28.

Title: CASTANEDA vs AGO

Reference: G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975

FACTS
- Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against Ago in the CFI of Manila to recover certain machineries.
- Judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson
- SC affirmed the judgment; trial court issued writ of execution; Ago’s motion denied, levy was made on Ago’s house and lots;
sheriff advertised the sale, Ago moved to stop the auction; CA dismissed the petition; SC ffirmed dismissal
- Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminary injunction to restrain sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; his motions
were denied
- Sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda and Henson; Ago failed to redeem
- Sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issued writ of possession to the properties
- Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered against him in the replevin suit saying it was his personal obligation and that
his wife ½ share in their conjugal house could not legally be reached by the levy made; CFI of QC issued writ of preliminary
injunction restraining Castaneda the Registed of Deeds and the sheriff from registering the final deed of sale; the battle on the
matter of lifting and restoring the restraining order continued
- Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of possession; SC dismissed it; Agos
filed a similar petition with the CA which also dismissed the petition; Agos appealed to SC which dismissed the petition
- Agos filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA which gave due course to the petition and granted
preliminary injunction.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Agos’ lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid controversy
RULINGS
No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff’s sale, justice demands that the
petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos abetted by
their lawyer Atty. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the
judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners.
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has
allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth
and moral justice.
A counsel’s assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his client’s cause must be encouraged and is to be
commended; what the SC does not and cannot countenance is a lawyer’s insistence despite the patent futility of his client’s
position.
It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit or lack of his case. If he finds his client’s cause as defenseless,
then he is his duty to advice the latter to acquiesce and submit rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the
whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client’s propensity to litigate.

29. OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a verified petition for disbarment[1] filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found guilty of grave misconduct
while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City.
It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by complainant against
respondent. In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged
respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan
Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah,[2] Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola
Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the
Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent. [3]
The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The investigating officer, Enrique Basa, absolved respondent
of all the charges brought against him, thus:
It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his case but that he has no case at all against
respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against
respondent be dismissed for lack of merit and evidence. [4]
The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a report dated 08 September 1992, then Secretary of
Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents. He,
however, found respondent guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the
criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latters co-accused. As a
result of this finding, Secretary Drilon recommended respondents dismissal from service.

