ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
. Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that
IN RE SOTTO
Facts:
Atty. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement2in
connection with the decision of this
Court in In re Angel Parazo the statement was published in the
Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality. The
court required Atty. Sotto to show cause why he should not be
charged with contempt of court.
Atty. Sotto does not deny having published the statement but
he contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power
to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, "this Court has no power to impose correctional
penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only
impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be
promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief
Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in the
exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the
Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press
with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending
any of the majority of the honorable members of this high
Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo
case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty
or integrity of any one.' The other arguments set forth by the
respondent in his defenses observe no consideration.
Issue: WON Atty. Sotto can be punished for contempt of court?
Yes
Ratio:
Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish
as for contempt of court an act which was not punishable as
such under the law and the inherent powers of the court to
punish for contempt
That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts
of superior statue, is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted
and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States,
which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution
and courts of justice are patterned after those of that country.
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness,
soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a
pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if
well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the
correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and
obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in
reversing or modifying its decision.
Atty. Sotto does not merely criticize or comment on the
decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending
reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He
not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with
the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is
one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and
reducing the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and
reducing the members of Justices from eleven to seven, so as to
change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo
case, who according to
2 As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.)
interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel
Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days
imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a
news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High
Page 1 of 131
it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow
mindedness o the majority of its members, In the wake of
so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed
during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put
an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the
Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of the first
measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of
the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, a constant
peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very
loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court
very of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of
Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who
were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary.
his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to
influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus
embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice.
As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty.
Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice. An attorney as
an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful
in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be
removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as
being guilty of flagrant misconduct.
Decision: Atty. Sotto guilty of contempt. Fine of 1,000 with
subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. He is also required to show cause why he
should not be disbarred.
IN RE ALMACEN
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a
civil case. They lost in said civil case but Almacen filed a
Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of
said motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of
hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then
appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed
with the trial court with regard to the motion for reconsideration.
Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the
Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute
resolution.
This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute
resolutions as unconstitutional. He then filed before the
Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyers certificate of
title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his
profession when members of the high court are men who are
calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their
own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that due to the
minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without
knowing the reasons why and that he became one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy. He also stated
that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacens
petition as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to ctually
surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his lawyers
certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to.
Almacen then asked that he may be permitted to give reasons
and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against
him . . . in an open and public hearing. He said he preferred
this considering that the Supreme Court is the complainant,
prosecutor and Judge. Almacen was however unapologetic.
ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute
resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court cannot accept
every case or write full opinion for every petition they reject
otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry
out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme
Court is to decide only those cases which present questions
whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the
particular facts and parties involved. It should be remembered
that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is
not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so
there is no need to fully explain the courts denial. For one
thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court
of Appeals opinion.
On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court
regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true
that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has
the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. His right as a
citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and
respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of
the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is
the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty
of respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacens criticism is misplaced. As a veteran
lawyer, he should have known that a motion for reconsideration
which failed to notify the opposing party of the time and place
of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by
the court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why
his client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely
KELLY R. WICKER ET. AL VS. HON. PAUL T.
ARCANGEL
G.R. NO. 112869. JAN. 29, 1996. 252 SCRA 444
Page 2 of 131
PONENTE: Mendoza
FACTS: It appears that on Nov 18, 1993, Wicker's counsel, Atty.
Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition of the respondent
Judge Arcangel from the case. Respondent judge found offense
in the allegations on the motion for inhibition filed by
complainants, and in an order, held them guilty of direct
contempt and sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for five (5)
days and to pay a fine of P100.00. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, which respondent judge denied for lack of merit
in his order of Dec 17, 1993.
HELD: The power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on
the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only
occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that respect
without which the administration of justice will fail. Consistent
with the foregoing principles and based on the abovementioned
facts, the Court sustains Judge Arcangel's finding that
petitioners are guilty of contempt. Atty. Rayos, however, cannot
evade responsibility for the allegations in question. As a lawyer,
he is not just an instrument of his client. His client came to him
for professional assistance in the representation of a cause, and
while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were bounds
set by his responsibility as a lawyer which he could not
overstep. Based on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the
contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his
client. Atty. Rayos' duty to the courts is not secondary to that of
his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins him
to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by others" and
"not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the
record or have materiality to the case."
MONTECILLO VS. GICA
JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL
MAR, petitioners,
vs.
FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE
N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON G. GAVIOLA, Justices of the
Court of Appeals, respondents. In Re Quirico del Mar, For
Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine
Bar, respondent
G.R. No. L-36800 October 21, 1974
Ponente: ESGUERRA, J.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
FACTS: Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica
of slander. Atty. Quirico del Mar represented Montecillo
and he successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower
court. Del Mar was even able to win their counterclaim
thus the lower court ordered Gica to pay Montecillo the
adjudged moral damages.
Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court
of Appeals where the latter court reversed the same. Atty.
Del Mar then filed a motion for reconsideration where he
made a veiled threat against the Court of Appeals judges
intimating that he thinks the CA justices knowingly
rendered an unjust decision and judgment has been
rendered through negligence and that the CA allowed
itself to be deceived.
The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty.
Del Mar from using such tone with the court. Del Mar then
filed a second MFR where he again made threats. The CA
then ordered del Mar to show cause as to why he should
not be punished for contempt.
Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a
copy of a letter which he sent to the President of the
Philippines asking the said justices to consider the CA
judgment. But the CA did not reverse its judgment. Del
Mar then filed a civil case against the three justices of the
CA before a Cebu lower court but the civil case was
eventually dismissed by reason of a compromise
agreement where del Mar agreed to pay damages to the
justices. Eventually, the CA suspended Atty. Del Mar from
practice.
The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar
asked the SC to reverse his suspension as well as the CA
decision as to the Montecillo case. The SC denied both
and this earned the ire of del Mar as he demanded from
the Clerk of the Supreme Court as to who were the judges
who voted against him.
The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to
submit an explanation as to why he should not be
disciplined. Del Mar in his explanation instead tried to
justify his actions even stating that had he not been
convinced that human efforts in [pursuing the case] will
be fruitless he would have continued with the civil case
against the CA justices. In his explanation, del Mar also
intimated that even the Supreme Court is part among the
corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing
injustice.
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some
Supreme Court justices but the judge who handled the
case dismissed the same.
Page 3 of 131
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be
suspended.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in
violation of his duties to the courts. As an officer of the
court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard
towards the court so essential to the proper administration
of justice.
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for
the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy
ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded
to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that
they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his
allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not
with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of
his client.
Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.
SANGALANG VS. IAC 177 SCRA 87
Ponente: SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS:
The incident before the Court refers to charges for
contempt against Atty. J. Cezar Sangco, counsel
for the petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda
Sangalang. (G.R. No. 71169.)
On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a
Resolution, requiring, among other things, Atty.
Sangco to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt "for using intemperate and
accusatory language."
On March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed an
explanation.
The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his
motion for reconsideration, reproduced as follows:
a This Decision of this Court in the above-
entitled case reads more like a Brief for
Ayala
b [t]he Court not only put to serious
question its own integrity and competence
but also jeopardized its own campaign
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
against graft and corruption undeniably
pervading the judiciary
c The blatant disregard of controlling,
documented and admitted facts not put in
issue, such as those summarily ignored in
this case; the extraordinary efforts exerted
to justify such arbitrariness and the very
strained and unwarranted conclusions
drawn therefrom, are unparalleled in the
history of this Court
d [T]o ignore the fact that Jupiter Street
was originally constructed for the
exclusive benefit of the residents of Bel-
Air Village, or rule that respondent Court's
admission of said fact is "inaccurate," as
Ayala's Counsel himself would like to do
but did not even contend, is a
manifestation of this Court's unusual
partiality to Ayala and puts to serious
question its integrity on that account.
e [i]t is submitted that this ruling is the most
serious reflection on the Court's
competence and integrity and exemplifies
its manifest partiality towards Ayala. It is a
blatant disregard of documented and
incontrovertible and uncontroverted
factual findings of the trial court fully
supported by the records and the true
significance of those facts which both the
respondent court and this Court did not
bother to read and consequently did not
consider and discuss, least of all in the
manner it did with respect to those in
which it arrived at conclusions favorable
to Ayala.
f To totally disregard Ayala's written letter of
application for special membership in
BAVA which clearly state that such
membership is necessary because it is a
new development in their relationship with
respect to its intention to give its
commercial lot buyers an equal right to
the use of Jupiter Street without giving
any reason therefor, smacks of judicial
arrogance ...
g [A]re all these unusual exercise of such
arbitrariness above suspicion? Will the
current campaign of this Court against
Page 4 of 131
graft and corruption in the judiciary be
enhanced by such broad discretionary
power of courts?
disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled for. His
suggestions that the Court might have been
guilty of graft and corruption in acting on these
cases are not only unbecoming, but comes, as well, as
an open assault upon the Court's honor and integrity. In
rendering its judgment, the Court yielded to the
records before it, and to the records alone, and not to
outside influences, much less, the influence of any
of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of an
inferior court, should know better that in any litigation,
one party prevails, but his success will not justify
indictments of bribery by the other party. He
should be aware that because of his accusations, he
has done an enormous disservice to the integrity
of the highest tribunal and to the stability of the
administration of justice in general.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the counsels act constitute to malpractice
in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provision on the use of scandalous offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the courts.
HELD:
Yes. As a former judge, Atty. Sangco also has to
be aware that the Court is not bound by the findings of the
trial court (in which his clients prevailed). But if the Court
did not agree with the findings of the court a quo, it does
not follow that the Supreme Court had acted arbitrarily
because, precisely, it is the office of an appeal to review
the findings of the inferior court.
To be sure, Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion,
but not to a license to insult the Court with derogatory
statements and recourses to argumenta ad hominem. In
that event, it is the Court's duty "to act to preserve the
honor and dignity ... and to safeguard the morals and
ethics of the legal profession."
The Court is not satisfied with his explanation that
he was merely defending the interests of his clients. As
held in Laureta, a lawyer's "first duty is not to his client but
to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's
success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to
and must always be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics." And while a lawyer must advocate his client's
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he
can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance,
intimidation, and innuendo.
That "[t]he questions propounded were not meant
or intended to accuse but to ... challenge the thinking in
the Decision, comes as an eleventh-hour effort to cleanse
what is in fact and plainly, an unfounded accusation.
Certainly, it is the prerogative of an unsuccessful party to
ask for reconsideration, but as held in Laureta, litigants
should not "'think that they will win a hearing by the sheer
multiplication of words' ". As indicated, the movants have
raised no new arguments to warrant reconsideration and
they cannot veil that fact with inflammatory language.
Atty. Sangco himself admits that "[a]s a judge I
have learned to live with and accept with grace criticisms
of my decisions". Apparently, he does not practice what
he preaches. Of course, the Court is not unreceptive to
comment and critique of its decisions, but provided they
are fair and dignified. Atty. Sangco has transcended the
limits of fair comment for which he deserves this Court's
rebuke.
In the "show-cause" Resolution, the Court sought
to hold Atty. Sangco in contempt, specifically, for resort to
insulting language amounting to disrespect toward the
Court within the meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71, of the
Rules of Court. Clearly, however, his act also constitutes
malpractice as the term is defined by Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows:
CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND
MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND
TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON
SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04-A lawyer should not attribute
to a Judge motives not supported by the
record or have no materiality to the case.
Thus, aside from contempt, Atty. Sangco faces
punishment for professional misconduct or malpractice.
WHEREFORE Atty. J. Cezar Sangco is (1)
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months
effective from receipt hereof, and (2) ORDERED to pay a
fine of P 500.00 payable from receipt hereof. Let a copy of
this Resolution be entered in his record.
Page 5 of 131
PARAGAS VS. CRUZ 14 SCRA 809
G.R. No. L-24438 July 30, 1965
ROSAURO PARAGAS, petitioner,
vs.
FERNANDO A. CRUZ, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Caloocan City;
THE CITY FISCAL OF CALOOCAN CITY and ELPO (EL
PORVENIR RUBBER PRODUCTS, INC.), respondents
Ponente: REYES, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
Atty. Jeremias T. Sebastian, acting as counsel de
parte for petitioner Rosauro Paragas, stated the
following in his written motion, filed on May 22,
1965:
"The petitioner respectfully prays
for a reconsideration of the resolution of
this Honorable Court dated April 20, 1965
on the ground that it constitutes a
violation of Section 14 of Rule 112 of the
Rules, of Court promulgated by this very
Hon. Supreme Court, and on the further
ground that it is likewise a violation of the
most important right in the Bill of Rights of
the Constitution of the Philippines,
a culpable violation which is a ground for
impeachment."
... . The rule of law in a
democracy should always be upheld and
protected by all means, because the rule
of law creates and preserves peace and
order and gives satisfaction and
contentment to all concerned. But when
the laws and the rules are violated, the
victims resort, sometimes, to armed force
and to the ways of the cave-men! We do
not want Verzosa and Reyes
repeated again and again, killed in the
premises of the Supreme Court and in
those of the City Hall of Manila. Educated
people should keep their temper under
control at all times! But justice should be
done to all concerned to perpetuate the
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
very life of Democracy on the face of the
earth."
Considering the foregoing expressions to be
derogatory to its dignity, the Court, by Resolution
of June 2, 1965, after quoting said statements
required Atty. Sebastian to show cause why
administrative action should not be taken against
him.
June 18, 1965 - filed an "explanatory
memorandum":
When we said that the said
violation is a ground for impeachment, the
undersigned did not say that he would file
impeachment proceedings against the
Justices who supported the resolution.
We said only what we said. The task of
impeaching the highest Justices in this
country is obviously not the task for a
common man, like the undersigned; it is a
herculean task which only exceptional
men, like Floor Leader Jose Laurel Jr.,
can do. In addition to this, we do not have
the time, the means and the strength for
this purpose.
The assertion that "But when the
laws and the rules are violated, the
victims resort, sometimes, to armed force
and to the ways of the cave-men! We do
not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated
again and again, killed in the premises of
the Supreme Court and in those of the
City Hall of Manila," is only a statement of
fact and of our wish. We learn from
observation that when the laws and the
rules are violated, the victims, sometimes,
resort to armed force and to the ways of
the cavemen, as shown in the case of
Luis M. Taruc and in the case of Jesus
Lava, both of whom went to the
mountains when they were not allowed to
take their seats in the House of
Representatives and, according to the
newspapers, one was charged with
murder and was found guilty. It was only
recently that Jesus Lava surrendered to
the authorities. We had this sad
recollection when we wrote the underlined
passage mentioned in this paragraph.
While writing that BRIEF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, the thought of
Page 6 of 131
Verzosa and Reyes flashed across the
mind of the undersigned as the shooting
of those two government employees must
have resulted from some kind of
dissatisfaction with their actuations while
in office. We stated or the undersigned
stated that we are against the repetition of
these abominable acts that surely
disturbed the peace and order of the
community. Shall the undersigned be
punished by this Honorable Supreme
Court only for telling the truth, for telling
what happened before in this Country?
Our statement is clear and unmistakable,
because we stated "We do not want
Verzosa and Reyes repeated ..." The
intention of the undersigned is likewise
clear and unmistakable; he is against the
repetition of these acts of subversion and
hate!
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Sebastian is guilty of contempt.
HELD:
Yes. The Court found the explanations submitted
to be unsatisfactory. The expressions contained in the
motion for reconsideration, previously quoted, are plainly
contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to the
recent killing of two employees is but a covert threat upon
the members of the Court.
That such threats and disrespectful language
contained in a pleading filed in Courts are constitutive of
direct contempt has been repeatedly decided. What
makes the present case more deplorable is that the guilty
party is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People
vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 580
Counsel should conduct himself towards
the judges who try his cases with that courtesy all
have a right to expect. As an officer of the court, it
is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the
proper administration of justice.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in
defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of
which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be
so, for him to exercise said right by resorting to
intimidation or proceeding without the propriety
and respect which the dignity of the courts
require.
Counsel's disavowal of any offensive intent is of
no avail, for it is a well-known and established rule that
defamatory words are to be taken in the ordinary meaning
attached to them by impartial observers.
A mere disclaimer of any intentional
disrespect by appellant is no ground for
exoneration. His intent must be determined by a
fair interpretation of the languages by him
employed. He cannot escape responsibility by
claiming that his words did not mean what any
reader must have understood them as meaning.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jeremias T. Sebastian is
hereby found guilty of direct contempt, and sentenced to
pay a fine of P200.00 within ten days from notice hereof,
or, in case of default, to suffer imprisonment not exceeding
ten (10) days. And he is warned that a subsequent
repetition of the offense will be more drastically dealt with.
PEOPLE VS. CARILLO 77 PHIL. 572
G.R. No. 86890 January 21, 1994
LEANDRO CARILLO, petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Ponente: FELICIANO, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Dr. Leandro Carillo, an anaesthetist,
seeks review of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 28 November 1988, which affirmed
his conviction by the Regional Trial Court of the
crime of simple negligence resulting in homicide,
for the death of his thirteen (13) year old patient
May 31, 1981 at about 10:30 o'clock: Catherine
Acosta, a 13 year old girl, daughter of spouses
Page 7 of 131
Domingo and Yolanda Acosta, complained to her
father in the morning of of pains in the lower part
of her abdomen. Catherine was then brought to
Dr. Elva Pea. Dra. Pea called for Dr. Emilio
Madrid and the latter examined Catherine Acosta.
According to Dr. Madrid, his findings might be
appendicitis. Then Dr. Pea told Catherine's
parents to bring the child to the hospital in
Baclaran so that the child will be observed.
At the Baclaran General Hospital, a nurse took
blood sample form the child. The findings became
known at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and
the child was scheduled for operation at 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon. The operation took place
at 5:45 p.m. because Dr. Madrid arrived only at
that time.
The child was feeling very well and they did not
subject the child to ECG and xray.
The appellant Dr. Emilio Madrid, a surgeon,
operated on Catherine. He was assisted by
appellant, Dr. Leandro Carillo, an
anesthesiologists.
During the operation, Yolanda Acosta "noticed
something very unfamiliar. Yolanda asked one of
the nurses if she could enter the operating room
but she was refused.
At around 6:30 p.m., Dr. Emilio Madrid went
outside the operating room and Yolanda Acosta
was allowed to enter the first door. The doctor told
them the child was already out of danger but the
operation was not yet finished.
It has also been established that the deceased
was not weighed before the administration of
anesthesia on her.
The operation was finished at 7:00 o'clock in the
evening and when the child was brought out from
the operating room, she was observed to be
shivering (nanginginig); her heart beat was not
normal; she was asleep and did not wake up; she
was pale; and as if she had difficulty in breathing.
Catherine remained unconscious until noontime
the next day and she was diagnosed as
comatose.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
Three (3) days later, Catherine died without
regaining consciousness.
RTC: guilty of simple negligence resulting in
homicide
CA: affirmed the RTC; guilty of simple negligence
resulting in homicide.
He filed this petition and added an argument that
he was denied of due process.
He contends that he was deprived of his right to
have competent representation at trial, and to
have his cause adequately heard, because his
counsel of record, Atty. Jose B. Puerto, was
"incompetent" and exhibited "gross negligence" by
manifesting an intent to file a demurrer to the
evidence, in failing to present evidence in his
behalf and in omitting to file a defense
memorandum for the benefit of Judge Yuzon, after
the latter took over the case at the end of trial and
before the Judge rendered his decision.
Petitioner submits he is entitled to a new trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied of due
process because of his lawyers incompetence and gross
negligence.
HELD:
No. An examination of the record indicates that
Atty. Puerto represented petitioner during trial with
reasonable competence. Except for the two hearing
sessions when witnesses were cross-examined and
recross-examined by Atty. Puerto, petitioner was present
during all the sessions when the other prosecution
witnesses were presented and during which Atty. Puerto
extensively cross-examined them in behalf of petitioner
and Dr. Madrid.
His counsel elicited from the two (2) expert
witnesses for the prosecution testimony favorable to
petitioner and which was relied upon by the latter in this
proceeding. The record further indicates that if petitioner
indeed entertained substantial doubts about the capability
of Atty. Puerto, he could have easily terminated the
Page 8 of 131
services of that counsel and retained a new one, or sought
from the trial court the appointment of counsel de oficio,
during the ample opportunity given from the time Atty.
Puerto manifested his intent to file a demurrer on 16
October 1985, to the submission of the case for decision
on 25 June 1986 and before the promulgation of judgment
on 19 September 1986.
During all this time, petitioner could have obtained
leave of court to present evidence in his behalf in lieu of a
demurrer, or to submit a memorandum for the defense.
After promulgation of the judgment of conviction, petitioner
did not seek a new trial, but permitted Atty. Puerto to
obtain leave from the trial court to continue on bail during
the pendency of the proceedings before the Court of
Appeals. Indeed, petitioner replaced Atty. Puerto as
counsel only upon institution of the present petition.
Hence, petitioner's constitutional objection is
plainly an afterthought.
IN RE AGUAS
FACTS:
From the record during the progress of the
trial before the Court of first instance in
Pampanga, the court had occasion to
caution Angel Alberto, a witness in the
case, not to look at the attorney for
the defendant but to fix his attention on the
judge who was at the time examining him.
The witness did not give heed of the
warning, thereupon the judge arose from his
seat and approach the witness, seized him by
the shoulders and using the expression
lingon ang mucha (look at me) either shook
him, as insisted by the attorney of the
defendant, or only turned him about, as
claimed by the judge and others. Whether the
witness was shaken or not, at all events
seizing him brought the action and protest
against the action of the judge as coercive of
the witness and demanded that a record be
made of the occurrence and that the further
hearing of the case be postponed. Two days
after the clerk of court entered a record a
recital of the incident and a statement that
on other and prior occasion, the attorney,
Marcelino Aguas had been wanting in respect
to the court by making use of improper
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
phrases and by interrupting the opposing
counsel in the examination of the witness. The
lower court adjudged the attorney to be in
contempt of court and suspended him from
practice of his profession for a period of
20 days. The attorney appealed but his
appeal has been denied by the lower court, he
asked to be heard in justification which was
granted.
ISSUE:
1. WON the attorney is disrespectful to the
court or offensive to to dignity?
2. WON the attorney had the right to protest
and to demand that the incident be made a
matter of record?
HELD:
The opinion of the court that the action of the
judge in seizing Alberto Aguas by the shoulder
and turning him about was unwarranted and
an interference with that freedom from
unlawful personal violence to which every
witness is entitled while giving testimony in a
court of justice. Against such conduct the
appellant had the right to pretest and to
demand that the incident be made a matter of
record. That he did so was not contempt,
providing protest and demand were
respectfully made and with due regard for the
dignity of the court XXXX
*** While lawyers are prohibited to
attribute motives to a judge not supported
by the record, lawyers must however be
courageous enough to expose
arbitrariness and injustices of courts and
judges
MACEDA VS. VASQUEZ
221 SCRA 464
Date of Promulgation: April 22, 1993
Ponente: Nocon, J.
Keywords: administrative power; falsification of
certificate of service; administrative and criminal
Page 9 of 131
liability; separation of powers; office of the
ombudsman
QuickGuide: Where a criminal complaint against a
Judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer
action on said complaint and refer it to the
Supreme Court for determination whether said
Judge or court employee had acted within the
scope of their administrative duties.
Facts:
- Petitioner (Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding
Judge of Branch 12 of the RTC of Antique)
seeks the review of the following
orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman:
(1) The Order dated September 18, 1991
denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the
Supreme Court (SC) filed by petitioner; and
(2) The Order dated November 22, 1991
denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and directing petitioner to
file his counter-affidavit and other
controverting evidences.
- Respondents (Napoleon A. Abiera of
the Public Attorney's Office)
allegations:
(1) Petitioner falsified his Certificate of
Service dated February 6, 1989, by
certifying "that all civil and criminal cases
which have been submitted for decision or
determination for a period of 90 days have
been determined and decided on or before
January 31, 1998," when petitioner knew
that no decision had been rendered in 5
civil and 10 criminal cases that have been
submitted for decision.
(2) Petitioner similarly falsified his
certificates of service for the months of
February and April to August of 1989; and
those from January to September 1990.
- Petitioners arguments:
(1) He had been granted by the SC an
extension of 90 days to decide the
aforementioned cases.
(2) The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction
over said case despite the SCs ruling in
Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
charged arose from the judge's
performance of his official duties, which is
under the control and supervision of the SC.
(3) The investigation of the Ombudsman
constitutes an encroachment into the SC's
constitutional duty of supervision over all
inferior courts.
Issue/s:
(1) W/N the Office of the Ombudsman could
entertain a criminal complaint for the
alleged falsification of a judge's certification
submitted to the SC.
(2) If it can (with regard to Issue 1), w/n a
referral should be made first to the SC.
Ruling:
- The instant petition is granted.
- The SC directed the Ombudsman to dismiss
the complaint and to refer it to the SC for
appropriate action.
Ratio:
(1) Issue 1: YES.
- There is nothing in the decision in Orap that
would restrict it only to offenses committed
by a judge unrelated to his official duties.
- A judge who falsifies his certificate of
service is:
(1) administratively liable to the SC for
serious misconduct and inefficiency under
Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
and
(2) criminally liable to the State under
the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
(2) Issue 2: YES.
- Referral to the SC
o The Ombudsman should first refer
the matter of petitioner's certificates
of service to the SC for
determination of whether said
certificates reflected the true status
of his pending case load, as the
Court has the necessary records to
make such a determination.
o The Ombudsman cannot compel the
SC, as one of the three branches of
government, to submit its records, or
to allow its personnel to testify on
the matter.
Page 10 of 131
- Administrative Power
o Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987
Constitution exclusively vests in
the SC administrative supervision
over all courts and court personnel,
from the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals down to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk.
o By virtue of the Courts
administrative power, it is only the
SC that can oversee the judges' and
court personnel's compliance with all
laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if
they commit any violation.
- Separation of Powers
o In the absence of any administrative
action taken against petitioner by
the SC with regard to his certificates
of service, the investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman
encroaches into the Court's power of
administrative supervision over all
courts and its personnel, in violation
of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
o No other branch of government may
intrude into the Courts
administrative power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
- Ombudsmans Justification
o The Ombudsman cannot justify its
investigation of petitioner on the
powers granted to it by Article XI,
section 13 (1) and (2) of the
1987 Constitution, for such a
justification not only runs counter to
the specific mandate of the
Constitution granting supervisory
powers to the SC over all courts and
their personnel, but likewise
undermines the independence of the
judiciary.
- Rationale for SC Referral
o Administratively, the question before
the Court is: Should a judge, having
been granted by this Court an
extension of time to decide cases
before him, report these cases in his
certificate of service?
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
o As the aforementioned question had
not yet been raised and resolved by
the SC, it is questionable how the
Ombudsman could resolve the
criminal complaint that requires the
resolution of the aforementioned
question.
FERNANDEZ V. DE RAMOS-VILLALON (2009)
(SYNDICATE)
Doctrines:
A lawyer, as an officer of the court, has a duty to
be truthful in all his dealings. However, this duty
does not require that the lawyer advance matters
of defense on behalf of his or her clients
opponent.
Facts:
The Palacios owned a parcel of land in Brgy.
San Lorenzo, a syndicate of land grabbers,
where after her property she,( the
syndicate was trying to have their title
Judicially Reconstituted). The Palacios as
suggested by a friend, got the help of
Fernandez et. al. (complainant), who
succeeded in stopping the syndicate.
After sometime the Palacios found out that
Fernandez was able to, transfer the title of
their land in his name, thru a deed of
donation.
The Palacios hired Atty. Villalon
(defendant) as counsel, to have the deed of
donation declared void.
Fernandez is now is filling a complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Villalon, for
violation of Rules 1.01, 7.03, 10.01,10.02,
and 10.03 of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility. Allegedly for suppressing
and excluding in her complaint a deed of
sale between Fernandez and The Palacios
(they were saying that there was a deed of
sale between Fernandez and The Palacios).
And that Atty. Villalon induced a witness to
sign a false affidavit. ( The witness was the
one that introduced Fernandez to the
Palacios, in the first affidavit the witness
said, she was also victimized by Fernandez.
She retracted in a second affidavit saying
that there was a valid sale, and she only
signed the first affidavit because she
thought that it would not be used in court.)
The complaint was dismissed by the IBP,
hence this petition.
Issues:
Page 11 of 131
1. W/N Atty. Villalon should be disbarred for the
deed of sale issue?
2. W/N Atty. Villalon should be disbarred for the
witness issue? (not important)
Held/Ratio:
1. No, A lawyer, as an officer of the court, has a
duty to be truthful in all his dealings. However, this
duty does not require that the lawyer advance
matters of defense on behalf of his or her clients
opponent. A lawyer is his or her clients advocate;
while duty-bound to utter no falsehood, an
advocate is not obliged to build the case for his or
her clients opponent. The respondents former
client, Palacios, approached her to file a complaint
for the annulment of the Deed of Donation. This
was the cause of action chosen by her client.
Assuming arguendo that the respondent knew of
the presence of the Deed of Absolute Sale, its
existence, is, indeed, a matter of defense for
Fernandez. We cannot fault the respondent for
choosing not to pursue the nullification of the Deed
of Absolute Sale. The respondent alleged that her
former client, Palacios, informed her that the Deed
of Absolute Sale was void for lack of consideration.
Furthermore, unlike the Deed of Donation, the
Deed of Absolute Sale was not registered in the
Registry of Deeds and was not the basis for the
transfer of title of Palacios property to Fernandez.
Under the circumstances, it was not unreasonable
for a lawyer to conclude, whether correctly or
incorrectly, that the Deed of Absolute Sale was
immaterial in achieving the ultimate goal the
recovery of Palacios property.
2. No, Both affidavits where not corroborated by
evidence and that both affidavits are contradictory
the only thing that could be concluded is that the
witness lied on one of the affidavit or both of them.
(not important)
RIVERA V. CORRAL (2002) (TAMPERING WITH
COURT RECORDS; FEBRUARY 29)
Doctrine:
Altering material dates on court records is an act of
dishonesty.
Facts:
Jose Rivera, a Baptist pastor, filed a
Complaint for Disbarment against Atty.
Napoleon Corral. The complaint charges
Atty. Corral with Malpractice and Conduct
Unbecoming a Member of the Philippine
Bar. According to Rivera, Atty. Corral
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17

tampered with court records by manually dishonest or deceitful conduct. He committed

changing the entries of a Decision without an act of dishonesty by altering the material
the Courts knowledge and permission. dates on the Notice of Appeal. He made it seem
Justice Ybanez wrote the Decision (civil case that it was timely filed within the period
ejectment) on February 12, 1990. Atty. prescribed. He deceived his client into thinking
Corrals secretary received the Decision on that it was filed on time. This constitutes as
February 23, 1990. On March 13, 1990, Atty.
grave misconduct upon the court. Further, his
Corral filed a Notice of Appeal. The
act is a disgraceful indictment on his moral
succeeding day, Atty. Corral went to the
Office of the Clerk of Court, Branch 7, fiber and personal fitness to his calling as a
Bacolod City and changed the date from lawyer. It is an embarrassment to the
February 23, 1990 to February 29, 1990. members of the Bar. Atty. Corral is suspended
However, Atty. Corral soon realized that for one year and sternly warned that a
there was no February 29, 1990. As a result, repetition will warrant a more severe penalty.
he filed a Reply to Plaintiffs Manifestation
claiming that he actually received the EDILBERTO CUENCA v. CA
Decision on February 28, 1990. Atty.
Corral claimed that he corrected the papers
G.R. No. 109870 December 1, 1995
in the presence and with the approval of the
Clerk of Court. He attributed the correction
to a typographical error. CANON 6
The Court referred the case to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation.
They found Atty. Corral guilty and
recommended his suspension for 6 months.
FACTS: The petitioner, Edilberto Cuenca filed
Atty. Corral filed a motion for
reconsideration of the IBPs decision but a Motion for New Trial on the case which the
this was denied. Atty. Corral filed a motion CA has rendered judgement for violation of
for reconsideration before the SC. He the "Trust Receipts Law" (Presidential Decree
claimed that there was no due process or No. 115) but was denied by this Court for "the
hearing.
petition having been already denied on
Issues: February 9, 1994." The Motion for New Trial
shall be grounded on newly discovered
1. W/N the penalty of suspension for 6 months
evidence and excusable (sic) negligence, and
is sufficient.
shall be supported by affidavits of:
Held/Ratio:
(i) an officer of private complainant
1. NO. The primary objective of administrative corporation who will exculpate
cases against lawyers is to punish and
petitioner;
discipline erring lawyers and to safeguard the
administration of justice by protecting the
(ii) an admission against interest by a
courts and the public from the misconduct of
lawyers. If it is evident that a lawyer lacks former officer of the owner of Ultra
moral character, honesty, probity and good Corporation (the Corporation that
demeanor or is unworthy to continues as an employed petitioner), which actually
officer of the court, he may be suspended or exercised control over the affairs of
disbarred. A lawyer must constantly uphold Ultra; and
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
He can do this by faithfully performing his (iii) the petitioner wherein he will assert
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and innocence for the first time and explain
to his clients. Every lawyer should act and
why he was unable to do so earlier.
comport himself in such manner that would
promote public confidence in the integrity of
the profession. Atty. Corral violated his solemn
oath as a lawyer by engaging in unlawful,

