HERRERA vs BARRETTO

25 PHIL 245, SEPTEMBER 10, 1913

FACTS: Constancio Joaquin began action against Godofredo B. Herrera as Caloocan municipal president when authorities
refused to issue a license to open and exploit a cockpit. Joaquin asked the court to issue a mandatory injunction directed
to Herrera, to issue a provisional license for Joaquin to conduct his cockpit. The court issued such order ex parte without
notice of Herrera. Godofredo B. Herrera then began a proceeding against Honorable Alberto Barretto (judge of the Court
of First Instance who had issued the mandatory injunction re cockpit license) and Joaquin (cockpit licensee) for a writ of
certiorari alleging that the court had acted without jurisdiction in the following statements.
Alberto Barretto exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing a mandatory injunction because:
1. Cockpit licenses in Loma and Maypajo, Caloocan are issued by the municipal council, not municipal president
(Godofredo), according to section 40j, of the Municipal Code and article 4 of municipal ordinance No. 8 of Caloocan,
2. He did not give the municipal president opportunity to show cause why such injunction should not be issued
as required by section 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
3. Cockpit license erroneously issued for Constancio has been cancelled according to ordinance No. ___ of
Caloocan, approved by provincial board of Rizal.
4. There is another pending action between same parties, that the Court had no jurisdiction to issue the
mandatory injunction because it renders null the final decision of court in civil case No. 8673.
5. Mandatory injunction tends to render inefficacious and null the decision which the Honorable Richard
Campbell will render in civil case No. 986.
6. Constancio Joaquin has neither the license nor the right to run the cockpit in Loma and Maypajo.
Objection is based on Bertol and Tanquilina T against municipality to declare null and void Caloocan ordinance No. 8,
where complaint of Constancio Joaquin and mandatory injunction was based on.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alberto Barretto and his alleged act of exceeding jurisdiction relative to issuance of mandatory
injunction for the cockpit license of Constancio Joaquin should be granted a writ of certiorari.

RULING: The Supreme Court denied the writ of certiorari and the proceeding is dismissed. From the order dissolving the
writ of preliminary injunction, the petitioner has gone directly to the Supreme Court without giving the respondent
Judge a chance or opportunity to correct his error, if any, in an appropriate motion for reconsideration. An omission to
comply with this procedural requirement justifies a denial of the writ applied for.
A writ of certiorari will not be issued unless it clearly appears that the court to which it is to be directed acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction. If the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, decisions upon
all questions pertaining to the cause are decision within its jurisdiction and, however irregular or erroneous they may be,
cannot be corrected by certiorari, but must be corrected by appeal. The Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in the
present case to resolve every question arising in such an action and to decide every question presented to it which
pertained to the cause, including issuance of a mandatory injunction to stand until the final determination of the action
in which it is issued. While the issuance of the mandatory injunction in this particular case may have been irregular and
erroneous, its issuance was within the jurisdiction of the court and its action is not reviewable on certiorari.
It has been urged that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in requiring the municipal president to issue the
license, for the reason that he was not the proper person to issue it and that, if he was the proper person, he had the
right to exercise discretion as to whom the license should be issued. We do not believe that either of these questions go
to the jurisdiction of the court to act. One of the fundamental questions in a mandamus against a public officer is
whether or not that officer has the right to exercise discretion in the performance of the act which the plaintiff asks him
to perform. In the case at bar no one denies the power, authority, or jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to take
cognizance of an action for mandamus and to decide every question which arises in that cause and pertains thereto. The
contention that the decision of one of those questions, if wrong, destroys jurisdiction involves an evident contradiction.
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause —the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and
determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the
decisions made. Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide
a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction.
 JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 112193. March 13, 1996

Facts:

Antonia Aruego and her sister Evelyn filed a petition in the courts seeking Jose Aruego, Jr. And his
five minor children to recognize them as illegitimate children and compulsory heirs of Jose who died
on March 30, 1982. They claim there is open and continuous possession of status of illegitimate
children of Jose who had an amorous relationship with their mother Luz Fabian until the time of his
death. The court declared that Antonia Aruego is an illegitimate daughter of the deceased with Luz
Fabian while Evelyn is not. Antonia and Evelyn contested the decision citing provisions of the Family
Code particularly Art. 127 on Filiation, Art. 172 on illegitimate children’s filiation, and Art. 256 on the
retroactivity of the code.

Issue:

Whether or not the provisions of the Family Code be applied retroactively and will it impair the vested
rights of the respondents.

Held:

The meaning of vested and acquired rights under Art. 256 was not defined by the Family Code, hence
the court will determine it according to issues submitted to them. The action must be governed by Art.
285 of the Civil Code and not by Art. 175 (2) of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given any
retroactive effect since its application is prejudicial under Art. 285. The supreme court denied
the petitionand upheld the court of appeals decision.
Municipality of Sta Fe vs Municipality of Aritao
GR No. 140474; 21 September 2007
Ponente: Azcuna

Facts:

In October 16, 1980, petitioner Municipality of Sta. Fe, in Nueva Vizcaya, filed before the RTC of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya for the determination of boundary dispute involving the barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan.
The trial was almost over when the court realized its oversight under existing law. On December 9, 1988, the
court suspended the proceedings and referred the case to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Vizcaya. In
turn, the Sanggunian concerned passed on the matter to its Committee on Legal Affairs, Ordinances &
Resolutions which adopted the former Provincial Board’s Resolution No. 64 adjudicating the two barangays as
part of respondent’s territory. The Sanggunian approved the Committee’s recommendation but endorsed the
boundary dispute to the RTC for further proceedings & preservation of the status quo pending finality of the
case.