On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion
reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering respondents dismissal from government service. Respondent subsequently questioned
said administrative order before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition[5] claiming that the Office
of the President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted that respondents [6] in that
petition violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA
committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him
(herein respondent).
In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition for failure on the part of petitioner to sufficiently show that
public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned order. [7] Respondent thereafter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied with finality in our Resolution of 15 November 1994.
On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us, seeking the disbarment of respondent.
Complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of
an attorney[8] and that he poses a serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession. [9]
In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the
Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law[10] and jurisprudence support his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register
of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the
applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he
was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law
allegedly committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latters co-defendants. Respondent explains that his participation in said case
was a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the various
land titles involved in said dispute. He further claims that the dismissal of said criminal case by the Secretary of Justice was based
solely on the evidence presented by the parties. Complainants allegation, therefore, that he influenced the outcome of the case is
totally unjustified.
Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995,[11] this Court referred this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation. Acting on this resolution, the IBP commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit.
On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez issued the following order relative to the transfer of venue of this case.
The pertinent portion of this order provides:
ORDER
When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent appeared.
The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the reception of evidence vis--vis this case be done in
Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president of the local IBP Chapter. Both parties agreed. Accordingly, transmit the records
of this case to the Director for Bar Discipline for appropriate action. [12]
On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving Commissioner Fernandezs recommendation for the
transfer of venue of this administrative case and directed the Western Mindanao Region governor to designate the local IBP
chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report, and recommendation. [13] The IBP Resolution states:
Resolution No. XII-96-153
Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong
RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the above-
entitled case and direct the Western Mindanao Region Governor George C. Jabido to designate the local IBP Chapter concerned to
conduct the investigation, report and recommendation.
Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar Discipline, wrote a letter dated 23 October 1996
addressed to Governor George C. Jabido, President of IBP Cotabato Chapter requesting the latter to receive the evidence in this
case and to submit his recommendation and recommendation as directed by the IBP Board of Governors. [14]
In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato Chapter[15] informed the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
that the investigating panel[16] had sent notices to both complainant and respondent for a series of hearings but respondent
consistently ignored said notices. The IBP Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by recommending that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for five years.
On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the transmittal of the records of this case to the
Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as Commissioner Fernandezs Order
dated 23 February 1996.
Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter to comment on respondents
motion.[17] Complying with this directive, the panel expressed no opposition to respondents motion for the transmittal of the
records of this case to IBP Marawi City.[18] On 25 September 1998, Commissioner Fernandez ordered the referral of this case to
IBP Marawi City for the reception of respondents evidence.[19] This order of referral, however, was set aside by the IBP Board of
Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268 issued on 4 December 1998. Said resolution provides:
RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the transmittal of the case records of the above-
entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is directed to re-evaluate the recommendation submitted by Cotabato Chapter and report
the same to the Board of Governors.[20]
Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08 October 1998 a motion praying that the
recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be stricken from the records. [21] Respondent insists that the investigating panel
constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the authority to conduct the investigation of this case since IBP Resolution XII-96-
153 and Commissioner Fernandezs Order of 23 February 1996 clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the power to investigate this
case. Moreover, he claims that he was never notified of any hearing by the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter thereby
depriving him of his right to due process.
Complainant opposed[22] this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches. According to complainant, the report and
recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter expressly states that respondent was duly notified of the hearings conducted
by the investigating panel yet despite these, respondent did nothing to defend himself. He also claims that respondent did not even
bother to submit his position paper when he was directed to do so. Further, as respondent is a member of IBP Marawi City
Chapter, complainant maintains that the presence of bias in favor of respondent is possible. Finally, complainant contends that to
refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would only entail a duplication of the process which had already been completed by IBP
Cotabato Chapter.
In an Order dated 15 October 1999,[23] Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP Cotabato Chapter to submit proofs that notices for
the hearings conducted by the investigating panel as well as for the submission of the position paper were duly received by
respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty. Jabido, a member of the IBP Cotabato Chapter investigating panel, furnished
Commissioner Fernandez with a copy of the panels order dated 4 August 1997. [24] Attached to said order was Registry Receipt
No. 3663 issued by the local post office. On the lower portion of the registry receipt was a handwritten notation reading Atty.
Mosib A. Bubong.
On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, Chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for
Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This directive had the approval of
the IBP Board of Governors through its Resolution No. XIV-2001-271 issued on 30 June 2001, to wit:
RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled
case and direct the CBD Mindanao to conduct an investigation, re-evaluation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days
from receipt of notice.[25]
Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father, Omar P. Ali, complainant in this case.
According to her, her father passed away on 12 June 2002 and that in interest of peace and Islamic brotherhood, she was
requesting the withdrawal of this case.[26]
Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to direct the chairman of the Commission on Bar
Discipline for Mindanao to designate and authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter to conduct an investigation of
this case.[27] This motion was effectively denied by Atty. Pedro S. Castillo in an Order dated 19 July 2002. [28] According to Atty.
Castillo
After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made on the report of the IBP Cotabato City Chapter,
the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of respondent, the undersigned sees no need for any further investigation, to be able to
make a re-evaluation and recommendation on the Report of the IBP Chapter of Cotabato City.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City, Zamboanga del Norte is hereby denied. The
undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP National Office within ten (10) days from date
hereof.
In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the findings and conclusion of IBP Cotabato Chapter
ratiocinating as follows:
The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office of the President in Administrative Case No. 41
dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein respondent was found guilty of Grave Misconduct in:
a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,
b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law.
And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. In the Comment filed by respondent in the
instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is good faith in the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821 and a denial of the charge of
manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law, which by the way, was filed against respondents
relatives. Going over the Decision of the Office of the President in Administrative Case No. 41, the undersigned finds substantial
evidence were taken into account and fully explained, before the Decision therein was rendered. In other words, the finding of
Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office of the President was fully supported by evidence and as such carries a
very strong weight in considering the professional misconduct of respondent in the present case.
In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or disturbing the Report and Recommendation of the
IBP Chapter of South Cotabato.[29]
In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with modification, the afore-
quoted Report and Recommendation of Atty. Castillo. The modification pertained solely to the period of suspension from the
practice of law which should be imposed on respondent whereas Atty. Castillo concurred in the earlier recommendation of IBP
Cotabato Chapter for a five-year suspension, the IBP Board of Governors found a two-year suspension to be proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP which the latter denied as by that time, the
matter had already been endorsed to this Court.[30]
The issue thus posed for this Courts resolution is whether respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he
was in the employ of the government. We resolve this question in the affirmative.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service.
In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyers misconduct as a government official is of such
nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar
on such grounds.[31] Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member
of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct
constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession. [32]
Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron,[33] we ordered the disbarment of respondent on the ground of his
dismissal from government service because of grave misconduct. Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we declared
[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby
becomes an officer of the court on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy
and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every
exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its
prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a
high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which,
throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as moral character. [34]
Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig,[35] this Court found sufficient basis to disbar respondent therein
for gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of the Commission on Higher Education.
As we had explained in that case
[A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and
confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is
burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and subsequently affirmed by this
Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and
employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly
demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule
6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:
Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor
allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the peoples confidence in the public office he used to occupy and cast doubt on the
integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the
withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainants daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of this case, we cannot
possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance,
settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. [37] As we have
previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:[38]
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is
whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven.
This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a
civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare.
They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in
them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice. [39]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of
the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

30. PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account
with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a
resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general
public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the
winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the
court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to
recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with
the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several
writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with
former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General
Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It
was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK
which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation. The
motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers
from accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.
The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the
existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his present employment as counsel
of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer
shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service.”

HELD
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse
interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is
still the issue of whether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing
respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the
matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is “advising the
Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila.
The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter”
contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that
“drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law
are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do
with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied
Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG
does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot
apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the
matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The applicable meaning as the
term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject
proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government lawyer does not act which can be
considered as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or
briefing abstract principles of law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely
petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as
an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of
the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.

Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.

Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:

Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having once held public office or having
been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.”

Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or advance his private
interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction
specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer
who once served in the government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement or employment” in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the service.

31. DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS VS. BAYOT

In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in securing marriage licenses; that he does so avoiding delays
and publicity; that he also makes marriage arrangements; that legal consultations are free for the poor; and that everything is
confidential. The Director of Religious Affairs took notice of the ad and so he sued Bayot for Malpractice.
Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted the same and asked for the court’s mercy as he
promised to never repeat the act again.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.

HELD: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that “the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.” The advertisement he caused to be
published is a brazen solicitation of business from the public. .” It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or
skill as a merchant advertises his wares. The Supreme Court again emphasized that best advertisement for a lawyer is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. But because of Bayot’s plea for leniency
and his promise and the fact that he did not earn any case by reason of the ad, the Supreme Court merely reprimanded him.

32. PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME “SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO,
HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO".

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME “SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO,
HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.”
July 30, 1979

Facts:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975 and by the surviving partners of
Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their
firms, the names of partners who had passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local custom, is not
unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. They also contend that no local
custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name; there is no custom or usage in the
Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the
individual members of the firm.
Issue:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the partners who already passed away in the name
of the firm? NO

Held:
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client, and the high
standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give
rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners from their
firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of
the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able
lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm’s reputation established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a particular purpose. … It is
not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding property.” Thus, it has been stated that “the
use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely
because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a
juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.

33. In Re: Marcial Edillon Case

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to
pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III,
of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled
as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding
dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as distinguished from bar
associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed
for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only
compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not
compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse
to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the
cost of the regulatory program – the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has
jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual
dues.

34. Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005
FACTS: Petitioners files a motion for exemption for paying his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of P12,035.00. He
contends that after admission to the Bar he worked at the Phil. Civil Service then migrated to the US until his retirement. His
contention to be exempt is that his employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his law profession and he did not practice
the same while in the US. The compulsion that he pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as
a lawyer. His removal from the profession because of non-payment of the same constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights
bereft of due process of the law.

ISSUE: WON inactive practice of the law profession is an exemption to payment for IBP annual membership.

RULING: The court held that the imposition of the membership fee is a matter of regulatory measure by the State, which is a
necessary consequence for being a member of the Philippine Bar. The compulsory requirement to pay the fees subsists for as long
as one remains to be a member regardless whether one is a practicing lawyer or not. Thus, his petition for exemption from paying
his IBP membership fee dues is denied.

35. GARCIA vs. BALA

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any
conduct that shows a violation of the norms and values of the legal profession exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.

