA testing
order, particularly in paternity and other filiation cases. We,
thus, address the question of whether a prima facie showing
is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench
and the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in
the judicial system. It provides the "prescribed parameters on
the requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the
proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports,
etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections to
the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the
probative value of DNA evidence." It seeks "to ensure that the
evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is
utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused
and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure
that DNA analysis serves justice and protects, rather than
prejudice the public."
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence
merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the
accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The
appropriate court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any person who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA
testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and
notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the
case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously
subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested;
or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but
the results may require confirmation for good
reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to
produce new information that is relevant to the
proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the
court may consider as potentially affecting the
accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a
prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law
enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be
issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said
conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing
order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the
applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or
"good cause" for the holding of the test. 36 In these states, a
court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which,
under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a
finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility,
was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of
probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently
explained —
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is still applicable, and a
proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be
made before a court may order a compulsory blood
test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed
regarding the kind of procedures which are required,
but those jurisdictions have almost universally found
that a preliminary showing must be made before a
court can constitutionally order compulsory blood
testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as
a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an
order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party
must show that there is a reasonable possibility of
paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which
paternity is contested and a party to the action
refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show
cause hearing must be held in which the court can
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance
of a court order for blood testing.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for
DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence
or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. Lucas vs.
Lucas, 650 SCRA 667, G.R. No. 190710 June 6, 2011
Page 65 of 186
17. MARYLAND v. KING (Certiorari to the court of
appeals of Maryland No. 12–207. Argued February
26, 2013—Decided June 3, 2013)
After his 2009 arrest on first- and second-degree assault
charges, respondent King was processed through a Wicomico
County, Maryland, facility, where booking personnel used a
cheek swab to take a DNA sample pursuant to the Maryland
DNA Collection Act (Act). The swab was matched to an
unsolved 2003 rape, and King was charged with that crime.
He moved to suppress the DNA match, arguing that the Act
violated the Fourth Amendment, but the Circuit Court Judge
found the law constitutional. King was convicted of rape. The
Maryland Court of Appeals set aside the conviction, finding
unconstitutional the portions of the Act authorizing DNA
collection from felony arrestees.
Held: When officers make an arrest supported by probable
cause to hold for a serious offense and bring the suspect to
the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a
cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and
photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 3–28.
(a) DNA testing may “significantly improve both the criminal
justice system and police investigative practices,” District
Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U. S.
52 , by making it “possible to determine whether a biological
tissue matches a suspect with near certainty,” id., at 62.
Maryland’s Act authorizes law enforcement authorities to
collect DNA samples from, as relevant here, persons charged
with violent crimes, including first-degree assault. A sample
may not be added to a database before an individual is
arraigned, and it must be destroyed if, e.g., he is not convicted.
Only identity information may be added to the database. Here,
the officer collected a DNA sample using the common “buccal
swab” procedure, which is quick and painless, requires no
“surgical intrusio[n] beneath the skin,” Winston v. Lee, 470 U.
S. 753 , and poses no threat to the arrestee’s “health or
safety,” id., at 763. Respondent’s identification as the rapist
resulted in part through the operation of the Combined DNA
Index System (CODIS), which connects DNA laboratories at
the local, state, and national level, and which standardizes the
points of comparison, i.e., loci, used in DNA analysis. Pp. 3–
7.
(b) The framework for deciding the issue presented is well
established. Using a buccal swab inside a person’s cheek to
obtain a DNA sample is a search under the Fourth
Amendment. And the fact that the intrusion is negligible is of
central relevance to determining whether the search is
reasonable, “the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a
governmental search,” Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U. S. 646 . Because the need for a warrant is greatly
diminished here, where the arrestee was already in valid
police custody for a serious offense supported by probable
cause, the search is analyzed by reference to
“reasonableness, not individualized suspicion,” Samson v.
California, 547 U. S. 843 , n. 4, and reasonableness is
determined by weighing “the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests” against “the degree to which [the
search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy,” Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U. S. 295 . Pp. 7–10.
(c) In this balance of reasonableness, great weight is given to
both the significant government interest at stake in the
identification of arrestees and DNA identification’s unmatched
potential to serve that interest. Pp. 10–23.
(1) The Act serves a well-established, legitimate
government interest: the need of law enforcement
officers in a safe and accurate way to process and
 identify persons and possessions taken into custody.
“[P]robable cause provides legal justification for
arresting a [suspect], and for a brief period of detention
to take the administrative steps incident to arrest,”
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 –114; and the “validity
of the search of a person incident to a lawful arrest” is
settled, United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 .
Individual suspicion is not necessary. The “routine
administrative procedure[s] at a police station house
incident to booking and jailing the suspect” have
different origins and different constitutional
justifications than, say, the search of a place not
incident to arrest, Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U. S. 640 ,
which depends on the “fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 . And when
probable cause exists to remove an individual from the
normal channels of society and hold him in legal
custody, DNA identification plays a critical role in
serving those interests. First, the government has an
interest in properly identifying “who has been arrested
and who is being tried.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.
Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty., 542 U. S. 177 . Criminal
history is critical to officers who are processing a
suspect for detention. They already seek identity
information through routine and accepted means:
comparing booking photographs to sketch artists’
depictions, showing mugshots to potential witnesses,
and comparing fingerprints against electronic
databases of known criminals and unsolved crimes.
The only difference between DNA analysis and
fingerprint databases is the unparalleled accuracy DNA
provides. DNA is another metric of identification used
to connect the arrestee with his or her public persona,
as reflected in records of his or her actions that are
available to the police. Second, officers must ensure
that the custody of an arrestee does not create
inordinate “risks for facility staff, for the existing
detainee population, and for a new detainee.” Florence
v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of
Burlington, 566 U. S. ___, ___. DNA allows officers to
know the type of person being detained. Third, “the
Government has a substantial interest in ensuring that
persons accused of crimes are available for trials.” Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520. An arrestee may be more
inclined to flee if he thinks that continued contact with
the criminal justice system may expose another serious
offense. Fourth, an arrestee’s past conduct is essential
to assessing the danger he poses to the public, which
will inform a court’s bail determination. Knowing that
the defendant is wanted for a previous violent crime
based on DNA identification may be especially
probative in this regard. Finally, in the interests of
justice, identifying an arrestee as the perpetrator of
some heinous crime may have the salutary effect of
freeing a person wrongfully imprisoned. Pp. 10–18.
efficacy of the search for its purpose of prompt
identification, not the constitutionality of the search.
Rapid technical advances are also reducing DNA
processing times. Pp. 18–23.
(d) The government interest is not outweighed by
respondent’s privacy interests. Pp. 23–28.
(1) By comparison to the substantial government interest
and the unique effectiveness of DNA identification, the
intrusion of a cheek swab to obtain a DNA sample is
minimal. Reasonableness must be considered in the
context of an individual’s legitimate privacy
expectations, which necessarily diminish when he is
taken into police custody. Bell, supra, at 557. Such
searches thus differ from the so-called special needs
searches of, e.g., otherwise law-abiding motorists at
checkpoints. See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32
. The reasonableness inquiry considers two other
circumstances in which particularized suspicion is not
categorically required: “diminished expectations of
privacy [and a] minimal intrusion.” Illinois v. McArthur,
531 U. S. 326 . An invasive surgery may raise privacy
concerns weighty enough for the search to require a
warrant, notwithstanding the arrestee’s diminished
privacy expectations, but a buccal swab, which
involves a brief and minimal intrusion with “virtually no
risk, trauma, or pain,” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.
S. 757 , does not increase the indignity already
attendant to normal incidents of arrest. Pp. 23–26.
(2) The processing of respondent’s DNA sample’s CODIS
loci also did not intrude on his privacy in a way that
would make his DNA identification unconstitutional.
Those loci came from noncoding DNA parts that do not
reveal an arrestee’s genetic traits and are unlikely to
reveal any private medical information. Even if they
could provide such information, they are not in fact
tested for that end. Finally, the Act provides statutory
protections to guard against such invasions of privacy.
Pp. 26–28.
425 Md. 550, 42 A. 3d 549, reversed.

(2) DNA identification is an important advance in the

techniques long used by law enforcement to serve
legitimate police concerns. Police routinely have used
scientific advancements as standard procedures for
identifying arrestees. Fingerprinting, perhaps the most
direct historical analogue to DNA technology, has, from
its advent, been viewed as a natural part of “the
administrative steps incident to arrest.” County of
Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44 . However, DNA
identification is far superior. The additional intrusion
upon the arrestee’s privacy beyond that associated
with fingerprinting is not significant, and DNA
identification is markedly more accurate. It may not be
as fast as fingerprinting, but rapid fingerprint analysis is
itself of recent vintage, and the question of how long it
takes to process identifying information goes to the

Page 66 of 186
18. UNITED STATES v. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ(1990) No.
88-1353
Argued: November 7, 1989Decided: February 28, 1990
After the Government obtained an arrest warrant for
respondent - a Mexican citizen and resident believed to be a
leader of an organization that smuggles narcotics into this
country - he was apprehended by Mexican police and
transported here, where he was arrested. Following his arrest,
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents, working with
Mexican officials, searched his Mexican residences and
seized certain documents. The District Court granted his
motion to suppress the evidence, concluding that the Fourth
Amendment - which protects "the people" against
unreasonable searches and seizures - applied to the
searches, and that the DEA agents had failed to justify
searching the premises without a warrant. The Court of
Appeals affirmed. Citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 - which
held that American citizens tried abroad by United States
military officials were entitled to Fifth and Sixth Amendment
protections - the court concluded that the Constitution
imposes substantive constraints on the Federal Government,
even when it operates abroad. Relying on INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 - where a majority assumed that
illegal aliens in the United States have Fourth Amendment
rights - the court observed that it would be odd to acknowledge
that respondent was entitled to trial-related rights guaranteed
by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, but not to Fourth
Amendment protection.
Held: The Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search
and seizure by United States agents of property owned by a
nonresident alien and located in a foreign country. Pp. 264-
275.
(a) If there were a constitutional violation in this case, it
occurred solely in Mexico, since a Fourth Amendment
violation is fully accomplished at the time of an unreasonable
governmental intrusion whether or not the evidence seized is
sought for use in a criminal trial. Thus, the Fourth Amendment
functions differently from the Fifth Amendment, whose
privilege against self-incrimination is a fundamental trial right
of criminal defendants. P. 264.
(b) The Fourth Amendment phrase "the people" seems to be
a term of art used in select parts of the Constitution and
contrasts with the words "person" and "accused" used in
Articles of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments regulating criminal
procedures. This suggests that "the people" [494 U.S. 259,
260] refers to a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient
connection with this country to be considered part of that
community. Pp. 264-266.
(c) The Fourth Amendment's drafting history shows that its
purpose was to protect the people of the United States against
arbitrary action by their own Government and not to restrain
the Federal Government's actions against aliens outside
United States territory. Nor is there any indication that the
Amendment was understood by the Framers' contemporaries
to apply to United States activities directed against aliens in
foreign territory or in international waters. Pp. 266-268.
(d) The view that every constitutional provision applies
wherever the Government exercises its power is contrary to
this Court's decisions in the Insular Cases, which held that not
all constitutional provisions apply to governmental activity
even in territories where the United States has sovereign
Page 67 of 186
power. See, e. g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 . Indeed,
the claim that extraterritorial aliens are entitled to rights under
the Fifth Amendment - which speaks in the relatively universal
term of "person" - has been emphatically rejected. Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 . Pp. 268-269.
(e) Respondent's reliance on Reid, supra, is misplaced, since
that case stands only for the proposition that United States
citizens stationed abroad could invoke the protection of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Similarly, those cases in which
aliens have been determined to enjoy certain constitutional
rights establish only that aliens receive such protections when
they have come within the territory of, and have developed
substantial connections with, this country. See, e. g., Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 . Respondent, however, is an alien
with no previous significant voluntary connection with the
United States, and his legal but involuntary presence here
does not indicate any substantial connection with this country.
The Court of Appeals' reliance on INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,
supra, is also misplaced, since that case assumed that, but
did not expressly address the question whether, the Fourth
Amendment applies to illegal aliens in the United States. Even
assuming such aliens - who are in this country voluntarily and
presumably have accepted some societal obligations - would
be entitled to Fourth Amendment protections, their situation
differs from that of respondent, who had no voluntary
connection with this country that might place him among "the
people." This Court's decisions expressly according differing
protection to aliens than to citizens also undermine
respondent's claim that treating aliens differently under the
Fourth Amendment violates the equal protection component
of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 269-273.
(f) The Court of Appeals' rule would have significant and
deleterious consequences for the United States in conducting
activities beyond its [494 U.S. 259, 261] borders. The rule
would apply not only to law enforcement operations abroad,
but also to other foreign operations - such as Armed Forces
actions - which might result in "searches and seizures." Under
the rule, aliens with no attachment to this country might bring
actions for damages to remedy claimed violations of the
Fourth Amendment in foreign countries or in international
waters, and Members of the Executive and Legislative
Branches would be plunged into a sea of uncertainty as to
what might be reasonable in the way of searches and seizures
conducted abroad. Any restrictions on searches and seizures
incident to American action abroad must be imposed by the
political branches through diplomatic understanding, treaty, or
legislation. Pp. 273-275.
856 F.2d 1214, reversed.

E. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND
CORRESPONDENCE
1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) No. 35 (389
U.S. 347 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT)
Argued October 17, 1967
Decided December 18, 1967
Syllabus: Petitioner was convicted under an indictment
charging him with transmitting wagering information by
telephone across state lines in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1084.
Evidence of petitioner's end of the conversations, overheard
by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and
recording device to the outside of the telephone booth from
which the calls were made, was introduced at the trial. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that there
was no Fourth Amendment violation, since there was "no
physical entrance into the area occupied by" petitioner.
Held:
1. The Government's eavesdropping activities violated the
privacy upon which petitioner justifiably relied while using
the telephone booth, and thus constituted a "search and
seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Pp. 389 U. S. 350-353.
(a) The Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure
of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording
of oral statements. Silverman v. United States, 365
U. S. 505, 365 U. S. 511. P. 389 U. S. 353.
(b) Because the Fourth Amendment protects people,
rather than places, its reach cannot turn on the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any
given enclosure. The "trespass" doctrine of
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, and
Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, is no longer
controlling. Pp. 389 U. S. 351, 389 U. S. 353.
2. Although the surveillance in this case may have been so
narrowly circumscribed that it could constitutionally have
been authorized in advance, it was not in fact conducted
pursuant to the warrant procedure which is a
constitutional precondition of such electronic
surveillance. Pp. 389 U. S. 354-359.
369 F.2d 130, reversed.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner was convicted in the District Court for the
Southern District of California under an eight-count indictment
charging him with transmitting wagering information by
telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston, in violation
of a federal statute. [Footnote 1] At trial, the Government was
permitted, over the petitioner's objection, to introduce
evidence of the petitioner's end of telephone conversations,
overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic
listening and recording device to the outside of the public
telephone booth from which he had placed his calls. In
affirming his conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected the
contention that the recordings had been obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment, because "[t]here was no physical
entrance into the area occupied by [the petitioner]." [Footnote
Page 68 of 186
2] We granted certiorari in order to consider the constitutional
questions thus presented. [Footnote 3]
The petitioner has phrased those questions as follows:
"A. Whether a public telephone booth is a
constitutionally protected area so that evidence
obtained by attaching an electronic listening
recording device to the top of such a booth is
obtained in violation of the right to privacy of the user
of the booth. "
"B. Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally
protected area is necessary before a search and
seizure can be said to be violative of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution."
We decline to adopt this formulation of the issues. In the first
place, the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is
not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase
"constitutionally protected area." Secondly, the Fourth
Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional
"right to privacy." That Amendment protects individual privacy
against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its
protections go further, and often have nothing to do with
privacy at all. [Footnote 4] Other provisions of the Constitution
protect personal privacy from other forms of governmental
invasion. [Footnote 5] But the protection of a person's general
right to privacy -- his right to be let alone by other people
[Footnote 6] -- is, like the protection of his property and of his
very life, left largely to the law of the individual States.
[Footnote 7]
Because of the misleading way the issues have been
formulated, the parties have attached great significance to the
characterization of the telephone booth from which the
petitioner placed his calls. The petitioner has strenuously
argued that the booth was a "constitutionally protected area."
The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was
not. [Footnote 8] But this effort to decide whether or not a
given "area," viewed in the abstract, is "constitutionally
protected" deflects attention from the problem presented by
this case. [Footnote 9] For the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United States,
385 U. S. 206, 385 U. S. 210; United States v. Lee, 274 U. S.
559, 274 U. S. 563. But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected. See Rios v. United States, 364 U.
S. 253; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 96 U. S. 733.
The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth
from which the petitioner made his calls was constructed
partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he entered it as
he would have been if he had remained outside. But what he
sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the
intruding eye -- it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his
right to do so simply because he made his calls from a place
where he might be seen. No less than an individual in a
business office, [Footnote 10] in a friend's apartment,
[Footnote 11] or in a taxicab, [Footnote 12] a person in a
telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him,
and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the
Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the
public telephone has come to play in private communication.
The Government contends, however, that the activities of its
agents in this case should not be tested by Fourth Amendment
requirements, for the surveillance technique they employed
involved no physical penetration of the telephone booth from
which the petitioner placed his calls. It is true that the absence
of such penetration was at one time thought to foreclose
further Fourth Amendment inquiry, Olmstead v. United States,
277 U. S. 438, 277 U. S. 457, 277 U. S. 464, 277 U. S. 466;
Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, 316 U. S. 134-136,
for that Amendment was thought to limit only searches and
seizures of tangible property. [Footnote 13] But "[t]he premise
that property interests control the right of the Government to
search and seize has been discredited." Warden v. Hayden,
387 U. S. 294, 387 U. S. 304. Thus, although a closely divided
Court supposed in Olmstead that surveillance without any
trespass and without the seizure of any material object fell
outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed
from the narrow view on which that decision rested. Indeed,
we have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs
not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to
the recording of oral statements, overheard without any
"technical trespass under . . . local property law." Silverman v.
United States, 365 U. S. 505, 365 U. S. 511. Once this much
is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the Fourth
Amendment protects people -- and not simply "areas" --
against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes
clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure.
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and
Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions
that the "trespass" doctrine there enunciated can no longer be
regarded as controlling. The Government's activities in
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words
violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using
the telephone booth, and thus constituted a "search and
seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end
did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no
constitutional significance. The question remaining for
decision, then, is whether the search and seizure conducted
in this case complied with constitutional standards. In that
regard, the Government's position is that its agents acted in
an entirely defensible manner: they did not begin their
electronic surveillance until investigation of the petitioner's
activities had established a strong probability that he was
using the telephone in question to transmit gambling
information to persons in other States, in violation of federal
law. Moreover, the surveillance was limited, both in scope and
in duration, to the specific purpose of establishing the contents
of the petitioner's unlawful telephonic communications. The
agents confined their surveillance to the brief periods during
which he used the telephone booth, [Footnote 14] and they
took great care to overhear only the conversations of the
petitioner himself. [Footnote 15]
Accepting this account of the Government's actions as
accurate, it is clear that this surveillance was so narrowly
circumscribed that a duly authorized magistrate, properly
notified of the need for such investigation, specifically
informed of the basis on which it was to proceed, and clearly
apprised of the precise intrusion it would entail, could
constitutionally have authorized, with appropriate safeguards,
the very limited search and seizure that the Government
asserts, in fact, took place. Only last Term we sustained the
validity of such an authorization, holding that, under
sufficiently "precise and discriminate circumstances," a
federal court may empower government agents to employ a
concealed electronic device "for the narrow and particularized
purpose of ascertaining the truth of the . . . allegations" of a
"detailed factual affidavit alleging the commission of a specific
criminal offense." Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323, 385
U. S. 329-330. Discussing that holding, the Court in Berger v.
New York, 388 U. S. 41, said that "the order authorizing the
use of the electronic device" in Osborn "afforded similar
protections to those . . . of conventional warrants authorizing
the seizure of tangible evidence." Through those protections,
"no greater invasion of privacy was permitted than was
Page 69 of 186
necessary under the circumstances." Id. at 388 U. S. 57.
[Footnote 16] Here, too, a similar judicial order could have
accommodated "the legitimate needs of law enforcement"
[Footnote 17] by authorizing the carefully limited use of
electronic surveillance.
The Government urges that, because its agents relied upon
the decisions in Olmstead and Goldman, and because they
did no more here than they might properly have done with prior
judicial sanction, we should retroactively validate their
conduct. That we cannot do. It is apparent that the agents in
this case acted with restraint. Yet the inescapable fact is that
this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a
judicial officer. They were not required, before commencing
the search, to present their estimate of probable cause for
detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. They were not
compelled, during the conduct of the search itself, to observe
precise limits established in advance by a specific court order.
Nor were they directed, after the search had been completed,
to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that had been
seized. In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has
never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers
reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and
voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means
consistent with that end. Searches conducted without
warrants have been held unlawful "notwithstanding facts
unquestionably showing probable cause," Agnello v. United
States, 269 U. S. 20, 269 U. S. 33, for the Constitution requires
"that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . .
be interposed between the citizen and the police. . . ." Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 371 U. S. 481-482. "Over
and again, this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the
[Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial
processes," United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 342 U. S.
51, and that searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment [Footnote 18] --
subject only to a few specifically established and well
delineated exceptions. [Footnote 19]
It is difficult to imagine how any of those exceptions could ever
apply to the sort of search and seizure involved in this case.
Even electronic surveillance substantially contemporaneous
with an individual's arrest could hardly be deemed an
"incident" of that arrest. [Footnote 20] Nor could the use of
electronic surveillance without prior authorization be justified
on grounds of "hot pursuit." [Footnote 21] And, of course, the
very nature of electronic surveillance precludes its use
pursuant to the suspect's consent. [Footnote 22]
The Government does not question these basic principles.
Rather, it urges the creation of a new exception to cover this
case. [Footnote 23] It argues that surveillance of a telephone
booth should be exempted from the usual requirement of
advance authorization by a magistrate upon a showing of
probable cause. We cannot agree. Omission of such
authorization "bypasses the safeguards provided by an
objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes
instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event
justification for the . . . search, too likely to be subtly influenced
by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment."
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 379 U. S. 96. And bypassing a
neutral predetermination of the scope of a search leaves
individuals secure from Fourth Amendment violations "only in
the discretion of the police." Id. at 379 U. S. 97.
These considerations do not vanish when the search in
question is transferred from the setting of a home, an office,
or a hotel room to that of a telephone booth. Wherever a man
may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. The government agents
here ignored "the procedure of antecedent justification . . . that
is central to the Fourth Amendment," [Footnote 24] a
procedure that we hold to be a constitutional precondition of
the kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case.
Because the surveillance here failed to meet that condition,
and because it led to the petitioner's conviction, the judgment
must be reversed.
It is so ordered.
Page 70 of 186
2. CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ALFREDO MARTIN (G.R. No. 107383; February 20, 1996)
FACTS: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent
Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the
clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and
papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the
documents and papers and for damages against petitioner.
The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described
in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia
Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately
return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him damages.
In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the trial court's decision, petitioner's only ground is
that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that
the documents and papers were admissible in evidence and,
therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did
not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct, For this
reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing
private respondent's complaint.
ISSUE: Were the documents indeed admissible in evidence?
HELD: No, the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence
[to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity)
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is
to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any
one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other
and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between
the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one
thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the
other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.

3. BLAS F. OPLE vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA (G.R. No. 127685
July 23, 1998)
FACTS: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of
the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly
intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant
the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the
petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion. He
alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification
that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of
every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more
particularly, violates their right to privacy.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general
circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On
January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against
respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the
heads of the government agencies, who as members of the
Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the
implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued
a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
ISSUE: Is A.O. No. 308 not a mere administrative order but a
law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue?
HELD: A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate
to be covered by an administrative order.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony
with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
The Court rejects the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements
the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The
Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified document
the major structural, functional and procedural principles of
governance." and "embodies changes in administrative
structure and procedures designed to serve the people."
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely
implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for
the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference
System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies — the primacy of national
security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-
gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed,
the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No.
308 involves the all-important freedom of thought. As said
administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic
rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that
separates the administrative power of the President to make
rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be
evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by
law.
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the
subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an
administrative legislation because facially it violates the right
to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone."
In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, we adopted the Griswold
ruling that there is a constitutional right to privacy. Speaking
thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, we
held:
Page 71 of 186
The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself,
it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The
language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The
concept of limited government has always included
the idea that governmental powers stop short of
certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between
absolute and limited government. Ultimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of
his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In
contrast, a system of limited government safeguards
a private sector, which belongs to the individual,
firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which
the state can control. Protection of this private sector
— protection, in other words, of the dignity and
integrity of the individual — has become increasingly
important as modern society has developed.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our
laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of
his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable
torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the
privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or
any private individual liable for damages for any violation of
the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the
privacy of letters and other private communications. The
Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by
an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and
trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in
special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of
Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The
Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise
recognize the privacy of certain information.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look
will show that it does not state whether encoding of data is
limited to biological information alone for identification
purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the
adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute
to the "generation of population data for development
planning." This is an admission that the PRN will not be used
solely for identification but the generation of other data with
remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308.
Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the
government the roving authority to store and retrieve
information for a purpose other than the identification of the
individual through his PRN. The potential for misuse of the
data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be
undarplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said
administrative order, an individual must present his PRN
everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic
services and security. His transactions with the government
agency will necessarily be recorded — whether it be in the
computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The
individual's file may include his transactions for loan
availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and
liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc.
The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance
of building a huge formidable information base through the
electronic linkage of the files.
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring
that personal information which will be gathered about our
people will only be processed for unequivocally specified
purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O.
No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it
may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential
information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination;
it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government
authorities and evade the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse
of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are
accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control
over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify
the correctness of the data encoded. 62 They threaten the
very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.
The Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's
abridgment of the right of privacy by using the rational
relationship test. 75 He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No.
308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the implementation of
basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding
duplication of services, and (3) generate population data for
development planning. He cocludes that these purposes
justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the means are
rationally related to the end. We are not impressed by the
argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, we upheld the constitutionality
of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a
valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in
compelling a public officer to make an annual report disclosing
his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses,
did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was
enacted to promote morality in public administration by
curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public
service. The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at
bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, not an administrative
order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The
law is clear on what practices were prohibited and penalized,
and it was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. IN the case at bar,
A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose,
but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly
drawn.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to
privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The
right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological
advancements that enhance public service and the common
good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and
a compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the
right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-
defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We
reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy
will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny.
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man
living in a mass society. The threats emanate from various
sources — governments, journalists, employers, social
scientists, etc. In th case at bar, the threat comes from the
executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No.
308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving
information about themselves on the pretext that it will
facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping
power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the
danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to
compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens.
It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin,
Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live
burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his
limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-
keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to
forget."
Page 72 of 186
4. KILUSANG MAYO UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION
OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-
KMU), et. al vs. DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NEDA and
Secretary of DBM (G.R. No. 167798 April 19, 2006)
FACTS: On April 13, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo issued EO No. 420, reads –
REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND
GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND
HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID)
SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH
PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
directing all government agencies and government-owned
and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data co llection
and format for their existing identification (ID) systems.
The EO was assailed as unconstitutional based on the same
grounds used in the earlier case of Ople vs. Torres. EO 420 is
a usurpation of legislative power by the President and that it is
an infringement on the citizen’s right to privacy and that the
implementation of the EO will use public funds not
appropriated by Congress for that purpose. EO 420 is vague
and without adequate safeguards or penalties for any violation
of its provisions. Granting without conceding that the
President may issue EO 420, the Executive Order was issued
without public hearing.
ISSUE:
1. WON EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the
President.
2. WON EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy.
RULING: No. EO 420 does not establish a national ID card
system. EO 420 does not compel all citizens to have an ID
card. EO 420 applies only to government entities that under
existing laws are already collecting data and issuing ID cards
as part of their governmental functions.
Section 2 of EO 420 provides, "Coverage. – All government
agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations
issuing ID cards to their members or constituents shall be
covered by this executive order." EO 420 applies only to
government entities that issue ID cards as part of their
functions under existing laws. These government entities have
already been issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420. Examples
of these government entities are the GSIS, SSS, Philhealth,
Mayor’s Office, LTO, PRC, and similar government entities.
Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to
"adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system." Thus, all
government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions
under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data
collection and format for their IDs. The purposes of the uniform
ID data collection and ID format are to reduce costs, achieve
efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility, and provide
convenience to the people served by government entities.
At present, government entities like LTO require considerably
more data from applicants for identification purposes. EO 420
will reduce the data required to be collected and recorded in
the ID databases of the government entities. Government
entities cannot collect or record data, for identification
purposes, other than the 14 specific data. Various laws allow
several government entities to collect and record data for their
ID systems, either expressly or impliedly by the nature of the
functions of these government entities. Under their existing ID
systems, some government entities collect and record more
data than what EO 420 allows.
A unified ID system for all these government entities can be
achieved in either of two ways. First, the heads of these
existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of
agreement making their systems uniform. If the government
entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID
pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws, they
can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format,
especially if the uniform format will result in substantial
savings, greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is
purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the
exercise of legislative power. Second, the President may by
executive or administrative order direct the government
entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID
data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that the "President shall have control of
all executive departments, bureaus and offices." The same
Section also mandates the President to "ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed." Certainly, under this constitutional
power of control the President can direct all government
entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws,
to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve
savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience
to the public.
The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that
the laws are faithfully executed. There are several laws
mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase
efficiency, and in general, improve public services. The
adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO
420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in
general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the
President is simply performing the constitutional duty to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Clearly, EO 420
is well within the constitutional power of the President to
promulgate. The President has not usurped legislative power
in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power
– the President’s constitutional power of control over the
Executive department.
What require legislation are three aspects of a government
maintained ID card system. First, when the implementation of
an ID card system requires a special appropriation because
there is no existing appropriation for such purpose. Second,
when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of
government, including the independent constitutional
commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens whether
they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card
system requires the collection and recording of personal data
beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose,
such that the citizen’s right to privacy is infringed. In the
present case, EO 420 does not require any special
appropriation because the existing ID card systems of
government entities covered by EO 420 have the proper
appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on all
branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens.
EO 420 requires a very narrow and focused collection and
recording of personal data while safeguarding the
confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data collected and
recorded under EO 420 are far less than the data collected
and recorded under the ID systems existing prior to EO 420.
Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right
to privacy. Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere
facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws
the data collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing
comprehensive safeguards. Ople v. Torres is not authority to
hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that
case the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and
devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that
the subject matter required legislation.
Page 73 of 186
5. MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA vs. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C.
CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director
of Ilocos Norte and WILLIAM O. FANG, in his
capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP
Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte (G.R. No. 193636; July
24, 2012)
FACTS: At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner
Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras.
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275),
"Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged
Existence of Private Armies in the Country." The body, which
was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission, was
formed to investigate the existence of private army groups
(PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before
the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently
in the future. Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the
Zeñarosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of
the President a confidential report entitled "A Journey
Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against
Private Armies’ Report to the President" (the Report). Gamboa
alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte
(PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance
operations against her and her aides, and classified her as
someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit
of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the
information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission,
thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of
individuals maintaining PAGs.
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening
news program the portion of the Report naming Gamboa as
one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG.
Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also
appeared on print media. Thus, she was publicly tagged as
someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified
information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded
to the Zeñarosa Commission. As a result, she claimed that her
malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of
personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report
also made her, as well as her supporters and other people
identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police
surveillance operations.
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her
reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition
dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-
Ilocos Norte. The case was docketed as Special Proc. No.
14979 and was raffled to RTC Br. 13, which issued the
corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the Petition
meritorious on its face. However, RTC dismissed the Petition
on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial
evidence that the subject information originated from
respondents, and that they forwarded this database to the
Zeñarosa Commission without the benefit of prior verification.
The trial court also ruled that even before respondents
assumed their official positions, information on her may have
already been acquired. The trial court categorically ruled that
the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining
PAGs, as published in the Report, constituted a violation of
her right to privacy.
ISSUE: Was there a violation of Gamboa’s right to privacy?
HELD: This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently
establish that the data contained in the Report listing her as a
PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the
trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP
to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that
violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or
security.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private
armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly
constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment of
one police force that is national in scope and civilian in
character, and is controlled and administered by a national
police commission. Taking into account these constitutional
fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a
legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of
PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them
permanently.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share
intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created
for the purpose of investigating the existence of these
notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was
explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the
fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the power to
request assistance from the latter. Following the
pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the
PNP released information to the Zeñarosa Commission
without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording
her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted
as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is
an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering
and investigation. Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that
the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update
information on individuals associated with PAGs and to
ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the field. Thus,
safeguards were put in place to make sure that the information
collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of
protection established in existing law and jurisprudence, this
Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these
investigating entities that information-sharing must observe
strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released
exclusively to the authorities empowered to receive the
relevant information. After all, inherent to the right to privacy is
the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or
from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to
cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long
been recognized as a constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe
v. Mutuc, thus enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged
deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long
way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff
that the provision on the periodical submission of a
sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative
of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to
be said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in
the constitutional sense must mean more than
freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it
must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository
of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the
beginning of all freedom." As a matter of fact, this
right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice
Brandeis "the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men."
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it
does not likewise compel respect for his personality
as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and
interference demands respect.
The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof.
Page 74 of 186
Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that governmental
powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of
the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions
between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is
the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of
limited government, safeguards a private sector, which
belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public
sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private
sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity
of the individual — has become increasingly important as
modern society has developed.
The right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that
must be protected from intrusion or constraint. However, in
Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, this
Court underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners
claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that
privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees
respect for the rights of persons affected by the
legislative investigation, not every invocation of the
right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a
legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon,
we have held that the right of the people to access
information on matters of public concern generally
prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial
transactions. In that case, we declared that the right
to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding
compelling state interest. Employing the rational
basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v.
Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individual’s
right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure
information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to
ensure that the government agencies involved in
regulating banking transactions adequately protect
the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it
to state that this purpose constitutes a reason
compelling enough to proceed with the assailed
legislative investigation.
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary
remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and
to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances
in which such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be
emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be
granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy
on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the
other.
The notion of informational privacy is still developing in
Philippine law and jurisprudence. Considering that even the
Latin American habeas data, on which our own Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the
European tradition of data protection, this Court can be guided
by cases on the protection of personal data decided by the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR ruled
that the storage in the secret police register of information
relating to the private life of Leander, coupled with the refusal
to allow him the opportunity to refute the same, amounted to
an interference in his right to respect for private life. However,
the ECHR held that the interference was justified on the
following grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a
legitimate aim, which was the protection of national security,
and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens
adequate indication as to the scope and the manner of 6. RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and
exercising discretion in the collection, recording and release DAVID SUZARA vs ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE
of information by the authorities. RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES (G.R. No.
202666 September 29, 2014)

TOPIC: right to informational privacy, writ of habeas data

PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.

PREFATORY: The individual’s desire for privacy is never

absolute, since participation in society is an equally powerful
desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a
personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire
for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication
of himself to others, in light of the environmental conditions
and social norms set by the society in which he lives. – Alan
Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

FACTS: Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high

school students at St. Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City.
Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their
swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia
and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures
of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These
pictures were then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook
profile.

At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high

school department, learned from her students that some
seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves
from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then
asked her students if they knew who the girls in the photos
are. In turn, they readily identified Julia and Julienne, among
others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to

their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her
photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and
Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a
bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu
wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of
their black brassieres.

Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when

access to or the availability of the identified students’ photos
was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in
fact, viewable by any Facebook user.
Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students
involved were barred from joining the commencement
exercises.

Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed

a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data. RTC
dismissed the petition for habeas data on the following
grounds:
1. Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an
actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to
privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of
the writ of habeas data.
2. The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook
without restrictions as to who may view them, lost
their privacy in some way.
3. STC gathered the photographs through legal
means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
implementation of the school’s policies and rules on
discipline.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was indeed an actual or

threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or
security of the minors involved in this case. (Is there a right to
informational privacy in online social network activities of its
users?)

Page 75 of 186
HELD: (Note that you can skip the preliminary discussions
and check the ruling at the latter part)
Nature of Writ of Habeas Data
It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy
in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.
It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect
the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce
one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a person’s right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to
protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, among
others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas
data as “a procedure designed to safeguard individual
freedom from abuse in the information age.”
Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements
1. The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy
2. An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim (proven by at least
substantial evidence)
Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an
alleged unauthorized access to information about a person.
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent
remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically the
right to informational privacy. The remedies against the
violation of such right can include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database or information or
files in possession or in control of respondents. Clearly then,
the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed
of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information
Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions
of public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged
in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved
party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her
family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of
collecting or storing data.
To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a
business endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or take
part in something.” It does not necessarily mean that the
activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What
matters is that the person or entity must be gathering,
collecting or storing said data or information about the
aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking
carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a
business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any
other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and
such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or
entity.
As such, the writ of habeas data may be issued against a
school like STC.
Page 76 of 186
Right to informational privacy
Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to
control information about themselves. Several
commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites,
however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, “in
this Social Networking environment, privacy is no longer
grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some
theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.” So the
underlying question now is: Up to what extent is the right to
privacy protected in OSNs?
Facebook Privacy Tools
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its
purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools
designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile as well
as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South
Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to
“customize their privacy settings,” but did so with this caveat:
“Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every
effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are
not foolproof.”
For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and
accessibility of digital images (photos), posted on his or her
personal bulletin or “wall,” except for the user’s profile picture
and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
1. Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view
the photo;
2. Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and
their friends can view the photo;
3. Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the
photo;
4. Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends
and/or networks of the Facebook user; and
5. Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users,
designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of
his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos,
among others, from another user’s point of view. In other
words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the
availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice
as to “when and to what extent to disclose facts about
themselves – and to put others in the position of receiving
such confidences.”
LONE ISSUE:
NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate
petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy as the subject digital
photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook friends,
or by the public at large.
Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement
that the images were visible only to the five of them, and
without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other
students were able to view the photos, their statements are,
at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s
sworn account that her students, who are the minors’
Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using their own
Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special
means to be able to view the allegedly private posts were ever
resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it is reasonable
to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable
either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at
large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is
“Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in question
were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof
that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the
photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the
protection attached to the right to informational privacy.
US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the
Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy
rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such
as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective
measures or devices that would have controlled access to the
Web page or the photograph itself.
United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of
transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect.
Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail
that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses
any semblance of privacy.
The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that setting
a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no assurance
that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not
Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s
own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her
own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user
tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former.
Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the
post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting
of which was set at “Friends.” Thus, it is suggested, that a
profile, or even a post, with visibility set at “Friends Only”
cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be “very
private,” contrary to petitioners’ argument.
No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of
minors
Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived
privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends
who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere
recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any
unlawful means of gathering the information as it was
voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate
access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the
friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the
minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy
against the students who showed the images to Escudero.
Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or
“Custom”
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were
limited to the original uploader, through the “Me Only” privacy
setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to
limit access to a select few, through the “Custom” setting, the
result may have been different, for in such instances, the
intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being
broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en
masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
Page 77 of 186
7. LEE v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN (G.R. No. 203254,
October 08, 2014)
FACTS: In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas
Data, Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate
Lee were former common law partners. Sometime in July
2011, he visited Lee at the latter’s condominium, Ilagan
noticed that his digital camera was missing. Lee confronted
Ilagan at the latter’s office regarding a purported sex video she
discovered from the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and
another woman.
Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the
camera, but to no avail. During the confrontation, Ilagan
allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a wall inside his office
and walked away.
Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing
various complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal
complaint for violation of R.A. 9262; and (b) an administrative
complaint for grave misconduct before the NAPOLCOM.
Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject video
and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons
of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not
only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that
of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas
data in his favor is warranted.
The RTC granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data in
Ilagan’s favor, and ordered the implementing officer to turn-
over copies of the subject video to him, and enjoined Lee from
further reproducing the same.
Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the
privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.
RULING: The petition is meritorious.
The Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was conceived as a
response, given the lack of effective and available remedies,
to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial
remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right
to informational privacy of individuals, which is defined as “the
right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and
dissemination of data about oneself.”
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of
habeas data now stands as “a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home, and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.”
Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such
writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires
that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he
manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how
it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party.” Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be
supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim.
In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data
will not issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to
sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or
security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex
video.
As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke,
alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s
privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are
crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on
either account certainly renders a habeas data petition
dismissible, as in this case.
Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as
the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it
proper to reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas
data petition.
Page 78 of 186
F. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND
CORRESPONDENCE
1. Francisco Chavez vs. Raul M. Gonzales and NTC
(G.R. No. 168338 | February 15, 2008)
Facts: As a consequence of the public release of copies of the
“Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes involving a
wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-
President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned
reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those
broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable
under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons
possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing
offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that
he had ordered the NBI to go after media organizations “found
to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the
contents of a tape.” Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned TV
and radio stations that their broadcast/airing of such false
information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just
cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of
the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media
establishments. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule
65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC
directly with the Supreme Court.
Issues: (1) Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-
Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom
of speech and of the press?
(2) Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ
Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of content-based
prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?
Held: (1) No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-
Wiretapping Law will not justify straitjacketing the exercise of
freedom of speech and of the press. A governmental action
that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on
content is given the strictest scrutiny, with
the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger
rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of
media, including broadcast media. Respondents, who have
the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of
speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present
danger test. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer
proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court
has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and
free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the
anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of
the State.
(2) Yes, the mere press statements of respondents
DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of content-
based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. It
is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents
were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or
circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made
by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions.
Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of
the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule
on prior restraint. The concept of an “act” does not limit itself
to acts already converted to a formal order or official
circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an
official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of
the prohibition on prior restraint.
 2. DISINI v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE (G.R. No. of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the
203335) people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

FACTS: These consolidated petitions seek to declare several

provisions of R.A. 10175, known as The Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012 unconstitutional and void. This case
holds a handful of petitions seeking the removal of different
sections deemed to be infringing on privacy rights and more.

For this instance, the focus is the creation of the “Cybercrime

Investigation and Coordinating Center” which, in the same
breath, promulgates powers and functions to the agents of the
said center. “Petitioners mainly contend that Congress
invalidly delegated its power when it gave the Cybercrime
Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to
formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient
standards or parameters for it to follow.”

“Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk

management approaches, actions, training, best practices,
assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cyber
environment and organization and user’s assets. This
definition serves as the parameters within which CICC should
work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the CICC is constitutional for it to

operate under delegated powers by Congress

HELD: YES. “In order to determine whether there is undue

delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two
tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce The second test mandates adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot.

Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed

the CICC to formulate and implement a national cybersecurity
plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law
gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it
provided a definition of cybersecurity.”

IMPORTANT LAWS/STATUTES/PROVISIONS/SECTIONS
R.A. 10175

Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center.–

There is hereby created, within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as the
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC),
under the administrative supervision of the Office of the
President, for policy coordination among concerned agencies
and for the formulation and enforcement of the national
cybersecurity plan.

Sec. 26. Powers and Functions.– The CICC shall have the
following powers and functions:

(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend

immediate assistance of real time commission of cybercrime
offenses through a computer emergency response team
(CERT); x x x.

Art. 1, Sec. 6 Philippine Constitution

Sec 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress

of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House

Page 79 of 186
 3. MTRCB vs ABS CBN (G.R. No. 155282; January 17,
2005)
FACTS: On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening,
respondent ABS-CBN aired "Prosti-tuition," an episode of the
television (TV) program "The Inside Story" produced and
hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students
moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their
tuition fees. In the course of the program, student prostitutes,
pimps, customers, and some faculty members were
interviewed. The Philippine Women’s University (PWU) was
named as the school of some of the students involved and the
facade of PWU Building at Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously
served as the background of the episode. The showing of "The
Inside Story" caused uproar in the PWU community. Dr.
Leticia P. de Guzman, Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU,
and the PWU Parents and Teachers Association filed letter-
complaints3 with petitioner MTRCB. Acting on the letter-
complaints, the MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a formal
complaint with the MTRCB Investigating Committee, alleging
among others, that respondents (1) did not submit "The Inside
Story" to petitioner for its review and (2) exhibited the same
without its permission, thus, violating Section 74 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 19865 and Section 3,6 Chapter
III and Section 7,7 Chapter IV of the MTRCB Rules and
Regulations respondents explained that the "The Inside Story"
is a "public affairs program, news documentary and socio-
political editorial," the airing of which is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the
press. Accordingly, petitioner has no power, authority and
jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon
respondents
ISSUE: Whether or not the “inside story” is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the
press
HELD: Respondents claim that the showing of "The Inside
Story" is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom
of speech and of the press. However, there has been no
declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that
freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred status.
If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious
programs from the jurisdiction and review power of petitioner
MTRCB, with more reason, there is no justification to exempt
therefrom "The Inside Story" which, according to respondents,
is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of
expression and of the press, a freedom bearing no preferred
status. The only exceptions from the MTRCB’s power of
review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No.
1986, such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited
by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and
agencies, and (2) newsreels.
Page 80 of 186
4. Lester Packingham v. North Carolina, No. 15-1194,
June 19, 2017
FACTS: Lester Packingham was convicted of taking “indecent
liberties” with a minor in 2002, as a 21-year-old college
student. Per North Carolina law, he was sentenced to a
standard 10-12 month imprisonment, followed by a 24-month
supervised release. Aside from being told to “remain away
from” the minor, his conviction entailed no special stipulations.
Packingham was arrested in 2010 after authorities came
across a post on his Facebook profile, thanking God for having
a parking ticket dismissed. He was arrested for violating North
Carolina’s laws regarding convicted sex offenders, which
barred the offender’s access to social media websites.
In his defense, Packingham argued that the law violated his
First Amendment rights. He was convicted in trial court, which
found that the state had a weighty interest in keeping sexual
predators off of social media websites for the “protection of
minors.” The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed and
held that the social media website provision of the law was
unconstitutional. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed
and held that the law was constitutional by finding that the law
was a “limitation on conduct” and not a restriction of free
speech. The court found that the state had a sufficient interest
in “forestalling the illicit lurking and contact” of registered sex
offenders and their potential future victims.
ISSUE: Does the North Carolina Law violate the First
Amendment (Right to Freedom of Speech)?
HELD: YES. In order to be valid under the First Amendment,
a content-neutral regulation of speech must be narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest. In other
words, the law cannot burden substantially more speech than
necessary to advance the government’s legitimate interest. In
this case, although the government has a legitimate interest in
protecting children from abuse, this law too broadly restricted
access to all sorts of websites. Even if it were limited only to
social media websites, the law would still unconstitutionally
restrict speech because of the vast number of functions that
social media websites perform in the modern world. First
Amendment jurisprudence has never allowed for such a broad
regulation of speech, and similarly broad restrictions have
been struck down. However, a state could accomplish the
same goal by enacting a more narrowly written statute.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., concurring in the judgment,
argued that the majority opinion erred in equating the entire
internet with a traditionally public forum instead of recognizing
the importance of allowing states to regulate certain types of
websites. The government certainly has a compelling interest
in protecting children from potential sexual predation, and the
internet is a place that allows sexual offenders to contact
children in ways that they might not otherwise be able, so the
government should be able to regulate sex offenders’ use of
the internet to an extent. However, the North Carolina law at
issue here went too far because it encompassed websites that
were unlikely to facilitate a sex crime against a child. Because
the North Carolina law prohibited more speech than
necessary to further the government’s significant interest, it
violated the First Amendment.
 5. Osmeña v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 132231, March 31,
1998
FACTS: Petitioners Emilio Osmeña is candidate for President
of the Philippines, while petitioner Pablo Garcia is governor of
Cebu Province, seeking reelection. They contend that events
after the ruling in National Press Club v. COMELEC “have
called into question the validity of the very premises of that
decision.” They seek a reexamination of the validity of Sec.
11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) which
prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print
space or air time for campaign or other political purposes,
except to COMELEC.
Petitioners claim that experience in the last five years since
the decision shown the “undesirable effects” of the law
because “the ban on political advertising has not only failed to
level the playing field, but actually worked to the grave
disadvantage of the poor candidates” by depriving them of a
medium which they can afford to pay for while their more
affluent rivals can always resort to other means of reaching
voters like airplanes, boats, rallies, parades, and handbills. No
empirical data have been presented by petitioners to back up
their claim, however.
Unable to show the “experience” and “subsequent events”
which they claim invalidate the major premise of said decision,
petitioners now say “there is no need for ‘empirical data’ to
determine whether the political ad ban offends the
Constitution or not.” Instead they make arguments from which
it is clear that their disagreement is with the opinion of the
Court on the constitutionality of §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 and
that what they seek is a reargument on the same issue already
decided in that case.
ISSUE: Does Sec. 11(b) of RA 6646 violate the right to
freedom of expression of political ads?
HELD: NO. The term political “ad ban,” when used to describe
§11(b) of RA 6646, is misleading, for even as §11(b) prohibits
the sale or donation of print space and air time to political
candidates, it mandates the COMELEC to procure and itself
allocate to the candidates space and time in the media. There
is no suppression of political ads but only a regulation of the
time and manner of advertising. The law’s concern is not with
the message or content of the ad but with ensuring media
equality between candidates with “deep pockets,” and those
with less resources.
Thus, §11(b) states: “Prohibited Forms of Election
Propaganda.—In addition to the forms of election propaganda
prohibited in Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall
be unlawful:
(b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or
television station, or other mass media, or any
person making use of the mass media to sell or to
give free of charge print space or air time for
campaign or other political purposes except to the
Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality
who is a candidate for any elective public office shall
take a leave of absence from his work as such during
the campaign period.
On the other hand, the Omnibus Election Code provisions
referred to in §11(b) read:
SEC. 90. Comelec space.—The Commission shall
procure space in at least one newspaper of general
Page 81 of 186
circulation in every province or city: Provided,
however, That in the absence of said newspaper,
publication shall be done in any other magazine or
periodical in said province or city, which shall be
known as “Comelec Space” wherein candidates can
announce their candidacy. Said space shall be
allocated, free of charge, equally and impartially by
the Commission among all candidates within the
area in which the newspaper is circulated.
SEC. 92. Comelec time.—The Commission shall
procure radio and television time to be known as
“Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and
impartially among the candidates within the area of
coverage of all radio and television stations. For this
purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and
television stations are hereby amended so as to
provide radio or television time, free of charge, during
the period of the campaign.
In this case, there is no total ban on political ads, much less
restriction on the content of the speech. Given the fact that
print space and air time can be controlled or dominated by rich
candidates to the disadvantage of poor candidates, there is a
substantial or legitimate governmental interest justifying
exercise of the regulatory power of the COMELEC under Art.
IX-C, §4 of the Constitution, which provides:
The commission may, during the election period, supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
permits for the operation of transportation and other public
utilities, media of communication or information, all grants,
special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation or
its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to
reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates in
connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
In short, the law only prohibits the sale or donation of print
space and air time to candidates but require the COMELEC
instead to procure space and time in the mass media for
allocation, free of charge, to the candidates. In effect, during
the election period, the COMELEC takes over the advertising
page of newspapers or the commercial time of radio and TV
stations and allocates these to the candidates. The main
purpose of §11(b) is regulatory. Any restriction on speech is
only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to achieve
its purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the use of
mass media for political advertising. The restriction on speech,
as pointed out in NPC, is limited both as to time and as to
scope.
What petitioners seem to miss is that the prohibition against
paid or sponsored political advertising is only half of the
regulatory framework, the other half being the mandate of the
COMELEC to procure print space and air time so that these
can be allocated free of charge to the candidates.
It is finally argued by the petitioners that COMELEC Space
and COMELEC Time are ineffectual. It is claimed that people
hardly read or watch or listen to them. Again, this is a factual
assertion without any empirical basis to support it. To be sure,
this Court did not hold in PPI v. COMELEC that it should not
procure newspaper space for allocation to candidates. What it
ruled is that the COMELEC cannot procure print space without
paying just compensation. Whether by its manifestation the
COMELEC meant it is not going to buy print space or only that
it will not require newspapers to donate free of charge print
space is not clear from the manifestation. It is to be presumed
that the COMELEC, in accordance with its mandate under
§11(b)of R.A. No. 6646 and §90 of the Omnibus Election
Code, will procure print space for allocation to candidates,
paying just compensation to newspapers providing print
space.
In any event, the validity of a law cannot be made to depend
on the faithful compliance of those charged with its
enforcement but by appropriate constitutional provisions.
There is a remedy for such lapse if it should happen. In
addition, there is the COMELEC Time during which
candidates may advertise themselves. Resolution No. 2983-A
of the COMELEC provides:
SEC. 2. Grant of “Comelec Time.”—Every radio broadcasting
and television station operating under franchise shall grant the
Commission, upon payment of just compensation, at least
thirty (30) minutes of prime time daily, to be known as
“Comelec Time,” effective February 10, 1998 for candidates
for President, Vice-President and Senators, and effective
March 27, 1998, for candidates for local elective offices, until
May 9, 1998.
In Adiong v. COMELEC, the Test for Content-Neutral
Restrictions was quoted by the Court from the decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court sustaining a Los Angeles City ordinance
which prohibited the posting of campaign signs on public
property:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
It is an appropriate test for restrictions on speech which, like
§11(b), are content-neutral. Unlike content-based restrictions,
they are not imposed because of the content of the speech.
For this reason, content-neutral restrictions are tests
demanding standards. For example, a rule such as that
involved in Sanidad v. COMELEC, prohibiting columnists,
commentators, and announcers from campaigning either for
or against an issue in a plebiscite must have a compelling
reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict
scrutiny. These restrictions, it will be seen, are censorial and
therefore they bear a heavy presumption of constitutional
invalidity. In addition, they will be tested for possible
overbreadth and vagueness. It is apparent that these
doctrines have no application to content-neutral regulations
which, like §11(b), are not concerned with the content of the
speech. These regulations need only a substantial
governmental interest to support them. A deferential standard
of review will suffice to test their validity. Petition is
DISMISSED.
Page 82 of 186
6. Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC (G.R. No.
147571, May 5, 2001)
FACTS: Petitioner Social Weather Stations is a social
research institution conducting surveys in various fields,
including economics, politics, demography, and social
development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and
publicly reporting the results thereof. On the other hand,
petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the
Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which
features newsworthy items of information including election
surveys. Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin
the COMELEC from enforcing §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair
Election Act), which provides:
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published
fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local
candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an
election.
The term “election surveys” is defined in §5.1 of the law as
follows: “Election surveys refer to the measurement of
opinions and perceptions of the voters as regards a
candidate’s popularity, qualifications, platforms or a matter of
public discussion in relation to the election, including voters’
preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during
the campaign period.” To implement §5.4, Resolution 3636,
§24(h), COMELEC enjoins these Surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published 15 days before an election
and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published
7 days before an election.
Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election
survey throughout the period of the elections both at the
national and local levels and release to the media the results
of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioner
Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the other hand, states
that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last
day of the elections on May 14, 2001.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of
election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present
danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other
pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior
to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two
days before the election day without causing confusion among
the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical
evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate
and inevitable danger to the voting process posed by election
surveys. They point out that no similar restriction is imposed
on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers
or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles
concerning political issues up to the day of the election.
Consequently, they contend that there is no reason for
ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election
surveys which are relatively objective.
Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions
in §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent the
manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by
unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election.
It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of
election survey results during the period proscribed by law
bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the
prevention of the debasement of the electoral process
resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and
absence of reply; (2) it narrowly tailored to meet the “evils”
sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of
expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in
duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the national election and
the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does
not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness.
Respondent claims that in National Press Club v. COMELEC,
a total ban on political advertisements, with candidates being
merely allocated broadcast time during the so-called
COMELEC space or COMELEC hour, was upheld by this
Court. In contrast, according to respondent, it states that the
prohibition in §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 is much more limited.
COMELEC and Osmeña v. COMELEC. For the ban imposed
by R.A. No. 6646, §11(b) is not only authorized by a specific
constitutional provision, but it also provided an alternative so
that, as this Court pointed out in Osmeña, there was actually
no ban but only a substitution of media advertisements by the
COMELEC space and COMELEC hour.

Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be

ISSUE: Is §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 unconstitutional for violating
the right to freedom of speech?
HELD: YES. §5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech,
expression, and the press by prohibiting the publication of
election survey results affecting candidates within the
prescribed periods. Because of the preferred status of the
constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press,
such a measure is vitiated by a presumption of invalidity.
Indeed, “any system of prior restraints of expression bearing
a presumption against its constitutional validity. . . . The
Government ‘carries a heavy burden of showing justification
for the enforcement of such restraint.’ The test employed to
determine the constitutional validity of §5.4 is enunciated in
United States v. O’Brien:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3]
if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press]
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if
such governmental interest is “not unrelated to the
suppression of free expression.” Moreover, even if the
purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the
law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on
freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve
the governmental purpose in question.
First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet third criterion of the O’Brien test
because the causal connection of expression to the asserted
governmental interest makes such interest “not unrelated to
the suppression of free expression.” By prohibiting the
publication of election survey results because of the possibility
that such publication might undermine the integrity of the
election, §5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of
expression, while allowing the expression of opinion
concerning the same subject matter by newspaper
columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists,
and other opinion makers. In effect, §5.4 shows a bias for a
particular subject matter by preferring personal opinion to
statistical results. The inhibition of speech should be upheld
only if the expression falls within one of the few unprotected
categories dealt with in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, thus:
promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the
resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, §5.4
nonetheless fails to meet fourth criterion of the O’Brien test.
As already stated, §5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute
pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect,
“junking” of weak or “losing” candidates, and resort to the form
of election cheating called “dagdag-bawas.” Praiseworthy as
these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained
at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when
such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful
acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such
speech creates the danger of such evils. Thus, under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the COMELEC is given the
power:
To stop any illegal activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop
any unlawful, libelous, misleading or false election
propaganda, after due notice and hearing.
This is surely a less restrictive means than the prohibition
contained in §5.4. Pursuant to this power of the COMELEC, it
can confiscate bogus survey results calculated to mislead
voters. Candidates can have their own surveys conducted. No
right of reply can be invoked by others. No principle of equality
is involved. As for the purpose of the law to prevent
bandwagon effects, it is doubtful whether the Government can
deal with this natural-enough tendency of some voters.
To summarize then, §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a
prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct
and total suppression of a category of expression even though
such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved
by means other than the suppression of freedom of
expression. Hence, petition for prohibition is GRANTED and
§5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 and §24(h) of COMELEC Resolution
3636 are declared unconstitutional.

These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the

libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.

Contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the prohibition

imposed by §5.4 cannot be justified on the ground that it is
only for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition
may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of
expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a
total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less
so because it is only for a period of 15 days immediately
before a national election and 7 days immediately before a
local election.

This sufficiently distinguishes §5.4 from R.A. No. 6646, §ll(b),

which this Court found to be valid in National Press Club v.

Page 83 of 186
 7. Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC (G.R. No.
208062, April 7, 2015)
FACTS: COMELEC Resolution No. 9674 directed Social
Weather Stations and Pulse Asia to submit to COMELEC the
names of all commissioners and payors of all surveys
published from February 12, 2013 to April 23, 2013, including
those of their “subscribers.” As recounted by SWS and Pulse
Asia, on February 15 to February 17, 2013, SWS conducted
a pre-election survey on voters’ preferences for senatorial
candidates. Thereafter, it published its findings. The following
question was asked in the survey:
Kung ang eleksyon ay gaganapin ngayon, sino ang
pinakamalamang ninyong iboboto bilang mga SENADOR ng
PILIPINAS? Narito ang listahan ng mga kandidato. Paki-
shade o itiman po ang naaangkop na oval katabi ng pangalan
ng mga taong pinakamalamang ninyong iboboto. Maaari po
kayong pumili ng hanggang labindalawang (12) kandidato.
Rep. Tobias Tiangco, Secretary-General of the United
Nationalist Alliance (UNA), wrote Atty. Esmeralda Ladra,
Director of COMELEC’s Law Department asking COMELEC
to “compel SWS to either comply with the directive in the Fair
Elections Act and COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 and give
the names or identities of the subscribers who paid for the pre-
election survey conducted from February 15 to February 17,
2013, or be liable for the violation thereof, an act constitutive
of an election offense.” Tiangco recounted that he wrote to
SWS requesting that he be furnished the identity of persons
who paid for the pre-election survey. SWS supposedly replied
to Tiangco, “furnishing him with some particulars about the
survey but without disclosing the identity of the persons who
commissioned or subscribed to the survey.”
Acting on Tiangco’s letter and on the COMELEC Law
Department’s recommendation, the COMELEC En Banc
issued the Order setting the matter for hearing and directed
SWS and Pulse Asia to submit its Comment within three (3)
days of receipt. During the hearing, Chairman Sixto Brillantes
stated that the proceeding was merely a clarificatory hearing
and not a formal hearing or an investigation. On April 23, 2013,
COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution No. 9674. As basis
for Resolution No. 9674, COMELEC cited Article IX-C, Section
2(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Sections 5.1 to 5.3 of
Republic Act No. 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Elections
Act, as implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 9615.
SWS and Pulse Asia alleged that following the issuance of
Resolution No. 9674, they have not been furnished copies of
Resolution No. 9674. They also articulated their view that
Resolution No. 9674 was tainted with irregularities, having
been issued ultra vires and in violation of the non-impairment
of contracts clause of the Constitution. Thus, they requested
that COMELEC defer or hold in abeyance Resolution No.
9674’s enforcement.
COMELEC Law Department issued a Notice to SWS and
Pulse Asia directing it to furnish COMELEC with a list of the
names of all commissioners, subscribers, and payors of
surveys published and failure to comply with the Notice shall
constitute an election offense punishable under the Omnibus
Election Code. COMELEC then issued a Subpoena notifying
SWS and Pulse Asia that a Complaint “for violation of Section
264, pars. 1 and 2 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to
R.A. No. 9006” was filed against them. SWS and Pulse Asia
maintained that before receiving the Subpoena, they were
never informed that a criminal case had been filed against
them. They added that they were never furnished copies of
the relevant criminal Complaint. Hence, the case.
Page 84 of 186
The petitioners are of the position that Resolution No. 9674, in
requiring the submission of information on subscribers, is in
excess of what the Fair Elections Act requires.
ISSUE: Is Resolution No. 9674 invalid for requiring the
disclosure of the names of “subscribers” of election surveys
as curtailment of the rights of petitioners to free speech?
HELD: NO. The names of those who commission or pay for
election surveys, including subscribers of survey firms, must
be disclosed pursuant to Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Elections
Act. This requirement is a valid regulation in the exercise of
police power and effects the constitutional policy of
“guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public
service.” Section 5.2(a)’s requirement of disclosing
subscribers neither curtails petitioners’ free speech rights nor
violates the constitutional proscription against the impairment
of contracts.
Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Elections Act, read in a manner
consistent not only with its text but also with the purpose for
which it, along with the Fair Elections Act, was adopted,
sustains COMELEC’s position. Republic Act No. 9006 was
adopted with the end in mind of “guaranteeing or ensuring
equal opportunity for public service” and to this end, stipulates
mechanisms for the “supervision or regulation of the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the
operation of media of communication or information.”
The Fair Elections Act provides means to realize the policy
articulated in Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution to
“guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service.”
Article II, Section 26 models an understanding of Philippine
political and electoral reality as it sums up an aversion to the
perpetuation of political power through electoral contests
skewed in favor of those with resources to dominate the
deliberative space in any media.
Moreover, the constitutional desire to “guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service” is the same intent
that animates the Constitution’s investiture in COMELEC of
the power to “supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization
of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation
and other public utilities, media of communication or
information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any GOCC or its subsidiary.”
The Fair Elections Act also governs published surveys during
elections. Section 5.1 defines election surveys as “the
measurement of opinions and perceptions of the voters as
regards a candidate’s popularity, qualifications, platforms or a
matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including
voters’ preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues
during the campaign period.” Sections 5.2 and 5.3 provide
regulations that facilitate transparency with respect to election
surveys. Section 5.2 enumerates the information that a person
publishing an election survey must publish along with the
survey itself.
The inclusion of election surveys in the list of items regulated
by the Fair Elections Act is a recognition that election surveys
are not a mere descriptive aggregation of data. Publishing
surveys are a means to shape the preference of voters, inform
the strategy of campaign machineries, and ultimately, affect
the outcome of elections. Election surveys have a similar
nature as election propaganda. They are expensive, normally
paid for by those interested in the outcome of elections, and
have tremendous consequences on election results.
The bandwagon effect in election surveys published during
election periods create the “politics of expectations.” Voters
act in accordance with what is perceived to be an existing or Petitioners have been complying with this without incident
emerging state of affairs with respect to how candidates are since the Fair Elections Act was enacted in 2001. After more
faring. Surveys can warp existing public opinion and can mold than a decade of compliance, it is odd for petitioners to
public opinion. Published election surveys offer valuable suddenly assail the disclosure requirement as unduly
insight into public opinion not just because they represent it burdensome or onerous.
but more so because they also tend to make it. Appreciating
this tendency to both entrench and marginalize is of relevance However, it is evident that Resolution No. 9674 was
in the context of Philippine political reality. This is the same promulgated in violation of the period set by the Fair Elections
reality that our policymakers, primarily the framers of the Act. Petitioners were also not served a copy of Resolution No.
Constitution, have seen fit to address. 9674 with which it was asked to comply. They were neither
shown nor served copies of the criminal Complaint subject of
To reiterate, the inclusion of published election surveys in a E.O. Case No. 13-222. Petitioners’ right to due process was,
statute that regulates election propaganda and other means thus, violated.
through which candidates may shape voter preferences is
itself telling of the recognition that published election surveys,
too, may influence voter preferences. This inclusion is
similarly telling of a recognition that, left unregulated, election
surveys can undermine the purposes of ensuring “fair”
elections. It is necessary that the Fair Elections Act be
appreciated for what it is: a mechanism for ensuring equality.
The Fair Elections Act is a means to effect the “necessary
condition” to a genuine democratic dialogue, to realizing a
deliberative democracy.

What is involved here is petitioners’ freedom of speech and of

expression, that is, to publish their findings. More specifically,
what is involved here is their right to political speech, that
which “refers to speech ‘both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue,’ ‘fostering
informed and civic-minded deliberation.’ The nature of the
speech involved, as well as the Fair Elections Act’s purpose
of ensuring political equality, calls into operation the equality-
based approach to weighing liberty to express vis-à-vis
equality of opportunities.

Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns

made by persons who are not candidates or who do not speak
as members of a political party which are, taken as a whole,
principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must
consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such regulation
is inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest
possible range of opinions coming from the electorate
including those that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and
robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.

Concededly, what are involved here are not election

propaganda per se. Election surveys, on their face, do not
state or allude to preferred candidates. Election surveys
become unambiguous only when viewed in relation to the end
for which they are employed. To those whose end is to get a
candidate elected, election surveys, when limited to their own
private consumption, are a means to formulate strategy. When
published, however, the tendency to shape voter preferences
comes into play. In this respect, published election surveys
partake of the nature of election propaganda. It is then
declarative speech in the context of an electoral campaign
properly subject to regulation. Hence, Section 5.2 of the Fair
Elections Act’s regulation of published surveys.

While it does regulate expression (i.e., petitioners’ publication

of election surveys), it does not go so far as to suppress
desired expression. There is neither prohibition nor
censorship specifically aimed at election surveys. The
freedom to publish election surveys remains. All Resolution
No. 9674 does is articulate a regulation as regards the manner
of publication, that is, that the disclosure of those who
commissioned and/or paid for, including those subscribed to,
published election surveys must be made.

In any case, the requirement of disclosing subscribers is

neither unduly burdensome nor onerous. Prior to the
promulgation of Resolution No. 9674, survey firms are already
understood to be bound by the requirement to disclose those
who commission or pay for published election surveys.

Page 85 of 186
 8. GMA Network v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 205357,
September 2, 2014)
FACTS: The heart of the controversy revolves upon the
proper interpretation of the limitation on the number of minutes
that candidates may use for television and radio
advertisements, as provided in Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006,
(Fair Election Act):
Sec. 6. Equal Access to Media Time and Space.—All
registered parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal
access to media time and space. The following guidelines may
be amplified on by the COMELEC:
6.2 (a) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party
for a nationally elective office shall be entitled to not more than
one hundred twenty (120) minutes of television advertisement
and one hundred eighty (180) minutes of radio advertisement
whether by purchase or donation.
(b) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a
locally elective office shall be entitled to not more than sixty
(60) minutes of television advertisement and ninety (90)
minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or
donation.
For this purpose, the COMELEC shall require any broadcast
station or entity to submit to the COMELEC a copy of its
broadcast logs and certificates of performance for the review
and verification of the frequency, date, time and duration of
advertisements broadcast for any candidate or political party.
During the previous elections of May 14, 2007 and May 10,
2010, COMELEC issued Resolutions implementing and
interpreting Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006, regarding airtime
limitations, to mean that a candidate is entitled to the stated
number of minutes “per station.” For the May 2013 elections,
however, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No.
9615 changing the interpretation of said candidates’ and
political parties’ airtime limitation for political campaigns or
advertisements from a “per station” basis, to a “total
aggregate” basis.
Petitioners ABS-CBN, ABC, GMA, MBC, NBN, and RMN,
owners/operators of radio and television networks in the
Philippines, and petitioner Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng
Pilipinas (KBP), the national organization of broadcasting
companies in the Philippines representing operators of radio
and television stations and said stations themselves, sent their
respective letters to the COMELEC questioning the provisions
of the aforementioned Resolution, thus, the COMELEC held
public hearings. Thereafter, respondent issued Resolution No.
9631 amending provisions of Resolution No. 9615.
Nevertheless, petitioners still found the provisions
objectionable and oppressive.
Petitioners posit that Section 9(a) of the assailed Resolution
provides for a very restrictive aggregate airtime limit and a
vague meaning for a proper computation of “aggregate total”
airtime, and violates the equal protection guarantee, thereby
defeating the intent and purpose of R.A. No. 9006. Petitioners
contend that Section 9(a), which imposes a notice
requirement, is vague and infringes on the constitutionally
protected freedom of speech, of the press and of expression,
and on the right of people to be informed on matters of public
concern Also, Section 9(a) is a cruel and oppressive
regulation as it imposes an unreasonable and almost
impossible burden on broadcast mass media of monitoring a
candidate’s or political party’s aggregate airtime, otherwise, it
may incur administrative and criminal liability.
Respondent maintains that the per candidate rule or total
aggregate airtime limit is in accordance with R.A. No. 9006 as
Page 86 of 186
this would give life to the constitutional objective to equalize
access to media during elections. It sees this as a more
effective way of levelling the playing field between
candidates/political parties with enormous resources and
those without much. Moreover, the COMELEC’s issuance of
the assailed Resolution is pursuant to Section 4, Article IX(C)
of the Constitution which vests on the COMELEC the power
to supervise and regulate, during election periods,
transportation and other public utilities, as well as mass
media.
Respondent also sees no prior restraint in the provisions
requiring notice to the COMELEC for appearances or
guestings of candidates in bona fide news broadcasts. It
points out that the fact that notice may be given 24 hours after
first broadcast only proves that the mechanism is for
monitoring purposes only, not for censorship. Further,
respondent argues, that for there to be prior restraint, official
governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression must be done in advance of actual publication or
dissemination. Moreover, petitioners are only required to
inform the COMELEC of candidates’/parties’ guestings, but
there is no regulation as to the content of the news or the
expressions in news interviews or news documentaries.
Respondent then emphasized that the Supreme Court has
held that freedom of speech and the press may be limited in
light of the duty of the COMELEC to ensure equal access to
opportunities for public service.
ISSUE: Does Section 9(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615
violate the petitioners’ right of speech?
HELD: YES. The authority of the COMELEC to impose airtime
limits directly flows from the Fair Election Act—120 minutes of
television advertisement and 180 minutes for radio
advertisement. For the 2013 elections, the COMELEC,
through Resolution No. 9615, chose to aggregate the total
broadcast time among the different broadcast media, thus:
Section 9. Requirements and/or Limitations on the Use of
Election Propaganda through Mass Media.—All parties and
bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media time
and space for their election propaganda during the campaign
period subject to the following requirements and/or limitations:
a. Broadcast Election Propaganda
The duration of an airtime that a candidate, or party may use
for their broadcast advertisements or election propaganda
shall be, as follows: In cases where two or more candidates or
parties whose names, initials, images, brands, logos,
insignias, color motifs, symbols, or forms of graphical
representations are displayed, exhibited, used, or mentioned
together in the broadcast election propaganda or
advertisements, the length of time during which they appear
or are being mentioned or promoted will be counted against
the airtime limits allotted for the said candidates or parties and
the cost of the said advertisement will likewise be considered
as their expenditures, regardless of whoever paid for the
advertisements or to whom the said advertisements were
donated.
From the foregoing, it appears that COMELEC did not have
any other basis for coming up with a new manner of
determining allowable time limits except its own idea as to
what should be the maximum number of minutes based on its
exercise of discretion as to how to level the playing field.
COMELEC is duty bound to come up with reasonable basis
for changing the interpretation and implementation of the
airtime limits It could not simply adopt measures or regulations
just because it feels that it is the right thing to do, insofar as it
might be concerned. It does have discretion, but such
discretion is something that must be exercised within the
bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is not free to
simply change the rules especially if it has consistently
interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the past.
If ever it has to change the rules, the same must be properly
explained with sufficient basis.
What the COMELEC came up with does not measure up to
that level of requirement and accountability which elevates
administrative rules to the level of respectability and
acceptability. Those governed by administrative regulations
are entitled to a reasonable and rational basis for any changes
in those rules by which they are supposed to live by, especially
if there is a radical departure from the previous ones. The
COMELEC went beyond the authority granted it by the law in
adopting “aggregate” basis in the determination of allowable
airtime. The law, on its face, does not justify a conclusion that
the maximum allowable airtime should be based on the totality
of possible broadcast in all television or radio stations.
Section 9(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its
adoption of the “aggregate-based” airtime limits unreasonably
restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.
Political speech is one of the most important expressions
protected by the Fundamental Law. In regard to limitations on
political speech relative to other state interests, an American
case observed:
drastically curtailing the ability of a candidate to effectively
reach out to the electorate would unjustifiably curtail his
freedom to speak as a means of connecting with the people.
It should be understandable that when an administrative rule
is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs
nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative
rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can
facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of
the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of
those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to
those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to
be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force
and effect of law.
However, the legal duty of monitoring lies with the Comelec.
Broadcast stations are merely required to submit certain
documents to aid the Comelec in ensuring that candidates are
not sold airtime in excess of the allowed limits. Further,
pursuant to Resolution No. 9631, the respondent revised the
third paragraph of Section 9(a).

A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can

spend on political communication during a campaign
necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration,
and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually
every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society
requires the expenditure of money. The electorate’s
increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass
media for news and information has made these expensive
modes of communication indispensable instruments of
effective political speech.

The assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is

unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and
constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to
reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the
adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime
limits — leveling the playing field — does not constitute a
compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial
restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties
to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and
programs of government. And, this is specially so in the
absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a
prohibitive measure. In this particular instance, what the
COMELEC has done is analogous to letting a bird fly after one
has clipped its wings.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the

aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time when we
consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many
islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken
among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a
national candidate to really reach out to as many of the
electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that
he conveys his message through his advertisements in
languages and dialects that the people may more readily
understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in
different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such
candidate to express himself — a form of suppression of his
political speech.

Respondent itself states that “television is arguably the most

cost-effective medium of dissemination. Even a slight increase
in television exposure can significantly boost a candidate’s
popularity, name recall and electability.” If that be so, then

Page 87 of 186
9. Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, 747 SCRA SCRA
1 (2015) Ponente: Justice Leonen
FACTS: This is a case centered on whether the COMELEC
has the competence to limit expressions made by citizens –
who are not candidates – during elections.
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted 2 tarpaulins within a
private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately 6 feet by 10 feet
in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within the public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message
“IBASURA RH Law”. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the
present case. This second tarpaulin contains the heading
“Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH)
Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “Pro-RH) Team Patay”
with an “X” mark. Basically, the electoral candidates were
classified according to their vote on the adoption of RH Law.
TEAM BUHAY TEAM PATAY
Estrada, JV Angara, Juan Edgardo
Honasan, Gregorio Casiño, Teddy
Magsaysay, Mitos Cayetano, Alan Peter
Pimentel, Koko Enrile, Jackie
Trillanes, Antonio Escudero, Francis
Villar, Cynthia Hontiveros, Risa
Party List Buhay Legarda, Loren
Party List Ang Pamilya Party List Gabriela
Party List Akbayan
Party List Bayan Muna
Party List Anak Pawis
During oral arguments, respondents conceded that the
tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names
of candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who
helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates
for that election.
On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon
as Election Officer of Bacolod City issued a notice to Remove
Campaign Materials within 3 days from receipt “for being
oversized” addressed to Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra.
COMELEC Resolution No. 9165 provides for the size
requirement of 2 feet by 3 feet.
On February 25, 2013, petitioners replied requesting that 1)
petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by the COMELEC
Law Department regarding the tarpaulin, and that 2) pending
this opinion and the availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin
be allowed to remain.
COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the
immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be
constrained to file an election offense against petitioners.
Concerned about an imminent threat of prosecution for their
exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case. They
question the respondent’s notice and letter. They also prayed
for:
1) the grant of their petition,
2) temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining respondents from further
proceeding in enforcing their orders for the removal of the
Team Patay tarpaulin and that
3) after notice and hearing, a decision be rendered declaring
the questioned orders of respondents as unconstitutional and
void, and permanently restraining respondents from enforcing
them or any other similar order.
Trial Court: Issued a TRO enjoining respondents from
enforcing the assailed notice and letter.
Page 88 of 186
One of the arguments of the respondents is that the tarpaulin
is an election propaganda subject to regulation by COMELEC
pursuant to its mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the
Constitution. Hence, the respondents claim that the issuances
ordering its removal for being oversized are valid and
constitutional.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC has legal basis to
regulate expressions made by private citizens (No)
2. Whether or not the petitioner’s fundamental right to
freedom of speech was violated by the issuance of
notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin (Yes)
3. Whether or not large tarpaulins are part of expression
protected under Art. III, Sec. 4 of the Constitution (Yes)
4. Whether or not the tarpaulin is an election propaganda,
being petitioner’s way of endorsing candidates who
voted against the RH Law (No)
5. Whether or not the COMELEC Law Department’s notice
and letter removing petitioner’s tarpaulin valid and
constitutional (No)
RULING:
PROCEDURAL ISSUES – Rule 65 is proper. This case may
be heard and ruled by the Supreme Court.
Respondent assails that the notice and letter are not final
orders of the COMELEC En Banc in the exercise of its
adjudicatory powers, reviewable via Rule 64 of the ROC.
The Court ruled that in the present case, petitioners are not
candidates seeking for public office. Their petition is filed to
assert their fundamental right to expression.
Furthermore, all these cases cited by respondents pertained
to COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
power. This case pertains to acts of COMELEC in the
implementation of its regulatory powers. When it issued the
notice and letter, the COMELEC was allegedly enforcing
election laws.
It is clear that the subject matter of the controversy is the effect
of COMELEC’s notice and letter on free speech. Certainly, a
breach of the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC
is a gave abuse of discretion. Thus, the constitutionality of the
notice and letter coming from COMELEC is within this court’s
power to review.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES –
1. No. The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC had no
legal basis to regulate expressions made by private
citizens. Provisions [in the Constitution], laws and
jurisprudence pertain to candidates and political
parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they
belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have
the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred
right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-
candidate in this case.
Respondents considered the tarpaulin as a campaign material
in their issuances. The provisions asserted by the
respondents regulating the posting of campaign materials only
apply to candidates and political parties, and petitioners are
neither of the two.
Furthermore, the tarpaulin was not paid for by any candidate
or political party. There was no allegation that petitioners
coordinated with any of the persons named in the tarpaulin
regarding its posting. On the other hand, petitioners posted
the tarpaulin as part of their advocacy against the RH Law.
In this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of
public concern, that is, a statement of either appreciation or
criticism on votes made in the passing of the RH law. Thus,
petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression.
2. Yes. The Court ruled that:
Fundamental to the consideration of this issue is Article III,
Section 4 of the Constitution:
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances.
No law. . .
While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but
an opinion by the COMELEC Law Department, this court has
applied Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution even to
governmental acts.
Our Constitution has also explicitly included the freedom of
expression, separate and in addition to the freedom of speech
and of the press provided in the US Constitution. The word
"expression" was added in the 1987 Constitution by
Commissioner Brocka for having a wider scope:
MR. BROCKA: This is a very minor amendment, Mr.
Presiding Officer. On Section 9, page 2, line 29, it
says: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech." I would like to recommend to the
Committee the change of the word "speech" to
EXPRESSION; or if not, add the words AND
EXPRESSION after the word "speech," because it is
more expansive, it has a wider scope, and it would
refer to means of expression other than speech.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): What
does the Committee say?
FR. BERNAS: "Expression" is more broad than
speech. We accept it.
MR. BROCKA: Thank you.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): Is it
accepted?
FR. BERNAS: Yes.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): Is there
any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the
amendment is approved.
FR. BERNAS: So, that provision will now read: "No
law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech,
expression or of the press . . . ." Speech may be said
to be inextricably linked to freedom itself as "[t]he
right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech
must be protected from the government because
speech is the beginning of thought."
Communication and Speech
Communication is an essential outcome of protected speech.
Communication exists when "(1) a speaker, seeking to signal
others, uses conventional actions because he or she
reasonably believes that such actions will be taken by the
audience in the manner intended; and (2) the audience so
takes the actions." "[I]n communicative action[,] the hearer
Page 89 of 186
may respond to the claims by . . . either accepting the speech
act’s claims or opposing them with criticism or requests for
justification."
Speech is not limited to vocal communication. "[C]onduct is
treated as a form of speech sometimes referred to as
‘symbolic speech[,]’" such that "‘when ‘speech’ and
‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of
conduct,’ the ‘communicative element’ of the conduct may be
‘sufficient to bring into play the [right to freedom of
expression].’"
The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire
continuum of speech from utterances made to conduct
enacted, and even to inaction itself as a symbolic manner of
communication.
Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it
been said that the Bill of Rights that guarantees to the
individual the liberty to utter what is in his mind also
guarantees to him the liberty not to utter what is not in his
mind. The salute is a symbolic manner of communication that
conveys its message as clearly as the written or spoken word.
As a valid form of expression, it cannot be compelled any more
than it can be prohibited in the face of valid religious objections
like those raised in this petition. To impose it on the petitioners
is to deny them the right not to speak when their religion bids
them to be silent. This coercion of conscience has no place in
the free society.
The democratic system provides for the accommodation of
diverse ideas, including the unconventional and even the
bizarre or eccentric. The will of the majority prevails, but it
cannot regiment thought by prescribing the recitation by rote
of its opinions or proscribing the assertion of unorthodox or
unpopular views as in this case. The conscientious objections
of the petitioners, no less than the impatience of those who
disagree with them, are protected by the Constitution. The
State cannot make the individual speak when the soul within
rebels.
Even before freedom "of expression" was included in Article
III, Section 4 of the present Constitution, this court has applied
its precedent version to expressions other than verbal
utterances.
3. Yes. The Court ruled that size does matter. The form of
expression is just as important as the information
conveyed that it forms part of the expression.
The court ruled that size matters because:
A) It enhances efficiency in communication.
B) The size of tarpaulin may underscore the importance of the
message to the reader
C) Lager spaces allow for more messages. Larger spaces
may translate to more opportunities to amplify and argue
points which the speakers might want to communicate.
These points become more salient when it is the electorate,
not the candidates or the political parties, that speaks. Too
often, the terms of public discussion during elections are
framed and kept hostage by brief and catchy but meaningless
sound bites extolling the character of the candidate. Worse,
elections sideline political arguments and privilege the
endorsement by celebrities. Rather than provide obstacles to
their speech, government should in fact encourage it.
Between the candidates and the electorate, the latter have the
better incentive to demand discussion of the more important
issues. Between the candidates and the electorate, the former
have better incentives to avoid difficult political standpoints
and instead focus on appearances and empty promises.
Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and
place. They are fundamentally part of expression protected
under Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution.
4. No. The Supreme Court held that the tarpaulin is not an
election propaganda.
“The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda"
refers to any matter broadcasted, published, printed,
displayed or exhibited, in any medium, which contain the
name, image, logo, brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and
other symbol or graphic representation that is capable of being
associated with a candidate or party, and is intended to draw
the attention of the public or a segment thereof to promote or
oppose, directly or indirectly, the election of the said candidate
or candidates to a public office.” It is clear that this paragraph
suggests that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.
While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was
not paid for or posted "in return for consideration" by any
candidate, political party, or party-list group.
Long Note:
Speech and equality:
Some considerations We first establish that there are two
paradigms of free speech that separate at the point of giving
priority to equality vis-à-vis liberty.
In an equality-based approach, "politically disadvantaged
speech prevails over regulation[,] but regulation promoting
political equality prevails over speech." This view allows the
government leeway to redistribute or equalize ‘speaking
power,’ such as protecting, even implicitly subsidizing,
unpopular or dissenting voices often systematically subdued
within society’s ideological ladder. This view acknowledges
that there are dominant political actors who, through authority,
power, resources, identity, or status, have capabilities that
may drown out the messages of others. This is especially true
in a developing or emerging economy that is part of the
majoritarian world like ours.
The question of libertarian tolerance:
This balance between equality and the ability to express so as
to find one’s authentic self or to participate in the self
determination of one’s communities is not new only to law. It
has always been a philosophical problematique.
In his seminal work, Repressive Tolerance, philosopher and
social theorist Herbert Marcuse recognized how
institutionalized inequality exists as a background limitation,
rendering freedoms exercised within such limitation as merely
"protect[ing] the already established machinery of
discrimination." In his view, any improvement "in the normal
course of events" within an unequal society, without
subversion, only strengthens existing interests of those in
power and control.
In other words, abstract guarantees of fundamental rights like
freedom of expression may become meaningless if not taken
in a real context. This tendency to tackle rights in the abstract
compromises liberties. In his words:
Liberty is self-determination, autonomy—this is
almost a tautology, but a tautology which results from
a whole series of synthetic judgments. It stipulates
the ability to determine one’s own life: to be able to
determine what to do and what not to do, what to
Page 90 of 186
suffer and what not. But the subject of this autonomy
is never the contingent, private individual as that
which he actually is or happens to be; it is rather the
individual as a human being who is capable of being
free with the others. And the problem of making
possible such a harmony between every individual
liberty and the other is not that of finding a
compromise between competitors, or between
freedom and law, between general and individual
interest, common and private welfare in an
established society, but of creating the society in
which man is no longer enslaved by institutions
which vitiate self-determination from the beginning.
In other words, freedom is still to be created even for
the freest of the existing societies.277 (Emphasis in
the original)
Marcuse suggests that the democratic argument — with all
opinions presented to and deliberated by the people —
"implies a necessary condition, namely, that the people must
be capable of deliberating and choosing on the basis of
knowledge, that they must have access to authentic
information, and that, on this basis, their evaluation must be
the result of autonomous thought."278 He submits that
"[d]ifferent opinions and ‘philosophies’ can no longer compete
peacefully for adherence and persuasion on rational grounds:
the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is organized and delimited by those
who determine the national and the individual interest."279 A
slant toward left manifests from his belief that "there is a
‘natural right’ of resistance for oppressed and overpowered
minorities to use extralegal means if the legal ones have
proved to be inadequate."280 Marcuse, thus, stands for an
equality that breaks away and transcends from established
hierarchies, power structures, and indoctrinations. The
tolerance of libertarian society he refers to as "repressive
tolerance."
Long Note #2:
There says that there are two views, right?
The first one is: “we have acknowledged the Constitution’s
guarantee for more substantive expressive freedoms that take
equality of opportunities into consideration during elections.”
The other view is: that considerations of equality of
opportunity or equality in the ability of citizens as speakers
should not have a bearing in free speech doctrine. Under this
view, "members of the public are trusted to make their own
individual evaluations of speech, and government is forbidden
to intervene for paternalistic or redistributive reasons . . .
[thus,] ideas are best left to a freely competitive ideological
market." This is consistent with the libertarian suspicion on
the use of viewpoint as well as content to evaluate the
constitutional validity or invalidity of speech.
When private speech amounts to election paraphernalia
The traditional view has been to tolerate the viewpoint of the
speaker and the content of his or her expression. This view,
thus, restricts laws or regulation that allows public officials to
make judgments of the value of such viewpoint or message
content. This should still be the principal approach.
However, the requirements of the Constitution regarding
equality in opportunity must provide limits to some expression
during electoral campaigns.
Thus clearly, regulation of speech in the context of electoral
campaigns made by candidates or the members of their
political parties or their political parties may be regulated as to
time, place, and manner. This is the effect of our rulings in
Osmeña v. COMELEC and National Press Club v.
COMELEC.
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns primordial right by our Constitution. The expression in the
made by persons who are not candidates or who do not speak medium chosen by petitioners deserves our protection.
as members of a political party which are, taken as a whole,
principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must Petition GRANTED.
consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such regulation
is inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest
possible range of opinions coming from the electorate
including those that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and
robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.

This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech

by a private citizen which will not amount to an election
paraphernalia to be validly regulated by law.

Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be

constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who
are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a
political party if they are not candidates, only if what is
regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for
its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The
regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c)
narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the
opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the
primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d)
demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that
object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time,
place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no
situation may the speech be prohibited or censored on the
basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether
the speech is made with or on private property.

This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons.
First, as discussed, the principal message in the twin
tarpaulins of petitioners consists of a social advocacy.
Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice
Antonio Carpio, the present law — Section 3.3 of Republic Act
No. 9006 and Section 6(c) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615
— if applied to this case, will not pass the test of reasonability.
A fixed size for election posters or tarpaulins without any
relation to the distance from the intended average audience
will be arbitrary. At certain distances, posters measuring 2 by
3 feet could no longer be read by the general public and,
hence, would render speech meaningless. It will amount to the
abridgement of speech with political consequences.

5. No. The Court ruled that the COMELEC Law

Department’s notice and letter removing petitioner’s
tarpaulin is not valid and is unconstitutional.

COMELEC’s general role includes a mandate to ensure equal

opportunities and reduce spending among candidates and
their registered political parties. It is not to regulate or limit the
speech of the electorate as it strives to participate in the
electoral exercise.

Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed

by petitioners. It is a specie of expression protected by our
fundamental law. It is an expression designed to invite
attention, cause debate, and hopefully, persuade. It may be
motivated by the interpretation of petitioners of their
ecclesiastical duty, but their parishioner’s actions will have
very real secular consequences. Certainly, provocative
messages do matter for the elections.

What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech

forms: expression by the electorate that tends to rouse the
public to debate contemporary issues. This is not speech by
candidates or political parties to entice votes. It is a portion of
the electorate telling candidates the conditions for their
election. It is the substantive content of the right to suffrage.
This. is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy that
we should all deserve. It is protected as a fundamental and

Page 91 of 186
 10. 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-Utak) vs.
COMELEC, 755 SCRA 441 Ponente: Justice Reyes
FACTS: On February 12, 2001, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9006,
otherwise known as the "Fair Elections Act", was passed.
Section 9 thereof provides:
Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. - The
COMELEC may authorize political parties and party-
list groups to erect common poster areas for their
candidates in not more than ten (10) public places
such as plazas, markets, barangay centers and the
like, wherein candidates can post, display or exhibit
election propaganda: Provided that the size of the
poster areas shall not exceed twelve (12) by sixteen
(16) feet or its equivalent.
Independent candidates with no political parties may
likewise be authorized to erect common poster areas
in not more than ten (10) public places, the size of
which shall not exceed four (4) by six (6) feet or its
equivalent.
Candidates may post any lawful propaganda
material in private places with the consent of the
owner thereof, and in public places or property which
shall be allocated equitably and impartially among
the candidates.
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution
No. 9615, which provided for the rules implementing R.A. No.
9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local
elections and subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which
enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda,
pertinently provides:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. -
During the campaign period, it is unlawful:
xxxx
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign
or propaganda material outside of authorized
common poster areas, in public places, or in private
properties without the consent of the owner thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous
subsection (f) include any of the following:
xxxx
5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys,
trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles,
whether motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such
as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers, train
stations, and the like.
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall
be a cause for the revocation of the public utility franchise
and will make the owner and/or operator of the
transportation service and/or terminal liable for an election
offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as
implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules.
In its letter dated January 30, 2013, the petitioner, through its
president, Melencio F. Vargas, sought clarification from the
COMELEC as regards the application of Resolution No. 9615,
particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section
7(f), vis-a-vis privately owned public utility vehicles (PUVs)
and transport terminals. The petitioner explained that the
prohibition stated in the aforementioned provisions impedes
Page 92 of 186
the right to free speech of the private owners of PUVs and
transport terminals. The petitioner then requested the
COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the assailed
provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport
terminals to post election campaign materials on their vehicles
and transport terminals.
On February 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute
Resolution No. 13-0214,5 which denied the petitioner's
request to reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items
(5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615.
The COMELEC en banc opined that Under the Constitution
itself, Section 6, Article XII, the use of property bears a social
function and all economic agents shall contribute to the
common good; and there is no higher Common good than that
as espoused in RA. 9006 – the equalization of opportunities
for all candidates for political office during elections – a policy
which Res. No. 9615 merely implements.
The exact purpose for placing political advertisements on a
PUV or in transport terminals is exactly because it is public
and can be seen by all; and although it is true that private
vehicles ply the same route as public vehicles, the exposure
of a [PUV] servicing the general, riding public is much more
compared to private vehicles. Categorizing PUVs and
transport terminals as 'public places' under Section 7 (f) of
Reso. No. 9615 is therefore logical. The same reasoning for
limiting political advertisements in print media, in radio, and in
television therefore holds true for political advertisements in
PUVs and transport terminals.
Petitioner’s argument: The petitioner maintains that Section
7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution
No. 9615 violate the right to free speech of the owners of
PUVs and transport terminals; that the prohibition curtails their
ideas of who should be voted by the public. Further, assuming
that substantial public interest exists in the said prohibition
imposed under Resolution No. 9615, the petitioner claims that
the curtailment of the right to free speech of the owners of
PUVs and transport terminals is much greater than is
necessary to achieve the desired governmental purpose, i.e.,
ensuring equality of opportunity to all candidates in elective
office.
Respondent’s argument: COMELEC points out that PUVs and
private transport terminals hold a captive audience - the
commuters, who have no choice but be subjected to the blare
of political propaganda. Thus, the COMELEC avers, it is within
its constitutional authority to prevent privately-owned PUVs
and transport terminals from concurrently serving campaign
materials to the captive audience that they transport.
The COMELEC further claims that Resolution No. 9615 is a
valid content-neutral regulation and, thus, does not impinge
on the constitutional right to freedom of speech. It avers that
the assailed regulation is within the constitutional power of the
COMELEC pursuant to Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution. The COMELEC alleges that the regulation
simply aims to ensure equal campaign opportunity, time, and
space for all candidates - an important and substantial
governmental interest, which is totally unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; that any restriction on free
speech is merely incidental and is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of the said governmental interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in
relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 which prohibits
the posting of any election campaign or propaganda material
in PUVs and public transport terminals are constitutional.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of
Resolution No. 9615 are null and void for being repugnant to
Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 are prior restraints on speech
Free speech may be identified with the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without
prior restraint or censorship and subsequent punishment.
Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the
press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is
largely freedom from government censorship of publications,
whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it
is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the
government. Any system of prior restraints of expression
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
validity.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right
of the people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition
is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and
private transport terminals, to express their preference,
through the posting of election campaign material in their
property, and convince others to agree with them.
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615,
posting an election campaign material during an election
period in PUVs and transport terminals carries with it the
penalty of revocation of the public utility franchise and shall
make the owner thereof liable for an election offense.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right
to free expression of the owners of PUVs and transport
terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and
transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from
expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for
an election offense and the revocation of their franchise or
permit to operate.
The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign
materials is an invalid content-neutral regulation repugnant to
the free speech clause.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned
with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls
the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards,
is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to
free speech, provided that the following requisites concur:
1. The government regulation is within the
constitutional power of the Government;
2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest;
3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and
4. The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are
content-neutral regulations since they merely control the place
where election campaign materials may be posted. However,
the prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech clause as it
fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral
regulation.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615, are not within the constitutionally
delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-
C of the Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no necessity to
restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and
transport terminals.
Page 93 of 186
The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to
operate and not the ownership per se of PUVs and transport
terminals.
In the instant case, the Court further delineates the
constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to
the COMELEC during an election period. As worded, Section
4, Article IX-C of the Constitution only grants COMELEC
supervisory and regulatory powers over the enjoyment or
utilization “of all franchises or permits for the operation,” inter
alia, of transportation and other public utilities. The
COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated powers of supervision
and regulation do not extend to the ownership per se of PUVs
and transport terminals, but only to the franchise or permit to
operate the same.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not
within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC
to supervise or regulate the franchise or permit to operate of
transportation utilities. The posting of election campaign
material on vehicles used for public transport or on transport
terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also an
act of ownership – it has nothing to do with the franchise or
permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not
justified under the captive-audience doctrine.
The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener
cannot, as a practical matter, escape from intrusive speech,
the speech can be restricted. The “captive-audience” doctrine
recognizes that a listener has a right not to be exposed to an
unwanted message in circumstances in which the
communication cannot be avoided.
A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the
guise of censorship, which undertakes selectively to shield the
public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are
more offensive than others. Such selective restrictions have
been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of
the home or the degree of captivity makes it either impossible
or impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid
exposure.
Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience
doctrine may not be justified if the supposed “captive
audience” may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive
speech. The prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6)
of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under the captive-
audience doctrine; the commuters are not forced or compelled
to read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs and
transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to
receive the messages contained in the posted election
campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if
they find the same unbearably intrusive.
Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from
posting election campaign materials violates the equal
protection clause.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not
only run afoul of the free speech clause, but also of the equal
protection clause. One of the basic principles on which this
government was founded is that of the equality of right, which
is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
"Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words,
should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to
some and unjustly discriminate against others.”
In order that there can be valid classification so that a
discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional
norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four
requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely: (1)
it must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the class.46
It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items
(5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not limited to existing
conditions and applies equally to the members of the
purported class. However, the classification remains
constitutionally impermissible since it is not based on
substantial distinction and is not germane to the purpose of
the law.
NOTE:
On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise
one's political candidacy is clearly a significant part of our
freedom of expression. A restriction on this freedom without
rhyme or reason is a violation of the most valuable feature of
the democratic way of life.
Page 94 of 186
11. United States vs. Alvarez, 567 U.S. (No. 11-210, 28
June 2012)
FACTS: In 2007, Xavier Alvarez, an elected member of a
water district board in California, identified himself at a public
meeting as a retired U.S. Marine who had been wounded in
combat many times and had received the Congressional
Medal of Honor.
"I'm a retired Marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001,"
Mr. Alvarez said at a public meeting of the board. "Back in
1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. I got
wounded many times by the same guy."
None of Alvarez's claims was true. He never served in the
Marine Corps or any branch of the military, was never
wounded in combat, and has never received a medal of any
kind, including the nation's highest military award – the Medal
of Honor. Alvarez had previously boasted, untruly, that he
played hockey for the Detroit Red Wings and that he once
married a starlet from Mexico.
After FBI agents obtained a tape recording of the meeting,
federal prosecutors charged Alvarez with two counts of
violating the Stolen Valor Act (Act punishing lying about
receiving military medals or honors).
Alvarez's lawyer argued that the Stolen Valor Act was invalid
under the First Amendment and, therefore, the case should be
dismissed.
The trial court rejected this argument. Alvarez was tried and
convicted in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California. He was sentenced to probation for three
years and ordered to pay a $5,000 fine. He was the first
person convicted under the Stolen Valor Act.
Alvarez appealed the First Amendment issue, claiming that
the Stolen Valor law violated the First Amendment’s
guarantee of the right to free speech and, therefore, his
conviction was unlawful. A three-judge panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with
Alvarez and reversed his conviction, declaring the Stolen
Valor Act unconstitutional in a vote of 2-to-1.
The government appealed the case to the Supreme Court of
the United States, which agreed to hear it. After the Court
agreed to hear the case, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit, ruling in a different case, declared the
Stolen Valor Act constitutional in a vote of 2-to-1.
Oral arguments were heard on February 22, 2012.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Stolen Valor Act, which makes it a
crime to lie about receiving military medals or honors, violates
the First Amendment’s guarantee of the right to free speech
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Stolen
Valor’s Act’s prohibition against making false statements of
having been awarded a military medal violated the First
Amendment. However, 6 justices in the majority could not
agree on a single rationale for the decision.
JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE,
JUSTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR,
concluded that the Act infringes upon speech protected by the
First Amendment. Pp. 3–18.
(a) The Constitution “demands that content-based
restrictions on speech be presumed invalid . . . and
that the Government bear the burden of showing
 their constitutionality.” Ashcroft v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 542 U. S. 656, 660.
Content-based restrictions on speech have been permitted
only for a few historic categories of speech, including
incitement, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal
conduct, so-called “fighting words,” child pornography, fraud,
true threats, and speech presenting some grave and imminent
threat the Government has the power to prevent. Absent from
these few categories is any general exception for false
statements. The Government argues that cases such as
Hustler Magazine, Inc., v. Falwell, 485 U. S. 46, 52, support
its claim that false statements have no value and hence no
First Amendment protection. But all the Government’s
quotations derive from cases discussing defamation, fraud, or
some other legally cognizable harm associated with a false
statement.
In those decisions the falsity of the speech at issue was not
irrelevant to the Court’s analysis, but neither was it
determinative. These prior decisions have not confronted a
measure, like the Stolen Valor Act, that targets falsity and
nothing more.
Even when considering some instances of defamation or
fraud, the Court has instructed that falsity alone may not
suffice to bring the speech outside the First Amendment; the
statement must be a knowing and reckless falsehood.
Page 95 of 186
12. Reno vs. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S.
844 (1997)
FACTS: Several litigants challenged the constitutionality of
two provisions in the 1996 Communications Decency Act.
Intended to protect minors from unsuitable internet material,
the Act criminalized the intentional transmission of “obscene
or indecent” messages as well as the transmission of
information which depicts or describes “sexual or excretory
activities or organs” in a manner deemed “offensive” by
community standards. After being enjoined by a District Court
from enforcing the above provisions, except for the one
concerning obscenity and its inherent protection against child
pornography, Attorney General Janet Reno appealed directly
to the Supreme Court as provided for by the Act’s special
review provisions.
ISSUE: Whether certain provisions of the 1996
Communications Decency Act violate the First and Fifth
Amendments by being overly broad and vague in their
definitions of the types of internet communications which they
criminalized.
RULING: Yes. The Court held that the Act violated the First
Amendment because its regulations amounted to a content-
based blanket restriction of free speech. The Act failed to
clearly define “indecent” communications, limit its restrictions
to particular times or individuals (by showing that it would not
impact adults), provide supportive statements from an
authority on the unique nature of internet communications, or
conclusively demonstrate that the transmission of “offensive”
material is devoid of any social value. The Court added that
since the First Amendment distinguishes between “indecent”
and “obscene” sexual expressions, protecting only the former,
the Act could be saved from facial overbreadth challenges if it
dropped the words “or indecent” from its text. The Court
refused to address any Fifth Amendment issues.
 Upon the facts, and under applicable laws and principles, the
13. Social Weather Stations, Inc. vs. Asuncion, 288 complaint fails to make a prima facie showing of the charges
SCRA xi (1993) made therein, and must perforce be as it is thereby,
DISMISSED.
FACTS: Published under the by-line of one Marichu
Villanueva and titled “Judiciary worse than PNP”, an item in
that June 17, 1993 issue of the Manila Standard, a
metropolitan daily, reported that the results of the latest
opinion polls conducted by the Ateneo Social Weather Station,
as Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is also known, showed
the Judiciary to have an even lower satisfaction rating than the
PNP. The item went on to state that the President and his
Cabinet had been briefed on the results of the survey by the
Professors Mahar Mangahas and Felipe Miranda of the SWS,
and that Malacanang had expressed concern over the
Judiciary’s law standing. Press Secretary Jesus Sison was
also quoted as saying that this was “most puzzling”, although
he could not recall the exact rating, noting only that the PNP
had “a better image than the judiciary”.

Said report appears to have prompted Judge Maximiano C.

Asuncion, presiding judge of Branch 104 of the RTC at
Quezon City, motu proprio to initiate on the same date of June
17, 1993 proceedings ordering the President of the SWS to
“explain why you should not be held in contempt or distributing
to the general public without prior permission from any court
your findings that the people have more confidence with the
police than with judges thereby tending directly or indirectly to
degrade the administration of justice.”

On June 21, 1993, Prof. Mahar Mangahas through Atty.