In the RTC, respondent moved to consider Resolution 64 as final and executory. The RTC denied the motion
ruling that since there was no amicable settlement in the Sanggunian, the latter cannot issue a “decision”
favoring a party. The court held that, under the law in force, the purpose of such referral was only to afford
the parties an opportunity to amicably settle with the intervention and assistance of the Provincial Board and
that in case no such settlement is reached, the court proceedings shall be resumed. Subsequently, respondent
filed a motion praying for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction since the power to try and decide
municipal boundary disputes already belonged to the Sanggunian Panlalawigan & no longer with the trial
court. The RTC granted the motion. The CA then affirmed. According to the CA, a new legislation can be given
retroactive effect so long as it is curative in nature. Thus, the LGC vesting jurisdiction to the Sanggunian was
given retroactive effect. Since the Local Government Code of 1991 is the latest will of the people expressed
through Congress on how boundary disputes should be resolved, the same must prevail over previous ones. It
must be emphasized that the laws on the creation of local government units as well as settling boundary
disputes are political in character, hence, can be changed from time to time and the latest will of the people
should always prevail. In the instant case, there is nothing wrong in holding that Regional Trial Courts no
longer have jurisdiction over boundary disputes.

Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Held: No

Ratio:

The RTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under the rules, it was the responsibility of the
court to dismiss an action “whenever it appears that *it+ has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Indeed,
the RTC acted accordingly because at the time of the filing of the motion to dismiss its want of jurisdiction was
evident. It was duty-bound to take judicial notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction as the choice of the
proper forum was crucial – for the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may
be struck down at any time by this Court as it would never become final and executory. Likewise, the standing
rule is that dismissal of a case for lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings since
jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and
to render judgment on the action; otherwise, the inevitable consequence would make the court’s decision a
“lawless” thing. As correctly pointed out by the RTC it will be a futile act for the Court to rule on the case
concerning a boundary dispute if its decision will not after all be followed by the people concerned because
the decision is totally unacceptable to them.

Supporting laws: October 1, 1917 (Revised Administrative Code)- jurisdiction with the provincial boards of the provinces
in which the municipalities are situated; June 17, 1970 (RA 6128)- jurisdiction with the CFI of the Province where the
municipalities are situated; February 10, 1983 (BP 337 or the 1983 Local Government Code); January 1, 1992 (LGC); -
Sangguniang Panlalawigan where the municipalities are situated, appeal with the RTC.

From Judge M.C.’s slides:

The Sanggunian Panlalawigan has an expanded role in resolving cases of municipal boundary disputes. Aside
from having the function of bringing the contending parties together and intervening or assisting in the amicable
settlement of the case, the SPanlalawigan is now specifically vested with ORIGINAL jurisdiction to actually hear and
decide the dispute in accordance with the procedures laid down in the law and its IRRs. The trial court now has no
power to try, at the first instance, cases of municipal boundary disputes. Only in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
can the proper RTC decide the case, on appeal, should any party aggrieved by the decision of the Spanlalawigan elevate
the same (Mun of Sta Fe v Mun of Aritao 140474 Sept 21, 2007).
G.R. No. L-44896 July 31, 1936

RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER vs. MANUEL vs. MORAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila

Facts: This petition is for a writ of prohibition overruled with a view to preventing the Court of First Instance of
Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed against him. The petitioner was an accredited
honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila. He was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila of falsification of
a private document. He objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the Constitution
of the United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try him. His
objection was overruled hence this present petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner.

Held: The counsel for the petitioner contend that the CIF of Manila has no jurisdiction according to Aticle III Sec.
2 of the United States Constitution which stipulated that the Supreme Court of the United States has original
jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction which
excludes the courts of the Philippines and that that such jurisdiction is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme
Court of the Philippines. Although section 17 of Act No. 136 vests in the Supreme Court the original jurisdiction to
issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, such jurisdictiona was also
conferred on the Courts of First Instance by the Code of Civil Procedure. (Act No. 190, secs. 197, 217, 222, 226,
and 525.) It results that the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance. Hence, the Court of
Instance has jurisdiction over the petitioner.
St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.

G.R. No. 130866

September 16, 1998

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS:

Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there
was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996,
he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00. Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was
not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St.Martin’s Funeral Home and in January 1996, the mother of
Amelita passed away, so the latter took over the management of the business.

Amelita made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management
thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. The labor arbiter rendered
a decision in favor of petitioner declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and therefore his office had no
jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: WON the decision of the NLRC are appealable to the Court of Appeals.