Page 12 of 131
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
The Court thereafter required the
Solicitor General to comment on said motion
and manifestation within ten (10) days from
notice, in a Resolution dated September 7,
1994.
In the Comment, the Solicitor General
himself recommends that petitioner be
entitled to a new trial, proceeding from the
same impression that a certain Rodolfo
Cuenca's (petitioner's brother) sworn
statement is an admission against interest
which may ultimately exonerate petitioner
from criminal liability. The Solicitor General
had this to say:
Ordinarily, it is too late at
this stage to ask for a new trial.
However, the sworn statement of
Rodolfo Cuenca is a declaration
against his own interests under
Section 38, Rule 130, Revised
Rules of Court and it casts doubt
on the culpability of his brother
Edilberto Cuenca, the petitioner.
Hence, the alleged confession of
guilt should be given a hard look
by the Court. The People is
inclined to allow petitioner to
establish the genuineness and
due execution of his brother's
affidavit in the interest of justice
and fair play.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Motion for New
Trial by the petitioner should be granted.
HELD: Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility,
prosecutors who represent the People of the
Philippines in a criminal case are not duty
bound to seek conviction of the accused but to
see that justice is done. Said Rule 6.01 of
Canon 6 states:
Canon 6 These canons shall
apply to lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their
official tasks.
Page 13 of 131
Rule 6.01 The primary duty
of a lawyer engaged in public
prosecution is not to convict
but to see that justice is
done. The suppression of facts
or the concealment of witnesses
capable of establishing the
innocence of the accused is
highly reprehensible and is cause
for disciplinary action. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The above duty is well founded on the
instruction of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935)
that prosecutors represent a sovereign "whose
obligation to govern impartially is compelling
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done (Time to Rein in the Prosecution,
by Atty. Bruce Fein, published on p. 11, The
Lawyers Review, July 31, 1994). (Emphasis
supplied.) 10
Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA
282 [1965]) decided some twenty (20) years
ago, this Court ruled that it is not authorized
to entertain a motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial predicated on allegedly newly
discovered evidence the rationale of which
being:
The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is conclusive as to the
facts, and cannot be reviewed by
the Supreme Court. Accordingly,
in an appeal by certiorari to the
Supreme Court, the latter has no
jurisdiction to entertain a motion
for new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence, for
only questions of fact are
involved therein.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17

The rule now appears to have been
relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent
cases like "Helmuth, Jr. v. People" 11 and
"People v. Amparado". 12
In both cases, the Court, opting to
brush aside technicalities and despite the
opposition of the Solicitor General, granted
new trial to the convicted accused concerned
on the basis of proposed testimonies or
affidavits of persons which the Court
considered as newly discovered and probably
sufficient evidence to reverse the judgment of
conviction. Being similarly circumstanced,
there is no nagging reason why herein
petitioner should be denied the same benefit.
It becomes all the more plausible under the
circumstances considering that the "People"
does not raise any objection to a new trial, for
which reason the Solicitor General ought to be
specially commended for displaying once
again such statesmanlike gesture
impartiality. The Solicitor General's finest hour,
indeed.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion For
New Trial is hereby GRANTED. Let the case be
RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the court of
origin for reception of petitioner's evidence.
SAMANIEGO V. ATTY. FERRER
CANON 7
(Complaint for immorality, abandonment and
willful refusal to give support to an illegitimate
child)
FACTS: Samaniego was a client of Atty. Ferrer
and their lawyer-client relationship became
intimate, when Atty. Ferrer courted her and she
fell in love. They lived together as "husband and
wife" from 96-97 and their daughter was born.
The affair ended in 2000 and since then he failed
to give support to their daughter.
Before the IBP Samaniego testified that
she knew that Atty. Ferrer was in a relationship
but did not think he was already married. Atty.
Ferrer refused to appear during the hearing since
he did not want to see Samaniego.
Atty. Ferrer manifested his willingness to
support their daughter in a position paper. He
also reasoned that he found it unconscionable to
abandon his wife and 10 children to cohabit with
Samaniego.
IBP Board of Governors imposed upon
Atty. Ferrer the penalty of 6 months suspension
for his refusal to support his daughter.
Atty. Ferrer filed MR with prayer for to
reduce the penalty because it will further cause
extreme hardship to his family of 10 children.
Upon finding that Atty. Ferrer lacked the degree
of morality required of a member of the bar, his
prayer for reduced penalty was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ferrer is guilty of
gross immorality.
HELD: Yes. SC finds Atty. Ferrer guilty of
of
gross immorality and he is ordered suspended for
6 months.
Atty. Ferrer admitted his extra-marital
affair and SC considers such illicit relation as a
disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to
disciplinary action. Although it is true that
Samaniego was not entirely blameless for
knowing about Atty. Ferrers wife, it does not
make this case less serious since it is immaterial
whether both are in pari delicto.
Atty. Ferrer was held to have violated
Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03.
xxxx
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
xxxx
Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support
the activities of the integrated bar.
xxxx