Antonio M. Abad, Jr. submitted his comment and explanation
that it was not true that the SWS distributed to the general
public the alleged survey. Said survey was privately given to
Pres. Ramos and the Cabinet and was not intended for
publication nor for public consumption and that if ever it
reaches the media, he had not authorized anyone to do so.
The hearing was scheduled on June 23, 1993, after
which Judge Asuncion promulgated an Order dated July 2,
1993, finding Professor Mangahas’ explanation satisfactory
and dismissing the contempt charge against him.

After three weeks or so, or more precisely on July 26, 1993,

Professor Managahas addressed a a letter to the Chief Justice
intended “as a formal complaint against Honorable Maximiano
C. Asuncion for grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance
of the law, in connection with his issuance of an Order dated
June 17, 1993.

ISSUE: Whether the Order dated June 17, 1993 is violative of

the constitutional guaranteed of freedom of speech and
freedom from prior restraint.

RULING: No.

What was clearly implicit in the newspaper report about the

results of the SWS poll – in the words of Judge Asuncion, “that
the people have more confidence with the police than with the
judges” – in light of this fact, of which judicial notice is taken,
that said report came out at a time when there already was
widespread publicity adverse to the judiciary, there can be no
doubt of its clear tendency to degrade the administration of
justice.

Thus, Judge Asuncion can hardly be faulted for what, at a

minimum, he must have felt duty-bound to do in the
circumstances. No question of prior restraint or violation of the
guarantee of free speech arises here, what he did being, in
essence, merely to initiate an inquiry into the source and basis
of the derogatory news report. And he forthwith abated the
proceedings upon receiving an explanation he deemed
satisfactory.

Page 96 of 186
14. RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED
"RESTORING INTEGRITY” (A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC.
March 8, 2011)
FACTS: On 28 April 2010, the decision of the case Vinuya v
Executive Secretary was promulgated with Justice Mariano
del Castillo as its ponente. Motion for reconsideration was
filed by the petitioner’s counsel on various grounds but most
notably on the ground that not only did the ponente of the case
plagiarised at least 3 books and articles in discussing the
principles of jus cogens and erga omnes, but have also twisted
such quotations making it appear contrary to the intent of the
original works. The authors and their purportedly plagiarized
articles are: 1) Evan J Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens published in 2009 in the Yale
Journal of International Law; 2) Christian J. Tams’ Enforcing
Erga Omnes Obligations in Internation Law published by the
Cambridge University Press in 2005; and 3) Mark Ellis’
Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime
published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of Internation
Law in 2006. Thereafter, news regarding the plagiarism by
the Supreme Court spread over the media and the original
authors wrote letters to the Chief Justice expressing
discontent by the questioned act of Justice del Castillo.
On 27 July 2010, the UP College of Law faculty members gave
their opinion on the matter of plagiarism by issuing an article
titled “Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations
of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court”
signed overall 37 faculty members. In said article, the faculty
expressly gave their dismay saying that the court had the
hopes of relief from those “comfort women” during the war
“crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the Land.”
In the article, it was stated that plagiarism, as appropriation
and misrepresentation of another person’s work as one’s own,
is considered as “dishonesty, pure and simple.” Hence, it was
argued that since the decision in the Vinuya case form part of
the Philippine judicial system, the Court, in fine, is allowing
dishonesty to be promulgated. Furthermore, the plagiarism
and misrepresentation in the Vinuya case undermines the
judicial system of our country and is a dirt on the honor and
dignity of the Supreme Court, the article sought for the
resignation of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo.
In response to the said article, the Court issued a resolution
stating that the remarks and choice of words used were such
a great insult to the members of the Court and a threat to the
independence of the judiciary, a clear violation of Canons 1,
11 and 13 and the Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Thereafter, the Court ordered the
signatories to show cause on why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for such alleged violations.
In fulfillment of the directive by the Court, the signatories
passed a Common Compliance stating therein that their
intention in issuing the article in question “was not to malign
the Court but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and
to ensure continued confidence in the legal system” by the
words used therein as “focusing on constructive action.” Also,
it was alleged that the respondents are correct in seeking
responsibility from Justice del Castillo for he, indeed,
committed plagiarism thus, rectifying their issuance of the
article. Furthermore, the respondents argued that the article
in question is a valid exercise of the freedom of expression as
Page 97 of 186
citizens of a democracy, and an exercise of academic
freedom.
ISSUE: Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents
their freedom of expression?
HELD: No.
It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the
issuance of the Show Cause Resolution, has interfered with
respondents’ constitutionally mandated right to free speech
and expression. It appears that the underlying assumption
behind respondents’ assertion is the misconception that this
Court is denying them the right to criticize the Court’s
decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence"
respondent law professors’ dissenting view on what they
characterize as a "legitimate public issue."
This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause
Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact that
respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they
had charged one of its members of plagiarism that motivated
the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the
contumacious language by which respondents, who are not
parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their
opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for
the "proper disposition" and consideration of the Court that
gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution
painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court
considered excessive and uncalled for under the
circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and
later submission to this Court of the UP Law faculty’s
Restoring Integrity Statement. To reiterate, it was not the
circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice
Del Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression
of that belief as "not only as an established fact, but a truth"
when it was "[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing
investigation precisely to determine the truth of such
allegations." It was also pointed out in the Show Cause
Resolution that there was a pending motion for
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. The Show Cause
Resolution made no objections to the portions of the Restoring
Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be
"constructive" but only asked respondents to explain those
portions of the said Statement that by no stretch of the
imagination could be considered as fair or constructive.
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized
respondents’ freedom of expression when it stated that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the
judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and
democratic society, there is also a general
consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far.
Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross
the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks.
These potentially devastating attacks and unjust
criticism can threaten the independence of the
judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to
proceed to the disposition of its business in an
orderly manner, free from outside interference
obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass
the administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable
purpose for the faculty’s less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010
 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the
Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in
addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if
the case on the comfort women’s claims is not
controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan
the flames and invite resentment against a resolution
that would not reverse the said decision. This runs
contrary to their obligation as law professors and
officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe
fidelity according to the oath they have taken as
attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice.
In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, cited in the Common
Compliance and the Vasquez Compliance, was an instance
where the Court indefinitely suspended a member of the Bar
for filing and releasing to the press a "Petition to Surrender
Lawyer’s Certificate of Title" in protest of what he claimed was
a great injustice to his client committed by the Supreme Court.
It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed
foreign jurisprudence on the principle that a lawyer, just like
any citizen, has the right to criticize and comment upon
actuations of public officers, including judicial authority.
However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such criticism of
the courts, whether done in court or outside of it, must conform
to standards of fairness and propriety. This case engaged in
an even more extensive discussion of the legal authorities
sustaining this view. To quote from that decision:
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that
it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls
of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the
other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a
misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person
obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession
places upon his shoulders no burden more basic,
more exacting and more imperative than that of
respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows
solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity x x
x to the courts;" and the Rules of Court constantly
remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due
to courts of justice and judicial officer.
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an
officer of the court, he cannot criticize the courts. That is his
right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the
court to avail of such right. Thus, in In Re: Almacen, this Court
explicitly declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a
lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No
law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally
answerable to a scrutiny into the official conduct of
the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am
Dec. 657, 665).
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this
Court warned in Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that
it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls
of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the
other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a
misconduct, that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by
the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights
of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every
right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not
freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility.
Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free
speech" defense in other bar discipline cases, academic
freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in
this case. The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence discussed
above is that the constitutional right to freedom of expression
of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical
duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to
uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the justice
system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of expression
may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater
force to the academic freedom of law professors.
It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in
view of the broad definition in Cayetano v. Monsod, lawyers
when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice
of law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than
lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their
oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured
against the same canons of professional responsibility
applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their
being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that
they are lawyers.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’
proposition in the Common Compliance that their issuance of
the Statement was in keeping with their duty to "participate in
the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting
efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the
administration of justice" under Canon 4 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have
fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons
1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal processes and the
courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence the courts.
Members of the Bar cannot be selective regarding which
canons to abide by given particular situations. With more
reason that law professors are not allowed this indulgence,
since they are expected to provide their students exemplars
of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not
just their preferred portions thereof.

xxxx

Page 98 of 186
 15. PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN vs. PRIMA JESUSA B.
QUINSAYAS, MA. GEMMA OQUENDO et al. (G.R. No.
194578; February 13, 2013)
FACTS: On 23 November 2009, a convoy of seven vehicles
carrying the relatives of then Maguindanao vice-mayor
Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu, as well as lawyers and
journalists, was on their way to the Commission on Elections
office in Shariff Aguak to file Mangudadatu’s Certificate of
Candidacy when they were accosted by a group of about 100
armed men at a checkpoint in Sitio Malating, Ampatuan town.
The gruesome aftermath of the hostage-taking was later
discovered and shocked the world. The hostages were
systematically killed by shooting them at close range with
automatic weapons, and their bodies and vehicles were
dumped in mass graves and covered with the use of a
backhoe. These gruesome killings became known as the
Maguindanao Massacre. A total of 57 victims were killed, 30
of them journalists. Subsequently, criminal cases for Murder
were filed and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. Petitioner is the counsel for Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr.
(Ampatuan, Jr.), the principal accused in the murder cases.
In November 2010, Atty. Quinsayas, et al. filed a disbarment
complaint against petitioner before this Court, docketed as Bar
Matter No. A.C. 8827. The disbarment case is still pending.
Petitioner alleged that on 22 November 2010, GMA News TV
internet website posted an article, written by Dedace, entitled
"Mangudadatu, others seek disbarment of Ampatuan lawyer".
On even date, Inquirer.net, the website of PDI, also published
an article, written by Torres, which according to petitioner also
stated details of the disbarment case. Petitioner further
alleged that on 23 November 2010, PhilStar published an
article, written by Punay, which gave details of the disbarment
allegations. Further, petitioner alleged that on 23 November
2010, Channel 23 aired on national television a program
entitled "ANC Presents: Crying for Justice: the Maguindanao
Massacre." Drilon, the program’s host, asked questions and
allowed Atty. Quinsayas to discuss the disbarment case
against petitioner, including its principal points.
Petitioner alleged that the public circulation of the disbarment
complaint against him exposed this Court and its investigators
to outside influence and public interference. Petitioner alleged
that opinion writers wrote about and commented on the
disbarment complaint which opened his professional and
personal reputation to attack. He alleged that the purpose of
respondents in publishing the disbarment complaint was to
malign his personal and professional reputation.
ISSUE: whether respondents violated the confidentiality rule
in disbarment proceedings, warranting a finding of guilt for
indirect contempt of court.
HELD: The Court recognizes that "publications which are
privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech."22 As a general
rule, disbarment proceedings are confidential in nature until
their final resolution and the final decision of this Court. In this
case, however, the filing of a disbarment complaint against
petitioner is itself a matter of public concern considering that it
arose from the Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of
the public is not on petitioner himself but primarily on his
involvement and participation as defense counsel in the
Maguindanao Massacre case. Indeed, the allegations in the
Page 99 of 186
disbarment complaint relate to petitioners supposed actions
involving the Maguindanao Massacre case.
Since the disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest,
legitimate media had a right to publish such fact under
freedom of the press. The Court also recognizes that
respondent media groups and personalities merely acted on a
news lead they received when they reported the filing of the
disbarment complaint.
The distribution by Atty. Quinsayas to the media of the
disbarment complaint, by itself, is not sufficient to absolve the
media from responsibility for violating the confidentiality rule.
However, since petitioner is a public figure or has become a
public figure because he is representing a matter of public
concern, and because the event itself that led to the filing of
the disbarment case against petitioner is a matter of public
concern, the media has the right to report the filing of the
disbarment case as legitimate news.
Defenses and Court’s answer:
GMA Network’s defense is that it has no newspaper or any
publication where the article could be printed; it did not
broadcast the disbarment complaint in its television station;
and that the publication was already completed when Atty.
Quinsayas distributed copies of the disbarment complaint to
the media. – Online posting, however, is already publication
considering that it was done on GMA Network’s online news
website.
PDI averred that it only shares its contents with Inquirer.net
through a syndication. PDI attached a photocopy of the
syndication page stating that "[d]ue to syndication agreements
between PDI and Inquirer.net, some articles published in PDI
may not appear in Inquirer.net." – PDI was not able to fully
establish that it has a separate personality from Inquirer.net.
ABS-CBN alleged that SNN is its subsidiary and although they
have interlocking directors, SNN has its own juridical
personality separate from its parent company. ABS-CBN
alleged that SNN controls the line-up of shows of ANC. – Court
agrees. A subsidiary has an independent and separate
juridical personality distinct from that of its parent company
and that any suit against the the latter does not bind the former
and vice-versa.
Respondent Ressa alleged that she was on terminal leave
when the program about the Maguindanao Massacre was
aired on ANC and that she had no hand in its production. –
Ressa’s defense was supported by a certification from the
Human Resource Account Head of ABS-CBN.
Basically, the defense of respondents Dedace, Torres, Drilon,
and Punay was that the disbarment complaint was published
without any comment, in good faith and without malice; that
petitioner is a public figure; that the Maguindanao Massacre is
a matter of public interest; and that there was no conspiracy
on their part in publishing the disbarment complaint. They also
argued that the news reports were part of privileged
communication.
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against
attorneys shall be private and confidential. However,
the final order of the Supreme Court shall be
published like its decisions in other cases.
The Court explained the purpose of the rule, as follows:
x x x. The purpose of the rule is not only to enable
this Court to make its investigations free from any
extraneous influence or interference, but also to
protect the personal and professional reputation of
attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of
disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and
litigants; it is also to deter the press from publishing
administrative cases or portions thereto without
authority.
Petitioner also failed to substantiate his claim that respondent
media groups and personalities acted in bad faith and that
they conspired with one another in their postings and
publications of the filing of a disbarment complaint against
him. Respondent media groups and personalities reported the
filing of the disbarment complaint without any comments or
remarks but merely as it was – a news item. Petitioner failed
to prove that respondent media groups and personalities
acted with malicious intent. Respondent media groups and
personalities made a fair and true news report and appeared
to have acted in good faith in publishing and posting the details
of the disbarment complaint. In the televised broadcast of the
commemoration of the Maguindanao Massacre over ANC, the
disbarment case was briefly discussed but petitioner was not
named. There was also no proof that respondent media
groups and personalities posted and published the news to
influence this Court on its action on the disbarment case or to
deliberately destroy petitioner’s reputation.
Page 100 of 186
16. PHARMACEUTICAL and HEALTH CARE
ASSOCIATION of the PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs.
HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III
et.al
FACTS: Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise
Known as The Milk Code, Relevant International Agreements,
Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes
(RIRR).Petitioner posits that the RIRR is not valid as it
contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond
the law it is supposed to implement. Executive Order No. 51
(Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on
October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted
to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the
preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks
to give effect to Article 11 of the International Code of
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted
by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to
2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected,
hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims
are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention
on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument
provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures
to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are
informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15,
2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take
effect on July 7, 2006.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents officers of the DOH acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in
violation of the provisions of the Constitution in promulgating
the RIRR
HELD: When it comes to information regarding nutrition of
infants and young children, however, the Milk Code
specifically delegated to the Ministry of Health (hereinafter
referred to as DOH) the power to ensure that there is
adequate, consistent and objective information on
breastfeeding and use of breastmilk substitutes, supplements
and related products; and the power to control such
information. Further, DOH is authorized by the Milk Code to
control the content of any information on breastmilk vis-à-vis
breastmilk substitutes, supplement and related products The
DOH is also authorized to control the purpose of the
information and to whom such information may be
disseminated under Sections 6 through 9 of the Milk Code to
ensure that the information that would reach pregnant women,
mothers of infants, and health professionals and workers in
the health care system is restricted to scientific and factual
matters and shall not imply or create a belief that bottle-
feeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding.
It bears emphasis, however, that the DOH's power under the
Milk Code to control information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis
breastmilk substitutes is not absolute as the power to control
does not encompass the power to absolutely prohibit the
advertising, marketing, and promotion of breastmilk
substitutes.
Sections 13 on "total effect" and 26 of Rule VII of the RIRR
contain some labeling requirements, specifically: a) that there
be a statement that there is no substitute to breastmilk; and b)
that there be a statement that powdered infant formula may
contain pathogenic microorganisms and must be prepared
and used appropriately. Section 16 of the RIRR prohibits all
health and nutrition claims for products within the scope of the
Milk Code, such as claims of increased emotional and
intellectual abilities of the infant and young child. These
requirements and limitations are consistent with the provisions
of Section 8 of the Milk Code and Section 10(d) which bars the
use on containers and labels of the terms "humanized,"
"maternalized," or similar terms. These provisions of the Milk
Code expressly forbid information that would imply or create a
belief that there is any milk product equivalent to breastmilk or
which is humanized or maternalized, as such information
would be inconsistent with the superiority of breastfeeding.
and 10 of the Milk Code, by which the IAC shall screen
advertising, promotional, or other marketing materials. It is
pursuant to such responsibility that the DOH correctly
provided for Section 13 in the RIRR which reads as follows:
SECTION 13. "Total Effect" - Promotion of products
within the scope of this Code must be objective and
should not equate or make the product appear to be
as good or equal to breastmilk or breastfeeding in the
advertising concept. It must not in any case
undermine breastmilk or breastfeeding. The "total
effect" should not directly or indirectly suggest that
buying their product would produce better
individuals, or resulting in greater love, intelligence,
ability, harmony or in any manner bring better health
to the baby or other such exaggerated and
unsubstantiated claim.

Such standards bind the IAC in formulating its rules and

Section 11 of the RIRR, to wit:
SECTION 11. Prohibition – No advertising,
promotions, sponsorships, or marketing materials
and activities for breastmilk substitutes intended for
infants and young children up to twenty-four (24)
months, shall be allowed, because they tend to
convey or give subliminal messages or impressions
that undermine breastmilk and breastfeeding or
otherwise exaggerate breastmilk substitutes and/or
replacements, as well as related products covered
within the scope of this Code.
prohibits advertising, promotions, sponsorships or marketing
materials and activities for breastmilk substitutes in line with
the RIRR’s declaration of principle under Section 4(f), to wit:
SECTION 4. Declaration of Principles –
xxxx
regulations on advertising, promotion, and marketing.
Through that single provision, the DOH exercises control over
the information content of advertising, promotional and
marketing materials on breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk
substitutes, supplements and other related products. It also
sets a viable standard against which the IAC may screen such
materials before they are made public.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, Section 22 of the RIRR does not
prohibit the giving of information to health professionals on
scientific and factual matters. What it prohibits is the
involvement of the manufacturer and distributor of the
products covered by the Code in activities for the promotion,
education and production of Information, Education and
Communication (IEC) materials regarding breastfeeding that
are intended for women and children. Said provision cannot
be construed to encompass even the dissemination of
information to health professionals, as restricted by the Milk
Code.

(f) Advertising, promotions, or sponsorships of infant

formula, breastmilk substitutes and other related
products are prohibited.

The DOH, through its co-respondents, evidently arrogated to

itself not only the regulatory authority given to the IAC but also
imposed absolute prohibition on advertising, promotion, and
marketing.

Yet, oddly enough, Section 12 of the RIRR reiterated the

requirement of the Milk Code in Section 6 thereof for prior
approval by IAC of all advertising, marketing and promotional
materials prior to dissemination. Even respondents, through
the OSG, acknowledged the authority of IAC, and repeatedly
insisted, during the oral arguments on June 19, 2007, that the
prohibition under Section 11 is not actually operational.

Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of the

Milk Code.

However, although it is the IAC which is authorized to

promulgate rules and regulations for the approval or rejection
of advertising, promotional, or other marketing materials under
Section 12(a) of the Milk Code, said provision must be related
to Section 6 thereof which in turn provides that the rules and
regulations must be "pursuant to the applicable standards
provided for in this Code." Said standards are set forth in
Sections 5(b), 8(b), and 10 of the Code.

Thus, the DOH has the significant responsibility to translate

into operational terms the standards set forth in Sections 5, 8,

Page 101 of 186

17. Pleasant Grove City, Utah et al. vs. Summum 555 US
_ (2009)
FACTS: Summum, a religious organization, sent a letter to the
mayor of Pleasant Grove, Utah asking to place a monument
in one of the city's parks. Although the park already housed a
monument to the Ten Commandments, the mayor denied
Summum's request because the monument did not "directly
relate to the history of Pleasant Grove." Summum filed suit
against the city in federal court citing, among other things, a
violation of its First Amendment free speech rights. The U.S.
District Court for the District of Utah denied Summum's
request for a preliminary injunction.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the
district court and granted Summum's injunction request. The
Tenth Circuit held that the park was in fact a "public" forum,
not a non-public forum as the district court had held.
Furthermore, Summum demonstrated that it would suffer
irreparable harm if the injunction were to be denied, and the
interests of the city did not outweigh this potential harm. The
injunction, according to the court, was also not against the
public interest.
ISSUE: Does a city's refusal to place a religious organization's
monument in a public park violate that organization's First
Amendment free speech rights when the park already
contains a monument from a different religious group?
HELD: No. The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit
holding that the placement of a monument in a public park is
a form of government speech and therefore not subject to
scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the
majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and
Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M.
Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and
Stephen G. Breyer, the Court reasoned that since Pleasant
Grove City had retained final authority over which monuments
were displayed, the monuments represented an expression of
the city's viewpoints and thus government speech.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote a separate
concurring opinion that largely embraced the majority's
reasoning. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, also
wrote a separate concurring opinion. Agreeing with the Court's
reasoning, he also noted that there were likely no violations of
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment on the part
of Pleasant Grove City. He argued that displays of the Ten
Commandments had been construed by the Court as "having
an undeniable historical meaning" and thus did not attempt to
establish a religion. Justice Breyer also wrote a separate
concurring opinion in which he noted that "government
speech" should be considered a rule of thumb and not a rigid
category. He stated that sometimes the Court should ask
"whether a government's actions burdens speech
disproportionately in light of the action's tendency to further a
legitimate government objective." Justice Souter also wrote
separately, concurring in the judgment, but warning that public
monuments should not be considered government speech
categorically.
Page 102 of 186
18. John Walker, III, et al. vs. Texas Division, Sons of
Confederate Veterans, Inc., et al. 576 US _ (2015)
FACTS: In August 2009, the Texas division of the Sons of
Confederate Veterans (Texas SCV), a non-profit organization
that works to preserve the memory and reputation of soldiers
who fought for the confederacy in the Civil War, applied to
have a new specialty license plate issued by the Texas
Department of Motor Vehicles (TDMV). The proposed license
plate had two confederate flags on it: one in the organization's
logo, and one faintly making up the background of the plate.
The TDMV had a policy stating that it "may refuse to create a
new specialty license plate if the design might be offensive to
any member of the public." The board in charge of approving
new specialty plates received multiple negative comments
from the public regarding this plate and ultimately voted to
deny Texas SCV's application.
Texas SCV sued in federal district court claiming their First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The TDMV
argued that the Free Speech Clause did not apply in this case
because license plates are a form of government speech;
therefore, they were within their rights to choose which
messages and views they wanted to express on the plates.
The district court disagreed and held that the plates were
private, non-governmental speech, and that the TDMV's
denial was a reasonable, content-based restriction of speech
in a non-public forum. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that TDMV's denial was a
form of viewpoint discrimination that "discriminated against
Texas SCV's view that the Confederate flag is a symbol of
sacrifice, independence, and Southern heritage."
ISSUE:
1. Do specialty license plates constitute government speech
that is immune from any requirement of viewpoint neutrality?
(YES)
2. Does preventing the confederate flag from appearing on
license plates constitute viewpoint discrimination? (NO)
HELD: Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the
5-4 majority. The Court held that the government choosing the
content of its speech is not unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination because that expression is the product of the
democratic electoral process. Based on the analysis from
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, Texas’s specialty license
plate is an example of such government speech (as opposed
to a forum open for private expression) because Texas and
other states have long used license plates to convey
messages. Moreover, the public associates license plates with
the State. Finally, Texas maintains direct control over the
messages on its specialty plates from design to final approval.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., wrote a dissent in which he argued
that, with over 350 varieties of specialty plates, an observer
would think that the plates were the expression of the
individual drivers, not Texas. Because the specialty license
plates are a limited public forum for private expression, Texas
rejecting the confederate flag design because it might be
offensive is unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Chief
Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Antonin Scalia, and
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent.
 19. Bayan et.al. vs. Ermita
Facts: Petitioners come in three groups – Bayan, et al, Jess
del Prado, et al, , Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al, KMU, et
al.,
The rally was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in
front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards
Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta
Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They
were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them.
Three other rallyists were arrested
in the case of Bayan, et al allege that they are citizens and
taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as
organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they
participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by
policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them
in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a),
as well as the policy of CPR, "Calibrated Preemptive
Response". They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies
under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy
recently announced.
Bayan et al argued that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before
one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence
or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the
choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of
expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly
form part of the message for which the expression is sought.
Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to
mass actions in support of the government. The words "lawful
cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the
exposition of some cause not espoused by the government.
Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law
applies to assemblies against the government because they
are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot
pass the strict scrutiny test.
Issue: Whether or not the implementation of B.P. No. 880
volated their rights as organizations and individuals when the
rally they participated in on October 6, 2005
Held: Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged.
Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and
exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the
Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which
requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the
nation’s streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely
engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to
press their claim that no such permit can be validly required
without violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents,
on the other hand, have challenged such action as contrary to
law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the
permit.
Sec. 4 Art. III Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances
Page 103 of 186
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble
and petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom
of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys
primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these
rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic
polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless
and unprotected
Rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a
redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form
associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to
engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are
guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly
Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article
IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with
hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the
people’s exercise of these rights
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute
ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates
the time, place and manner of the assemblies, it as a "content-
neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding
public assemblies
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows
that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies22 that would use
public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make
it content-based because assemblies really have to be for
lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and
entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion,"
"protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public
assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject.
The words "petitioning the government for redress of
grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its
use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the
protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the
content of the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no
place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a
darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people
and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the
other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as
unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms;
it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time,
place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious,
"maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the
government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to
issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the
constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard.
In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in
safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of
30 days within which to designate specific freedom parks as
provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such
parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the
law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city
concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior
permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly
therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the
police and the mayor’s office to allow proper coordination and
orderly activities.
 20. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
represented by its National President, Jose Anselmo
I. Cadiz, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, and JOEL RUIZ
BUTUYAN vs. HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE
"LITO" ATIENZA (G.R. No. 175241; February 24,
2010)
FACTS: On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National
President Jose Anselmo Cadiz (Cadiz), filed with the Office of
the City Mayor of Manila a letter application4 for a permit to
rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30
p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP officers and
members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.
Respondent issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the
IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated therein Plaza
Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which
permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 94949. The petition having been unresolved within 24
hours from its filing, petitioners filed before this Court on June
22, 2006 a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 172951
which assailed the appellate court’s inaction or refusal to
resolve the petition within the period provided under the Public
Assembly Act of 1985.
The Court, by Resolutions of July 26, 2006, August 30, 2006
and November 20, 2006, respectively, denied the petition for
being moot and academic, denied the relief that the petition
be heard on the merits in view of the pendency of CA-G.R. SP
No. 94949, and denied the motion for reconsideration.
The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola
Bridge, after Cadiz discussed with P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan
whose contingent from the Manila Police District (MPD) earlier
barred petitioners from proceeding thereto. Petitioners allege
that the participants voluntarily dispersed after the peaceful
conduct of the program. The MPD thereupon instituted on
June 26, 2006 a criminal action, docketed as I.S. No. 06I-
12501, against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in
staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit, to which
charge Cadiz filed a Counter-Affidavit of August 3, 2006.
In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas
(KMP) v. Ermita, the Court reiterated:
x x x Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the
people to meet peaceably for consultation and
discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled
to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It
is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing, as is the case with freedom of expression,
of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the
1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to
stress that it is a necessary consequence of our
republican institutions and complements the right of
free speech. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice
Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American
Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by
accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of
speech and of the press were coupled in a single
guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to
assemble and to petition the government for redress
of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are
inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is
a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the
judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the
challenged governmental actuation. The sole
justification for a limitation on the exercise of this
right, so fundamental to the maintenance of
democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character
both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health, or any other
legitimate public interest.
It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is
not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit
would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion.
While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not
of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur,
given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption –
especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific
public place – is that the permit must be for the assembly
being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language
of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court,
is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place.

ISSUE: whether the appellate court erred in holding that the

modification of the venue in IBP’s rally permit does not
constitute grave abuse of discretion.

HELD: Yes, in modifying the permit outright, respondent

gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately
inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter
of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The
opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit,
since the applicant may directly go to court after an
unfavorable action on the permit.

Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying

the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and
present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an
indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the
issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification would,
when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it,
render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.

Page 104 of 186

 G. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
1. RENATO V. PERALTA, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE
POSTAL CORPORATION (PHILPOST) (G.R. No.
223395, December 04, 2018)
FACTS: Philippine Postal Corporation (PhilPost) issued a
stamp commemorating Iglesia ni Cristo's (INC's) Centennial
Celebration. The design of the stamp showed a photo of INC
founder, the late Felix Y. Manalo (Manalo) with the
designation on the left side containing the words "Felix Y.
Manalo, 1886-1963 First Executive Minister of Iglesia ni
Cristo", with the Central Temple of the religious group at the
background.
On June 16, 2014, petitioner Renato V. Peralta (petitioner)
filed a complaint for injunction with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Br. 33 of Manila, assailing the constitutionality of the
printing, issuance and distribution of the INC commemorative
centennial stamps, allegedly paid for by respondent PhilPost
using public funds. In his complaint, petitioner alleged that the
printing and issuance of the INC commemorative stamp
involved disbursement of public funds, and violated. Section
29(2) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. He argued that
respondents' act of releasing the said stamps was
unconstitutional because it was tantamount to sponsorship of
a religious activity; it violated the separation of the Church and
the State; and the non-establishment of religion clause.
Respondents filed their Answer, maintaining that no public
funds were disbursed in the printing of the INC
commemorative stamps. They alleged that there was a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated May 7, 2014
executed between PhilPost and INC, where it was provided
that the costs of printing will be borne by INC. They claimed
that the proceeds of the sale of the stamps will not redound to
the sole benefit of INC. The printing, according to them, is part
of PhilPost's philatelic products, which will promote tourism in
the country because it will attract people from all over the
world.
On July 25, 2014, the RTC issued an Order, denying
petitioner's application for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction and dismissing the action. It ruled that it was not a
taxpayer's suit and that it did not violate Section 29 (2), Article
VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Petitioner appealed the
RTC's decision with the CA, but the same was denied in its
July 24, 2015 decision.
ISSUE: Was the selling of the postage stamps
commemorating the INC’s centennial celebration
constitutional?
HELD: There is no quibbling that as to the 50,000 stamps
ordered, printed and issued to INC, the same did not violate
the Constitutional prohibitions separating State matters from
religion.
The non-establishment of religion clause is not equivalent to
indifference to religion
True, fundamental to the resolution of this case is the policy of
the State on the inviolability of the principle of separation of
the church and the state. Justice Isagani Cruz explained the
rationale of this principle in this wise:
Page 105 of 186
The rationale of the rule is summed up in the familiar
saying, "Strong fences make good neighbors." The
idea is to delineate the boundaries between the two
institutions and, thus, avoid encroachments by one
against the other because of a misunderstanding of
the limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions.
The demarcation line calls on the entities to "render
therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's
and unto God the things that are God's."
In upholding the issuance of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress commemorative stamp, this Court in
Aglipay v. Ruiz recognized how religion is integrated in the
Filipino way of life:
The more important question raised refers to the
alleged violation of the Constitution by the
respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of
the respondent is violative of the provisions of
section 13, subsection 3, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as
follows:
"No public money or property shall ever be
appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly,
for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, secretarian institution, or system of
religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher
or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage,
or leprosarium."
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional
mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not denial of its influence in human
affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds
the purest principles of morality, its influence is
deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino
people, in the preamble of their Constitution,
implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to
establish a government that shall embody their
ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the
nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to
themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy," they thereby manifested their intense
religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon
Him who guides the destinies of men and nations.
The elevating influence of religion in human society
is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain
general concessions are indiscriminately accorded
to religious sects and denominations.
Religious Profession and Worship
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold
aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's
beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined
within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the
public welfare.
(1) Freedom to Believe
The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases
concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his own theories
about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at
all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of
God or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize
or deny the immortality of his soul - in fact, cherish any
religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However
absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and
heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he
pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may
not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is
a matter of faith. Men may believe what they cannot prove.
Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called
to account because he cannot prove what he believes.
(2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs
But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or
omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes
subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty
may be, religious freedom, like all the other rights guaranteed
in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard
for the rights of others. It is error to think that the mere
invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and
render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The
inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious
practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such
practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and
not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable
requirements or prohibitions of the law.
By adopting the above constitutional provisions on religion,
the Filipinos manifested their adherence to the benevolent
neutrality approach in interpreting the religion clauses, an
approach that looks further than the secular purposes of
government action and examines the effect of these actions
on religious exercise. Benevolent neutrality recognizes the
religious nature of the Filipino people and the elevating
influence of religion in society; at the same time, it
acknowledges that government must pursue its secular goals.
In pursuing these goals, however, government might adopt
laws or actions of general applicability which inadvertently
burden religious exercise. Benevolent neutrality gives room
for accommodation of these religious exercises as required by
the Free Exercise Clause.
We adopt the benevolent neutrality approach not only
because of its merits as discussed above, but more
importantly, because our constitutional history and
interpretation indubitably show that benevolent neutrality is
the launching pad from which the Court should take off in
interpreting religion clause cases.
Where the Court has been asked to determine whether there
has been an undue encroachment of this Constitutionally
forged "wall", this Court has adopted a stance of "benevolent
neutrality". Rightfully so, for this incorporates the
Constitutional principle of separation of the Church and the
State while recognizing the people's right to express their
belief or non-belief of a Supreme Being.
Even in the U. S., whose jurisprudence are of persuasive
weight in this jurisdiction, it can be gleaned that the religious
nature of certain governmental acts does not automatically
result in striking them as unconstitutional for violation of the
non-establishment clause, particularly if the act involves
constitutionally protected form of exercise of religious
freedom. The "Lemon test", which has been extensively
applied by the U. S. Supreme Court in issues involving the
determination of non-establishment of religion clause
Page 106 of 186
originated from the case of Lemon vs. Kurtzman. In that case,
the Court used a three-pronged test to adjudge whether the
assailed governmental act violated the First Amendment, as
follows:
1. The statute must have a secular legislative
purpose;
2. Its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and,
3. The statute must not foster "an excessive
government entanglement with religion."
It is plain, that the costs for the printing and issuance of the
aforesaid 50,000 stamps were all paid for by INC. Any
perceived use of government property, machines or
otherwise, is de minimis and certainly do not amount to a
sponsorship of a specific religion. Also, We see no violation of
the Constitutional prohibition on establishment of religion,
insofar as the remaining 1,150,000 pieces of stamps printed
and distributed by PhilPost. First, there is no law mandating
anyone to avail of the INC commemorative stamps, nor is
there any law purporting to require anyone to adopt the INC's
teachings. Arguably, while then President Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 815, s. 2014, authorizing the issuance of the
INC commemorative stamp, the same did not contain any
legal mandate endorsing or requiring people to conform to the
INC's teachings.
As to the use of the government's machinery in printing and
distribution of the 1.2 million stamps, this Court does not find
that the same amounted to sponsorship of INC as a religion
considering that the same is no different from other stamps
issued by PhilPost acknowledging persons and events of
significance to the country.
In the same vein, We do not find that there was illegal
disbursement of funds under Section 29(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution. The application of this prohibition towards
government acts was already clarified by the Court in Re:
Letter of Tony Q. Valenciana, Holding Of Religious Rituals At
The Hall Of Justice Building In Quezon City:
Section 29 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
provides, "No public money or property shall be
appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or
system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as
such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any
penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium."
The word "apply" means "to use or employ for a
particular purpose." "Appropriate" means "to
prescribe a particular use for particular moneys or to
designate or destine a fund or property for a distinct
use, or for the payment of a particular demand."
Under the principle of noscitur a sociis, where a
particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is found
with or with which it is associated. This is because a
word or phrase in a statute is always used in
association with other words or phrases, and its
meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by the
latter. The particular words, clauses and phrases
 should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the
statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of
any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious
whole. A statute must be so construed as to
harmonize and give effect to all its provisions
whenever possible.
Thus, the words "pay" and "employ" should be
understood to mean that what is prohibited is the use
of public money or property for the sole purpose of
benefiting or supporting any church. The prohibition
contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is
primarily intended for the furtherance of a particular
church.
It has also been held that the aforecited constitutional
provision "does not inhibit the use of public property
for religious purposes when the religious character of
such use is merely incidental to a temporary use
which is available indiscriminately to the public in
general."
Adopting the stance of benevolent neutrality, this Court deems
the design of the INC commemorative stamp constitutionally
permissible. As correctly held by the CA, there is an intrinsic
historical value in the fact that Felix Y Manalo is a Filipino and
that the INC is a Filipino institution. Thus, this Court sees no
religious overtones surrounding the commemorative stamps,
as insisted upon by the petitioner. the design depicted in the
INC commemorative stamp is merely a recognition of the
continuous existence of a group that is strictly Filipino. As
compared to major religious groups established in the country,
Felix Y. Manalo, and the INC, are not plain religious symbols,
but also a representation of a group that is distinctly unique
to the Philippines. To the mind of this Court, the use of the
facade of the Church and the image of Felix Y. Manalo is
nothing more than an acknowledgment of a historical
milestone. It does not endorse, establish or disparage other
religious groups and even non-believers, especially
considering the fact that PhilPost also print stamps with
symbols which can arguably be connected to religion.
Page 107 of 186
2. ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR A.M. No. P-02-1651
August 4, 2003 J. PUNO
FACTS: In a sworn letter-complaint, Estrada wrote to Judge
Caoibes, Jr. requesting for an investigation of rumors that
Escritor, court interpreter in said court, is living with a man not
her husband. They allegedly have a child of 18 to 20 years
old. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her
partner and is a resident not of Las Piñas City but of Bacoor,
Cavite. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as
he believes that she is committing an immoral act that
tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be
allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the
court condones her act.
Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999,
she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998.
She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio,
Jr. without the benefit of marriage for 20 years and that they
have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as
the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible
Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with
their religious beliefs and it does not consider it immoral. In
fact, after ten years of living together, she executed a
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness”. Quilapio also executed
a similar pledge on the same day. At the time Escritor
executed her pledge, her husband was still alive but living with
another woman. Quilapio was likewise married at that time,
but had been separated in fact from his wife.
Estrada argued, through counsel, that the Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness recognizes the supremacy of the
“proper public authorities” such that she bound herself “to
seek means to . . . legalize their union.” Thus, even assuming
arguendo that the declaration is valid and binding in her
congregation, it is binding only to her co-members in the
congregation and serves only the internal purpose of
displaying to the rest of the congregation that she and her
mate are a respectable and morally upright couple. Their
religious belief and practice, however, cannot override the
norms of conduct required by law for government employees.
To rule otherwise would create a dangerous precedent as
those who cannot legalize their live-in relationship can simply
join the Jehovah’s Witnesses congregation and use their
religion as a defense against legal liability.
ISSUE: WoN Escritor’s right to religious freedom should carve
out an exception from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit
relations for which government employees are held
administratively liable. (WoN Escritor should be found guilty of
the administrative charge of “gross and immoral conduct.”)
HELD: Yes. The Philippine constitution’s religion clauses
prescribe the benevolent neutrality approach not the strict
neutrality approach. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that
government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at
the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest
extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus,
although the morality contemplated by laws is secular,
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.
With benevolent neutrality as a framework, the Court cannot
simply reject respondent’s plea of religious freedom without
even subjecting it to the “compelling state interest” test that
would balance her freedom with the paramount interests of the
state.
Application of Benevolent Neutrality and the Compelling
State Interest Test to the Case at Bar.
Escritor’s claim of religious freedom (the possibility that the
claim to religious freedom would warrant carving out an
exception from the Civil Service Law) versus government’s
showing of compelling interest.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondent’s
right to religious freedom has been burdened. There is no
doubt that choosing between keeping her employment and
abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the
one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her
religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a burden
on her free exercise of religion. The burden on respondent in
the case at bar is even greater as the price she has to pay for
her employment is not only her religious precept but also her
family which, by the Declaration Pledging Faithfulness, stands
“honorable before God and men.”
The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her
religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her
religious belief and practice and is not merely using the
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” to avoid punishment for
immorality. She did not secure the Declaration only after
entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict and
defined, much less only after an administrative case for
immorality was filed against her. The Declaration was issued
to her by her congregation after ten years of living together
with her partner, Quilapio, and ten years before she entered
the judiciary. Ministers from her congregation testified on the
authenticity of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ practice of securing
a Declaration and their doctrinal or scriptural basis for such a
practice. As the ministers testified, the Declaration is not
whimsically issued to avoid legal punishment for illicit conduct
but to make the “union” of their members under respondent’s
circumstances “honorable before God and men.” It is also
worthy of notice that the Report and Recommendation of the
investigating judge annexed letters of the OCA to the
respondent regarding her request to be exempt from attending
the flag ceremony after Circular No. 62-2001 was issued
requiring attendance in the flag ceremony. The OCA’s letters
were not submitted by respondent as evidence but annexed
by the investigating judge in explaining that he was caught in
a dilemma whether to find respondent guilty of immorality
because the Court Administrator and Deputy Court
Administrator had different positions regarding respondent’s
request for exemption from the flag ceremony on the ground
of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ contrary belief and practice.
Respondent’s request for exemption from the flag ceremony
shows her sincerity in practicing the Jehovah’s Witnesses’
beliefs and not using them merely to escape punishment. She
is a practicing member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the
Jehovah ministers testified that she is a member in good
standing.
GUYS THE CASE WAS REMANDED TO THE OCA KASI DI
NAGPARTICIPATE SI SOLGEN. SO INORDER SYA TO
INTERVENE AND TO SHOW THE STATES’ COMPELLING
REASON…. In the final decision on the case, Estrada v.
Escritor, 492 SCRA 1 (2006), the Court then went on to allow
a court interpreter to continue with her conjugal arrangement
with a married man not her husband, since the same was
sanctioned by her religion and there was no compelling state
interest that would have warranted overriding her religion-
grounded practice – “we find that in this particular case and
under these distinct circumstances, respondent Escritor’s
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made
out a case for exemption from the law based on her
fundamental right to freedom of religion.”
[RELEVANT DEFINITONS]
 FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE accords absolute protection
to individual religious convictions and beliefs and
Page 108 of 186
proscribes government from questioning a person’s
beliefs or imposing penalties or disabilities based solely
on those beliefs—it extends to both beliefs and unbeliefs.
i. e. religious speech and expressive religious conduct o
BELIEF-ACTION TEST which allows absolute protection
to belief but not to action.
o DELIBERATE-INADVERTENT DISTINCTION -
the distinction between deliberate state
interference of religious exercise for religious
reasons which was plainly unconstitutional and
government’s inadvertent interference with religion
in pursuing some secular objective.
o BALANCING TEST - a two-part balancing test of
validity where the first step was for plaintiff to show
that the regulation placed a real burden on his
religious exercise. Next, the burden would be
upheld only if the state showed that it was pursuing
an overriding secular goal by the means which
imposed the least burden on religious practices.
o COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST –
stresses that the state interest is not merely any
colorable state interest, but must be paramount
and compelling to override the free exercise claim.
o EXEMPTION DOCTRINE - Under the exemption
doctrine when general laws conflict with scruples
of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted
unless some “compelling state interest”
intervenes.
 NON ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE creates “a wall of
separation between church and state”. o NEUTRALITY
AND BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY STANDARDS - Two
main standards used by the U.S. Supreme Court in
deciding religion clause cases—separation (in the form of
strict separation or the tamer version of strict neutrality or
separation) and benevolent neutrality or accommodation.
o The STRICT SEPARATIONIST VIEW holds that
the “wall of separation” is meant to protect the
state from the church.
o Under BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY, which gives
room for accommodation, the wall of separation is
meant to protect the church from the state.
o An ACCOMMODATIONIST holds that it is good
public policy, and sometimes constitutionally
required, for the state to make conscious and
deliberate efforts to avoid interference with
religious freedom.
o A STRICT NEUTRALITY ADHERENT believes
that it is good public policy, and also
constitutionally required, for the government to
avoid religion-specific policy even at the cost of
inhibiting religious exercise.
 PHILIPPINE RELIGION CLAUSES CASE LAW A close
scrutiny of the Philippine cases involving the religion
clauses would reveal that while U.S. jurisprudence on
religion clauses flows into two main streams of
interpretation—separation and benevolent neutrality—
the well-spring of Philippine jurisprudence on this subject
is for the most part benevolent neutrality which gives
room for accommodation. o The Philippine Supreme
Court has adopted a posture of not invalidating a law
offensive to religious freedom, but carving out an
exception or upholding an exception to accommodate
religious exercise where it is justified.
o How the tension between the Non Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause will be
resolved is a question for determination in the
actual cases that come to the Court—the two
clauses should be balanced against each other.
o Although our constitutional history and
interpretation mandate benevolent neutrality, it
does not mean that the Court ought to grant
exemptions every time a free exercise claim
 comes before it, but that the Court will not look with
hostility or act indifferently towards religious beliefs
and practices and that it will strive to accommodate
them when it can within flexible constitutional
limits; it does mean that the Court will not simply
dismiss a claim under the Free Exercise Clause.
o When the law speaks of “immorality” in the Civil
Service Law or “immoral” in the Code of
Professional Responsibility for lawyers, or “public
morals” in the Revised Penal Code, or “morals” in
the New Civil Code, or “moral character” in the
Constitution, the distinction between public and
secular morality on the one hand, and religious
morality, on the other, should be kept in mind—the
morality referred to in the law is public and
necessarily secular, not religious.
Page 109 of 186
3. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC (G.R. No.
190582, April 8, 2010)
FACTS: Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and
women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals,
or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003,
Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the
ground that the organization had no substantial membership
base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition
for registration with the COMELEC. Before the COMELEC,
petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized
and under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination,
and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes,
LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and
that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines
enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its
national membership base consisting of individual members
and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of
governance. On November 11, 2009, after admitting the
petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division)
dismissed the Petition on moral grounds –
a marginalized and under-represented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that
which:
x x x refers to a person’s capacity for profound
emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and
intimate and sexual rela tions with, individuals of a
different gender, of the same gender, or more than
one gender.
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal
clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which
offends religious beliefs.
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual
immorality as indicated in the Petition’s par. 6F:
‘Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays
and lesbians who are already of age’. It is further
indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for
the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or
MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000
(Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract,
permit, license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence,
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the
Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the
requirement to be complied with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil
Code which defines nuisance as ‘Any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or
disregards decency or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code:
‘The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides
that ‘Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy’ are inexistent and void from the
beginning.
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three
commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution
(Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento,
and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to
deny Ang Ladlad’s Motion for Reconsideration
(Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and
Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie
and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld
the First Assailed Resolution –
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral
party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it
has properly proven its under-representation and
marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad’s
expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit
the nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states
that the purpose of the party-list system of electing
congressional representatives is to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and under-
represented sectors, organizations and parties, and
who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as
a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. If entry into the party-list system
would depend only on the ability of an organization
to represent its constituencies, then all
representative organizations would have found
themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the
intention of the framers of the law. The party-list
system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and
acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of
persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the
realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals
whose interests are also the nation’s—only that their
interests have not been brought to the attention of
the nation because of their under representation.
Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify
that having mixed sexual orientations and
transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its
application for accreditation under the party-list
system will remain just that.
Even if society’s understanding, tolerance, and
acceptance of LGBT’s is elevated, there can be no
denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males
and females, and they will remain either male or
female protected by the same Bill of Rights that
applies to all citizens alike.
What are being adopted as moral parameters and
precepts are generally accepted public morals. They
are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the
Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of
Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some
moral precepts espoused by said religions have
sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly
accepted moral norms.
But above morality and social norms, they have
become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision
mayor upon “Those who shall publicly expound or
proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals.”
It penalizes “immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibition and indecent shows.”
“Ang Ladlad” apparently falls under these legal
provisions.
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that
the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the
COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as
it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the
Page 110 of 186
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of
religion. The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad’s petition and
argued that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioner’s
application for registration since there was no basis for
COMELEC’s allegations of immorality. It also opined that
LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which
should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate
classification.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does
not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to
benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed
on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the
LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941
ISSUE: Whether Ang Ladlad party-list should be given
accreditation
RULING: Yes as they have sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong
Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors
(labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered
under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive.” The crucial element is
not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.
The Court finds that there has been no misrepresentation. A
cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’sinitial petition shows that it
never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines.
Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the
Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000
persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the
country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion
group. Ang Ladladalso represented itself to be “a national
LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the
Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks XXX”
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG
LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they
found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions.
In fact, if COMELEC’s findings are to be believed, petitioner
does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang
Ladlad’s principal place of business.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in
religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious
justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment
clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. The government must act
for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular
effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:
if government relies upon religious beliefs in
formulating public policies and morals, the resulting
policies and morals would require conformity to what
some might regard as religious programs or agenda.
The non-believers would therefore be compelled to
conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a
religious belief.
 government action, including its proscription of
immorality as expressed in criminal law like
concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is,
the government proscribes this conduct because it is
“detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human
society” and not because the conduct is proscribed
by the beliefs of one religion or the other.
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation
of homosexuality and homosexual conduct may be religion-
based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted
public morals. We are not blind to the fact that, through the
years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals
themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is
not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure—
religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of
marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle.
Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to
criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these
“generally accepted public morals” have not been convincingly
transplanted into the realm of law. The Assailed Resolutions
have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed
by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that “there should have
been a finding by the COMELEC that the group’s members
have committed or are committing immoral acts.” Respondent
has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be
prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth.
Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its
position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system
would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric
of society.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported
violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards
decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution
under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil
action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation
of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand,
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of
civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of
liability or culpability.
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our
Constitution, which provides “nor shall any person be denied
equal protection of the laws,” courts have never interpreted
the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification.
“Equality,” said Aristotle, “consists in the same treatment of
similar persons.” The equal protection clause guarantees that
no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and in like circumstances. Recent
jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold
the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to
some legitimate government end. The COMELEC posits that
the majority of the Philippine population considers
homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this
constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner.
Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has
expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize
homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about
Page 111 of 186
homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that
public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted
state interest here—that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular
minority—is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to
satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause.
The COMELEC’s differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim
that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of
legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate
state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a
disfavored group.
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to
promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the
validity of its position through normal democratic means. It is
in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing
opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. Freedom of
expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those
that are favorably received but also to those that offend,
shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must
be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any
compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this
Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated,
the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for
no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one. We do not doubt that a number
of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is
distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold
and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their
supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that
relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally
equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are
entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this
Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the
religious or moral views of one part of the community to
exclude from consideration the values of other members of the
community. The OSG argues that since there has been
neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on
Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their
right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no
restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The
OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its
qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and—as
advanced by the OSG itself—the moral objection offered by
the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law.
The Court explicitly recognize the principle of non-
discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation,
enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR. The principle of non-
discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to the equal protection of
the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal
and effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that
laws of general application relating to elections be applied
equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as
a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR,
the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the
reference to “sex” in Article 26 should be construed to include
“sexual orientation.” As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-
Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is
elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General
Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right
to Vote) as follows:
“1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and
protects the right of every citizen to take part in the
conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be
elected and the right to have access to public
service. Whatever form of constitution or government
is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt
such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective
opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25
lies at the core of democratic government based on
the consent of the people and in conformity with the
principles of the Covenant.
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to
assume the responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines’
international law obligations, the blanket invocation of
international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer
now to the petitioner’s invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles
(the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation
to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity), which petitioner
declares to reflect binding principles of international law. At
this time, we are not prepared to declare that these
Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the
Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in
said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of
international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources
of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta
Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various
international law professors, are—at best—de lege ferenda—
and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines.
Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is
characterized by the “soft law” nomenclature, i.e., international
law is full of principles that promote international cooperation,
harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount
to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of
either State practice or opinio juri.
Page 112 of 186
4. RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. V ALENCIANO, HOLDING
OF RELIGIOUS RITUALS AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE
BUILDING IN QUEZON CITY (A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC)
FACTS: This controversy originated from a series of letters,
written by Tony Q. Valenciano (Valenciano) and addressed to
then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (Chief Justice Puno).
In his first Letter, Valenciano reported that the basement of the
Hall of Justice of Quezon City (QC) had been converted into
a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with offertory table,
images of Catholic religious icons, a canopy, an electric organ,
and a projector. He believed that such practice violated the
constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State
and the constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of
public money or property for the benefit of a sect, church,
denomination, or any other system of religion.
Valenciano further averred that the holding of masses at the
basement of the QC Hall of Justice showed that it tended to
favor Catholic litigants; that the rehearsals of the choir caused
great disturbance to other employees; that the public could no
longer use the basement as resting place; that the employees
and litigants of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), RTC, Legal
Library, Philippine Mediation Center, and Records Section of
the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) could not attend to their
personal necessities such as going to the lavatories because
they could not traverse the basement between 12:00 o'clock
noontime and 1: 15 o'clock in the afternoon; that the court
employees became hostile toward each other as they vied for
the right to read the epistle; and that the water supply in the
entire building was cut off during the mass because the
generator was turned off to ensure silence.
Valenciano wrote another letter, praying that rules be
promulgated by the Court to put a stop to the holding of
Catholic masses, or any other religious rituals, at the QC Hall
of Justice and in all other halls of justice in the country.
The Court noted the letter of Valenciano and referred the
matter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
In its Memorandum, the OCA believed that the practical
inconveniences cited by Valenciano were unfounded. It, thus,
recommended that his letter-complaints be dismissed for lack
of merit.
ISSUE: WON the holding of masses at the basement of the
Quezon City Hall of Justice violates the constitutional principle
of separation of church and state as well as the constitutional
prohibition against appropriation of public money or property
for the benefit of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion. NO
HELD: Rituals in the Halls of Justice does not Amount to a
Union of Church and State
The State still recognizes the inherent right of the people to
have some form of belief system, whether such may be belief
in a Supreme Being, a certain way of life, or even an outright
rejection of religion.
Thus, the right to believe or not to believe has again been
enshrined in Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution:
 Section 5. xxx. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. xxx.
"The right to religious profession and worship has a
two-fold aspect - freedom to believe and freedom to
act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as
the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The
second is subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare."
Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of
separation of Church and State. In fact, these two principles
are in perfect harmony with each other.
Clearly, allowing the citizens to practice their religion is not
equivalent to a fusion of Church and State.
No Compelling State Interest
Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have its
way if there is a compelling state interest. To successfully
invoke compelling state interest, it must be demonstrated that
the masses in the QC Hall of Justice unduly disrupt the
delivery of public services or affect the judges and employees
in the performance of their official functions.
As reported by the Executive Judges of Quezon City, the
masses were being conducted only during noon breaks and
were not disruptive of public services. The court proceedings
were not being distracted or interrupted and that the
performance of the judiciary employees were not being
adversely affected. Moreover, no Civil Service rules were
being violated. As there has been no detrimental effect on the
public service or prejudice to the State, there is simply no state
interest compelling enough to prohibit the exercise of religious
freedom in the halls of justice.
Accommodation, Not Establishment of Religion
In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of
religion, the State adopts a policy of accommodation.
Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some
governmental measures may not be imposed on a certain
portion of the population for the reason that these measures
are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be
shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public
welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such
right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.
Establishment entails a positive action on the part of the State.
Accommodation, on the other hand, is passive. In the former,
the State becomes involved through the use of government
resources with the primary intention of setting up a state
religion. In the latter, the State, without being entangled,
merely gives consideration to its citizens who want to freely
exercise their religion.
Guided by the foregoing, it is our considered view that the
holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of
Justice is not a case of establishment, but merely
accommodation. First, there is no law, ordinance or circular
issued by any duly constitutive authorities expressly
mandating that judiciary employees attend the Catholic
masses at the basement. Second, when judiciary employees
attend the masses to profess their faith, it is at their own
Page 113 of 186
initiative as they are there on their own free will and volition,
without any coercion from the judges or administrative
officers. Third, no government funds are being spent because
the lightings and airconditioning continue to be operational
even if there are no religious rituals there. Fourth, the
basement has neither been converted into a Roman Catholic
chapel nor has it been permanently appropriated for the
exclusive use of its faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the masses
has not prejudiced other religions.
No Appropriation of Public Money or Property for the Benefit
of any Church
Here, the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not
appropriated, applied or employed for the sole purpose of
supporting the Roman Catholics.
Further, it has not been converted into a Roman Catholic
chapel for the exclusive use of its faithful contrary to the claim
of Valenciana. Judge Maceren reported that the basement is
also being used as a public waiting area for most of the day
and a meeting place for different employee organizations. The
use of the area for holding masses is limited to lunch break
period from twelve (12) o'clock to one (1) o'clock in the
afternoon. Further, Judge Sagun, Jr. related that masses run
for just a little over thirty (30) minutes. It is, therefore, clear that
no undue religious bias is being committed when the subject
basement is allowed to be temporarily used by the Catholics
to celebrate mass, as the same area can be used by other
groups of people and for other purposes.49 Thus, the
basement of the QC Hall of Justice has remained to be a
public property devoted for public use because the holding of
Catholic masses therein is a mere incidental consequence of
its primary purpose.
Conclusion
Directing the Executive Judges of the RTC and MeTC to
regulate and closely monitor the holding of masses and other
religious practices within the courts does not promote
excessive collaboration between courts and various religions.
On the contrary, this is necessary to ensure that there would
be no excessive entanglement.
To disallow the holding of religious rituals within halls of justice
would set a dangerous precedent and commence a domino
effect. Strict separation, rather than benevolent
neutrality/accommodation, would be the norm. Thus, the
establishment of Shari'a courts, the National Commission for
Muslim Filipinos, and the exception of Muslims from the
provisions of the RPC relative to the crime of bigamy would all
be rendered nugatory because of strict separation. The
exception of members of Iglesia ni Cristo from joining a union
or the non-compulsion recognized in favor of members of the
Jehovah's Witnesses from doing certain gestures during the
flag ceremony, will all go down the drain simply because we
insist on strict separation.
That the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of
Justice may offend non-Catholics is no reason to proscribe it.
Our Constitution ensures and mandates an unconditional
tolerance, without regard to whether those who seek to
profess their faith belong to the majority or to the minority. It is
emphatic in saying that "the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship shall be without
discrimination or preference." Otherwise, accommodation or
tolerance would just be mere lip service.
 5. DENMARK S. V ALMORES vs. DR. CRISTINA
ACHACOSO, in her capacity as Dean of the College
of Medicine, and DR. GIOVANNI CABILDO, Faculty
of the Mindanao State University (G.R. No. 217453)
FACTS: Petitioner Denmark S. Valmores (Valmores) is a
member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, whose
fundamental beliefs include the strict observance of the
Sabbath as a sacred day. As such, petitioner Valmores joins
the faithful in worshipping and resting on Saturday, the
seventh day of the week, and refrains from non-religious
undertakings from sunset of Friday to sunset of Saturday.
Prior to the instant controversy, petitioner Valmores was
enrolled as a first-year student at the MSU-College of
Medicine. Some of petitioner Valmores' classes and
examinations were moved from weekdays to Saturdays. In
one instance, petitioner Valmores was unable to take his
Risto-Pathology laboratory examination held on a Saturday.
Respondent Cabildo was his professor for the said subject.
Despite his request for exemption, no accommodation was
given by either of the respondents. As a result, petitioner
Valmores received a failing grade of 5 for that particular
module and was considered ineligible to retake the exam.
Thereafter, several pastors and officers of the Seventh-day
Adventist Church sent a letter to respondent Achacoso,
requesting for a possible audience with the members of the
MSU school board. In addition, the church, through Pastor
Hanani P. Nietes, issued a Certification in connection with
petitioner Valmores' request for exemption.
Despite the foregoing communications, petitioner Valmores'
requests fell on deaf ears.
Petitioner Valmores elevated the matter before the CHED. In
an Indorsement, the CHED Regional Office referred the
matter directly to the President of MSU as well as respondent
Achacoso and requested that the office be advised of the
action thus taken.
Dr. Muslim, President of MSU, instructed respondent
Achacoso to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum. Despite
the foregoing correspondence, petitioner Valmores' request
still went unheeded.
ISSUE: WON mandamus lies to compel respondents to
enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum in the case of petitioner
Valmores. YES
HELD: In 2010, the CHED institutionalized the framework for
operationalizing Section 5, Article Ill of the 1987 Constitution
vis-a-vis the academic freedom of higher education
institutions (HEis ), pursuant to its statutory power to formulate
policies, priorities, and programs on higher education in both
public and private HEIs.
In the 2010 CHED Memorandum, the CHED laid down
guidelines for the exemption of teachers, personnel, and
students from participating in school or related activities due
to compliance with religious obligations.
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a
ministerial duty by a tribunal, board, officer, or person.48 Case
law requires that the petitioner should have a right to the thing
demanded and that it must be the imperative duty of the
Page 114 of 186
respondent to perform the act required; such duty need not be
absolutely expressed, so long as it is clear.49 In this regard, a
duty is considered ministerial where an officer is required to
perform an act not requiring the exercise of official discretion
or judgment in a given state of facts.50 Conversely, if the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary.
MSU is an HEI created by legislative charter under Republic
Act No. 1387, as amended, and was established "to better
implement the policy of the Government in the intensification
of the education of the Filipino youth, especially among the
Muslims and others belonging to the national minorities."52
Thus, respondents herein, as faculty members of MSU, fall
under the policy-making authority of the CHED and therefore
bound to observe the issuances promulgated by the latter.
At once, a plain reading of the memorandum reveals the
ministerial nature of the duty imposed upon HEIs. Its policy is
crystal clear: a student's religious obligations takes
precedence over his academic responsibilities, consonant
with the constitutional guarantee of free exercise and
enjoyment of religious worship. Accordingly, the CHED
imposed a positive duty on all HEIs to exempt students, as
well as faculty members, from academic activities in case
such activities interfere with their religious obligations.
Although the said memorandum contains the phrase "within
the bounds of school rules and regulations," the same relates
only to the requirement of remedial work, which, based on the
language used, is merely optional on the part of the HEI.
Neither can such phrase be said to have conferred discretion
as the use of the words "shall be enjoined" and "strict
compliance" denote a mandatory duty on the part of the HEI
to excuse its students upon submission of the certification
prescribed in the same memorandum.
Clearly, under the 2010 CHED Memorandum, HEIs do not
possess absolute discretion to grant or deny requests for
exemption of affected students. Instead, the memorandum
only imposes minimum standards should HEIs decide to
require remedial work, i.e., that the same is within the bounds
of school rules and regulations and that the grades of the
students will not be affected.
As a condition for exemption, the 2010 CHED Memorandum
simply requires the submission of "a certification or proof of
attendance/participation duly signed by their pastor, priest,
minister or religious leader for periods of absence from
classes, work or school activities."
The certification submitted to the private respondents needs
little or no interpretation: petitioner Valmores, as a bona fide
member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, is expected to
miss "all his Sabbath x x x classes [and] exams" due to his
observance of the Sabbath day as a day of worship. There is
nothing in the 2010 CHED Memorandum that prohibits the
certification from being issued before the period of absence
from class. Even then, the Certification dated September 15,
2014 is broad enough to cover both past and future Sabbath
days for which petitioner Valmores would be absent.
For these reasons, the Court finds that respondents were duty
bound to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum insofar as it
requires the exemption of petitioner Valmores from academic
responsibilities that conflict with the schedule of his Saturday
worship. Their failure to do so is therefore correctible by
mandamus.
Without more, respondents' bare arguments crumble against
constitutional standards. As discussed above, the Bill of
Rights guarantees citizens the freedom to act on their
individual beliefs and proscribes government intervention
unless necessary to protect its citizens from injury or when
public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience requires it.
Thus, as faculty members of the MSU-College of Medicine,
respondents herein were duty-bound to protect and preserve
petitioner Valmores' religious freedom.
While in some cases the Court has sustained government
regulation of religious rights, the Court fails to see in the
present case how public order and safety will be served by the
denial of petitioner Valmores' request for exemption. Neither
is there any showing that petitioner Valmores' absence from
Saturday classes would be injurious to the rights of others.
Precisely, the 2010 CHED Memorandum was issued to
address such conflicts and prescribes the action to be taken
by HEIs should such circumstance arise.
What is certain, as gathered from the foregoing, is that
respondents' concerted refusal to accommodate petitioner
Valmores rests mainly on extralegal grounds, which cannot,
by no stretch of legal verbiage, defeat the latter's
constitutionally-enshrined rights. That petitioner Valmores is
being made by respondents to choose between honoring his
religious obligations and finishing his education is a patent
infringement of his religious freedoms. As the final bulwark of
fundamental rights, this Court will not allow such violation to
perpetuate any further.
Page 115 of 186
H. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
1. B/GEN. (RET.) FRANCISCO V. GUDANI AND LT.
COL. ALEXANDER F. BALUTAN vs. LT./GEN.
GENEROSO S. SENGA CORONA, AS CHIEF OF
STAFF OF THE CARPIO-MORALES, ARMED
FORCES OF THE CALLEJO, SR., PHILIPPINES, COL.
GILBERTO AZCUNA, JOSE C. ROA AS THE PRE-
TRIAL TINGA, INVESTIGATING OFFICER, THE
CHICO-NAZARIO, PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL
GARCIA, and OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL
(G.R. No. 170165 August 15, 2006)
FACTS: The petitioners are high-ranking officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Both petitioners, Brigadier
General Francisco Gudani (Gen. Gudani) and Lieutenant
Colonel Alexander Balutan (Col. Balutan), belonged to the
Philippine Marines.
Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several senior
officers of the AFP to appear at a public hearing before the
Senate Committee. The hearing was scheduled after topics
concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the
public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating and
the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a
phone conversation between President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo and an official of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) widely reputed as then COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. At the time of the 2004
elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander,
and Col. Balutan a member, of "Joint Task Force Ranao" by
the AFP Southern Command. "Joint Task Force Ranao" was
tasked with the maintenance of peace and order during the
2004 elections in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao
del Sur.
Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan, and AFP Chief of Staff Lieutenant
General Generoso Senga (Gen. Senga) were among the
several AFP officers who received a letter invitation from Sen.
Biazon to attend the hearing.
The Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a
Memorandum. Noting that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had
been invited to attend the Senate Committee hearing, the
Memorandum directed the two officers to attend the hearing.
Conformably, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan filed their
respective requests for travel authority addressed to the PMA
Superintendent.
Gen. Senga sent a letter to Sen. Biazon, informing the senator
that "no approval has been granted by the President to any
AFP officer to appear" before the hearing scheduled on that
day. Nonetheless, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were
present as the hearing started, and they both testified as to
the conduct of the 2004 elections.
Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had
appeared before the Senate Committee "in spite of the fact
that a guidance has been given that a Presidential approval
should be sought prior to such an appearance;" that such
directive was "in keeping with the time[-]honored principle of
the Chain of Command;" and that the two officers "disobeyed
a legal order, in violation of A[rticles of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully
Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to
General Court Martial proceedings x x x" Both Gen. Gudani
and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments before they could travel to Manila to attend the Senate
then. Hearing.