RULING:

The Court is of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the SC were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the
special civil action for certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word appeal in
relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for
certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with which
the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action for certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and
the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the SC are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert,
the intention of the Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and
hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the
Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION OVER PUBLIC LAND OWNERSHIP
BELONGS TO DENR, NOT TO REGULAR COURTS.
In BAGUNU VS. SPS. AGGABAO, G.R. NO. 186487, AUGUST 15, 2011, the question as to who between the DENR
and the regular courts has primary jurisdiction over matters of land ownership was clarified. Primary jurisdiction over
matters of public land ownership belongs to the Director of Lands, subject to review by the DENR Secretary. On the other
hand, jurisdiction over matters of private land ownership is exclusively vested with the regular courts.

The pertinent portions of the pronouncement are quoted as follows:

The petitioner insists that under the law actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, to which a suit for reformation of
contracts belong, and those involving ownership of real property fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court. Since these actions are already pending before the RTC, the DENR Secretary overstepped his authority in
excluding Lot 322 from the petitioner’s free patent application and ordering the respondents to apply for a free
patent over the same lot.

In an action for reformation of contract, the court determines whether the parties’ written agreement reflects their true
intention. In the present case, this intention refers to the identity of the land covered by the second and third sale. On the
other hand, in a reivindicatory action, the court resolves the issue of ownership of real property and the plaintiff’s
entitlement to recover its full possession. In this action, the plaintiff is required to prove not only his ownership, but also
the identity of the real property he seeks to recover.

While these actions ordinarily fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, the court’s jurisdiction to
resolve controversies involving ownership of real property extends only to private lands. In the present case,
neither party has asserted private ownership over Lot 322. The respondents acknowledged the public character of Lot 322
by mainly relying on the administrative findings of the DENR in their complaint-in-intervention, instead of asserting their
own private ownership of the property. For his part, the petitioner’s act of applying for a free patent with the Bureau
of Lands is an acknowledgment that the land covered by his application is a public land whose management and
disposition belong to the DENR Secretary, with the assistance of the Bureau of Lands.

Xxxx
The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is within the regular courts’ area of competence
and, concededly, this issue is judicial in character. However, regular courts would have no power to conclusively
resolve this issue of ownership given the publiccharacter of the land, since under C.A. No. 141, in relation to
Executive Order No. 192, the disposition and management of public lands fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Director of Lands, subject to review by the DENR Secretary.
Xxxx

With this clarification, it should now be clear that jurisdiction on questions of land ownership is determined by the
nature of the land involved. If the land is still a public land, then the DENR has primary jurisdiction. If the subject land is
already a private land, the authority to adjudicate matters of ownership belongs with the regular courts.
G.R. No. 183409 June 18, 2010

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA), petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent.

FACTS:

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97,3 entitled "Omnibus Rules and
Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses," which consolidated all existing
implementing guidelines related to land use conversion. The aforesaid rules embraced all private agricultural lands regardless
of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by
Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988.

Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 01-99,4 entitled "Revised Rules
and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses," amending and updating the previous rules
on land use conversion. Its coverage includes the following agricultural lands, to wit: (1) those to be converted to residential,
commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of
agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond ─ the effect of which is to exempt the land from the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that
previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or
after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657.

Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled "2002
Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion," which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and
repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all applications for conversion from
agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use.

To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all
land use conversion applications.

By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of housing projects, which, in turn, aggravated
the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and
its members but more so of the whole nation.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION OVER LANDS THAT HAVE BEEN RECLASSIFIED AS RESIDENTIAL,
COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, OR FOR OTHER NON-AGRICULTURAL USES.

HELD: yes?

Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural
uses before 15 June 1988" have been included in the definition of agricultural lands. In so doing, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform merely acted within the scope of his authority stated in the aforesaid sections of Executive Order No. 129-A, which is
to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian reform implementation and that includes the authority to define agricultural
lands for purposes of land use conversion. Further, the definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended,
merely refers to the category of agricultural lands that may be the subject for conversion to non-agricultural uses and is not in
any way confined to agricultural lands in the context of land redistribution as provided for under Republic Act No. 6657.

More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which Opinion has been recognized in many cases
decided by this Court, clarified that after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 the DAR has been given the
authority to approve land conversion.38 Concomitant to such authority, therefore, is the authority to include in the definition of
agricultural lands "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June
1988" for purposes of land use conversion.

It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and conversion that agricultural lands though
reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses must still undergo the process of conversion
before they can be used for the purpose to which they are intended.

Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DAR’s conversion authority can only be exercised after the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988.45 The said date served as the cut-off period for automatic reclassification
or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR conversion clearance or authority. 46 Thereafter,
reclassification of agricultural lands is already subject to DAR’s conversion authority. Reclassification alone will not suffice to
use the agricultural lands for other purposes. Conversion is needed to change the current use of reclassified agricultural lands.
It bears stressing that the act of reclassifying agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses simply specifies how agricultural lands
shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses and does not automatically convert agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses or for
other purposes.