Page 14 of 131
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
xxxx
JOHNNY NG v. ATTY. BENJAMIN C. ALAR
Adm. Case No. 7252 (CBD 05-1434),
November 22, 2006
CANON 12
FACTS: Atty. Benjamin Alar is the counsel for
the complainants in a labor case filed with the
Labor Arbiter which dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, NLRCs First Division upheld the
dismissal. In his Motion for Reconsideration
with Motion to Inhibit (MRMI), Atty. Alar used
improper and abusive language full of
diatribes castigating the Labor Arbiter and the
ponente of the NLRC decision. Johnny Ng, one
of the respondents, filed a disbarment case
against Alar before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline for such misbehavior.
Alar contended, inter alia, that the
Rules of Court/Code of Professional
Responsibility applies only suppletorily at the
NLRC when the NLRC Rules of Procedure has
no provision on disciplinary matters for
litigants and lawyers appearing before it and
that Rule X of the NLRC Rules of Procedure
provides for adequate sanctions against
misbehaving lawyers and litigants appearing
in cases before it. Finally he asserted that the
Rules of Court/Code of Professional
Responsibility does not apply to lawyers
practicing at the NLRC, the latter not being a
court and that LAs and NLRC Commissioners
are not judges nor justices and the Code of
Judicial Conduct similarly do not apply to
them, not being part of the judiciary.
ISSUE: Is a lawyers misbehavior before the
NLRC susceptible of the provisions of the Code
of Professional Conduct?
HELD: The MRMI contains insults and
diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both its
moral and intellectual integrity, replete with
implied accusations of partiality, impropriety
and lack of diligence. Respondent used
improper and offensive language in his
Page 15 of 131
pleadings that does not admit any
justification.
The assertion that the NLRC not being a
court, its commissioners, not being judges or
justices and therefore not part of the judiciary
and that consequently, the Code of Judicial
Conduct does not apply to them, is unavailing.
In Lubiano v. Gordolla, the Court held that
respondent became unmindful of the fact that
in addressing the NLRC, he nonetheless
remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound
servant of the law, whose first duty is not to
his client but to the administration of justice
and whose conduct ought to be and must be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics.
Respondent has clearly violated Canons
8 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. His actions erode the publics
perception of the legal profession.
CARMELITA FUDOT v. CATTLEYA, INC.
GR. No. 171008 September 13, 2007
CANON 12
Facts: Sometime in July 1992, Cattleya Land,
Inc. (hereinafter referred to as respondent)
asked someone to check, on its behalf, the
titles of nine (9) lots, the subject land
included, which it intended to buy from the
spouses Troadio and Asuncion Tecson. Finding
no defect on the titles, respondent purchased
the nine lots through a Deed of Conditional
Sale on 6 November 1992. Subsequently, on
30 August 1993, respondent and the Tecsons
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the
same properties. The Deed of Conditional Sale
and the Deed of Absolute Sale were registered
with the Register of Deeds on 06 November
1992 and 04 October 1993, respectively. The
Register of Deeds refused to actually annotate
the deed of sale on the titles because of the
existing notice of attachment pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The
attachment was eventually cancelled by virtue
of a compromise agreement between the
Tecsons and their attaching creditor which was
brokered by respondent. Titles to six (6) of the
nine (9) lots were issued, but the Register of
Deeds refused to issue titles to the remaining
three (3) lots , because the titles covering the
same were still unaccounted for.
Later, respondent learned that the
Register of Deeds had already registered the
deed of sale in favor of petitioner and issued a
new title herein. The respondent filed its
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
Complaint for Quieting Of Title &/Or Recovery
Of Ownership, Cancellation Of Title With
Damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Tagbilaran City.
Issue: Is the issuance of Deed of Sale valid?
Held: On 31 October 2001, the trial court
rendered its decision: (i) quieting the title or
ownership of the subject land in favor of
respondent; (ii) declaring the deed of sale
between petitioner and spouses Tecson
invalid; (iii) ordering the registration of the
subject land in favor of respondent; (iv)
dismissing respondents claim for damages
against the Register of Deeds for insufficiency
of evidence; (v) dismissing Asuncions claim
for damages against petitioner for lack of
factual basis; and (vi) dismissing petitioners
counterclaim for lack of the required
preponderance of evidence.
JUAN PABLO BONDOC v JUDGE DIVINA
LUZ AQUINO-SIMBULAN,
A.M.No. RTJ-09-2004 | October 26, 2009 |
604 scra 416
CANON 12
FACTS: This is a case filed by former
Representative Bondoc charging Judge
Aquino-Simbulan with partiality, gross
ignorance of the law and gross misconduct in
the handling of Criminal case entitled People
v Totaan. Complainant bewailed: (1) the
respondents attempt to have the cases
settled in an off-the-record huddle with the
parties lawyers because she did not want the
accused to be administratively suspended; (2)
the respondents order to fast track the
cases because the accused had been
suspended upon the motion of the private
prosecutors. The complainant then narrated
the instances when his lawyers were alleged
given a hard time and subjected to indignities
by the respondent in her desire to fast track
the criminal case. On the other hand, the
respondent pointed out that an examination of
the complaint would readily show that it was
prepared by the private prosecutors, Attys.
Stephen David and Lanee David, who wove a
tale lies and distortions regarding the
proceedings to cover up their own
shortcomings as lawyers; had they performed
their duty as officers of the court and
members of the bar, they would have
Page 16 of 131
informed the complainant that they lost
because of their blunders in the prosecution
cases. In the manifestation and motion
respondent prayed for the permanent
dismissal of the present administrative matter
and requested that her complaint against
Attys. Stephen David and Lanee David be
acted upon and given due course. The court
resolved to dismiss the administrative
complaint against the respondent and
required Attys. Stephen and Lanee David to
show cause why they should not be disciplined
or held in contempt.
ISSUE: WON Attys. Stephen and Lanee David
guilty of contempt.
RULING: The SC dismissed the administrative
complaint filed against the respondent and
resolved the liability of the two Attorneys. The
complainant (Bondoc) never appeared in
court, it is reasonable to conclude that the two
lawyers crafted the complaint and
incorporated therein all the unfounded
accusations against the respondent in order to
conceal their inadequacies in the handling of
their clients case. To say the least, the
complaint was most unfair to the respondent
who, as the record shows, was simply keeping
faith with her avowed objective of expediting
the proceedings in her court by, among other
measures, requiring lawyers to be prepared at
all times and to be fair and candid in their
dealings with the court. As the court held in
Racines v Judge Morallos, et al., a clients
cause does not permit an attorney to cross the
line between liberty and license. Lawyers
must always keep in perspective that since
they are administrators of justice, oath-bound
servants of society, their first duty is not to
their clients, as many suppose, but to the
administration of justice. As a lawyer, he is an
officer of the court with the duty to uphold its
dignity and authority and not promote distrust
in the administration of justice.
Attys. Stephen and Lanee David
miserably failed to come up to the standards
of these rulings. They are liable and was held
in indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71
of the Rules of Court.
AUSTRIA V. MASAQUEL
G.R. L-22536 August 31, 1967
CANON 13
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
FACTS: Asturia was the plaintiff in a civil case
involving 3 parcels of land in Pangasinan in
which Judge Masaquel ruled in his favor.
Sometime later the defendant in the civil case
hired a new lawyer in the person of Atty. Sicat,
a former associate of Judge Masaquel when he
was still in the practice of law. Atty. Sicat then
filed a superdeas bond to stay the execution
of the sheriff and a motion for new trial, all of
which was granted by Judge Masaquel.
Before the opening of one of the court
sessions, Atty Macaraeg, lawyer of Asturia saw
Judge Masaquel to his chamber and verbally
transmitted to him the request that he inhibit
himself on the ground that Atty. Sicat was his
associate. The Judge denied the request
pointing out that it was not one of the grounds
for disqualification of a judge as provided in
the rules of court. During the court session, he
asked Asturia if he had authorized Atty.
Macaraeg to approach him in his chambers
and whether he doubts the integrity of the
judge to decide fairly and impartially because
the lawyer of the defending party was his
associate, Asturia answered them all in the
positive stating that he heard rumors that the
defendant was boasting that he would
definitely win because of his lawyer. The Judge
then declared Asturia in contempt. The Judge
considered his actuations offensive, insulting
and lack of respect to the
court. He was ordered to pay 50 pesos. Hence
this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for the
judge to declare Asturia to be in contempt of
court.
HELD: NO. While the court consider it
improper for a litigant or counsel to see a
judge in chambers and talk to him about a
matter related to the case pending in the
court of said judge, it is not an act of
contempt of court to see the judge in his
chamber and requested him to disqualify
himself on the ground which the respondent
judge might consider just and valid. The
circumstances that led the respondent judge
to declare the petitioner in direct contempt of
court do not indicate any deliberate design on
the part of the petitioner to disrespect
respondent judge. The petitioner has not
misbehaved in court or in the presence of the
respondent judge so as to obstruct or interrupt
the proceedings. He simply expressed his
sincere feeling under the circumstances.
Page 17 of 131
Certainly, any person is entitled to his opinion
about a judge, whether that opinion is
flattering or not. A judge as a public servant
should not be so thin-skinned or sensitive as
to feel hurt or offended if a citizen expresses
an honest opinion about him.
IN RE SYCIP
Two firms ask that they be allowed to continue using the names of their
firms despite the fact that Attys. Sycip and Ozaeta died.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from
continuing its business under a firm name that includes the
name of a deceased partner. NCC 1840 explicitly sanctions
the practice.
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the
partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof,
shall not of itself make the individual property of the deceased partner
liable for any debts contracted by such person or partnership.
2. In regulating other professions (accountancy and
engineering), the legislature has authorized the adoption of
firm names without any restriction as to the use of the
name of a deceased partner. There is no fundamental
policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of
professionals of a firm name, which includes the name of a
deceased partner, at least where such firm name has acquired
the characteristics of a "trade name."
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by
the continued use of the name of a deceased partner because
Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by
the American Bar Association declares that:
The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken
that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the
deaths of their respective deceased partners were well-
publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for
several days. The stationeries now being used by them carry
new letterheads indicating the years when their respective
deceased partners were connected with the firm.
Petitioners will notify all leading national and international
law directories of the fact of their deceased partners' deaths.
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased
partner's name in a professional firm's name. There is no
Philippine custom or usage that recognizes that the name of
a law firm identifies the firms individual members.
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm
name of law partnerships has been consistently allowed by
U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal
profession of most countries.
ISSUE & HOLDING
WON they may be allowed to continue using the current names of their
firms. NO. Petitioners advised to drop the names SYCIP and OZAETA
from their respective firm names. Names may be included in the listing
of individuals who have been partners, indicating the years during
which they served.
RATIO
JURISPRUDENCE
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
The Deen case [1953] Court advised the firm to desist
from including in their firm designation the name of C. D.
Johnston, who has long been dead
Register of Deeds of Manila v. China Banking
Corporation [1958] In this case, the law firm of Perkins &
Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. The Court
in a Resolution stated that it "would like to be informed why
the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A.
Perkins is already dead." The Court advised the firm to drop
the name of E. A. Perkins from the firm name, and ruled that
no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree
could give rise to the possibility of deception. Deen case cited
in the ruling.
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of
the legal system. The Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases
laid down a legal rule against which no custom or practice to the
contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil
law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of
any partner. Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public
policy shall not be countenanced.
The use in their partnership names of the names of deceased
partners will run counter to NCC 1815.
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which
may or may not include the name of one or more of the partners. Those
who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the
firm name shall be subject to the liability of a partner.
Names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those of living
partners and in the case of non-partners, should be living persons
who can be subjected to liability. NCC 1825 prohibits a third person
from including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the
liability of a partner.
The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as
the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they are
non-lawyers. Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a
deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees
received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both
because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because
such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of
the recipient. Neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for
transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor.
There being no benefits accruing, there can be no corresponding
liability.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend
to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the
profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a
name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can
join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation
established by deceased partners.
ON ARGUMENT #1
NCC 1840 is within Chapter 3 of Title IX entitled "Dissolution and
Winding Up." It primarily deals with the exemption from liability in
cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the
deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership,
which continues the business using the partnership name or the name of
the deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein
is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal reorganization.
Secondly, NCC 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with
a good will to protect rather than of a professional partnership
[with no saleable goodwill but whose reputation depends on the
personal qualifications of its individual members]. A saleable goodwill
can exist only in a commercial partnership, not in a professional
partnership consisting of lawyers.
Page 18 of 131
ON ARGUMENT #2
A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to
partnerships formed by other professionals or for business. The law
on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in
connection with the practice of accountancy.
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere
relationship or association for a particular purpose. It is not a
partnership formed to carry on trade or business or of holding property.
The use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is
improper.
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from
business
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct,
and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making
much money
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice
involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor,
fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods
of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing
directly with their clients
The right to practice law does not only presuppose in its possessor
integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a
special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a
public trust.
ON ARGUMENT #3
Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name
of a deceased or former partner when such a practice is permissible by
local custom, but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no
imposition or deception is practiced.
In the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued
use of a deceased or former partner's name. Firm names, under
our custom, identify the more active and/or more senior members or
partners of the law firm.
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential,
where the name of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be
ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the
familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
ON ARGUMENT #6
U.S. Courts have allowed the continued use of a deceased partner's
name because it is sanctioned by custom. Not so in this jurisdiction
where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice.
Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of
acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding
and obligatory. Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must
be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. A local custom
as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless
such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any
other fact. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice
does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of
adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be
differentiated from social custom. The former can supplement statutory
law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with the latter.
The practice of law is related to the administration of justice and should
not be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade." Petitioners'
desire to preserve the identity of their firms in the eyes of the public
must bow to legal and ethical impediment.
Petitions DENIED
CONCURRENCE OF J. FERNANDO
It is out of delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in the
disposition of these petitions. Sycip Salazar started with partnership of
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late
Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and
the most junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his
brother- in-law.
DISSENT OF J. AQUINO
The petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in
the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that A. Sycip,
former J. Ozaeta and H. Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served
as partners should be stated therein.
The purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their
deceased founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought
the legal services of Attys. Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the
goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law
practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation. The retention of their
names is not illegal per se.
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985
DACANAY V. BAKER & MCKENZIE
(super ikli lang kaya ganyan hehe)
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980
verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other
lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a
law firm organized in Illinois.
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres,
using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names
of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of
Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any
liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed
whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what
is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not
having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Baker & McKenzie, an alien law firm, could practice
law in the Philippines.
HELD:
NO. Respondents were enjoined from practicing law under the firm
name Baker & McKenzie.
RATIO:
Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
[R]espondents use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constituted a
representation that being associated with the firm they could render
legal services of the highest quality to multinational business
enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment. This
was unethical because Baker & McKenzie was not authorized to
practice law here.
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law
under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
ANTONIO V. CA
Page 19 of 131
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus with a prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction.
The petitioners are lessees of an apartment building located in No. 121,
2nd Street, 9th Avenue, Caloocan City. This property was
foreclosed by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
after its original owner failed to pay back his loan.
The property was sold to the private respondents at a public bidding
after due notice to all the parties concerned. GSIS issued a
conditional deed of sale stating that the private respondent is the
owner of the property.
The GSIS advised the petitioners that they should now pay their rent
and arrearages to the private respondent. But despite repeated
written demands, the petitioners failed and refused to settle their
accounts
Private respondent filed a complaint for ejectment against the petitioner
with the MTC. MTC ordered the petitioners to vacate the premises
occupied and to pay certain amounts as damages.
Petitioners appealed to the RTC. IT affirmed in toto the judgment of the
MTC
Petitioners filed for a review on certiorari. (CA-G.R. SP No. 07828)
On December 5, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered a
decision dismissing the petitioner for review. Later an entry of
judgment dated February 3, 1987, was duly certified thereupon by
the Clerk of Court attesting to the fact that the judgment became
final and executory as of January 22, 1987. The records of the case
were consequently, remanded to the respondent Regional Trial
Court on February 11, 1987.
On February 23, 1987, the petitioners, through their new counsel, filed
an "Appearance And Motion For Leave To Admit Motion For
Reconsideration, together with the Motion For Reconsideration
With Prayer For Issuance Of Temporary Restraining Order," with
the respondent Court of Appeals. They moved that the respondent
Court of Appeals admit their motion for reconsideration, which was
obviously filed beyond the reglementary period for filing the same,
alleging that their counsel of record abandoned them and migrated
to the United States without at least informing them that a decision
was rendered against them.
Petitioners motion was denied by the CA:
Now before this Court is an Appearance and
Motion for Leave to Admit Motion for Reconsideration' filed
by petitioners in the above-entitled case on February 23, 1987
on the ground that their former counsel Atty. Funelas had
abandoned the case and is now abroad, together with the
corresponding Motion For Reconsideration With Prayer for
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order.
Considering that the decision sought to be
reconsidered dated December 5, 1986 had become final,
entry of judgment having been issued on February 3, 1987
and the records remanded to the court a quo on February 11,
1987, for which reason the said decision has become final
and this Court has become bereft of jurisdiction to act
thereupon, the abovementioned Motions are hereby noted.
Parenthetically, and merely for purposes of record, it is
observed that counsel of record of petitioners is the law office
Funelas, Perez and Associates and not Atty. Funelas alone.
Therefore, the fact that Atty. Funelas has abandoned the case
and is now abroad is not a valid ground for the late filing of
the motion for reconsideration.
The RTC earlier issued an order for a writ of execution for the
enforcement of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 07828 (which the
 ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
petitioners are not aware of since their counsel left the country
without a word)
Petitioners, believing that they were deprived of their day in court
when CA denied their motion for consideration. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the denial by the CA of the Motion for Reconsideration is
correct?
2. Whether the petitioners are bound by the negligence of their
former counsels failure to notify them regarding the judgment of
the trial court?
HELD:
1. Yes. It is well-settled that after the lapse of fifteen (1 5) days from
notice of judgment, the same becomes final and the Court of
Appeals loses, jurisdiction over the case. And the subsequent filing
of a motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality of the
judgment nor restore jurisdiction which had already been lost. The
court a quo cannot decide the case anew. decision rendered anew
notwithstanding the finality of the original one is null and void.
2. Yes. The negligence attributed by the petitioners to their then
counsel, Atty. Funelas, is not excusable, Clear and as it can be
seen from the pleadings filed that the petitioners' counsel of record
is the law office of Funelas Perez and Associates and not Atty.
Funelas alone. Atty. Funelas signed the documents in his capacity
as the representative of the said law firm.
The client is bound by the negligence or failings of counsel.
It is the duty of an attorney to himself and to his clients to
invariably adopt a system whereby he can be sure of receiving
promptly all judicial notices during his absence from his
address of record. The attorney must so arrange matters that
communications sent by mail addressed to his office or residence,
may reach him promptly.
The petitioners may have submitted an affidavit of a Mr.
Obligar stating that the firm was only composed of Atty. Pitty
Funelas after being dissolved in 1986, it is considered as a mere
afterthought and futile. It is safe to presume that a law firm which
registered and represented itself as such, with at least two named
partners, is composed of at least two lawyers. And if it is true that
this law office was earlier dissolved, the winding up process is
presumed to have been performed in a regular manner, with all
the obligations properly accounted for. Very concrete evidence
must be presented in order that these presumptions may be rebutted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and
mandamus with preliminary injunction is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. With costs against petitioners.
OUANO ARRASTRE SERVICE, INC.. V. ALEONOR
Private respondent International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("IPI") filed
a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City against
Mercantile Insurance Company, Inc. ("Mercantile") and petitioner
Ouano Arrastre Service, Inc. ("OASI") for replacement of certain
equipment imported by IPI which were insured by Mercantile but
were lost on arrival in Cebu City, allegedly because of mishandling
by petitioner OASI.
Petitioner OASI's answer was filed by the law firm of Ledesma,
Saludo and Associates ("LSA") and signed by Atty. Manuel
Trinidad of the Cebu office or branch of LSA. However, sometime
thereafter, Atty. Trinidad resigned from LSA and Atty. Fidel
Manalo, a partner from the Makati office of LSA, filed a motion to
postpone the hearing stating that the case had just been endorsed to
him by petitioner OASI.
Atty. Manalo handled the case and t hereafter, the trial court held
that Mercantile and OASI are jointly and severally for the cost of
Page 20 of 131
replacement of the damaged equipment plus damages, totalling
P435,000.00.
Only Mercantile appealed from the decision.
IPI filed a motion for execution of the decision which public
respondent judge granted.
Petitioners counsel filed an appeal claiming that the decision was
mistakenly sent by the trial court to the law firms Head Office in
Makati.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging: : (1) the
failure seasonably to file an appeal was due to excusable neglect
and slight "oversight" claiming that there was miscommunication
between LSA-Cebu and LSA main office as to who would file the
notice of appeal; and (2) Mercantile's timely notice of appeal should
benefit petitioner OASI, a solidary co-debtor.
Public respondent judge denied OASI's motion for reconsideration
declaring that the appeal cannot be given due course for lack of
merit and ordered that the writ of execution be enforced.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal upon the
grounds that: (1) there had been a valid service of the decision; (2)
the decision had become final and executory as to petitioner OASI;
and (3) Mercantile's appeal does not inure to the benefit of
petitioner as they do not share common defenses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was valid service of the decision of the
trial court upon petitioner's counsel; and
HELD:
There was a valid service upon the petitioners counsel.
The Court of Appeals found as a fact that a copy of the
decision was served upon Atty. Catipay but that he refused to
receive it:
Finally, on this point, there is an uncontroverted sworn
statement of the lower court's legal aide, Mr. Jesus A. Lim, attesting
to the fact that on February 7, 1990 he served on Atty. Ronald
Catipay a copy of the decision in the case, but that the latter 'refused
to receive copy of the decision and instead instructed me to send the
copy of the decision to the Makati Office of the law firm' and that
Mr. Lim accompanied the lawyer to a place where a xerox machine
was located, copied the decision and gave to the lawyer a xerox
copy of said decision. This statement seems to find corroboration in
the later allegation of Atty. Catipay that their Cebu office never
'officially' received copy of the decision.
There was no justification for Atty. Catipay of LSA-Cebu to
refuse the service, especially if, as petitioner now alleges, the notice
should have been sent to LSA-Cebu on the theory that Atty. Catipay
was the lead counsel.
Petitioner's counsel was and is the firm of Ledesma, Saludo
and Associates (and not any particular member or associate of that
firm) which firm happens to have a main office in Makati and a
branch office in Cebu City. The Court notes that both the main and
branch offices operate under one and the same name, Saludo
Ledesma and Associates. Having represented itself to the public as
comprising a single firm, LSA should not be allowed at this point to
pretend that its main office and its branch office in effect constitute
separate law firms with separate and distinct personalities and
responsibilities.
In view of the unitary nature of the law firm retained by
petitioner as its counsel, we believe that the reglementary period for
filing a notice of appeal actually began to run on 8 February 1990.
However, even if the Court were to accept (which it does not) the
supposition that the reglementary period began to run only on 22
February 1990, the day after the copy of the trial court's decision
was received by LSA-Makati, it is quite clear that the notice of
appeal filed by petitioner's counsel on 26 June 1990 was wholly
late. By the time the notice of appeal was filed, the trial court's
decision had become final and executory as to petitioner and could
be executed against it.
 ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. Costs against petitioner.
B. R. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES, INC., V. CA
This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for
preliminary injunction, to review the Resolution of CA which denied
the petitioners motion to reinstate its appeal, earlier dismissed for
failure to file the Appellants Brief.
Eulogio Reyes, before his death, filed an action for damages against the
Director of Public Works, the Republic of the Philippines and the
herein petitioner, B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. (Civil Case No.
757-R.)
The trial court held that BR Sebastian should be liable for damages but
absolved the other defendants.
BR Sebastian, through counsel Baizas, Alberto and Associates,
appealed. During the pendency of the appeal, Reyes died and was
later substituted by his heirs Enrique N. Reyes, Felicisima R.
Natividad, Donna Marie N. Reyes and Renne Marie N. Reyes
who are now the private respondents in this present petition.
Petitioner, thru its then counsel of record, received notice to file
Appellant's Brief within 45 days from receipt thereof. It had,
therefore, until 5 April 1974 within which to comply.
Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief.
Respondent Court issued a Resolution requiring said counsel to show
cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the
Appellant's Brief within the reglementary period. Counsel for
petitioner failed to comply with the Resolution; Another Resolution
was issuat ed DISMISSING the Apppeal.
The BAIZAS LAW OFFICE filed a Motion for Reconsideration stating
that a result of the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas, senior partner in
the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES, the affairs
of the said firm are still being settled between Atty. Jose Baizas (son
of Crispin Baizas) and Atty. Ruby Alberto, the latter having
established her own law office; furthermore, Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu,
the lawyer who handled this case in the trial court and who is
believed to have also attended to the preparation of the Appellant's
Brief but failed to submit it through oversight and inadvertence, had
also left the firm.
CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration because it has been 6
months since the expiration of the original period and more than
two and one-half months since counsel received the copy of the
resolution requiring him to show cause why the appeal should not
be dismissed.
No action having been taken by petitioner from the above Resolution
within the period to file a petition for review, the same became final
and executory, and the records of the case were remanded to the
court of origin for execution.
RTC issued a writ of execution. The respondent Provincial Sheriff and
Deputy Sheriff attached petitioner's Hough Pay Loader with
Hercules Diesel Engine and issued a Notice of Sheriff's Sale.
Petitioner filed with respondent Court a Motion to Reinstate Appeal
with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioner alleges that (1) CA may set aside its processes especially
in the present case which was dismissed due to the untimely death
of Atty. Baizas; (2) the dismissal of the case would be tantamount to
denying BRSEI its day in the court.
The CA denied the Motion in its Resolution stating that the firm was
not dissolved since it received the Notice to File Brief.
Hence, the Original Petition against the Court of Appeals, Eulogio B.
Reyes, Nicanor G. Salaysay, as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, and
Antonio Marinas, as Deputy Sheriff. The petition likewise prayed
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
-Motion to suspend , and Motion for Leave to Admit Amended
Petition were granted.
Present petition denied on May 12, 1976 via Resolution- MR
Page 21 of 131
Court resolved to reconsider the Resolution issued on May 12, 1976-
Both parties submitted their respective memorandum.
ISSUE: Whether the appeal of BR Sebastian should be reinstated.
HELD:
NO. Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO &
ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of
the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between said
firm and petitioner.
Undoubtedly, there was inexcusable negligence on the part of
petitioner's counsel in failing to file the Appellant's Brief. As revealed
by the records, petitioner's counsel, the BAIZAS ALBERTO &
ASSOCIATES law firm, received the notice to file Brief on 19
February 1974. It failed to do so within the 45 days granted to it. Said
law firm also received a copy of the respondent Court's Resolution of 9
July 1974 requiring it to show cause why the appeal should not be
dismissed for failure to file the Brief within the reglementary period.
Petitioner chose not to comply with it, thus compelling the respondent
Court to issue on 9 September 1974 a Resolution dismissing the appeal,
a copy of which the former also received. Then, on 28 September 1974,
the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved for reconsideration of the said
Resolution which respondent Court denied in its Resolution of 9
October 1974. Nothing more was heard from petitioner until after a
year when, on 6 November 1975, it filed the instant petition in reaction
to the issuance of a writ of execution by the trial court following receipt
of the records for the respondent Court.
The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the
death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its failure to
file the Brief. With Baizas' death, the responsibility of Atty. Alberto and
his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by
the former of their appearance in the manner provided by the Rules of
Court. This is so because it was the law firm which handled the case for
petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu,
an associate who was designated to handle the case, later left the office
after the death of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm
could have replaced him.. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the
law firm should have re-assigned the case to another associate or, it
could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules
of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new
lawyer.
Compounding such negligence is the failure of the BAIZAS
LAW OFFICE, which filed on 28 September 1974 the motion for
reconsider the Resolution of 9 September 1974, to take any further
appropriate action after the respondent Court denied said motion on 9
October 1974. The appearance of said counsel is presumed to be duly
authorized by petitioner. The latter has neither assailed nor questioned
such appearance.
The rule is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was failure to
show a good and sufficient cause which would justify the reinstatement
of petitioner's appeal. Respondent Court of Appeals did not them
commit any grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's
motion to reinstate its appeal.
March 23, 1929
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA
Luis Tagorda is a member of the provincial board of Isabela.
Previous to the last election, he used placards which in a way was
advertising his services as a lawyer and notary public.
He also wrote a letter to a lieutenant of a barrio in
Echague,Isabela. In essence he was informing the lieutenant that
he will be in Echague during the weekends and the lieutenant
should convey this information to the other people in his town.
ISSUE: Whether the advertising is contrary to the duties imposed upon
lawyers
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
HELD:
Yes. The The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of
Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908
and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the
Code of Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. The most worthy
and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and
especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This
cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct.
The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being
a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of
convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by
circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or
interview not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is
equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through
touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies
advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers
in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the
lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's
position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower
the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH
AGENTS. It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to
bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or
trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not
only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is
disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and
inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed
litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those
having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or
to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward
directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such
cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials,
physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under the
guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the
criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his
professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession
devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such
practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform
thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of
the court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby
suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one
month from April 1, 1929.
KHAN V. SIMBILLO
An advertisement in Philippine Daily Inquirer came out
which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
SPECIALIST 532-4333/521-2667.
SC ordered its staff to call the number and ask some
information.
Espeleta called the number and the wife of Atty. Rizalino
Simbillo answered who said that his husband was an expert
in handling annulment cases and guarantees a court decree
within 4-6 month. The services of Atty. Simbillo is for
P48,000. half of which is payable at the filing of the case and
the balance after the decision has been rendered.
Similar advertisement also appeared in The Philippine Star
and Manila Bulletin.
Khan, Assist. Court Administrator, filed a case against
Simbillo for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Rule 2.03 and 3.01.
Page 22 of 131
Simbillo admitted that he caused the advertisement but he
argued that solicitation and advertisement is not prohibited
per se and that it is about time to change our views about the
prohibition on advertising and solicitation. He also said that
the interest of the public is not served by the prohibition and
suggested that the ban be lifted.
IBP recommended that Simbillo be suspended for 1 year and
that repetition of similar act will be dealt with more severely.
While the case was being investigated upon by the court,
Simbillo again advertised his legal services, for 2 times, in
the Buy & Sell Free Ads Magazine.
ISSUE:
Whether Simbillo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD:
Yes. Rule 2.03 provides a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any
act designed primarily to solicit legal business while Rule 3.01 states
that a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.
It is a profession in which the duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration. The gaining of livelihood should be a secondary
consideration.
Aside from advertising himself as an Annulment of Marriage
Specialist, his assurance of his clients that an annulment may be
obtained in 4-6 months from the filing of the case encourages people,
who might other have 2nd thought, to dissolve their marriage.
Solicitation of legal business is not proscribed. However, solicitation
must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
simple signs stating the name/s of the lawyers, the office and residence
address and the fields of expertise, as well as advertisement in legal
periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible.
CANOY V. ORTIZ
A Complaint was filed by Canoy accusing Atty. Ortiz of misconduct
and malpractice. It was alleged that Canoy filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against Coca Cola Philippines. Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel
for Canoy in this proceeding. Canoy submitted all the documents and
records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper.
Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits to the office of Atty. Ortiz to
follow-up the progress of the case. He was shocked to learn that his
complaint was actually dismissed way back in 1998, for failure to
prosecute, the parties not having submitted their position papers. Canoy
alleged that Ortiz had never communicated to him about the status of the
case.
Atty. Ortiz informs the Court that he has mostly catered to indigent and
low-income clients, at considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty.
Ortiz admits that the period within which to file the position paper had
already lapsed. He attributes this failure to timely file the position paper
to the fact that after his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, he was
frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a local government
official and as a practicing lawyer.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Ortiz is liable to be sanctioned.
HELD: Atty. Ortiz is to be sanctioned. Suspension from the practice
of law for one (1) month.
Several of the canons and rules in the Code of Professional
Responsibility guard against the sort of conduct.
 ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
CANON 18A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
Rule 18.04A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to
the clients request for information.
His failure to do so constitutes a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He
owes entire devotion to the interest of the client. The relationship of
lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for
the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the
case and should not be left in the dark. Neither is the Court mollified by
the circumstance of Atty. Ortizs election as a City Councilor of Bacolod
City, as his adoption of these additional duties does not exonerate him of
his negligent behavior.
LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO
A complaint for disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan
against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services. Complaint alleged that
respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his
clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To
induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent
them text messages. To support his allegations, complainant presented
the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to
prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant
and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,
000.00. Complainant also attached respondents calling card.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing
the printing and circulation of the said calling card.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tolentinos actions violated theCPR
HELD: Yes. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not do
or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such
actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. Rule 2.03
should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides
that lawyer, shall not for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any
suit or proceeding or delay any mans cause. This rule proscribes
ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty.
In the case at bar, complainant presented substantial
evidence (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons
coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that
respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from
referrals suits. Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice
was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation
on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a
more favorable result. Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly
solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3
of the CPR and section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Any act of
solicitations constitutes malpractice which calls for the exercise of the
Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statues
warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective
client for the purpose of obtaining employment. Thus in this
jurisdiction, the Court adheres to the rule to protect the public from the
Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the
nobility of the legal profession .Canon 2: A lawyer shall make his legal
Page 23 of 131
services available in an efficient and convenient manner compatible
with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession.
Rule 2.03: A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a
business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money,
is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they
owe to themselves.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for
violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.
PEOPLE V. CAWILI
The question before us is whether or not Hospicio O. Zapata, a member
of the Philippine Bar, is to be subjected to disciplinary action. He was,
under our resolution of August 3, 1970, given a period of ten days after
receipt thereof to explain why no such action should be taken against
him in view of his failure to submit the brief as counsel de parte within
the reglementary period. He filed an explanation in a memorandum
submitted to us on August 22, 1970, admitting that he was remiss in his
obligation to file said brief, but seeking to minimize such failure on his
part with the allegation that the accused, Rodrigo Cawili, was in a state
of indigence resulting not being paid but also in his partly assuming the
expenses entailed in such defense. After invoking such circumstances
as the expenses incident on the printing of the brief being beyond the
power of the wife of the accused to bear and that he was not called
upon to continue spending on behalf of such client, he would have us
overlook his failure to file the brief as in his opinion "the mere review
of the record of the case will readily show that the decision is contrary
to law and the evidence adduced during the trial, . . ." He did tender his
apology, coupled with a promise that an incident of such character will
not be repeated in the future.
ISSUE: Whether the memorandum filed by Zapata justifies his
inability to file his pleadings within the reglementary period
HELD: No. It cannot be denied that the failure of counsel to submit the
brief within the reglementary period is an offense that entails
disciplinary action. The recital of the circumstances on which counsel
would seek to reduce its gravity do not call for exculpation. He could
have sought the permission to file a mimeographed brief, or, at the very
least, he could have informed us of the difficulties attendant on
defending his client. For him to blithely assume that a mere reading of
the record would suffice to discharge an obligation not only to his client
but to this Court is to betray a degree of irresponsibility. It is not in
keeping, even, with the minimal standards expected of membership in
the bar to be so lacking in elementary courtesy that this Court was not
even informed of his inability to comply with what was incumbent on
him. His conduct was therefore inexcusable, although the explanation
he tendered and the difficulties under which he worked would, to a
certain degree, invite less than full punishment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Hospicio O. Zapata is hereby reprimanded
for his failure to submit his brief within the reglementary period, and
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
admonished to be much more careful in the fulfillment of his
obligations to his client and to this honorable Tribunal.
AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO.,V. NLRC
Petition for certiorari, with prayer for issuance of a restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction.
Private respondents Virgilio Malinao, Rosemilo Gacusan and
Dominador Loriaga filed a Complaint for regularization, sick
leave pay, vacation leave pay and night shift differential pay
against petitioners American Home Assurance Company and/or
Leslie Mouat before the National Capital Region Arbitration
Branch of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss insofar as private
respondents Malinao and Gacusan were concerned. The motion
alleged that petitioner and private respondents Malinao and
Gacusan have settled the case by way of a compromise
agreement.
Malinao and Loriaga filed an Amended Complaint for illegal
dismissal and service incentive leave.
Private respondents Malinao and Gacusan filed an Opposition to
the Motion to Dismiss. They averred that petitioners, using
"undue influence and trickery considering their educational
backgrounds," deluded them into signing the compromise
agreement. A Supplemental Opposition was subsequently filed
by said private respondents
Petitioners filed a Rejoinder to private respondents Malinaos and
Gacusans opposition to the motion to dismiss.
LA ordered the parties submission of their position papers and
the return of the money received for settlemet.
Before private respondents Malinao, Gacusan and Loriaga could
submit their respective position papers, petitioners filed an
Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private respondents
Malinao and Gacusan failed to comply with Labor Arbiter
Caday s directive to return the money they received by virtue of
the compromise agreement.
Private respondents Malinao, Gacusan and Loriaga "by
themselves, having been neglected by their counsel on record"
filed an Opposition to [the] Urgent Motion to Dismiss.
LA rendered the case to be Dismissed with Prejudice, as against
Gacusan and Malinao
Petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Postponement and
Revision of Title of the Case, praying" [f]or a revision of the title
of the case at bar so that it will reflect only the name of
Dominador G. Loriaga, as the sole complainant in the light of the
dismissal with prejudice of the claims of complainants Rosemilo
Gacusan and Virgilio Malinao
Atty. Albert G. Fanoga served notice with Labor Arbiter Caday
that he was withdrawing as counsel of record for private
respondents Malinao, Gacusan and Loriaga.
In the hearing, Atty. Cornelio G. Montesclaros, new counsel of
record for private respondents Malinao, Gacusan and Loriaga,
was furnished with a copy of the Order dated April 30, 1992.
Likewise on even date, private respondent Loriaga moved that
"the case be dismissed as against him (sic) without prejudice,
however, to refiling the same at a future date." The motion was
granted by Labor Arbiter Caday in an Order dated August 11,
1992.
More than four months later, or on December 14, 1992, private
respondent Malinao filed a Motion to Admit the Motion for
Reconsideration. On December 22, 1992, petitioners filed a
Motion to Deny Due Course to Complainant Malinaos Motion
to Admit.
Page 24 of 131
The motion to admit the motion for reconsideration was
considered an appeal and eventually was elevated to public
respondent NLRC for adjudication.
NLRC ordered that the previous order be set aside. Petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution.
NLRC denied.
Petitioners argue that respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
giving due course to the Motion to Admit Motion for
Reconsideration which was already filed out of time, and in
ordering the hearing on the merits of the case despite the
presence of supervening events, both in violation of the
constitutional rights of herein petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether the counsels failure to file the motion of
consideration on time due to poverty is excusable
HELD:
The supposed extreme poverty of the client is not a justifiable
excuse for the failure of his counsel to file a motion for reconsideration
on time. It is not disputed that the counsel for respondent Malinao
received a copy of the Order of April 30, 1992 during the hearing held
before the labor arbiter on August 10, 1992. Evidently, the supposed
extreme poverty of the client is not a justifiable excuse for the failure of
his counsel to file the motion for reconsideration on time under the
circumstances. Instead, there was gross negligence on the part of Atty.
Montesclaros in the discharge of his duty and this cannot be
countenanced if we are to have an orderly administration of justice. It
has always been the judicial policy and an accepted rule that the client
shall be bound by the acts of his lawyer, and no compelling reason
exists in this case to sanction a deviation therefrom.
REGALA v SANDIGANAYAN G.R. No. 105938
(consolidated with Hayudini v Sandiganbayan G.R.
No. 108113 September 20, 1996)
Petitioners: Teodoro R. Regala, Edgardo J. Angara,
Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan,
Victor P. Lazatin and Eduardo U. Escueta
Respondents: The Honorable Sandiganbayan, First
Division, Republic of the Philippines, acting through the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, and Raul
S. Roco
Date of Promulgation: September 20, 1996
Ponente: Kapunan, J.
FACTS:
The matters raised in the present case are an
offshoot of the institution of the PCGG against
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal
defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the
several corporations in PCGG Case No. 33,
entitled Republic of the Philippines vs Eduardo
Cojuangco, et al. Petitioners in this case are all
partners in ACCRA Regala, Angara, Cruz,
Concepcion, Vinluan, Lazatin, Escueta and
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
Hayudini (hereinafter ACCRA LAWYERS).
Likewise, private respondent ROCO is also a
partner in ACCRA.
ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its
clients, which included, among others, the
organization and acquisition of business
associations and/or organizations, with the
correlative and incidental services where its
members acted as incorporators, or simply, as
stockholders.
The complaint in PCGG Case No. 0033 alleged
that the ACCRA LAWYERS and Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in
setting up through the use of coconut levy funds
the financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the establishment of UCPB,
UNICOM and others and that through insidious
means and machinations, ACCRA, using its
wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA
Investments Corporation, became the holder of
approximately fifteen million shares representing
roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB
as of 31 March 1987.
The PCGG wanted to establish through the
ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client
and it was Cojuangco who furnished all the
monies to the subscription payment; hence,
ACCRA LAWYERS acted as dummies, nominees
and/or agents by allowing themselves, among
others, to be used as instrument in accumulating
ill-gotten wealth through government
concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross
abuse of official position and authority, flagrant
breach of public trust, unjust enrichment,
violation of the Constitution and laws of the
Republic of the Philippines.
On August 20, 1991, PCGG filed a Motion to
Admit Third Amended Complaint which
EXCLUDED private respondent ROCO from the
complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-
defendant, whereas ACCRA LAWYERS still were
included still as defendants.
ACCRA LAWYERS subsequently filed their
Comment/Opposition with Counter-Motion that
respondent PCGG similarly grant the same
treatment to them (exclusion as parties-
defendants) as accorded private respondent
ROCO.
PCGG in its comment agreed to exclude the
ACCRA LAWYERS on the following conditions:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the
lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignments
ACCRA LAWYERS executed in favor of its clients
covering their respective shareholdings.
SANDIGANBAYAN RULING:
DENIED the exclusion of ACCRA LAWYERS in
PCGG Case No. 33 for their refusal to comply
with the conditions required by respondent
PCGG.
ACCRA LAWYERS argue they are prohibited from
revealing the identity of their principal under
their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as
Page 25 of 131
lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality
of information obtained during such lawyer-client
relationship.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyers fiduciary duty may
be asserted in refusing to disclose the identity of clients
(name of ACCRA LAWYERS' clients) under the facts and
circumstances obtaining in the instant case? YES.
HELD/RATIO:
The lawyer-client relationship is more than that
of the principal-agent and lessorlessee. In
modern day perception of the lawyer-client
relationship, an attorney is more than a mere
agent or servant, because he possesses special
powers of trust and confidence reposed on him
by his client. A lawyer is also as independent as
the judge of the court, thus his powers are
entirely different from and superior to those of
an ordinary agent. Moreover, an attorney also
occupies what may be considered as a quasi-
judicial office since he is in fact an officer of the
Court and exercises his judgment in the choice
of courses of action to be taken favorable to his
client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship,
there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that
breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary
duty to his client which is of a very delicate,
exacting and confidential character, requiring a
very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that
is required by reason of necessity and public
interest based on the hypothesis that abstinence
from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an
evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to
his client that distinguishes him from any other
professional in society.
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from
the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the
Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901.
Section 383 of the Code specifically forbids
counsel, without authority of his client to reveal
any communication made by the client to him or
his advice given thereon in the course of
professional employment.
Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of
Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently
worded provides:
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
o Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of
privileged communication.The
following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the
following cases: x x x An attorney
cannot, without the consent of his client,
be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him, or his advice
given thereon in the course of, or with a
view to, professional employment, can
an attorneys secretary, stenographer, or
clerk be examined, without the consent
of the client and his employer,
concerning any fact the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such
capacity.
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
o Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e)
to maintain inviolate the confidence, and
at every peril to himself, to preserve the
secrets of his client, and to accept no
compensation in connection with his
clients business except from him or with
his knowledge and approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that:
o Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.
o Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics also demands a lawyers fidelity to
client: xxx No fear of judicial disfavor or
public popularity should restrain him
from the full discharge of his duty. In the
judicial forum the client is entitled to the
benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of
the land, and he may expect his lawyer
to assert every such remedy or defense.
In the constitutional sphere, the privilege
gives flesh to one of the most sacrosanct
rights available to the accused, the right
to counsel. If a client were made to
choose between legal representation
without effective communication and
disclosure and legal representation with
all his secrets revealed then he might be
compelled, in some instances, to either
opt to stay away from the judicial system
or to lose the right to counsel.
Page 26 of 131
An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely
dependent upon the degree of confidence which
exists between lawyer and client which in turn
requires a situation which encourages a dynamic
and fruitful exchange and flow of information. It
necessarily follows that in order to attain
effective representation, the lawyer must invoke
the privilege not as a matter of option but as a
matter of duty and professional responsibility.
GENERAL RULE: A lawyer may NOT invoke the
privilege and refuse to divulge the name or
identity of his client.
As a matter of public policy, a clients identity
should NOT be shrouded in mystery. Under this
premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction
(as well as in the US) is that a lawyer may
NOT invoke the privilege and refuse to
divulge the name or identity of his client.
Why?
o First, the court has a right to know that
the client whose privileged information is
sought to be protected is flesh and
blood.
o Second, the privilege begins to exist only
after the attorney-client relationship has
been established. The attorney-client
privilege does not attach until there is a
client.
o Third, the privilege generally pertains to
the subject matter of the relationship.
o Finally, due process considerations
require that the opposing party should,
as a general rule, know his adversary. A
party suing or sued is entitled to know
who his opponent is. He cannot be
obliged to grope in the dark against
unknown forces.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong
probability exists that revealing the clients name
would implicate that client in the very activity for
which he sought the lawyers advice.
In Ex-Parte Enzor (US case), the unidentified
client, an election official, informed his attorney
in confidence that he had been offered a bribe to
violate election laws or that he had accepted a
bribe to that end. In her testimony, the attorney
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
revealed that she had advised her client to count
the votes correctly, but averred that she could
not remember whether her client had been, in
fact, bribed. The lawyer was cited for contempt
for her refusal to reveal his clients identity
before a grand jury. Reversing the lower courts
contempt orders, the state supreme court held
that under the circumstances of the case, and
under the exceptions described above, even the
name of the client was privileged.
U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig involved federal grand
jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of
the Sandino Gang, a gang involved in the
illegal importation of drugs in the United States.
In connection with a tax investigation in
November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to
Hodge and Zweig, requiring them to produce
documents and information regarding payment
received by Sandino on behalf of any other
person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to
divulge the names. The Ninth Circuit of the
United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-
disclosure under the facts and circumstances of
the case, held:
o A clients identity and the nature of that
clients fee arrangements may be
privileged where the person invoking the
privilege can show that a strong
probability exists that disclosure of such
information would implicate that client in
the very criminal activity for which legal
advice was sought
Baird v. Koerner. While in Baird Owe enunciated
this rule as a matter of California law, the rule
also reflects federal law. Appellants contend that
the Baird exception applies to this case.
o The Baird exception is entirely consonant
with the principal policy behind the
attorney-client privilege. In order to
promote freedom of consultation of legal
advisors by clients, the apprehension of
compelled disclosure from the legal
advisors must be removed; hence, the
law must prohibit such disclosure except
on the clients consent.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil
liability, his identity is privileged.
Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation, prompted
the NY Supreme Court to allow a lawyers claim
to the effect that he could not reveal the name
of his client because this would expose the latter
to civil litigation. In the said case, Neugass, the
Page 27 of 131
plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she
was riding, owned by respondent corporation,
collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was
unknown. Plaintiff brought action both against
defendant corporation and the owner of the
second cab, identified in the information only as
John Doe. The attorney of defendant
corporation came to know the name of the
owner of the second cab when a man, a client of
the insurance company, prior to the institution of
legal action, came to him and reported that he
was involved in a car accident. It was apparent
under the circumstances that the man was the
owner of the second cab. The state supreme
court held that the reports were clearly made to
the lawyer in his professional capacity. The court
said:
o That his employment came about
through the fact that the insurance
company had hired him to defend its
policyholders seems immaterial. The
attorney in such cases is clearly the
attorney for the policyholder when the
policyholder goes to him to report an
occurrence contemplating that it would
be used in an action or claim against
him.
o All communications made by a client to
his counsel, for the purpose of
professional advice or assistance, are
privileged, whether they relate to a suit
pending or contemplated, or to any other
matter proper for such advice or aid; x x
x And whenever the communication
made, relates to a matter so connected
with the employment as attorney or
counsel as to afford presumption that it
was the ground of the address by the
client, then it is privileged from
disclosure. x x x. It appears . . . that the
name and address of the owner of the
second cab came to the attorney in this
case as a confidential communication.
His client is not seeking to use the
courts, and his address cannot be
disclosed on that theory, nor is the
present action pending against him as
service of the summons on him has not
been effected.
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining
Company, the lawyer involved was required by a
lower court to disclose whether he represented
certain clients in a certain transaction. The
purpose of the courts request was to determine
whether the unnamed persons as interested
parties were connected with the purchase of
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
properties involved in the action. The lawyer
refused and brought the question to the State
Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyers refusal to
divulge the names of his clients the court held:
o We feel sure that under such conditions
no case has ever gone to the length of
compelling an attorney, at the instance
of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only
his retainer, but the nature of the
transactions to which it related, when
such information could be made the
basis of a suit against his client.
3) Where the governments lawyers have no case
against an attorneys client unless, by revealing
the clients name, the said name would furnish
the only link that would form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime, the clients name is privileged.
In Baird vs. Korner, a lawyer was consulted by
the accountants and the lawyer of certain
undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be
taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a
favorable position in case criminal charges were
brought against them by the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service (IRS).
o It appeared that the taxpayers returns
of previous years were probably
incorrect and the taxes understated. The
clients themselves were unsure about
whether or not they violated tax laws
and sought advice from Atty. Baird on
the hypothetical possibility that they
had. No investigation was then being
undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers.
Subsequently, the attorney of the
taxpayers delivered to Baird the sum of
$12,706.85, which had been previously
assessed as the tax due, and another
amount of money representing his fee
for the advice given. Baird then sent a
check for $12,706.85 to the IRS in
Baltimore, Maryland, with a note
explaining the payment, but without
naming his clients.
o The IRS demanded that Baird identify the
lawyers, accountants, and other clients
involved. Baird refused on the ground
that he did not know their names, and
declined to name the attorney and
accountants because this constituted
privileged communication.
Page 28 of 131
o The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that, a lawyer could not be forced to
reveal the names of clients who
employed him to pay sums of money to
the government voluntarily in settlement
of undetermined income taxes, unsued
on, and with no government audit or
investigation into that clients income
tax liability pending. The court
emphasized the exception that a clients
name is privileged when so much has
been revealed concerning the legal
services rendered that the disclosure of
the clients identity exposes him to
possible investigation and sanction by
government agencies. The Court held:
The facts of the instant case
bring it squarely within that
exception to the general rule.
Here money was received by the
government, paid by persons
who thereby admitted they had
not paid a sufficient amount in
income taxes some one or more
years in the past. The names of
the clients are useful to the
government for but one purpose
to ascertain which taxpayers
think they were delinquent, so
that it may check the records for
that one year or several years.
The voluntary nature of the
payment indicates a belief by
the taxpayers that more taxes or
interest or penalties are due
than the sum previously paid, if
any. It indicates a feeling of guilt
for non-payment of taxes,
though whether it is criminal
guilt is undisclosed. But it may
well be the link that could form
the chain of testimony necessary
to convict an individual of a
federal crime. Certainly, the
payment and the feeling of guilt
are the reasons the attorney
here involved was employedto
advise his clients what, under
the circumstances, should be
done.
Other situations which could qualify as exceptions
to the general rule.
Content of any client communication to a
lawyer relevant to the subject matter of the
legal problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
Where the nature of the attorney-client
relationship has been previously disclosed
and it is the identity which is intended to
be confidential, since such revelation would
otherwise result in disclosure of the entire
transaction.
Summarizing these exceptions, information
relating to the identity of a client may fall
within the ambit of the privilege when the
clients name itself has an independent
significance, such that disclosure would
then reveal client confidences.
In the case at bar, the instant case falls
under at least two exceptions to the
general rule. (Exception 1 & 3)
o First, disclosure of the alleged clients
name would lead to establish said
clients connection with the very fact in
issue of the case, which is privileged
information, because the privilege, as
stated earlier, protects the subject
matter or the substance (without which
there would be no attorney-client
relationship).
An important distinction must be made between
o The link between the alleged criminal
offense and the legal advice or legal
service sought was duly established in
the case at bar, by no less than the
PCGG itself. The key lies in the three
specific conditions laid down by the
PCGG which constitutes ACCRA
LAWYERS ticket to non-prosecution
should they accede thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its
clients;
(b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client
relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of
assignment ACCRA LAWYERS executed in
favor of their clients covering their
respective shareholdings.
o From these conditions, particularly the
third, we can readily deduce that the
clients indeed consulted the ACCRA
LAWYERS, in their capacity as lawyers,
regarding the financial and corporate
structure, framework and set-up of the
corporations in question. In turn, ACCRA
LAWYERS gave their professional advice
Page 29 of 131
in the form of, among others, the
aforementioned deeds of assignment
covering their clients shareholdings.
o There is no question that the preparation
of the aforestated documents was part
and parcel of ACCRA LAWYERS legal
service to their clients. More important,
it constituted an integral part of their
duties as lawyers. ACCRA LAWYERS,
therefore, have a legitimate fear that
identifying their clients would implicate
them in the very activity for which legal
advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the
aforementioned corporations.
o Furthermore, under the third main
exception, revelation of the clients
name would obviously provide the
necessary link for the prosecution to
build its case, where none otherwise
exists. It is the link, in the words of Baird,
that would inevitably form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict the
(client) of a . . . crime.
(1) a case where a client takes on the
services of an attorney for illicit purposes,
seeking advice about how to go around the
law for the purpose of committing illegal
activities and (2) a case where a client
thinks he might have previously committed
something illegal and consults his attorney
about it.
o The first case clearly does not fall within
the privilege because the same cannot
be invoked for purposes illegal.
The privilege cannot be invoked
or used as a shield for an illegal
act
Reason: It is not within the
professional character of a
lawyer to give advice on the
commission of a crime.
o The second case falls within the
exception because whether or not
the act for which the client sought
advice turns out to be illegal, his
name cannot be used or disclosed if
the disclosure leads to evidence,
not yet in the hands of the
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
prosecution, which might lead to
possible action against him.
The prosecution may not have a
case against the client in the
second example and cannot use
the attorney client relationship to
build up a case against the latter
Reason: founded on the same
policy grounds for which the
attorney-client privilege, in
general, exists.
There are, after all, alternative sources of
information available to the prosecutor which do
not depend on utilizing a defendants counsel as
a convenient and readily available source of
information in the building of a case against the
latter.
o Compelling disclosure of the clients
name in circumstances such as the
one which exists in the case at
bench amounts to sanctioning
fishing expeditions by lazy
prosecutors and litigants which we
cannot and will not countenance.
In fine, the crux of ACCRA LAWYERS objections
ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the
prosecution has a case against their clients, the
latters case should be built upon evidence
painstakingly gathered by them from their own
sources and not from compelled testimony
requiring them to reveal the name of their
clients, information which unavoidably reveals
much about the nature of the transaction which
may or may not be illegal.
The fiduciary relationship between a lawyer and
his client therefore imposes a strict liability for
negligence on the former. The ethical duties
owing to the client, including confidentiality,
loyalty, competence, diligence as well as the
responsibility to keep clients informed and
protect their rights to make decisions have been
zealously sustained.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the
protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege and lawyers loyalty to his client is
evident in the duration of the protection, which
exists not only during the relationship, but
extends even after the termination of the
relationship.
Conclusion
Page 30 of 131
We have no choice but to uphold ACCRA
LAWYERS right not to reveal the identity of their
clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty
owing to their clients, because the facts of the
instant case clearly fall within recognized
exceptions to the rule that the clients name is
not privileged information.
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the
lawyer-client confidential privilege under the
circumstances obtaining here does not cover the
identity of the client, then it would expose the
lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their
clients in view of the strict fiduciary
responsibility imposed on them in the exercise of
their duties.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan
(First Division) are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is
further ordered to exclude petitioners Teodoro D.
Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose
C. Concepcion, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U.
Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini as
partiesdefendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033
entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr., et al.
Cases on the lawyers fiduciary
relationship with his/her client
Commingling of funds; delivery of funds;
borrowing or lending
Aro vs. Naawa 27 SCRA 1090
A Lawyers zeal, competence, and
diligence
Javellana vs. Lutero 20 SCRA 717
Adarne vs. Aldaba 83 SCRA 735
In Re: Filart 40 Phil. 205 no digest
Villafuerte vs. Cortez, A.C. No. 3455 14
April 1998
Alcala vs. De Vera 56 SCRA 30
Bernardo vs. CA 275 SCRA 413
Attorneys Fees
Reparations Commission vs. Visayan
Packing 193 SCRA 540 for digest pa
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
Agustin vs. CA 186 SCRA 375
Perez vs. Scottish Union 76 Phil. 320
REGINO B. ARO, petitioner, vs.
THE HON. ARSENIO NAAWA,
Presiding Judge ofBranch IV, Court of
First Instance of Laguna, LUIS
MAGTIBAY, PABLO MAGTIBAY,AURELIA
MARTINEZ, GREGORIO LONTOK,
MARIA MENDOZA, MAXIMOPORTO and
ROSARIO ANDAYA, respondents
Cases on the lawyers fiduciary
relationship with his/her client
Commingling of funds; delivery of funds;
borrowing or lending
FACTS: That the services of herein
petitioner, as practicing attorney, was
engaged by respondents LuisMagtibay and
Pablo Magtibay for the prosecution of their
claim, as heirs, in the estate of
theirdeceased uncle Lucio Magtibay. Luis
Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay agreed with
herein petitioner to avail of his services
and entrust the prosecution of their claim
on a contingent basis.The petitioner took
the necessary steps to gather the needed
papers and documents for the filingof a
petition to litigate as pauper and a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, inwhich respondents Luis
Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay were the
plaintiffs and the otherrespondents,
excepting the respondent Judge, were the
defendants.on October 24, 1964, there
was a conversation which took place
between herein petitioner andthe attorney
of the defendants, Atty. Rustico de los
Reyes, Jr., in the civil case and one who
wasthen acting as a sort of spokesman for
the defendants (Ex-mayor Cordova of Sta.
Maria, Laguna)for the amicable settlement
of the case between the plaintiffs and the
defendants to the effect thata certain
property of the spouses Lucio Magtibay
(deceased) and respondent Aurelia
Martinez,worth P3,000.00, would be given
Page 31 of 131
to the plaintiffs in full settlement of their
claim, as share in
the properties left by their deceased uncle
Lucio Magtibay, if having been agreed by
herein petitioner and Atty. de los Reyes an
d the spokesman of the defendants that fo
r the purpose ofsaid amicable settlement,
the plaintiffs or one of them and herein
petitioner would go to Sta.Maria, Laguna,
on October 23, 1964.
On October 28, 1964, petitioner
received on the said day a second motion
to dismiss datedOctober 26, 1964,
together with Annex 'A' of said motion,
which is entitled KASULATAN
NGPAGHAHATIAN NA LABAS SA HUKUMAN
AT PAGPAPALABI, dated October 23,
1964at Sta. Cruz, Laguna and signed by
the plaintiffs and defendant Aurelia
Martinez (the three beingnow respondents
in this case), it having been made to
appear that the plaintiffs and
defendantAurelia Martinez had made an
extrajudicial partition of the properties of
the deceased LucioMagtibay and the said
Aurelia Martinez adjudicating to the
plaintiffs one-fourth (1/4) share inthe
properties of the spouses and three-fourth
(3/4) share of the defendant Aurelia
Martinez, butmaking it appear also that
said plaintiffs waived their share in favor
of Aurelia Martinez, . . .,thru which
fraudulent waiver, herein petitioner was
deprived of his contingent fees, agreed
upon.Petitioner filed his opposition to the
second motion to dismiss and prayed,
among others,invoking the provisions of
Section 5(d) and Section 6, Rule 135 of the
Revised Rules of Court,for the protection
of the rights of herein petitioner as an
officer of the Court. The respondentJudge,
instead of denying the second motion to
dismiss and fixing his attorney's fees in
the saidcase and recording the same as
lien, .. dismissed the case and refused to
give herein petitionerany kind of
immediate protection to safeguard his
rights.Upon these facts, petitioner tries to
make out before this Court a case of
certiorari for graveabuse of discretion on
the part of respondent Judge in dismissing
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
the case on the basis of thecompromise
agreement of the parties, entered into at
the back of petitioner, notwithstanding
thereservation made in his favor to file an
action against both parties "with respect
to his allegedattorney's fees," as well as a
case of mandamus "to order and
command the said respondent judge"
to take cognizance of and resolve
his opposition and counter- motion for
the court to fixthe compensation he
should be paid.
RULING: While We here reaffirm the rule
that "the client has an undoubted right to
compromise a suitwithout the intervention
of his lawyer," We hold that when such
compromise is entered into infraud of the
lawyer, with intent to deprive him of the
fees justly due him, the compromise
must be subject to the said fees, and that
when it is evident that the said fraud is co
mmitted inconfabulation with the adverse
party who had knowledge of the lawyer's
contingent interest orsuch interest
appears of record and who would benefit
under such compromise, the
better practice is to settle the matter of
the attorney's fees in the
same proceeding, after hearing all
theaffected parties and without prejudice
to the finality of the compromise in so far
as it does notadversely affect the rights of
the lawyer. Under Canon 12 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics,"in fixing fees, it
should not be forgotten that the profession
is a branch of the administration of justice
and not a mere money-getting trade."In
the case at bar, by entering into the
compromise agreement in question and
even insertingtherein a prayer to the court
to dismiss their case filed by petitioner,
petitioner's clients impliedly dismissed
him. In other words, through the services
of petitioner, his clients secured, in effect,
arecognition, which had been previously
denied by their aunt-in-law, that they were
entitled to a1/4 share in the estate left by
their uncle. We hold that under these
circumstances, and since itappears that
said clients have no other means to pay
Page 32 of 131
petitioner, since they instituted their case
as paupers, and that their aunt-in-law was
aware of the terms of their contract of prof
essionalservices with petitioner, said
clients had no right to waive the portion of
their such acknowledgedrights in favor of
their opponent to the extent that such
waiver would prejudice the
stipulatedcontingent interest of their
lawyer and their aunt-in- law had no right
to accept such waiverunqualifiedly.Under
the circumstance extant in the record, it is
clear that the compromise agreement
inquestion falls short of the moral
requirements of this quoted article of the
Civil Code. If for thisreason alone, it should
not be allowed to prejudice the rights of
petitioner. Accordingly, as all ofthese
circumstances were presented to
respondent judge before he issued the
challenged order ofdismissal and all the
parties were heard thereon, it was
incumbent upon His Honor, in equity
andto avoid multiplicity of suits,
particularly, because the amount claimed
by petitioner is onlyP1,000.00, to have
directly passed upon petitioner's claim,
and not having done so, it would appear
that the court a quo abused its discretion
gravely enough to warrant the writ of
certiorari herein prayed for in so far as the
questioned orders prejudiced petitioner's
right to the fees for the professional
services which appear to have
been creditably rendered by
him. Respondents allege that the
judgment of dismissal in question is
already final because no appeal was taken
therefrom, but since We hold that the
same was rendered with enough grave
abuse of discretion to warrant the
certiorari prayed for, such alleged finality
could not have materialized;
obviously, petitioner could not have
appealed, not being a party in the case.
The orders of the respondent court dated
November 21, 1964 and January 9, 1965
in Civil Case No. SC-525 are hereby
set aside in so far as
they prejudice the payment of petitioner's
claim of attorney's fees in the form of
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
either one-third of the 1/4 share
acknowledged as his clients in the
compromise in question or P1,000.00,
which should constitute as a lien on the
said share, in spite of the waiver thereof in
favor of respondent Aurelia Martinez. It is
unnecessary to consider the petition for
mandamus.
JAVELLANA vs LUTERIO
A Lawyers zeal, competence, and
diligence
FACTS: On March 1, 1963, the Roman
Archbishop in Jaro Iloilo filed a detainer
complaint against Elpidio Javellana in the
municipal court which was presided by
Judge Nicolas Luterio. The hearing was
rest four times, all at the benfit of Elpidio
Javellanas lawyer who gave reasons as
flimsy as a painful toe, or an unfinished
business transactions in Manila. This last
postponement was granted by the
municipal court, with a warning that no
further postponements shall be allowed.
When the case was called for trial on
August 27, 1963,neither the defendant nor
his counsel Atty. Hautea appeared
although on eAtty. Romy Pea who was
present in court verbally moved for the
postponement of the trial on the ground
that Atty. Hautea was in Manila attending
to a business transaction. The plaintiffs
counsel objected to the motion on the
ground that the defendant and his counsel
were well aware of the courts previous
admonition that no further postponement
of the case would be granted, and then
manifested that the witnesses and the
evidence for the plaintiff were ready for
presentation on that date.
The verbal motion was denied, and
plaintiff was directed to adduce his
evidence. During the hearing, a telegram
arrived from Atty. Hautea asking for a
Page 33 of 131
postponement of the hearing. However,
the hearing still continued. The court on
the same date rendered judgement for the
plaintiff and against the defendant.
About 50 days later, the defendant
thru his same counsel filed a petition for
relief (from the judgement of the
municipal court) with the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, praying that the decision
in question be set aside, that the detainer
case be set for trial on the merits, and
pending determination of the petition, that
an injunction issue restraining the
enforcement of the decision. Counsel for
the petitioner averred that his absence on
the date of the trial was excusable as he
attended to very urgent business
transaction in Manila; that before his
departure for the latter city, he verbally
informed the respondent judge that his
return to Iloilo might be delayed and that
he might not arrive on time for the trial of
the case as set; that he called at both the
law office and the residence of the counsel
for the private respondent to inform him of
the desired postponement and the reason
therefor, but the latter was in Bacolod at
that time; that he exercised utm,ost
diligence and precaution in th essence
that while in Manila he sent a telegram to
the respondent judge, asking for
postponement; and that notwithstanding
all the foregoing, themunicpal court
nevertheless proceeded with the trial in
his absence and that of his client, allowed
the private respondent to present his
evidenceex parte, and rendered a decision
against the petitioner, thus depriving the
latter of his day in court. Counsel for the
petitioner further asserted that his client
has a good and substantial defense, which
is, that the complainant had given his
client an option to buy the premises
subject-matter of the complaint below,
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
and that a reopening of the case would
cause the private respondent no real
injury.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Hautea was
negligent in his duties as a lawyer.
HELD: A counsel for any in a judicial
controversy, by mandate of the canons of
legal ethics, and with due regard for the
elementary standards of fair play, is duty
bound to prepare for trial with diligence
and deliberate speed. This norm of
conduct is no less applicable in a detainer
case, such as the one at bar, even if the
issues are essentially simple and
uncomplicated. It is obvious that the
counsel for the petitioner-appellant has
been in this respect.
The case was set for trial six times.
This it was postponed at the behest of the
said counsel. The last postponement was
granted on July 24, 1963 with the
unequivocal admonition by the judgment
that no further postponement would be
countenanced. The case was reset for
hearing on August 27, 1963, which means
that the appellants counsel had more
than a months time to so adjust his
schedule of activities as to obviate a
conflict between his business transactions
and his calendar of hearings. Came
August 27, and neither he nor the
appellant appeared at the trial. His
absence on the latter date was not
occasioned by illness or some other
supervening occurrence which
unavoidably and justifiably prevented him
from appearing in court.
It was bounden duty of the said
counsel, under the circumstances, to give
preferential attention to the case. As
things, he regarded the municipal court as
a mere marionette that must ever await
Page 34 of 131
his pleasure. This attitude on his part is
censurable as it reveals more than just a
modicum of disrespect for the judiciary
and the established machinery of justice.
ADARNE vs ALDBABA
A Lawyers zeal, competence, and
diligence
FACTS:
Spouses Cumpio filed an action
for forcible entry against herein complaint
Cesario Adarne, Aning Arante, and Miguel
Inokando with the justice of the peace
of Alang-alang Leyte.
Attys Isauro Marmita represented the
defendants who raised the issue of
ownership of theland in questions
Justice of the peace dismissed
the complaint for lack of jurisdictions
plaintiffs again appealed to the Court
of First Instance of Leyte
Attys. Arturo Mirales and Generoso
Casimpan filed the answer for the
defendants.
At the hearing of the case on August 7,
1961, Cesario Adarne, noting that his
attorneys had not yet arrived, prevailed
upon the respondent Atty. Damian
Aldaba, who was present in court to
attend the trial of an electoral case, to
appear as counsel for them
The respondent, who is a third degree
cousin of the complainant, agreed, and
entered aspecial appearances. Upon
noticing that the plaintiffs and their
counsel were not also present in court, the
respondent, instead of asking for a
postponement, moved for the dismissal of
the case. This motion was granted and the
case was again dismissed. Thereafter, the
plaintiff filed a motion for
the reconsideration of the order, to which
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
the respondent filed an opposition in
behalf of the defendants, and the motion
was denied. CA remanded the case to
the lower court for further proceedings.
on October 23, 1964, the respondent was
again prevailed upon by the
complainant to appear in his behalf.
The respondent entered a "special
appearance" for the complainant
and argued that the interest of justice
would best be served of the defendants
were allowed to file an action for quieting
of title and the case heard jointly with the
pending action for forcible entry. Finding
merit in the argument, the court ordered
the defendant Cesario Adarne to file an
action for quieting of title within one week
and the plaintiffs to answer the same
within the reglementary period, after
which both cases would be
tried jointly. The hearing was deferred
until after the filing of the action for
quieting of title.
In June 17, 1965, the court declared
the defendants in default for their
failure to appeal at the hearing set
for that day. Because of
this, Adarne against the respondent Atty.
Damian Aldaba an Administrative action
against the respondent attorney for
gross negligence and misconduct, for
failure to give his entire devotion to
the interest of his client, warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his
rights, and exertion of his utmost
learning and ability in the
prosecution and defense of his client,
and for not taking steps to protect
the interests of his client in the face
of an adverse decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent
atty. ALDABA is gulity for such misconduct.
Page 35 of 131
HELD: The judgment by default rendered
against the complainant cannot be
attributed to the respondent attorney.
The blame lies with the complainant
for having engaged the services of
several lawyers to handle his case
without formally withdrawing the
authority he had given to them to
appear in his behalf as to place the
responsibility upon the respondent.
The rule followed on matters of
substitution of attorneys as laid down by
this Court is that no substitution of
attorneys will be allowed unless there
be filed: (1) a written application for such
substitution, (2) the written consent of
the client; (3) the written consent of the
attorney substituted; and (4) in case such
written consent cannot be secured, there
must be filed with the application proof of
service of notice of such motion upon the
attorney to be substituted, in the manner
prescribed by the rules.
It was neither gross negligence
nor omission to have entertained
such belief. An attorney is not bound
to exercise extraordinary diligence,
but only a reasonable degree of care
and skill. CASE DISMISSED.
In re the complaint against Attorney
ANACLETO FILART.
September 27, 1919
A Lawyers zeal, competence, and diligence
FACTS: These proceedings were
instituted at the instance of thirty-seven
residents of Asingan, Pangasinan, who
filed a complaint against attorney
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
Anacleto Filart for malpractice, alleging
in substance:
1. That while Filart was deputy fiscal of
Pangasinan he received of them the sum
of P111 as fees for drafting a
memorandum in connection with
Registration Case No. 3, Record No. 8540;
2. That Filart was guilty of fraud and
negligence in prosecuting the appeal to
the Supreme Court, he having practically
abandoned the case.
In connection with point No. 1, even
admitting that Filart while deputy fiscal
received such a sum of complainants,
which respondent denies, Filart seems to
have had a legal right to receive
compensation as an attorney, the office of
deputy provincial fiscal not being
specifically included in section 36 of the
Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act
No. 1702, as an official who shall not
engage in private practice. It is also to be
noted that Filart did not take up the case
of his own volition but was ordered by the
court to defend the rights of petitioners
because the attorney they formerly
retained was almost always in a state of
intoxication.
In connection with point No. 2, the
following facts are important:
1. That having resigned as deputy fiscal,
and having engaged in the practice of law,
complainants asked Filart to prosecute the
appeal of their case;
2. That Filart received from complainants
sums of money, P780 according to
complainants, and P160 according to
respondent;
Page 36 of 131
3. That the complainants were driven from
their lands, and their houses were
destroyed, by order of the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the facts are
sufficient to support the complaint, and
recommends dismissal of the case.
HELD: We agree to the extent that
such gross misconduct or negligence
has not been shown as warrants
disbarment or suspension pursuant
to sections 21 and 22 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. "That part of the
profession," said Lord Mansfield in Pitt vs.
Yalden, ([1767], 4 Burr., 2060), "which is
carried on by attorneys is liberal and
reputable, as well as useful to the public,
when they conduct themselves with honor
and integrity; and they ought to be
protected when they act to the best of
their skill and knowledge. But every man
is liable to error; and I should be very sorry
that it should be taken for granted that an
attorney is answerable for every error or
mistake. . . . A counsel may mistake as
well as an attorney. . . . Yet no one will
say that a counsel who has been mistaken
shall be charged. . . . Not only counsel but
judges may differ, or doubt, or take time
to consider. Therefore, an attorney ought
not to be liable in case of reasonable
doubt." "No attorney," said Chief Justice
Abbott, "is bound to know all the law;
God forbid that it should be imagined that
an attorney or a counsel, or even a judge,
is bound to know all the law."
(Montorious vs. Jeffreys, 2 Car. & P., 113.)
The court, having in mind the many
appeals which have been dismissed
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17