Subsequently, petitioners were charged of violating Articles of It is clear that the basic position of petitioners impinges on
War 65 and 97. these fundamental principles we have discussed. They seek
to be exempted from military justice for having traveled to the
It was from these premises that the present petition for Senate to testify before the Senate Committee against the
certiorari and prohibition was filed. express orders of Gen. Senga, the AFP Chief of Staff. If
petitioners’ position is affirmed, a considerable exception
would be carved from the unimpeachable right of military
ISSUE: WON the petitioners' right to travel and movement can officers to restrict the speech and movement of their juniors.
be restricted by the President (Commander-in-Chief). YES The ruinous consequences to the chain of command and
military discipline simply cannot warrant the Court’s
imprimatur on petitioner’s position.
HELD: The vitality of the tenet that the President is the
commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is most crucial to the
democratic way of life, to civilian supremacy over the military,
and to the general stability of our representative system of
government. The Constitution reposes final authority, control
and supervision of the AFP to the President, a civilian who is
not a member of the armed forces, and whose duties as
commander-in-chief represent only a part of the organic duties
imposed upon the office, the other functions being clearly civil
in nature. Civilian supremacy over the military also
countermands the notion that the military may bypass civilian
authorities, such as civil courts, on matters such as conducting
warrantless searches and seizures.

The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is

denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins with the
simple declaration that "[t]he President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines x x
x"37 Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those
found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause
vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute
authority over the persons and actions of the members of the
armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the
President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of
military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned
under civilian law.

Of possibly less gravitas, but of equal importance, is the

principle that mobility of travel is another necessary restriction
on members of the military. A soldier cannot leave his/her post
without the consent of the commanding officer. The reasons
are self-evident. The commanding officer has to be aware at
all times of the location of the troops under command, so as
to be able to appropriately respond to any exigencies. For the
same reason, commanding officers have to be able to restrict
the movement or travel of their soldiers, if in their judgment,
their presence at place of call of duty is necessary. At times,
this may lead to unsentimental, painful consequences, such
as a soldier being denied permission to witness the birth of his
first-born, or to attend the funeral of a parent. Yet again,
military life calls for considerable personal sacrifices during
the period of conscription, wherein the higher duty is not to self
but to country.

Indeed, the military practice is to require a soldier to obtain

permission from the commanding officer before he/she may
leave his destination. A soldier who goes from the properly
appointed place of duty or absents from his/her command,
guard, quarters, station, or camp without proper leave is
subject to punishment by court-martial. It is even clear from
the record that petitioners had actually requested for travel
authority from the PMA in Baguio City to Manila, to attend the
Senate Hearing. Even petitioners are well aware that it was
necessary for them to obtain permission from their superiors

Page 116 of 186

 2. LEAVE DIVISION, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICES-Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),
vs. WILMA SALVACION P. HEUSDENS, Clerk IV
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tagum City (A.M. No.
P-11-2927 ; December 13, 2011 [Formerly A.M. OCA
IPI No. 10-3532-P])
FACTS: This case stemmed from the leave application for
foreign travel sent through mail by Wilma Salvacion P.
Heusdens (respondent), Staff Clerk IV of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Tagum City, Davao del Norte.
Records disclose that on July 10, 2009, the Employees Leave
Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), received respondent’s leave application
for foreign travel from September 11, 2009 to October 11,
2009. Respondent left for abroad without waiting for the result
of her application. It turned out that no travel authority was
issued in her favor because she was not cleared of all her
accountabilities as evidenced by the Supreme Court
Certificate of Clearance. Respondent reported back to work
on October 19, 2009.
The OCA, in its Memorandum dated November 26, 2009,
recommended the disapproval of respondent’s leave
application. It further advised that respondent be directed to
make a written explanation of her failure to secure authority to
travel abroad in violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003. Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno approved the OCA recommendation.
Respondent admitted having travelled overseas without the
required travel authority. She explained that it was not her
intention to violate the rules as she, in fact, mailed her leave
application which was approved by her superior, Judge Arlene
Lirag-Palabrica. She honestly believed that her leave
application would be eventually approved by the Court.
The OCA found respondent to have violated OCA Circular No.
49-2003 for failing to secure the approval of her application for
travel authority.
Hence, the OCA recommended that the administrative
complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter
and that respondent be deemed guilty for violation of OCA
Circular No. 49-2003 and be reprimanded with a warning that
a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future would
be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE: WON the requirements under OCA Circular No. 49-
2003 on vacation leave to be spent abroad unduly restricts a
citizen’s right to travel guaranteed by Section 6, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.
HELD: NO.
Section 6 of Article III of the 1987 Constitition reads:
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law. [Emphases
supplied]
Page 117 of 186
The exercise of one’s right to travel or the freedom to move
from one place to another, as assured by the Constitution, is
not absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and inherent
limitations regulating the right to travel. Section 6 itself
provides that "neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health, as may be provided by law."
Inherent limitations on the right to travel are those that
naturally emanate from the source. These are very basic and
are built-in with the power.
Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all courts
and the personnel thereof.
With respect to the power of the Court, Section 5 (6), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the "Supreme Court
shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof." This provision empowers the Court to
oversee all matters relating to the effective supervision and
management of all courts and personnel under it. Recognizing
this mandate, Memorandum Circular No. 26 of the Office of
the President, dated July 31, 1986, considers the Supreme
Court exempt and with authority to promulgate its own rules
and regulations on foreign travels. Thus, the Court came out
with OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (B).
Where a person joins the Judiciary or the government in
general, he or she swears to faithfully adhere to, and abide
with, the law and the corresponding office rules and
regulations. These rules and regulations, to which one
submits himself or herself, have been issued to guide the
government officers and employees in the efficient
performance of their obligations. When one becomes a public
servant, he or she assumes certain duties with their
concomitant responsibilities and gives up some rights like the
absolute right to travel so that public service would not be
prejudiced.
As earlier stated, with respect to members and employees of
the Judiciary, the Court issued OCA Circular No. 49-2003 to
regulate their foreign travel in an unofficial capacity. Such
regulation is necessary for the orderly administration of
justice. If judges and court personnel can go on leave and
travel abroad at will and without restrictions or regulations,
there could be a disruption in the administration of justice. A
situation where the employees go on mass leave and travel
together, despite the fact that their invaluable services are
urgently needed, could possibly arise. For said reason,
members and employees of the Judiciary cannot just invoke
and demand their right to travel.
To permit such unrestricted freedom can result in disorder, if
not chaos, in the Judiciary and the society as well. In a
situation where there is a delay in the dispensation of justice,
litigants can get disappointed and disheartened. If their
expectations are frustrated, they may take the law into their
own hands which results in public disorder undermining public
safety. In this limited sense, it can even be considered that the
restriction or regulation of a court personnel’s right to travel is
a concern for public safety, one of the exceptions to the non-
impairment of one’s constitutional right to travel.
Given the exacting standard expected from each individual
called upon to serve in the Judiciary, it is imperative that every
court employee comply with the travel notification and
authority requirements as mandated by OCA Circular No. 49-
2003. A court employee who plans to travel abroad must file
his leave application prior to his intended date of travel with
sufficient time allotted for his application to be processed and
approved first by the Court. He cannot leave the country
without his application being approved, much less assume
that his leave application would be favorably acted upon. In
the case at bench, respondent should have exercised
prudence and asked for the status of her leave application
before leaving for abroad.
WHEREFORE, respondent Wilma Salvacion P. Heusdens,
Clerk IV Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tagum City, is hereby
ADMONISHED for traveling abroad without any travel
authority in violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003, with a
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense
would be dealt with more severely.
NOTE: DISSENTING OPINION CARPIO, J.:
(1) Respondent’s leave application for travel abroad was
received by the OCA on 10 July 2009, or two months before
her intended leave from 11 September 2009 to 11 October
2009. However, it was only on 26 November 2009, or after
respondent’s intended leave, that the OCA issued a
memorandum recommending disapproval of her leave
application. Furthermore, it was only in a letter dated 6
January 2010 that the OCA informed respondent of the
disapproval of her leave application. Clearly, the OCA’s letter
dated 6 January 2010 disapproving the leave application
came too late. Although OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not
provide for the time frame within which to act on the leave
application, it is understood that it should be prior to the
applicant’s intended leave. The requirement that the leave
application be submitted to the OCA at least two weeks before
the intended leave for travel is to give sufficient time for its
approval or disapproval before the intended leave.
SCSLA’s conformity, such requirement has no legal basis.
The OCA does not have jurisdiction to require such clearance
because that would be tantamount to making the Court a
collecting agent of the SCSLA which is a private association.
Indeed, the OCA has no right to deny a court employee’s
constitutional right to travel just to enforce collection of the
SCSLA’s loans to its members. There is no law prohibiting a
person from traveling abroad just because he has an existing
debt or financial obligation. Requiring the court employee
clearance from the SCSLA is no different from requiring the
court employee to secure a clearance from his or her creditor
banks before he or she can travel abroad. That would unduly
restrict a citizen’s right to travel which is guaranteed by
Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Although the constitutional right to travel is not absolute, it can
only be restricted in the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The SCSLA clearance is not required by any law before a
court employee can travel abroad. The SCSLA clearance is
not even specifically required under OCA Circular No. 49-
2003. Clearly, respondent has submitted to the OCA all the
requirements for her leave application two months prior to her
intended leave. Thus, respondent’s leave application was
deemed approved as of 15 July 2009 pursuant to Section 49,
Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave and the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292.

Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292, a

leave application should be acted upon within five (5) working
days after its receipt, otherwise the leave application is
deemed approved.

In this case, where the leave application was received by the

OCA two months before the intended leave but was only acted
upon after the intended leave. Thus, respondent’s leave of
absence was deemed approved as of 15 July 2009 pursuant
to Section 49, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave.

(2) The majority states that although respondent submitted her

leave application for foreign travel, she failed to comply with
the clearance and accountability requirements because she
"failed to secure clearance from the Supreme Court Savings
and Loan Association (SCSLA) where she had an outstanding
loan." Thus, since OCA Circular No. 49-2003 specifically
provides that "no action shall be taken on requests for travel
authority with incomplete requirements," the majority
rationalizes that respondent should have expected that her
leave application would be disapproved.

I disagree with the majority’s view that clearance from the

SCSLA is required before a court employee can exercise his
or her constitutional right to travel abroad. The SCSLA is a
private association with private funds, even if some of its
investors are Supreme Court officials. The OCA has no power
to enforce the collection of loans extended by a private lender,
under pain of denying a constitutional right of a citizen if he
does not secure clearance from the private lender. Although
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 provides that "clearance as to
money and property accountability" is one of the requirements
to be submitted, this refers to accountability to the
government, not to a private company like the SCSLA. Even
if the OCA’s Certificate of Clearance Form requires the

Page 118 of 186

 3. OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-OFFICE
OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE
IGNACIO B. MACARINE, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Gen. Luna, Surigao del Norte (A.M. No. MTJ-
10-1770; July 18, 2012 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No.
10-2255-MTJ)
FACTS: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) filed the
present administrative case against Judge Ignacio B.
Macarine (respondent) for violation of OCA Circular No. 49-
2003.
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires that all foreign travels of
judges and court personnel, regardless of the number of days,
must be with prior permission from the Court. A travel authority
must be secured from the OCA Judges must submit the
following requirements:
(1.) application or letter-request addressed to the Court
Administrator stating the purpose of the travel abroad;
(2.) application for leave covering the period of the travel
abroad, favorably recommended by the Executive Judge; and
(3.) certification from the Statistics Division, Court
Management Office, OCA as to the condition of the docket.
The complete requirements should be submitted to and
received by the OCA at least two weeks before the intended
time of travel. No action shall be taken on requests for travel
authority with incomplete requirements.
Judges and personnel who shall leave the country without
travel authority issued by the OCA shall be subject to
disciplinary action.
On August 13, 2009, the respondent wrote then Court
Administrator, now Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez,
requesting for authority to travel to Hongkong with his family
for the period of September 10 - 14, 2009 where he would
celebrate his 65th birthday. The respondent stated that his
travel abroad shall be charged to his annual forced leave.
However, he did not submit the corresponding application for
leave. For his failure to submit the complete requirements, his
request for authority to travel remained unacted upon. The
respondent proceeded with his travel abroad without the
required travel authority from the OCA.
On January 28, 2010, the respondent was informed by the
OCA that his leave of absence for the period of September 9-
15, 2009 had been disapproved and his travel considered
unauthorized by the Court.
In his letter-explanation, the respondent narrated that his
daughter, a nurse working in New Jersey, USA, gave him a
trip to Hongkong as a gift for his 65th birthday. In the first week
of September 2009, he received a call from his daughter that
she had already booked him, together with his wife and two
sons, in a hotel in Hongkong from September 13 to 15, 2009.
They flew in to Manila from Surigao City on September 9,
2009, intending to prepare the necessary papers for his
authority to travel at the Supreme Court the following day.
However, sensing time constraint and thinking of the futility of
completing the requirements before their scheduled flight, he
opted not to immediately complete the requirements and
simply went ahead with their travel abroad. He thought of
submitting his compliance upon his return to Manila. He
acknowledged his mistake and regretted his failure to comply
Page 119 of 186
with OCA Circular No. 49-2003. He promised not to commit
the same infraction again. He further requested for
reconsideration of the OCA’s intended action to deduct his
salary corresponding to the seven (7) days that he was
absent, instead of charging his absences to his leave credits.
OCA found the respondent guilty of violation of OCA Circular
No. 49-2003 for traveling out of the country without filing the
necessary application for leave and without first securing a
travel authority from the Court.
ISSUE: WON OCA Circular No. 49-2003 violates Section 6 of
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. NO
HELD: True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the
Constitution.1âwphi1 However, the exercise of such right is
not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
allows restrictions on one’s right to travel provided that such
restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health as may be provided by law. This, however,
should by no means be construed as limiting the Court’s
inherent power of administrative supervision over lower
courts. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely
regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges
and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel
abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person from
doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or direct according
to rule.
To ensure management of court dockets and to avoid
disruption in the administration of justice, OCA Circular No.
49-2003 requires a judge who wishes to travel abroad to
submit, together with his application for leave of absence duly
recommended for approval by his Executive Judge, a
certification from the Statistics Division, Court Management
Office of the OCA, as to the condition of his docket, based on
his Certificate of Service for the month immediately preceding
the date of his intended travel, that he has decided and
resolved all cases or incidents within three (3) months from
date of submission, pursuant to Section 15(1) and (2), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
For traveling abroad without having been officially allowed by
the Court, the respondent is guilty of violation of OCA Circular
No. 49-2003.
The Court had in several instances refrained from imposing
the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating facts, such
as the employee’s length of service, acknowledgement of his
or her infractions and feelings of remorse for the same,
advanced age, family circumstances, and other humanitarian
and equitable considerations.
In the present case, the respondent regretted his failure to
comply with the requirements of OCA Circular No. 49-2003.
He acknowledged his mistake and promised not to commit the
same infraction in the future.
We consider the outlined circumstances as mitigating.
Following judicial precedents, the respondent deserves some
degree of leniency in imposing upon him the appropriate
penalty.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Ignacio B. Macarine,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Gen. Luna, Surigao del Norte, is
hereby given the ADMONITION that he acted irresponsibly
when he opted not to immediately secure a travel authority
and is saved only from the full force that his violation carries
by the attendant mitigating circumstances. He is also
WARNED that the commission of a similar violation in the
future will merit a more severe penalty.
NOTE: DISSENTING AND CONCURRING OPINION
SERENO, J.:
I agree with the imposition of a penalty on Judge Macarine for
his failure to (a) file an application for leave and (b) submit a
report on the conditions of the docket pending in his sala prior
to his travel abroad. However, I do not agree that he should
be penalized for his failure to request a travel authority from
the OCA.
The policy of the Court requiring judges and court personnel
to secure a travel authority must be re-examined.
Requiring judges and court personnel prior submission of a
request for travel authority impairs their right to travel, a
constitutional right that cannot be unduly curtailed. During the
approved leave of absence of a judge or court personnel, he
or she should be accorded the liberty to travel within the
country or abroad, as any other citizen, without this Court
imposing a requirement to secure prior permission therefor.
Thus, Judge Macarine should not be held administratively
liable for his failure to secure a permit to travel prior to his
intended departure, as such action would amount to an
unjustified restriction to his constitutional right to travel.
However, on account of his failure to file (a) an application for
leave and (b) a report on his caseload prior to his travel
abroad, I agree that he should be admonished.
Page 120 of 186
4. Marcos v. Manglapus 177 SCRA 669, G.R. No. 88211
(1989)
FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed
from the presidency via the non-violent “people power”
revolution and was forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C.
Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a
revolutionary government.
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering
the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time
when the stability of government is threatened from various
directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of
Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats
& following supervening events listed as follows:
• The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political
leaders of Mr. Marcos
• the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel
troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos
loyalists"
• the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to
surreptitiously return from Hawii with mercenaries
aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms
dealer Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987
• On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one
of the major players in the February Revolution, led
a failed coup that left scores of people, both
combatants and civilians, dead signifying a split in
the ranks of the military establishment that
threatened civilian supremacy over military and
brought to the fore the realization that civilian
government could be at the mercy of a fractious
military
• communist insurgency and the seccessionist
movement in Mindanao to the extent that the
communists have set up a parallel government of
their own on the areas they effectively control while
the separatist are virtually free to move about in
armed bands
• The accumulated foreign debt, and
• the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos
and his cronies left the economy devastated
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to
order the respondents to issue them their travel documents
and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s
decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines.
Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the
country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the
decision was made in the interest of national security, public
safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President
acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their
right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal
protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of
their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of
the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return to
the Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of
the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law.
Furthermore, they contend that the President is without power
to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a
court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor may
the President impair their right to travel because no law has
authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before
the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency
of the government, there must be legislation to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the
right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines
is guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each
state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:
Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State
shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject
to any restrictions except those which are provided
by law, are necessary to protect national security,
public order (order public), public health or morals or
the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent
with the other rights recognized in the present
Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to
enter his own country.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the President has the power under the
Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the
Marcose’s to the Philippines poses a serious threat to
Page 121 of 186
national interest and welfare and decided to bar their
return.
HELD: No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
1. The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re
flexible depending on the circumstances. The request of the
Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to
certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present
one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately
addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President
which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty
residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare.
In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to
determine whether it must be granted or denied.
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not
the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or
within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to
return to one’s country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the
right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode
within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and
the right to enter one’s country as separate and distinct rights.
The Declaration speaks of the “right to freedom of movement
and residence within the borders of each state” Art. 13(l)
separately from the “right to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his country.” Art. 13(2). On the other
hand, the Covenant guarantees the “right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence” Art. 12(l)
and the right to “be free to leave any country, including his
own.” Art. 12(2) which rights may be restricted by such laws
as “are necessary to protect national security, public order,
public health or morals or enter qqqs own country” of which
one cannot be “arbitrarily deprived.” Art. 12(4). It would
therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the
right to return to one’s country in the same context as those
pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights
specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only
of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as
a generally accepted principle of international law and, under
our Constitution, is part of the law of the land Art. II, Sec. 2 of
the Constitution. However, it is distinct and separate from the
right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e.,
against being “arbitrarily deprived” thereof Art. 12 (4).
Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact
what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
“executive power.” Corollarily, the powers of the President
cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive
power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general
welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights
of certain individuals. The power involved is the President’s
residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It
is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the
people.
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that
“the prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the
people” and that “the maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of
the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the
people of the blessings of democracy.” Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.
is of common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of
judicial notice.
2. The question for the court to determine is whether or not
there exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it
was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses
in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in
her decision. The supervening events that happened before
her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive
measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection
of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the

President’s powers as protector of the peace. The power of
Fernan, Concurring
the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of • The president’s power is not fixed. Limits would depend on
emergency or to leading the State against external and the imperatives of events and not on abstract theories of law.
internal threats to its existence. The President is not only We are undergoing a critical time and the current problem can
clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but only be answerable by the President.
is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of
maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility • Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear &
in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide present danger. Thus, it’s the executive’s responsibility &
discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential obligation to prevent a grave & serious threat to its safety from
duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the arising.
relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-
• We can’t sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political
chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-
& economic gains to give in to Marcos’ wish to die in the
chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to
country. Compassion must give way to the other state
exclude the President’s exercising as Commander-in- Chief
interests.
powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial
law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and
security. Cruz, Dissenting

The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and
pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-
organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in
Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban
terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police
officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The
documented history of the efforts of the Marcose’s and their
followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this
ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the
Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the
violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.
• As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ right to return, live &
die in his own country. It is a right guaranteed by the Consti to
all individuals, whether patriot, homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.
• Military representatives failed to show that Marcos’ return
would pose a threat to national security. Fears were mere
conjectures.
• Residual powers – but the executive’s powers were outlined
to limit her powers & not expand.

The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded Paras, Dissenting
from taking pre- emptive action against threats to its existence
if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become • AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to
serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of impair Marcos’ right to return to the Philippines. .
the duty of government. The preservation of the State the
• Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that one
fruition of the people’s sovereignty is an obligation in the
dies, he/she should be buried w/in 10 days.
highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend
the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, • Untenable that without a legislation, right to travel is absolute
cannot shirk from that responsibility. & state is powerless to restrict it. It’s w/in police power of the
state to restrict this right if national security, public
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only
safety/health demands that such be restricted. It can’t be
now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by
the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and absolute & unlimited all the time. It can’t be arbitrary &
irrational.
their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still
here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, • No proof that Marcos’ return would endanger national
while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to security or public safety. Fears are speculative & military
speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed admits that it’s under control. Filipinos would know how to
away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We handle Marcos’ return.
cannot ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on
the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the
Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and
is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its
attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy

Page 122 of 186

Padilla, Dissenting 4.1 Marcos vs Manglapus (G.R. No. 88211, October 27,
1989)
Sarmiento, Dissenting

President’s determination that Marcos’ return would threaten

national security should be agreed upon by the court. Such
threat must be clear & present.
FACTS: In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court
by a vote of eight to seven, dismissed the petition, after finding
that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion in determining that the return of former President
Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest and
welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On
September 28, 1989, Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.

President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in

the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of
Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for
the tranquility and order of the state and society, she did not
allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in the
Philippines.

A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners

raising the following arguments:

Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as

citizens to return to their country of birth and all other rights
guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos. The President
has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has,
she had exercised it arbitrarily. There is no basis for barring
the return of the family of former President Marcos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the

Marcoses be allowed to return in the Philippines be granted.

HELD: No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion

for Reconsideration denied because of lack of merit.

Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant

reconsideration. Factual scenario during the time Court
rendered its decision has not changed. The threats to the
government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been
viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to
have ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino
“illegal” claiming that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal
president.

President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of

executive power. Enumerations are merely for specifying
principal articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest to
flow from general grant that power, interpreted in conformity
with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton). Executive
unlike Congress can exercise power from sources not
enumerates so long as not forbidden by constitutional text
(Myers vs. US). This does not amount to dictatorship.
Amendment No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of
legislation whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino with
implied powers. It is within Aquino’s power to protect &
promote interest & welfare of the people. She bound to comply
w/ that duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily

Page 123 of 186

 5. SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN
(SPARK) vs QUEZON CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY
MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, AS
REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, AND
NAVOTAS CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOHN
REY TIANGCO (G.R. No. 225442, August 08, 2017)
FACTS: Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several
local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly
implement their curfew ordinances on minors through police
operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."
Among those local governments that implemented curfew
ordinances were respondents:
(a) Navotas City - "Nagtatakda ng 'Curfew' ng mga
Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong
Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila,";
(b) City of Manila - "An Ordinance Declaring the
Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00A.M. of the Following
Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and
Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age;
Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other
Purposes"; and
(c) Quezon City - "An Ordinance Setting for a
Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from
10:00 P.M. to 5:00A.M., Providing Penalties for
Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other
Purposes".
Petitioners, spearheaded by SPARK - an association of young
adults and minors for the protection of the rights and welfare
of the youth and minors - filed this present petition, arguing
that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because
they:
(a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine;
(b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew
hours;
(c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right
to travel without substantive due process; and
(d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right
in rearing the youth without substantive due process.
Petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement as there are no
detailed standards on how law enforcers should apprehend
and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew violators
since law enforcer's apprehension depends only on his
physical assessment, and, thus, subjective.
Likewise, although the curfew ordinances exempt working
students or students with evening class, they contend that the
lists of exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of
legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be out
at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate
activities of minors during curfew hours.
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances:
(a) are unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the
right to liberty and the right to travel without
substantive due process; and
Page 124 of 186
(b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being
narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear
no reasonable relation to their purpose.
Furthermore, petitioners claim that Section 4 of Manila
Ordinance contravenes Section RA 9344 given that the cited
curfew provision imposes on minors the penalties of
imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition.
Lastly, there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews
contrary to the parents' prerogative to impose them in the
exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the
youth. In this regard, they suggest massive street lighting
programs, installation of CCTVs (closed-circuit televisions) in
public streets, and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as
other viable means of protecting children and preventing
crimes at night. They further opine that the government can
impose more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental
counseling and education seminars informing the parents of
the reasons behind the curfew, and that imprisonment is too
harsh a penalty for parents who allowed their children to be
out during curfew hours.
ISSUE: whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional.
HELD The petition is partly granted.
A. Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
A direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
especially set out in the petition." This Court is tasked to
resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at
the first instance if it is of paramount importance and
immediately affects the social, economic, and moral well-
being of the people," as in this case. Hence, petitioners' direct
resort to the Court is justified.
Requisites of Judicial Review. - (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case." In this case, respondents assail the
existence of the first two (2) requisites.
Actual Case or Controversy.
This Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable
controversy in this case given the evident clash of the parties'
legal claims, particularly on whether the Curfew Ordinances
impair the minors' and parents' constitutional rights, and
whether the Manila Ordinance goes against the provisions of
RA 9344.
Legal Standing.
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce
Villegas has legal standing to raise the issue affecting the
minor's right to travel, because: (a) she was still a minor at the
time the petition was filed before this Court, and, hence, a
proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged,
she travels from Manila to Quezon City at night after school
and is, thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by virtue of
the Curfew Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne
Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel
Baccutan, and Mark Leo Delos Reyes admitted in the petition
that they are all of legal age, and therefore, beyond the
ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of
the Curfew Ordinances, hence has no legal standing to raise
the issue, for which they could base any direct injury as a
consequence thereof.
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and,
consequently, has no legal personality to bring an action in
court. Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK
still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was authorized
by its members who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances,
i.e., the minors, to file this case on their behalf.
Hence, except Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required
personal interest in the controversy. However, Clarissa has
standing only on the issue of the alleged violation of the
minors' right to travel, but not on the alleged violation of the
parents' right.
Accordingly, this case is of overarching significance to the
public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural
rules, including, among others, the standing requirement.
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances
are void for vagueness. They claim that the lack of procedural
guidelines in these issuances led to the questioning of
petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even though they were
already of legal age. They maintain that the enforcing
authorities apprehended the suspected curfew offenders
based only on their physical appearances and, thus, acted
arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded that the
Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the
age of the child, they submit that nowhere does the said
ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or
identification of the child to show his age.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application.
It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially
the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle."
They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the
subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the
ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any
ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew
Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the
age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus, without
any correlation to any vague legal provision, the Curfew
Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void for
vagueness doctrine.
While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly
state these parameters, law enforcement agents are still
bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory
law when implementing ordinances.
Page 125 of 186
Note that RA 10630 (the law that amended RA 9344) repeals
all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law. Pursuant to
Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630, minors
caught in violation of curfew ordinances are children at risk
and, therefore, covered by its provisions.
B. Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their natural
and primary right in the rearing of the youth without
substantive due process.
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the
State's policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of
their children. Parents are not only given the privilege of
exercising their authority over their children; they are equally
obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously.
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, the State
may act to promote legitimate interests." Thus, "in cases in
which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to
public safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these
legitimate state interests may override the parents' qualified
right to control the upbringing of their children."
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to
aid parents in the moral development of their children, and,
thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their
parental obligations.
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew
Ordinances apply only when the minors are not - whether
actually or constructively - accompanied by their parents.
Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over their
children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to
supervise them. The Curfew Ordinances only amount to a
minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right
to bring up his or her child.
C. Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew
Ordinances based on the minors' right to travel. They claim
that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which,
therefore, necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny.
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the
overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners have not
claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or any
inhibition of speech-related conduct. This Court explained that
"the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial
kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial
challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.
This Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth
analysis in this case, there being no claimed curtailment of
free speech. On the contrary, however, this Court finds proper
to examine the assailed regulations under the strict scrutiny
test.
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a
fundamental right under Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
 the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law.
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to
move freely from the Philippines to other countries or within
the Philippines. It is a right embraced within the general
concept of liberty (such as to exercise the right to education,
free expression, assembly, association, and religion.)
As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may impose
limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1)
serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health; and (2) are provided by law.
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically
the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile
crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The
restriction on the minor's movement and activities within the
confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity during
the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the
minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and
criminal activities.
As to the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be
provided by law," our legal system is replete with laws
emphasizing the State's duty to afford special protection to
children, particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD
603, which explicitly authorizes local government units,
through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for
children.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply
solely to minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In
this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and
enjoy constitutional rights, but the exercise of these rights is
not co-extensive as those of adults.
The US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the
differential treatment of the minors' constitutional rights. These
are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature
manner; and third, the importance of the parental role in child
rearing:
Three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the
reasonableness of classifications
1. Strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i)
interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including
the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii)
burdens suspect classes.
2. Intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does
not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires
heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on
gender and legitimacy.
3. Rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered
by the first two tests.
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right under
the Constitution, the strict scrutiny test is the applicable test.
a. Compelling State Interest.
Respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate
objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised
minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas,
so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their exposure to
Page 126 of 186
potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal pressure
and influences which may even include themselves.
The local governments of Quezon City and Manila presented
statistical data in their respective pleadings showing the
alarming prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either as
victims or perpetrators, in their respective localities. Based on
these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact
curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power under the
general welfare clause.
b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective
provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon City
Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the
Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions, namely:
(a) Minors accompanied by their parents, family
members of legal age, or guardian;
(b) Those running lawful errands such as buying of
medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for
emergency purposes and the like;
(c) Night school students and those who, by virtue of
their employment, are required in the streets or
outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and
(d) Those working at night.
The Navotas Ordinance, to wit:
(a) Minors with night classes;
(b) Those working at night;
(c) Those who attended a school or church activity,
in coordination with a specific barangay office;
(d) Those traveling towards home during the curfew
hours;
(e) Those running errands under the supervision of
their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age
having authority over them
(f) Those involved in accidents, calamities, and the
like, and
(g) during these specific occasions: Christmas eve,
Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the
night before the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta,
All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good
Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not
narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate and
therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors'
fundamental freedoms.
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church
activities, it hinders them from engaging in legitimate non-
school or non-church activities in the streets or going to and
from such activities; thus, their freedom of association is
effectively curtailed.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the
curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively
prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities
(such as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying adults,
Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate
avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or attend city
council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their
right to peaceably assemble and to free expression.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be
completely stricken down since their exceptions, which are
essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the
curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of the
above-mentioned fundamental rights.
On the other hand, the list of exceptions under the Quezon
City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect
the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion,
travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of
exceptions guarantees the protection of these aforementioned
rights. These items uphold the right of association by enabling
minors to attend both official and extra-curricular activities not
only of their school or church but also of other legitimate
organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and of free
expression are also covered by these items given that the
minors' attendance in the official activities of civic or religious
organizations are allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in
the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of religion
is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance
Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions
to the minor based on the age and frequency of violations, to
wit:
SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any
child or youth violating this ordinance shall be
sanctioned/punished as follows:
(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and
below, the sanction shall consist of a REPRIMAND
for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the
offender's parent, guardian or person exercising
parental authority.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is
likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as
it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing
disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor.
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based
programs and admonition are clearly not penalties - as they
are not punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on
the rights and conduct of the minor. To be clear, their
objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and
for the latter to understand, what actions must be avoided so
as to aid him in his future conduct.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably
constitute penalties - as provided in our various criminal and
administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of
RA 9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances
have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is,
that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to
promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the
concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has
passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the
only issuance out of the three which provides for the least
restrictive means to achieve this interest.
In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for
adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise
their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours,
and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's purpose.
Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "those accompanied
by their parents or guardian", has also been construed to
include parental permission as a constructive form of
accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception to the
curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left
to the discretion of the local government unit. In fine, the
Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional
and thus, null and void, while the Quezon City Ordinance is
declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with
this Decision.

(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and

under Eighteen (18) years of age, the
sanction/penalty shall be: For the FIRST OFFENSE,
Reprimand and Admonition; For the SECOND
OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a
warning about the legal impostitions in case of a third
and subsequent violation; and For the THIRD AND
SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one
(1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine of TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the
discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, That the
complaint shall be filed by the Punong Barangay with
the office of the City Prosecutor.

Thus springs the question of whether local governments could

validly impose on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a) community
service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d)
imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344,
as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors for
status offenses such as curfew violations, viz.: what they
prohibit is the imposition of penalties on minors for violations
of these regulations.

In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community

service is a valid form of intervention program that a local
government (such as Navotas City in this case) could
appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of
minors.