The Case and the Facts

On April 8, 1999, Spouses Eduardo and Teresita Garcia filed before this Court a Letter-Complaint[1] against Atty.
Rolando S. Bala. According to complainants, he failed to render a legal service contracted -- the preparation of a petition for
review that he was to file with the Court of Appeals (CA) in connection with DARAB Case No. 5532. Moreover, he supposedly
refused to return the P9,200 legal fees they had paid him for the purpose. Finally, he allegedly hurled invectives at them when
they asked him for a copy of the petition that he claimed to have filed.

This Court required respondent to comment on the Complaint. [2] He failed to comply; thus, he was presumed to have
waived his right to be heard.[3] In its Resolution, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.[4]

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In her September 23, 2004 Report,[5] Investigating IBP Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa found respondent guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Despite due notice, he neither submitted a position paper nor appeared at any of the hearings[6] called by the
Commission. Thus, the case was decided on the basis of complainants evidence.

According to the findings of Commissioner Herbosa, complainants engaged the services of respondent (sometime in
May 1998)[7] to appeal to the CA the adverse Decision of the Department of Agrarian Relations Adjudication Board (DARAB). [8]
Instead, he erroneously filed a Notice of Appeal[9] with the DARAB. Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, appeals from the
decisions of the DARAB 
should be filed with the CA through a verified petition for review. [10] Because of respondents error,
the prescribed period for filing the petition lapsed, to the prejudice of his clients.

Commissioner Herbosa gave no credence, however, to the allegation of complainants that respondent had deceived
them by resorting to a wrong remedy. While opining that he might not have been in bad faith in filing a notice of appeal instead of
a petition for review, the commissioner in her Report nonetheless held that his failure to use the proper legal remedy constituted
lack of professional competency that warranted an appropriate sanction. [11]

The Report also concluded that respondent should be sanctioned for his unjustified refusal and failure to return the
money paid by his clients.[12] Their payment totaled P9,200, broken down as follows: P5,000 to write the appeal; P700 to mail it;
and an additional P3,500 for writing the pleading on short notice. He, however, failed to return the money despite his promise --
and his obligation under the circumstances -- to do so.[13]

Finally, Commissioner Herbosa held that respondent should be sanctioned further for uttering unsavory words against
complainants during one instance when they had called on him to ask for a copy of the supposed appeal. Hence, she recommended
that, aside from a fine of P5,000 and the return to complainants of the amount of P9,200, suspension from the practice of law for a
period of six months should be imposed upon him.

Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors

On March 12, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVI-2005-74,[14] which adopted with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the investigating commissioner. It recommended that respondent should be
reprimanded and suspended from the practice of law for six months; and that he should return, within thirty days from his receipt
of the Decision, the amount of P9,200, with legal interest from the filing of the present Complaint with this Court. [15]

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possessed and
continue to possess the legal qualifications for it.[16] Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. [17] They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the
legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.[18]
Negligence for
Wrong Remedy

The Code of Professional Responsibility[19] mandates lawyers to serve their clients with competence and diligence. [20]
Rule 18.02 states that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. Specifically, Rule 18.03 provides
that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the cause and must always be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in them.[21] A client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense authorized by law,
and is expected to rely on the lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. [22]

Evidently, respondent failed to champion the cause of his clients with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.
Despite 
adequate time, he did not familiarize himself with the correct procedural remedy as regards their case. Worse, he
repeatedly assured them that the supposed petition had already been filed. [23]

Since he effectively waived his right to be heard, the Court can only assume that there was no valid reason for his
failure to file a petition for review, and that he was therefore negligent.

Conduct Unbecoming

Having become aware of the wrong remedy he had erroneously taken, respondent purposely evaded complainants,
refused to update them on the appeal, and misled them as to his whereabouts.[24] Moreover, on June 17, 1998, he uttered invectives
at them when they visited him for an update on the case. [25]

Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status
of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. Accordingly, complainants had the
right to be updated on the developments and status of the case for which they had engaged the services of respondent.[26] But he
apparently denied them that right.

Furthermore, for using unsavory words against complainants, he should also be sanctioned. Lawyers may be
disciplined -- whether in their professional or in their private capacity -- for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty,
probity and good demeanor.[27] Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession at all times.