because of the lack of diligence of

counsel, cannot let the occurrence pass
without expressing a strong disapproval of
such criminal carelessness. While we
Villafuerte v Cortez
would not wish to assume a harsh and A Lawyers zeal, competence, and
uncompromising attitude towards diligence
attorneys-at-law, we would wish for them
to know that by indulging in such Facts:
unprofessional tactics they become Complainant Arsenio Villafuerte seeks
for the disbarment of Atty. Dante H. Cortez
unworthy of the trust which the law
because he perceived that the
reposes in them. The lack of due care is a respondent, Atty.
breach of the attorney's undertaking with Dante H. Cortez neglected
his client, and is indicative of a disregard the handling of his cases despite
of the attorney's duties to the court. We receiving P1,750.00 acceptance and
bring to the notice of clients whose rights retainers fee.
have been prejudiced by the failure or by Complainant went to the office of
respondent lawyer to discuss his case for
the delay of an attorney in preparing or
'reconveyance'.
filing pleadings necessary in the proper During their initial meeting, complainant
conduct of a cause, and in taking such reconstructed the incidents of the case
steps as may be required in the progress merely from memory so the respondent
of the case, that the client who has lawyer asked him to return another
suffered damages as the result of his day with the records.
attorney's negligence or misconduct may Complainant again saw respondent but
still sans the records.
recover therefor. In Drais vs.
Complainant requested respondent
Hoggan ([1875], 50 Cal., 121), although to accept the case, paying the
many other cases might be cited, it was sum of P1,750.00 representing the
held that "if a judgment is obtained acceptance fee of P1,500.00 and P250.00
against a party upon a complaint which is retainer fee.
radically defective, and he desires to Respondent averred that he
accepted the money reluctance and
appeal, and procures bondsmen, but his
only upon the condition that
attorney neglects to do so until the time complainant would get the records of
for appeal expires, the attorney is guilty of the case as well as secure the
gross negligence, and is liable for the loss withdrawal of appearance of Atty. Jose
sustained by the client." Dizon, the former counsel of
complainant.
Without, therefore, desiring Allegedly, Complainant never showed up
especially to overemphasize the thereafter until he went to the office of
respondent but only to leave acopy of a
dereliction of Attorney Anacleto Filart for,
writ of execution in the civil case, a case
sad to relate, he is only one of a class, it for e-ectment, which, according to
does become our solemn duty to respondent, & as never priorly mentioned
reprimand him for carelessness and to him by complainant. Respondent said
misconduct in attending to the cause he had never entered his appearance
of poor clients. in the case.
IBP-CBD concluded that the facts
established would just the same indicate

Page 37 of 131
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17

sufficiently a case of neglect of dutyon the listening to his own counsel

part of respondent. The CBD rejected the and extending full cooperation to him.
excuse by respondent that the non-receipt It is not right for complainant to wait for
of the records of thecase -ustified his almost two years and to deal ith his lawyer
failure to represent complainant. only after receivin an adverse decision. All
The IBP-CBD recommended to the IBP considered, the Court deems it proper to
Board of Governors the suspension of reduce the recommended period of
respondent from the practice of law for suspension of the IBP from three months
three months with a warning. to one month.
IBP Board of Governors approved the
decision of the IBP CBD.
Bo t h re s p o n d e n t l a w y e r a n d c o m p ALCALA vs. DE VERA
l a i n a n t fi l e d w i t h t h e I B P C B D t h e i r
re s p e c t i v e m o t i o n s f o r t h e reconside
A Lawyers zeal, competence, and
ration.
diligence
Issue: Whether or not respondent lawyer
should be suspended from the practice of
FACTS: Jose Alcala engaged the services
law.
of Atty. Honesto De Vera to defend him in
a civil case. On April 17, 1963, the court
Held: The Court is convinced that a
rendered a decision against Alcala. On
lawyer-client relationship has already
April 19, 1963, Atty. De Vera received a
arisen between respondent and
copy of the adverse decision. Atty. De Vera
complainant. His acceptance of the
failed to inform Alcala about the adverse
payment eff ectively bars him
decision. On July 17, 1963, the court
from altogether disclaiming
sheriff went to Alcala to serve a writ of
the existence of an attorney-
execution. That was the only time when
clientrelationship between them. It would
Alcala learned that he lost. And because of
not matter really whether the money has
Atty. De Veras failure to inform him of the
been intended to pertain only to Civil
adverse decision, the period within which
CaseNo. 8318877 or to include Civil Case
Alcala can appeal his case had already
No. 062160-CV, there being no showing, in
lapsed.
any event, that respondent lawyer has
attended to either of said cases. It would
As a result, in September 1963,
seem that he hardly has exerted any effort
Alcala filed a civil case against Atty. De
to find out what might have happened to
Vera in order to collect damages as he
his clients cases. A lawyers fidelity to the
averred that he sustained damages due to
cause of his client requires him to be ever
Atty. De Veras negligence. The court
mindful of the responsibilities that should
however ruled that Alcala is not entitled to
be expected of him. He is mandated to
damages. Unfettered, Alcala filed a
exert his best efforts to protect, within the
disbarment case against Atty. De Vera.
bounds of the law, the interests of his
client. The Code of professional
responsibility has stated that a 'lawyer
shall serve his client with competence and ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. De Vera
diligence decreeing further that he 'shall should be disbarred because of his failure
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to to update his client of the status of the
him.' Complainant, nevertheless, is not case.
entirely without fault himself. He cannot
expect his case to be properly and
intelligently handled without

Page 38 of 131
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
HELD: No. Disbarment is not warranted in
this case. It is true that Atty. De Vera had
been remiss in his duties as counsel for
Alcala because he failed to update him of
the status of the case, however, it appears
that Alcala did not sustain any damage by
reason of such negligence. But this is not
to say that Atty. De Vera can go scot-free.
The lack of damage to Alcala will only
serve as a mitigating circumstance. The
Supreme Court found Atty. De Vera guilty
of simple negligence and he was severely
censured for his negligence. Atty. De
Veras failure to notify his clients of the
decision in question manifests a lack of
total dedication or devotion to the
clients interest expected of Atty. De
Vera under the lawyers oath.
In this case, it can also be gleaned that
not all negligence by counsel entitles the
client to collect damages from the
negligent lawyer.
ARMANDO BERNARDO V. COURT
OF APPEALS/ CSC / LBP
A Lawyers zeal, competence, and
diligence
FACTSl: Armando Bernardo entered the
government service as Claims Adjuster of
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and
became the Head of the Loans and
Discount Divisions. He also maintained a
Savings Account with the LBP. He
deposited P500,000 in his own account
and photocopied the page reflecting this
in his passbook and on the same day
withdrew the same. He then executed, as
Treasurer-in-Trust of Markay Trading and
Manpower Services (MTMSI) a treasurers
certificate certifying that 25% of the
authorized capital stock has been
subscribed and 25% of the subscription,
which was P500,000 had been paid and
received y him. He also executed a letter-
authority to the SEC authorizing their
Page 39 of 131
office to examine and verify the deposit in
the LBP in his name as Treasurer-in-Trust
for MTMSI. The Articles of Incorporation of
MTMSI was signed by Bernardo and he
became one of its incorporators and was
elected as member in the Board of
Directorsand as Treasurer. He never
opened an account with the LBP for the
corporation though he was elected
Treasurer and in the meantime he was
promoted Assistant Branch Manager of
LBP. Because of this, LBP filed a formal
charge against Bernardo for gross neglect,
grave misconduct, and serious violation of
the CSC rules namely engaging in a
private business without the permission
and authority required by the CS rules and
regulations.
After the formal investigation, the
hearing officer issued a resolution finding
Bernardo guilty and be meted out with the
penalty of forced resignation. The LBP
approved the recommendation which was
affirmed by the Merit Systems Protection
Board (MPSB). The CSC likewise affirmed
the penalty but based its findings on a
different ground, that he made use of his
being an employee of LBP to do an
irregular act of depositing and
withdrawing the paid up capital without
the resolution of the Board of Directors of
the Company. Bernardo filed an MR
alleging that the acts used as basis for
finding his guilt was not raised in the
formal charge thus violating his right to
due process and that his acts were not
violative of the CSC rules and regulations.
The CA dismissed the petition for lack
of merit thus the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether Bernardo violated the
CSC rules and regulations.
HELD: YES. The evidence on record
shows that not only was he an
incorporator, he was also a member of
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
the Board of Directors and was the
treasurer of MTMSI. He and his wife even
signed vouchers of the corporation. Before
he can do this, he must first secure a
permit from a competent authority of the
LBP but failed to do so. However, the SC
found that the CSC erred in finding him
guilty of grounds not alleged in the formal
charges thus violating his right to
be informedof the charges against him.
But it did not err in finding him guilty of
grave misconduct. The constitution
enunciates the policy of promoting a high
standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service and
these are not mere rhetorical words but
must be taken as working standards and
attainable goals that should be matched
with actual deeds.
REPARATION COMMISSION vs.
VISAYAN PACKING CORPORATION
Attorneys Fees
Written contract of Attorneys fees is the
law between the lawyer and the client.
Held: Anent the contention of FICI that
the trial court erred in ordering Vispac to
pay to FICI attorneys fees equivalent to
only 10% of the amount due despite the
fact that VIspac bound itself to pay FICI
attorneys fees equivalent to 20% of the
total amount due but in no case less than
P200,000 as per their Indemnity
Agreement, it has been held that a
stipulation regarding the payment of
attorneys fees is neither illegal nor
immoral and is enforceable as the law
between the parties, as long as such
stipulation does not contravene law, good
morals, good customs, public order or
public policy.
Page 40 of 131
AGUSTIN V CA
G.R. No. 162571 | June 15, 2005 | J. Corona
Attorneys Fees
Facts: Respondents Fe Angela and her
son Martin Prollamante sued Martins
alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel
Agustin, for support and support pendente
lite before the Quezon City RTC.
In their complaint, respondents
alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which
they entered into an intimate relationship.
Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her
34th birthday but despite Arnels
insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give
birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin.
The babys birth certificate was
purportedly signed by Arnel as the father.
Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and
hospital expenses but later refused Fes
repeated requests for Martins support
despite his adequate financial capacity
and even suggested to have the child
committed for adoption. Arnel also denied
having fathered the child.
On January 2001, while Fe was carrying
five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills
Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel
sped off in his van, with the open car door
hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported
to the police. Several months later, Fe was
diagnosed with leukemia and has, since
then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe
and Martin then sued Arnel for support.
Fe and Martin moved for the
issuance of an order directing all the
parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by
invoking his constitutional right against
self-incrimination and moving to dismiss
the complaint for lack of cause of action.
The trial court denied the MTD and
ordered the parties to submit themselves
to DNA paternity testing at the expense of
the applicants. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court, thus this petition.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
Issue:
1 W/N the respondent court erred in
denying the petitioners MTD
2 W/N the court erred in directing parties
to subject to DNA paternity testing and
was a form of unreasonable search
Held:
1. No. The trial court properly denied the
petitioners motion to dismiss because the
private respondents complaint on its face
showed that they had a cause of action
against the petitioner. The elements of a
cause of action are: (1) the plaintiffs
primary right and the defendants
corresponding primary duty, and (2) the
delict or wrongful act or omission of the
defendant, by which the primary right and
duty have been violated. The cause of
action is determined not by the prayer of
the complaint but by the facts alleged.
2. No. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme
Court struck down the proposed national
computerized identification system
embodied in Administrative Order No. 308,
we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore
that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The
right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance
public service and the common good...
Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards that
enhance public service and the common
good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the
areas of legality of searches and
seizures, and the infringement of privacy
of communication where the constitutional
right to privacy has been critically at
issue. Petitioners case involves neither
and, as already stated, his argument that
his right against self-incrimination is in
jeopardy holds no water.
PEREZ v. SCOTTISH UNION (and National
Insurance Co.)
Page 41 of 131
Attorneys Fees
FACTS: Petitioner was seeking the
payment of attorneys fees in the criminal
case of arson and other cases against
defendant, who had in a written contract,
agreed to pay the same out of the
proceeds of a fire insurance policy issued
by defendant insurance company.
Defendant Mitre acknowledged the
professional services rendered by Perez
but alleged that the agreement as to
payment of attorneys fees out of the
insurance proceeds was only a simulation
to bar other claims against the said policy.
The CFI of Albay rendered a judgment in
favour Perez, from which Mitre now
appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not a written contract
for services shall be controlling.
HELD: Yes. Exhibit D should be given its
full force and effect. A written contract
for services shall control the amount to be
paid thereof unless found by the court to
be unconscionable or unreasonable. (Rule
of Court 127, section 22.) The arson case
required several days of trial. The gravity
of the situation confronted by the
appellant after the rendition of the
judgement of the court of first instance is
shown by the fact that he was sentenced
to undergo imprisonment for the period of
from ten to twelve years and to pay an
indemnity of P101,115. That the plaintiff
had handled appellants defense with
competence and success cannot be
gainsaid, it being enough to state that the
appellant was acquitted in the Court of
Appeals before which the plaintiff orally
argued, in addition to a 78-page brief
which had filed therein. We are thus not
prepared to rule that the amount of
P6,000 is excessive or unjust, especially
because said fee is in a sense contingent
upon the acquittal of the appellant, since
no insurance money (P6,000 of which was
ceded to the plaintiff under Exhibit D) was
of course forthcoming if the fire which
destroyed the insured property could be
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17

proven to have resulted from incendiarism MAGTIBAY, PABLO MAGTIBAY,

for which the appellant was criminally AURELLO MARTINEZ, GREGORIO
liable. LONTOK, MARIA MENDOZA, MAXIMO
PORTO and ROSARlO
ANDAYA, respondents.