Page 127 of 186

 6. EFRAIM C. GENUINO, ERWIN F. GENUINO and
SHERYL G. SEE, et.al, vs. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in
her capacity as Secretary of Justice, and RI CARDO V.
PARAS III, in his capacity as Chief State Counsel,
CRISTINO L. NAGUIAT, JR. and the BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION
FACTS: On March 19, 1998, then DOJ Secretary Silvestre H.
Bello III issued DOJ Circular No. 17, prescribing rules and
regulations governing the issuance of Hold Departure Orders
(HDO). The said issuance was intended to restrain the
indiscriminate issuance of HDOs which impinge on the
people's right to travel.
On April 23, 2007, former DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez
issued DOJ Circular No. 18, prescribing rules and regulations
governing the issuance and implementation of watchlist
orders. In particular, it provides for the power of the DOJ
Secretary to issue a Watchlist Order (WLO) against persons
with criminal cases pending preliminary investigation or
petition for review before the DOJ. Further, it states that the
DOJ Secretary may issue an Allow Departure Order (ADO) to
a person subject of a WLO who intends to leave the country
for some exceptional reasons. On May 25, 2010, then Acting
DOJ Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued the assailed DOJ
Circular No. 41, consolidating DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18,
which will govern the issuance and implementation of HDOs,
WLOs, and ADOs.
After the expiration of GMA's term as President of the
Republic of the Philippines and her subsequent election as
Pampanga representative, criminal complaints were filed
against her before the DOJ.
Following the filing of criminal complaints, De Lima issued
DOJ WLO No. 2011-573 against GMA and Miguel Arroyo on
October 27, 2011, with a validity period of 60 days, or until
December 26, 2011, unless sooner terminated or otherwise
extended.
In three separate letters dated October 20, 2011, October 21,
2011, and October 24, 2011, GMA requested for the issuance
of an ADO, pursuant to Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 41, so
that she may be able to seek medical attention from medical
specialists abroad for her hypoparathyroidism and metabolic
bone mineral disorder. She mentioned six different countries
where she intends to undergo consultations and treatments:
United States of America, Germany, Singapore, Italy, Spain
and Austria. She likewise undertook to return to the
Philippines, once her treatment abroad is completed, and
participate in the proceedings before the DOJ.
To determine whether GMA's condition necessitates medical
attention abroad, the Medical Abstract prepared by Dr. Mirasol
was referred to then Secretary of the Department of Health,
Dr. Enrique Ona (Dr. Ona) for his expert opinion as the chief
government physician. Dr. Ona visited GMA at her residence
in La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City. After the visit, Dr. Ona
noted that "Mrs. Arroyo is recuperating reasonably well after
having undergone a series of three major operations.
GMA Filed for TRO
On November 8, 2011, before the resolution of her application
for ADO, GMA filed the present Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Prayer for
the Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
to annul and set aside DOJ Circular No. 41 and WLOs issued
against her for allegedly being unconstitutional.
Page 128 of 186
Also, on November 8, 2011, De Lima issued an Order,
denying GMA's application for an ADO because based on the
medical condition of Secretary Ona, (1) there appears to be
no urgent and immediate medical emergency situation for
Applicant to seek medical treatment abroad; (2) Applicant lists
several countries as her destination, some of which were not
for purposes of medical consultation, but for attending
conferences; (3) while the Applicant's undertaking is to return
to the Philippines upon the completion of her medical
treatment, this means that her return will always depend on
said treatment, which, based on her presentation of her
condition, could last indefinitely; (4) Applicant has chosen for
her destination five (5) countries, namely, Singapore,
Germany, Austria, Spain and Italy, with which the Philippines
has no existing extradition treaty.
SC Issued TRO
The Court likewise resolved to issue a TRO in the
consolidated petitions, enjoining the respondents from
enforcing or implementing DOJ Circular No. 41 and WLOs
subject to the following conditions, to wit: (i) The petitioners
shall post a cash bond of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00)
payable to this Court within five (5) days from notice hereof.
Failure to post the bond within the aforesaid period will result
in the automatic lifting of the temporary restraining order; (ii)
The petitioners shall appoint a legal representative common
to both of them who will receive subpoena, orders and other
legal processes on their behalf during their absence. The
petitioners shall submit the name of the legal representative,
also within five (5) days from notice hereof; and (iii) If there is
a Philippine embassy or consulate in the place where they will
be traveling, the petitioners shall inform said embassy or
consulate by personal appearance or by phone of their
whereabouts at all times;
On the very day of the issuance of the TRO, the petitioners
tendered their compliance with the conditions set forth in the
Resolution.
At around 8:00 p.m. on the same day, the petitioners
proceeded to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA),
with an aide-de-camp and a private nurse, to take their flights
to Singapore. However, the BI officials at NAIA refused to
process their travel documents which ultimately resulted to
them not being able to join their flights.
On November 17, 2011, GMA, through counsel, filed an
Urgent Motion for Respondents to Cease and Desist from
Preventing Petitioner GMA from Leaving the Country. She
strongly emphasized that the TRO issued by the Court was
immediately executory and that openly defying the same is
tantamount to gross disobedience and resistance to a lawful
order of the Court.
Respondent’s Contentions
On November 16, 2011, the respondents filed a Consolidated
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Lift TRO, praying
that the Court reconsider and set aside the TRO issued in the
consolidated petitions until they are duly heard on the merits.
While the petitioners anchor their right in esse on the right to
travel under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the
said right is not absolute. One of the limitations on the right to
travel is DOJ Circular No. 41, which was issued pursuant to
the rule-making powers of the DOJ in order to keep individuals
under preliminary investigation within the jurisdiction of the
Philippine criminal justice system.
On November 18, 2011, the Court issued a Resolution,
requiring De Lima to show cause why she should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt of court for failure
to comply with the TRO. She was likewise ordered to
immediately comply with the TRO by allowing the petitioners
to leave the country. At the same time, the Court denied the
Consolidated Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Lift
TRO dated November 16, 2011 filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General.
Petitioner’s Contention
Petitioner opined that DOI Circular No. 41 was validly issued
pursuant to the agency's rule-making powers provided in
Sections 1 and 3, Book IV, Title III Chapter 1 of E.O. No. 292
and Section 50, Chapter 11, Book IV of the mentioned Code.
ISSUE NO. 1
Whether or not the DOJ has the power to issue a Hold
Departure Order
HELD NO. 1
NO.
Guided by the foregoing disquisition, the Court is in quandary
of identifying the authority from which the DOJ believed its
power to restrain the right to travel emanates. To begin with,
there is no law particularly providing for the authority of the
secretary of justice to curtail the exercise of the right to travel,
in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health. As it is, the only ground of the former DOJ Secretary
in restraining the petitioners, at that time, was the pendency
of the preliminary investigation of the Joint DOJ-COMELEC
Preliminary Investigation Committee on the complaint for
electoral sabotage against them.
To be clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a
legislative enactment which underwent the scrutiny and
concurrence of lawmakers, and submitted to the President for
approval. It is a mere administrative issuance apparently
designed to carry out the provisions of an enabling law which
the former DOJ Secretary believed to be Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 292, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code
of 1987."
Indeed, administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or
rule-making powers, among others. It is the "power to make
rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation
that is within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers." In the
exercise of this power, the rules and regulations that
administrative agencies promulgate should be within the
scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to
the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by law. They must conform to and be consistent
with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule
or regulation to be valid.
It is, however, important to stress that before there can even
be a valid administrative issuance, there must first be a
showing that the delegation of legislative power is itself valid.
It is valid only if there is a law that (a) is complete in itself,
setting forth the policy therein to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate: and (b) fixes a standard the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable
Page 129 of 186
to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.
A painstaking examination of the provisions being relied upon
by the former DOJ Secretary will disclose that they do not
particularly vest the DOJ the authority to issue DOJ Circular
No. 41 which effectively restricts the right to travel through the
issuance of WLOs and HDOs. Sections 1 and 3, Book IV, Title
III, Chapter 1 of E.O. No. 292 reads:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy.- It is the declared
policy of the State to provide the government with a
principal law agency which shall be both its legal
counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal
justice system in accordance with the accepted
processes thereof consisting in the investigation of
the crimes, prosecution of offenders and
administration of the correctional system; implement
the laws on the admission and stay of aliens,
citizenship, land titling system, and settlement of land
problems involving small landowners and member of
indigenous cultural minorities; and provide free legal
services to indigent members of the society.
Section 3. Powers and Functions. - to accomplish its mandate,
the Department shall have the following powers and functions:
(1) Act as principal law agency of the government
and as legal counsel and representative thereof,
whenever so required;
(2) investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute
offenders and administer the probation and
correction system;
A plain reading of the foregoing provisions shows that they are
mere general provisions designed to lay down the purposes
of the enactment and the broad enumeration of the powers
and functions of the DOJ. In no way can they be interpreted
as a grant of power to curtail a fundamental right as the
language of the provision itself does not lend to that stretched
construction.
In the same way, Section 3 does not authorize the DOJ to
issue WLOs and HDOs to restrict the constitutional right to
travel. There is even no mention of the exigencies stated in
the Constitution that will justify the impairment. The provision
simply grants the DOJ the power to investigate the
commission of crimes and prosecute offenders, which are
basically the functions of the agency. However, it does not
carry with it the power to indiscriminately devise all means it
deems proper in performing its functions without regard to
constitutionally-protected rights.
The DOJ cannot also rely on Section 50, Chapter 1 l, Book JV
of E.O. No. 292, which simply provides for the types of
issuances that administrative agencies, in general, may issue.
It does not speak of any authority or power but rather a mere
clarification on the nature of the issuances that may be issued
by a secretary or head of agency.
In the same manner, Section 7, Chapter 2, Title III, Book IV of
E.O. 292 cited in the memorandum of the former DOJ
Secretary cannot justify the restriction on the right to travel in
DOJ Circular No. 41. It is indisputable that the secretaries of
government agencies have the power to promulgate rules and
regulations that will aid performance in the performance of
their functions. This is adjunct to the power of administrative
agencies to execute laws and does not require the authority
of a law. This is, however, different from the delegated
legislative power to promulgate rules of government agencies.
The questioned circular does not come under the inherent
power of the executive department to adopt rules and
regulations as clearly the issuance of HDO and WLO is not
the DOJ's business. As such, it is a compulsory requirement
that there be an existing law, complete and sufficient in itself,
conferring the expressed authority to the concerned agency to
promulgate rules.
Consistent with the foregoing, there must be an enabling law
from which DOJ Circular No. 41 must derive its life.
Unfortunately, all of the supposed statutory authorities relied
upon by the DOJ did not pass the completeness test and
sufficient standard test. The DOJ miserably failed to establish
the existence of the enabling law that will justify the issuance
of the questioned circular.
Petitioner Contends
The DOJ stresses the necessity of the restraint imposed in
DOJ Circular No. 41 in that to allow the petitioners, who are
under preliminary investigation, to exercise an untrammeled
right to travel, especially when the risk of flight is distinctly high
will surely impede the efficient and effective operation of the
justice system. The absence of the petitioners, it asseverates,
would mean that the farthest criminal proceeding they could
go would be the filing of the criminal information since they
cannot be arraigned in absentia.
ISSUE NO 2
Whether or not allowing the accused the right to travel when
the risk of flight is extremely high will surely impede the
efficient and effective operation of the justice system.
HELD NO. 2
NO.
It bears emphasizing that the conduct of a preliminary
investigation is an implement of due process which essentially
benefits the accused as it accords an opportunity for the
presentation of his side with regard to the accusation. The
accused may, however, opt to waive his presence in the
preliminary investigation. In any case, whether the accused
responds to a subpoena, the investigating prosecutor shall
resolve the complaint within 10 days after the filing of the
same.
The point is that in the conduct of a preliminary investigation,
the presence of the accused is not necessary for the
prosecutor to discharge his investigatory duties. If the accused
chooses to waive his presence or fails to submit countervailing
evidence, that is his own lookout. Ultimately, he shall be bound
by the determination of the prosecutor on the presence of
probable cause and he cannot claim denial of due process.
The DOJ therefore cannot justify the restraint in the liberty of
movement imposed by DOJ Circular No. 41 on the ground that
it is necessary to ensure presence and attendance in the
preliminary investigation of the complaints.
There is also no authority of law granting it the power to
compel the attendance of the subjects of a preliminary
investigation, pursuant to its investigatory powers under E.O.
No. 292. Its investigatory power is simply inquisitorial and,
unfortunately, not broad enough to embrace the imposition of
restraint on the liberty of movement.
Page 130 of 186
That there is a risk of flight does not authorize the DOJ to take
the situation upon itself and draft an administrative issuance
to keep the individual within the Philippine jurisdiction so that
he may not be able to evade criminal prosecution and
consequent liability. It is an arrogation of power it does not
have; it is a usurpation of function that properly belongs to the
legislature.
Without a law to justify its action, the issuance of DOJ Circular
No. 41 is an unauthorized act of the DOJ of empowering itself
under the pretext of dire exigency or urgent necessity. This
action runs afoul the separation of powers between the three
branches of the government and cannot be upheld. Even the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its power to promulgate
rules is limited in that the same shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. This should have cautioned the
DOJ, which is only one of the many agencies of the executive
branch, to be more scrutinizing in its actions especially when
they affect substantive rights, like the right to travel.
ISSUE NO 3
Whether or not the DOJ’s Power to issue Hold Departure
Order is pursuant to its police power.
HELD NO 3
NO.
The DOJ's reliance on the police power of the state cannot
also be countenanced. Police power pertains to the "state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." "It
may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society." Verily, the exercise of this
power is primarily lodged with the legislature but may be
wielded by the President and administrative boards, as well as
the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the
barangay, by virtue of a valid delegation of power. It bears
noting, however, that police power may only be validly
exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought
to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
On its own, the DOJ cannot wield police power since the
authority pertains to Congress. Even if it claims to be
exercising the same as the alter ego of the President, it must
first establish the presence of a definite legislative enactment
evidencing the delegation of power from its principal. This, the
DOJ failed to do. There is likewise no showing that the
curtailment of the right to travel imposed by DOJ Circular No.
41 was reasonably necessary in order for it to perform its
investigatory duties.
ISSUE NO. 4
Whether or not the DOJ Circular violates due process
HELD NO. 4
YES.
Apart from lack of legal basis, DOJ Circular No. 41 also suffers
from other serious infirmities that render it invalid. The
apparent vagueness of the circular as to the distinction
between a HDO and WLO is violative of the due process
clause. An act that is vague "violates due process for failure
to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid and leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes
an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle." Here, the
distinction is significant as it will inform the respondents of the
grounds, effects and the measures they may take to contest
the issuance against them. Verily, there must be a standard
by which a HDO or WLO may be issued, particularly against
those whose cases are still under preliminary investigation,
since at that stage there is yet no criminal information against
them which could have warranted the restraint.
Further, a reading of the introductory provisions of DOJ
Circular No. shows that it emanates from the DOJ's
assumption of powers that is not actually conferred to it.
ISSUE NO. 5
Whether or not a Watch List Order is constitutional
HELD NO 5
NO.
It is apparent in Section 7 of the same circular that the subject
of a HDO or WLO cannot leave the country unless he obtains
an ADO. The said section reads as follows:
Section 7. Allow Departure Order (ADO)- Any person
subject of HDO/WLO issued pursuant to this Circular
who intends, for some exceptional reasons, to leave
the country may, upon application under oath with
the Secretary of Justice, be issued an ADO.
The ADO may be issued upon submission of the following
requirements:
(a) Affidavit stating clearly the purpose, inclusive
period of the date of travel, and containing an
undertaking to immediately report to the DOJ upon
return; and
(b) Authority to travel or travel clearance from the
court or appropriate government office where the
case upon which the issued HDO/WLO was based is
pending, or from the investigating prosecutor in
charge or the subject case.
By requiring an ADO before the subject of a HDO or WLO is
allowed to leave the country, the only plausible conclusion that
can be made is that its mere issuance operates as a restraint
on the right to travel. To make it even more difficult, the
individual will need to cite an exceptional reason to justify the
granting of an ADO.
The WLO also does not bear a significant distinction from a
HDO, thereby giving the impression that they are one and the
same or, at the very least, complementary such that whatever
is not covered in Section 1, which pertains to the issuance of
HDO, can conveniently fall under Section 2, which calls for the
issuance of WLO. In any case, there is an identical provision
in DOJ Circular No. 41 which authorizes the Secretary of
Justice to issue a HDO or WLO against anyone, motu proprio,
in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health. With this all-encompassing provision, there is nothing
Page 131 of 186
that can prevent the Secretary of Justice to prevent anyone
from leaving the country under the guise of national security,
public safety or public health.
Petitioner’s Contention
The DOJ argues that Section 6, Article III of the Constitution
is not an exclusive enumeration of the instances wherein the
right to travel may be validly impaired. It cites that this Court
has its own administrative issuances restricting travel of its
employees and that even lower courts may issue HDO even
on grounds outside of what is stated in the Constitution.
ISSUE NO. 6
Whether or not the enumeration of the instances wherein the
right to travel may be validly impaired is exclusive.
HELD NO. 6
YES.
It bears reiterating that the power to issue HDO is inherent to
the courts. The courts may issue a HDO against an accused
in a criminal case so that he may be dealt with in accordance
with law. It does not require legislative conferment or
constitutional recognition; it co-exists with the grant of judicial
power. The inherent powers of the courts are essential in
upholding its integrity and largely beneficial in keeping the
people's faith in the institution by ensuring that it has the power
and the means to enforce its jurisdiction.
As regards the power of the courts to regulate foreign travels,
by virtue of its administrative supervision over all courts and
personnel that this Court came out with OCA Circular No. 49-
2003, which provided for the guidelines that must be observed
by employees of the judiciary seeking to travel abroad.
Specifically, they are required to secure a leave of absence
for the purpose of foreign travel from this Court through the
Chief Justice and the Chairmen of the Divisions, or from the
Office of the Court Administrator, as the case maybe. This is
"to ensure management of court dockets and to avoid
disruption in the administration of justice.
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 is therefore not a restriction, but
more properly, a regulation of the employee's leave for
purpose of foreign travel which is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit
a person from doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or
direct according to rule. This regulation comes as a necessary
consequence of the individual's employment in the judiciary,
as part and parcel of his contract in joining the institution. For,
if the members of the judiciary are at liberty to go on leave any
time, the dispensation of justice will be seriously hampered.
Short of key personnel, the courts cannot properly function in
the midst of the intricacies in the administration of justice. At
any rate, the concerned employee is not prevented from
pursuing his travel plans without complying with OCA Circular
No. 49-2003 but he must be ready to suffer the consequences
of his non-compliance.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition,
Department of Justice Circular No. 41 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All issuances which were released
pursuant thereto are hereby declared NULL and VOID.
 I. RIGHT TO INFORMATION
1. NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG,
INC. vs MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE
VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE (G.R. No. 187587; June 5, 2013)
FACTS: By virtue of Proclamation 423, Former President
Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities
of Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay
City for military reservation. The military reservation, then
known as Fort William McKinley, was later on renamed Fort
Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 208,
amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain
area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The
excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani,
which is under the administration of herein respondent MSS-
PVAO.
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No.
423, which excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan
and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423
and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of
Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos
made a handwritten addendum which includes Western
Bicutan for the disposition of the area. The proclamation was
published in the Official Gazette without the handwritten
addendum
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172
which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as
published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western
Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and
declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions
of R.A. 274 and 730.
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No.
172, was issued on the same day.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied
some areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan
ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista
issued General Order No. 1323 creating TFB, primarily to
prevent further unauthorized occupation and to cause the
demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio. Demolition of
illegal structures existed to prevent the area from the
increasing number of informal settlers.
Members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio
Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) and Western Bicutan Lot Owners
Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed for a Petition with
Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP)
praying for the reclassification of the areas they are occupying
as is already alienable and disposable, where it was docketed
as COSLAP Case No. 99-434.
Specifically, the Petition prayed for the following:
• the reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot
3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to
alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No.
2476;
Page 132 of 186
• the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands;
and
• the Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution
and sale of the subject lot to its bona fide occupants.
Petitioner (WBLOAI) filed a Petition-in-Intervention
substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for
by NMSMI with regard to the area the former then occupied.
COSLAP issued a Resolution granting the Petition and
declaring the portions of land in question alienable and
disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-
General dissenting.
COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President
Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and
was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could
not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others.
Further, considering that Proclamation No. 2476 was done
while the former President was exercising legislative powers,
it could not be amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere
executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could not
have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No.
2476, as the latter was issued on October 16, 1987 when
President Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied by the COSLAP in a
Resolution dated 24 January 2007.
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking
to reverse the COSLAP Resolutions dated 1 September 2006
and 24 January 2007.
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First
Division rendered the assailed Decision granting MSS-
PVAO’s Petition.
Both NMSMI and WBLOAI appealed the said Decision by
filing their respective Petitions for Review with this Court under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of
Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos was not included in the
publication of the said law.
HELD: NO.
Applying the foregoing ruling in Tanada vs Tuvera to the
instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that
was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. The
handwritten addendum of President Marcos did not have the
force and effect law since it was not included in the publication.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws.
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the
Administrative Code, "the publication of any law, resolution or
other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima
facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President
Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only
irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from
the words appearing in the law.
This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when, 2. In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents
evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. and the Attendance of Court officials and employees as
Trajano, we ruled that ' This does not mean, however, that witnesses under the subpoenas of February 10, 2012
courts can create law. The courts exist for inter"under Article and the various letters for the Impeachment Prosecution
8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions applying or interpreting Panel dated January 19 and 25, 2012
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines. This does not mean, however, that
courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law,
FACTS: During the impeachment proceedings against Chief
not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the
Justice Corona, the prosecution Panel manifested in a
principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole
COMPLIANCE that it would present about 100 witnesses
function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws,
which included Justices of the Supreme Court, and Court
particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities
officials and employees who will testify on matters internal to
becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of
the Court and almost a thousand documents
legislating." The remedy sought in these Petitions is not
judicial interpretation, but another legislation that would In separate letters to the Supreme Court in January, members
amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots in the of the prosecution panel requested the following:
reclassification.
- the rollo and certified true copies of the agenda and
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions deliberations of Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of
are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Philippines (FASAP) vs. Philippine Airlines Inc.;
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April
2009 is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court's status - the rollo of Navarro vs. Ermita;
quo order dated 17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all
- the rollo of Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez vs. The House of
pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is DENIED,
Representatives Committee on Justice; and
having been rendered moot. No costs.
- the rollo of League of Cities vs. Comelec.

The Impeachment Court, on the other hand, issued a

subpoena ad testificandum et duces tecum dated February 9,
2012 directing the attendance of Clerk of Court Enriqueta
Vidal and Deputy Clerk of Court Felipa Anama, and the
production of documents involving FASAP vs. PAL, such as:

- records/logbook of the Raffle Committee showing the

assignment of the FASAP case; and

- letters of PAL counsel Estelito Mendoza addressed to the

Clerk of Court dated Sept. 13, 2011; Sept. 16, 2011; Sept. 20,
2011; and Sept. 22, 2011;

Another subpoena dated Feb. 10 directed Vidal the following

in the case of former first couple Gloria and Mike Arroyo:

- Supreme Court received (with time and date stamp) Petition

for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction filed by Mrs. Arroyo, including annexes;

- Supreme Court received (with time and date stamp) Petition

for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by Mr. Arroyo;

- Chief Justice Corona's travel order or leave applied for within

the month of November 2011;

- minutes of the Raffle Committee which handled the Arroyo

petitions;

- appointment or assignment of the Member(Justice)-in-

charge of the Arroyo petitions;

- Resolution dated Nov. 15, 2011 in the Arroyo petitions;

- Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) dated November 15,

2011 issued in the Arroyo petitions;

Page 133 of 186

- logbook or receiving copy showing the time the TRO was
issued to the counsel of the Arroyos, and the date and time
the TRO was received by the Sheriff for service to the parties;
- Special Power of Attorney dated Nov. 15, 2011 submitted by
the Arroyos in favor of Attys. Ferdinand Topacio and Anacleto
Diaz in compliance with the TRO;
- official receipt dated Nov. 15, 2011 issued by the Supreme
Court for the P2-million cash bond posted by Mr. and Mrs.
Arroyo, with the official date and time stamp;
- Nov. 15 and 16, 2011 Sheriff's Return for the service of the
TRO to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG);
- certification from the Fiscal Management and Budget Office
of the Supreme Court dated Nov. 15, 2011, with the date and
time it was received by the Clerk of Court showing it to be Nov.
16, 2011 at 8:55 am;
- Resolution dated Nov. 18, 2011 issued in the Arroyo TRO
petitions;
- Resolution dated Nov. 22, 2011 on the Arroyo petitions;
- logbook showing the date and time Associate Justice Ma.
Lourdes Sereno's dissent to the Nov. 22 Resolution was
received by the Clerk of Court en banc;
- Dissenting Opinions dated Nov. 13 and 18, 2011 of
Associate Justice Antonio Carpio on the Arroyo TRO petitions;
- Separate Opinion dated Dec. 13, 2011 of Associate Justice
Presbitero Velasco, Jr. on the Arroyo TRO petitions;
- Concurring Opinion dated Dec. 13, 2011 of Associate Justice
Roberto Abad on the Arroyo petitions;
- Official Appointment of Chief Justice Corona as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court; and
- Official Appointment of Chief Justice Corona as Chief
Magistrate.
Subpoena Ad Testificandum et Duces TecumAnd Subpoena
Ad Testificandum were also issued against Clerks of Court of
the SC.
In light of the subpoenas served, the urgent need for a court
ruling and based on the Constitution, the pertinent laws and of
the Court’s rules and policies, we shall now determine how the
Court will comply with the subpoenas and the letters of the
Prosecution Impeachment Panel.
ISSUE NO. 1
What is Judicial Privilege?
HELD NO.
In fine, there are Philippine laws, rules and jurisprudence
prohibiting the revelation of confidential or “secret” information
that causes damage to public interest even in judicial and
other proceedings such as the sui generis impeachment trial.
As far as the Court is concerned, its Members and officials
involved in all proceedings are duty-bound to observe the
privileged communication and confidentiality rules if the
integrity of the administration of justice were to be preserved
– i.e., not even Members of the Court, on their own and without
Page 134 of 186
the consent of the Supreme Court, can testify on matters
covered by the prohibitions and exclusions, particularly with
respect to matters pending resolution before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE NO. 2
Whether or not Court Records are considered Confidential or
privileged.
HELD NO. 2
In the Judiciary, privileges against disclosure of official records
“create a hierarchy of rights that protect certain confidential
relationships over and above the public’s evidentiary need” or
“right to every man’s evidence.” Accordingly, certain
information contained in the records of cases before the
Supreme Court are considered confidential and are exempt
from disclosure. To reiterate, the need arises from the dictates
of the integrity of the Court’s decision-making function which
may be affected by the disclosure of information.
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) prohibits the
disclosure of
(1) the result of the raffle of cases,
(2) the actions taken by the Court on each case included in
the agenda of the Court’s session,
(3) the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on
cases and matters pending before it.
Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC10 declares that the results of
the raffle of cases shall only be available to the parties and
their counsels, unless the cases involve bar matters,
administrative cases and criminal cases involving the penalty
of life imprisonment, which are treated with strict
confidentiality and where the raffle results are not disclosed
even to the parties themselves.
Rule 10, Section 2 of the IRSC provides that the actions taken
in each case in the Court’s agenda, which are noted by the
Chief Justice or the Division Chairman, are also to be treated
with strict confidentiality. Only after the official release of the
resolution embodying the Court action may that action be
made available to the public. A resolution is considered
officially released once the envelope containing its final copy,
addressed to the parties, has been transmitted to the process
server for personal service or to the mailing section of the
Judicial Records Office.
Court deliberations are traditionally recognized as privileged
communication. Section 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC provides:
Section 2. Confidentiality of court sessions. – Court
sessions are executive in character, with only the
Members of the Court present. Court deliberations
are confidential and shall not be disclosed to outside
parties, except as may be provided herein or as
authorized by the Court.
Justice Abad discussed the rationale for the rule in his
concurring opinion to the Court Resolution in Arroyo v. De
Lima13 (TRO on Watch List Order case): the rules on
confidentiality will enable the Members of the Court to “freely
discuss the issues without fear of criticism for holding
unpopular positions” or fear of humiliation for one’s comments.
The privilege against disclosure of these kinds of
information/communication is known as deliberative process
privilege, involving as it does the deliberative process of
reaching a decision. “Written advice from a variety of
individuals is an important element of the government’s
decision-making process and that the interchange of advice
could be stifled if courts forced the government to disclose
those recommendations;” the privilege is intended “to prevent
the ‘chilling’ of deliberative communications.”
The privilege is not exclusive to the Judiciary. We have in
passing recognized the claim of this privilege by the two other
branches of government in Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority17 (speaking through J. Carpio) when the Court
declared that -
[t]he information x x x like internal deliberations of the
Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive
sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as
confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by
a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of
exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of
publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to
protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked
to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.
Justice Brion noted this fact in his Separate Concurring
Opinion in Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations:
Significantly, this type of privilege is not for the Executive to
enjoy alone. All the great branches of government are entitled
to this treatment for their own decision and policy making
conversations and correspondence. It is unthinkable that the
disclosure of internal debates and deliberations of the
Supreme Court or the executive sessions of either Houses of
Congress can be compelled at will by outside parties.
Thus, a Senator may invoke legislative privilege when he or
she is questioned outside the Senate about information
gathered during an executive session of the Senate’s
legislative inquiry in aid of legislation. In the same manner, a
justice of the court or a judge may invoke judicial privilege in
the Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court, for proceedings
in the performance of his or her own judicial functions. What
applies to magistrates applies with equal force to court officials
and employees who are privy to these deliberations. They
may likewise claim exemption when asked about this
privileged information.
While Section 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC cited above speaks only
of the confidentiality of court deliberations, it is understood that
the rule extends to documents and other communications
which are part of or are related to the deliberative process.
The deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure
documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations
and deliberations that are component parts of the process for
formulating governmental decisions and policies. Obviously,
the privilege may also be claimed by other court officials and
employees when asked to act on these documents and other
communications.
The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel in fact provides that
access shall be denied with respect to information or records
relating to drafts of decisions, rulings, orders, or internal
memoranda or internal reports. In the 2007 Resolution on
Access to Justice for the Poor Project, the Court excluded the
same information and records from the public by classifying
them as confidential:
Article 1. Definition of Terms.
Page 135 of 186
2. Confidential information generally refers to
information not yet made a matter of public record
relating to pending cases, such as notes, drafts,
research papers, internal discussion, internal
memoranda, records of internal deliberations, and
similar papers. Even after the decision, resolution, or
order is made public, such information that a justice
or judge uses in preparing a decision, resolution, or
order shall remain confidential.
To qualify for protection under the deliberative process
privilege, the agency must show that the document is both (1)
predecisional and (2) deliberative.
A document is “predecisional” under the deliberative process
privilege if it precedes, in temporal sequence, the decision to
which it relates. In other words, communications are
considered predecisional if they were made in the attempt to
reach a final conclusion.
A material is “deliberative,” on the other hand, if it reflects the
giveand- take of the consultative process. The key question in
determining whether the material is deliberative in nature is
whether disclosure of the information would discourage
candid discussion within the agency. If the disclosure of the
information would expose the government’s decision making
process in a way that discourages candid discussion among
the decision-makers (thereby undermining the courts’ ability to
perform their functions), the information is deemed privileged.
Court records which are “predecisional” and “deliberative” in
nature are thus protected and cannot be the subject of a
subpoena if judicial privilege is to be preserved. The privilege
in general insulates the Judiciary from an improper intrusion
into the functions of the judicial branch and shields justices,
judges, and court officials and employees from public scrutiny
or the pressure of public opinion that would impair a judge’s
ability to render impartial decisions. The deliberative process
can be impaired by undue exposure of the decision-making
process to public scrutiny before or even after the decision is
made, as discussed below.
Additionally, two other grounds may be cited for denying
access to court records, as well as preventing members of the
bench, from being subjected to compulsory process:
(1) the disqualification by reason of privileged
communication and
(2) the pendency of an action or matter.
The prohibition against disclosure of confidential information
is required to be observed by members of the Court under the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
Section 9, Canon 4 (Propriety) states:
Section 9. Confidential information acquired by
judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or
disclosed for any other purpose related to their
judicial duties.
This rule of judicial ethics complements the rule of evidence
that disqualifies public officials from testifying on information
they acquire in confidence in the course of their duties:
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 24. Disqualification by
reason of privileged communication. – The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
 (e) A public officer cannot be examined during his
term of office or afterwards, as to communications
made to him in official confidence, when the court
finds that the public interest would suffer by the
disclosure.
Under the law, therefore, the Members of the Court may not
be compelled to testify in the impeachment proceedings
against the Chief Justice or other Members of the Court about
information they acquired in the performance of their official
function of adjudication, such as information on how
deliberations were conducted or the material inputs that the
justices used in decision-making, because the end-result
would be the disclosure of confidential information that could
subject them to criminal prosecution. Such act violates judicial
privilege (or the equivalent of executive privilege) as it pertains
to the exercise of the constitutional mandate of adjudication.
Jurisprudence implies that justices and judges may not be
subject to any compulsory process in relation to the
performance of their adjudicatory functions. In Senate of the
Philippines v. Exec. Sec. Ermita,31 the Court declared that
members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from [the
Congress’] power of inquiry [in aid of legislation]. Unlike the
Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence,
each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of
separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the
constitutional independence of the judiciary.
This ruling was dictated in no small measure by the principle
of comity mentioned above. Inter-departmental courtesy
demands that the highest levels of each department be
exempt from the compulsory processes of the other
departments on matters related to the functions and duties of
their office.
With respect to Court officials and employees, the same rules
on confidentiality that apply to justices and judges apply to
them. They are barred from disclosing (1) the result of the
raffle of cases, (2) the actions taken by the Court on each case
included in the agenda of the Court’s session, and (3) the
deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and
matters pending before it. They are subject as well to the
disqualification by reason of privileged communication and the
sub judice rule. As stated above, these rules extend to
documents and other communications which cannot be
disclosed.
These privileges, incidentally, belong to the Judiciary and are
for the Supreme Court (as the representative and entity
speaking for the Judiciary), and not for the individual justice,
judge, or court official or employees to waive. Thus, every
proposed waiver must be referred to the Supreme Court for its
consideration and approval.
In fine, there are Philippine laws, rules and jurisprudence
prohibiting the revelation of confidential or “secret” information
that causes damage to public interest even in judicial and
other proceedings such as the sui generis impeachment trial.
As far as the Court is concerned, its Members and officials
involved in all proceedings are duty-bound to observe the
privileged communication and confidentiality rules if the
integrity of the administration of justice were to be preserved
– i.e., not even Members of the Court, on their own and without
the consent of the Supreme Court, can testify on matters
covered by the prohibitions and exclusions, particularly with
respect to matters pending resolution before the Supreme
Court.
Page 136 of 186
To state the rule differently, Justices of the Court cannot be
compelled to testify on matters relating to the internal
deliberations and actions of the Court, in the exercise of their
adjudicatory functions and duties. This is to be differentiated
from a situation where the testimony is on a matter which is
external to their adjudicatory functions and duties.
When court records are considered confidential
The "deliberative process privilege" was also stressed, where
Justices of the High Court freely discuss and deliberate cases
and matters "without fear of criticism for holding unpopular
positions or fear of humiliation for one's comments."
The Resolution stated that deliberations in closed-door
sessions must remain executive in nature, as the same is also
granted the Executive and Legislative branches of
government as stated in Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority
where executive sessions of the Senate and the Lower House
are recognized as confidential, and in Neri vs. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations where it was held that the privilege is enjoyed
by all the branches of government "for their own decision and
policy-making conversation and correspondence."
Court records considered 'matter of public record' allowed to
be released
As to Court Records:
While the High Court refused the requested examination by
the Prosecution of the rollos of the FASAP vs. PAL, Navarro
vs. Ermita, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez vs. The House of
Representatives, and League of Cities vs. Comelec, it allowed
the issuance of certified true copies of the Decisions, Orders,
and Resolutions it issued in these cases and which have
already been released to the parties, including the certified
true copies of the parties' pleadings.
The High Court also allowed the release of certified true
copies of the letters of Atty. Mendoza.
As to the Senate Impeachment Court's subpoena, all
documents subpoenaed pertaining to the FASAP vs. PAL
case were not allowed to be released citing the pendency of
the case.
Vidal, however, was directed to provide the impeachment
court with certified true copies of the Decisions, Orders and
Resolutions furnished to the parties, parties' pleadings, and
Mendoza's letters.
As for the subpoena on court records pertaining to the Arroyo
TRO petitions, the High Court allowed the release of certified
true copies only of the following on the basis that these are
matters of public record (the rest, privileged and confidential):
- Supreme Court received (with time and date stamp) Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction filed by Mrs. Arroyo, including annexes;
- Supreme Court received (with time and date stamp) Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by Mr. Arroyo;
- Official Leave of Chief Justice Corona's travel order or leave
applied in Nov. 2011;
- Resolution dated Nov. 15, 2011 in the Arroyo petitions, as
published;
- TRO dated November 15, 2011 issued in the Arroyo
petitions;
- official receipt dated Nov. 15, 2011 issued by the Supreme
Court for the P2 M cash bond posted by Mr. and Mrs. Arroyo,
with the official date and time stamp;
- Resolution dated Nov. 18, 2011 issued in the Arroyo TRO
petitions, as published;
- Resolution dated Nov. 22, 2011 on the Arroyo petitions;
- Official Appointment of Chief Justice Corona as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court; and
- Official Appointment of Chief Justice Corona as Chief
Justice.
The High Court allowed the release of certified true copies of
the subpoenaed Opinions of Justices Carpio, Sereno, Velasco
and Abad, however, reservations were made as it was pointed
out that as an institution, the Supreme Court is entitled to the
deliberative process privilege and "cannot waive the
confidentiality of certain portions" of the Opinions.
The Resolution also pointed out that the attendance of court
officials and employees in the impeachment trial should be
excused "if the intent only is for them to identify and certify to
the existence and genuineness of documents within their
custody or control that are not otherwise confidential or
privileged."
SC Justices, officials, employees not compelled to testify on
'adjudicatory' incidents
In its Resolution, the High Court held that "Philippine laws,
rules and jurisprudence prohibit the disclosure of confidential
or privileged information under well-defined rules" and
stressed that "Justices and judges may not be subject to any
compulsory process in relation to the performance of their
adjudicatory functions."
"Under the law... the Members of the Court may not be
compelled to testify in the impeachment proceedings against
the Chief Justice or other Members (Justices) of the Court
about information they acquired in the performance of their
official function of adjudication, such as information on how
deliberations were conducted or the material inputs that the
Justices used in decision-making, because the end-result
would be the disclosure of confidential information that could
subject them to criminal prosecution.
"Such act violates judicial privilege (or the equivalent of
executive privilege) as it pertains to the exercise of the
constitutional mandate of adjudication," the Resolution read.
As a penultimate point, witnesses need not be summoned to
testify on matters of public record. These are the records that
a government unit is required by law to keep or which it is
compelled to keep in the discharge of duties imposed by law.
A record is a public record within the purview of a statute
providing that books and records required by law to be kept by
a clerk may be received in evidence in any court if it is a record
which a public officer is required to keep and if it is filled in
such a manner that it is subject to public inspection. Under the
Rules of Court, the rule on public records is embodied in
Section 44, Rule 130.
Page 137 of 186
To restate the rule, entries in official records may be presented
without the necessity of presenting in court the officer or
person who made the entries. Entries in public or official books
or records may be proved by the production of the books or
records themselves or by a copy certified by the legal keeper
thereof. These records, however, may be presented and
marked in evidence only where they are not excluded by
reasons of privilege and the other reasons discussed above.
The reasons for this rule are necessity and trustworthiness.
Necessity consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of
requiring the official’s attendance as a witness to testify to the
innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. A public
officer is excused from appearing in court in order that public
business may not be interrupted, hampered or delayed.
Where there is no exception for official statements, hosts of
officials would be found devoting the greater part of their time
attending as witnesses in court, delivering their deposition
before an officer. Trustworthiness is a reason because of the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty. The
law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it
presumes that they will discharge their several trusts with
accuracy and fidelity; and therefore, whatever acts they do in
the discharge of their public duty may be given in evidence
and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution
as the nature and circumstances of each case may appear to
require. Thus, “[t]he trustworthiness of public documents and
the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded
on: 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the
statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a
breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of
most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which
makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might
have occurred.”
The independence of the Judiciary, separation of powers
The High Court stressed that the doctrine of separation of
powers "is an essential component of our democratic and
republican system of government" and system of checks and
balances.
The High Court maintained that its mandate, "in so far as these
constitutional principles are concerned, is to keep the different
branches within the exercise of their respective powers and
prerogatives through the Rule of Law."
Principle of comity
Inter-branch and inter-departmental comity was also stressed
as the High Court held that while voluntary, is established
practice, for each branch to perform its assigned constitutional
duties.
"The Judiciary applies the principle of comity at the first
instance in its interpretation and application of laws... the
courts tread carefully; they exercise restraint and intervene
only when the grave abuse of discretion is clear and even then
must act with carefully calibrated steps, safely and surely
made within constitutional bounds," the Resolution read.
The High Court recognized that the trial on matters of
impeachment "has been specifically assigned by the
Constitution to the Senate," however, it also held that "where
doubt exists in an impeachment case, a standard that should
not be forgotten is the need to preserve the structure of a
democratic and republican government, particularly the check
and balance that should prevail."
As a last point and mainly for purposes of stress, the privileges
discussed above that apply to justices and judges apply
mutatis mutandis to court officials and employees with respect
to their official functions. If the intent only is for them to identify
and certify to the existence and genuineness of documents
within their custody or control that are not otherwise
confidential or privileged under the above discussed rules,
their presence before the Impeachment Court can be and
should be excused where certified copies of these non-
privileged and non-confidential documents can be provided.
Page 138 of 186
3. HAZEL MA. C. ANTOLIN vs. ABELARDO T.
DOMONDON, JOSE A. GANGAN, and VIOLETA J.
JOSEF (G.R. No. 165036; July 5, 2010)
FACTS: Antolin took the accountancy licensure examinations
conducted by the Board of Accountancy (the Board) in
October 1997.1 The examination results were released and
out of 6,481 examinees, only 1,171 passed. Unfortunately,
petitioner did not make it. When the results were released, she
received failing grades in four out of the seven subjects.2
Convinced that she deserved to pass the examinations, she
wrote to respondent Abelardo T. Domondon (Domondon),
Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy, and requested
that her answer sheets be re-corrected.3 The petitioner was
shown her answer sheets, but these consisted merely of
shaded marks, so she was unable to determine why she failed
the exam.4 Thus, she again wrote to the Board to request for
copies of (a) the questionnaire in each of the seven subjects
(b) her answer sheets; (c) the answer keys to the
questionnaires, and (d) an explanation of the grading system
used in each subject
Acting Chairman Domondon denied petitioner’s request.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages, with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction, against the
Board and its members before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
praying that the Board provide her with all documents that
would show whether the Board fairly administered the exam
and correctly graded her answers, and if warranted, to issue
to her a certificate of registration as a CPA. She later amended
her Petition to clarify that she only wanted access to the
documents requested, not recorrection of her exam, deleting
in the process her original prayer for issuance of a certificate
of registration as CPA.
Petitioner passed the May 1998 CPA Licensure Exam and
took her oath as a CPA. Consequently, the RTC denied her
application for mandatory injunction for being moot. She
amended her Petition a second time to implead the PRC and
to ask, in addition to access to the documents she had
requested, that if warranted, appropriate revisions in the
October 1997 Exam results be made by the Board and the
PRC. The RTC considered the matter moot and dismissed the
petition. On her motion, however, the RTC reconsidered the
dismissal, holding that her passing of the subsequent CPA
examination did not render the petition moot because the relief
“and if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of registration as
Certified Public Accountant” was deleted from the original
petition. As regards whether she had the constitutional right to
have access to the documents she requested, the RTC
resolved to let the parties first adduce evidence, and to have
PRC air its side of the case. The RTC also ordered the PRC
to preserve and safeguard the questionnaire, petitioner’s
answer sheets, and the answer keys for the October 1997
CPA Licensure Exam.
When their motion for reconsideration was denied,
respondents brought the case to the Court of Appeals (CA)
which set aside the RTC’s decision and ordered the dismissal
of the case because: (1) the petition was mooted when
petitioner passed the May 1998 CPA exam; (2) Section 20,
Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994,
constituted a valid limitation on her right to information and
access to government documents; (3) the Examination
Documents were not of public concern, because she merely
sought review of her failing marks; (4) it was not the ministerial
or mandatory function of the respondents to review and
reassess the answers to examination questions of a failing
examinee; and (5) she failed to exhaust administrative
remedies when she did not elevate the matter to the PRC
before seeking judicial intervention. Petitioner, thus, brought
the matter to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioner may seek judicial intervention to compel the
re-correction of her examination;
2. WON petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies;
3. WON the case was mooted by petitioner’s passing the May
1998 CPA Licensure Examination; and
4. WON petitioner has the constitutional right to have
access to the Examination Papers. (MAIN ISSUE)
HELD:
1. Any claim for re-correction or revision of petitioner’s 1997
examination cannot be compelled by mandamus. In
AgustinRamos vs. Sandoval[G.R. No. 84470, February 2,
1989 (Minute Resolution)], where therespondent Judge was
questioned for dismissing therein petitioners’ mandamus
action to compel the Medical Board of Examiners and the
Professional Regulation Commission to re-correct their
ratings, the Supreme Court held that “(t)he function of
reviewing and re-assessing the petitioners’ answers to the
examination questions, in the light of the facts and arguments
presented by them x x x is a discretionary function of the
Medical Board, not a ministerial and mandatory one, hence,
not within the scope of thewrit of mandamus.”
For a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a
well-defined, clear, and certain legal right to the thing
demanded. The corresponding duty of the respondent to
perform the required act must be equally clear. No such clarity
exists here. And despite petitioner’s assertion that she did not
demand re-correction, the most cursory perusal of her Second
Amended Petition and her prayer that respondents “make the
appropriate revisions on the results of her examination” belied
this claim.
2. Like the claimants in Agustin, petitioner’s remedy from the
Board’s refusal to release the Examination Papers should
have been through an appeal to the PRC. Under Section 5(c)
of Presidential Decree No. 223, the PRC has the power to
review and approve the policies, resolutions, rules and
regulations, orders and decisions of the various professional
Boards, including the results of their licensure examinations,
and the decisions of the Boards on administrative cases shall
be final and executory unless appealed to the PRC within 30
days from promulgation. Contrary’s to petitioner’s claim, this
power is not limited to administrative investigations but
encompasses requests for documents. And since the PRC
itself issued the resolution (PRC Resolution No. 338)
questioned by petitioner, it was in the best position to resolve
questions addressed to its area of expertise. One of the
reasons for exhaustion of administrative remedies is thewell-
entrenched doctrine on separation of powers, which enjoins
upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with
matters falling primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the
competence of other departments. However, the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to
Page 139 of 186
exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is
involved. Whether or not petitioner had a constitutional right to
demand access to the Examination Papers was one such
question of law which cannot be resolved with finality by the
administrative officer.
3. An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to
present a justiciable controversy, so that a declaration on the
issue would be of no practical use or value. In this jurisdiction,
any citizen may challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise
of his or her right to information and may seek its enforcement
by mandamus. And since every citizen possesses the inherent
right to be informed by the mere fact of citizenship, petitioner’s
belated passing of the CPA Board Exams did not
automatically mean that her interest in the Examination
Papers had become mere superfluity. Undoubtedly, the
constitutional question presented, in view of the likelihood that
the issues in this case would be repeated, warranted review.
4. Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to
information is not absolute; it is limited to “matters of
public concern” and is further “subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law” (Section 7, Article
III, 1987 Constitution). Similarly, the State’s policy of full
disclosure is limited to “transactions involving public
interest,” and is “subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law” (Sec. 28, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). The
Court has always grappled with the meanings of “public
interest” and “public concern” which “embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen,” and which are, in the final analysis, up
to the courts to determine on a case by case basis
[Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 234 Phil. 521, 535
(1987)]. National board examinations such as the CPA
Board Exams are matters of public concern. The
populace in general, and the examinees in particular,
would understandably be interested in the fair and
competent administration of these exams in order to
ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the
accounting profession. And as with all matters
pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely
quantitative means of assessment, but also means to
further improve the teaching and learning of the art and
science of accounting. The Court, nonetheless, realizes
that there may be valid reasons to limit access to the
Examination Papers in order to properly administer the
exam. More than the mere convenience of the examiner,
it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the
preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and
checking of these multiple choice exams that require that
the questions and answers remain confidential for a
limited duration. The PRC, however, had not been given
an opportunity to explain the reasons behind their
regulations or articulate the justification for keeping the
Examination Papers confidential. In view of the far-
reaching implications of this case, which may impact on
every board examination administered by the PRC, and in
order that all relevant issues may be ventilated, the Court
deemed it best to remand the case to the RTC for further
proceedings.
 4. AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION v. PENNSWELL,
INC. (G.R. NO. 172835 : December 13, 2007)
FACTS: Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of air transportation
services. On the other hand, respondent Pennswell, Inc. was
organized to engage in the business of manufacturing and
selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants.
On various dates, respondent delivered and sold to petitioner
sundry goods in trade. Under the contracts, petitioner's total
outstanding obligation amounted to P449,864.98 with interest
at 14% per annum until the amount would be fully paid. For
failure of the petitioner to comply with its obligation under said
contracts, respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money
with the RTC.
In its Answer, petitioner contended that its refusal to pay was
not without valid and justifiable reasons. In particular,
petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in the amount
of P592,000.00 by respondent for its previous sale of four
items. Said items were misrepresented by respondent as
belonging to a new line, but were in truth and in fact, identical
with products petitioner had previously purchased from
respondent. Petitioner asserted that it was deceived by
respondent which merely altered the names and labels of
such goods.
Petitioner alleged that when the purported fraud was
discovered, a conference was held between petitioner and
respondent, whereby the parties agreed that respondent
would return to petitioner the amount it previously paid.
However, petitioner was surprised when it received a letter
from the respondent, demanding payment of the amount
of P449,864.94, which later became the subject of
respondent's Complaint for Collection of a Sum of Money
against petitioner.
During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to
Compel respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients
and chemical components of the following products. The RTC
rendered an Order granting the petitioner’s motion.
Respondent sought reconsideration of the foregoing Order,
contending that it cannot be compelled to disclose the
chemical components sought because the matter is
confidential. It argued that what petitioner endeavored to
inquire upon constituted a trade secret which respondent
cannot be forced to divulge.
The RTC gave credence to respondent’s reasoning, and
reversed itself. Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, which
denied the Petition and affirmed the Order dated 30 June 2004
of the RTC. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was
denied. Unyielding, petitioner brought the instant Petition
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON THE CHEMICAL COMPONENTS OR
INGREDIENTS OF RESPONDENT'S PRODUCTS ARE
TRADE SECRETS OR INDUSTRIAL SECRETS THAT ARE
NOT SUBJECT TO COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE.
HELD: The products are covered by the exception of trade
secrets being divulged in compulsory disclosure. The Court
Page 140 of 186
affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals which upheld the
finding of the RTC that there is substantial basis for
respondent to seek protection of the law for its proprietary
rights over the detailed chemical composition of its products.
The Supreme Court has declared that trade secrets and
banking transactions are among the recognized restrictions to
the right of the people to information as embodied in the
Constitution. SC said that the drafters of the Constitution also
unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security
matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets
(pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other related
laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy
of Bank Deposits Act), are also exempted from compulsory
disclosure.
A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool,
mechanism or compound known only to its owner and those
of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. The
definition also extends to a secret formula or process not
patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in
compounding some article of trade having a commercial
value. American jurisprudence has utilized the following
factors to determine if an information is a trade secret, to wit:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the
employer’s business; (2) the extent to which the information is
known by employees and others involved in the business; (3)
the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the
secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to
the employer and to competitors; (5) the amount of effort or
money expended by the company in developing the
information; and (6) the extent to which the information could
be easily or readily obtained through an independent source.
Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things that may be produced and inspected should
not be privileged. The documents must not be privileged
against disclosure. On the ground of public policy, the rules
providing for production and inspection of books and papers
do not authorize the production or inspection of privileged
matter; that is, books and papers which, because of their
confidential and privileged character, could not be received in
evidence. Such a condition is in addition to the requisite that
the items be specifically described, and must constitute or
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action
and which are in the party’s possession, custody or control.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot rely on Section 77of
Republic Act 7394, or the Consumer Act of the Philippines, in
order to compel respondent to reveal the chemical
components of its products. While it is true that all consumer
products domestically sold, whether manufactured locally or
imported, shall indicate their general make or active
ingredients in their respective labels of packaging, the law
does not apply to respondent. Respondent’s specialized
lubricants — namely, Contact Grease, Connector Grease,
Thixohtropic Grease, Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating,
Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound — are not consumer
products.
What is clear from the factual findings of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals is that the chemical formulation of
respondent’s products is not known to the general public and
is unique only to it. Both courts uniformly ruled that these
ingredients are not within the knowledge of the public. Since
such factual findings are generally not reviewable by this
Court, it is not dutybound to analyze and weigh all over again
the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.
The revelation of respondent’s trade secrets serves no better
purpose to the disposition of the main case pending with the
RTC, which is on the collection of a sum of money. As can be
gleaned from the facts, petitioner received respondent’s
goods in trade in the normal course of business. To be sure,
there are defenses under the laws of contracts and sales
available to petitioner. On the other hand, the greater interest
of justice ought to favor respondent as the holder of trade
secrets. Weighing the conflicting interests between the
parties, SC rules in favor of the greater interest of respondent.
Trade secrets should receive greater protection from
discovery, because they derive economic value from being
generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public.
Page 141 of 186
J. RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
1. Boy Scouts of America et al. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)
FACTS: The Boy Scouts of America is a private, non-profit
organization engaged in instilling its system of values in young
people. At the time of the case, it asserted
that homosexuality was inconsistent with those values.
When Dale was a student at Rutgers University, he became
co-president of the Lesbian/Gay student alliance. In July 1990,
he attended a seminar on the health needs of lesbian and gay
teenagers, where he was interviewed. An account of the
interview was published and in a local newspaper and Dale
was quoted as stating he was gay. BSA officials read the
interview and expelled Dale from his position as
assistant Scoutmaster of a New Jersey troop.
Dale, an Eagle Scout, filed suit in the New Jersey Superior
Court, alleging, among other things, that the Boy Scouts had
violated the state statute prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation.
The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled against the Boy Scouts,
saying that they violated the State's public accommodations
law by revoking Dale's membership based on his
homosexuality.
Among other rulings, the court
(1) held that application of that law did not violate the Boy
Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association
because Dale's inclusion would not significantly affect
members' ability to carry out their purposes;
(2) determined that New Jersey has a compelling interest in
eliminating the destructive consequences of discrimination
from society, and that its public accommodations law abridges
no more speech than is necessary to accomplish its purpose;
and
(3) held that Dale's reinstatement did not compel the Boy
Scouts to express any message.
The Boy Scouts appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, which granted certiorari to determine whether the
application of New Jersey's public accommodations law
violated the First Amendment.
ISSUE: WON BSA has a right to revoke the membership of
a gay assistant scoutmaster after he publicly announced his
sexual orientation.
HELD: YES. Chief Justice William Rehnquist's majority
opinion relied upon Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 622 (1984), in which the Supreme Court said:
"Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in the
right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment
a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a
wide variety of political, social, economic, educational,
religious, and cultural ends." This right, the Roberts decision
continues, is crucial in preventing the majority from imposing
its views on groups that would rather express other, perhaps
unpopular, ideas. Government actions that may
unconstitutionally burden this freedom may take many forms,
one of which is "intrusion into the internal structure or affairs
of an association" like a "regulation that forces the group to
accept members it does not desire". Forcing a group to accept
certain members may impair the ability of the group to express
those views, and only those views, that it intends to express.
Thus, "freedom of association ... plainly presupposes a
freedom not to associate."
However, to determine whether a group is protected by the
First Amendment's expressive associational right, it must first
be determined whether the group engages in "expressive
association." After reviewing the Scout Oath and Scout
Law the court decided that the general mission of the Boy
Scouts is clear—it is "to instill values in young people". The
Boy Scouts seek to instill these values by having its adult
leaders spend time with the youth members, instructing and
engaging them in activities like camping, fishing, etc. During
the time spent with the youth members, the Scoutmasters and
assistant Scoutmasters inculcate them with the Boy Scouts'
values—both expressly and by example. An association that
seeks to transmit such a system of values engages in
expressive activity.
 First, associations do not have to associate for the
"purpose" of disseminating a certain message in order to
be entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. An
association must merely engage in expressive activity
that could be impaired in order to be entitled to protection.
 Second, even if the Boy Scouts discourages Scout
leaders from disseminating views on sexual issues, the
First Amendment protects the Boy Scouts' method of
expression. If the Boy Scouts wishes Scout leaders to
avoid questions of sexuality and teach only by example,
this fact does not negate the sincerity of its belief
discussed above.
 Regarding whether the Boy Scouts as a whole had an
expressive policy against homosexuality, the Court gave
deference to the organization's own assertions of the
nature of its expressions, as well as what would impair
them. The Boy Scouts asserts that it "teach[es] that
homosexual conduct is not morally straight", and that it
does "not want to promote homosexual conduct as a
legitimate form of behavior".While the policy may not
represent the views of all Boy Scouts, the First
Amendment "does not require that every member of a
group agree on every issue in order for the group's policy
to be expressive association." The Court deemed it
sufficient that the Boy Scouts had taken an official
position with respect to same-sex relationships. The
presence of an openly gay activist in an assistant
Scoutmaster's uniform sends a distinctly different
message from the presence of a heterosexual assistant
Scoutmaster who is on record as disagreeing with Boy
Scouts policy. The Boy Scouts has a First Amendment
right to choose to send one message but not the other.
The fact that the organization does not trumpet its views
from the housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its
ranks, does not mean that its views receive no First
Amendment protection.
Page 142 of 186
2. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. BPI
EMPLOYEES UNION-DAVAO CHAPTER-FEDERATION
OF UNIONS IN BPI UNIBANK (G.R. No. 164301 : August
10, 2010)
FACTS: On March 23, 2000, the BSP approved the Articles
of Merger executed 2000 by and between BPI, herein
petitioner, and FEBTC.5 This Article and Plan of Merger was
approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Pursuant to the Article and Plan of Merger, all the assets and
liabilities of FEBTC were transferred to and absorbed by BPI
as the surviving corporation. FEBTC employees, including
those in its different branches across the country, were hired
by petitioner as its own employees, with their status and
tenure recognized and salaries and benefits maintained.
Respondent BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter -
Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank is the exclusive
bargaining agent of BPI’s rank and file employees in Davao
City. The former FEBTC rank-and-file employees in Davao
City did not belong to any labor union at the time of the merger.
Prior to the effectivity of the merger, respondent Union invited
said FEBTC employees to a meeting regarding the Union
Shop Clause (Article II, Section 2) of the existing CBA
between petitioner BPI and respondent Union.7
After the meeting called by the Union, some of the former
FEBTC employees joined the Union, while others refused.
Later, however, some of those who initially joined retracted
their membership.9
Respondent Union then sent notices to the former FEBTC
employees who refused to join, as well as those who retracted
their membership, and called them to a hearing regarding the
matter. When these former FEBTC employees refused to
attend the hearing, the president of the Union requested BPI
to implement the Union Shop Clause of the CBA and to
terminate their employment pursuant thereto.10
After two months of management inaction on the request,
respondent Union informed petitioner BPI of its decision to
refer the issue of the implementation of the Union Shop
Clause of the CBA to the Grievance Committee. However, the
issue remained unresolved at this level and so it was
subsequently submitted for voluntary arbitration by the
parties.11
After two months of management inaction on the request,
respondent Union informed petitioner BPI of its decision to
refer the issue of the implementation of the Union Shop
Clause of the CBA to the Grievance Committee. However, the
issue remained unresolved at this level and so it was
subsequently submitted for voluntary arbitration by the parties.
The Voluntary Arbitrator concluded that the former FEBTC
employees could not be compelled to join the Union, as it was
their constitutional right to join or not to join any organization.
CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: WON “absorbed” FEBTC employees fell within the
definition of “new employees” under the Union Shop Clause.
HELD: YES. All employees in the bargaining unit covered by
a Union Shop Clause in their CBA with management are
subject to its terms. However, under law and jurisprudence,
the following kinds of employees are exempted from its
coverage, namely, employees who at the time the union shop
agreement takes effect are bona fide members of a religious
organization which prohibits its members from joining labor
unions on religious grounds; employees already in the
service and already members of a union other than the
majority at the time the union shop agreement took
effect;22 confidential employees who are excluded from the
rank and file bargaining unit;23 and employees excluded
from the union shop by express terms of the agreement.
When certain employees are obliged to join a particular union
as a requisite for continued employment, as in the case of
Union Security Clauses, this condition is a valid restriction of
the freedom or right not to join any labor organization because
it is in favor of unionism. This Court, on occasion, has even
held that a union security clause in a CBA is not a restriction
of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the
Constitution.24
Right of an Employee not to Join a Union is not Absolute
and Must Give Way to the Collective Good of All Members
of the Bargaining Unit
The dissenting opinions place a premium on the fact that even
if the former FEBTC employees are not old employees, they
nonetheless were employed as regular and permanent
employees without a gap in their service. However, an
employee’s permanent and regular employment status in itself
does not necessarily exempt him from the coverage of a union
shop clause.
In the past this Court has upheld even the more stringent type
of union security clause, i.e., the closed shop provision, and
held that it can be made applicable to old employees who are
already regular and permanent but have chosen not to join a
union. In the early case of Juat v. Court of Industrial
Relations,38 the Court held that an old employee who had no
union may be compelled to join the union even if the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) imposing the closed shop
provision was only entered into seven years after of the hiring
of the said employee. To quote from that decision:

Moreover, a closed shop agreement is an agreement whereby A closed-shop agreement has been considered as one form
an employer binds himself to hire only members of the of union security whereby only union members can be hired
contracting union who must continue to remain members in and workers must remain union members as a condition of
good standing to keep their jobs. It is "the most prized continued employment. The requirement for employees or
achievement of unionism." It adds membership and workers to become members of a union as a condition for
compulsory dues. By holding out to loyal members a promise employment redounds to the benefit and advantage of said
of employment in the closed shop, it wields group employees because by holding out to loyal members a
solidarity.25 promise of employment in the closed-shop the union wields
group solidarity. In fact, it is said that "the closed-shop contract
Indeed, the situation of the former FEBTC employees in this is the most prized achievement of unionism."
case clearly does not fall within the first three exceptions to
the application of the Union Shop Clause discussed earlier.
No allegation or evidence of religious exemption or prior
membership in another union or engagement as a confidential
employee was presented by both parties. The sole category
therefore in which petitioner may prove its claim is the fourth
recognized exception or whether the former FEBTC
employees are excluded by the express terms of the existing
CBA between petitioner and respondent.