In addition, the Court notes the nonparticipation of respondent even in the present proceedings. He ignored the
directive for him to file his comment,[28] just as he had disregarded the IBP hearing commissioners orders [29] for the conduct of
hearings, submission of documentary evidence and position paper. Never did he acknowledge or offer any excuse for his
noncompliance.
Clearly, his conduct manifests his disrespect of judicial authorities. Despite the fact that his profession and honor are
at stake, he did not even bother to speak a word in his defense. Apparently, he has no wish to preserve the dignity and honor
expected of lawyers and the legal profession. His demeanor is clearly demeaning.

The Need to Reimburse

the Money Paid

Under the present factual circumstances, respondent should return the money paid by complainants. First, his legal services were
virtually nullified by his recourse to the wrong remedy. Complainants would not have lost their right to appeal had he acted
competently.

Second, the legal fees were not commensurate to the services rendered. Complainants engaged his legal services to appeal the
DARAB Decision, but all he did was to file a Notice of Appeal. [30]
Additionally, he had already promised them a refund of the money paid, yet he failed to do so.

The Court may ascertain how much attorneys fees are reasonable under the circumstances. [31] In the present case, the
request of complainants for a full refund of the attorneys fees they had paid effectively challenged the contract; it was as though
the parties had no express stipulation as to those fees. [32] Quantum meruit therefore applies.

Quantum meruit -- meaning as much as he deserves -- is used as basis for determining a lawyers professional fees in the absence
of a contract.[33] Lawyers must be able to show that they are entitled to reasonable compensation for their efforts in pursuing their
clients case, taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees. [34] Based on the circumstances of the present
case, the legal services actually rendered by respondent were too insignificant for remuneration because of the uselessness of the
remedy he took.

This Court has imposed the penalty of suspension for six months for a lawyers negligence in failing to perfect an
appeal.[35] Considering the similarity of the circumstances with those prevailing in this case, we find the imposition of the same
penalty reasonable.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rolando S. Bala is found guilty of negligence and conduct unbecoming a lawyer; he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Furthermore, he is ORDERED
to pay Spouses Eduardo and Teresita Garcia the amount of P9,200 -- with legal interest from April 8, 1999 -- within 30 days from
his receipt of this Decision. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offenses will be dealt with more
severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney. Further, let other copies be served on
the IBP and on the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

36. IN RE: VICTORIO LANUEVO(former Bar confidant)

RAMON GALANG (1971 Bar Examinee) flunked in 1969, 1966-76, 1962-64 Bar exam
FACTS:

Administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanuevo for disbarment.

1 Admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to the respective examiners for re-evalution
or re-checking.
2 The five examiners admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he has
the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and was on the
borderline of passing.
3 Ramon galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of Lanuevo’s move but the exam results bears that he failed in 5
subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial).
4 Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of Slight Physical Injuries on Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU.
RULING:
The court disbarred Lanuevo – has no authority to request the examiners to re-evaluate grades of examinees w/o prior authority
from Supreme Court.
He does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the bar. He does not a have any
business evaluating the answers of the examinees.

Consequently, Galang was also disbarred Sec. 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Curt of 1964, candidates for admission to the
bar must be of good moral character. Galang has a pending criminal cases of Physical Injuries, he committed perjury when he
declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case this resulted him to revoked his license.

37. Diao v. Martinez

A.C. No. 244. March 29, 1962.

FACTS:
Severino Marquez charged Telesforo A. Diao with having represented in his application for 1952 bar examination, that he had the
requisite academic qualification.

ISSUE:
WON respondent should be disbarred.
RULING:
Yes. Passing the bar examination is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law, taking the prescribed courses of legal
study in the regular manner is equally essential.