Hilado et.al VS. Chavez

Facts:
Celso ‘Nene’ Zayco owned a parcel of agricultural land with 540,248 square meters located at
Kabankalan Poblacion, Negros Occidental, now Kabankalan City. Some portions thereof were occupied and cultivated by
tenants. Zayco mortgaged the property to the Pacific Banking Corporation as security for a loan; however, the bank
foreclosed the mortgage upon Zayco’s failure to pay his account. When the property was sold at public auction by the
sheriff, the bank was adjudged as the highest bidder. Zayco failed to redeem the property, and the bank consolidated its
title thereon. On December 21, 1984, the bank sold the property to Julieta C. Salgado, the Chairman of the Board of the
respondent, Perpetual Help Development and Realty Corporation (PHDRC). TCT No. 133298 was, thereafter, issued in
favor of PHDRC on January 18, 1985. No liens or encumbrances whatsoever or any notice that the property had been
placed under the agrarian reform laws were annotated at the dorsal portion thereof. Subsequently, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) granted Emancipation Patents to the twenty (20) tenants on the property from April 28, 1988 to
July 1, 1988 on the basis of which titles were issued in their favor. The Sangguniang Bayan ng Kabankalan reclassified the
property partly as property for light industry, and the rest as residential.
On August 26, 1997, the respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Kabankalan City. According to the respondent, the petitioners were not agricultural tenants under the
agrarian reform laws because (a) they entered the property without its consent and did not pay any consideration for
the use of the land they occupied; and (b) the property was, as resolved by the Sangguniang Bayan under Resolution No.
96-39 in 1996, partly for light industry and partly residential. The court a quo applied the Rules of Summary Procedure
and rendered judgment in favor of the respondent. It ruled that the petitioners failed to prove that they were farmers-
beneficiaries on the landholding and that based on Resolution No. 96-39 of the Municipal Council, the said property had
already been reclassified as part residential and part industrial/commercial areas. The court a quo also ruled that
thirteen (13) of the petitioners occupied portions of the landholding only by tolerance of the respondent and its
predecessors, and failed to pay any amount as consideration for their occupancy of the petitioners’ property. It rejected
the petitioners’ contention that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) had exclusive original
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, ruling that the action was one for unlawful detainer over which it had
exclusive original jurisdiction. The petitioners then filed on April 23, 1998 a petition with the Regional Trial Court against
the respondent asserting that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action of the respondent, it
being an agrarian dispute between the petitioners, as patentees, and the respondent; hence, the court a quo’s decision
was null and void. They contended that the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (PARAD) had exclusive
jurisdiction over the said action.
The RTC issued an Order declaring that the case involved only questions of law and not of facts, and on May 26,
1998, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing the petition on the ground that the MTCC had exclusive jurisdiction over
the action of the plaintiff and over the persons of the defendants therein. The RTC also held that the petitioners failed to
file a motion to dismiss the complaint in the MTCC and even participated in the proceedings therein; hence, they were
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Instead of appealing the decision to the Court of Appeals by writ of
error, the petitioners filed their petition with this Court, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, assailing the
decision of the RTC on questions of law. Thus, this petition.

Issue(s):
1. Whether it is proper for the petitioners to file a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with this Court
from the decision of the RTC;
2. Whether the MTCC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondent; and,
3. Whether the decision of the MTCC is null and void.