To reiterate, petitioner insists that the term "new employees,"

as the same is used in the Union Shop Clause of the CBA at
issue, refers only to employees hired by BPI as non-regular
employees who later qualify for regular employment and
become regular employees, and not those who, as a legal
consequence of a merger, are allegedly automatically deemed
regular employees of BPI. However, the CBA does not make
a distinction as to how a regular employee attains such a
status. Moreover, there is nothing in the Corporation Law and
the merger agreement mandating the automatic employment
as regular employees by the surviving corporation in the
merger.

In sum, this Court finds it reasonable and just to conclude that

the Union Shop Clause of the CBA covers the former FEBTC
employees who were hired/employed by BPI during the
effectivity of the CBA in a manner which petitioner describes
as "absorption." A contrary appreciation of the facts of this
case would, undoubtedly, lead to an inequitable and very
volatile labor situation which this Court has consistently ruled
against.1avvphi1

In the case of former FEBTC employees who initially joined

the union but later withdrew their membership, there is even
greater reason for the union to request their dismissal from the
employer since the CBA also contained a Maintenance of
Membership Clause.

Page 143 of 186

 K. EMINENT DOMAIN
1. MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE
CORPORATION vs. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT,
CORPORATION (G.R. No. 123346; March 31, 2009)
FACTS: In 1992, CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT)
sought to recover from Manotok Realty, Inc. (MRI) and
Manotok Estate Corporation (MEC) (collectively, Manotoks)
the possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate in an action
filed before the RTC of Caloocan City.
CLT claims it is the owner of Lot 26 covered by TCT No. T-
177013 issued in its name by the Caloocan City Register of
Deeds, which title was derived from Estelita Hipolito. Hipolito’s
title in turn emanated from Jose Dimson, the registered owner
of TCT No. 15166, the latter having acquired the same by
virtue of a Court Order in 1966 issued by the court in a Civil
Case. Dimson’s title appears to have been sourced from OCT
No. 994
Manotoks claimed that Dimson’s title, the proximate source of
CLT’s title, was irregularly issued and, hence, the same and
subsequent titles flowing therefrom are likewise void.
Like CLT, the Manotoks likewise traced its title to OCT No.
994. TCT No. 4210, which cancelled OCT No. 994, had been
issued to Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio who had
previously acquired the property in 1918 by virtue of an
“Escritura de Venta” executed by Don Tomas Arguelles and
Don Enrique Lopes. In 1920, Ruiz and Leuterio sold the
property to Francisco Gonzalez who held title thereto until
1938 when the property was subdivided amongst the
Gonzalez children.
The properties covered by said seven certificates of title (TCT
Nos. 1368-1374) were expropriated by the Republic of the
Philippines. These properties were then later subdivided by
the National Housing Authority [NHA] into 77 lots and
thereafter sold to qualified vendees. A number of said
vendees sold 19 of these lots to Manotok Realty, Inc. while 1
lot was purchased by the Manotok Estate Corporation.
The trial court, found in favor of CLT by adopting the factual
findings arrived at by the majority commissioners appointed to
resolve the conflict of titles. It was found that that there were
inherent technical infirmities or defects on the face of TCT No.
4211 (4210), from which the Manotoks derived their titles
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence,
the Manotoks filed a petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: What are the titles acquired by the Government and
whether any of the parties is able to trace its title to the title
acquired by the Government through expropriation.
HELD: Titles acquired by the State by way of expropriation
are deemed cleansed of whatever previous flaws may have
attended these titles.
As mentioned above, the properties covered by TCT Nos.
1368-1374 were expropriated by the Republic of the
Philippines and were eventually subdivided and sold to
various vendees. The fact of expropriation is extremely
significant, for titles acquired by the State by way of
expropriation are deemed cleansed of whatever previous
flaws may have attended these titles.
Page 144 of 186
In an rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property.
After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under
a new and independent title; thus, by giving notice to all
claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings
provide a judicial process for securing better title against all
the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance."
In annulling the Manotok titles, focus was laid on the alleged
defects of TCT No. 4211 issued in September of 1918.
However, TCT No. 4211 was issued decades before the
property was expropriated. Thus, any and all defects that may
have attended that particular title would have been purged
when the property covered by it was subsequently acquired
by the State through eminent domain.
The majority report focused on the alleged flaws and inherent
technical defects of TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486, ranging
from the language of the technical descriptions, absence of
subdivision plan, lot number and survey plan. The imputed
flaws affect only those certificates of title issued prior to those
registered in the name of the Republic. Remarkably, no
specific flaw was found on the MANOTOKS' titles indicating
any irregularity on their issuance.
As it is, the validity of most of MRI’s certificates of title should
be upheld because they were derived from the Republic’s
valid certificates of title. In fact, some of the MANOTOKS’ titles
can be traced back to the Government’s titles as a result of
the expropriation in 1947.
Relevantly, the titles of the Republic, as the predecessor-in-
interest of the MANOTOKS, are presumed valid by virtue of
their acquisition resulting from the exercise of its inherent
power of eminent domain that need not be granted even by
the fundamental law. Thus, the alleged flaws concerning the
certificates of title issued previous to the exercise of the State
of its inherent power did not affect or render invalid the
subsequent transfers after the forced sale. Indeed, when land
has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally,
either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the
former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use
may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different
use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired or
any reversion to the former owner.
 2. Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI), petitioner, versus
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC);
Secretary Nasser Pangandaman of the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR); Alyansa ng mga
Manggagawang Bukid ng Hacienda Luisita
(AMBALA), Rene Galang, Noel Mallari, and Julio
Suniga and his Supervisory Group of the HLI and
Windsor Andaya, respondents. (G.R. No. 171101)
FACTS: On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted
unanimously (11-0) to dismiss the petition filed by HLI and
affirm with modifications the resolutions of the PARC revoking
HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject
lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the
government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution.
Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that
occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly
ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the
SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give
way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-
beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain
as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus
ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to
“immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs
and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or
practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will
be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the
ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as
the case may be, over their printed names.”
On November 22, 2011, the Court recalled and set aside the
option to remain as stockholders of HLI, while maintaining that
all benefits received shall be respected with no obligation to
refund or return them.
On December 9, 2011, a Motion for
Reconsideration/Clarification by private respondents Mallari,
Suniga, Supervisory Group of HLI, and Andaya (Mallari, et al
On December 16, 2011, a Motion to Clarify and Reconsider
Resolution of November 22, 2011 was filed by HLI.
ISSUES:
A. Whether or not SC erred in determining just compensation
by considering the date of taking as November 21, 1989 when
PARC approved the SDP (already revoked) since the Notice
of Coverage of January 2, 2006 may be considered as time
FWBs owned and possess the agricultural lands of Hacienda
Luisita because it was the only time when the latter was placed
under Compulsory Acquisition in view of failure to perform
their obligations under the SDP, or SDOA, when the owner is
ACTUALLY deprived or dispossessed of his property, and
considering taking from November 21, 1989 is a deprivation
of landowner’s property WITHOUT due process of law; and
HLI is entitled to be paid interest on the just compensation.
B. Whether or not Just Compensation for the Homelots be
given to FWBs as it does not form part of the 4,915.75
hectares covered by the SDP, and hence, the value of these
homelots should, with the revocation of the SDP, be paid to
Tadeco as the landowner.
Page 145 of 186
HELD:
A. The Court stressed that “just compensation has been
defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the
takers gain, but the owner’s loss. Hence, in determining
just compensation, the price or value of the property at
the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by
the government shall be the basis. If the government
takes possession of the land before the institution of
expropriation proceedings, the value should be fixed as
of the time of the taking of said possession, not of the
filing of the complaint.”
The SC, citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioc, said that
taking is when the landowner was deprived of the use and
benefit of his property, such as when the title is transferred to
the Republic. It also noted that taking also occurs when
agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and
approved by PARC for CARP coverage through the stock
distribution scheme, as in the case of HLI earlier decided.
Thus, HLI submitting its SDP for approval is an
acknowledgment on its part that the agricultural lands of
Hacienda Luisita are covered by CARP. However, the PARC
approval should be considered as the effective date of taking
because it was only during that time that the government
officially confirmed the CARP coverage of these lands.
Accordingly, Stock distribution and compulsory acquisition are
two modalities sharing the same end goal of having a more
equitable distribution of land ownership, without ignoring such
right to just compensation. Also, since it is only upon the
approval of the SDP that the agricultural lands actually came
under CARP coverage, such approval operates and takes the
place of a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under
compulsory acquisition.
What the SC found notable, however, is that the divestment
by Tadeco of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita and the
giving of the shares of stock for free is nothing but an
enticement or incentive for the FWBs to agree with the stock
distribution option scheme and not further push for land
distribution. And the stubborn fact is that the “man days”
scheme of HLI impelled the FWBs to work in the hacienda in
exchange for such shares of stock.
The Court ruled that taking only when the landowner is
deprived of the use and benefit of his property is not
incompatible with the earlier conclusion that taking took place
on November 21, 1989, and since even from the start,
TADECO seemed to already favour Stock Distribution
Scheme when complying with the CARP when it organized the
HLI as its spin-off corporation which facilitated stock
acquisition of FWBs. Tadeco assigned and conveyed
4,915.75 has to HLI the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita.
These agricultural lands constituted as the capital contribution
of the FWBs in HLI. This, in effect, deprived TADECO itself of
the ownership over these lands when it transferred the same
to HLI.
When the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita were
transferred by Tadeco to HLI in order to comply with CARP
through the stock distribution option scheme under PARC
Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989, Tadeco
was consequently dispossessed of the ownership of the
same.
Furthermore, adherence to the suggestion of HLI that the
Notice of Coverage issued on January 2, 2006 should be
considered as date of taking would in effect penalize the
qualified FWBs twice for acceding to the Stock Distribution
Scheme, (1) depriving them of the agricultural lands they
should have gotten earlier, if it were not for this SDP and (2)
making them pay higher amortization for the agricultural lands
that should have been given to them decades ago.
The SC maintained that, as it has in fact already ruled on its
reckoning date, that is, November 21, 1989, the date of
issuance of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2, based on the
above-mentioned disquisitions.
On side note, the SC added that “even though the
compensation due to HLI will still be preliminarily determined
by DAR and LBP, subject to review by the RTC acting as a
SAC, the fact that the reckoning point of taking is already fixed
at a certain date should already hasten the proceedings and
not further cause undue hardship on the parties, especially the
qualified FWBs.”
B. The court ruled in the negative. As reiterated in the earlier
decision, the distribution of homelots is required under RA
6657 only for corporations or business associations owning or
operating farms which opted for land distribution.
Corporations are not obliged to provide for homelots.
Nonetheless, HLI undertook to subdivide and allocate for free
and without charge among the qualified family-beneficiaries
240 sq. m. of homelots to some, if not all of the qualified
beneficiaries.
The Supreme Court, by a unanimous vote, resolved to
maintain its ruling that the FWBs shall retain ownership of the
homelots given to them with no obligation to pay for the value
of said lots. Also, since the SDP was already revoked with
finality in th earlier discussion of the decision, the Court directs
the government through the DAR to pay HLI the just
compensation for said homelots in consonance with Sec. 4,
Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution that the taking of land for
use in the agrarian reform program is subject to the payment
of just compensation.
The Motions of both parties were DENIED with qualification.
The July 5, 2011, Decision was modified by the November 21,
2011 Resolution which ordered the government, through the
DAR, to pay just compensation for the 240 sq. m. homelots
distributed to FWBs. This RESOLUTION is now declared
FINAL and EXECUTORY.
Page 146 of 186
3. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT ENGINEER
CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS vs. SPOUSES
HERACLEO and RAMONA TECSON, (2013
DECISION)
FACTS: Respondent spouses Heracleo and Ramona Tecson
(respondents) are co-owners of a parcel of land with an area
of 7,268 square meters located in San Pablo, Malolos,
Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-43006of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Said parcel of
land was among the properties taken by the government
sometime in 1940 without the owners consent and without the
necessary expropriation proceedings and used for the
construction of the MacArthur Highway.
In 1940, the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) took respondents-movants' subject property without
the benefit of expropriation proceedings for the construction of
the MacArthur Highway. In a letter dated December 15,
1994,respondents-movants demanded the payment of the fair
market value of the subject parcel of land. Celestino R.
Contreras (Contreras), then District Engineer of the First
Bulacan Engineering District of the DPWH, offered to pay for
the subject land at the rate of Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per
square meter, per Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal
Committee (PAC) of Bulacan. Unsatisfied with the offer,
respondents-movants demanded the return of their property,
or the payment of compensation at the current fair market
value. Hence, the complaint for recovery of possession with
damages filed by respondents-movants. Respondents-
movants were able to obtain favorable decisions in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA),
with the subject property valued at One Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (₱1,500.00) per square meter, with interest at
six percent (6%) per annum. Aggrieved, petitioners come
before the Court assailing the CA decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the just compensation should be
based on the value of the property at the time of taking in 1940
and not at the time of payment?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is modified. The instant case
stemmed from an action for recovery of possession with
damages filed by respondents against petitioners. It, however,
revolves around the taking of the subject lot by petitioners for
the construction of the MacArthur Highway. There is taking
when the expropriator enters private property not only for a
momentary period but for a permanent duration, or for the
purpose of devoting the property to public use in such a
manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof.
When a property is taken by the government for public use,
jurisprudence clearly provides for the remedies available to a
landowner. The owner may recover his property if its return is
feasible or, if it is not, the aggrieved owner may demand
payment of just compensation for the land taken.For failure of
respondents to question the lack of expropriation proceedings
for a long period of time, they are deemed to have waived and
are estopped from assailing the power of the government to
expropriate or the public use for which the power was
exercised. What is left to respondents is the right of
compensation.The trial and appellate courts found that
respondents are entitled to compensation. The only issue left
for determination is the propriety of the amount awarded to
respondents.
Just compensation is "the fair value of the property as
between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, fixed
at the time of the actual taking by the government." This rule
holds true when the property is taken before the filing of an
expropriation suit, and even if it is the property owner who
brings the action for compensation.
The Court in the several cases was confronted with common
factual circumstances where the government took control and
possession of the subject properties for public use without
initiating expropriation proceedings and without payment of
just compensation, while the landowners failed for a long
period of time to question such government act and later
instituted actions for recovery of possession with damages.
The Court thus determined the landowners right to the
payment of just compensation and, more importantly, the
amount of just compensation. The Court has uniformly ruled
that just compensation is the value of the property at the time
of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation As
in said cases, just compensation due respondents in this case
should, therefore, be fixed not as of the time of payment but
at the time of taking, that is, in 1940.
The reason for the rule has been clearly explained in Republic
v. Lara, et al.,and repeatedly held by the Court in recent cases,
thus:
"The value of the property should be fixed as of the date when
it was taken and not the date of the filing of the proceedings."
For where property is taken ahead of the filing of the
condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be
enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry
by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its
value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in
the value of the property from the time it is taken to the time
the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The
owner of private property should be compensated only for
what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation
shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is
only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken.
Both the RTC and the CA recognized that the fair market value
of the subject property in 1940 wasP0.70/sq m. Hence, it
should, therefore, be used in determining the amount due
respondents instead of the higher value which isP1,500.00.
While disparity in the above amounts is obvious and may
appear inequitable to respondents as they would be receiving
such outdated valuation after a very long period, it is equally
true that they too are remiss in guarding against the cruel
effects of belated claim. The concept of just compensation
does not imply fairness to the property owner alone.
Compensation must be just not only to the property owner, but
also to the public which ultimately bears the cost of
expropriation.
Clearly, petitioners had been occupying the subject property
for more than fifty years without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings. In taking respondents property without the
benefit of expropriation proceedings and without payment of
just compensation, petitioners clearly acted in utter disregard
of respondents proprietary rights which cannot be
countenanced by the Court.For said illegal taking,
respondents are entitled to adequate compensation in the
form of actual or compensatory damages which in this case
should be the legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum on
the value of the land at the time of taking in 1940 until full
payment. This is based on the principle that interest runs as a
matter of law and follows from the right of the landowner to be
placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as of
the date of taking.
Page 147 of 186
2015 DECISION
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by
respondents-movants spouses Heracleo and Ramona
Tecson imploring the Court to take a second look at its July 1,
2013 Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
July 31, 2007 in CAG.R. CV No. 77997 is MODIFIED, in that
the valuation of the subject property owned by respondents
shall be P0.70 instead of ₱1,500.00 per square meter, with
interest at six percent (6%) per annum from the date of taking
in 1940 instead of March 17, 1995, until full payment.
In view of the contrasting opinions of the members of the Third
Division on the instant motion, and the transcendental
importance of the issue raised herein, the members of the
Third Division opted to refer the issue to the En Banc for
resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of private property without
due process should be nullified?
HELD: No. The government’s failure to initiate the necessary
expropriation proceedings prior to actual taking cannot simply
invalidate the State’s exercise of its eminent domain power,
given that the property subject of expropriation is indubitably
devoted for public use, and public policy imposes upon the
public utility the obligation to continue its services to the public.
To hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise of lack of due
process would certainly diminish or weaken one of the State’s
inherent powers, the ultimate objective of which is to serve the
greater good. Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation
will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the
landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of
compensation.
While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to
receive an outdated valuation, the long-established rule is that
the fair equivalent of a property should be computed not at the
time of payment, but at the time of taking. This is because the
purpose of ‘just compensation’ is not to reward the owner for
the property taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof.
The owner should be compensated only for what he actually
loses, and what he loses is the actual value of the property at
the time it is taken. The Court must adhere to the doctrine that
its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law
according to its express terms, interpretation being called for
only when such literal application is impossible. To entertain
other formula for computing just compensation, contrary to
those established by law and jurisprudence, would open
varying interpretation of economic policies – a matter which
this Court has no competence to take cognizance of. Equity
and equitable principles only come into full play when a gap
exists in the law and jurisprudence.
Velasco Dissent:
The State’s power of eminent domain is not absolute; the
Constitution is clear that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty and property without due process of law. As such,
failure of the government to institute the necessary
proceedings should lead to failure of taking an individual’s
property. In this case, since the property was already taken,
the complainants must be equitably compensated for the loss
thereof.
For purposes of “just” compensation, the value of the land
should be determined from the time the property owners filed
the initiatory complaint, earning interest therefrom. To hold
otherwise would validate the State’s act as one of
expropriation in spite of procedural infirmities which, in turn,
would amount to unjust enrichment on its part. To continue
condoning such acts would be licensing the government to
continue dispensing with constitutional requirements in taking
private property.
Page 148 of 186
4. PATRICIA I. TIONGSON VS NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY (558 SCRA 56 (2008)
FACTS:
The present Petition for Review on Certiorari raises the
question of from what date should just compensation of the
subject properties sought to be expropriated be reckoned -
whether it is from the taking of the property or on the filing of
the complaint.
Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) took
possession in 1978, for purposes of expropriation, of
properties belonging to petitioners Patricia L. Tiongson, et al.
pursuant to P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670. "An Act Providing for
the Expropriation of the Property Known as the 'Tambunting
Estate' Registered Under TCT Nos. 119059, 122450, 122459,
122452 And Lot Nos. 1-A, 1-C, 1-D, 1-E, 1-F, 1-G And 1-H Of
(LRC) PSD-230517 (Previously Covered By TCT No. 119058)
of the Register of Deeds of Manila and for The Sale at Cost of
the Lots Therein to the Bona Fide Occupants and Other
Squatters Families and to Upgrade the Same, and Authorizing
the Appropriation of Funds For The Purpose" (underscoring
supplied), and of properties belonging to Patricia Tiongson, et
al. pursuant to P.D. No. 1670, "An Act Providing For The
Expropriation of the Property Along the Estero De Sunog-
Apog Formerly Consisting of Lots Nos. 55-A, 55-B And 55-C,
Block 2918 of the Subdivision Plan Psd-11746, Covered by
TCT Nos. 49286, 49287 and 49288, Respectively, of the
Register of Deeds of Manila and for The Sale at Cost of the
Lots Therein to the Bona Fide Occupants and Other Squatter
Families and to Upgrade The Same, and Authorizing The
Appropriation of Funds For The Purpose". The two P.D.’s
were thereafter declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court they being violative of the therein petitioners' right to due
process of law. On September 14, 1987, the NHA filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against Tiongson,
et al. for expropriation of parcels of land which were covered
by P.D. Nos. 1669 and 1670.
The RTC held that the determination of just compensation of
the properties should be reckoned from the date of filing of
NHA’s petition or on September 14, 1987. However, on
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial
court’s orders and held that the just compensation should be
based on the actual taking of the property in 1978. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not just compensation should be reckoned from
the time of the taking of the property or on the filing of the
complaint
HELD:
In several aforementioned cases, in a situation where a
government agency, in this case the National Housing
Authority, took possession of properties belonging to private
individuals for purposes of expropriation and the laws by virtue
of which such government agency expropriated the subject
properties were subsequently declared to be unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court, the determination of just compensation
should be reckoned from the date of filing the complaint for
expropriation and not from the time of actual taking of the
properties.
In declaring, in its challenged Decision, that the determination
of just compensation should be reckoned from NHA’s taking
of the properties in 1978, the appellate court simply relied on
Annex ―C of NHA’s petition before it, the Order dated June
15, 1988 of the then Presiding Judge of the trial court, and
thus concluded that ―the parties admitted that [NHA] took
possession of the subject properties as early as 1978. The
appellate court reached that conclusion, despite its recital of
the antecedents of the case including Tiongson, sustained
moves, even before the trial court, in maintaining that the
reckoning of just compensation should be from the date of
filing of the petition for expropriation on September 14, 1987.
The earlier-quoted allegations of the body and prayer in NHA’s
Petition for Expropriation filed before the RTC constitute
judicial admissions of NHA—that it possessed the subject
properties until this Court’s declaration, in its above-stated
Decision in G.R. No. L-55166 promulgated on May 21, 1987,
that P.D. No. 1669 pursuant to which NHA took possession of
the properties of petitioners in 1978 was unconstitutional and,
therefore, null and void. These admissions, the appellate court
either unwittingly failed to consider or escaped its notice.
Following then Rule 67, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
reading:
SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. - If the objections to and the
defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the
property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as
required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of
expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to
take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use
or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of
just compensation to be determined as of the date of the
taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever
came first.
Page 149 of 186
5. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH THE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROSARIO
RODRIGUEZ REYES CARPIO, J.)
FACTS: Private respondent Rosario Rodriguez Reyes is the
absolute owner of a parcel of land identified as Lot 849-B and
covered by TCT No. T-7194. The 1,043-square meter lot is
situated on Claro M. Recto and Osmeña Streets, Cagayan de
Oro City.
On 6 November 1990, private respondent received a letter
from petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
requesting permission to enter into a portion of private
respondent’s lot consisting of 663 square meters, and to begin
construction of the Osmeña Street extension road.
On 20 December 1990, petitioner took possession of private
respondent’s property without initiating expropriation
proceedings. Consequently, on 4 and 7 January 1991, private
respondent sent letters to the DPWH stating her objection to
the taking of her property. Private respondent sent a letter to
the City Appraisal Committee (CAC) rejecting the latter’s
appraisal of the subject property. In the same letter, private
respondent requested the City Assessor for a reappraisal of
her property, but said request was denied.
On 17 March 1992, private respondent filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City a complaint claiming
just compensation and damages against petitioner.
On 30 June 1993, the RTC appointed three commissioners to
determine the subject property’s fair market value, as well as
the consequential benefits and damages of its expropriation.
The RTC deemed it just, fair and reasonable to adopt the
market value of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (₱4,000.00) per
square meter as the highest price obtaining and prevailing in
1990, the time of the taking of the property.
On 13 April 1994, the scheduled hearing was reset to 19 May
1994, to give private respondent (plaintiff) time to consider the
offer of petitioner (defendant) to amicably settle the case and
to accept the just compensation of ₱3,200 per square meter,
or a total of ₱2,212,600, for the 663-square meter portion of
private respondent’s lot. On 16 May 1994, private respondent
filed with the RTC an "Urgent Motion to Deposit The Amount
of ₱2,121,600 in Court. RTC ordered the commissioners to
submit their report as soon as possible, but until the scheduled
hearing on 15 July 1994, the commissioners still failed to
submit their report. Upon motion of private respondent, the
RTC issued an order appointing a new set of commissioners.
On 11 October 1994, the new commissioners submitted their
report, the pertinent facts are as follows:
Taking into consideration, among others, the location of the
property and a research of the prevailing prices of lots
proximate to and/or near the vicinity of plaintiff's property, the
undersigned Commissioners respectfully recommend to the
Honorable Court the following valuation, to wit:
1. Front portion along Recto Avenue with a measurement of
21.52 meters from south to north with an area of 347.66
square meters at ₱18,000.00 to ₱20,000.00 per square meter;
2. Middle portion with a measurement of 21.52 meters
containing an area of 347.66 square meters at ₱16,000.00 to
₱18,000.00 per square meter;
3. Rear/back portion measuring 21.52 meters with an area of
347.66 square meters at ₱14,000.00 to ₱16,000.00 per
square meter;
On the other hand, the remaining portion left to the plaintiff,
Lot No. 849-B-3 will not actually be 297 square meters. If we
deduct the setback area from Osmeña Extension Street, the
usable/buildable area left to the plaintiff would only be a little
over 50 square meters. This portion would not command a
good price if sold. Neither is it ideal for purposes of any
building construction because aside from its being a very
small strip of land, the shape is triangular.
On 2 June 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants, declaring the former as
having the right to retain 590 square meters of the property
covered by TCT No. T-7194, and ordering the latter to return
293 square meters of the 746 square meters taken. Plaintiff
herein is ordered to forthwith defray the expenses to be
incurred in undertaking the road construction of the 293
square meters which the defendants will later on provide along
the right portion of her property.
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment affirming with modifications the decision of the RTC.
The Court of Appeals found that the commissioners’
recommendations on just compensation were not supported
by valid documents. Also, it was unclear in the RTC decision
whether the trial court merely adopted the commissioners’
recommendations or the court made its own independent
valuation of the subject property. Thus, the Court of Appeals
held that a reconvening of the commissioners or an
appointment of new commissioners to determine just
compensation was necessary. The appellate court further held
that the trial court’s order for petitioner’s return of the 293-
square meter lot had no legal basis and was no longer feasible
since the lot was already part of the completed Sergio
Osmeña extension road. Moreover, consequential damages
should be awarded in lieu of actual damages for private
respondent’s alleged loss of income from the remaining 297-
square meter lot.
The case is remanded to the trial court which is ordered to
reconvene the commissioners or appoint new commissioners
to determine, in accordance with this Decision, the amount of
just compensation due to plaintiff-appellee Rosario Rodriguez
Reyes for the 746 square meters of land taken from her and
consequential damages to the 297-square meter portion left.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
A. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the remand
of the case to the trial court, to order the reconvening of the
commissioners or appointment of new commissioners to
determine the consequential damages for the remaining 297-
square meter lot; and
B. Whether or not the Court erred in awarding consequential
damages.
HELD:
A. On whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the
remand of the case to the trial court to order the reconvening
of the commissioners or appointment of new commissioners
Page 150 of 186
to determine the consequential damages for the remaining
297-square meter lot
Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as
sovereign, to take private property for public use upon
observance of due process of law and payment ofjust
compensation. The Constitution provides that, "[p]rivate
property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation."
Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property
sought to be expropriated. Among the factors to be considered
in arriving at the fair market value of the property are the cost
of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or
potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size,
shape, location, and the tax declarations thereon. The
measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. To be
just, the compensation must be fair not only to the owner but
also to the taker.
Just compensation is based on the price or value of the
property at the time it was taken from the owner and
appropriated by the government. However, if the government
takes possession before the institution of expropriation
proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the
taking of said possession, not of the filing of the complaint.
The value at the time of the filing of the complaint should be
the basis for the determination of the value when the taking of
the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to the
commencement of the proceedings.
However, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals that Rule
67 presupposes a prior filing of complaint for eminent domain
with the appropriate court by the expropriator. If no such
complaint is filed, the expropriator is considered to have
violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived the
usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the
appointment of commissioners to ascertain just
compensation.
In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we
clarified that when there is no action for expropriation and the
case involves only a complaint for damages or just
compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on
ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule
67) are no longer applicable, and a trial before commissioners
is dispensable.
In this case, petitioner took possession of the subject property
without initiating expropriation proceedings. Consequently,
private respondent filed the instant case for just compensation
and damages. To determine just compensation, the trial court
appointed three commissioners pursuant to Section 5 of Rule
67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. None of the parties
objected to such appointment.
The trial court’s appointment of commissioners in this
particular case is not improper. The appointment was done
mainly to aid the trial court in determining just compensation,
and it was not opposed by the parties. Besides, the trial court
is not bound by the commissioners’ recommended valuation
of the subject property. The court has the discretion on
whether to adopt the commissioners’ valuation or to substitute
its own estimate of the value as gathered from the records.
However, we agree with the appellate court that the trial
court’s decision is not clear as to its basis for ascertaining just
compensation. The trial court mentioned in its decision the
valuations in the reports of the City Appraisal Committee and
of the commissioners appointed pursuant to Rule 67. But
whether the trial court considered these valuations in arriving
at the just compensation, or the court made its own
independent valuation based on the records, was obscure in
the decision. The trial court simply gave the total amount of
just compensation due to the property owner without laying
down its basis. Thus, there is no way to determine whether the
adjudged just compensation is based on competent evidence.
For this reason alone, a remand of the case to the trial court
for proper determination of just compensation is in order. In
National Power Corporation v. Bongbong, we held that
although the determination of just compensation lies within the
trial court’s discretion, it should not be done arbitrarily or
capriciously. The decision of the trial court must be based on
all established rules, correct legal principles, and competent
evidence. The court is proscribed from basing its judgment on
speculations and surmises.
him." The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 22
requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without
a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived
at another’s expense or damage.39 There is no unjust
enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid claim
to such benefit. As stated, consequential damages are
awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining
property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease
in value. Thus, there is a valid basis for the grant of
consequential damages to the property owner, and no unjust
enrichment can result therefrom.

B. Petitioner contends that no consequential damages may be

awarded as the remaining lot was "not actually taken" by the
DPWH, and to award consequential damages for the lot which
was retained by the owner is tantamount to unjust enrichment
on the part of the latter. Petitioner’s contention is
unmeritorious.

No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real property

is necessary to grant consequential damages. If as a result of
the expropriation made by petitioner, the remaining lot (i.e.,
the 297-square meter lot) of private respondent suffers from
an impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages
may be awarded to private respondent. On the other hand, if
the expropriation results to benefits to the remaining lot of
private respondent, these consequential benefits36 may be
deducted from the awarded consequential damages, if any, or
from the market value of the expropriated property. We held
in B.H. Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of Appeals that:

To determine just compensation, the trial court should first

ascertain the market value of the property, to which should be
added the consequential damages after deducting therefrom
the consequential benefits which may arise from the
expropriation. If the consequential benefits exceed the
consequential damages, these items should be disregarded
altogether as the basic value of the property should be paid in
every case.

Section 6 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

x x x The commissioners shall assess the

consequential damages to the property not taken
and deduct from such consequential damages the
consequential benefits to be derived by the owner
from the public use or purpose of the property taken,
the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the
carrying on of the business of the corporation or
person taking the property. But in no case shall the
consequential benefits assessed exceed the
consequential damages assessed, or the owner be
deprived of the actual value of his property so taken.

An award of consequential damages for property not taken is

not tantamount to unjust enrichment of the property owner.
There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a
benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money
or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience."38 Article 22 of the Civil
Code provides that "[e]very person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to

Page 151 of 186

 6. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. APOLONIO
V. MARASIGAN, FRANCISCO V. MARASIGAN, LILIA
V. MARASIGAN, BENITO V. MARASIGAN, JR., and
ALICIA V. MARASIGAN, (November 20, 2017 Tijam
J)
Facts: NPC filed an expropriation committee against
Marasigan in order to construct Steel Transmission Lines and
Wooden electric poles. NPC sought an easement of right of
way over the subject properties. Based on the tax declaration
which classified the properties as agricultural and based on
the BIR zoning valuations, NPC offered to pay Php
299,550.50
Marasigan did not object to the expropriation but opposed the
classification since they allege that it is classified as industrial,
commercial, and residential since 1993. They then claim Php
47,064,400 for the affected properties. As counterclaim, they
also seek payment of consequential damages for the areas in
between the transmission lines (dangling portions). RTC
issued an Expropriation order and fixed the value of the
properties at Php 47,064,400 which was deposited by NPC
with Landbank. RTC then issued a writ of possession in favor
of NPC . An appraisal committee was formed by the RTC for
purposes of determining just compensation. A reverse trial
thereafter ensued.
Marasigan presented the Chairman of the appraisal
committee who testified that the appraisal committee
recommended the total valuation of PhP 49,064,400 based on
the assessor's data and the BIR zonal valuations as indicated
on the 1997 tax declarations. Also presented was the
succeeding Chairman of the appraisal committee who testified
that the properties suffered consequential damages which the
appraisal committee recommended to be computed at 50% of
the BIR zonal value per square meter or for a total amount of
PhP 22,227,800.
On ocular inspection, the appraisal committee found that the
existence of the transmission lines hampered the properties'
potential use such that while the areas before and after the
transmission lines could still be used, the areas it between
could no longer be utilized. The appraisal committee also
noted that the transmission lines produced considerable noise
making the area unsuitable for residential purposes. NPC,
presented its right-of-way officers whose testimonies sought
to establish that the lots being claimed by Marasigan as
dangling areas were classified as agricultural under the tax
declarations and that NPC negotiated with Marasigan, and
that NPC took the properties between 1996 and 1998. NPC’s
officers alleged that the dangling areas could still be used for
agricultural purposes but agreed that the lines may endanger
people and animals.
On cross-examination, the right of way officer admitted that
the properties were classified as agro industrial as stated in
the 1998 tax declarations. He admitted that the classification
of the properties as agricultural which was used as basis for
computing its value was erroneous.
RTC affirmed the recommendation of the appraisal committee
for payment of the Just compensation in the amount of
47,064,400 based on the BIR zonal valuation as of the time of
the filing of the complaint on Jan 23, 2006. It also affirmed that
payment of the consequential damages for the properties that
were rendered useless. RTC rejected NPC’s claim that it took
the properties in 1972 when NPC was allegedly allowed by
Marasigan to construct the lines. NPC’s MR was denied by
RTC but the court made modifications by including interest
(6%, 12%) On their appeal to the CA, they alleged that the
award was based on the premise that it sought to acquire
ownership when it merely sought to acquire right-of-way; the
Page 152 of 186
payment of which is only 10% of the market-value of the
properties. The CA held that payment of the full value was
Just Compensation. It was also held that NPC failed to allege
the issue of taking in its complaint nor was it raised during pre-
trial or even proved during trial. The CA denied their appeal
and affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reckoning point of the market
value of the properties was during the taking of the property
HELD: The court ruled in the affirmative. The general rule is
that it should be reckoned at the time of actual taking when it
preceded the filing of the complaint. Under Rule 67, Sec 4; the
value of just compensation is to be determined as of the date
of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
whichever came first. In NTC v. Oroville: it was settled that just
compensation should be reckoned from the date of actual
taking when such preceded the filing of the complaint for
expropriation. The State is only obliged to make good the loss
sustained by the landowner and considering the
circumstances availing at the time the property was taken In
some cases, there were deviations from the general rule due
to special circumstances as it necessitated a valuation at the
time the landowners initiated proceedings after the taking of
the properties.
In the case at bar, NPC insists that it took the properties in the
1970s despite initiating the complaint only on Jan 23, 2006
which is why they allege that it should be reckoned in the
1970s. NPC's action relative to the acquisition of an easement
of right-of-way made prior to the filing of its expropriation
complaint was limited only to the conduct of negotiations with
respondents. The negotiations pertained to the construction
of transmission lines not among the transmission lines subject
of the complaint. This was alleged by NPC and was testified
to by their right-of-way officer. There being no sufficient proof
that NPC actually took the subject properties at a date
preceding the filing of the expropriation complaint, the time of
the taking should be taken to mean as coinciding with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings on January
23, 2006.
The determination of just compensation in expropriation cases
is a function addressed to the discretion of the courts owing to
the constitutional mandate that no private property shall be
taken for public use without payment of just compensation. As
such, legislative enactments, as well as executive issuances,
fixing or providing for the method of computing just
compensation are tantamount to impermissible encroachment
on judicial prerogatives. As such, they are not binding on
courts and are treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the
amount of just compensation The tax declarations presented
by NPC is only of of the several factors which the court may
consider to facilitate the determination of just compensation
as they enjoy judicial discretion to determine the classification
of lands. The court's discretion in classifying the expropriated
land is only for the purpose of determining just compensation
and is not meant to substitute that of the local government's
power to reclassify and convert lands through local ordinance
 7. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LIM (G.R. No.
161656, June 29, 2005)
FACTS: In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action
for expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu City for the purpose
of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army.
The said lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and
Eulalia Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB
then took possession of the lots. Thereafter, on May 1940, the
CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the
Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation. The
Denzons appealed to the CA but it was dismissed on March
11, 1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5, 1948.
In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National
Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it
"denied knowledge of the matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt.
Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the
appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time.
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September
20, 1961, the Denzons· successors-in-interest,Valdehueza
and Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of
possession with damages against the Republic and AFP
officers in possession of the property.
On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the
names of Valdehueza and Panerio with the annotation
"subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to
acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and939 upon previous
payment of a reasonable market value".
On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of
Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and
have retained their right as such over lots because of the
Republic’s failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged
in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the
annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a
deed of sale in favor of the Republic.
They appealed the CFI·s decision to the SC. The latter held
that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of
Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just
compensation by the Republic. SC still ruled that they are not
entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand
the payment of their fair market value.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot
932 to Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as security for their
loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the
mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lot title was issued in his
name.
On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title
with the RTC against the petitioners herein. On 2001, the RTC
rendered a decision in favor of Lim, declaring that he is the
absolute and exclusive owner of the lot with all the rights of an
absolute owner including the right to possession. Petitioners
elevated the case to the CA. In its Decision dated September
18, 2003, it sustained the RTC Decision saying: ´... This is
contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just
compensation embraces not only the correct determination of
the amount to be paid to the owners of the land,but also the
payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
"just"...”
Page 153 of 186
Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for
review alleging that they remain as the owner of Lot 932.
ISSUE: Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot
932 despite its failure to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-
interest the just compensation pursuant to the judgment of the
CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940.
HELD: No.
No person shall be deprived of his private property without due
process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential
element of due process is that there must be just
compensation whenever private property is taken for public
use. Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution
mandates: “Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.”
The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it
failed and refused to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-
interest the just compensation. The length of time and the
manner with which it evaded payment demonstrate its
arbitrary highhandedness and confiscatory attitude. More than
half of a century has passed, yet, to this day, the landowner,
now respondent, has remained empty-handed. Undoubtedly,
over 50 years of delayed payment cannot, in any way, be
viewed as fair. This is more so when such delay is
accompanied by bureaucratic hassles.
The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republic’s delay
is contrary to the rules of fair play, as “just compensation
embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to
be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the
land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered ‘just.’” In
jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated
property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been
held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time,
the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.
While it is true that all private properties are subject to the
need of government, and the government may take them
whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion
demands, however, the Constitution guarantees that when
this governmental right of expropriation is exercised, it shall
be attended by compensation. From the taking of private
property by the government under the power of eminent
domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the
owner for his loss. Significantly, the above-mentioned
provision of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a
grant but a limitation of power. This limiting function is in
keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against the
arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of
the individual’s rights. Given this function, the provision should
therefore be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the
government, and liberally in favor of the property owner.
The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated
shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full
payment of the just compensation. Although the right to
appropriate and use land is complete at the time of entry, title
to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is
actually made. Clearly, without full payment of just
compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the
landowner to the expropriator. Otherwise stated, the
Republic’s acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon the
full payment of just compensation within a reasonable time.
Of course the Court is aware of the doctrine that “nonpayment
of just compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does
not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the
expropriated lots.” However, the facts of the present case do
not justify its application. It bears stressing that the Republic
was ordered to pay just compensation twice, the first was in
the expropriation proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza.
Fifty-seven (57) years have passed since then. We cannot but
construe the Republic’s failure to pay just compensation as a
deliberate refusal on its part. Under such circumstance,
recovery of possession is in order. In several jurisdictions, the
courts held that recovery of possession may be had when
property has been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained
by one claiming to act under the power of eminent domain or
where a rightful entry is made and the party condemning
refuses to pay the compensation which has been assessed or
agreed upon; or fails or refuses to have the compensation
assessed and paid.
It must be emphasized that an individual cannot be deprived
of his property for the public convenience. One of the basic
principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of
the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the
means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is
also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in
keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not
excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not
even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public
need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the
bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say
that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of
the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest
of the nation who would deny him that right.
Besides, practically speaking, the reversion of Lot 932 to
respondent will only affect a handful of military personnel. It
will not result to “irreparable damage” or “damage beyond
pecuniary estimation,” as what the Republic vehemently
claims.In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that “the
nonpayment of just compensation does not entitle the private
landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots,
however, in cases where the government failed to pay just
compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the
judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners
concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their
property. This is in consonance with the principle that “the
government cannot keep the property and dishonor the
judgment.” To be sure, the five-year period limitation will
encourage the government to pay just compensation
punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all,
it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property
from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment
of just compensation. We defined just compensation as not
only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
property owner but also the payment of the property within a
reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered “just.”
Page 154 of 186
8. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EUGENIO
DALAUTA (G.R. No. 190004, August 08, 2017)
FACTS: Eugenio Dalauta (Dalauta) was the registered owner
of an agricultural land in Florida, Butuan City, with an area of
25.2160 hectares and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-1624. The land was placed by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) under compulsory acquisition of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) as
reflected in the Notice of Coverage, dated January 17, 1994,
which Dalauta received on February 7, 1994. Petitioner Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered P192,782.59 as
compensation for the land, but Dalauta rejected such
valuation for being too low. The case was referred to the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB) through the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Butuan City. A summary
administrative proceeding was conducted to determine the
appropriate just compensation for the subject property. In its
Resolution,5 dated December 4, 1995, the PARAD affirmed
the valuation made by LBP in the amount of P192,782.59. On
February 28, 2000, Dalauta filed a petition for determination
of just compensation with the RTC, sitting as SAC. He alleged
that LBP's valuation of the land was inconsistent with the rules
and regulations prescribed in DAR Administrative Order (A.O.)
No. 06, series of 1992, for determining the just compensation
of lands covered by CARP's compulsory acquisition scheme.
Dalauta argued that the valuation of his land should be
determined using the formula in DAR A.O. No. 6, series of
1992, which was Land Value (LV) = Capitalized Net Income
(CNI) x 0.9 + Market Value (MV) per tax declaration x 0.1, as
he had a net income of 350,000.00 in 1993 from the sale of
the trees that were grown on the said land. LBP argued that
the valuation of Dalauta's land should be determined using the
formula LV= MV x 2, which yielded a total value of
P192,782.59 for the 25.2160 hectares of Dalauta's land. LBP
claimed that during the ocular inspection/investigation, only 36
coconut trees existed on the subject land; that three (3)
hectares of it were planted with com; and the rest was idle with
few second-growth trees.
The SAC explained its decision in this wise:
Going over the records of this case, taking into consideration
the Commissioners Report which is replete with pictures of the
improvements introduced which pictures are admitted into
evidence not as illustrated testimony of a human witness but
as probative evidence in itself of what it shows (Basic
Evidence, Bautista, 2004 Edition), this Court is of the
considered view that the Report (Commissioners) must be
given weight.
While LBP's witness Ruben P. Penaso may have gone to the
area, but he did not, at least, list down the improvements. The
members of the Board of Commissioners on the other hand,
went into the area, surveyed its metes and bounds and listed
the improvements they found including the farmhouse made
of wood with galvanized iron roofing (Annex "C",
Commissioner's Report, p. 132, Record)
All told, the basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by
Voluntary Offer to Sell and Compulsory Acquisition is:
LV = (CNI X 0.6) + (CS X 0.3) + (MV X 0.1)
Where: LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
 MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula is used if all the three (3) factors are
present, relevant and applicable. In any case, the resulting
figure in the equation is always multiplied to the number of
area or hectarage of land valued for just compensation.
Whenever one of the factors in the general formula is not
available, the computation of land value will be any of the three
(3) computations or formulae:
LV (CNI x 0.9) + (MVx 0.1) (If the comparable sales
factor is missing)
LV (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1) (If the capitalize net
income is unavailable)
LV = MV x 2 (If only the market value factor is
available)
Since the Capitalized Net Income in this case is available, the
formula to be used is:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
Whence:
LV = (P350,000.00/.12 x 0.9) + (P145,570 x 0.1)
= (P2,916,666.67 x 0.9) + (P145,557.00) [sic]
= P2,625,000.00 + P14,557.00
= P2,639,557.00 plus P100,000.00 for the Farmhouse
The CA sustained the valuation by the SAC for being well
within R.A. No. 6657, its implementing rules and regulations,
and in accordance with settled jurisprudence. The factors laid
down under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, which were
translated into a basic formula in DAR A.O. No. 6, series of
1992, were used in determining the value of Dalauta's
property. It stated that the courts were not at liberty to
disregard the formula which was devised to implement
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657. The CA, however, disagreed with
the SAC's valuation of the farmhouse, which was made of
wood and galvanized iron, for it was inexistent during the
taking of the subject land – (1) the compensation for the
farmhouse (P100,000.00), as well as the awards for attorney's
fees (P150,000.00) and litigation expenses (P50,000.00), are
hereby DELETED
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court correctly computed the
just compensation of the subject property.
HELD: Upon an assiduous assessment of the different
valuations arrived at by the DAR, the SAC and the CA, the
Court agrees with the position of Justice Francis Jardeleza
that just compensation for respondent Dalauta's land should
be computed based on the formula provided under DAR-LBP
Joint Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 2003 (JMC No.
11 (2003)). This Memorandum Circular, which provides for the
specific guidelines for properties with standing commercial
trees, explains:
Page 155 of 186
The Capitalized Net Income (CNI) approach to land
valuation assumes that there would be uniform
streams of future income that would be realized in
perpetuity from the seasonal/permanent crops
planted to the land. In the case of commercial trees
(hardwood and soft wood species), however, only a
one-time income is realized when the trees are due
for harvest. The regular CNI approach in the
valuation of lands planted to commercial trees would
therefore not apply.
Dalauta's sale of falcata trees indeed appears to be a one-
time transaction. He did not claim to have derived any other
income from the property prior to receiving the Notice of
Coverage from the DAR in February 1994. For this reason, his
property would be more appropriately covered by the formula
provided under JMC No. 11 (2003).
Applying the above formula to compute just compensation for
respondent's land would be the most equitable course of
action under the circumstances. Without JMC No. 11 (2003),
Dalauta's property would have to be valued using the formula
for idle lands, the CNI and CS factors not being applicable.
Following this formula, just compensation for Dalauta's
property would only amount to 225,300.00, computed as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
LV = MV x 2
Where:
LV = Land Value
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration*
• For the area planted to com, P7,740.00/hectare
• For idle/pasture land, P3,890/hectare
Thus:
For the 4 hectares planted to corn:
LV = (P7,740/hectare x 4 hectares) x 2
= P61,920.00
For the 21 hectares of idle/pasture land:
LV = (P3,890/hectare x 21) x 2
= P163,380.00
Total Land Value = P61,920.00 + P163,380.00
= P225,300.00
As above stated, the amount would be more equitable if it
would be computed pursuant to JMC No. 11 (2003).
Moreover, the award shall earn legal interest. Pursuant to
Nacar v. Gallery Frames, the interest shall be computed from
the time of taking at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, the rate shall be six
percent (6%) per annum until fully paid.
 9. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs.
Lozada, Sr. (G.R. No. 176625 February 25, 2010
Nachura,)
DOCTRINE: It is well settled that the taking of private property
by the Governments power of eminent domain is subject to
two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public
purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the
property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of
implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the
condemnor to keep the property expropriated.
FACTS: Subject of this case is a lot (Lot 88) located in Lahug,
Cebu City. Its original owner was Anastacio Deiparine when
the same was subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated
by the Republic, represented by the then Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA), for the expansion and improvement of
the Lahug Airport. During the pendency of the expropriation
proceedings, respondent Lozada acquired Lot 88 from
Deiparine. The trial court ruled for the Republic and ordered
the Deiparine to pay Lozada the fair market value of the land.
However, the projected improvement and expansion plan of
the old Lahug Airport was not pursued. The plaintiff-
respondents initiated a complaint for the recovery of
possession and conveyance of ownership on the subject lot.
On the other hand, petitioners asked for the immediate
dismissal of the complaint. They specifically denied that the
Government had made assurances to reconvey Lot 88 to
respondents in the event that the property would no longer be
needed for airport operations. Petitioners instead asserted
that the judgment of condemnation was unconditional, and
respondents were, therefore, not entitled to recover the
expropriated property notwithstanding non-use or
abandonment thereof. The trial court ruled for herein plaintiff-
respondents, which decision was affirmed by the CA.
judgment would violate the property owner’s right to justice,
fairness, and equity.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the
taking of private property, consequent to the Governments
exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to
the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public
purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular
purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is
peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so
desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the
return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a
case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has
become improper for lack of the required factual justification.•
The right of respondents to repurchase Lot No. 88 may be
enforced based on a constructive trust constituted on the
property held by the government in favor of the former.
 In constructive trusts, the arrangement is temporary and
passive in which the trustees sole duty is to transfer the
title and possession over the property to the plaintiff-
beneficiary.
 Of course, the wronged party seeking the aid of a court of
equity in establishing a constructive trust must himself do
equity. Accordingly, the court will exercise its discretion in
deciding what acts are required of the plaintiff-beneficiary
as conditions precedent to obtaining such decree and has
the obligation to reimburse the trustee the consideration
received from the latter just as the plaintiff-beneficiary
would if he proceeded on the theory of rescission. In the
good judgment of the court, the trustee may also be paid
the necessary expenses he may have incurred in
sustaining the property, his fixed costs for improvements
thereon, and the monetary value of his services in
managing the property to the extent that plaintiff-
beneficiary will secure a benefit from his acts.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid exercise of power of

eminent domain.