Regino B. Aro in his own behalf as

petitioner.
Enrique C. Villanueva for respondents.

BARREDO, J.:

Original petition: (1) for certiorari to annul

the order of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, dated November 21, 1964,
dismissing its Civil Case No. SC-525
"without prejudice to the right of Atty.
Regino B. Aro (petitioner herein) to file a
separate action against both the plaintiffs
and defendants (private respondents
herein) with respect to his alleged
attorney's fees", as well as its order dated
January 9, 1965, denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration thereof for lack
of merit and (2) for mandamus to compel
respondent Judge to take cognizance of
petitioner's opposition and countermotion
or petition dated November 3, 1964 and to
resolve the same on the merits.

There appears to be no dispute as to the

following facts alleged in the petition:

2. That the services of herein

petitioner, as practising attorney,
was engaged by respondents Luis
Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay for the
prosecution of their claim, as heirs,
in the estate of their deceased uncle
Lucio Magtibay, consisting of
properties which were in the
possession of the respondents
Aurelia Martinez,1spouses Gregorio
Lontok and Maria Mendoza and
spouses Maximo Porto and Rosario
G.R. No. L-24163 April 28, Andaya.
1969
REGINO B. ARO, petitioner, vs. 3. That being without means to
THE HON. ARSENIO NAAWA, prosecute their claim against the
Presiding Judge of Branch IV, Court of persons concerned, respondents
First Instance of Laguna, LUIS Luis Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay

Page 42 of 131
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
agreed with herein petitioner to
avail of his services and entrust the
prosecution of their claim on a
contingent basis as shown in the
agreement, copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex 'A' and is made
an integral part hereof.2
4. That by virtue of said agreement,
herein petitioner took the necessary
steps to gather the needed papers
and documents for the filing of a
petition to litigate as pauper and a
complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, in which
respondents Luis Magtibay and
Pablo Magtibay were the plaintiffs
and the other respondents,
excepting the respondent Judge,
were the defendants, ....
5. That said petition to litigate as
pauper filed by herein petitioner for
respondents Luis Magtibay and
Pablo Magtibay was granted by the
respondent Judge as per the order
dated September 10, 1964, .....
6. That to plaintiffs' complaint in
Civil Case No. SC-525, the
defendants in said case interposed a
motion to dismiss dated September
29, 1964....3
7. That to the said motion to dismiss
herein petitioner, as attorney for the
plaintiffs (now respondents Luis
Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay) filed
an opposition dated October 5,
1964.....4
8. That after the hearing of the
motion to dismiss filed by the
defendants and the opposition
thereto by the plaintiffs, which
finally took place on October 24,
1964, the respondent Judge issued
its resolution or order dated October
24, 1964, denying the motion to
dismiss, ....5
Page 43 of 131
9. That on the very day of and after
the hearing of the motion to dismiss,
or on October 24, 1964, before
receipt of a copy of the said order
(Annex 'G'), there was a
conversation which took place
between herein petitioner and the
attorney of the defendants, Atty.
Rustico de los Reyes, Jr., in the civil
case and one who was then acting
as a sort of spokesman for the
defendants (Ex-Mayor Cordova of
Sta. Maria, Laguna) for the amicable
settlement of the case between the
plaintiffs and the defendants to the
effect that a certain property of the
spouses Lucio Magtibay (deceased)
and respondent Aurelia Martinez,
worth P3,000.00, would be given to
the plaintiffs in full settlement of
their claim, as share in the
properties left by their deceased
uncle Lucio Magtibay, it having been
agreed by herein petitioner and Atty.
de los Reyes and the spokesman of
the defendants that for the purpose
of said amicable settlement, the
plaintiffs or one of them and herein
petitioner would go to Sta. Maria,
Laguna, on October 23, 1964.
10. That having given notice to the
plaintiffs (now respondents Luis
Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay) at
their given address in Calauag,
Quezon to come to Candelaria for
the purpose of going to Sta. Maria,
Laguna on October 23, 1964,
petitioner had waited for said
plaintiffs to go to his office on or
before said date for the engagement
mentioned, but due to their
(plaintiffs') failure to come to
Candelaria, petitioner had to send a
telegram to Ex-Mayor Cordova
notifying him of his (petitioner's) and
plaintiffs' not being able to go to
Sta. Maria because of the failure of
any of the plaintiffs to come to
Candelria, ....
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
11. That it was only on October 28,
1964, when herein petitioner
received a copy of the order dated
October 24, 1964 (Annex "G") and to
his surprise he also received on the
said day a second motion to dismiss
dated October 26, 1964; together
with Annex "A" of said motion, which
is entitled KASULATAN NG
PAGHAHATIAN NA LABAS SA
HUKUMAN AT PAGPAPALABI, dated
October 23, 1964 at Sta. Cruz,
Laguna and signed by the plaintiffs
and defendant Aurelia Martinez (the
three being now respondents in this
case), it having been made to
appear in said Annex "A" of the
second motion to dismiss, among
others, that the plaintiffs and
defendant Aurelia Martinez had
made an extrajudicial partition of
the properties of the deceased Lucio
Magtibay and the said Aurelia
Martinez adjudicating to the
plaintiffs one-fourth () share in the
properties of the spouses and three-
fourth (3/4) share of the defendant
Aurelia Martinez, but making it
appear also that said plaintiffs
waived their share in favor of Aurelia
Martinez, ..., thru which fraudulent
waiver, herein petitioner was
deprived of his contingent fees,
agreed upon, as evidenced by Annex
"A" of this petition.6
xxx xxx xxx
14. That petitioner filed by
registered mail, on November 4,
1964, his "OPPOSITION TO THE
SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS AND
COUNTER-MOTION OR PETITION TO
SET ASIDE DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL
PARTITION AND WAIVER DATED
OCTOBER 23, 1964 AND TO RECORD
ATTORNEY'S LIEN", dated November
3, 1964, wherein he (petitioner)
prayed, among others, invoking the
provisions of Section 5(d) and
Section 6, Rule 135 of the Revised
Page 44 of 131
Rules of Court, for the protection of
the rights of herein petitioner as an
officer of the Court, to wit:
(a) to deny the second motion
to dismiss and get aside and
annul the deed of extrajudicial
partition and waiver dated
October 23, 1964;
(b) to fix the compensation of
herein counsel in the
proportion of one-third (1/3) of
the shares of plaintiffs, if in
land, or in the amount of
P1,000.00, if in cash, and to
record the same and expenses
advanced by him for the
plaintiffs in the sum of P22.15
as lien in favor of herein
claimant-petitioner over the
properties in litigation,
particularly over the one-
fourth (1/4) share of the
plaintiffs in all the properties
of the spouses;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) as an alternative to prayer
(a) above, to grant the second
motion to dismiss, subjecting,
however, the properties in
litigation and subject-matters
of the extrajudicial partition
and waiver to the lien for
attorney's fees and expenses
in favor of herein claimant-
petitioner, after fixing said
attorney's fees as prayed for
in (b) above.
xxx xxx xxx
15. That on the day f finally set for
the hearing of the second motion to
dismiss, as well as of the counter-
motion or petition, or on November
21, 1964, because of the inquiries or
interpellation made by respondent
Judge to herein petitioner as to
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
whether there is a Philippine
precedent which allows or directs
the protection by the Court of the
rights of any of its officers (lawyer)
against any collusion perpetrated by
the parties in a case to defraud or
cheat an attorney of his
compensation agreed upon by him
and his clients, and his answer that
insofar as his researches were
concerned, he could not find any,
although there are a number of
cases to that effect in American
jurisdiction, the respondent Judge
had opined in open court that the
claim for and the fixing of the
attorney's fees should better be
done in a separate action and, in
spite of petitioner's memorandum
citing American authorities to the
effect that,
Though a party may without
the consent of his attorney
money make a bona fide
adjustment with the adverse
party and dismiss an action or
suit before a judgment or a
decree has been rendered
thereon, if it appears,
however, that such settlement
was collosive and
consummated pursuant to the
intent of both parties to
defraud the attorney, the
court in which the action was
pending may interfere to
protect him as one of its
officers, by setting aside the
order of dismissal, .... (Jackson
vs. Stearns, 48 Ore. 25, 84
Pac. 798).
... the respondent Judge, instead of
denying the second motion to
dismiss and fixing his attorney's fees
in the said case and recording the
same as lien, ... dismissed the case
and refused to give herein petitioner
any kind of immediate protection to
safeguard his rights ... in said Civil
Page 45 of 131
Case No. SC-525 of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna.
16. That by the express terms of the
agreement, Annex "A" of this
petition, plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
SC-525 had expressly ceded to
herein petitioner one-half () [later
verbally reduced to one-third (1/3)
or P1,000.00] or whatever share
they would get from the estate of
their deceased uncle Lucio
Magtibay, and the defendants in
said Civil Case had full knowledge of
said right of herein petitioner in the
properties in controversy from and
after the time they were served with
summons and copies of the
complaint in said civil case
because of the allegations contained
in par. 10 thereof. 7 [Emphasis by
the Court]
18. That on December 5, 1964,
herein petitioner filed his motion for
reconsideration dated December 4,
1664 asking for the reconsideration
of the order dated November 21,
1964, ....
19. That the motion for
reconsideration was denied by the
court, thru the respondent Judge, as
per the order dated January 9, 1965,
....
Upon these facts, petitioner tries to make
out before this Court a case
of certiorari for grave abuse of discretion
on the part of respondent Judge in
dismissing the case on the basis of the
compromise agreement of the parties,
entered into at the back of petitioner
notwithstanding the reservation made in
his favor to file an action against both
parties "with respect to his alleged
attorney's fees", as well as a case of
mandamus "to order and command the
said respondent judge" to take cognizance
of and resolve his opposition and counter-
motion for the court to fix the
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
compensation he should be paid. Unable
to find any local precedent to support his
position, he cites American authorities
thus:
In the American jurisdiction, it would
seem that, even without the specific
provisions of the rules of court cited
above, courts had always
intervened, in the mere exercise of
their inherent powers, to protect
attorneys against collusive
agreements or fraudulent
settlements entered into by the
parties in a case to cheat attorneys
out of their costs or of their fees.
Thus, it was held or had been stated
in:
(a) Coughlin vs. N.Y. Cont. & H.R.R.
Co., 71 N.Y. 443, 27 Am. Rep. 75.
... But since the time of Lord
Mansfield, it has been the
practice of courts to intervene
to protect attorneys against
settlement made to cheat
them out of their costs. If an
attorney has commenced an
action, and his client settles it
with the opposite party before
judgment, collusively, to
deprive him of his costs, the
court will permit the attorney
to go on with the suit for the
purpose of collecting his costs.
Swain v. Senate, 5 Bos. & Pul.
99; Cole v. Bennett, 6 Price,
15; Moore v. Cook, 13 Id. 473;
Talcott v. Bronson, 4 Paige,
501; Rusquin v. The
Knickerbocker Stage Col., 12
Abb. Pr 324; Ward v. Syme, 9
How. Pr. 16; McDonald v.
Napier, 14 Ga. 89.
There are many cases where
this had been allowed to be
done. It is impossible to
ascertain precisely when this
practice commenced, nor how
Page 46 of 131
originated, nor upon what
principle it was based. It was
not upon the principle of a
lien, because an attorney has
no lien upon the cause of as it
upon the action before
judgment for his costs; nor
was it upon principle that his
services had produced the
money paid his client upon the
settlement, because that
could not be known, and in
fact no money may have been
paid upon the settlement. So
far as I can perceive, it was
based upon no principle. It
was a mere arbitrary exercise
of power by the courts; not
arbitrary in the sense that it
was unjust or improper, but in
the sense that it was not
based upon any right or
principle recognized in other
cases. The parties being in
court, and a suit commenced
and pending, for the purpose
of protecting attorneys who
were their officers and subject
to their control, the courts
invented this practice and
assumed this extraordinary
power to defeat attempts to
cheat the attorneys out of
their costs. The attorney's fees
were fixed in definite sums,
easily determined by taxation
and this power was exercised
to secure them their fees. (pp.
76-77)
(b) Randall v. Van Wagenan et al., 22
N.E. 361, 362.lawphi1.nt
... But where such settlement
is made collusively for the
purpose of defrauding the
attorney out of his costs,
courts have been accustomed
to intervene, and to protect
the attorney by permitting him
to proceed with the suit, and,
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
if he is able to establish a right
to recover on the cause of
action as it originally stood, to
permit such recovery to the
extent of his costs in the
action. Coughlin v. Railroad
Co., 71 N. Y. 443, and pages
cited. And the court will set
aside an order of
discontinuance if it stands in
the way. This is an adequate
remedy, and we think the
exclusive remedy where the
suit has been fraudulently
settled by the parties before
judgment to cheat the
attorney out of his costs. We
have found no case of an
equitable action to enforce the
inchoate right of an attorney,
under such circumstances,
and no such precedent ought,
we think, to be established.
(c) Jackson v. Stearns, et al., 43 Ore
25, 84 Pac. 798.
... Though a party may,
without the consent of his
attorney, make a bona fide
adjustment with the adverse
party, and dismiss an action or
suit before a judgment or a
decree has been rendered
therein, if it appears, however,
that such settlement was
collusive and consummated
pursuant to the intent of both
parties to defraud the
attorney, the court in which
the action or suit was pending
may interfere to protect him,
as one of its officers, by
setting aside the order of
dismissal and permitting him
to proceed in the cause in the
name of his client to final
determination to ascertain
what sum of money, or
interest in the subject-matter,
if any, is due him for his
Page 47 of 131
services when fully performed.
Jones v. Morgage 99 Am. Dec.
458; Randall v. Van Wagenen
(N.Y.) 22 N.E. 361, 12 Am. St.
Rep. 828. (p. 800)
Before a court will set aside an
order dismissing a suit or an
action, made upon stipulation
of the parties, without the
consent of plaintiff's attorney,
and allow the latter to proceed
with the cause in the name of
his client, to determine the
amount of fees due him, it
must appear that the
defendant participated in the
fraudulent intent to deprive
the attorney of his
compensation. Courtney v.
McGavock, 25 Wis. 619. When
no adequate consideration is
given by the defendant for the
settlement and discharge of
an action or a suit, the
insufficiency of the
inducement to the contract
affords evidence of his bad
faith. Young v. Dearborn, 27
N.E. 324. It will be
remembered that the
complaint alleges that the
value of the real property in
question is $3,000.00, and
that Stearns executed to
Wilson a deed to the premises
for a nominal consideration.
This is a sufficient averment of
the defendant's intent to
deprive the plaintiff of his
compensation thereby
imputing to Wilson bad faith.
(p. 800)
(d) Desaman v. Butler Bros., 188
Minn. 198, 136 N.W. 747.
We have recently held that a
client has always the right to
settle his cause of action and
stop litigation at any stage of
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
the proceeding, subject,
however, to the right of the
attorney to receive
compensation for services
rendered. Burho v. Camichael
135 N.W. 386. It is therefore
contended by defendant that a
litigant retains the
unrestricted right to determine
for what amount the cause of
action may be settled, and,
having so done, the lien of his
attorney for services is
measured by the amount
determined on and actually
settled for. Conceding, without
deciding, that this may be true
of any time prior to the
rendition of a verdict in the
action which the attorney has
been employed to bring, we
are of opinion that after
verdict fixing the amount of a
plaintiff's cause of action a
secret and collusive
compromise between parties
litigant does not affect the
amount of the attorney's
lien...; but therein is also
clearly indicated by Mr. Justice
Brown that, if there be fraud
and collusion to deprive the
attorney of his lien, the
settlement will not be
permitted to accomplish such
result. (p. 748)
To be sure, these authorities are quite
persuasive, but contrary to petitioner's
impression, there is already a precedent
setting decision of this Court handed down
way back in 1922 in a case very similar to
his, that in Rustia vs. the Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, et al.,
44 Phil. 62. As it is very brief, it can be
quoted in full:
This is a petition for a writ
of certiorari, the petitioner alleging
that the respondent Judge of the
Court of First Instance exceeded his
Page 48 of 131
jurisdiction in dismissing a pending
action at the instance of the parties
but without the intervention of the
attorney for the plaintiff in the case,
the herein petitioner.
It appears from the record that on
July 31, 1921, the respondent Justo
Porcuna, for himself and on behalf of
his wife, the respondent Rosa H. de
Porcuna, by means of a written
contract, retained the petitioner to
represent them as their lawyer in
case No. 1435 then pending in the
Court of First Instance of Batangas
and in which Rosa H. de Porcuna was
the plaintiff and one Eulalia
Magsombol was the defendant. The
contract fixed the petitioner's fee at
P200 in advance with an additional
contingent fee of P1,300. It was also
provided in the contract that Justo
Porcuna should not compromise the
claim against the defendant in the
case without express consent of his
lawyer, the herein petitioner.
After trial, the petitioner then being
plaintiff's attorney of record, the
Court of First Instance, under date of
December 24, 1921, rendered
judgment in favor of Justo Porcuna
and Rosa H. de Porcuna ordering the
defendant Eulalia Magsombol to
return to them 602 pieces of cloth or
in default thereof to pay to them the
sum of P3,250. On January 14, 1922,
Eulalia Magsombol filed her
exception to the judgment and on
the following day presented a
motion for a new trial, which was
denied on the 21st of the same
month. She thereupon gave notice
of appeal and presented a bill of
exceptions which was approved on
February 20, 1922. On March 2,
1922, and before the transmission of
the bill of exceptions to this court,
the plaintiffs presented the following
motion in the Court of First Instance:
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
The plaintiffs, without any
further intervention of their
attorney, now appear before
this Honorable Court and
respectfully aver:
That, through Mr. Miguel
Olgado they already settled
this case with the herein
defendant.
That the basis of the
compromise is that we, the
plaintiffs, finally agree that we
should be paid the amount of
eight hundred pesos (P800) in
two installments; P300 to be
paid on this same date, and
the remaining five hundred
pesos (P500) at the end of
March, 1922.
That we, the plaintiffs,
recognize not to have any
further rights in this case than
to the aforesaid amount of
eight hundred pesos (P800)
and that this is the total
amount the defendant Eulalia
Magsombol should pay us, and
we have no right whatever to
any other amount than the
aforementioned.
That we have not sold to any
other person our rights as
plaintiffs in this case.
Wherefore, the plaintiffs
respectfully request the
dismissal of this case, without
any pronouncement as to
costs, and that the appeal
interposed by the defendant
be further dismissed.
Batangas, Batangas, P.I.,
March 2, 1922.
Page 49 of 131
(Sgd) ROSA H. PORCUNA
Plaintiff
JUSTO M. PORCUNA
Plaintiff
The defendant, through her
attorney, Jose Mayo Librea, having
signified her assent to the motion,
the Court of First Instance on the
same day, March 2, dismissed the
action without notice to counsel for
the plaintiffs.
The petitioner alleges that he did
not discover the dismissal of the
action until April 4, 1922. After an
unsuccessful effort to obtain a
reconsideration of the order of
dismissal from the trial court, he
filed the present petition for a writ of
certiorari. By resolution dated
October 24, 1922, this court denied
the petition and upon motion of the
petitioner we shall now briefly state
our reasons for such denial.
The burden of the petitioner's
contention is (1) that he, as attorney
of record, was entitled to notice of
his client's motion to dismiss the
case, and (2) that after the approval
of the bill of exceptions the lower
court had lost jurisdiction of the case
and had no power to dismiss it. A
moment's reflection should make it
clear that neither of these
propositions is tenable.
Both at the common law and under
section 32 of the Code of Civil
Procedure a client may dismiss his
lawyer at any time or at any stage of
the proceedings and there is nothing
to prevent a litigant from appearing
before the court to conduct his own
litigation. (Sec. 34, Code of Civil
Procedure.) The client has also an
undoubted right to compromise a
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
suit without the intervention of his
lawyer.
Though there is a valid
agreement for the payment to
the attorney of a large
proportion of the sum
recovered in case of success
this does not give the attorney
such an interest in the cause
of action that it prevents
plaintiff from compromising
the suit. (4 Cyc. 990, and
authorities cited in Note 6; see
also Louque vs. Dejan 129 La.
519; Price vs. Western Loan &
Savings Co., 19 Am. Cas. 589
and Note.)
In the present instance the clients
did nothing that they did not have a
perfect right to do. By appearing
personally and presenting a motion
they impliedly dismissed their
lawyer. The petitioner's contingent
interests in the judgment rendered
did not appear of record. Neither as
a party in interest nor as and
attorney was he therefore entitled to
notice of the motion.
As to the second proposition that the
court below could not dismiss the
case after the bill of exceptions had
been approved, it is very true that
upon such approval the lower court
loses its jurisdiction over all
contentious matters connected with
the issues in the case. But there is
nothing to prevent all of the parties
by agreement to withdraw the bill of
exceptions with the consent of said
court and resubmit the case to the
jurisdiction of the court. That was all
that was done in this case. A valid
agreement between the parties to a
case is the law of the case in
everything covered by the
agreement. (Civil Code, art. 1091;
Compania General de Tabacos vs.
Obed, 13 Phil. 391.) The petitioner
Page 50 of 131
might have protected his interests
by entering an attorney's lien under
section 37 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
The petition for a writ
of certiorari was therefore properly
denied. So ordered.
The difference We perceive, however,
between petitioner's case, on the one
hand, and that of Atty. Rustia, in the above
decision, on the other, is that in the
latter's case, neither the court nor the
party adverse to his clients were aware of
the exact agreement as to his fees,
whereas in the case of petitioner, both the
court and the other parties knew the
terms of the contract for professional
services between petitioner and his
clients, the Magtibay brothers, because
the written contract therefor, Annex A,
was made part of the complaint, and none
seriously disputes its authenticity. Besides,
the court had already dismissed the case
when Atty. Rustia raised the question of
his fees before the court; in petitioner's
instance, he opposed the motion to
dismiss and pleaded with the court to
protect his rights as officer of the court
before the first order in question was
issued by respondent judge. Were it not
for these differences, We would have
inclined towards denying the herein
petition in line with the Rustia ruling that,
in any event, certiorari is not the
appropriate remedy, the American
authorities cited by petitioner not
withstanding.
Withal, there is another Philippine case
which Us to sustain petitioner. In the case
of Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 440, Atty.
Claro M. Recto found himself practically in
the same situation as petitioner herein.
After Atty. Recto had rendered services to
Mrs. Esperanza P. de Harden in a
protracted suit against her husband for
the purposes of securing an increase of
her and her daughter's monthly support,
(the spouses were separated), to
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
P10,000.00 and of protecting and
preserving her rights in the properties of
the conjugal partnership, which suit lasted
from 1941 to 1949, and after the Court of
First Instance of Manila had rendered a
judgment favorable to Mrs. Harden
acknowledging, inter alia, her rights to the
assets of the conjugal partnership, which
turned out to be P4,000,000, and
awarding her a monthly support of P2,500,
practically as prayed for in Atty. Recto's
pleadings, while the case was already
pending on appeal before this Court, Mrs.
Harden and her husband, Mr. Fred Harden,
entered into a compromise of their case,
without the knowledge of Atty. Recto,
whereby said spouses "purportedly agreed
to settle their differences in consideration
of the sum of P5,000 paid by Mr. Harden to
Mrs. Harden, and a monthly pension of
$500 to be paid by him to her; (2) Mr.
Harden created a trust fund of $20,000
from which said monthly pension of $500
would be taken; and (3) Mr. and Mrs.
Harden had mutually released and forever
discharged each other from all actions,
debts, duties, accounts, demands and
claims to the conjugal partnership, in
consideration of the sum of $1." (p. 435)
Whereupon Atty. Recto filed a motion with
this Court praying that:
a) Pending the resolution of this
motion, the receiver appointed
herein be authorized to continue
holding the properties above
mentioned in his custody in order
not to defeat the undersigned's
inchoate lien on them;
b) A day set aside to receive the
evidence of the undersigned and
those of the plaintiff and the
defendant Fred M. Harden, in order
to determine the amount of fees due
to the undersigned, by the
appointment of a referee or
commissioner for the reception of
such evidence;
Page 51 of 131
c) After due hearing, the
undersigned be declared entitled to
the sum of P400,000 as his fees for
services rendered in behalf of the
plaintiff in this case, under
paragraph 3 of the contract, Annex
"A" and to that end a charging lien
therefore be established upon the
properties above-mentioned;
d) And the receiver be ordered to
pay to the undersigned the full
amount of the fees to which the
latter is found to be entitled.
This motion was objected to by Mr.
Hardens counsel, who in turn, moved for
the dismissal of the case, to which Atty.
Recto objected. Under these
circumstances, this Court acceded to Atty.
Recto's prayer that the case be not
dismissed, that the receivership be
maintained except as to certain properties
not material to mention here, and that the
case be remanded to the lower court so
that his fees may be determined and
ordered paid. Upon the remand of the
case to the lower court, a commissioner
was appointed to hear the matter of the
amount of the fees in question, and after
the commissioner had submitted a report
recommending the payment to Atty. Recto
of the 20,70 attorney's fees stipulated in
the contract for his services, equivalent to
P369,410.04, the court rendered judgment
as follows:
The contingent fee to which the
claimant is entitled under paragraph
3 of the contract, Exhibit JJJ or 20, is
20% of P1,920,554.85 or the sum of
P384,110.97.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby
approves the recommendation of
the Commissioner with the above-
stated modification, and finds that
Attorney Claro M. Recto is entitled to
the sum of THREE HUNDRED
EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED AND TEN PESOS AND
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
NINETY-SEVEN CENTAVOS
(P384,110.97), representing 20% of
Esperanza P. de Harden's share in
the conjugal properties owned by
her and her husband, Fred M.
Harden, as contingent fee stipulated
in paragraph 3 of the Contract of
Professional Services, Exhibit JJJ or
20, and the said Esperanza P. de
Harden is hereby ordered to pay the
said amount above-stated.
On appeal from this judgment to this
Court, the same was affirmed, the decision
stating pertinently in part:
The last objection is based upon
principles of equity, but, pursuant
thereto, one who seeks equity must
come with clean hands (Bastida et
al. vs. Dy Buncio & Co., 93 Phil. 195;
30 C.J.S. 475), and appellants have
not done so, for the circumstances
surrounding the case show, to our
satisfaction, that their
aforementioned agreements,
ostensibly for the settlement of the
differences between husband and
wife, were made for the purpose of
circumventing or defeating the
rights of herein appellee, under his
above-quoted contract of services
with Mrs. Harden. Indeed, having
secured a judgment in her favor,
acknowledging her rights to the
assets of the conjugal partnership,
which turned out to be worth almost
P4,000,000 in addition to litis
expensae in the sum of P175,000, it
is inconceivable that Mrs. Harden
would have waived such rights, as
well as the benefits of all orders and
judgments in her favor, in
consideration of the paltry sum of
$5,000 allegedly paid to her by Mr.
Harden and the additional sum of
$20,000 to be paid by him in
installments, at the rate of $500 a
month. In fact, no explanation has
been given for this moat unusual
avowed settlement between Mr. and
Page 52 of 131
Mrs. Harden. One can not even
consider the possibility of a
reconciliation between the spouses,
the same being inconsistent with the
monetary consideration for said
alleged settlement. What is more,
the records show that the relations
between said spouses which were
bad indeed, not only in July, 1941,
when Mrs. Harden engaged the
services of the appellee, but, even,
before, for Mr. and Mrs. Harden were
separated since 1938 had
worsened considerably thereafter,
as evidenced by an action for
divorce filed by Mr. Harden in New
Jersey, in July 1948, upon the ground
of repeated acts of infidelity
allegedly committed by Mrs. Harden
in 1940 and 1941.
On the same considerations of equity, and
for the better protection of lawyers, who,
trusting in the good faith of their clients,
render professional services on contingent
basis, and so that it may not be said that
this Court, sanctions in any way the
questionable practice of clients of
compromising their cases at the back of
their counsel with the consequence that
the stipulated contingent fees of the
lawyer are either unreasonably reduced or
even completely rendered without basis,
as in this case wherein the clients
waived the whole of their rights in favor of
their opponent after the latter had
acknowledged, in effect, the correctness
of said clients' contention We have
decided to grant the herein petition, in so
far as the rights of petitioner have been
prejudiced by the questioned compromise
agreement. While We here reaffirm the
rule that "the client has an undoubted
right to compromise a suit without the
intervention of his lawyer", 8 We hold that
when such compromise is entered into in
fraud of the lawyer, with intent to deprive
him of the fees justly due him, the
compromise must be subject to the said
fees, and that when it is evident that the
said fraud is committed in confabulation
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
with the adverse party who had
knowledge of the lawyer's contingent
interest or such interest appears of record
and who would benefit under such
compromise, the better practice is to
settle the matter of the attorney's fees in
the same proceeding, after hearing all the
affected parties and without prejudice to
the finality of the compromise in so far as
it does not adversely affect the rights of
the lawyer. Surely, "the client cannot, by
setting, compromising or dismissing his
suit during its pendency, deprive the
attorney of his compensation for the
agreed amount, unless the lawyer
consents to such settlement, compromise
or dismissal", (Legal and Judicial Ethics by
Martin, 1967 Rev. Ed p. 121) for the,
attorney is or "Shall be entitled to have
and recover from his client - a reasonable
compensation (not more) for his services,
with a view to the importance of the
subject-matter of the controversy, the
extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney",
(Sec. 24, Rule 138, on Attorney and
Admission to Bar) albeit, under Canon 12
of the Canons of Professional Ethics, "in
fixing fees, it should not be forgotten that
the profession is a branch of the
administration of justice and not a mere
money-getting trade."
True it is also that "a client may, at
anytime, dismiss his attorney or substitute
another in his place", (Sec. 26, Rule 138)
but it must be emphasized that the same
provision, which is an incorporation of
Republic Act 636 into the Rules of Court,
also provides that "if the contract between
client and attorney had been reduced to
writing and the dismissal of the attorney
was without justifiable cause, he shall be
entitled to recover from the client full
compensation ..." In the case at bar, by
entering into the compromise agreement
in question and even inserting therein a
prayer to the court to dismiss their case
filed by petitioner, (see footnote 6, ante)
petitioner's clients impliedly dismissed
him. (Rustia vs. the Court, etc., supra.)
Page 53 of 131
Such implied dismissal appears to Us to
have been made without justifiable cause,
none is urged anywhere in the record, and
so, the above-quoted provision of Section
26, Rule 138 applies here. The terms of
the compromise in question, as spelled
out in Annex A of Annex I of the petition,
indicate clearly that Aurelia Martinez, the
defendant aunt in-law of petitioner's
clients, acknowledged that the rights of
said clients were practically as alleged by
petitioner in the complaint he filed for
them. In other words, through the services
of petitioner, his clients secured, in effect,
a recognition, which had been previously
denied by their aunt-in-law, that they were
entitled to a share in the estate left by
their uncle. We hold that under these
circumstances, and since it appears that
said clients have no other means to pay
petitioner, since they instituted their case
as paupers, and that their aunt-in-law was
aware of the terms of their contract of
professional services with petitioner', said
clients had no right to waive the portion of
their such acknowledged rights in favor of
their opponent to the extent that such
waiver would prejudice the stipulated
contingent interest of their lawyer and
their aunt-in-law had no right to accept
such waiver unqualified. The Civil Code
enjoins that:
ART. 19. Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Under the circumstance extant in the
record, it is clear that the compromise
agreement in question falls short of the
moral requirements of this quoted article
of the Civil Code. If for this reason alone, it
should not be allowed to prejudice the
rights of petitioner. Accordingly, as all of
these circumstances were presented to
respondent judge before he issued the
challenged order of dismissal and all the
parties were heard thereon, it was
incumbent upon His Honor, in equity and
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
to avoid multiplicity of suits, particularly,
because the amount claimed by petitioner
is only P1,000.00, to have directly passed
upon petitioner's claim, and not having
done so, it would appear that the court a
quo abused its discretion gravely enough
to warrant the writ of certiorari herein
prayed for in so far as the questioned
orders prejudiced petitioner's right to the
fees for the professional services which
appear to have been creditably rendered
by him. Respondents allege that the
judgment of dismissal in question is
already final because no appeal was taken
therefrom, but since We hold that the
same was rendered with enough grave
abuse of discretion to warrant
the certiorari prayed for, such alleged
finality could not have materialized;
obviously, petitioner could not have
appealed, not being a party in the case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the orders of
the respondent court dated November 21,
1964 and January 9, 1965 in Civil Case No.
SC-525 are hereby set aside in so far as
they prejudice the payment of petitioner's
claim of attorney's fees in the form of
either one-third of the share
acknowledged as his clients in the
compromise in question or P1,000.00,
which should constitute as a lien on the
said share, in spite of the waiver thereof in
favor of respondent Aurelia Martinez. It is
unnecessary to consider the petition for
mandamus. Costs against, private
respondents.
G.R. No. L-23956 July 21, 1967
ELPIDIO JAVELLANA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
NICOLAS LUTERO, Judge of the
Municipal Court of Iloilo City and the
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF
JARO, defendants-appellees.
Hautea and Hinojales for plaintiff-
appellant.
Page 54 of 131
Luisito C. Hofilea for defendants-
appellees.
CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo (CC 6425)
dismissing a petition for relief directed
against the judgment rendered by the
municipal court of Iloilo City in its civil
case 7220.
On March 29, 1963 the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Jaro, Iloilo filed a detainer
complaint against Elpidio Javellana with
the municipal court of Iloilo City, presided
by Judge Nicolas Lutero. The hearing,
originally set for April 30, 1963, was
postponed to May 24 for failure of the
defendant to receive summons, and then
postponed again to June 27 for the same
reason. It was thereafter postponed to July
16, then to July 24, and finally to August
27, all at the behest of the defendant's
Atty. Jose Hautea, on the grounds that "he
has not finished his business transactions
in Manila" and that "he hurt his right foot
toe." The last postponement was granted
by the municipal court with the warning
that no further postponement would be
entertained.
When the case was called for trial on
August 27, 1963, neither the defendant
nor his counsel Atty. Hautea appeared
although one Atty. Romy Pea who was
present in court verbally moved for the
postponement of the trial on the ground
that Atty. Hautea was in Manila attending
to a business transaction. The plaintiff's
counsel objected to the motion on the
ground that the defendant and his counsel
were well aware of the court's previous
admonition that no further postponement
of the case would be granted, and then
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
manifested that the witnesses and the
evidence for the plaintiff were ready for
presentation on that date. The verbal
motion for postponement was denied and
the plaintiff was directed to adduce his
evidence. During the presentation of the
plaintiff's evidence, the municipal court
received a telegram from Atty. Hautea
requesting postponement of the hearing.
The trial proceeded nevertheless, and, on
the basis of the plaintiff's evidence, the
court on the same date rendered
judgment for the plaintiff and against the
defendant. The latter's counsel received a
copy of the decision on September 9,
1963. On the following September 11, he
filed a motion to set aside judgment and
for new trial. This motion was denied on
September 26; a copy of the order of
denial was received by him on the same
date.
On November 16, 1963, or about 50 days
later, the defendant thru his same counsel
filed a petition for relief (from the
judgment of the municipal court)with the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, praying
that the decision in question be set aside,
that the detainer case be set for trial on
the merits, and, pending determination of
the petition, that an injunction issue
restraining the enforcement of the
decision. Counsel for the petitioner
averred that his absence on the date of
the trial was excusable as he attended to
a very urgent business transaction in
Manila; that before his departure for the
latter city, he verbally informed the
respondent judge that his return to Iloilo
might be delayed and that he might not
arrive on time for the trial of the case as
set; that he called at both the law office
and the residence of the counsel for the
private respondent to inform him of the
Page 55 of 131
desired postponement and the reason
therefor, but the latter was in Bacolod at
the time; that he exercised utmost
diligence and precaution in the sense that
while in Manila he sent a telegram to the
respondent judge, asking for
postponement; and that notwithstanding
all the foregoing, the municipal court
nevertheless proceeded with the trial in
his absence and that of his client, allowed
the private respondent to present his
evidence ex parte, and rendered a
decision against the petitioner, thus
depriving the latter of his day in court.
Counsel for the petitioner further asserted
that his client has a good and substantial
defense, which is, that the complainant
had given his client an option to buy the
premises subject-matter of the complaint
below, and that a reopening of the case
would cause the private respondent no
real injury.
This petition was given due course, the
respondents were required to file their
answers, and a cease-and-desist order
was issued as prayed for. On February 22,
1964, after due hearing, the Court of First
Instance rendered judgment dismissing
the petition.1wph1.t
Hence the present recourse.
From the perspective of the environmental
circumstances obtaining in this case, the
present appeal is palpably devoid of merit.
A counsel for any party in a judicial
controversy, by mandate of the canons of
legal ethics, and with due regard for the
elementary standards of fair play, is duty
bound to prepare for trial with diligence
and deliberate speed. This norm of
conduct is no less applicable in a detainer
case, such as the one at bar, even if the
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
issues are essentially simple and
uncomplicated. It is obvious that the
counsel for the petitioner-appellant has
been remiss in this respect.
The case was set for trial six times. Thrice
it was postponed at the behest of the said
counsel. The last postponement was
granted on July 24, 1963 with the
unequivocal admonition by the judgment
that no further postponement would be
countenanced. The case was reset for
hearing on August 27, 1963, which means
that the appellant's counsel had more
than a month's time to so adjust his
schedule of activities as to obviate a
conflict between his business transactions
and his calendar of hearings. Came August
27, and neither he nor the appellant
appeared at the trial. His absence on the
latter date was not occasioned by illness
or some other supervening occurrence
which unavoidably and justifiably
prevented him from appearing in court.
In our view, it was the bounden duty of the
said counsel, under the circumstances, to
give preferential attention to the case. As
things were, he regarded the municipal
court as a mere marionette that must ever
await his pleasure. This attitude on his
part is censurable as it reveals more than
just a modicum of disrespect for the
judiciary and the established machinery of
justice.
Nor is his censurable conduct mitigated by
the appearance in court on August 27 of
another attorney who verbally moved for
postponement nor by his telegram
received by the municipal judge on the
same date asking for continuance. These
circumstances, upon the contrary,
emphasize his presumptuousness vis-a-
vis the municipal judge.
Page 56 of 131
It is thus crystal-clear from the foregoing
disquisition that the petitioner-appellant
was not deprived of his day in court, and
that the respondent municipal judge did
not err in proceeding with the trial,
allowing the private respondent to present
his evidence ex parte, and thereafter
rendering decision for the plaintiff-
appellee. It follows that the petitioner was
not entitled to the remedy of a petition for
relief.
Moreover, after the denial of his motion to
set aside judgment and for new trial, the
appellant had ample time to appeal;
instead he allowed the judgment to
become final and executory. His argument
that an appeal would have been futile as
there was no evidence upon which such
appeal could be based, merits scant
consideration. An appeal from the decision
of a municipal court to the Court of First
Instance has the effect of vacating the
decision (sec. 9, Rule 40, view Rules of
Court; sec. 9, Rule 40, of the old Rules),
and the action is to be tried de
novowithout regard to the proof presented
in the municipal court or the conclusions
reached thereon (Colegio de San Jose vs.
Sison, 56 Phil. 344, 351; Lizo vs.
Carandang, 73 Phil. 649; Crisostomo vs.
Director of Prisons, 41 Phil. 368). To grant
the appellant's petition for relief would
amount to reviving his right to appeal
which he had irretrievably lost through the
gross inaction of his counsel (see Espinosa
vs. Yatco, etc., et al., L-16435, Jan. 31,
1963, and the cases therein cited). This in
law cannot be done.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is
affirmed. As this appeal is patently
frivolous and dilatory, this Court, under
the authority of section 3 of Rule 142 of
the Rules of Court, hereby assesses treble
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
costs against the petitioner-appellant
Elpidio Javellana, said costs to be paid by
his counsel, Atty. Jose Hautea.
A.M. No. 801 June 27, 1978
CESARIO ADARNE, complainant, vs.
ATTY. DAMIAN V. ALDABA, respondent.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
Administrative action against the
respondent attorney for gross negligence
and misconduct, for failure to give his
entire devotion to the interest of his client,
warm zeal in the . maintenance and
defense of his rights, and exertion of his
utmost learning and ability in the
prosecution and defense of his client, and
for not taking steps to protect the
interests of his client in the face of an
adverse decision.
The record shows that sometime in 1958,
Raymunda Cumpio and her husband, Rufo
Cumpio, filed an action for forcible entry
against herein complaint Cesario Adarne,
Aning Arante, and Miguel Inokando with
the Justice of the Peace of Alang-alang
Leyte. The case was docketed in the said
court as Civil Case No. 96. Atty. Isauro
Marmita represented the defendants who
raised the issue of ownership of the land
in question. After hearing the parties, the
Justice of the Peace dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Consequently, the plaintiffs therein
appealed to the Court of First Instance of
Leyte and the case was assigned to
Branch VI of Carigara, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 556. Resolving
Page 57 of 131
the issue interposed by the appellants, the
Judge of the Court of First Instance found
that the Justice of the Peace Court has
jurisdiction over the case and returned the
same to the lower court for trial on the
merits. After trial on the merits, the Justice
of the Peace again dismissed the case and
the plaintiffs again appealed to the Court
of First Instance of Leyte where the case
was docketed anew as Civil Case No, 632.
Attys. Arturo Mirales and Generoso
Casimpan filed the answer for the
defendants. 1
At the hearing of the case on August 7,
1961, the herein complainant Cesario
Adarne, one of the defendants in the
aforementioned Civil Case No. 632, noting
that his attorneys had not yet arrived,
prevailed upon the respondent Atty.
Damian Aldaba, who was then present in
court to attend the trial of an electoral
case, to appear as counsel for them and
ask for the Postponement of the trial. The
respondent, who is a third degree cousin
of the complainant, agreed, and entered a
special appearance. Upon noticing that
the plaintiffs and their counsel were not
also present in court, the respondent,
instead of asking for a postponement,
moved for the dismissal of the case. "is
motion was granted and the case was
again dismissed. Thereafter, the plaintiff
filed a motion for the reconsideration of
the order, 2 to which the respondent filed
an opposition in behalf of the
3
defendants, and the motion was
4
denied. Whereupon, the plaintiffs
appealed to the Court of Appeals. After
appropriate. proceedings, the appellee
court set aside the order of dismissal and
remanded the case to the lower court for
further proceedings.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
At the hearing of the case on October 23,
1964 before the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, the respondent was again prevailed
upon by the complainant to appear in his
behalf. The respondent entered a "special
appearance" for the complainant and
thereafter argued that the interest of
justice would best be served of the
defendants were allowed to file an action
for quieting of title and the case heard
jointly with the pending action for forcible
entry. Finding merit in the argument, the
court ordered the defendant Cesario
Adarne to file an action for quieting of title
within one (1) week and the plaintiffs to
answer the same within the reglementary
period, after which both cases would be
tried jointly. The hearing was deferred until
after the filing of the action for quieting of
title. 5
On June 17, 1965, the court declared the
defendants in default for their failure to
appeal at the hearing set for that day and
directed the plaintiffs to present evidence
to support their claim. 6 On September 17,
1965, the court rendered a decision and a
writ of execution was issued thereafter. 7
Because of this, Cesario Adarne filed the
present complaint against the respondent
Atty. Damian V. Aldaba on August 3, 1967,
praying:
Dahil dito, isinusumbong ko po ang aking
Abogado ng "Mal practice" pabaya at
pahamak sa kliente at sinisingil ko po siya
ng pinsala katumbas sa sinisingil sa kin ng
akin kalaban. O kaya lakarin niya na
mapigil and decision ng Hukom sa C.F.I. at
ulitin and hearing sa Forcible Entry. Kung
hindi niya magagawa ito, ipinauubaya ko
na po sa kataas taasan Hukoman and
paglapat ng parusa. Sapagkat kung hindi p
susugpo-in and masamang gawa naito ng
Page 58 of 131
mga ibang abogado na nabibili, lalala
and sakit naito sa profession ng mga
abogado, at lilikha ng maraming api, at
habang naghahari and pang-aapi,
lalaganap and kriminalidad ng walang
tigil, at walang katahimikan ang ating
Demukrasya, at kung magkakagayon ang
mga mamamayan at sapilitan sa
kumunista sasamba.
The respondent denied that he ever had
any agreement with the complainant with
respect to the handling of the latter's case
in the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
Carigara Branch, except for the "special
appearance" that he entered for the
complainant on August 7, 1961 and
October 23, 1964, in view of the non-
availability of the complainant's lawyers
on said dates.
The case referred to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and
8
recommendation, after which a
complaint for the disbarment of the
respondent attorney was filed. 9
The judgment by default rendered against
the complainant cannot be attributed to
the respondent attorney. The blame lies
with the complainant for having engaged
the services of several lawyers to handle
his case without formally withdrawing the
authority he had given to them to appear
in his behalf as to place the responsibility
upon the respondent. To add to the
confusion, the complainant had also
requested the clerk of court of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte that he
(complainant) be furnished with summons
and subpoena accorded to him. 10 He also
filed a motion by himself, 11 thus implying
that he was handling his case personally.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
It appears that there have been three
changes made of the attorneys for the
complainant in the forcible entry case. The
complainant was originally represented by
Atty. Isauro Marmita who, upon his
appointment to the Department of Labor,
engaged Atty. de Veyra to take his
place. 12 Then came Atty. Arturo Mirales
and later, Atty. Generoso Casimpan.
However, no formalities whatever were
observed in those changes such that the
respondent entered a "special
appearance" for the complainant in order
that he could ask for the dismissal of the
case for the failure of the adverse party to
prosecute. The rule followed on matters of
substitution of attorneys as laid down by
this Court is that no substitution of
attorneys will be allowed unless there be
filed: (1) a written application for such
substitution; (2) the written consent of the
client; (3) the written consent of the
attorney substituted; and (4) in case such
written consent can not be secured, there
must be filed with the application proof of
service of notice of such motion upon the
attorney to be substituted, in the manner
prescribed by the rules. Unless the
foregoing formalities are complied with,
substitution will not be permitted, and the
attorney who properly appeared last in the
cause, before such application for
substitution, will be regarded as the
attorney of record and will be held
responsible for the proper conduct of the
cause. 13
Besides, the respondent honestly believed
that he had appeared for the complainant
only for a special purpose and that the
complainant had agreed to contact his
attorney of record to handle his case after
the hearing of October 23, 1964, so that
he did nothing more about it. 14 It was
Page 59 of 131
neither gross negligence nor omission to
have entertained such belief. An attorney
is not bound to exercise extraordinary
diligence, but only a reasonable degree of
care and skill, having reference to the
character of the business he undertakes to
do. Prone to err like any other human
being, he is not answerable for every error
or mistake, and will be protected as long
as he acts honestly and in good faith to
the best of his skill and knowledge.
It is well settled that in disbarment
proceedings, the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant and for the Court to
exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent attorney must be
established by convincing proof. In the
instant case, there is no sufficient proof to
warrant the disbarment of the respondent
attorney. Neither is there culpable
malpractice to justify his suspension.
WHEREFORE, the present administrative
complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
filart_1919 September 27, 1919
In re the complaint against Attorney
ANACLETO FILART.
Acting Attorney-General Feria for the
Government.
The respondent in his own behalf.
MALCOLM, J.:
These proceedings were instituted at the
instance of thirty-seven residents of
Asingan, Pangasinan, who filed a
complaint against attorney Anacleto
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
Filart for malpractice, alleging in
substance:
1. That while Filart was deputy fiscal of
Pangasinan he received of them the sum
of P111 as fees for drafting a
memorandum in connection with
Registration Case No. 3, Record No. 8540;
2. That Filart was guilty of fraud and
negligence in prosecuting the appeal to
the Supreme Court, he having practically
abandoned the case.
In connection with point No. 1, even
admitting that Filart while deputy fiscal
received such a sum of complainants,
which respondent denies, Filart seems to
have had a legal right to receive
compensation as an attorney, the office of
deputy provincial fiscal not being
specifically included in section 36 of the
Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act
No. 1702, as an official who shall not
engage in private practice. It is also to be
noted that Filart did not take up the case
of his own volition but was ordered by the
court to defend the rights of petitioners
because the attorney they formerly
retained was almost always in a state of
intoxication.
In connection with point No. 2, the
following facts are important:
1. That having resigned as deputy fiscal,
and having engaged in the practice of law,
complainants asked Filart to prosecute the
appeal of their case;
2. That Filart received from complainants
sums of money, P780 according to
complainants, and P160 according to
respondent;
Page 60 of 131
3. That the complainants were driven from
their lands, and their houses were
destroyed, by order of the court.
The facts which support the allegation of
fraud and negligence on the part of
respondent are:
1. The lapse of fifty-one days between the
receipt of notice of denial of motion for a
new trial (March 7, 1917) until the filing of
the bill of exceptions (April 27, 1917)
when the statutory period is only thirty
days (Act No. 2347), sec. 26);
2. Failure to perfect a satisfactory bill of
exceptions after repeated amendments
and re-amendments;
3. Failure to file a bond in order to prevent
execution;
4. Assurances made by respondent that all
was right.
1. This is explained by the fact that the
record was not in the clerk's office. The
date when the answers to Filart's
questions from the Land Registration
Office reached Filart, which were to be
made a part of the bill of exceptions, does
not appear in the record. Filart also alleges
he made an oral motion to extend the
period fixed by law for the filing of the bill
of exceptions, but that motion appears to
have been overlooked by the judge;
2. The parties are agreed that the bills of
exceptions are voluminous. Respondent
further pleads pressure of work in his law
office;
3. Respondent says that he believed
execution would not be valid until after
certiorari proceedings were decided;
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
4. The exact nature of the assurances do
not clearly appear in the record possibly
they are no more than what an attorney
fairly confident of success would make to
a client.
The Acting Attorney-General believes that
the facts are not sufficient to support the
complaint, and recommends dismissal of
the case. We agree to the extent that
such gross misconduct or negligence
has not been shown as warrants
disbarment or suspension pursuant
to sections 21 and 22 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. "That part of the
profession," said Lord Mansfield in Pitt vs.
Yalden, ([1767], 4 Burr., 2060), "which is
carried on by attorneys is liberal and
reputable, as well as useful to the public,
when they conduct themselves with honor
and integrity; and they ought to be
protected when they act to the best of
their skill and knowledge. But every man
is liable to error; and I should be very sorry
that it should be taken for granted that an
attorney is answerable for every error or
mistake. . . . A counsel may mistake as
well as an attorney. . . . Yet no one will say
that a counsel who has been mistaken
shall be charged. . . . Not only counsel but
judges may differ, or doubt, or take time
to consider. Therefore, an attorney ought
not to be liable in case of reasonable
doubt." "No attorney," said Chief Justice
Abbott, "is bound to know all the law; God
forbid that it should be imagined that an
attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is
bound to know all the law."
(Montorious vs. Jeffreys, 2 Car. & P., 113.)
The court, having in mind the many
appeals which have been dismissed
because of the lack of diligence of
counsel, cannot let the occurrence pass
without expressing a strong disapproval of
Page 61 of 131
such criminal carelessness. While we
would not wish to assume a harsh and
uncompromising attitude towards
attorneys-at-law, we would wish for them
to know that by indulging in such
unprofessional tactics they become
unworthy of the trust which the law
reposes in them. The lack of due care is a
breach of the attorney's undertaking with
his client, and is indicative of a disregard
of the attorney's duties to the court. We
bring to the notice of clients whose rights
have been prejudiced by the failure or by
the delay of an attorney in preparing or
filing pleadings necessary in the proper
conduct of a cause, and in taking such
steps as may be required in the progress
of the case, that the client who has
suffered damages as the result of his
attorney's negligence or misconduct may
recover therefor. In Drais vs.
Hoggan ([1875], 50 Cal., 121), although
many other cases might be cited, it was
held that "if a judgment is obtained
against a party upon a complaint which is
radically defective, and he desires to
appeal, and procures bondsmen, but his
attorney neglects to do so until the time
for appeal expires, the attorney is guilty of
gross negligence, and is liable for the loss
sustained by the client."
Without, therefore, desiring especially to
overemphasize the dereliction of Attorney
Anacleto Filart for, sad to relate, he is only
one of a class, it does become our solemn
duty to reprimand him for
carelessness and misconduct in
attending to the cause of poor
clients. Let a copy of this order be
furnished to the respondent for his
information with a warning that a more
severe punishment will be meted out to
him in case of a repetition of similar acts
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17