Ruling:
The remedy of a party aggrieved by the decision of the RTC, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, is to appeal
by writ of error to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, in which questions of facts and/or of law
may be raised by the parties. However, under Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, where only questions of law
are raised or are involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules. However, even if only questions or issues are raised by the party in his appeal, it should be made to the Court
of Appeals and not to the Supreme Court, unless there are compelling reasons to allow such appeal.
In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, we held that “for a question to be one of law, it must involve no examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any one of them.” In an avuncular case, we held that there
is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain set of
facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts. We resolved to
give due course to the petition. Indeed, unless the issues, which are cogent and substantial, are resolved, in all
likelihood, suits may again be filed by the aggrieved parties in suits involving landholdings where the validity of the
decision of the MTCC is assailed for lack of jurisdiction.
On the issue of jurisdiction, Section 33, paragraph 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3 of
Rep. Act No. 7691 provides that Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court and Metropolitan Trial Court, have
exclusive original jurisdiction over cases for unlawful detainer. The proceedings in ejectment cases are covered by Rule
70 of the Rules of Court and the Rules on Summary Procedure. However, such courts have no original jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian disputes under Rep. Act No. 6657, as amended, and the Rules of Procedure issued by
the DARAB implementing said laws, which are within the exclusive original and appellate jurisdiction of the DARAB.
Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (sic) (CARP) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules shall
be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR. The DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction
to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform programs. The rule is that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian
dispute or any incident involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. In Tirona v. Alejo,
we held that the MTCC has no jurisdiction over an ejectment case where the issue of possession is inextricably
interwoven with an agrarian dispute. The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. In Movers-Baseco Integrated
Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corporation, we ruled that the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action
and the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to
dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. Once jurisdiction is
vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation. We also held in Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, that in
American jurisprudence, the nullity of a decision arising from lack of jurisdiction may be determined from the record of
the case, not necessarily from the face of the judgment only. The MTCC does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment
case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship
between the parties. But it is the duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the allegations of tenancy. If after
hearing, tenancy had in fact been shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Earlier in Bayog v. Natino, we held that if a defendant in an action for ejectment interposed the defense of being the
agricultural tenant in the property subject of the complaint, the MTCC should hear and receive the evidence for the
purpose of determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over the case, and if, upon such hearing, tenancy is
shown to be the issue, the MTCC should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
In this case, even on the basis of the material allegations of the complaint, more so if the answer with motion to
dismiss the petition and position papers of the parties are considered, the DARAB, and not the MTCC, had primary and
original jurisdiction over the action of the respondent. The latter alleged, in its complaint, that seven (7) of the
petitioners were issued Emancipation Patents which were annotated at the dorsal portion of TCT No. 133298.
It bears stressing that before Emancipation Patents are issued to farmers-beneficiaries, the DAR is mandated to
comply with the requirements of P.D. No. 266 and the procedural requirements set forth by Rep. Act No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. Conformably to our ruling in Bayog v.
Natino, the MTCC should not have applied the Rules on Summary Procedure; it should have dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction; or, at the very least, should have proceeded to hear the parties on the petitioners’ motion to dismiss
and receive their respective evidence on the issue of whether or not it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action. Had the MTCC followed our ruling in Bayog, it would have confirmed that, before the respondent filed its
complaint, the property had long been brought under Operation Land Transfer and that the Register of Deeds had
issued to all the petitioners their respective transfer certificates of title based on the Emancipation Patents issued by the
President of the Philippines, through the DAR.
It must be underscored that the said patents were already annotated at the dorsal portion of TCT No. 133298
long before the respondent filed its complaint with the MTCC against the petitioners. The MTCC also took into account
and gave emphasis to Resolution No. 96-39 approved by the Sangguniang Bayan on February 14, 1996.
The ruling of the MTCC is erroneous. Under Section 65 of Rep. Act No. 6657 which took effect on June 15, 1988,
agricultural lands may be reclassified only by the DAR after the lapse of five (5) years from its award to the farmers-
beneficiaries:
Section 65. Conversion of Lands. – After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have
greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary
or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification
of conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation. In this
case, there is no showing that the DAR ever approved the reclassification of the property. It appears that the
reclassification of the landholding was unilaterally made by the Sangguniang Bayan despite the issuance to the
petitioners of Emancipation Patents and transfer certificates of title in their names over the portions of the landholdings
respectively occupied by them.
We reject the contention of the respondent that the decision of the MTCC had become final and executory
because of the petitioners’ failure to perfect the appeal therefrom; hence, immutable. Neither do we agree with the
respondent’s contention that by participating in the proceedings before the MTCC, the petitioners were estopped from
assailing the jurisdiction of the MTCC. As we held in Arevalo v. Benedicto: [F]urthermore, the want of jurisdiction by a
court over the subject-matter renders its judgment void and a mere nullity, and considering that a void judgment is in
legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no rights can be obtained, which neither binds nor
bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out of are void, and considering further, that the
decision, for want of jurisdiction of the court, is not a decision in contemplation of law, and, hence, can never become
executory, it follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res judicata. Our
ruling in Abbain v. Chua is also instructive: In varying language, this Court has expressed its reprobation for judgments
rendered by a court without jurisdiction. Such a judgment is held to be “a dead limb on the judicial tree, which should be
lopped off or wholly disregarded as the circumstances require.” In the language of Mr. Justice Street: “Where a
judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it maybe said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and
slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.” And in Gomez vs. Concepcion, this Court quoted
with approval the following from Freeman on Judgments: “A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no
rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings found upon it are equally
worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The
parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. The purchaser at a sale by virtue of its authority
finds himself without title and without redress.”
Since the judgment here on its face is void ab initio, the limited periods for relief from judgment in Rule 38 are
inapplicable. That judgment is vulnerable to attack “in any way and at any time, even when no appeal has been taken.”
It is settled that jurisdiction over the judgment cannot be changed by agreement of the parties or by the act or omission
of each of them that will contravene the legislative will. A party should not be allowed to divest a competent court of its
jurisdiction, whether erroneously or even deliberately in derogation of the law.
In this case, the counsel of the petitioners opted to assail in a direct action the decision of the MTCC, instead of
perfecting their appeal or assailing the decision of the MTCC disallowing their appeal. The petitioners believed that the
decision of the MTCC was null and void for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action filed therein; hence,
they are not proscribed from assailing such decision in a direct action. The remedy resorted to by their counsel should
not prejudice and bar them from assailing the MTCC decision before the RTC on a petition to annul the same for lack of
jurisdiction. Neither are they estopped from assailing the decision, simply because they filed their answer and motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. After all, the only relief
prayed for by them in their answer was the dismissal of the complaint. A propos is our ruling in Calimlim v. Ramirez: It is
neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was taken cognizance of in a court which
lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the attendant circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppel requires
knowledge or consciousness of the facts upon which it is based.
The same thing is true with estoppel by conduct which may be asserted only when it is shown, among others,
that the representation must have been made with knowledge of the facts and that the party to whom it was made is
ignorant of the truth of the matter. (De Castro vs. Gineta, 27 SCRA 623.)
The filing of an action or suit in a court that does not possess jurisdiction to entertain the same may not be
presumed to be deliberate and intended to secure a ruling which could later be annulled if not favorable to the party
who filed such suit or proceeding. Instituting such an action is not a one-sided affair. It can just as well be prejudicial to
the one who filed the action or suit in the event that he obtains a favorable judgment therein which could also be
attacked for having been rendered without jurisdiction. The determination of the correct jurisdiction of a court is not a
simple matter. It can raise highly debatable issues of such importance that the highest tribunal of the land is given the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to entertain the same. The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his
suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed
sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of
doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame should
be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their
remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action “whenever it appears that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.” (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court.) Should the court render a
judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule
132, Ibid.), within ten (10) years from the finality of the same. (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code.)
It bears stressing that the petitioners are now the registered owners of the portions of the landholding and
entitled to the possession thereof. For us to deny the petition and affirm the decision of the RTC would be to sanction
the eviction of the petitioners who are the registered owners of the landholding and, as such, are entitled to the
possession thereof and allow the respondent to take possession thereof in derogation of law. Not too long ago
in Calimlim v. Ramirez[47] we held that: The inequity of barring the petitioners from vindicating their right over their
property in Civil Case No. SCC-180 is rendered more acute in the face of the undisputed fact that the property in
question admittedly belonged to the petitioners, and that the title in the name of the private respondent was the result
of an error committed by the Provincial Sheriff in issuing the deed of sale in the execution proceeding. The justness of
the relief sought by herein petitioners may not be ignored or rendered futile by reason of a doctrine which is of highly
doubtful applicability herein.
Petition is granted.
Mangaliag v. Pastoral