HELD: No. The acquisition by the Republic of the expropriated

lots was subject to the condition that the Lahug Airport would
continue its operation. The condition not having materialized
because the airport had been abandoned, the former owner
should then be allowed to reacquire the expropriated property.
It is well settled that the taking of private property by the
Governments power of eminent domain is subject to two
mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public
purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the
property owner. These requirements partake of the nature of
implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the
condemnor to keep the property expropriated.

More particularly, with respect to the element of public use,

the expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant
to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed,
failing which, it should file another petition for the new
purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to
return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires
to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of
expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of
eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for
which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private
property owner would be denied due process of law, and the

Page 156 of 186

 10. Vda de Ouano vs. Republic (G.R. No. 168770
February 9, 2011 Velasco, Jr., J.)
DOCTRINE: A condemnor should commit to use the property
pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation,
failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose.
If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The
government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated
in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the
judgment of expropriation.
FACTS: In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC),
MCIAAs predecessor agency, pursued a program to expand
the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Through its team of
negotiators, NAC met and negotiated with the owners of the
properties situated around the airport, which included Lot Nos.
744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942, and 947
of the Banilad Estate. As the landowners would later claim, the
government negotiating team, as a sweetener, assured them
that they could repurchase their respective lands should the
Lahug Airport expansion project do not push through or once
the Lahug Airport closes or its operations transferred to
Mactan-Cebu Airport. Some of the landowners accepted the
assurance and executed deeds of sale with a right of
repurchase. Others, however, including the owners of the
aforementioned lots, refused to sell because the purchase
price offered was viewed as way below market, forcing the
hand of the Republic, represented by the then Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA), as successor agency of the
NAC, to file a complaint for the expropriation of Lot Nos. 744-
A, 745A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942, and 947, among
others, docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881 entitled Republic
v. Damian Ouano, et al.
upon a state of affairs that was not conceived nor
contemplated when the expropriation was authorized. In
effect, the government merely held the properties condemned
in trust until the proposed public use or purpose for which the
lots were condemned was actually consummated by the
government. Since the government failed to perform the
obligation that is the basis of the transfer of the property, then
the lot owners Ouanos and Inocians can demand the
reconveyance of their old properties after the payment of the
condemnation price.Constructive trusts are fictions of equity
that courts Respondents demanded hat NAPOCOR pay
damages use as devices to remedy any situation in which the
holder of the legal title, MCIAA in this case, may not, in good
conscience, retain the beneficial interest. We add, however,
as in Heirs of Moreno, that the party seeking the aid of equity
the landowners in this instance, in establishing the trust must
himself do equity in a manner as the court may deem just and
reasonable.
Expropriation is forced private property taking, the landowner
being really without a ghost of a chance to defeat the case of
the expropriating agency. In other words, in expropriation, the
private owner is deprived of property against his will. Withal,
the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly
followed, such that the state must show, at the minimum, a
genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take private
property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or least
reasonably deducible from the complaint.

Soon after the MCIAA jettisoned the Lahug Airport expansion

project, informal settlers entered and occupied Lot No. 763-A
which, before its expropriation, belonged to the Ouanos. The
Ouanos then formally asked to be allowed to exercise their
right to repurchase the aforementioned lot, but the MCIAA
ignored the demand. On August 18, 1997, the Ouanos
instituted a complaint before the Cebu City RTC against the
Republic and the MCIAA for reconveyance.

Answering, the Republic and MCIAA averred that the Ouanos

no longer have enforceable rights whatsoever over the
condemned Lot No. 763-A, the decision in Civil Case No. R-
1881 not having found any reversionary condition.

ISSUE: Whether or not former owners of lots acquired for the

expansion of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City have the right to
repurchase or secure reconveyance of their respective
properties.

HELD: Yes. Providing added support to the Ouanos and the

Inocians right to repurchase is what in Heirs of Moreno was
referred to as constructive trust, one that is akin to the implied
trust expressed in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code, the purpose of
which is to prevent unjust enrichment. In the case at bench,
the Ouanos and the Inocians parted with their respective lots
in favor of the MCIAA, the latter obliging itself to use the
realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport; failing to keep its
end of the bargain, MCIAA can be compelled by the former
landowners to reconvey the parcels of land to them,
otherwise, they would be denied the use of their properties

Page 157 of 186

11. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. HEIRS OF
SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND COURT OF
APPEALS (G.R. No. 165354 ; January 12, 2015)
FACTS: In February 1993, NAPOCOR entered a property
located in Barangay San Isidro, Batangas City in order to
construct and maintain transmission lines for the 230 KV
Mahabang Parang-Pinamucan Power Transmission Project.
Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the
property, with a total area of 14,257 square meters, which was
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9696 of the
Registry of Deeds of Batangas.
On May 26, 1995, NAPOCOR filed a complaint for
expropriation in the Regional Trial Court in Batangas City
(RTC), seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way
over a portion of the property involving an area of only 6,326
square meters, more or less, alleging that it had negotiated
with the respondents for the acquisition of the easement but
they had failed to reach any agreement; and that,
nonetheless, it was willing to deposit the amount of ₱9,790.00
representing the assessed value of the portion sought to be
expropriated. It prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession
upon deposit to enable it to enter and take possession and
control of the affected portion of the property; to demolish all
improvements existing thereon; and to commence
construction of the transmission line project.
In their answer with motion to dismiss, the respondents
staunchly maintained that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with
them before entering the property and that the entry was done
without their consent in the process, destroying some fruit
trees without payment, and installing five transmission line
posts and five woodpoles for its project; that the area being
expropriated only covered the portion directly affected by the
transmission lines; that the remaining portion of the property
was also affected because the transmission line passed
through the center of the land, thereby dividing the land into
three lots; that the presence of the high tension transmission
line had rendered the entire property inutile for any future use
and capabilities; that, nonetheless, they tendered no objection
to NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay just compensation
not only for the portion sought to be expropriated but for the
entire property whose potential was greatly diminished, if not
totally lost, due to the project; and that their property was
classified as industrial land.
In the judgment dated November 27, 2000, the RTC adopted
the recommendation contained in the joint report, and ruled
thusly:
The price to be paid for an expropriated land is its
value at the time of taking, which is the date when
the plaintiff actually entered the property or the date
of the filing of the complaint for expropriation. In this
case, there is no evidence as to when the plaintiff
actually entered the property in question, so the
reference point should be the date of filing of the
complaint, which is May 5, 1995.
Accordingly, the RTC ordered NAPOCOR to pay the
respondents: (1) just compensation for the whole area of
14,257 square meters at the rate of ₱550.00/square meter; (2)
legal rate of interest from May 5, 1995 until full payment; and
(3) the costs of suit.
The CA made some modification on RTC’s ruling stating that
plaintiff-appellant shall pay only for the occupied 6,326 square
Page 158 of 186
meters of the subject real property at the rate of ₱550.00 per
square meter and to pay legal interest therefrom until fully
paid.
On January 3, 2014, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and
Motion to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings, informing
that the parties failed to reach an amicable agreement; that
the property sought to be expropriated was no longer
necessary for public purpose because of the intervening
retirement of the transmission lines installed on the
respondents’ property; that because the public purpose for
which such property would be used thereby ceased to exist,
the proceedings for expropriation should no longer continue,
and the State was now duty-bound to return the property to its
owners; and that the dismissal or discontinuance of the
expropriation proceedings was in accordance with Section 4,
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Hence, NAPOCOR prayed that
the proceedings be discontinued "under such terms as the
court deems just and equitable," and that the compensation to
be awarded the respondents be reduced by the equivalent of
the benefit they received from the land during the time of its
occupation, for which purpose the case could be remanded to
the trial court for the determination of reasonable
compensation to be paid to them.
ISSUE: whether or not the expropriation proceedings should
be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal
HELD: The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at
the instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but, conformably with
Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal or
discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms
as the court deems just and equitable.
NAPOCOR entered the property without the owners’ consent
and without paying just compensation to the respondents.
Neither did it deposit any amount as required by law prior to
its entry. The Constitution is explicit in obliging the
Government and its entities to pay just compensation before
depriving any person of his or her property for public use.
Considering that in the process of installing transmission lines,
NAPOCOR destroyed some fruit trees and plants without
payment, and the installation of the transmission lines went
through the middle of the land as to divide the property into
three lots, thereby effectively rendering the entire property
inutile for any future use, it would be unfair for NAPOCOR not
to be made liable to the respondents for the disturbance of
their property rights from the time of entry until the time of
restoration of the possession of the property. There should be
no question about the taking. There is a sufficient showing that
NAPOCOR entered into and took possession of the
respondents’ property as early as in March 1993 without the
benefit of first filing a petition for eminent domain. For all
intents and purposes, therefore, March 1993 is the reckoning
point of NAPOCOR’s taking of the property, instead of May 5,
1995, the time NAPOCOR filed the petition for expropriation.
In the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain,
there is a "taking" when the owner is actually deprived or
dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical
destruction or a material impairment of the value of his
property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof.
There is a "taking" in this sense when the expropriator enters
private property not only for a momentary period but for a more
permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting the property
to a public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. For ownership,
after all, "is nothing without the inherent rights of possession,
control and enjoyment. Where the owner is deprived of the
ordinary and beneficial use of his property or of its value by its
being diverted to public use, there is taking within the
Constitutional sense." x x x.
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the
eventual return of the property to the respondents, there is no
need to pay "just compensation" to them because their
property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full
market value of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR should
compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their
property rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until the
time of restoration of the possession by paying to them actual
or other compensatory damages.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the
taking of private property, consequent to the Government’s
exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to
the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public
purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular
purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is
peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so
desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the
return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a
case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has
become improper for lack of the required factual justification.
This should mean that the compensation must be based on
what they actually lost as a result and by reason of their
dispossession of the property and of its use, including the
value of the fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by
NAPOCOR’s construction of the transmission lines.
Considering that the dismissal of the expropriation
proceedings is a development occurring during the appeal, the
Court now treats the dismissal of the expropriation
proceedings as producing the effect of converting the case
into an action for damages. For that purpose, the Court
remands the case to the court of origin for further proceedings,
with instruction to the court of origin to enable the parties to
fully litigate the action for damages by giving them the
opportunity to re-define the factual and legal issues by the
submission of the proper pleadings on the extent of the taking,
the value of the compensation to be paid to the respondents
by NAPOCOR, and other relevant matters as they deem fit.
Page 159 of 186
12. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES
RODOLFO ZABALA and LILIA BAYLON (G.R. No.
173520; January 30, 2013)
FACTS:
On October 27, 1994, plaintiff-appellant National Power
Corporation (Napocor) filed a complaint for Eminent Domain
against defendants-appellees Sps. R. Zabala & L. Baylon,
before the RTC, Balanga City, Bataan alleging that Spouses
Zabala and Baylon own parcels of land located in Balanga
City, Bataan and that it urgently needed an easement of right
of way over the affected areas for its 230 KV Limay-Hermosa
Transmission Lines. The Commissioners submitted their
Report/ Recommendation fixing the just compensation at
P150.00 per square meter. Napocor prayed that the report be
recommitted to the commissioners for the modification of the
report and the substantiation of the same with reliable and
competent documentary evidence based on the value of the
property at the time of its taking. The Commissioners
submitted their Final Report fixing the just compensation at
P500.00 per square meter.
On June 28, 2004, the RTC rendered its Partial Decision and
ordered Napocor to pay Php150.00 per square meter for the
6,820 square meters determined as of the date of the taking
of the property.
Napocor appealed to the CA arguing that the Commissioners
reports are not supported by documentary evidence. Napocor
argued that the RTC did not apply Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395
which limits its liability to easement fee of not more than 10%
of the market value of the property traversed by its
transmission lines. CA affirmed the RTCs Partial Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in fixing the amount of
Php150.00 per square meter as the fair market value of the
property subject of the easement right of way of
Napocor?
HELD:
The petition is partially meritorious. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: just compensation
Sec. 3A of RA No. 6395 cannot restrict the constitutional
power of the courts to determine just compensation. The
payment of just compensation for private property taken for
public use is guaranteed no less by our Constitution and is
included in the Bill of Rights. As such, no legislative
enactments or executive issuances can prevent the courts
from determining whether the right of the property owners to
just compensation has been violated. It is a judicial function
that cannot be usurped by any other branch or official of the
government. Statutes and executive issuances fixing or
providing for the method of computing just compensation are
not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere
guidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof.
The Supreme Court has held in a long line of cases that since
the high- tension electric current passing through the
transmission lines will perpetually deprive the property owners
of the normal use of their land, it is only just and proper to
require Napocor to recompense them for the full market value
of their property.
The just compensation of P150.00 per square meter as fixed
by the RTC is not supported by evidence. Just compensation
cannot be arrived at arbitrarily. Several factors must be
considered, such as, but not limited to, acquisition cost,
current market value of like properties, tax value of the
condemned property, its size, shape, and location. But before
these factors can be considered and given weight, the same
must be supported by documentary evidence.
Under Section 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the trial court
may accept or reject, whether in whole or in part, the
commissioners report which is merely advisory and
recommendatory in character. It may also recommit the report
or set aside the same and appoint new commissioners. In this
case, however, in spite of the insufficient and flawed reports
of the Commissioners and Napocors objections thereto, the
RTC eventually adopted the same. It shrugged off Napocors
protestations and limited itself to the reports submitted by the
Commissioners.
Lastly, it should be borne in mind that just compensation
should be computed based on the fair value of the subject
property at the time of its taking or the filing of the complaint,
whichever came first. Since in this case the filing of the
eminent domain case came ahead of the taking, just
compensation should be based on the fair market value of
spouses Zabalas property at the time of the filing of Napocors
Complaint on October 27, 1994 or thereabouts.
Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Case is REMANDED to
the RTC for the proper determination of just
compensation.
Page 160 of 186
13. Cabahug v. National Power Corporation (698 SCRA
666), GR No. 186069, Jan 30, 2013
Facts:
Spouses Cabahug are the owners of two parcels of land in
Leyte. They were among the defendants in a Special Civil
Action suit for expropriation earlier filed by NPC before the
RTC.
The suit was later dismissed when NPC opted to settle with
the landowners by paying an easement fee equivalent to 10%
of value of their property in Accordance with RA 6395, “An Act
Revising the Charter of the NPC”.
Leyte Provincial Appraisal Committee fixed the valuation of
the affected properties at P45.00 per square meter. Jesus
Cabahug executed two documents denominated as Right of
Way Grant in favor of NPC. For and in consideration of the
easement fees Jesus Cabahug also granted NPC a
continuous easement of right of way for the latter’s
transmissions lines and their appurtenances.
Jesus Cabahug agreed not to construct any building or
structure whatsoever, nor plant in any area within the Right of
Way that will adversely affect or obstruct the transmission line
of NPC, except agricultural crops, the growth of which will not
exceed three meters high.
Jesus Cabahug reserved the option to seek additional
compensation for easement fee, based on the Supreme
Court’s 18 January 1991 Decision.
Spouses Cabahug filed the complaint for the payment of just
compensation, damages, and attorney’s fees against NPC,
claiming to have been totally deprived of the use of the
portions of land covered by their TCTs.
NPC’s answer: they already paid full easement fee
RTC ruled for the Spouses Cabahug. NPC’s easement of right
of way which indefinitely deprives the owner of their propriety
rights over their property falls within the purview of the power
of eminent domain.
CA: reversed and set aside the RTC decision finding that the
RA 6395 only allows NPC to acquire an easement right of way
over properties traversed by its transmission lines. MR denied
for lack of merit.
Issue 1:
Whether or not CA reversibly erred in sustaining NPC’s
reliance on Section 3-A of RA 6395 which states that only 10%
of the market value of the property is due to the owner of the
property subject to an easement of right of way. (YES)
Held 1:
Since said easement falls within the purview of the power of
eminent domain, NPC’s utilization of said provision has been
repeatedly struck down by this Court in a number of cases.
The determination of just compensation in eminent domain
proceedings is a judicial function and no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall
prevail over the court’s findings. Any valuation for just
compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a
guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own
judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to
arrive at such amount. Hence, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395,
as amended, is not binding upon this Court.
Issue 2:
Whether or not NPC may still be held liable to pay for the full
market value of the affected property despite the fact transfer
of title thereto was not required by the easement.
Held 2:
The power of Eminent Domain may be exercised although title
is not transferred to the expropriator in easement of right of
way. Just compensation which should be neither more nor
less than the money equivalent of the property is, moreover,
due where the nature and effect of the easement is to impose
limitations against the use of the land for an indefinite period
and deprive the landowner if ordinary use.
The owner should be compensated for the monetary
equivalent of the land if the easement is intended to
perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary
rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the
ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of the property or
through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with
the exercise of the attributes of ownership, or when the
introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature,
create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or
destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary.
DISPOSITIVE: petition is GRANTED and the CA’s assailed
Decision and Resolution are, accordingly, REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
Page 161 of 186
14. National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, G.R. No.
168732. June 29, 2007
DOCTRINE: In determining the just compensation, the
valuation of the property should be based on the value on the
date when the landowners discovered the presence of the
huge underground tunnels beneath their lands, not the value
on the date on which the latter constructed the tunnels.
Facts:
Respondent Lucman G. Ibrahim, in his personal capacity and
in behalf of his co-heirs instituted an action against petitioner
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for recovery of
possession of land and damages before the RTC of Lanao del
Sur.
Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they were owners of
several parcels of land described in Survey Plan FP (VII-5)
2278 consisting of 70,000 square meters, divided into three
(3) lots, i.e. Lots 1, 2, and 3 consisting of 31,894, 14,915, and
23,191 square meters each respectively. NAPOCOR, through
alleged stealth and without respondents’ knowledge and prior
consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area of their lands
and constructed therein underground tunnels. The existence
of the tunnels was only discovered sometime in July 1992 by
respondents and then later confirmed on November 13, 1992
by NAPOCOR itself through a memorandum issued by the
latter’s Acting Assistant Project Manager. The tunnels were
apparently being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water
of Lake Lanao and in the operation of NAPOCOR’s Agus II,
III, IV, V, VI, VII projects located in Saguiran, Lanao del Sur;
Nangca and Balo-i in Lanao del Norte; and Ditucalan and
Fuentes in Iligan City.
Respondents demanded that NAPOCOR pay damages and
vacate the sub-terrain portion of their lands but the latter
refused to vacate much less pay damages. Respondents
further averred that the construction of the underground
tunnels has endangered their lives and properties as Marawi
City lies in an area of local volcanic and tectonic activity.
This case revolves around the propriety of paying just
compensation to respondents, and, by extension, the basis for
computing the same.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents are entitled to just compensation
hinges upon who owns the sub-terrain area occupied by
Petitioner.
Held:
The Court sustains the finding of the lower courts that the sub-
terrain portion of the property similarly belongs to
respondents.
Thus, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as
to the subsoil under it. This principle was applied to show that
rights over lands are indivisible and, consequently, require a
definitive and categorical classification.
Registered landowners may even be ousted of ownership and
possession of their properties in the event the latter are
reclassified as mineral lands because real properties are
characteristically indivisible. For the loss sustained by such
owners, they are entitled to just compensation under the
Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.
Moreover, petitioner’s argument that the landowners’ right
extends to the sub-soil insofar as necessary for their practical
interests serves only to further weaken its case. The theory
would limit the right to the sub-soil upon the economic utility,
which such area offers to the surface owners. Presumably, the
landowners’ right extends to such height or depth where it is
possible for them to obtain some benefit or enjoyment, and it
is extinguished beyond such limit as there would be no more
interest protected by law.
The underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents’
use of the property for an indefinite period and deprive them
of its ordinary use. Based upon the foregoing, respondents are
clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation.
The entitlement of respondents to just compensation having
been settled, the issue now is on the manner of computing the
same.
The general rule in determining “just compensation” in
eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of
the filing of the complaint.
The general rule, however, admits of an exception: where this
Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken
and not the date of the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings.
The exception finds the application where the owner would be
given undue incremental advantages arising from the use to
which the government devotes the property expropriated.
In the present case, to allow petitioner to use the date it
constructed the tunnels as the date of valuation would be
grossly unfair. First, it did not enter the land under warrant or
color of legal authority or with intent to expropriate the same.
In fact, it did not bother to notify the owners and wrongly
assumed it had the right to dig those tunnels under their
property. Secondly, the “improvements” introduced by
petitioner, namely, the tunnels, in no way contributed to an
increase in the value of the land. The trial court, therefore, as
affirmed by the CA, rightly computed the valuation of the
property as of 1992, when respondents discovered the
construction of the huge underground tunnels beneath their
lands and petitioner confirmed the same and started
negotiations for their purchase but no agreement could be
reached.
Page 162 of 186
15. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit
Sangkay, G.R. No. 165828. August 24, 2011.
DOCTRINE: The Court of Appeals’ restrictive construal of
Section 3(i) of R.A. No. 6395 as exclusive of tunnels was
obviously unwarranted, for the provision applies not only to
development works easily discoverable or on the surface of
the earth but also to subterranean works like tunnels—when
the law does not distinguish, so must we not, and when the
language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and
expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that
meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the
Congress intended to convey.
The prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i)
of Republic Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an action for
damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just
compensation.
Facts:
Pursuant to its legal mandate under Republic Act
No. 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the National Power
Corporation), NPC undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric
Power Plant Project in the 1970s to generate electricity for
Mindanao. The project included the construction of several
underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow
from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants.
The respondents (Heirs of Macabangkit), as the
owners of land with an area of 221,573 square meters
situated in Ditucalan, Iligan City, sued NPC in the RTC for the
recovery of damages and of the property, with the alternative
prayer for the payment of just compensation. They alleged
that they had belatedly discovered that one of the
underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of
the Agus River for the operation of the Hydroelectric Project
in Agus V, Agus VI and Agus VII traversed their land; that their
discovery had occurred in 1995 after Atty. Saidali C.
Gandamra, had rejected their offer to sell the land because of
the danger the underground tunnel might pose to the
proposed Arabic Language Training Center and Muslims
Skills Development Center; that such rejection had been
followed by the withdrawal by Global Asia Management and
Resource Corporation from developing the land into a
housing project for the same reason; that Al-Amanah Islamic
Investment Bank of the Philippines had also refused to accept
their land as collateral because of the presence of the
underground tunnel; that the underground tunnel had been
constructed without their knowledge and consent; that the
presence of the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural,
commercial, industrial and residential value of their land; and
that their land had also become an unsafe place for habitation
because of the loud sound of the water rushing through the
tunnel and the constant shaking of the ground, forcing them
and their workers to relocate to safer grounds.
NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had
no right to compensation under section 3(f) of Republic Act
No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land
was established; that their cause of action, should they be
entitled to compensation, already prescribed due to the tunnel
having been constructed in 1979; and that by reason of the
tunnel being an apparent and continuous easement, any
action arising from such easement prescribed in five years.
Issue:
Whether the Heirs of Macabangkit’s right to claim
just compensation had prescribed under section 3(i) of
Republic Act No. 6395, or, alternatively, under Article 620 and
Article 646 of the Civil Code.
Held:
The Court upholds the liability of NPC for payment
of just compensation.
Five-year prescriptive period under Section 3(i) of Republic
Act No. 6395 does not apply to claims for just compensation.
A cursory reading shows that Section 3(i) covers the
construction of “works across, or otherwise, any stream,
watercourse, canal, ditch, flume, street, avenue, highway or
railway of private and public ownership, as the location of said
works may require.” It is notable that Section 3(i) includes no
limitation except those enumerated after the term works.
Accordingly, we consider the term works as embracing all
kinds of constructions, facilities, and other developments that
can enable or help NPC to meet its objectives of developing
hydraulic power expressly provided under paragraph (g) of
Section 3. The CA’s restrictive construal of Section 3(i) as
exclusive of tunnels was obviously unwarranted, for the
provision applies not only to development works easily
discoverable or on the surface of the earth but also to
subterranean works like tunnels. Such interpretation accords
with the fundamental guideline in statutory construction that
when the law does not distinguish, so must we not. Moreover,
when the language of the statute is plain and free from
ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible
meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the
meaning that the Congress intended to convey.
We rule that the prescriptive period provided under
Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an
action for damages, and does not extend to an action to
recover just compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC
cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to
recover just compensation for their land.
Page 163 of 186
16. National Power Corporation vs. Tarcelo, G.R. No.
198139. September 8, 2014.
DOCTRINE: Execution must therefore conform to that
ordained or decreed in the dispositive part of the decision.
Facts:
Respondents Felicisimo Tarcelo (Tarcelo) and the heirs of
Comia Santos (Santos heirs) are the owners of two lots
measuring 4,404 and 2,611 square meters, respectively,
which are situated in Brgy. Tabangao-Ambulong, Batangas
City.
Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) filed Civil Case
No. 5785 with the Batangas City RTC, seeking to expropriate
portions of Tarcelo and the Santos heirs’ lots to the extent of
1,595.91 square meters which are affected by the
construction and maintenance of NPC’s 1,200 MW Ilijan
Natural Gas Pipeline Project. In other words, NPC’s natural
gas pipeline shall traverse respondents’ lands to such extent.
The Decision of the appellate court which defendants-
appellees are entitled for just compensation to the full market
value of their property not just ten percent (10%) of it, and just
compensation was fixed at P1,000.00 per square meter only
for the affected area of 1,591.91 square meters, and not for
the whole of respondents’ respective lots became final and
executory, and entry of judgment was done accordingly.
Respondents moved for execution.
A Notice of Garnishment was served on the Manager of the
Land Bank of the Philippines, NPC Branch, Quezon City for
the satisfaction of the amount of P5,594,462.50 representing
just compensation for the whole of respondents’ 4,404- and
2,611-square meter lots — or 7,015 square meters — and not
merely the supposedly affected portions thereof totaling
1,595.91 square meters as NPC originally sought to acquire.
NPC filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion seeking to quash the
Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents are entitled for just
compensation for the whole lots and not only the affected
portions thereof.
Held:
The Court held that the respondents are entitled to just
compensation for the affected portions of their land only.
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly
by the State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in
derogation of private rights. It is one of the harshest
proceedings known to the law. x x x The authority to condemn
is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the
condemnor. When the power is granted, the extent to which
it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or clear
implication of the statute in which the grant is contained.
Corollarily, it has been held that trial courts should exercise
care and circumspection in the resolution of just
compensation cases, considering that they involve the
expenditure of public funds.
The Commissioners’ Reports in Civil Case No. 5785 indicate
that only the affected areas were intended to be acquired and
compensated.
It has always been the rule that “the only portion of the
decision that may be the subject of execution is that which is
ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion. Whatever may
be found in the body of the decision can only be considered
as part of the reasons or conclusions of the court and serve
only as guides to determine the ratio decidendi.” “Where there
is a conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision
and the body thereof, the dispositive portion controls
irrespective of what appears in the body of the decision. While
the body of the decision, order or resolution might create
some ambiguity in the manner of the court’s reasoning
preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally
invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the
exercise of those rights, and imposes corresponding duties or
obligation.” Thus, with the decretal portion of the trial court’s
November 7, 2005 Decision particularly stating that NPC shall
have the lawful right to enter, take possession and acquire
easement of right-of-way over the affected portions of
respondents’ properties upon the payment of just
compensation, any order executing the trial court’s Decision
should be based on such dispositive portion. “An order of
execution is based on the disposition, not on the body, of the
decision.”
Execution must therefore conform to that ordained or decreed
in the dispositive part of the decision. Since there is a disparity
between the dispositive portion of the trial court’s November
7, 2005 Decision as affirmed with modification by the final and
executory June 26, 2007 Decision of the CA in C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 86712 — which decreed that respondents be paid just
compensation only for the affected portions of their
properties, totaling 1,595.91 square meters — and the
Notice of Garnishment — for the satisfaction of the amount of
P5,594,462.50 representing just compensation for the whole
7,015 square meters — the latter must be declared null and
void. It is a settled general principle that a writ of execution
must conform substantially to every essential particular of the
judgment promulgated. Execution not in harmony with the
judgment is bereft of validity. It must conform, more
particularly, to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive
portion of the decision.
Page 164 of 186
L. CONTRACT CLAUSE
1. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO. VS. WMC
RESOURCES INT’L G.R. NO. 162331 NOVEMBER 20, 2006
J. CHICO-NAZARIO
FACTS: On 22 March 1995, the Philippine Government and
WMC Philippines executed a Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement, denominated as the Columbio FTAA
for the purpose of large scale exploration, development, and
commercial exploration of possible mineral resources in
accordance with EO 279 and DAO No. 63, Series of 1991.
The Columbio FTAA is covered in part by 156 mining claims
held under various Mineral Production Sharing Agreements
(MPSA) by Southcot Mining Corporation, Tampakan Mining
Corporation, and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (collectively called
the Tampakan Companies), in accordance with the
Tampakan Option Agreement. The Option Agreement
provides for the grant of the right of first refusal to the
Tampakan Companies in case WMC Philippines desires to
dispose of its rights and interests in the mining claims
covering the area subject of the agreement.
WMC Resources subsequently divested itself of its rights and
interests in the Columbio FTAA, executed a Sale and
Purchase Agreement with Lepanto over its entire
shareholdings in WMC Philippines, subject to the exercise of
the Tampakan Companies’ right of first refusal to purchase
the subject shares. Lepanto sought the approval of the Sale
and Purchase Agreement from the DENR Secretary.
The Tampakan Companies sought to exercise its right of first
refusal. Thus, Lepanto assailed the Tampakan Companies’
exercise of its right of first refusal, alleging that the Tampakan
Companies failed to match the terms and conditions set forth
in the Sale and Purchase Agreement.
Lepanto filed a case for Injunction, Specific Performance,
Annulment of Contracts and Contractual Interference with the
RTC against WMC Philippines and the Tampakan
Companies. Respondents moved for the dismissal of said
case, but was denied.
In the interim, contending that the Sale and Purchase
Agreement between Lepanto and WMC Philippines had
expired due to failure to meet the necessary preconditions for
its validity, WMC and the Tampakan Companies executed
another Sale and Purchase Agreement, where Sagittarius
Mines, Inc. was designated assignee and corporate vehicle
which would acquire the shareholdings and undertake the
Columbio FTAA activities.
After due consideration and evaluation of the financial and
technical qualifications of Sagittarius Mines, Inc., the DENR
Secretary approved the transfer of the Columbio FTAA from
WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines, Inc.
Aggrieved by the transfer of the Columbio FTAA in favor of
Sagittarius Mines, Inc., Lepanto filed a Petition for Review of
the Order of the DENR Secretary with the OP. The OP
dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: WoN Sec. 40 of RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act
of 1995 which took effect on 14 April 1995, requiring the
approval of the President of the assignment or transfer of
FTTAs, is applicable as contended by Lepanto.
HELD: No. The Columbio FTAA was entered into by the
Philippine Government and WMC Philippines on 22 March
1995, undoubtedly before the Philippine Mining Act of 1995
took effect on 14 April 1995.
Furthermore, it is undisputed that said FTAA was granted in
accordance with EO 279 and DAO No. 63, Series of 1991,
which does not contain any similar condition on the transfer
or assignment of FTTAs.
There is also an absence of either an express declaration or
an implication in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 that the
provisions of said law shall be made to apply retroactively,
therefore, any section of said law must be made to apply only
prospectively, in view of the rule that a statute ought not to
receive a construction making it act retroactively, unless the
words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other
meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of
the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied.
Assuming for the sake of argument that We are to apply the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 retrospectively to the Columbio
FTAA, the lack of presidential approval will not be fatal as to
render the transfer illegal, especially since the alleged lack of
presidential approval has been remedied when Lepanto
appealed the matter to the OP which approved the Order of
the DENR Secretary granting the application for transfer of
the Columbio FTAA to Sagittarius Mines, Inc.
Furthermore, if Lepanto was indeed of the mind that Section
40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is applicable to the
Columbio FTAA, thus necessitating the approval of the
President for the validity of its transfer or assignment, it would
seem contradictory that Lepanto sought the approval of the
DENR Secretary, and not that of the President, of its Sale and
Purchase Agreement with WMC Resources. Hence, it may be
glimpsed from the very act of Lepanto that it recognized that
the provision of the Columbio FTAA regarding the consent of
the DENR Secretary with respect to the transfer of said FTAA
must be upheld.
The constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the
obligation of contract does not prohibit every change in
existing laws, and to fall within the prohibition, the change
must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but
the impairment must be substantial. Substantial impairment
as conceived in relation to impairment of contracts has been
explained in the case of Clemons v. Nolting, which stated that:
a law which changes the terms of a legal contract between
parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes
new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or
authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that
provided in its terms, is law which impairs the obligation of a
contract and is therefore null and void. Section 40 of the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 requiring the approval of the
President with respect to assignment or transfer of FTAAs, if
made applicable retroactively to the Columbio FTAA, would
be tantamount to an impairment of the obligations under said
contract as it would effectively restrict the right of the parties
thereto to assign or transfer their interests in the said FTAA.
By imposing a new condition apart from those already
contained in the agreement, before the parties to the
Columbio FTAA may assign or transfer its rights and interest
in the said agreement, Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act
of 1995, if made to apply to the Columbio FTAA, will effectively
modify the terms of the original contract and thus impair the
obligations of the parties thereto and restrict the exercise of
their vested rights under the original agreement. Such
modification to the Columbio FTAA, particularly in the
conditions imposed for its valid transfer is equivalent to an
impairment of said contract violative of the Constitution.
Page 165 of 186
M. FREE ACCESS TO COURTS
1. RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE
EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND FILING FEES OF THE
GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC.
(Dahil taga Baguio ako, alam ko to. Hahaha. Yung Good
Shepherd kasi sa Baguio ung gumagawa ng Ubeng Halaya,
peanut brittle etc. Ung workers nila indigent in a way. So pag
nagwork ka dun ung tipong taga-pack ka or parang factory
worker, pagaaralin ka ng Good Shepherd. Yung funds ng
scholars nila nakukuha sa profits nung pagbenta ng Good
Shepherd)
Can the Courts grant to our Foundation who works for indigent
and underprivileged people, the same option granted to
indigent people?
To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Courts cannot grant
to foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the
same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to
indigent litigants even if the foundations are working for
indigent and underprivileged people.
The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the
free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987
Constitution, thus:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial
bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty.
The importance of the right to free access to the courts and
quasi judicial bodies and to adequate legal assistance cannot
be denied. A move to remove the provision on free access
from the Constitution on the ground that it was already
covered by the equal protection clause was defeated by the
desire to give constitutional stature to such specific protection
of the poor.
The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted
provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that only a natural
party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The
Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation
invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and
distinct from that of its members,[4] is a juridical person.
Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess
property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil
or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations
of their organization.[5] As a juridical person, therefore, it
cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees
granted to indigent litigants.
That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for
indigent and underprivileged people is of no moment. Clearly,
the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause
on a persons poverty, a condition that only a natural person
can suffer.
There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the
request for exemption in favor of a juridical person. For one,
extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground
that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be
prone to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid
documentation requirements), particularly by corporations
and entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the
fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation
requirements may prove too time-consuming and wasteful for
the courts.
1. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)
Facts:
During questioning about a robbery he was connected to,
Charles Dickerson made statements to authorities admitting
that he was the getaway driver in a series of bank robberies.
Dickerson was then placed under arrest. The timing of his
statement is disputed. The FBI and local detectives testified
that Dickerson was advised of his Miranda rights, established
in Miranda v. Arizona, and waived them before he made his
statement. Dickerson said he was not read his Miranda
warnings until after he gave his statement. After his indictment
for bank robbery, Dickerson filed a motion to suppress the
statement that he made on the ground that he had not
received Miranda warnings before being interrogated. The
government argued that even if the Miranda warnings were
not read, the statement was voluntary and therefore
admissible under 18 USC Section 3501, which provides that
“a confession shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily
given.” The District Court granted Dickerson’s motion, finding
that he had not been read his Miranda rights or signed a
waiver until after he made his statement, but the Court did not
address section 3501. In reversing, the Court of Appeals
acknowledged that Dickerson had not received Miranda
warnings, but held that section 3501 was satisfied because
his statement was voluntary. The Court held that “Congress
enacted section 3501 with the express purpose of legislatively
overruling Miranda and restoring voluntariness as the test for
admitting confessions in federal court.”
Issue:
Whether or not the Congress may legislatively overrule
Miranda vs. Arizona and its warnings that govern the
admissibility of statements made during custodial
investigation.
Held:
NO. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Miranda governs the
admissibility of statements made during custodial
interrogation in both state and federal courts. “Miranda has
become embedded in routine police practice to the point
where the warnings have become part of our national culture,”
wrote Rehnquist. “Miranda announced a constitutional rule
that Congress may not supersede legislatively. We decline to
overrule Miranda ourselves.” Dissenting, Justice Antolin
Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, blasted the
Court’s
Page 166 of 186
2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- appellee, vs.
DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN ARNALDO y AVENA
and JOSELITO FLORES y VICTORIO, accused-
appellants. G.R. No. 178300. March 17, 2009.
Facts:
DOCTRINE: Right to Counsel; The mantle of protection
afforded by Art. III, Sec. 12 of the 1987 Constitution covers
the period from the time a person is taken into custody for the
investigation of his possible participation in the commission
of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in
the commission of the offense although not yet in custody.
The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused
from saying anything which might incriminate him, but, rather,
it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest
coercion on the accused to admit something false—the
counsel should never prevent an accused from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth.
Facts:
An Information was filed before the RTC charging appellants
with the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with
homicide. During their arraignment, appellants, assisted by a
counsel de oficio, pleaded “Not guilty” to the charge. Trial on
the merits thereafter followed. Appellants, however,
challenge the legality and admissibility of the written
extrajudicial confessions. Appellants claim that their alleged
participation in the kidnapping of the Yao family was based
solely on the written extrajudicial confessions of appellants
Arnaldo and Flores. They maintain, however, that said
extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence,
because they were obtained in violation of his co-appellants’
constitutional right to have an independent counsel of their
own choice during custodial investigation.
BACKGROUND: The Yao family owns and operates a poultry
farm in Barangay Santo Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
On 16 July 1999, at about 11:00 p.m., the Yao family, on
board a Mazda MVP van, arrived at their poultry farm in
Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Yao San
alighted from the van to open the gate of the farm, appellant
Reyes and a certain Juanito Pataray (Pataray) approached,
poked their guns at Yao San, and dragged him inside the van.
Appellant Reyes and Pataray also boarded the van.
Thereupon, appellants Arnaldo and Flores, with two male
companions, all armed with guns, arrived and immediately
boarded the van. Appellant Flores took the driver’s seat and
drove the van. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their
cohorts then blindfolded each member of the Yao family
inside the van with packaging tape.
Appellant Flores and his male companion told Yao San to
produce the amount of five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) as
ransom in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim,
Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Thereafter, appellant
Flores and his male companion left the van and fled; while
Yao San, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and Josephine remained
inside the van. Upon sensing that the kidnappers had already
left, Yao San drove the van towards the poultry farm and
sought the help of relatives. Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim,
Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan were taken on foot by
appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one male
companion to a safe-house situated in the mountainous part
of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan where they spent the whole
night.
On the morning of 19 July 1999, appellants again called Yao
San via a cellular phone and threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping
Sim and Raymond because of newspaper and radio reports
regarding the incident. Yao San clarified to appellants that he
did not report the incident to the police and also pleaded with
them to spare the life of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond.
Appellants then instructed Yao San to appear and bring with
him the ransom of P5 million at 3:00 p.m. in the Usan
dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview, Quezon City. Yao San
arrived at the designated place of the pay-off at 4:00 p.m., but
none of the appellants or their cohorts showed up. Yao San
waited for appellant’s call, but none came. Thus, Yao San left.
The corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were
found at the La Mesa Dam.
Novaliches, Quezon City. Both died of asphyxia by
strangulation. On 26 July 1999, appellant Arnaldo
surrendered.
Issue:
NO. The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended
to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused
to admit something false. The right to counsel attaches upon
the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer
starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions
or admissions from the accused. The lawyer called to be
present during such investigation should be, as far as
reasonably possible, the choice of the accused. If the lawyer
is one furnished in behalf of accused, he should be competent
and independent; that is, he must be willing to fully safeguard
the constitutional rights of the accused. A competent and
independent counsel is logically required to be present and
able to advice and assist his client from the time the latter
answers the first question asked by the investigator until the
signing of the confession. Moreover, the lawyer should
ascertain that the confession was made voluntarily, and that
the person under investigation fully understood the nature and
the consequence of his extrajudicial confession vis-a-vis his
constitutional rights.
However, the foregoing rule is not intended to deter
to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntarily and
intelligently so desires, but to protect him from admitting what
he is being coerced to admit although untrue. To be an
effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the
questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a
lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying
anything which might incriminate him; but, rather, it was
adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion
on the accused to admit something false. The counsel should
never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling
the truth.
We have gone over the records and found that the PAOCTF
investigators have duly apprised appellants Arnaldo and
Flores of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel of their own choice
during their respective custodial investigations.
In the case at bar, appellants Arnaldo and Flores failed to
discharge their burden of proving that they were forced or
coerced to make their respective confessions. Other than
their self-serving statements that they were maltreated by the
PAOCTF officers/agents, they did not present any plausible
proof to substantiate their claims. They did not submit any
medical report showing that their bodies were subjected to
violence or torture. Neither did they file complaints against
the persons who had allegedly beaten or forced them to
execute their respective confessions despite several
opportunities to do so. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores averred
that they informed their family members/relatives of the
alleged maltreatment, but the latter did not report such
allegations to proper authorities.
Page 167 of 186
3. PEOPLE vs. CHAVEZ, G.R. No. 207950, September 22,
2014.
Facts:
When Peñamante (witness) arrived home from work, around
2:45am, he saw a person wearing a black, long-sleeved shirt
and black pants and holding something while leaving the
house/parlor of Elmer Duque aka Barbie (victim).
There was a light at the left side of the house/parlor of Barbie,
his favorite haircutter, so Peñamante was able to see the face
of Chavez (accused).
The following day, Barbie was found dead, due to stab
wounds, in the parlor and the place was in disarray. In a line-
up to identify the person he saw leaving Barbie’s house/parlor
that early morning of October 28, 2006, Peñamante
immediately pointed to and identified Chavez and thereafter
executed his written statement.
Chavez was charged with robbery with homicide.
LC: Guilty as charged, based on circumstantial evidence.
CA: Affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Chavez is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery with homicide.
Held:
No. There was no robbery. “What is imperative and essential
for a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide is for
the prosecution to establish the offender’s intent to take
personal property before the killing, regardless of the time
when the homicide is actually carried out.” In cases when the
prosecution failed to conclusively prove that homicide was
committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, no accused
can be convicted of robbery with homicide.
The circumstantial evidence relied on by the lower courts do
not satisfactorily establish an original criminal design by
Chavez to commit robbery.
At most, the intent to take personal property was mentioned
by Chavez’s mother in her statement as follows: “Na sinabi
niya sa akin na wala siyang intensyon na patayin [sic] si
Barbie kundi ay pagnakawan lamang.” However, this
statement is considered as hearsay, with no evidentiary
value, since Chavez’s mother was never presented as a
witness during trial to testify on her statement.
An original criminal design to take personal property is also
inconsistent with the infliction of no less than 21 stab wounds
in various parts of Barbie’s body. The sheer number of stab
wounds inflicted on Barbie makes it difficult to conclude an
original criminal intent of merely taking Barbie’s personal
property.
Homicide – All these circumstances taken together establish
Chavez’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
homicide:
1. The alibi of Chavez still places him at the scene of the
crime that early morning of October 28, 2006. This court has
considered motive as one of the factors in determining the
presence of an intent to kill, and a confrontation with the victim
immediately prior to the victim’s death has been considered
as circumstantial evidence for homicide.
2. The number of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie
strengthens an intention to kill and ensures his death.
3. Peñamante’s positive identification of Chavez as the
person leaving Barbie’s house that early morning of October
28, 2006.
4. The medico-legal’s testimony establishing Barbie’s time
of death as 12 hours prior to autopsy at 1:00 p.m., thus,
narrowing the time of death to approximately 1:00 a.m. of the
same day, October 28, 2006.
DECISION. Judgment by lower court is MODIFIED. Chavez
is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the separate and
distinct crime of HOMICIDE.
Page 168 of 186
4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDNA
MALNGAN y MAYO, G.R. No. 170470. September 26,2006.
DOCTRINE: Rights of Suspects; Miranda Doctrine;
Extrajudicial Confessions; Requisites for Admissibility.—We
have held that the above quoted provision applies to the
stage of custodial investigation—when the investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to
focus on a particular person as a suspect. Said constitutional
guarantee has also been extended to situations in which an
individual has not been formally arrested but has merely
been “invited" for questioning. To be admissible in evidence
against an accused, the extrajudicial confessions made must
satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary;
(2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must
be in writing.
Facts:
An Information was filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch
41, charging accused-appellant with the crime of Arson with
Multiple Homicide. When arraigned, accused-appellant with
assistance of counsel de officio, pleaded “Not Guilty” to the
crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued. The RTC considered
accused-appellant to have waived her right to present
evidence, having filed the Demurrer to Evidence without
leave of court. Accused- appellant has not shown any
compelling reason why the witnesses presented would
openly, publicly and deliberately lie or concoct a story, to
send an innocent person to jail all the while knowing that the
real malefactor remains at large. Such proposition defies
logic. And where the defense failed to show any evil or
improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses, the
presumption is that their testimonies are true and thus
entitled to full faith and credence.
Accused-appellant questions the admissibility of her
uncounselled extrajudicial confession given to prosecution
witnesses, namely Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza,
and to the media. Accused-appellant Edna contends that
being uncounselled extrajudicial confession, her admissions
to having committed the crime charged should have been
excluded in evidence against her for being violative of Article
III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution.
BACKGROUND: From the personal account of Remigio
Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman in the area, as well as the
personal account of the pedicab driver named Rolando Gruta,
it was at around 4:45 a.m. on January 2, 2001 when Remigio
Bernardo and his tanods saw the accused-appellant EDNA,
one hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr., with her
head turning in different directions, hurriedly leaving the house
of her employer at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo,
Manila. She was seen to have boarded a pedicab which was
driven by a person later identified as Rolando Gruta. She was
heard by the pedicab driver to have instructed that she be
brought to Nipa Street, but upon her arrival there, she changed
her mind and asked that she be brought instead to Balasan
Street where she finally alighted, after paying for her fare.
Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman
Bernardo’s group later discovered that a fire gutted the house
of the employer of the housemaid. Barangay Chairman
Bernardo and his tanods responded to the fire upon hearing
shouts from the residents and thereafter, firemen from the
Fire District 1-NCR arrived at the fire scene to contain the fire.
When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the
Barangay Hall, he received a report from pedicab driver
Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, that shortly before the
occurrence of the fire, he saw a woman (the housemaid)
coming out of the house at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut,
Tondo, Manila and he received a call from his wife telling him
of a woman (the same housemaid) who was acting strangely
and suspiciously on Balasan Street. Barangay Chairman
Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and the other tanods proceeded to
Balasan Street and found the woman who was later identified “interrogation” made by the latter —admittedly conducted
as the accused- appellant. After Rolando Gruta positively without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under
identified the woman as the same person who left No. 172 the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this
Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila, Barangay Chairman reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to
Bernardo and his tanods apprehended her and brought her to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter
the Barangay Hall for investigation. At the Barangay Hall, found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence
Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr. and against her as such were obtained in violation of her
whose house was also burned, identified the woman as constitutional rights.
accused-appellant EDNA who was the housemaid of Roberto
Separa, Sr. Upon inspection, a disposable lighter was found Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellant’s
inside accused-appellant EDNA’s bag. Thereafter, accused- confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the
appellant EDNA confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo lighter as evidence do not automatically lead to her acquittal.
in the presence of multitudes of angry residents outside the It should well be recalled that the constitutional safeguards
Barangay Hall that she set her employer’s house on fire during custodial investigations do not apply to those not
because she had not been paid her salary for about a year elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but
and that she wanted to go home to her province but her given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally
employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going home. admits to having committed the offense as what happened in
the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to
Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over to arson Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of Roberto Separa,
investigators headed by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who brought Sr., to having started the fire in the Separas’ house. The
her to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta. Cruz, Manila where testimony of Mercedita Mendoza recounting said admission
she was further investigated and then detained.When is, unfortunately for accused-appellant, admissible in
Mercedita Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station to evidence against her and is not covered by the aforesaid
give her sworn statement, she had the opportunity to ask constitutional guarantee. Article III of the Constitution, or the
accused-appellant EDNA at the latter’s detention cell why she Bill of Rights, solely governs the relationship between the
did the burning of her employer’s house and accused- individual on one hand and the State (and its agents) on the
appellant EDNA replied that she set the house on fire other; it does not concern itself with the relation between a
because when she asked permission to go home to her private individual and another private individual—as both
province, the wife of her employer Roberto Separa, Sr., accused-appellant and prose ution witness Mercedita
named Virginia Separa shouted at her: “Sige umuwi ka, Mendoza undoubtedly are. Here, there is no evidence on
pagdating mo maputi ka na. Sumakay ka sa walis, pagdating record to show that said witness was acting under police
mo maputi ka na” (“Go ahead, when you arrive your color authority, so appropriately, accused-appellant’s uncounselled
would be fair already. Ride a broomstick, when you arrive extrajudicial confession to said witness was properly admitted
your color would be fair already.”) And when Mercedita by the RTC.
Mendoza asked accused-appellant EDNA how she burned
the house, accused-appellant EDNA told her: “Naglukot ako
ng maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng disposable lighter at
hinagis ko sa ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob ng bahay” (“I
crumpled newspapers, lighted them with a disposable lighter
and threw them on top of the table inside the house.”)
When interviewed by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS-
CBN Network, accused-appellant
EDNA while under detention was heard by SFO4 Danilo
Talusan as having admitted the crime and even narrated the
manner how she accomplished it. SFO4 Danilo Talusan was
able to hear the same confession, this time at his home, while
watching the television program “True Crime” hosted by Gus
Abelgas also of ABS-CBN Network.
The fire resulted in [the] destruction of the house of Roberto
Separa, Sr. and other adjoining houses and the death of
Roberto Separa, Sr. and Virginia Separa together with their
four (4) children, namely: Michael, Daphne, Priscilla and
Roberto, Jr.”
Issue:
Whether or not the uncounselled extrajudicial confession
given to prosecution witnesses was admissible in evidence.
Held:
NO. Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay
Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III,
Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-
appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of
2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only
one, in the fire that destroyed several houses as well as killed
the whole family of Roberto Separa, Sr. She was, therefore,
already under custodial investigation and the rights
guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of the Constitution
should have already been observed or applied to her.
Accused- appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman
Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the