and omissions; and let a copy hereof be "reconveyance" (Civil Case No. 83-
filed with his personal papers in this court. 18877). During their initial meeting,
So ordered. complainant tried to reconstruct before
respondent lawyer the incidents of the
case merely from memory prompting the
latter to ask complainant to instead return
at another time with the records of the
case. On 30 January 1987, complainant
again saw respondent but still sans the
records. Complainant requested
respondent to accept the case, paying to
the latter the sum of P1,750.00
representing the acceptance fee
of P1,500.00 and P250.00 retainer fee for
January 1987. Respondent averred that he
[A.C. No. 3455. April 14, 1998] accepted the money with much reluctance
and only upon the condition that
ARSENIO A. complainant would get the records of the
VILLAFUERTE, complainant, case from, as well as secure the
vs. ATTY. DANTE H. withdrawal of appearance of, Atty. Jose
CORTEZ, respondent. Dizon, the former counsel of
complainant. Allegedly, complainant never
showed up thereafter until November
1989 when he went to the office of
RESOLUTION respondent lawyer but only to leave a
copy of a writ of execution in Civil Case
VITUG, J.:
No. 062160-CV, a case for ejectment,
which, according to respondent, was never
Feeling aggrieved by what he
priorly mentioned to him by
perceives to be a neglect in the handling
complainant. Indeed, said respondent, he
of his cases by respondent lawyer, despite
had never entered his appearance in the
the latter's receipt of P1,750.00
aforenumbered case.
acceptance and retainer fees, complainant
Arsenio A. Villafuerte seeks, in the instant
In its report, IBP-CBD concluded that
proceedings, the disbarment of Atty. Dante
the facts established would just the same
H. Cortez.
indicate sufficiently a case of neglect of
duty on the part of respondent. The CBD
From the records of the case and the
rejected the excuse proffered by
Report submitted by the Commission on
respondent that the non-receipt of the
Bar Discipline ("CBD") of the Integrated
records of the case justified his failure to
Bar of the Philippines ("IBP"), it would
represent complainant. The IBP-CBD,
appear that sometime in January 1987,
through Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo,
complainant, upon the referral of Atty.
recommended to the IBP Board of
Rene A. V. Saguisag, went to the office of
Governors the suspension of respondent
respondent lawyer to discuss his case for

Page 62 of 131
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
from the practice of law for three months
with a warning that a repetition of similar
acts could be dealt with more severely
than a mere 3-month suspension.
On 30 August 1996, the IBP Board of
Governors passed Resolution No. XII-96-
191 which -
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it
is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, hereinmade part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex `A;' and,
finding the recommendation therein to be
fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules,
Respondent Atty. Dante Cortez is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) months with a warning that a
repetition of the acts/omission complained
of will be dealt with more severely."[1]
Both respondent lawyer and
complainant filed with the IBP-CBD their
respective motions for the reconsideration
of the foregoing resolution.
On 23 August 1997, the Board of
Governors passed Resolution No. XII-97-66
that -
"RESOLVED to CONFIRM Resolution NO.
XII-96-191 of the Board of Governors
Meeting dated August 30, 1996
SUSPENDING Atty. Dante Cortez from
the practice of law for three (3)
months with a warning that repetition
of the acts/omission complained of will
be dealt with more severely."[2]
The Court agrees with the IBP-CBD in
its findings and conclusion that
Page 63 of 131
respondent lawyer has somehow been
remiss in his responsibilities.
The Court is convinced that a lawyer-
client relationship, given the
circumstances, has arisen between
respondent and complainant. Respondent
lawyer has admitted having received the
amount of P1,750.00, including its nature
and purpose, from complainant. His
acceptance of the payment effectively
bars him from altogether disclaiming the
existence of an attorney-client relationship
between them. It would not matter really
whether the money has been intended to
pertain only to Civil Case No. 83-18877 or
to include Civil Case No. 062160-CV, there
being no showing, in any event, that
respondent lawyer has attended to either
of said cases. It would seem that he hardly
has exerted any effort to find out what
might have happened to his client's
cases. A lawyer's fidelity to the cause of
his client requires him to be ever mindful
of the responsibilities that should be
expected of him.[3] He is mandated to
exert his best efforts to protect, within the
bounds of the law, the interests of his
client. The Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot be any clearer in
its dictum than when it has stated that a
"lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence,"[4] decreeing
further that he "shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him."[5]
Complainant, nevertheless, is not
entirely without fault himself. He cannot
expect his case to be properly and
intelligently handled without listening to
his own counsel and extending full
cooperation to him. It is not right for
complainant to wait for almost two years
and to deal with his lawyer only after
receiving an adverse decision.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
All considered, the Court deems it
proper to reduce the recommended period
of suspension of the IBP from three
months to one month.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Dante H. Cortez is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one month from notice
hereof, with a warning that a repetition of
similar acts and other administrative
lapses will be dealt with more severely
than presently.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made
a part of the personal records of
respondent lawyer in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines, and let copies thereof be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 620 March 21, 1974
JOSE ALCALA and AVELINA
IMPERIAL, petitioners, vs.
HONESTO DE VERA, respondent.
MUOZ PALMA, J.:p
On May 19, 1964, Jose Alcala (now
deceased) and his wife, Avelina Imperial,
filed this present petition for disbarment
against respondent Honesto de Vera, a
practicing attorney of Locsin, Albay, who
was retained by them as their counsel in
civil case 2478 of the Court of First
Instance of Albay, entitled: "Ray
Semenchuk vs. Jose Alcala".
Page 64 of 131
Complainants charge Atty. Honesto de
Vera with gross negligence and
malpractice: 1) for having maliciously and
deliberately omitted to notify them of the
decision in civil case 2478 resulting in the
deprivation of their right to appeal from
the adverse judgment rendered against
them; and 2) for respondent's indifference,
disloyalty and lack of interest in
petitioners' cause resulting to their
damage and prejudice.
Respondent attorney, in his answer to
these charges, asserted that he notified
his clients of the decision in question and
that he defended complainants' case to
the best of his ability as demanded by the
circumstances and that he never showed
indifference, lack of interest or disloyalty
to their cause.
The Solicitor General, to whom this Court
referred this case for investigation, report
and recommendation, substantially found
the following:
Civil case 2478 was an action for
annulment of a sale of two parcels of land
(lots Nos. 1880 and 1883 covered by TCT
Nos. T-12392 and 12393 respectively) filed
by the vendee, Ray Semenchuk, against
the vendors, spouses Alcala, on the
ground that lot 1880 "could not be located
or did not exist", and for the recovery of
damages and attorney's fees.
Respondent attorney, whose legal services
were engaged by complainants, filed an
answer denying the material allegations of
the above-mentioned complaint and
setting up a counterclaim for the balance
of the purchase price of the lots sold, the
expenses of notarials, internal revenue,
registration, etc. plus damages and
attorney's fees.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
On April 17, 1963, the trial court rendered
judgment rescinding the contract of sale,
on the ground that the vendee Semenchuk
was not able to take material possession
of lot 1880 it being in the possession of a
certain Ruperto Ludovice and his brothers
who have been occupying the land for a
number of years. The dispositive portion of
the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the deed of sale
(Exhibit A) rescinded;
(b) Directing the plaintiff to
deliver to the defendants the
possession of lot No. 1883.
(c) Ordering the defendants to
return to the plaintiff the sum
of P1,000.00 after deducting
the amount of P250.00 which
is the consideration in the
deed of sale of Lot No. 185;
and
(d) Without pronouncement as
to costs. (p. 11, rollo)
On April 19, 1963, respondent Atty. de
Vera received a copy of the decision but
he failed to inform his clients of the
judgment against them. On July 17, 1963,
a sheriff came to complainants' house to
serve a writ of execution issued in said
case. Totally caught by surprise, Jose
Alcala immediately wrote to the trial court
and inquired for the status of case 2478.
The deputy Clerk of Court, in his reply
dated July 22, 1963, informed Alcala that
the case was decided on April 17, 1963,
that a copy of the decision was received
by respondent attorney on April 19, 1963,
Page 65 of 131
and that since no appeal was taken, a writ
of execution was issued by the trial court
on motion of the plaintiff Semenchuk.
On September 12, 1963, spouses Alcala
instituted civil case 2723 for damages
against Atty. Honesto de Vera for having
failed to inform them of the decision in
case 2478 as a result of which they lost
their right to appeal from said decision.
The trial court that heard case 2723 found
for a fact that respondent did not inform
his clients of the decision rendered in case
2478; however, it denied damages for lack
of proof that the spouses Alcala suffered
any damage as a result of respondent's
failure to notify them of the aforesaid
decision. The judgment in case 2723 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals 1 by
respondent herein but the same was
affirmed by said appellate court.
Not content with having filed case 2723,
complainants instituted this complaint for
disbarment against their former counsel.
1. "Indifference, loyalty, and lack of
interest" of respondent in the handling of
complainants' defense in civil case 2478.
The basis of this particular charge is the
alleged failure of Atty. de Vera to present
at the trial of case 2478 certain
documents which according to the
complainants could have proven that lot
1880 actually existed, to wit: a sketch of
lot 1880 prepared by the vendee,
Semenchuk, himself (Exh. L-Adm. Case);
technical description of lot 1880 taken
from complainants' certificate of title (Exh.
M-Adm. Case); sketch plan of lot 1880 in
relation to the adjoining lots prepared by
surveyor Miguel N. Romero (Exh. N-Adm
Case); a receipt for P10.00 issued by
surveyor Romero for the preparation of the
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
sketch, Exh. N (Exh. O-Adm. Case) all of
which documents were turned over by
Jose Alcala to respondent before the trial
of case 2478.
We agree with the Solicitor General that
there is no merit to this particular charge.
The records of case 2478 show that upon
agreement of the parties and their
attorneys, the trial court appointed a
commissioner to relocate lot 1880 and
after conducting such relocation, the
commissioner reported to the Courtthat
the lot existed, but that the same was in
the possession of other persons. Inasmuch
as the existence of lot 1880 had already
been verified by the commissioner, it was
therefore unnecessary for respondent
attorney to introduce in evidence Exhibits
"L", "M", "N", and "O", the purpose of
which was merely to prove the existence
of said lot. If the complaint for rescission
prospered it was because of complainant
Alcala's failure to comply with his
obligation of transferring the material or
physical possession of lot 1880 to the
vendee and for no other reason; hence,
complainants had nobody to blame but
themselves. The fact that the plaintiff,
Semenchuk, was not awarded any
damages, attorney's fees, and costs shows
that respondent attorney exerted his
utmost to resist plaintiff's complaint.
2. Gross negligence and malpractice
committed by respondent for failure to
inform his clients of the decision in case
2478:
The matter in dispute with respect to this
specific charge is whether or not
respondent notified his clients, the
complainants herein, about the decision in
case 2478. Respondent claims that he did
Page 66 of 131
inform his clients of the decision;
complainants insist the contrary.
We agree with the Solicitor General that
there is sufficient evidence on hand to
prove that respondent neglected to
acquaint his clients of the decision in case
2478.
As stated in the Solicitor General's report,
the reaction of complainant Jose Alcala
when the writ of execution in said civil
case was served upon him and his wife by
a sheriff was such that it betrayed a total
unawareness of the adverse decision. The
evidence shows that when he was told
about the sheriff's visit, Jose Alcala
immediately inquired from the trial Court
the reason for the writ of execution and it
was only then that he was informed that a
decision had been rendered, that his
lawyer received a copy thereof since April
19, 1963, and because no appeal was
taken the judgment became final and
executory. Alcala then sought the help of
his brother, Atty. Ernesto Alcala, in Manila
and the latter wrote to respondent
inquiring as to what steps were taken, if
any, to prosecute an appeal from the
decision in question but respondent chose
not to answer the letter. Thereafter, Alcala
instituted an action for damages and filed
the instant complaint for disbarment.
As aptly observed by the Solicitor General:
Again, we do not think
petitioner Alcala would have
felt so aggrieved and
embittered by the loss of his
right to appeal the decision in
Civil Case No. 2478 so as to
take all these legal steps
against respondent, with all
the attendant trouble and
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17