38. TOLOSA vs. CARGO

A.M. No. 2385 | March 8, 1989
By: Karen P. Lustica
Facts:
Complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit- Complaint seeking the disbarment of respondent District Citizens’
Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality. Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his (complainant’s) wife Priscilla
M. Tolosa in his house and elsewhere. Complainant further alleged that his wife left his conjugal home and went to live with
respondent.
Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a “Comment and/or Answer” denying the allegations of complainant.
Respondent acknowledged that complainant’s wife had been seeing him but that she had done so in the course of seeking advice
from respondent (in view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against her),
much as complainant’s mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his wife and mother as to what
to do about the” continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious)
that the latter sustained from the former.
Complainant filed a Reply to respondent’s “Comment and/or Answer” and made a number of further allegations, to wit:
(a) That complainant’s wife was not the only mistress that respondent had taken;
(b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of complainant’s wife last May 1981, and visited her at the hospital
everyday;
(c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing respondent but that she had refused to do so;
(d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances where she was living although she had no means of livelihood;
and
(e) That respondent was paying for his wife’s house rent.
Respondent filed a Rejoinder denying the further allegations of complainant, and stating that he (respondent) had merely given
complainant’s wife the amount of P35.00 by way of financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital.
The Solicitor General found that complainant’s charges of immorality had not been sustained by sufficient evidence. At the same
time, however, the Solicitor General found that the respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following:
5 Respondent’s failure to avoid seeing Priscilla, in spite of complainant’s suspicion and/or jealousy that he was having an affair
with his wife.
6 Priscilla’s being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner is admittedly a friend and former client of respondent.
7 Respondent’s failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend, in spite of his differences with complainant.
8 Respondent’s failure to avoid getting involved invarious incidents involving complainant and Priscilla’s brothers
9 Respondent’s interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she was confined in the FEU Hospital, in spite again of his
differences with complainant.

Issue: WON the respondent should be suspended

Held: NO.
Ratio: The record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that respondent had indeed been cohabiting with complainant’s
wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of immorality. For this very reason, we do not believe that the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law may be properly imposed upon respondent.
At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to comply with the rigorous standards of
conduct appropriately required from the members of the Bar and officers of the court. As officers of the court, lawyers must not
only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to
avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.

39: Cerina B. Likong vs. Atty. Alexander H. Lim, A.C. No. 3149, August 17, 1994
Facts: This is a disbarment case failed by Cerina against Atty Lim. What happened was complainant Cerina B. Likong executed a
promissory note and a deed of assignment assigning to Geesnell L. Yap pension checks which she regularly receives from the US
government as a widow of a US pensioner. The deed of assignment states that the same shall be irrevocable until her loan is fully
paid. Cerina likewise executed a special power of attorney authorizing Yap to get her pension checks from the post office. About
three months after the execution of the SPA, Cerina informed the post office that she was revoking the SPA. Yap filed a complaint
for injunction against Cerina. Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared as counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B. Inting and Erico
B. Aumentado appeared for Cerina. Cerina and Yap filed a joint motion, which does not bear the signatures of Cerina's counsel, to
allow Yap to withdraw the pension checks. They also entered into a compromise agreement without the participation of Cerina's
counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was stated that complainant Cerina admitted an obligation to Yap and that they agreed
that the amount would be paid in monthly installments. The compromise agreement prepared by respondent increased Cerina‘s
debt to Yap and the terms contained therein are grossly prejudicial to Cerina.
Contention of Petitioner: Cerina filed a complaint for disbarment, alleging that in all the motions, she was prevented from seeking
assistance, advice and signature of any of her two lawyers as she was advised by Atty. Lim that it was not necessary for her to
consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a) this could only jeopardize the settlement; (b) she would only be incurring
enormous expense if she consulted a new lawyer; (c) respondent was assisting her anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry about the
documents foisted upon her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to court afterwards to save her time; and in any event
respondent already took care of everything. She alleged that she was prevented from exhibiting fully her case by means of fraud,
deception and some other form of mendacity practiced on her by Atty. Lim who, fraudulently or without authority, assumed to
represent complainant and connived in her defeat.
Contention of Respondent: Atty. Lim argued that Cerina‘s counsel had abandoned her and it was upon her request that he made
the compromise agreement. Atty. Lim states that he first instructed Cerina to notify her lawyers but was informed that her lawyer
had abandoned her since she could not pay his attorney's fees.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Lim is guilty of malpractice and grave misconduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD: Yes, Atty. Lim violated Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics and Rule 1.01, Rule 8.02 and Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professioal Responsibility.
RATIO: Atty. Lim prevented Cerina from informing her lawyers by giving her the reasons enumerated in the complaint. There is
no showing that Atty. Lim even tried to inform opposing counsel of the compromise agreement. Neither is there any showing that
Atty. Lim informed the trial court of the alleged abandonment of Cerina by her counsel. Instead, even assuming that she was
really abandoned by her counsel, Atty. Lim saw an opportunity to take advantage of the situation, and the result was the execution
of the compromise agreement which is grossly and patently disadvantageous and prejudicial to Cerina. Undoubtedly, Atty. Lim's
conduct is unbecoming a member of the legal profession.
Penalty: Atty. Lim was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.
Recommendation of IBP CBD and BOG: not specifically mentioned in the case