Facts: Respondent Serquina filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against petitioners Mangaliag and Solano. This complaint
alleges that the Serquina and his co-passengers sustained serious injuries and permanent deformities from the collision of their
tricycle with the petitioners’ dump truck and the gross negligence, carelessness and imprudence of the petitioners in driving the
dump truck. Respondents seek damages in the form of medical expenses amounting to P71,392.00. Respondents also claim
P500,000.00 by way of moral damages, as a further result of his hospitalization, lost income of P25,000.00 or the nominal damages,
and attorney’s fees.

Petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim. After pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. After the respondent rested
his case, petitioners testified in their defense. Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. They alleged that since the principal amount prayed for, in the amount of P71,392.00, falls
within the jurisdiction of MTC. Petitioners maintain that the court’s jurisdiction should be based exclusively on the amount of actual
damages, excluding therefrom the amounts claimed as moral, exemplary, nominal damages and attorney’s fee, etc.

The respondent opposed the motion saying that since the claim for damages is the main action, the totality of the damages sought
to be recovered should be considered in determining jurisdiction. He relied on Administrative Circular No. 09-94 which provides that
“in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action. . . the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining
the jurisdiction of the court” Also, the petitioners’ defense of lack of jurisdiction has already been barred by estoppel and laches. He
contends that after actively taking part in the trial proceedings and presenting a witness to seek exoneration, it would be unfair and
legally improper for petitioners to seek the dismissal of the case.

RTC ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioners filed an MR which was denied. Subsequently, they filed a petition for certiorari with the
SC.

Issues: (1) Whether petitioners are barred from raising the defense of the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction? NO

(2) Whether it is the amount of P71,392.00 as medical expenses, excluding moral, nominal damages and attorney’s fees, which
determines jurisdiction, hence it is MTC which has jurisdiction? NO

Ruling:

(1) On the matter of estoppel and laches: In the present case, no judgment has yet been rendered by the RTC. As a matter of
fact, as soon as the petitioners discovered the alleged jurisdictional defect, they did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion
to dismiss. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent, the Sibonghanoy doctrine does not control the present
controversy. What happened in the Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage
when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches.
But in this case, there is no laches. Thus, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings must apply. Petitioners are not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC.

(2) On the issue which of the amounts is determinative of jurisdiction: The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective
of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. In the present case, the
allegations in the complaint plainly show that private respondent seeks to recover not only his medical expenses, lost income but
also damages for physical suffering and mental anguish due to permanent facial deformity from injuries sustained in the vehicular
accident. Viewed as an action for quasi-delict, the present case falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219 (2), which provides
for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi-delict causing physical injuries.

Private respondent’s claim for moral damages of P500,000.00 cannot be considered as merely incidental to or a consequence of the
claim for actual damages. It is a separate and distinct cause of action or an independent actionable tort. It springs from the right of
a person to the physical integrity of his or her body, and if that integrity is violated, damages are due and assessable. Hence, the
demand for moral damages must be considered as a separate cause of action, independent of the claim for actual damages and
must be included in determining the jurisdictional amount.