expense in doing so, if it is not respondent from the decision

true, as he alleged, that the of the trial court in C.C. No.
latter indeed did not notify 2723), found that respondent
him of said decision. We actually did not inform
believe and so submit, petitioners of the decision in
therefore, that respondent Civil Case No. 2478, still both
really failed to inform courts also held that
petitioners of the decision in petitioners did not sustain any
Civil Case No. 2478, and this damages as a result of said
was also the finding made by decision, for which reason the
the Court of First Instance of trial court dismissed
Albay in its decision in Civil petitioners' action for
Case No. 2723 for damages damages against respondent,
filed by petitioners against which dismissal was affirmed
respondent, and by the Court by the Court of Appeals. We
of Appeals in the appeal taken quote the finding of the Court
by respondent from said of First Instance of Albay in its
decision. (pp. 38-39, rollo) decision in Civil Case No. 2723
in this regard:
Is respondent's failure to notify his clients
of the decision sufficient cause for his The second issue
disbarment? Complainants answer the that has to be
question in the affirmative, while on the passed upon by
other hand, respondent prays that he be the Court is
exonerated because, according to him, neither the
granting arguendo that he failed to inform plaintiffs are
the complainants about the decision, the entitled to
truth is that said decision was fair and just damages. On this
and no damage was caused to issue, the Court
complainants by reason thereof. finds that the
plaintiffs cannot
On this point, We agree with the following recover damages
appraisal of the evidence by the Solicitor from defendant
General: Atty. Honesto de
Vera. No evidence
In this connection, it is indeed has been
true that although both the presented that
Court of First Instance of they sustained
Albay, in Civil Case No. 2723 damages of the
for damages filed by decision. Neither it
petitioners against respondent has been shown
Atty. De Vera (pp. 30-34, Exh. that the decision is
"D", id.), and the Court of not supported by
Appeals, in C.A.-G.R. No. the facts and the
35267-R (the appeal taken by

Page 67 of 131
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17

law applicable to like

the case. any
Consequently, the other
plaintiffs are not human
entitled to being,
damages because he is
of the failure of answe
Atty. Honesto de rable
Vera to inform to
them of the every
decision. error
or
"An mistak
attorn e, and
ey is will be
not protect
bound ed as
to long
exercis as he
e acts
extrao honest
rdinary ly and
diligen in
ce, but good
only a faith to
reason the
able best of
degree his
of care skill
and and
skill, knowle
having dge.
refere Moreo
nce to ver, a
the party
charac seekin
ter of g
the damag
busine es
ss he resulti
undert ng
akes from a
to do. judgm
Fallible ent

Page 68 of 131
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17

advers n.
e to (Tuzon
him vs.
which Donat
becam o, 58
e final O.G.
by 6480).
reason "
of the
allege (Exh.
d fault "D", id.
or ; pp.
neglig 33-34)
ence
of his Significantly, petitioners did
lawyer not appeal from the above
must decision, which is an implied
prove acceptance by them of the
his correctness of the findings
loss therein. Instead, it was
due to respondent Atty. De Vera who
the appealed said decision to the
injustic Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No.
e of 35267-R), and the latter Court,
the although agreeing with the
decisio finding of the trial court that
n. He respondent really did not
cannot inform petitioners of the
base decision in Civil Case No. 2478
his (Exh. "T"), affirmed, however,
action the lower court's finding that
on the petitioners were not entitled to
unsubs the damages claimed by them
tantiat by reason of respondent's
ed and failure to notify them of the
arbitra decision in Civil Case No.
ry 2478. ... While the rule of res
suppos judicata in civil or criminal
ition of cases is not, strictly speaking,
the applicable in disbarment
injustic proceedings, which is neither
e of a civil or a criminal proceeding
the intended to punish a lawyer or
decisio afford redress to private
grievances but is a

Page 69 of 131
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
proceeding sui
generis intended to safeguard
the administration of justice
by removing from the legal
profession a person who has
proved himself unfit to
exercise such trust (p. 207,
Martin, Legal and Judicial
Ethics; Re Keenan, 86 ALR
679; De Jesus-Paras vs.
Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439,
April 12, 1961; In re Montague
& Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577,
588), still we consider the
findings of the trial court as
well as of the Court of Appeals
in the damage, suit filed by
petitioners against respondent
Atty. De Vera based on the
same grounds now invoked in
this disbarment case relevant
and highly persuasive in this
case, especially as petitioners
themselves have, as already
observed, accepted and
admitted the correctness of
said findings. And we may add
that we ourselves agree with
respondent that petitioners
had not been prejudiced or
damaged in any way by the
decision in Civil Case No.
2478, but that said decision
appears in fact to be more
favorable to them than could
have been the case if the trial
court had applied the law
strictly against them in said
case, ... (pp. 17-19, Report.
pp. 39-41, rollo; emphasis
supplied).
The Solicitor General's Report continues
and says:
Page 70 of 131
True it is that petitioners do
not appear to have suffered
any material or pecuniary
damage by the failure of
respondent Atty. De Vera to
notify them of the decision in
Civil Case No. 2478. It is no
less true, however, that in
failing to inform his clients,
the petitioners, of the decision
in said civil case, respondent
failed to exercise "such skill,
care, and diligence as men of
the legal profession commonly
possess and exercise in such
matters of professional
employment" (7 C.J.S. 979).
The relationship of lawyer-
client being one of confidence,
there is ever present the need
for the client's being
adequately and fully informed
and should not be left in the
dark as to the mode and
manner in which his interests
are being defended. It is only
thus that their faith in counsel
may remain unimpaired
(Oparel, Sr. vs. Aberia Adm.
Case No. 595, July 30, 1971).
As it happened in this case,
because of respondent's
failure to notify petitioners of
the decision in Civil Case No.
2478, the latter were entirely
caught by surprise, resulting in
shock and mental and
emotional disturbance to
them, when the sheriff
suddenly showed up in their
home with a writ of execution
of a judgment that they never
knew had been rendered in
the case, since their lawyer,
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
the respondent, had totally
failed to inform them about
the same. ... (pp. 23-24,
Report, pp. 45-46, rollo;
emphasis supplied).
We concur with the above-quoted
observations and add that the correctness
of the decision in case 2478 is no ground
for exonerating respondent of the charge
but at most will serve only to mitigate his
liability. While there is no finding of malice,
deceit, or deliberate intent to cause
damage to his clients, there is,
nonetheless, proof of negligence,
inattention, and carelessness on the part
of respondent in his failure to give timely
notice of the decision in question.
Fortunately for respondent, his negligence
did not result in any material or pecuniary
damage to the herein complainants and
for this reason We are not disposed to
impose upon him what may be considered
in a lawyer's career as the extreme
penalty of disbarment. As stated in the
very early case of In Re Macdougall:
The disbarment of an attorney
is not intended as a bench should be preserved.
punishment, but is rather
intended to protect the
administration of justice by
requiring that those who
exercise this important
function shall be competent,
honorable, and reliable; men
in whom courts and clients
may repose confidence. This
purpose should be borne in
mind in the exercise of
disbarment, and the power
should be exercised with that
caution which the serious
consequences of the action
involves.
Page 71 of 131
The profession of an attorney
is acquired after long and
laborious study. It is a lifetime
profession. By years of
patience, zeal, and ability, the
attorney may have acquired a
fixed means of support for
himself and family of great
pecuniary value, and the
deprivation of which would
result in irreparable injury. (3
Phil. 70, 77-78)
In the words of former Chief Justice
Marshall of the United States Court:
On one hand, the profession of
an attorney is of great
importance to an individual
and the prosperity of his whole
life may depend on its
exercise. The right to exercise
it ought not to be lightly or
capriciously taken from him.
On the other, it is extremely
that the respectability of the
bar should be maintained and
that its harmony with the
For these objects, some
controlling power, some
discretion, ought to reside in
the Court. This discretion,
ought to be exercised with
great moderation and
judgment; but it must be
exercised. (Ex parte Burr. 9
Wheat 529; Martin, Legal &
Judicial Ethics 1972 Ed. p.
213.)
Although respondent's negligence does
not warrant disbarment or suspension
under the circumstances of the case,
nonetheless it cannot escape a rebuke
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
from Us as we hereby rebuke and censure
him, considering that his failure to notify
his clients of the decision in question
manifests a lack of total dedication or
devotion to their interest expected of him
under his lawyer's oath and the Canons of
Professional Ethics. Respondent's inaction
merits a severe censure from the Court.
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence,
the report and recommendation of the
Solicitor General, and the fact that this
appears to be the first misconduct of
respondent in the exercise of his legal
profession, We hereby hold said
respondent GUILTY only of simple
negligence in the performance of his
duties as a lawyer of complainants, and
We hereby SEVERELY CENSURE him. Let
this decision be noted in respondent's
record as a member of the Bar in this
Court.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-18148 February 28,
1963
DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of
the testate estate of the deceased
EUSEBIO CAPILI; and the instituted
heirs, namely: ARMANDO CAPILI and
ARTURO BERNARDO, ET
AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE
HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMOGENA
REYES, namely: FRANCISCO REYES,
Page 72 of 131
ET AL., and JOSE ISIDORO, ET
AL., respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla Law Offices for
petitioners.
Romerico F. Flores for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition by certiorari for the
review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan holding that the
probate court in Special Proceeding 1101
had jurisdiction to determine the validity
of the deed of donation in question and to
pass upon the question of title or
ownership of the properties mentioned
therein.
The facts are briefly stated in the
appealed decision of the Court of Appeals
as follows:
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena
Reyes were husband and wife. The
first died on July 27, 1958 and a
testate proceeding for the
settlement of his estate was
instituted in the Court of the Fist
Instance of Bulacan. His will was
admitted to probate on October 9,
1958, disposing of his properties in
favor of his widow; his cousins
Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura,
all surnamed Capili; and Arturo,
Deogracias and Eduardo, all
surnamed Bernardo. Hermogena
Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959.
Upon petition of Deogracias
Bernardo, executor of the estate of
the deceased Eusebio Capili, she
was substituted by her collateral
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
relatives and intestate heirs,
namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco
and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes;
and Jose, Constancia, Raymunda
and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.
On June 12, 1959, the executor filed
a project of partition in the testate
proceeding in accordance with the
terms of the will, adjudicating the
estate of Eusebio Capili among the
testamentary heirs with the
exception of Hermogena Reyes,
whose share was alloted to her
collateral relatives aforementioned.
On June 16, 1959 these relatives
filed an opposition to the executor's
project of partition and submitted a
counter-project of partition of their
own, claiming 1/2 of the properties
mentioned in the will of the
deceased Eusebio Capili on the
theory that they belonged not to the
latter alone but to the conjugal
partnership of the spouses.
The probate court, in two orders
dated June 24, 1959 and February
10, 1960, respectively, set the two
projects of partition for hearing, at
which evidence was presented by
the parties, followed by the
submission of memoranda
discussing certain legal issues. In
the memorandum for the executor
and the instituted heirs it was
contended: (1) that the properties
disposed of in the will of the
deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to
him exclusively and not to the
conjugal partnership, because
Hermogena Reyes had donated to
him her half share of such
partnership; (2) that the collateral
heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no
Page 73 of 131
lawful standing or grounds to
question the validity of the donation;
and (3) that even assuming that
they could question the validity of
the donation, the same must be
litigated not in the testate
proceeding but in a separate civil
action.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully
pray that the foregoing stipulation of
facts be admitted and approved by
this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing
other evidence to prove their case
not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1wph1.t
The oppositors and heirs of
Hermogena Reyes, on their part,
argued that the deed of donation
itself was determinative of the
original conjugal character to the
properties, aside from the legal
presumption laid down in Article 160
of the Civil Code, and that since the
donation was null and void the
deceased Eusebio Capili did not
become owner of the share of his
wife and therefore could not validly
dispose of it in his will.
On September 14, 1960, the probate
court, the Honorable M. Mejia
presiding, issued an order declaring
the donation void without making
any specific finding as to its juridical
nature, that is, whether it was inter
vivos or mortis causa, for the reason
that, considered under the first
category, it falls under Article 133 of
the Civil Code, which prohibits
donations between spouses during
the marriage; and considered under
the second category, it does not
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
comply with the formalities of a will
as required by Article 728 in relation
to Article 805 of the same Code,
there being no attestation clause. In
the same order the court
disapproved both projects of
partition and directed the executor
to file another," dividing the
property mentioned in the last will
and testament of the deceased
Eusebio Capili and the properties
mentioned in the deed of donation,
Exhibit B, between the instituted
heirs of the deceased Eusebio Capili
and the legal heirs of the deceased
Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis
that the said properties were
conjugal properties of the deceased
spouses." On September 27, 1960,
the executor filed a motion for new
trial, reiterating and emphasizing
the contention previously raised in
their memorandum that the probate
court had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the claim of the legal
heirs of Hermogena Reyes involving
title to the properties mentioned in
the will of Eusebio Capili and taking
exception to the court's declaration
of the nullity of the donation
"without stating facts or provision of
law on which it was based." The
motion for new trial was denied in
an order dated October 3, 1960.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the
order appealed from being affirmed,
petitioners filed this present petition for
review by certiorari.
Page 74 of 131
The petitioners-appellants contend that
the appellate court erred in not declaring
that the probate court, having limited and
special jurisdiction, had generally no
power to adjudicate title and erred in
applying the exception to the rule.
In a line of decisions, this Court
consistently held that as a general rule,
question as to title to property cannot be
passed upon on testate or intestate
proceedings,"1 except where one of the
parties prays merely for the inclusion or
exclusion from the inventory of the
property, in which case the probate court
may pass provisionally upon the question
without prejudice to its final determination
in a separate action.2 However, we have
also held that when the parties interested
are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional
to them to submit to the probate court a
question as to title to property, and when
so submitted, said probate court may
definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual
v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Manalac v.
Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661); and that
with the consent of the parties, matters
affecting property under judicial
administration may be taken cognizance
of by the court in the course of intestate
proceeding, provided interests of third
persons are not prejudiced (Cunanan v.
Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).
In the light of this doctrine, may it be said
correctly that the trial court as well as the
Court of Appeals erred in upholding the
power of the probate court in this case to
adjudicate in the testate proceedings, the
question as to whether the properties
herein involved belong to the conjugal
partnership of Eusebio Capili and
Hermogena Reyes, or to the deceased
husband exclusively?
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
At the outset, let it be clarified that the
matter at issue is not a question of
jurisdiction, in the sense advanced by
appellants that the trial court had
completely no authority to pass upon the
title to the lands in dispute, and that its
decision on the subject is null and void
and does not bind even those who had
invoked its authority and submitted to its
decision because, it is contended,
jurisdiction is a creature of law and parties
to an action can not vest, extend or
broaden it. If appellants' contention is
correct, then there can be no exception to
the no-jurisdiction theory. But as has been
stated in the case of Cunanan v.
Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court
speaking through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason:
"Determination of title to property is
within the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance. The responding Soriano's
objection (that the probate court lacked
jurisdiction to order the delivery of the
possession of the lots to the estate)
relates exclusively to the procedure, which
is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only
personal rights to a mode of practice (the
filing of an independent ordinary action)
which may be waived". Strictly speaking,
it is more a question of jurisdiction over
the person, not over the subject matter,
for the jurisdiction to try controversies
between heirs of a deceased person
regarding the ownership of properties
alleged to belong to his estate, has been
recognized to be vested in probate courts.
This is so because the purpose of an
administration proceeding is the
liquidation of the estate and distribution of
the residue among the heirs and legatees.
Liquidation means determination of all the
assets of the estate and payment of all the
debts and expenses.3 Thereafter,
distribution is made of the decedent's
Page 75 of 131
liquidated estate among the persons
entitled to succeed him. The proceeding is
in the nature of an action of partition, in
which each party is required to bring into
the mass whatever community property
he has in his possession. To this end, and
as a necessary corollary, the interested
parties may introduce proofs relative to
the ownership of the properties in dispute.
All the heirs who take part in the
distribution of the decedent's estate are
before the court, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and
incidents necessary to the complete
settlement of such estate, so long as no
interests of third parties are affected.4
In the case now before us, the matter in
controversy is the question of ownership
of certain of the properties involved
whether they belong to the conjugal
partnership or to the husband exclusively.
This is a matter properly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court which
necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order to determine the
estate of the decedent which is to be
distributed among his heirs who are all
parties to the proceedings, including, of
course, the widow, now represented
because of her death, by her heirs who
have been substituted upon petition of the
executor himself and who have appeared
voluntarily. There are no third parties
whose rights may be affected. It is true
that the heirs of the deceased widow are
not heirs of the testator-husband, but the
widow is, in addition to her own right to
the conjugal property. And it is this right
that is being sought to be enforced by her
substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is
being asserted is one belonging to an heir
to the testator and, consequently, it
complies with the requirement of the
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
exception that the parties interested (the
petitioners and the widow, represented by
dents) are all heirs claiming title under the
testator.
Petitioners contend additionally that they
have never submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the probate court, for the
purpose of the determination of the
question of ownership of the disputed
properties. This is not borne by the
admitted facts. On the contrary, it is
undisputed that they were the ones who
presented the project of partition claiming
the questioned properties as part of the
testator's asset. The respondents, as
representatives or substitutes of the
deceased widow opposed the project of
partition and submitted another. As the
Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of
them must be deemed to have submitted
the issue for resolution in the same
proceeding. Certainly, the petitioners can
not be heard to insist, as they do, on the
approval of their project of partition and,
thus, have the court take it for granted
that their theory as to the character of the
properties is correct, entirely without
regard to the opposition of the
respondents". In other words, by
presenting their project of partition
including therein the disputed lands (upon
the claim that they were donated by the
wife to her husband), petitioners
themselves put in issue the question of
ownership of the properties which is
well within the competence of the probate
court and just because of an opposition
thereto, they can not thereafter withdraw
either their appearance or the issue from
the jurisdiction of the court. Certainly,
there is here a waiver where the parties
who raise the objection are the ones who
set the court in motion.5 They can not be
Page 76 of 131
permitted to complain if the court, after
due hearing, adjudges question against
them.6
Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that
appellees are estopped to raise the
question of ownership of the properties
involved because the widow herself,
during her lifetime, not only did not object
to the inclusion of these properties in the
inventory of the assets of her deceased
husband, but also signed an extra-judicial
partition of those inventoried properties.
But the very authorities cited by
appellants require that to constitute
estoppel, the actor must have knowledge
of the facts and be appraised of his rights
at the time he performs the act
constituting estoppel, because silence
without knowledge works no estoppel. 7 In
the present case, the deceased widow
acted as she did because of the deed of
donation she executed in favor of her
husband not knowing that such deed was
illegal, if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if
mortis-causa, as it has not been executed
with the required formalities similar to a
will.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals being in accordance with law, the
same is hereby affirmed with costs against
appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-30712 February 6,
1991
THE REPARATIONS
COMMISSION, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
THE VISAYAN PACKING CORPORATION
and THE FIELDMENS INSURANCE CO.,
INC., defendants-appellants.
Panfilo M. Manguera & Associates for
plaintiff-appellee.
BIDIN, J.:
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17

This is an appeal originally filed with the "SONIA" and M/S "ANA LARES", 75 G.T.
Court of Appeals but certified to this Court and one (1) Fishing Boat M/S "SALVADOR
for disposition since it involves purely "B"", 100 G.T.; including all its
questions of law, from the decision of the corresponding accessories and
then Court of First Instance of appurtenances. These reparations goods
Manila, * Branch IX, dated June 23, 1964, were delivered to the defendant Vispac, on
in Civil Case No. 51712, ordering the May 30, 1960 (Exhibit "A-2").
defendants-appellants herein to pay, Attached with said contract and forming
jointly and severally, to the plaintiff- part thereof is the questioned Schedule of
appellee the sum of P124,242.47, with Installment Payments, herein reproduced,
interest at the legal rate from the date of as follows:
the filing of the complaint until fully paid SCHEDULE OF INSTALLMENT
and denying plaintiff s prayer for PAYMENTS
attorney's fees. With respect to the cross- NAME OF USER VISAYAN PACKING
claim of Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc., the CORPORATION
said court ordered Visayan Packing
Corporation to pay Fieldmen's Insurance ADDRESS Bacolod City
Co., Inc. such amount which the latter may NATURE OF CAPITAL
pay to the plaintiff-appellee with interest GOODS/SERVICES One (1) Cannery
at 12% per annum until fully paid, and Plant and appurtenances; Two (2)
attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the Fishing Vessels, 75 G.T. M/S "SONIA"
amount, paid by Fieldmen's Insurance Co., and M/S "ANA LARES" and one (1)
Inc. to the plaintiff-appellee. With costs fishing vessel "M/S SALVADOR B",
against the defendants-appellants. 100 G.T., together with all equipment
As gathered from the records, the and appurtenances.
antecedent facts of this case are as
follows: DATE OF
Plaintiff Reparations Commission COMPLETE May 30,1960
(Repacom, for short) is a government DELIVERY
entity created by virtue of Republic Act No. TOTAL F.O.B.
1789, with offices at the 5th Floor, P1,242,424.67
COST
Development Bank of the Philippines
Building No. 2, Port Area, Manila while the AMOUNT OF (10% of FOB
defendants, Visayan Packing Corporation FIRST COST
(Vispac, for short) and the Fieldmen's INSTALLMENT P1,24,242.47)
Insurance Co., Inc. (FICI, for short) are
DUE DATE OF
corporations duly organized and registered
1ST May 30,1962
under the laws of the Philippines, with
INSTALLMENT
offices in Bacolod City, Philippines and
Singson Bldg., Plaza Moraga, Manila, TERM: Ten (10) EQUAL YEARLY
respectively. INSTALLMENTS
On May 19, 1960, plaintiff Repacom
RATE OF INTEREST: THREE PERCENT
adopted Resolution No. 262 awarding to
(3%) PER ANNUM
the defendant Vispac by way of a contract
of conditional purchase and sale NO. OF
subsequently executed on November 15, INSTALLMEN DATE DUE AMOUNT
1960 (Exhibit "A") the following TS
reparations goods with a total F.O.B. value
of P1,242,424.67 (Exhibit "A-2"): one (1) May 30,
1 P131,085.07
Cannery Plant, divested from M/S 1963
"Estancia"; two (2) Fishing Boats M/S 2 " " 1964 P131,085.07