Page 169 of 186

5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- appellee, vs. Court needs to ascertain whether or not a “ bantay bayan”
ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO, accused- may be deemed a law enforcement officer with in the
appellant. G.R. No. 186228. March 15, 2010. contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution. In
People of the Philippines v. Buendia, 382 SCRA 714 (2002),
DOCTRINE: Bantay Bayan; Words and Phrases; A “bantay
this Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a “bantay
bayan" is a group of male residents living in an area organized bayan,” that is, “a group of male residents living in the area
for the purpose of keeping peace in their community. organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their
Barangay-based volunteer organization in the nature of watch community, which is an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP.”
groups, as in the case of the “bantay bayan," are recognized Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section
by the local government unit to perform functions relating to 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November
the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level; 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each
Any inquiry a bantay bayan makes has the color of a state- barangay shall be organized “to serve as implementing arm
related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the
suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article Barangay level.” The composition of the Committee includes,
III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the
Miranda Rights, is concerned, and an extrajudicial confession Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the
taken from a suspect by such bantay bayan without a counsel Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at
is inadmissible in evidence. least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-
Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government
Facts: Organization Representative well-known in his community.
The appellant was accused of the crime of QUALIFIED The Court is convinced that barangay-based volunteer nature
RAPE. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty. This case is a of watch groups, as in the case of the “bantay bayan,” are
review of a conviction for the rape of the accused’s 13 year recognized by the local government unit to perform functions
old daughter. relating to the preservation of peace and order at the
BACKGROUND: In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the
left alone at home. AAA’s father, the appellant, as having a actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope
drinking spree at the neighbor’s place. Her mother decided to of duties and responsibilities delegated to a “bantay bayan,”
leave because when appellant get drunk, he has the habit of particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial
mauling AAA’s mother. Her only brother BBB also went out in investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-
the company of some neighbors. related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a
suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article
At around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, appellant woke AAA III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the
up; removed his pants, slid inside the blanket co ering AAA Miranda Rights, is concerned. We, therefore, find the
and removed her pants and underwear; warned her not to extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without
shout for help while threatening her with his fist; and tol her a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
that he had a knife placed above her head. He proceeded to
mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and “inserted his penis
inside her vagina.”
Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying. Appellant
claimed he scolded her for staying out late. BBB decided to
take AAA with him. While on their way to their maternal
grandmother’s house, AAA ecounted her harrowing
experience with their father. Upon reaching their
grandmother’s house, they told their grandmother and uncle
of the incident, after which, they sought the assistance of
Moises Boy Banting.Moises Boy Banting found appellant in
his house wearing only his und rwear. He invited appellant to
the police station, to which appellant obliged. At the police
outpost, he admitted to him that he raped. AAA because he
was unable to control himself. The following day, AAA
submitted herself to physical examination.
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He
believed that the charge against him was ill-motivated
because he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front o
their children after engaging in a heated argu ent, and beats
the children as a disciplinary measure. He went further to
narrate how his day was on the date of the alleged rape.
Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3
o’clock in the afternoon. Finding nobody at home, he prepared
his dinner and went to sleep. Later in the evening, he was
awakened by the members of the “Bantay Bayan” headed by
Moises Boy Banting. They asked him to go with them to
discuss some matters. He later learned that he was under
detention because AAA charged him of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not the confession of the accused with a “bantay
bayan” is admissible in evidence.
Held:
NO. Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this

Page 170 of 186

6. Miguel vs. People, 833 SCRA 139, 2017
FACTS:
An information was filed before the RTC charging Jeffrey
Miguel (petitioner) of illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
penalized under 9165 or the “Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002”
Prosecution alleged that (prosecution version of facts):
Around 12:45 am of May 24, 2010, a Bantay Bayan operative
of Brgy. San Antonio Village, Makati, named Reynaldo
Bahoyo was doing his rounds when he received a report of a
man showing off his private parts at Kaong Street!
Bahoyo and fellow Bantay Bayan operative Mark Velasquez
then went to said street and saw a visible intoxicated person,
which they later identified as petitioner, urinating and
displaying his private parts while standing in front of a gate
enclosing an empty lot
When they asked petitioner where he lived, the latter
answered “Kaong Street”
Bahoyo then said he lived on the same street but petitioner
looked unfamiliar to him, so he asked for an ID, but petitioner
failed to produce one
Velasquez repeated the for an ID, but instead, petitioner
emptied his pockets, revealing a pack of cigarettes containing
one stick and two pieces of rolled paper containing dried
marijuana leaves
This prompted the Bantay Bayans to seize the items, take
petitioner to the police station, and turn him, as well as the
items, over to SPO3 Rafael Castillo
SPO3 Castillo then inventoried the items, and prepared a
request for qualitative examination of the rolled paper and for
petitioner to undergo drug testing
Tests confirmed it was marijuana and that petitioner was
positive for the presence of Methamphetamine but negative
for THC-metabolites
Petitioner pleaded not guilty, and presented a different version
of facts (petitioner version of facts):
He was just urinating in from of his workplace when 2 Bantay
Bayan operatives approached him and asked him where he
lived
Upon responding that he lived in Kaong Street, they frisked
him, took away his belongings, and thereafter handcuffed and
brought him to the Brgy. Hall
He was detained for about an hour before being taken to the
Ospital ng Makati and to another office where a bald officer
questioned him
He was then taken back to the Brgy. Hall where they showed
him 2 sticks of marijuana joints allegedly recovered from him
RTC Ruling
RTC found petitioner guilty for the crime charged
They ruled that the Bahoyo and Velasques conducted a valid
warrantless arrest, as petitioner was scandalously showing his
private parts at the time of his arrest
Thus, the incidental search which yielded the seized
marijuana was also lawful
Petitioner appealed to the CA
CA Ruling
CA affirmed conviction
Page 171 of 186
It held that search made on petitioner was valid as it was done
incidental to his arrest for exhibiting his private parts on public
As such, said marijuana is admissible in evidence and
sufficient to convict him for the crime charged
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence
the petition to the SC
Petitioner argues that the search and arrest was illegal and,
thus, the marijuana purportedly seized from him is
inadmissible in evidence
ISSUE:
Whether or not the there was a valid search incidental to a
lawful warrantless arrest
HELD:
NO
(First, the Court established that the Bill of Rights apply to
Bantay Bayan operatives)
The Bantay Bayan operatives are not government agents like
the PNP or the NBI in charge of law enforcement, but are
civilian volunteers who act as “force multipliers” to assist the
law enforcement agencies in maintaining peace and security.
The Bill of Rights generally cannot be invoked against the acts
of private individuals, however, they may be applicable if such
individuals act under the color of a state-related function
In this case, the acts of the Bantay Bayan relating to the
preservation of peace and order in their respective areas have
the color of a state-related function. As such, the Bill of Rights
may be applied to the Bantay Bayan operatives who arrested
and subsequently searched petitioner.
(Next, the court determined that the arrest and search was
NOT validly made)
The Bill of Rights provides that evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding, being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. The law requires that there
first be a lawful arrest first before a search can be made – this
process cannot be reversed.
A lawful arrest may be made without a warrant, provided the
parameters defined in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure are complied with.
In Section 5(a), or in flagrante delicto arrests, 2 elements must
concur, namely:
a. The person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime
b. Such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer
Section 5(b), requires that at the time of the arrest, an offense
had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had
committed it
In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the
fact of the commission of an offense is essential
On the basis of the testimonies, the Court is inclined to believe
that petitioner went out to the street to urinate (note that there
was no CR in his workplace) when the Bantay Bayan
operatives chanced upon him. That latter then approached
and questioned petitioner, and thereafter went on to search
his person, which purportedly yielded the marijuana.
Verily, the prosecution’s claim that petitioner was showing off
his private parts was belied by the testimonies (important
note: the Bantay Bayans testified in the cross examination
that petitioner was showing off his private parts while urinating
and turning his back from them. How the hell can you show off
your private parts when you are turning your back and
urinating? lol)
Clearly, these circumstances do not justify the conduct of
an in flagrante delicto arrest, considering that there was
NO overt act constituting a crime committed by petitioner
in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer
Neither do these circumstances necessitate a “hot pursuit”
warrantless arrest as the arresting operatives do not have any
personal knowledge of facts that petitioner had just committed
an offense
Moreover, if the arrest was made because of the alleged
display of private parts, then the proper charge should have
been filed against him. However, records are bereft of any
showing that such charge was filed aside from the instant
criminal charge for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
This strengthens the view that no prior lawful arrest was made
which led to a valid search incidental thereto.
There must be a lawful arrest FIRST, before a search can be
made, the process cannot be reversed.
Page 172 of 186
7. People vs. Dacanay, 807 SCRA 130, 2016
Facts:
In 1985, petitioner was the vice-president of the National
Sugar Trading Corporation (NASUTRA). In 1986, a criminal
complaint for economic sabotage through smuggling, with
regard to the importation of raw sugar in 1983 and 1984 by
NASUTRA, was filed with the Tanodbayan against the
principal officers of the said corporation including petitioner.
On October 10, 1986, the Tanodbayan approved the
resolution of the team of Special Prosecutors who
investigated the case. It found sufficient prima facie evidence
against petitioner and his co-accused to warrant the filing of
an information with respondent Sandiganbayan for violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. The
corresponding information was filed with the Sandiganbayan.
On November 20, petitioner filed a motion to quash but he
later withdrew the same. On October 14, 1988, a resolution
was issued by Special Prosecutors Margarito P. Gervacio and
Robert E. Kallos, recommending the dismissal of the
complaint against petitioner and his co-accused for lack of
sufficient evidence and the withdrawal of the information filed
in court. The resolution was approved by Acting Special
Prosecutor Jose Ferrer. On January 6, 1989, the resolution
issued by Prosecutors Gervacio and Kallos was reviewed by
Special Prosecutor Wilfredo Orencia, who recommended its
disapproval. The recommendation of Prosecutor Orencia was
approved by Acting Special Prosecutor Jose F. Guerrero and
by Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez. On February 22, Jose
Unson, a co-accused of petitioner, filed a motion to quash the
information in the Sandiganbayan. The motion was adopted
by petitioner. On December 12, the Sandiganbayan denied
the motion to quash. Likewise, the motion for reconsideration
filed by Unson and adopted by petitioner was denied.
On April 3, 1991 petitioner filed a motion for immediate and
separate trial invoking his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
On April 23, respondent People of the Philippines opposed
the said motion on the ground that a separate trial for
petitioner would entail a lengthy and repetitious proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a separate trial.
Held:
Yes.
A separate trial necessarily requires a repetition of the
presentation of the same evidence. But the resulting in
convenience and expense on the part of the Government
cannot be given preference over the right to speedy trial and
the protection to a person's life, liberty or property accorded
by the Constitution. This is particularly true in the case of
petitioner where the prosecutors' opposition to the request for
separate trial was based on the ground that the principal
accused in the case, the former President of NASUTRA, was
abroad and was not yet arrested. If an accused cannot be
placed under arrest because he remains outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines, with more reason should his co-
accused, who are under arrest, be entitled to a separate trial.
A separate trial is in consonance with the right of an
accused to a speedy trial as guaranteed to him by the
1987 Constitution, more specifically under Section 14(2)
of Article III thereof. As defined in the case of Flores v.
People, 61 SCRA 331 (1974), a speedy trial is one
"conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the
rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays." The primordial purpose of this
constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of an accused
by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of
time. Likewise, it is intended to prevent delays in the
administration of justice by requiring judicial tribunals to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal
prosecutions.
WHEREFORE, respondents are ORDERED to proceed
with the trial of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 11957,
separately if it need be.
Page 173 of 186
O. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
LUZVIMINDA S. VALDEZ and THE SANDIGANBAYAN
(FIFTH DIVISION), respondents, G.R. Nos. 216007-09.
December 8, 2015.
DOCTRINE: Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification
of Official/Public Documents; Manalac, Jr. v. People, G.R.
Nos. 206194-206207, July 3, 2013, already resolved that an
accused charged with Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents where the amount
involved exceeds P22,000.00 is not entitled to bail as a matter
of right because it has an actual imposable penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
Facts:
The case stemmed from the Joint Affidavit executed by
Sheila S. Velmonte-Portal and Mylene T. Romero, both State
Auditors of the Commission on Audit Region VI in Pavia,
Iloilo, who conducted a post- audit of the disbursement
vouchers (D.V.) of the Bacolod City Government. Among the
subjects thereof were the reimbursements of expenses of
private respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez (Valdez), a former
mayor of Bacolod City.
Based on the verification conducted in the establishments
that issued the official receipts, it was alleged that the cash
slips were altered/falsified to enable Valdez to claim/receive
reimbursement from the Government the total amount of
P279,150.00 instead of only P4,843.25; thus, an aggregate
overclaim of P274,306.75.
Valdez was charged with eight cases four of which (SB - 14-
CRM-0317 to 0320) were for Violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, while the remaining half (SB-14-
CRM-0321 to 0324) were for the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents under Articles 217 and 171, in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to bail as a matter of
right.
Held:
No. The controversy is, in fact, not one of first impression.
Manalac, Jr. v. People already resolved that an accused
charged with Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification
of Official/Public Documents where the amount involved
exceeds P22,000.00 is not entitled to bail as a matter of right
because it has an actual imposable penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The Sandiganbayan thus gravely erred in setting aside the
“No Bail” recommendation of the Special Prosecutor and
fixing the amount of bail as prayed for by Valdez. It is settled
that the grant of bail to an accused charged with an offense
that carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
discretionary on the part of the trial court, i.e., accused is still
entitled to bail but no longer as a matter of right. Indeed, the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong
is a matter of judicial discretion. This discretion, by the nature
of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing. The Prosecution must
be given a chance to show strength of its evidence; otherwise,
a violation of due process occurs. As the rule now stands, a
hearing upon notice is mandatory before the grant of bail,
whether bail is a matter of right or discretion.
2. Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region v. Olalia. G.R. No. 153675; April 19, 2007, 521
SCRA 470, (2007)
Private respondent Munoz was charged before the Hong
Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting
an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He
also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to
defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On
August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest
were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
The DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice
a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The
DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila,
Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private
respondent. The RTC issued an Order of Arrest. The CA
declared the Order of Arrest void. On certiorari, the SC
sustained the validity of the Order and this decision became
final and executory.
Meanwhile, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the
extradition of private respondent. Private respondent filed, in
the same case a petition for bail. Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued
an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no
Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that
private respondent is a high "flight risk.” Judge Bernardo later
inhibited himself from the case. It was then raffled off to
Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. On motion for
reconsideration, respondent judge allowed private
respondent to post bail.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order,
but it was denied by respondent judge. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether a potential extraditee has the right to bail.
Held:
Yes.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right
to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo
G. Purganan, this Court, held that the constitutional provision
on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is
"available only in criminal proceedings," thus:
As suggested by the use of the word "conviction,"
the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as
well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It
does not apply to extradition proceedings because
extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from
the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt". It follows that the constitutional
Page 174 of 186
provision on bail will not apply to a case like
extradition, where the presumption of innocence is
not at issue.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private
respondent's case. However, this Court cannot ignore the
following trends in international law: (1) the growing
importance of the individual person in public international law
who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global
recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human
rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty
of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court
to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental
law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy
placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity
of human rights. Significant events show that the individual
person is now a valid subject of international law. In facts, the
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty
and all the other fundamental rights of every person were
proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the
said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding
upon the members of the international community. The
principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of
our land.
Thus, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this
Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various
international treaties giving recognition and protection to
human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a
reexamination of this Court's ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State's power to deprive
an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal
proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings,
such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been
detained. Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would
be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail
to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail
persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact,
bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in
detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings,
taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under
international conventions to uphold human rights.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no
justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no
reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all,
both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or
guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail
in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various
treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights. Under these
treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus,
the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every
individual is not impaired.
Concept of Extradition
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of
placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in connection with
any criminal investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the
criminal law of the requesting state or government." prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now
It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard
is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be
criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him,
punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable
existence wholly to treaty obligations between different doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing
the potential extraditee. Nor is it a fullblown civil action, but evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to orders and processes of the extradition court.
prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a
crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, In this case, there is no showing that private respondent
for the purpose of trial or punishment. presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail
characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means
employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the
machinery of criminal law." Obviously, an extradition
proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all
earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be
subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and
forced to transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings." Temporary detention" may be a necessary step
in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on
September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his
admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for
over two (2) years without having been convicted of any
crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention
is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In
fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which
prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail
to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting
him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process
under the Constitution.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands
that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition
Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these
obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats
the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily
mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the
Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee's rights to
life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are
guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party.
Burden of Proof
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not
be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the
standard of due process is premised on the presumption of
innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out,
it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in
favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose
of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance
of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the
possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on
the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.
Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the
onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and
should be granted bail.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of
proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the
proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases.
While administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply

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3. Alejano vs. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792; August 25, 2005.
Facts:
After the Oakwood Mutiny, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff
of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service
Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers
involved to the ISAFP Detention Center. The government
prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup d'etat as defined
and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code
of the Philippines, as amended. The trial court later issued the
Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG
Antonio Trillanes IV ("Trillanes") and Capt. Gerardo Gambala
to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP.
Petitioners later filed a petition for habeas corpus with the
Supreme Court. The Court issued a
Writ of Habeas Corpus directing respondents to make a
return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of
the detainees before the Court of Appeals on the scheduled
date for hearing and further proceedings. Respondents
submitted their Return of the Writ and Answer to the petition
and produced the detainees before the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the petition
on the ground that habeas corpus is not available as the
detainees’ confinement is under a valid indictment.
Nonetheless, the appellate court ordered Gen. Cabuay, who
was in charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP
Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the
detainees. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners admit that they do not question the legality of the
detention of the detainees. Neither do they dispute the lawful
indictment of the detainees for criminal and military offenses.
What petitioners bewail is the regulation adopted by Gen.
Cabuay in the ISAFP Detention Center preventing petitioners
as lawyers from seeing the detainees - their clients - any time
of the day or night. The regulation allegedly curtails the
detainees' right to counsel and violates Republic Act No.
7438. Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP
Detention Center violated the detainees' right to privacy of
communication when the ISAFP officials opened and read the
personal letters of Trillanes and Capt. Milo Maestrecampo.
Petitioners further claim that the ISAFP officials violated the
detainees' right against cruel and unusual punishment when
the ISAFP officials prevented the detainees from having
contact with their visitors. Moreover, the ISAFP officials
boarded up with iron bars and plywood slabs the iron grills of
the detention cells, limiting the already poor light and
ventilation in the detainees' cells.
Issue no.1:
Whether the detainees are entitled to the writ of habeas
corpus.
Held 1:
No, neither is the prior granting of the SC of the privilege of
the writ determinative of this case.
In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual
before the court is a preliminary step in the hearing of the
petition. The respondent must produce the person and
explain the cause of his detention. However, this order is not
a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive
matters covered by the remedy. Thus, the Court's order to the
Court of Appeals to conduct a factual hearing was not an
affirmation of the propriety of the remedy of habeas corpus.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of
habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to address the
detainees' complaint against the regulations and conditions in
the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus
has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a
person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a
person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry
reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the
Page 176 of 186
release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven
lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The
use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of
error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.
Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writ's application to
circumstances where there is deprivation of a person's
constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person
continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process,
where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are also
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally
valid has later become arbitrary.
However, a mere allegation of a violation of one's
constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will extend the
scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is
present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had
no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive
penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the
excess. Whatever situation the petitioner invokes, the
threshold remains high. The violation of constitutional right
must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings.
Issue no. 2:
Whether there has been a violation of detainees’ rights when
respondent regulated their visits.
Held no 2:
No.
Petitioners contend that there was an actual prohibition of the
detainees' right to effective representation when petitioners'
visits were limited by the schedule of visiting hours.
Petitioners assert that the violation of the detainees' rights
entitle them to be released from detention. This is not correct.
It is true that pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their
constitutional rights upon confinement. However, the fact that
the detainees are confined makes their rights more limited
than those of the public. RA 7438, which specifies the rights
of detainees and the duties of detention officers, expressly
recognizes the power of the detention officer to adopt and
implement reasonable measures to secure the safety of the
detainee and prevent his escape.
Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides:
b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits
any lawyer, any member of the immediate family of
a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or
religious minister or by his counsel, from visiting and
conferring privately chosen by him or by any
member of his immediate family with him, or from
examining and treating him, or from ministering to
his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in
urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor
more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand
pesos (P4,000.00).
The provisions of the above Section
notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial
responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may
undertake such reasonable measures as may be
necessary to secure his safety and prevent his
escape.
The schedule of visiting hours does not render void the
detainees' indictment for criminal and military offenses to
warrant the detainees' release from detention. The ISAFP
officials did not deny, but merely regulated, the detainees'
right to counsel. The purpose of the regulation is not to render
ineffective the right to counsel, but to secure the safety and
security of all detainees.
In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA
7438 provides the standard to make regulations in detention
centers allowable: "such reasonable measures as may be
necessary to secure the detainee's safety and prevent his
escape." In the present case, the visiting hours accorded to
the lawyers of the detainees are reasonably connected to the
legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing the
escape of all detainees.
While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they
want, the fact that the detainees still have face- to-face
meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly shows that
there is no impairment of detainees' right to counsel.
Petitioners as counsels could visit their clients between 8:00
a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00 p.m. Clearly,
the visiting hours pass the standard of reasonableness.
Moreover, in urgent cases, petitioners could always seek
permission from the ISAFP officials to confer with their clients
beyond the visiting hours.
Issue no. 3:
Whether respondents violated the detainees' right against
cruel and unusual punishment when the ISAFP officials
prevented the detainees from having contact with their visitors
anf boarded up with iron bars and plywood slabs the iron grills
of the detention cells, limiting the already poor light and
ventilation in the detainees' cells.
Held:
No.
An American case, Bell v. Wolfish, pointed out that while a
detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt
in accordance with due process of law, detention inevitably
interferes with a detainee's desire to live comfortably. The fact
that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the
detainees' desire to live comfortably does not convert those
restrictions into punishment. It is when the restrictions are
arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish.
Courts will also infer intent to punish even if the restriction
seems to be related rationally to the alternative purpose if the
restriction appears excessive in relation to that purpose. Jail
officials are thus not required to use the least restrictive
security measure. They must only refrain from implementing
a restriction that appears excessive to the purpose it serves.
An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action
causes the inmate to suffer some harm or "disability," and (2)
the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate. Punishment
also requires that the harm or disability be significantly greater
than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of
confinement. In the present case, we cannot infer punishment
from the separation of the detainees from their visitors by iron
bars, which is merely a limitation on contact visits. The iron
bars separating the detainees from their visitors prevent direct
physical contact but still allow the detainees to have visual,
verbal, non-verbal and limited physical contact with their
visitors. The arrangement is not unduly restrictive. In fact, it is
not even a strict noncontact visitation regulation. The
limitation on the detainees' physical contacts with visitors is a
reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security concerns.
The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security
within the ISAFP Detention Center. This measure intends to
fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from
passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to another.
The boarded grills ensure security and prevent disorder and
crime within the facility. The diminished illumination and
ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of
detention, and do not constitute punishments on the
detainees.
Issue no 4:
Whether respondents violated the detainees' right to privacy
of communication when the ISAFP officials opened and read
Page 177 of 186
the personal letters of Trillanes and Capt. Milo
Maestrecampo.
Held no 4:
No.
American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-
trial detainees' non-privileged mail poses a genuine threat to
jail security. Hence, when a detainee places his letter in an
envelope for nonprivileged mail, the detainee knowingly
exposes his letter to possible inspection by jail officials. A pre-
trial detainee has no reasonable expectation of privacy for his
incoming mail. However, incoming mail from lawyers of
inmates enjoys limited protection such that prison officials can
open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not read
the contents without violating the inmates' right to correspond
with his lawyer. The inspection of privileged mail is limited to
physical contraband and not to verbal contraband.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening
and reading of the detainees' letters in the present case
violated the detainees' right to privacy of communication. The
letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the
folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same
purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of
contraband.
Besides, the letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP
authorities were not confidential letters between the
detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the
letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was
merely acting as the detainees' personal courier and not as
their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the
present case, since the letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the
officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters.
If the letters are marked confidential communication between
the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should
not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection
in the presence of the detainees.
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude
on a citizen's privacy rights is a guarantee that is available
only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained
or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject
to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent
in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their
detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a
diminished expectation of privacy rights.
The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right
of detainees and convicted prisoners from petitioning the
courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and
conditions in detention and prison facilities that violate the
Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be
reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts
could afford injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and
prisoners subjected to arbitrary and inhumane conditions.
However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question
conditions of confinement. The writ of habeas corpus will only
lie if what is challenged is the fact or duration of confinement.
4. Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847; August 18,
2015.
Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several
others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their
purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF). Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion
and Supplemental Opposition, praying, among others, that he
be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found
against him. The Sandiganbayan issued its resolution
denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on
the ground of its prematurity. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan
ordered the arrest of Enrile. Enrile voluntarily surrendered to
Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and
was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP)
General Hospital following his medical examination.
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP
General Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail. Enrile argued
that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the
Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his
guilt was strong;
(b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to
him would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua;
and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical
condition must further be seriously considered.
The Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motion, hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether Enrile is entitled to post bail.
Held:
Yes.
Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to
be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. The presumption of
innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail,
and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose
any punishment on the accused.
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the
accused from committing additional crimes. The purpose of
bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial,
or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail
should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused
when so required, but it should be no higher than is
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as
a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s
interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and
the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at
trial.
Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III
(Bill of Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:
All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance
as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
Page 178 of 186
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. — No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of
the stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to
an offense that, under the law existing at the time of
its commission and the application for admission to
bail, may be punished with death.
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he
is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and
the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment
he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the
officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his
provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his
right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with
an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it
has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no
right to bail shall be recognized.
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary:
(1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment; or
(2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the
circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5,
Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by
the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life
imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is subject to judicial
discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases
involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the
discretion of the trial court. Such discretion may be exercised
only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of
the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be
granted provisional liberty.” It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail
cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on
the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with
notice to the Prosecution.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the
presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for the
prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and
circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the
accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the
probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or
not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not
the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule
114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can
appreciate these guidelines in an ex- parte determination
where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard. The hearing,
which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion
of the court, should primarily determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to
comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing
of the application for bail regardless of whether or not
the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose
of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion;
(Section 7 and 8, supra)
Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based
on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
3. If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should
be denied.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari,
the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose
of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused
at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court
is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the
international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as
value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment
is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: “The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due
process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every
person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right
to be admitted to bail.
In our view, his social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being
charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape
from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal
disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal
or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal
processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an
earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he
already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for
the legal processes, and was granted bail during the
pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk.
With his solid reputation in both his public and his private
lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment
of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another
Page 179 of 186
compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the
Sandiganbayan did not recognize. Dr. Gonzales attested that
the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could
pose significant risks to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1)
uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or
heart complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2)
arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal
cardiovascular events, especially under stressful conditions;
(3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary artery
disease, because they could indicate a future risk for heart
attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of
ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain
circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen
exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients with
asthma or COPD. Based on foregoing, there is no question at
all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill health required special
medical attention.
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of
the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the
merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is
clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his
life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and
life would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not
unprecedented. The Court has already held in Dela Rama v.
The People’s Court: [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by
law in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner,
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance,
and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration which
should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the
proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to
admit the prisoner to bail.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to
finish before a meaningful consideration of the application for
bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to
entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial.
There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail -
whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is
properly the subject of judicial notice - that the courts can
already consider in resolving the application for bail without
awaiting the trial to finish. The Court thus balances the scales
of justice by protecting the interest of the People through
ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same
time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well
as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily
ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the
accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the
clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of
Enrile.
4.2 Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847; July 12, Admission to bail always involves the risk that the accused
2016 will take flight. This is the reason precisely why the probability
or the improbability of flight is an important factor to be taken
Facts:
into consideration in granting or denying bail, even in capital
This is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the People of the cases. The exception to the fundamental right to bail should
Philippines on the previous case. People asserts that the be applied in direct ratio to the extent of the probability of
decision unduly and radically modified constitutional and evasion of prosecution. Apparently, an accused's official and
procedural principles governing bail. social standing and his other personal circumstances are
considered and appreciated as tending to render his flight
Issue: improbable.
Whether Enrile is entitled to bail. The petitioner has proven with more than sufficient evidence
Held: that he would not be a flight risk. For one, his advanced age
and fragile state of health have minimized the likelihood that
Yes. he would make himself scarce and escape from the
jurisdiction of our courts.
The Court finds no compelling or good reason to reverse its
decision.
Firstly, the People were not denied the reasonable
opportunity to challenge or refute the allegations about his
advanced age and the instability of his health even if the
allegations had not been directly made in connection with his
Motion to Fix Bail.
Secondly, the imputation of "preferential treatment" in "undue
favor" of the petitioner is absolutely bereft of basis. A reading
of the decision of August 18, 2015 indicates that the Court did
not grant his provisional liberty because he was a sitting
Senator of the Republic. It did so because there were proper
bases - legal as well as factual - for the favorable
consideration and treatment of his plea for provisional liberty
on bail. By its decision, the Court has recognized his right to
bail by emphasizing that such right should be curtailed only if
the risks of flight from this jurisdiction were too high. In our
view, however, the records demonstrated that the risks of
flight were low, or even nil. The Court has taken into
consideration other circumstances, such as his advanced age
and poor health, his past and present disposition of respect
for the legal processes, the length of his public service, and
his individual public and private reputation. There was really
no reasonable way for the Court to deny bail to him simply
because his situation of being 92 years of age when he was
first charged for the very serious crime in court was quite
unique and very rare. To ignore his advanced age and
unstable health condition in order to deny his right to bail on
the basis alone of the judicial discretion to deny bail would be
probably unjust. To equate his situation with that of the other
accused indicted for a similarly serious offense would be
inherently wrong when other conditions significantly
differentiating his situation from that of the latter's
unquestionably existed.
Section 2, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court expressly states that
one of the conditions of bail is for the accused to "appear
before the proper court whenever required by the court or
these Rules." The practice of bail fixing supports this purpose.
Bail exists to ensure society's interest in having the accused
answer to a criminal prosecution without unduly restricting his
or her liberty and without ignoring the accused's right to be
presumed innocent. It does not perform the function of
preventing or licensing the commission of a crime. The notion
that bail is required to punish a person accused of crime is,
therefore, fundamentally misplaced. Indeed, the practice of
admission to bail is not a device for keeping persons in jail
upon mere accusation until it is found convenient to give them
a trial. The spirit of the procedure is rather to enable them to
stay out of jail until a trial with all the safeguards has found
and adjudged them guilty. Unless permitted this conditional
privilege, the individuals wrongly accused could be punished
by the period of imprisonment they undergo while awaiting
trial, and even handicap them in consulting counsel,
searching for evidence and witnesses, and preparing a
defense. Hence, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accused's interest in pretrial liberty
and society's interest in assuring his presence at trial

Page 180 of 186

5. Qui vs. People, G.R. No. 196161; September 26, 2012.
Facts:
Petitioner Cyril Calpito Qui was convicted by the RTC of
violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. (RA)
7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act and sentenced her
to two equal periods of imprisonment for an indeterminate
penalty of five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty one (21)
days of prision correccional in its maximum period, as
minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision mayor in its minimum period, as maximum.
Petitioner filed her Notice of Appeal. With the perfection of her
appeal and the consequent elevation of the case records to
the CA, petitioner posthaste filed before the appellate court
an Urgent Petition/Application for Bail Pending Appeal. The
CA denied petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal on
the basis of Sec. 5(d) of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Issue:
Whether Qui is entitled to bail pending appeal.
Held:
Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of
discretion upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
as here.
In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be
guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail
pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with
grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that
the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.
The CA properly exercised its discretion in denying
petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal. The CA’s
determination as to petitioner being a high risk for flight is not
without factual mooring. Indeed, the undisputed fact that
petitioner did not attend the hearings before the RTC, which
compelled the trial court to issue warrants for her arrest, is
undeniably indicative of petitioner’s propensity to trifle with
court processes. This fact alone should weigh heavily against
a grant of bail pending appeal.
Petitioner’s argument that she has the constitutional right to
bail and that the evidence of guilt against her is not strong is
spurious. Certainly, after one is convicted by the trial court,
the presumption of innocence, and with it, the constitutional
right to bail, ends.
Page 181 of 186
6. Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion Angeles, A.M. No.
06-9-545-RTC; January 31, 2008.
Facts:
The RTC convicted Judge Angeles of violation of Republic
Act (RA) No. 7610. Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y.
Velasco (SSP Velasco) of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
wrote a letter to then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban
inquiring whether it is possible for this Court, in the public
interest, motu proprio to order the immediate suspension of
the respondent in view of the aforementioned RTC Decision.
On the basis of SSP Velasco's letter, the OCA recommended
that she be indefinitely suspended pending the outcome of
the case or until further orders from the Court.
Issue:
Whether Judge Angeles should be suspended pending the
determination of her criminal case.
Held:
No.
The Court cannot fully agree with the recommendation of the
OCA.
It is settled that conviction in the criminal case will not
automatically warrant a finding of guilt in the administrative
case. Criminal and civil cases are altogether different from
administrative matters, and each must be disposed of
according to the facts and the law applicable to it.
In Nunez v. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga, the Court held that the
mere existence of pending criminal charges against the
respondent-lawyer cannot be a ground for disbarment or
suspension of the latter. To hold otherwise would open the
door to harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of
numerous criminal cases against them.
By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent’s conviction by
the RTC does not necessarily warrant her suspension. We
agree with respondent's argument that since her conviction of
the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the CA,
the same has not yet attained finality. As such, she still enjoys
the constitutional presumption of innocence. It must be
remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating
the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the
constitutional presumption of innocence unless the
inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the
lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the accused's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt is
shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence
continues
7. People vs. Caoili, G.R. No. 196342. August 8, 2017, G.R.
No. 196848. August 8, 2017.
Doctrines:
Variance Doctrine; By jurisprudence, an accused charged in
the Information with rape by sexual intercourse cannot be
found guilty of rape by sexual assault, even though the latter
crime was proven during trial. —The language of paragraphs
1 and 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No.
8353, provides the elements that substantially differentiate
the two forms of rape, i.e., rape by sexual intercourse and
rape by sexual assault. It is through legislative process that
the dichotomy between these two modes of rape was created.
To broaden the scope of rape by sexual assault, by
eliminating its legal distinction from rape through sexual
intercourse, calls for judicial legislation which We cannot
traverse without violating the principle of separation of
powers. The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers
within the constitutional sphere of applying the law as enacted
by the Legislature. In fine, given the material distinctions
between the two modes of rape introduced in R.A. No. 8353,
the variance doctrine cannot be applied to convict an accused
of rape by sexual assault if the crime charged is rape through
sexual intercourse, since the former offense cannot be
considered subsumed in the latter.
Leonen, Dissenting
Constitutional Law; Right to be Informed; View that the right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations
against a person need not be alleged with the highest degree
of particularity. It is satisfied as long as facts are alleged with
sufficient clarity that allows the accused to understand what
acts he is being made liable for in order to enable him to make
a defense.—The accused may be convicted of rape by sexual
intercourse without violating his due process rights and his
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusations against him as provided in Article III, Section 14
of the 1987 Constitution and reproduced in Rule 115, Section
1(b) of our Rules of Procedure. The importance and purpose
of this rule has been explained by this Court in People v.
Quitlong, 292 SCRA 360 (1998): First. To furnish the accused
with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself
of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause, and third, to inform the court
of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.
The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusations against a person need not be alleged with the
highest degree of particularity. It is satisfied as long as facts
are alleged with sufficient clarity that allows the accused to
understand what acts he is being made liable for in order to
enable him to make a defense.
Facts:
On June 22, 2006, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Raul
O. Nasayao filed an Information against Caoili, charging him
with the crime of rape through sexual intercourse in violation
of Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC as
amended by R.A. No. 8353, and R.A. No. 7610. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 23rd day of October 2005, at 7:00 o’clock
in the evening, more or less, in Purok [III], Barangay [JJJ],
[KKK], [LLL], Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, with full
freedom and intelligence, with lewd design, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had sexual
intercourse with one [AAA],7 a minor, fifteen (15) years of age
and the daughter of the herein accused, through force, threat
and intimidation and against her will, to her damage and
prejudice in the amount as may be allowed by law.
CONTRARY TO Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B of
Page 182 of 186
R.A. 8353, with the aggravating circumstance that the
accused is the father of the victim and R.A. 7610[.]
The RTC declared Caoili guilty of rape by sexual assault.
Thereafter, Caoili filed his appeal before the CA.
The CA held that although Caoili is clearly guilty of rape by
sexual assault, what the trial court should have done was to
direct the State Prosecutor to file a new Information charging
the proper offense, and after compliance therewith, to dismiss
the original Information. The appellate court found it
“imperative and morally upright” to set the judgment aside and
to remand the case for further proceedings pursuant to
Section 14, Rule 110.
Issue:
WHETHER RAPE BY SEXUAL ASSAULT IS NECESSARILY
INCLUDED IN RAPE BY SEXUAL INTERCOURSE.
Ruling:
Rape by sexual assault is not subsumed in rape through
sexual intercourse.
The Court did not accept the OSG’s argument that based on
the variance doctrine, Caoili can be convicted of rape by
sexual assault because this offense is necessarily included in
the crime of rape through sexual intercourse.
The variance doctrine, which allows the conviction of an
accused for a crime proved which is different from but
necessarily included in the crime charged, is embodied in
Section 4, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court which reads:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and
proof.—When there is variance between the offense charged
in the complaint or information and that proved, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
(Emphasis ours)
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—
An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute
the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in
the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
By jurisprudence, however, an accused charged in the
Information with rape by sexual intercourse cannot be found
guilty of rape by sexual assault, even though the latter crime
was proven during trial. This is due to the substantial
distinctions between these two modes of rape.
In the first mode (rape by sexual intercourse): (1) the offender
is always a man; (2) the offended party is always a woman;
(3) rape is committed through penile penetration of the
vagina; and (4) the penalty is reclusion perpertua.
In the second mode (rape by sexual assault): (1) theoffender
may be a man or a woman; (2) the offended party may be a
man or a woman; (3) rape is committed by inserting the penis
into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument
or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and
(4) the penalty is prisión mayor.
Given the material distinctions between the two modes of rape
introduced in R.A. No. 8353, the variance doctrine cannot be
applied to convict an accused of rape by sexual assault if the
crime charged is rape through sexual intercourse, since the
former offense cannot be considered subsumed in the latter.
The Court, thus, took the occasion to once again remind
public prosecutors of their crucial role in drafting criminal
complaints or Information. They have to be more judicious
and circumspect in preparing the Information since a mistake
or defect therein may not render full justice to the State, the
offended party and even the offender.
Variance Doctrine Applied
Caoili had been charged with rape through sexual intercourse
in violation of Article 266-A of the RPC and R.A. No. 7610.
Applying the variance doctrine under Section 4, in relation to
Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Caoili can be held guilty of the lesser crime of acts
of lasciviousness performed on a child, i.e., lascivious
conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, which was the
offense proved, because it is included in rape, the offense
charged. This echoes the Court’s pronouncement in
Leonardo, viz.:
This Court holds that the lower courts properly convicted the
appellant in Criminal Case Nos. 546-V-02, 547-V-02, 548-V-
02, 554-V-02 and 555-V-02 for five counts of sexual abuse
under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 even
though the charges against him in the aforesaid criminal
cases were for rape in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. The
lower court[’s] ruling is in conformity with the variance doctrine
embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, x x x:
This Court holds that the lower courts properly convicted the
appellant in Criminal Case Nos. 546-V-02, 547-V-02, 548-V-
02, 554-V-02 and 555-V-02 for five counts of sexual abuse
under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 even
though the charges against him in the aforesaid criminal
cases were for rape in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. The
lower court[’s] ruling is in conformity with the variance doctrine
embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, x x x:
xxxx
With the aforesaid provisions, the appellant can be held guilty
of a lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness performed on a
child, i.e., sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610, which was the offense proved
because it is included in rape, the offense charged.
The due recognition of the constitutional right of an accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
through the criminal complaint or information is decisive of
whether his prosecution for a crime stands or not.
Nonetheless, the right is not transgressed if the information
sufficiently alleges facts and omissions constituting an
offense that includes the offense established to have been
committed by the accused, which, in this case, is lascivious
conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
Page 183 of 186
8. RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION
COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES
AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY
AMPATUAN, ET AL.
FACTS:
On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists
and media practitioners were killed on their way to Shariff
Aguak in Maguindanao. This tragic incident came to be
known as Maguindanao massacre" spawned charges for 57
counts of murder and additional charges of rebellion against
197 accused, commonly entitled People v. Datu Andal
Ampatuan, Jr., et al. Following the transfer of venue and the
re-raffling of the cases, the cases are being tried by Presiding
Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of RTC Quezon
City. Almost a year later, the National Union of Journalists of
the Philippines (NUJP), ABSCBN Broadcasting Corporation,
GMA Network Inc., relatives of the victims, individual
journalists from various media entities and members of the
academe filed a petition before this court praying that live
television and radio coverage of the trial in this criminal cases
be allowed, recording devises be permitted inside the court
room to assist the working journalists, and reasonable
guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage
and the use of devices. President Benigno
S. Aquino III, letter addressed to Chief Justice Renato
Corona, came out in support of those who have petitioned this
Court to permit television and radio broadcast of the trial.
Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre
cases has attracted intense media coverage due to the
gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the accused, and
the number of media personnel killed. They inform that
reporters are being frisked and searched for cameras,
recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and that under
strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast coverage,
the number of media practitioners allowed inside the
courtroom has been limited to one reporter for each media
institution. Hence, the present petitions which assert the
exercise of right to a fair and public trial and the lifting of the
absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of court
proceedings. They principally urge the Court to revisit the
1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing
of President Corazon C. Aquinos Libel Case and the 2001
ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the
Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former
President Joseph E. Estrada which rulings, they contend,
violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on
constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed and outright
prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable
alternative.
ISSUE:
WON the petition for radio and television coverage of the
Maguindanao Massacre should be allowed
HELD:
The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners’ prayer
for a live broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to
guidelines. Respecting the possible influence of media
coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners
correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it
undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the totality of
circumstances test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and
Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused to a fair trial
is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is
not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial,
and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear
of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual
prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.
On public trial, Estrada basically discusses: An accused has
a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more
than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically effects weighs heavily against broadcasting the trial.
in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt Moreover, the fact that the accused has legal remedies after
with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights the fact is of no moment, since the damage has been done
are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A and may be irreparable. It must be pointed out that the
public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only fundamental right to due process of the accused cannot be
implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish afforded after the fact but must be protected at the first
to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with instance.
decorum and observe the trial process.
The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm. A trial of any kind
or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all
concerned and should not be treated as a means of
entertainment, and to so treat it deprives the court of the
dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and
serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are
formulated. The observation that massive intrusion of
representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so
alter and destroy the constitutionally necessary atmosphere
and decorum stands. The Court had another unique
opportunity in Estrada to revisit the question of live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings in a criminal case. It
held that the propriety of granting or denying the instant
petition involves the weighing out of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public
information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of
the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional
power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair
and impartial trial In so allowing pro hac vice the live
broadcasting by radio and television of the Maguindanao
Massacre cases.
RESOLUTION October 23
Petitioners Tiamzon and Legarta take issue on provisos (g)
and (h) of the enumerated guidelines in the June 14, 2011
Resolution and allege that these must be struck down for
being unconstitutional, as they constitute prior restraint on
free expression because they dictate what media can and
cannot report about the "Maguindanao massacre" trial.
(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio
output from the on-going proceedings, the proceedings shall
be broadcast without any voiceovers, except brief annotations
of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain
them at the start or at the end of the scene. Any commentary
shall observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the
contempt power of the court;
(h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall
be allowed until after the finality of judgment, except brief
footages and still images derived from or cartographic
sketches of scenes based on the recording, only for news
purposes, which shall likewise observe the sub-judice rule
and be subject to the contempt power of the court
Accused Ampatuan also filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
alleging that the June 14, 2011 Resolution "deprives him of
his rights to due process, equal protection, presumption of
innocence, and to be shielded from degrading psychological
punishment." This Court partially grants reconsideration of the
June 14, 2011 Resolution and deny the Partial Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioners Editha Mirandilla Tiamzon and
Glenna Legarta. The Court is now disallowing the live media
broadcast of the trial of the "Maguindanao massacre" cases
but is still allowing the filming of the proceedings for (1) the
real-time transmission to specified viewing areas, and
(2) documentation. In a constitutional sense, public trial is
not synonymous with publicized trial. The right to a public trial
belongs to the accused. The requirement of a public trial is
satisfied by the opportunity of the members of the public and
the press to attend the trial and to report what they have
observed. The accused's right to a public trial should not be
confused with the freedom of the press and the public's right
to know as a justification for allowing the live broadcast of the
trial. The tendency of a high profile case like the subject case
to generate undue publicity with its concomitant undesirable

Page 184 of 186

9. Go v. People, 677 SCRA 213, 2012
Facts:
Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go
were charged before MeTC of Manila for Other Deceits under
Article 318 of the RPC. Sometime in August 1996 accused,
conspiring, confederating together and helping one another
defraud Highdone Company Ltd. Represented by Li Luen
Ping. Made Li Luen Ping believed that they have chattels such
as machinery, spare parts, equipment and raw materials
installed and fixed in the premises of BGB Industrial Textile
Mills Factory located in the Bataan Export Processing Zone
(BEPZ) in Mariveles, Bataan, executed a Deed of Mortgage
for a consideration of the amount of P21M more or less in
favor of ML Resources and Highdone Company Ltd.
Representing that the said deed is a FIRST MORTGAGE
when in truth and in fact the accused well knew that the same
had been previously encumbered, mortgaged and foreclosed
by CHINA BANK CORPORATION as early as September
1994 thereby causing damage and prejudice to said
HIGHDONE COMPANY LTD. The prosecution's complaining
witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos,
Cambodia, traveled from his home country back to the
Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September
9, 2004. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed
due to his unavailability. The private prosecutor filed with the
MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition6 of Li Luen Ping,
alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the
Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon
doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the
Philippines by reason of ill health. Notwithstanding petitioners'
Opposition, the MeTC granted the motion after the
prosecution complied with the directive to submit a Medical
Certificate of Li Luen Ping. Petitioners sought its
reconsideration which the MeTC denied, prompting
petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC.
Upon denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration
through an Order dated March 5, 2006, the prosecution
elevated the case to the CA. the CA denied petitioners' motion
for Reconsideration.
Issue:
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads
thus:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. - When
it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is
too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court,
or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before
the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the
presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable
notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall
be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the
trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the
examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The
statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the
accused.
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness
elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case
is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his
right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge
of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness'
deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is
especially intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to
the prosecution's case against the accused. This is the import
of the Court's ruling in Vda. de Manguerra where we further
declared that
While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the
testimony of its witness in order to prove its case, we cannot
disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the
protection of the accused's constitutional rights. The giving of
testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional
examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an
exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the
rules.

WON CA erred in sustaining the judicial legislation committed

by the MeTC in applying the ruled on deposition-taking in civil
case to criminal cases.
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a
judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal cases
where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a
public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to face.
The requirement is the “safest and most satisfactory method
of investigating facts” as it enables the judge to test the
witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while
testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules
of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses
and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu
of direct court testimony.
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court
allows the taking of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral
examination or written interrogatories, before any judge,
notary public or person authorized to administer oaths at any
time or place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine
consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized
to administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no
additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to
the other party.
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases,
more particularly of a prosecution witness who would
foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial
examination should be made before the court, or at least
before the judge, where the case is pending as required by
the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised

Page 185 of 186

9. Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan, 746 SCRA 452 (2015)
Facts:
In a decision dated April 17 2007, the Sandiganbayan found
petitioners Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona and Habalo guilty of
homicide. During the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan’s
judgment, none of the accused appeared despite notice.
Thus, the decision was promulgated in absentia and the
judgment entered in the criminal docket. Their bail bonds
were also cancelled and warrants for their arrest issued.
The petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
the abovementioned decision, but the Sandiganbayan took
no action on said motion and ordered the implementation of
the arrest warrants, holding that the 15-dayh period from the
promulgation of the judgment had long passed without any of
the accused giving any reason for their non-appearance
during the promulgation. Applying Section 6, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court, the Sandiganbayan held that the accused
have lost the remedies available to them under the Rules of
Court against the Sandiganbayan’s judgment of conviction,
including the filing of a motion for reconsideration. The
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court, arguing that Section 6, Rule 120 cannot diminish,
modify or increase substantive rights like the filing of an MR
under P.D. 1606. Petitioners also argued that even if Section
6, Rule 120 were applied, the conditions under which the said
rules may be applied do not obtain in this case because it was
“it was incumbent upon the Sandiganbayan to take pains to
find out whether their absence at the promulgation was
without justifiable cause, and only then could the court
conclude that petitioners have lost the remedies available in
the Rules of Court against the judgment of conviction.”.
of Court diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of
petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the
Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases." This provision
protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of
criminal cases - delay arising from the simple expediency of
nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled
promulgation of the judgment of conviction.
In this case, petitioners have just shown their lack of faith in
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by not appearing before
it for the promulgation of the judgment on their cases. Surely
they cannot later on expect to be allowed to invoke the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to grant them relief from its
judgment of conviction.
3. YES. It is well to note that Section 6, Rule 120, of the
Rules of Court also provides the remedy by which the
accused who were absent during the promulgation may
reverse the forfeiture of the remedies available to them
against the judgment of conviction. In order to regain their
standing in court, the accused must do as follows: 1)
surrender and 2) file a motion for leave of court to avail of the
remedies, stating the reasons for their absence, within 15
days from the date of the promulgation of judgment.
In Villena v. People, we stated that the term "surrender"
contemplates the act by the convicted accused of physically
and voluntarily submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the
court to suffer the consequences of the judgment against
them. Upon surrender, the accused must request permission
of the court to avail of the remedies by making clear the
reasons for their failure to attend the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction.

Issue: Clearly, the convicted accused are the ones who should show
that their reason for being absent at the promulgation of
1. WON the petitioners, who failed to appear at the judgment was justifiable. If the court finds that the reasons
promulgation of judgment, has any standing in court and has proffered justify their nonappearance during the promulgation
the right to seek relief? of judgment, it shall allow them to avail of the remedies. Thus,
unless they surrender and prove their justifiable reason to the
2. WON Section 6, Rule 120 diminished or modified satisfaction of the court, their absence is presumed to be
the substantive rights of the petitioners? unjustified.
3. WON Section 6, Rule 120 applies to this case?
Held:

1. No. Section 6, Rule 120 provides that an accused

who failed to an accused who failed to appear at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the
remedies available against the said judgment.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was
without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose the remedies
available in the Rules of Court against the judgment. Thus, it
is incumbent upon the accused to appear on the scheduled
date of promulgation, because it determines the availability of
their possible remedies against the judgment of conviction.
When the accused fail to present themselves at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction, they lose the
remedies of filing a motion for a new trial or reconsideration
(Rule 121) and an appeal from the judgment of conviction
(Rule 122). The reason is simple. When the accused on bail
fail to present themselves at the promulgation of a judgment
of conviction, they are considered to have lost their standing
in court. Without any standing in court, the accused cannot
invoke its jurisdiction to seek relief.
2. No. Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does
not take away per se the right of the convicted accused to
avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the
accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled
date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits
their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the
judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules

Page 186 of 186