If the rule were otherwise, i.e., the court’s jurisdiction in a case of quasi-delict causing physical injuries would only be based on the
claim for actual damages and the complaint is filed in the MTC, it can only award moral damages in an amount within its
jurisdictional limitations, a situation not intended by the framers of the law.

(3) (Not really an issue raised by the respondent himself, but was nonetheless discussed by the SC) On the issue whether a
direct recourse by petition for certiorari to the SC from the order of RTC: Generally a direct recourse to this Court is highly
improper, for it violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. Although this Court, the RTCs
and the CA have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. This Court is a court of last
resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition.

Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the
availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.

Be that as it may, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. It generally applies to cases involving warring factual
allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to repair to the trial courts at the first instance to determine the truth or falsity of
these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot
be brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of facts. Therefore, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy
of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.

In the present case, petitioners submit a pure question of law involving the interpretation and application of paragraph 2 of
Administrative Circular No. 09-94. This legal question and in order to avoid further delay are compelling enough reasons to allow
petitioners’ invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction in the first instance.

(Maybe it is important to note that the petition for certiorari was filed from the denial of the RTC of the petitioners’ motion to
dismiss. There is no final adjudication yet as to the complaint for damages.)
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs.MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY
alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO (CASE
DIGEST) G.R. No. L-21450 - - April 15, 1968
FACTS:

The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive of interest
filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary
Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the
demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)

The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding the appellant never
raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of Appeals' adverse decision.

Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which jurisdiction of any
inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court along with the records of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance during
the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

RULING:

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of
estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of
society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and,
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86
A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is
barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but
for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S.
273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16
Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May
20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision
and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in
Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.,
Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965,
and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the
question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by
reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in
the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke
up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as
useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment
creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.

Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become persuaded that We can do
nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals x x x granting plaintiffs'
motion for execution against the surety x x x

UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila
Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.
DILWEG V. PHILLIPS (1964)

[ G.R. No. L-19596, October 30, 1964 ]

FACTS:

On 7 February 1958 plaintiff Lavern R. Dilweg, a nonresident American citizen, through counsel, instituted the complaint at bar consisting of six
causes of action against defendants Robert O. Phillips, Inocentes G. Dineros, and Isaac S. Eceta, claiming civil damages arising out of alleged
libelous and defamatory statements uttered and published in the Philippines by the latter. On 24 February 1958 the first two named defendants
presented a motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff interposed an opposition thereto on 7 March 1958.

On 11 May 1961 the trial court issued an order, which is the subject of the present appeal, the pertinent portion of which is as follows:

"This action is one for damages by reason of alleged libelous statements uttered in the Philippines by the defendants against the plaintiff. In
other words, it is an action bared on a tort or act, which under the law of the Philippines, is defined as a criminal offense. At the time the said libelous
statements were uttered, the plaintiff was in Washington, D.C. where, he was and has always been a resident. There is no allegation in the complaint
that plaintiff has ever been in the Philippines or has resided at anytime therein.

"The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff by the filing of his complaint. It was
contended that as the plaintiff therein has never been a resident of the Philippines, the courts of this country have not acquired jurisdiction to take
cognizance of his action bared on a contract which was executed in the State of New York,USA.

The Court has come to conclusion that in order that it may validly try this case, it must have jurisdiction not only over the persons of the parties
and over the subject matter and the plaintiff must be a resident within the territorial of this Court in order that jurisdiction over his person can be
acquired, otherwise the Court will not be able to render a valid judgment against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not our Philippine courts can rightfully refuse to assume jurisdiction over a personal action instituted by a nonresident alien who is
not within the territorial jurisdiction of our courts?

RULING:

It is thus evident that, contrary to the conclusion reached by the court below, it is not indispensable for a foreigner to establish a residence, nor
need he be physically present in a state of which he is not a resident or citizen in order that he may initiate or maintain a personal action against a
resident or citizen of that ether state for rights of action arising in, or for violations oflaws committed within, the territorial jurisdiction of that other
state. In this jurisdiction, no general law has come to our knowledge or notice which restricts the right of nonresident aliens to sue in our courts. It is
not disputed that plaintiff's causes of action arose in, and that the defendants are within, our territorial jurisdiction. It is conceded by both parties that
the law under which the instant case falls is silent on the matter of the right of an Alien to sue in our courts. On the other hand the particular law
evidently availed of by the plaintiff in filing his complaint is Article 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:

"In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require only preponderance of
evidence."

The above-quoted provision of law does not make any distinction as to whether the "injured party." who may maintain an action for damages
based on defamation, is a Filipino citizen or resident or an alien.

“Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside, and the case is ordered remanded to the court below for further proceeding consonant with
this opinion”.
Boston equity v CA

(jurisdiction over the person)

Facts:
On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Herein respondent filed an Answer dated 19 March 1998 but on 7
May 1998, she filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer in which she alleged, among others, that her husband and
co-defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead. As a result, petitioner filed a motion, dated 5 August 1999, to
require respondent to disclose the heirs of Manuel. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Substitution, praying that Manuel be
substituted by his children as party-defendants. This motion was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 9 October
13
2000.

On 26 May 2004, the reception of evidence for herein respondent was cancelled upon agreement of the parties. On 24
September 2004, counsel for herein respondent was given a period of fifteen days within which to file a demurrer to
evidence. However, on 7 October 2004, respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the following as
grounds: (1) **********; (2) that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to Section
5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court; (3) ******

The trial court, denied the motion to dismiss for having been filed out of time, citing Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of
Court which Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court seriously erred and
gravely abused its discretion in denying her motion. CA granted the petition.

Issue

W/N the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the dead (Manuel Toledo) person?

Ruling: No. Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired through a valid service of summons; trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo.

Citing the case of Sarsaba:

“The court’s failure to acquire jurisdiction over one’s person is a defense which is personal to the person
claiming it.Obviously, it is now impossible for Sereno to invoke the same in view of his death.Neither can petitioner
invoke such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of having the case dismissed against all of the
defendants. “

Boston equity v CA

Facts: ----- supra-----

Issue: W/N the Estate of Manuel Toledo is an indispensable party?

Held:

Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court states: cralavvonline lawlib rary

SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. — Parties-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of
an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.

Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case at bar, it is clear that the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party
to the collection case, for the simple reason that the obligation of Manuel and his wife, respondent herein, is solidary.
The contract between petitioner, on the one hand and respondent and respondent’s husband, on the other, states: cralavvon line lawlib rary

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I/We jointly and severally46 (in solemn) promise to pay BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. x x x
the sum of PESOS: [ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED (P1,400,000.00)] x x x
It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision in this matter.
Ruth Kristine A. San Pedro

CrimPro Digest – Atty. Tranquil Salvador (Ateneo Law B2015)

Valdepenas vs. People (G.R. No. L-‐20687, April 30, 1966)

Doctrine: Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his apprehension, with or without
warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

Appeal by Valdepeñas from a decision of CA, affirming that of the CFI Cagayan, convicting him of the crime
of abduction with consent, and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty and to indemnify Ester Ulsano.

Ester Ulsano, 17yrs old, assisted by her mother filed forcible abduction with rape against Valdepenas. CFI
found him guilty as charged. CA modified to abduction with consent.

Valdepenas filed an MR & MNT on the finding of minority at time of occurrence which was granted but on
retrial the prior CA ruling was affirmed. 2nd MR based on lack of jurisdiction of CFI was denied so he filed
petition for certiorari.

Petitioner's theory is that no complaint for abduction with consent has been filedand the lower court
acquired no jurisdiction over his person or over the crime of abduction with consent and had, therefore,
noauthority to convict him.

Issue: WON CA erred in not reversing CFI for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the
subject matter of the action for the offense of abduction with consent? NO!

Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his apprehension, with or without
warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction of the court. In the case at bar, it is not claimed that
petitioner had not been apprehended

or had not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.Indeed, although brought before the bar of
justice as early as January 25, 1956, first, before the then justice of the

peace court of Piat, then before theCFI of Cagayan, later before the CA, thereafter back to CFI, and then,
again, before the CA, never, within the period of six (6) years had he questioned the judicial authority
of any of these three (3) courtsover his person.

He is deemed waived whatever objection he might havehad to the jurisdiction over his person, and, hence,
to have submitted himself to the Court's jurisdiction.His behaviour
and every single one of the steps taken by him before said courts— particularly the motions therein filed by
him — implied, not merely a submission to the jurisdiction thereof, but, also, that he urged the courts to
exercise the authority thereof over his person.

Abduction with consent -‐ jurisdiction over a given crime, not vested by law upon a particular court, may
not be conferred thereto by the parties involve in the offense.

In the case at bar, the offended woman and her mother have negated such preference by filing the complaint
and going through the trials and tribulations concomitant with the proceedings in this case, before several
courts, for the last ten (10) years. Petitioner says that the complaint was for forcible abduction, not
abduction with consent; but, as already adverted to, the latter is included in the former.

This allegation implies that Ester is a minor livingunder patria protestas, and, hence, single, thus leading to
the presumption that she is a virgin. She was taken by force from their dwelling when her mother was away
and brought to a secluded area and raped.

CA and CFI affirmed. Cost against Valdepenas.

Miranda et al. v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006
Crim Pro - Jurisdiction

Facts:
On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later identified as
the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is
now under the witness protection program.
Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police officers including SPO2 Maderal in the
RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to the RTC of Manila. The RTC convicted the
accused and sentenced them two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to
be arraigned at that time being at large. Upon automatic review, the SC acquitted the accused on the
ground of reasonable doubt.
In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the
petitioners as the ones responsible for the death of the victims, so, Tuliao filed a criminal complaint
for murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued a warrant of arrest
against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge
Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the urgent motion
on the ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be
properly heard by the court.

Issues: Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the
jurisdiction of the court.

Whether or not a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.

Held. No, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the Jurisdiction of the
Court. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the Court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other relief sought by the dependant
where by mere application, thereof, constitutes a waiver of the defence of lack of jurisdiction over the
person accused.
Posted by sharppy38 at 8:49 PM
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