Page 77 of 131
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17

3 " " 1965 P131,085.07 construed against Repacom, the party

which drafted the contract.
4 " " 1966 P131,085.07 Thus, while Repacom maintains that the
1967 1st installment is due on May 30, 1962,
5" " Vispac, on the other hand, argues that it is
P131,085.07
due on May 30, 1963.
6 " " 1968 P131,085.07 On January 13, 1964, Repacom and Vispac
7 " " 1969 P131,085.07 submitted a "Stipulation of Facts" and both
prayed that this case be submitted for
8 " " 1970 P131,085.07 decision after their respective memoranda
have been filed. FICI joined with this move
9 " " 1971 P131,085.07
and request of the principal parties.
10 " " 1972 P131,085.07 Pertinent provisions of said Stipulation of
Facts are quoted as follows:
-----------------
MANILA, PHILIPPINES paragraph 1
--------- 1960
That in order to abbreviate
VISAYAN PACKING proceeding they have agreed that
REPARATIONS the transcript of notes taken in Civil
CORPORATION
COMMISSION Case No. 51713, The Reparations
END-USER
Commission vs. Fieldmen's
BY: BY: Insurance Co., Inc., Branch III, CFI,
HERNAN DE LA RAMA Manila, be submitted as evidence in
President & General the above entitled case. This
RODOLFO MASLOG agreement stemmed from the fact
Manager
Chairman that both Civil Case 51712, the case
(Ibid., Exhibit "A-1",
p. 11) now being litigated and Civil Case
No. 51713 mentioned earlier in this
Defendant-appellant FICI is impleaded as
paragraph are both collection cases
bondsman for the principal defendant
instituted by the Reparations
Vispac, under Surety Bond No. 4122
Commission against the defendant,
(Exhibit "B") issued by the former on May
The Visayan Packing Corporation
30, 1960, to guarantee "faithful
and the Fieldmen's Insurance Co.,
observance and compliance by the
Inc., based on similar Contracts of
principal of all its obligations" recited in
Conditional Purchase and Sale,
the Contract of Conditional Purchase and
drafted in the usual standard form
Sale of Reparations Goods (Exhibit "A")
and containing practically the same
and in the annexed Schedule of Payments
standard provisions and stipulations.
(Exhibit "A-1 ").
paragraph 2
On September 27, 1962, Repacom filed a
That Civil Case No. 51713 has
complaint for specific performance with
already been decided on March 27,
the court a quo against Vispac seeking
1963 granting relief for the plaintiff,
collection of the amount of P124,242.47
The Reparations Commission as
allegedly due on May 30, 1962 as
prayed for, a copy of said decision is
payment of the 1st installment of the
hereto attached and marked Annex
reparations goods and impleaded the FICI
"A" for purposes of identification and
as defendant.
is hereby made an integral part of
In its answer dated November 8, 1962,
this Stipulation of Facts.
Vispac claimed that the Schedule of
paragraph 3
Payments (Exhibit "A") is vague and
That Civil Case No. 51712 refers to
ambiguous with respect to the date when
reparations goods, denominated,
the first installment falls due and that by
one (1) cannery plant, two (2)
reason thereof, the ambiguity should be
Page 78 of 131
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
fishing boats, M/S "Sonia" and M/S
"Ana Lares", 100 G.T. including all its
corresponding accessories and
appurtenances, which is the subject
matter of a Contract of Conditional
Purchase and Sale dated November
15, 1960 entered into by and
between the plaintiff Reparations
Commission as Conditional Vendor
and the defendant, The Visayan
Packing Corporation as Conditional
Vendee, the legality and due
execution of which is not disputed
by the herein parties, a copy of
which contract together with its
annex "B" were introduced in
evidence by plaintiffs as Exhibits "A"
and "A-1" respectively and were
admitted by the Court without
objection on the part of the
defendants. That, likewise, there
were introduced in evidence and
admitted by the Court without
objection on the part of the
defendants as additional exhibits,
Exh. "A-2" (Date of complete
delivery as it appears in Annex "B"
[May 30, 1960]; Exh. "A-1"; Exh. "A-
2", amount due in the sum of
P124,242.47; Exh. "A-4", date of first
installment as it appears in Annex
"B" (Exh. "A-1") and as Exh. "B", FICI
Bond No. 4122.
On the basis of the said Stipulations of
Facts and the pleadings submitted by the
parties, the court a quo rendered
judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
Court hereby renders judgment
ordering the defendant to pay,
jointly and severally, to the plaintiff
the sum of P124,242.47 with
interest at the legal rate from the
date of filing of the complaint until
fully paid. The plaintiffs prayer for
attorney's fees is denied, inasmuch
as there is no showing that the
defendants were motivated with bad
faith in failing to pay plaintiffs claim.
Page 79 of 131
With respect to the cross-claim of
defendant Fieldmen's Insurance Co.,
Inc., the Court hereby orders
defendant Visayan Packing
Corporation to pay defendant
Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc., such
amount which the latter may pay to
the plaintiff by reason of this
judgment, with interest at 12% per
annum until fully paid, and
attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of
the amount paid by Fieldmen's
Insurance Co., Inc., to the plaintiff.
With costs against the defendants.
From said decision, Vispac and FICI filed on
July 24, 1964 and July 27, 1964,
respectively, a motion for reconsideration
of the said decision. On August 8, 1 964,
the court a quo issued its order denying
the said motion.
Feeling aggrieved, Vispac and FICI
appealed the case to the Court of Appeals,
docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 34552-R.
After the parties have submitted their
respective briefs, Repacom on April 28,
1965; Vispac on January 2, 1965; and FICI
on January 15, 1965, the case was
submitted for decision on September 6,
1965. In a resolution promulgated June 14,
1969, the Court of Appeals ** certified the
instant case to this Court for proper
disposition for being pure question of law.
While Vispac and FICI raised several
issues, the focal issue involved in the
instant case, as correctly stated by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals, is the
interpretation of the Schedule of Payments
(Exhibit "A-1 ").
It is the contention of the Repacom that
under the abovequoted Schedule of
Payments, the amount of P124,242.47
representing the 1st installment without
interest, which is equivalent to 10% of the
entire F.O.B. costs, has already become
due and demandable on May 30, 1962.
However, Vispac and FICI argue that as
there are two dates given for the first
installment in the said Schedule of
Payment, the lst installment should be on
May 30, 1963 considering that it was
Repacom which prepared the contract and
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
therefore such ambiguity should be taken
against the latter which caused the
ambiguity.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Section 12, Republic Act 1789, reads as
follows:
Section 12 Terms of Sale
Capital goods and complimentary
services disposed to private parties
as provided for in sub-section (1) of
Section 2 hereof, shall be sold on a
cash or credit basis under the rules
and regulations as maybe
determined by the
Commission. Sales on credit basis
shall be paid in
installments. Provided that the lst
installment shall be paid within 24
months after complete delivery of
the capital goods and the balance
within a period not exceeding 10
years. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in the Schedule of Payments,
Exhibit "A-1", the amount of P124,242.47,
now being claimed by the Repacom from
Vispac, represents the 1st installment or
initial payment without interest as said
amount is equivalent to 10% of the total
F.O.B. cost of the reparation goods
received by Vispac which is
P1,242,424.67. Exhibit "A-2" of the
Schedule of Payments specifically states
the date when the reparations goods in
question were delivered which was on May
30, 1960. This particular date was not
denied by Vispac as per their Stipulation of
Facts. Consequently, as reflected in the
Schedule of Payments, Exhibit "A-1 ", the
1st installment without interest in the
amount of P124,242.47 representing 10%
of the F.O.B. cost of reparations goods,
became due and demandable on May 30,
1962, or exactly 24 months from the date
of the complete delivery of the reparations
goods to Vispac.
The rest of the schedule clearly refers to
the payment of the balance of the sales on
credit which in accordance with law
(Section 12, Rep. Act 1789) must be paid
within a period not exceeding ten (10)
years, and chargeable with interest at
Page 80 of 131
3% per annum. Said schedule of payment
for the balance i.e., after payment of the
first installment is, in turn, payable in ten
(10) equal yearly installments, as follows:
Term: Ten (10) equal yearly
installments
Rate of Interest: Three per cent
(3%) per annum
No. of
Date Due Amount
Installments
1 May 30, 1963 P131,086.07
2 " " 1964 P131,086.07
3 " " 1965 P131,086.07
4 " " 1966 P131,086.07
5 " " 1967 P131,086.07
6 " " 1968 P131,086.07
7 " " 1969 P131,086.07
8 " " 1970 P131,086.07
9 " " 1971 P131,086.07
10 " " 1972 P131,086.07
While it is a statutory and decisional rule
in this jurisdiction that the contract is the
law between the contracting parties (Art.
1306, Civil Code; Phoenix Assurance Co.,
Ltd. vs. United States Lines, 22 SCRA 674
[1968]; Phil. American General Insurance
v. Mutuc, 61 SCRA 22 [1974]; Herrera v.
Petrophil Corporation, 146 SCRA 360
[1986]; Syjuco v. CA, 172 SCRA 111
[1989]), there is a proviso that nothing
therein must be contrary to law, morals,
good customs public policy, or public order
(Art. 1306, Civil Code; Lagunsad v. Soto,
92 SCRA 476 [1979]). To sustain the
contention of Vispac and FICI that the 1st
installment should be due on May 30,
1963, instead of May 30, 1962. would
render the said installment payment
unenforceable as it would run counter to
the provision of the said law (Section 12,
R.A. 1789) which specifically provides that
"the 1st installment shall be paid within 24
months after complete delivery of the
capital goods", or on May 30, 1962, the
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17

complete delivery thereof having been good morals, good customs, public order
made on May 30, 1960. or public policy (Polytrade Corp. v. Blanco,
Finally, it is basic that a contract is what 30 SCRA 187 [1969]; Social Security
the law defines it to be, and not what it is Commission v. Almeda, 168 SCRA 474
called by the contracting parties [1988]).
Novesteras v. CA, 149 SCRA 48 [1987]). Considering, therefore, that the 20%
Having disposed of the main case, attorney's fees provided under the parties'
discussion of other ancillary issues raised Indemnity Agreement (Exhibit "1-FICI") is
by the appellant Vispac becomes not contrary to the existing jurisprudence
unnecessary.1wphi1 on the matter *** and is not considered
As to the issue of FICI's liability arising excessive nor unconscionable, the same
from its issuance of Surety Bond No. 4122 should be awarded to FICI.
dated May 30, 1960, it will be noted that WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
FICI interposed for the first time, on is Affirmed with the modification that the
appeal, the defense that Surety Bond No. amount of the attorney's fees due from
4122 has already expired. FICI did not Vispac to FICI should be 20% of the
allege any defense to the effect that amount due as per Indemnity Agreement.
Surety Bond No. 4122 has already expired SO ORDERED.
either in its answer to the complaint dated
October 26, 1962 nor in the entire
proceedings below. In fact, it adopted as
its own whatever defenses its co-
defendant-appellant Vispac may interpose
(Rollo, Record on Appeal, FICI, p. 25; p.
44). It is settled jurisprudence that an
issue which was neither averred in the
complaint nor raised during the trial in the
court below cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal as it would be offensive to
the basic rules of fair play, justice and due
process Dihiansan v. CA, 153 SCRA 713
[1987]; Anchuelo v. IAC, 147 SCRA 434
[1987]; Dulos Realty & Development Corp.
v. CA, 157 SCRA 425 [1988]; Ramos v. IAC,
175 SCRA 70 [1989]; Gevero v. IAC, G.R. [G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005]
77029, August 30, 1990).
Anent the contention of FICI that the trial ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs.
court erred in ordering Vispac to pay to HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
FICI attorney's fees equivalent to only 10%
MINOR MARTIN JOSE
of the amount due despite the fact that
Vispac bound itself to pay to FICI PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED
attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE
total amount due but in no case less than ANGELA
P200.00 as per their Indemnity Agreement PROLLAMANTE, respondents.
(Exhibit "1-FICI"), it has been held that a
stipulation regarding the payment of DECISION
attorney's fees is neither illegal nor
immoral and is enforceable as the law CORONA, J.:
between the parties (Santiago v.
Dimayuga, 3 SCRA 919 [1961]), as long as
such stipulation does not contravene law,

Page 81 of 131
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
At issue in this petition
[1]
for certiorari is whether or not the Court
of Appeals (CA) gravely erred in exercising
its discretion, amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, in issuing a decision[2]and
resolution[3] upholding the resolution and
order of the trial court,[4] which denied
petitioners motion to dismiss private
respondents complaint for support and
directed the parties to submit themselves
to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity
testing.
Respondents Fe Angela and her son
Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged
biological father, petitioner Arnel L.
Agustin, for support and support pendente
lite before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 106.[5]
In their complaint, respondents alleged
that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which
they entered into an intimate relationship.
Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her
34th birthday on November 10, 1999.
Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe
decided otherwise and gave birth to their
child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11,
2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in
Quezon City. The babys birth certificate
was purportedly signed by Arnel as the
father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and
hospital expenses but later refused Fes
repeated requests for Martins support
despite his adequate financial capacity
and even suggested to have the child
committed for adoption. Arnel also denied
having fathered the child.
On January 19, 2001, while Fe was
carrying five-month old Martin at the
Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking
lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open
car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was
reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was
Page 82 of 131
diagnosed with leukemia and has, since
then, been undergoing chemotherapy. On
March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel
for support.[6]
In his amended answer, Arnel denied
having sired Martin because his affair and
intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in
1998, long before Martins conception. He
claimed that Fe had at least one other
secret lover. Arnel admitted that their
relationship started in 1993 but he never
really fell in love with (Fe) not only
because (she) had at least one secret
lover, a certain Jun, but also because she
proved to be scheming and overly
demanding and possessive. As a result,
theirs was a stormy on-and-off affair. What
started as a romantic liaison between two
consenting adults eventually turned out to
be a case of fatal attraction where (Fe)
became so obsessed with (Arnel), to the
point of even entertaining the idea of
marrying him, that she resorted to various
devious ways and means to alienate (him)
from his wife and family. Unable to bear
the prospect of losing his wife and
children, Arnel terminated the affair
although he still treated her as a friend
such as by referring potential customers
to the car aircon repair shop[7] where she
worked. Later on, Arnel found out that Fe
had another erstwhile secret lover. In May
2000, Arnel and his entire family went to
the United States for a vacation. Upon
their return in June 2000, Arnel learned
that Fe was telling people that he had
impregnated her. Arnel refused to
acknowledge the child as his because their
last intimacy was sometime in 1998.
[8]
Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnels
wife and family. On January 19, 2001, Fe
followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and
Country Club parking lot to demand that
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
he acknowledge Martin as his child.
According to Arnel, he could not get
through Fe and the discussion became so
heated that he had no alternative but to
move on but without bumping or hitting
any part of her body.[9] Finally, Arnel
claimed that the signature and the
community tax certificate (CTC) attributed
to him in the acknowledgment of Martins
birth certificate were falsified. The CTC
erroneously reflected his marital status as
single when he was actually married and
that his birth year was 1965 when it
should have been 1964.[10]
In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17,
2002, Arnel vehemently denied having
sired Martin but expressed willingness to
consider any proposal to settle the case.[11]
On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved
for the issuance of an order directing all
the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of
the Rules of Court.[12]
Arnel opposed said motion by invoking
his constitutional right against self-
incrimination.[13] He also moved to dismiss
the complaint for lack of cause of action,
considering that his signature on the birth
certificate was a forgery and that, under
the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled
to support if not recognized by the
putative father.[14] In his motion, Arnel
manifested that he had filed criminal
charges for falsification of documents
against Fe (I.S. Nos. 02-5723 and 02-7192)
and a petition for cancellation of his name
appearing in Martins birth certificate
(docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-46669).
He attached the certification of the
Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory that his signature in the birth
certificate was forged.
Page 83 of 131
The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss the complaint and ordered the
parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing at the expense of the
applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court.
Thus, this petition.
In a nutshell, petitioner raises two
issues: (1) whether a complaint for
support can be converted to a petition for
recognition and (2) whether DNA paternity
testing can be ordered in a proceeding for
support without violating petitioners
constitutional right to privacy and right
against self-incrimination.[15]
The petition is without merit.
First of all, the trial court properly
denied the petitioners motion to dismiss
because the private respondents
complaint on its face showed that they
had a cause of action against the
petitioner. The elements of a cause of
action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right
and the defendants corresponding primary
duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or
omission of the defendant, by which the
primary right and duty have been violated.
The cause of action is determined not by
the prayer of the complaint but by the
facts alleged.[16]
In the complaint, private respondents
alleged that Fe had amorous relations with
the petitioner, as a result of which she
gave birth to Martin out of wedlock. In his
answer, petitioner admitted that he had
sexual relations with Fe but denied that he
fathered Martin, claiming that he had
ended the relationship long before the
childs conception and birth. It is
undisputed and even admitted by the
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
parties that there existed a sexual
relationship between Arnel and Fe. The
only remaining question is whether such
sexual relationship produced the child,
Martin. If it did, as respondents have
alleged, then Martin should be supported
by his father Arnel. If not, petitioner and
Martin are strangers to each other and
Martin has no right to demand and
petitioner has no obligation to give
support.
Preliminaries aside, we now tackle the
main issues.
Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin
as his own child and denies the
genuineness and authenticity of the childs
birth certificate which he purportedly
signed as the father. He also claims that
the order and resolution of the trial court,
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
effectively converted the complaint for
support to a petition for recognition, which
is supposedly proscribed by law. According
to petitioner, Martin, as an unrecognized
child, has no right to ask for support and
must first establish his filiation in a
separate suit under Article 283[17] in
relation to Article 265[18] of the Civil Code
and Section 1, Rule 105[19] of the Rules of
Court.
The petitioners contentions are without
merit.
The assailed resolution and order did
not convert the action for support into one
for recognition but merely allowed the
respondents to prove their cause of action
against petitioner who had been denying
the authenticity of the documentary
evidence of acknowledgement. But even if
the assailed resolution and order
effectively integrated an action to compel
Page 84 of 131
recognition with an action for support,
such was valid and in accordance with
jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of
Appeals,[20] we allowed the integration of
an action to compel recognition with an
action to claim ones inheritance:
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate
child, to be entitled to support and
successional rights from the putative or
presumed parent, must prove his filiation
to the latter. We also said that it is
necessary to allege in the complaint that
the putative father had acknowledged and
recognized the illegitimate child because
such acknowledgment is essential to and
is the basis of the right to inherit. There
being no allegation of such
acknowledgment, the action becomes one
to compel recognition which cannot be
brought after the death of the putative
father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino,
therefore, is not the absence of a cause of
action for failure of the petitioner to allege
the fact of acknowledgment in the
complaint, but the prescription of the
action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the
case at bar, although petitioner contends
that the complaint filed by herein private
respondent merely alleges that the minor
Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of
the deceased and is actually a claim for
inheritance, from the allegations therein
the same may be considered as one to
compel recognition. Further, that the two
causes of action, one to compel
recognition and the other to claim
inheritance, may be joined in one
complaint is not new in our
jurisprudence.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule
thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al. (43 Phil. 763
[1922]) wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the
position of the present plaintiff can in any
event maintain a complex action to
compel recognition as a natural child and
at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in
the character of heir, is one which in the
opinion of this court must be answered in
the affirmative, provided always that the
conditions justifying the joinder of the two
distinct causes of action are present in the
particular case. In other words, there is
no absolute necessity requiring that
the action to compel acknowledgment
should have been instituted and
prosecuted to a successful conclusion
prior to the action in which that same
plaintiff seeks additional relief in the
character of heir. Certainly, there is
nothing so peculiar to the action to compel
acknowledgment as to require that a rule
should be here applied different from that
generally applicable in other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not
heretofore explicitly formulated by this
court, is undoubtedly to some extent
supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we
have held in numerous cases, and the
doctrine must be considered well
settled, that a natural child having a
right to compel acknowledgment, but
who has not been in fact legally
acknowledged, may maintain
partition proceedings for the division
of the inheritance against his
coheirs x x x; and the same person may
intervene in proceedings for the
distribution of the estate of his deceased
natural father, or mother x x x. In neither
of these situations has it been thought
necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior
Page 85 of 131
decree compelling acknowledgment. The
obvious reason is that in partition suits
and distribution proceedings the other
persons who might take by inheritance are
before the court; and the declaration of
heirship is appropriate to such
proceedings. (Underscoring supplied)
Although the instant case deals with
support rather than inheritance, as
in Tayag, the basis or rationale for
integrating them remains the same.
Whether or not respondent Martin is
entitled to support depends completely on
the determination of filiation. A separate
action will only result in a multiplicity of
suits, given how intimately related the
main issues in both cases are. To
paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of
filiation is entirely appropriate to these
proceedings.
On the second issue, petitioner posits
that DNA is not recognized by this Court
as a conclusive means of proving
paternity. He also contends that
compulsory testing violates his right to
privacy and right against self-incrimination
as guaranteed under the 1987
Constitution. These contentions have no
merit.
Given that this is the very first time
that the admissibility of DNA testing as a
means for determining paternity has
actually been the focal issue in a
controversy, a brief historical sketch of our
past decisions featuring or mentioning
DNA testing is called for.
In the 1995 case of People v.
Teehankee[21] where the appellant was
convicted of murder on the testimony of
three eyewitnesses, we stated as
an obiter dictum that while eyewitness
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
identification is significant, it is not as
accurate and authoritative as the scientific
forms of identification evidence such as
the fingerprint or the DNA test
result (emphasis supplied).
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was
not quite so steadfast in the previous
decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals,
[22]
promulgated in 1997, we cautioned
against the use of DNA because DNA,
being a relatively new science, (had) not
as yet been accorded official recognition
by our courts. Paternity (would) still have
to be resolved by such conventional
evidence as the relevant incriminating
acts, verbal and written, by the putative
father.
In 2001, however, we opened the
possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of
parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court
of Appeals:[23]
A final note. Parentage will still be
resolved using conventional methods
unless we adopt the modern and scientific
ways available. Fortunately, we have now
the facility and expertise in using DNA test
for identification and parentage testing.
The University of the Philippines Natural
Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability
to conduct DNA typing using short tandem
repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is
based on the fact that the DNA of a
child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the
alleged father and child are analyzed to
establish parentage. Of course, being a
novel scientific technique, the use of DNA
test as evidence is still open to challenge.
Eventually, as the appropriate case
comes, courts should not hesitate to rule
Page 86 of 131
on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For
it was said, that courts should apply the
results of science when competently
obtained in aid of situations presented,
since to reject said result is to deny
progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as
admissible and authoritative evidence in
Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002
with our en banc decision in People v.
Vallejo[24] where the rape and murder
victims DNA samples from the
bloodstained clothes of the accused were
admitted in evidence. We reasoned that
the purpose of DNA testing (was) to
ascertain whether an association exist(ed)
between the evidence sample and the
reference sample. The samples collected
(were) subjected to various chemical
processes to establish their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson,[25] we
acquitted the accused charged with rape
for lack of evidence because doubts
persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were)
the real malefactors. Yes, a complex
offense (had) been perpetrated but who
(were) the perpetrators? How we wish we
had DNA or other scientific evidence to
still our doubts!
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v.
[26]
COMELEC where the Court en banc was
faced with the issue of filiation of then
presidential candidate Fernando Poe Jr., we
stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would
be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or
would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes obtained
from body cells of the illegitimate child
and any physical residue of the long dead
parent could be resorted to. A positive
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
match would clear up filiation or paternity.
In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court
has acknowledged the strong weight of
DNA testing
Moreover, in our en banc decision
in People v. Yatar,[27] we affirmed the
conviction of the accused for rape with
homicide, the principal evidence for which
included DNA test results. We did a
lengthy discussion of DNA, the process of
DNA testing and the reasons for its
admissibility in the context of our own
Rules of Evidence:
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a
molecule that encodes the genetic
information in all living organisms. A
persons DNA is the same in each cell and
it does not change throughout a persons
lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the
same as the DNA found in his saliva,
sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair,
earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and
vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly,
because of polymorphisms in human
genetic structure, no two individuals have
the same DNA, with the notable exception
of identical twins.
xxx xxx xxx
In assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, courts should consider, inter
alia, the following factors: how the
samples were collected, how they were
handled, the possibility of contamination
of the samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether proper
standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification
of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon
Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by
Page 87 of 131
the prosecution as an expert witness on
DNA print or identification techniques.
Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was
determined that the gene type and DNA
profile of appellant are identical to that of
the extracts subject of examination. The
blood sample taken from the appellant
showed that he was of the following gene
types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP29/10
and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical
with semen taken from the victims vaginal
canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between
the semen found in the victim and the
blood sample given by the appellant in
open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to
integrate these advances in science and
technology in the Philippine criminal
justice system, so we must be cautious as
we traverse these relatively uncharted
waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from
the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence
that has developed in other jurisdictions.
Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the
U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579
(1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it was ruled
that pertinent evidence based on
scientifically valid principles could be used
as long as it was relevant and reliable.
Judges, underDaubert, were allowed
greater discretion over which testimony
they would allow at trial, including the
introduction of new kinds of scientific
techniques. DNA typing is one such novel
procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant
when it relates directly to a fact in issue as
to induce belief in its existence or non-
existence. Applying the Daubert test to
the case at bar, the DNA evidence
obtained through PCR testing and utilizing
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
STR analysis, and which was appreciated
by the court a quo is relevant and reliable
since it is reasonably based on
scientifically valid principles of human
genetics and molecular biology.
Significantly, we upheld the
constitutionality of compulsory DNA
testing and the admissibility of the results
thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA
samples from semen recovered from a
rape victims vagina were used to
positively identify the accused Joel Kawit
Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the
compulsory extraction of his blood sample
for DNA testing, as well as the testing
itself, violated his right against self-
incrimination, as embodied in both
Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the
Constitution. We addressed this as follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of
the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion. The right
against self-incrimination is simply against
the legal process of extracting from the
lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It
does not apply where the evidence sought
to be excluded is not an incrimination but
as part of object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly
excluded several kinds of object evidence
taken from the person of the accused from
the realm of self-incrimination. These
include photographs,[28] hair,[29]and other
bodily substances.[30] We have also
declared as constitutional several
procedures performed on the accused
such as pregnancy tests for women
accused of adultery,[31] expulsion
[32]
morphine from ones mouth and the
tracing of ones foot to determine its
identity with bloody footprints.
[33] [34]
In Jimenez v. Caizares, we even
Page 88 of 131
authorized the examination of a womans
genitalia, in an action for annulment filed
by her husband, to verify his claim that
she was impotent, her orifice being too
small for his penis. Some of these
procedures were, to be sure, rather
invasive and involuntary, but all of them
were constitutionally sound. DNA testing
and its results, per our ruling in Yatar,
[35]
are now similarly acceptable.
Nor does petitioners invocation of his
right to privacy persuade us. In Ople v.
Torres,[36] where we struck down the
proposed national computerized
identification system embodied in
Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore
that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The
right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance
public service and the common good...
Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards that
enhance public service and the common
good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the
areas of legality of searches and seizures,
[37]
and the infringement of privacy of
communication[38] where the constitutional
right to privacy has been critically at
issue. Petitioners case involves neither
and, as already stated, his argument that
his right against self-incrimination is in
jeopardy holds no water. His hollow
invocation of his constitutional rights
elicits no sympathy here for the simple
of reason that they are not in any way being
violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused
whose very life is at stake can be
compelled to submit to DNA testing, we
see no reason why, in this civil case,
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
petitioner herein who does not face such
dire consequences cannot be ordered to
do the same.
DNA paternity testing first came to
prominence in the United States, where it
yielded its first official results sometime in
1985. In the decade that followed, DNA
rapidly found widespread general
[39]
acceptance. Several cases decided by
various State Supreme Courts reflect the
total assimilation of DNA testing into their
rules of procedure and evidence.
The case of Wilson v. Lumb[40] shows
that DNA testing is so commonly accepted
that, in some instances, ordering the
procedure has become a ministerial act.
The Supreme Court of St. Lawrence
County, New York allowed a party who had
already acknowledged paternity to
subsequently challenge his prior
acknowledgment. The Court pointed out
that, under the law, specifically Section
516 of the New York Family Court Act, the
Family Court examiner had the duty, upon
receipt of the challenge, to order DNA
tests:[41]
516-a. Acknowledgment of paternity. (a)
An acknowledgment of paternity executed
pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k
of the social services law or section four
thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the
public health law shall establish the
paternity of and liability for the support of
a child pursuant to this act. Such
acknowledgment must be reduced to
writing and filed pursuant to section four
thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the
public health law with the registrar of the
district in which the birth occurred and in
which the birth certificate has been filed.
No further judicial or administrative
proceedings are required to ratify an
Page 89 of 131
unchallenged acknowledgment of
paternity.
(b) An acknowledgment of paternity
executed pursuant to section one hundred
eleven-k of the social services law or
section four thousand one hundred thirty-
five-b of the public health law may be
rescinded by either signators filing of a
petition with the court to vacate the
acknowledgment within the earlier of sixty
days of the date of signing the
acknowledgment or the date of an
administrative or a judicial proceeding
(including a proceeding to establish a
support order) relating to the child in
which either signator is a party. For
purposes of this section, the "date of an
administrative or a judicial proceeding"
shall be the date by which the respondent
is required to answer the petition. After
the expiration of sixty days of the
execution of the acknowledgment, either
signator may challenge the
acknowledgment of paternity in court only
on the basis of fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact, with the burden of proof
on the party challenging the voluntary
acknowledgment. Upon receiving a
partys challenge to an
acknowledgment, the court shall
order genetic marker tests
orDNA tests for the determination of
the childs paternity and shall make a
finding of paternity, if appropriate, in
accordance with this article. Neither
signators legal obligations, including the
obligation for child support arising from
the acknowledgment, may be suspended
during the challenge to the
acknowledgment except for good cause as
the court may find. If a party petitions to
rescind an acknowledgment and if the
court determines that the alleged father is
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
not the father of the child, or if the court
finds that an acknowledgment is invalid
because it was executed on the basis of
fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact,
the court shall vacate the
acknowledgment of paternity and shall
immediately provide a copy of the order to
the registrar of the district in which the
childs birth certificate is filed and also to
the putative father registry operated by
the department of social services pursuant
to section three hundred seventy-two-c of
the social services law. In addition, if the
mother of the child who is the subject of
the acknowledgment is in receipt of child
support services pursuant to title six-A of
article three of the social services law, the
court shall immediately provide a copy of
the order to the child support enforcement
unit of the social services district that
provides the mother with such services.
(c) A determination of paternity made by
any other state, whether established
through the parents acknowledgment of
paternity or through an administrative or
judicial process, must be accorded full
faith and credit, if and only if such
acknowledgment meets the requirements
set forth in section 452(a)(7) of the social
security act.
(emphasis supplied)
DNA testing also appears elsewhere in
the New York Family Court Act:[42]
532. Genetic marker and DNA tests;
admissibility of records or reports of test
results; costs of tests.
a) The court shall advise the parties of
their right to one or more genetic marker
tests or DNA tests and, on the courts own
motion or the motion of any party, shall
Page 90 of 131
order the mother, her child and the
alleged father to submit to one or more
genetic marker or DNA tests of a type
generally acknowledged as reliable by an
accreditation body designated by the
secretary of the federal department of
health and human services and performed
by a laboratory approved by such an
accreditation body and by the
commissioner of health or by a duly
qualified physician to aid in the
determination of whether the alleged
father is or is not the father of the
child. No such test shall be ordered,
however, upon a written finding by
the court that it is not in the best
interests of the child on the basis of
res judicata, equitable estoppel, or
the presumption of legitimacy of a
child born to a married woman. The
record or report of the results of any such
genetic marker or DNA test ordered
pursuant to this section or pursuant to
section one hundred eleven-k of the social
services law shall be received in evidence
by the court pursuant to subdivision (e) of
rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil
practice law and rules where no timely
objection in writing has been made
thereto and that if such timely objections
are not made, they shall be deemed
waived and shall not be heard by the
court. If the record or report of the
results of any such genetic marker
or DNA test or tests indicate at least
a ninety-five percent probability of
paternity, the admission of such
record or report shall create a
rebuttable presumption of
paternity, and shall establish, if
unrebutted, the paternity of and
liability for the support of a child
pursuant to this article and article
four of this act.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
(b) Whenever the court directs a genetic
marker or DNA test pursuant to this
section, a report made as provided in
subdivision (a) of this section may be
received in evidence pursuant to rule
forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil
practice law and rules if offered by any
party.
(c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant
to subdivision (a) of this section shall be,
in the first instance, paid by the moving
party. If the moving party is financially
unable to pay such cost, the court may
direct any qualified public health officer to
conduct such test, if practicable;
otherwise, the court may direct payment
from the funds of the appropriate local
social services district. In its order of
disposition, however, the court may direct
that the cost of any such test be
apportioned between the parties
according to their respective abilities to
pay or be assessed against the party who
does not prevail on the issue of paternity,
unless such party is financially unable to
pay. (emphasis supplied)
In R.E. v. C.E.W.,[43] a decision of the
Mississippi Supreme Court, DNA tests were
used to prove that H.W., previously
thought to be an offspring of the marriage
between A.C.W. and C.E.W., was actually
the child of R.E. with whom C.E.W. had, at
the time of conception, maintained an
adulterous relationship.
In Erie County Department of Social
Services on behalf of Tiffany M.H. v. Greg
G.,[44] the 4th Department of the New York
Supreme Courts Appellate Division allowed
G.G., who had been adjudicated as T.M.H.s
father by default, to have the said
judgment vacated, even after six years,
once he had shown through a genetic
Page 91 of 131
marker test that he was not the childs
father. In this case, G.G. only requested
the tests after the Department of Social
Services, six years after G.G. had been
adjudicated as T.M.H.s father, sought an
increase in his support obligation to her.
In Greco v. Coleman,[45] the Michigan
Supreme Court while ruling on the
constitutionality of a provision of law
allowing non-modifiable support
agreements pointed out that it was
because of the difficulty of determining
paternity before the advent of DNA testing
that such support agreements were
necessary:
As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy
with which paternity can be proven has
increased significantly since the parties in
this lawsuit entered into their support
agreement(current testing methods can
determine the probability of paternity to
99.999999% accuracy). However, at the
time the parties before us entered into the
disputed agreement, proving paternity
was a very significant obstacle to an
illegitimate child's access to child support.
The first reported results of
modern DNA paternity testing did not
occur until 1985. ("In fact, since its first
reported results in 1985, DNA matching
has progressed to 'general acceptance in
less than a decade'"). Of course, while
prior blood-testing methods could exclude
some males from being the possible father
of a child, those methods could not
affirmatively pinpoint a particular male as
being the father. Thus, when the
settlement agreement between the
present parties was entered in 1980,
establishing paternity was a far more
difficult ordeal than at present. Contested
paternity actions at that time were often
no more than credibility contests.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
Consequently, in every contested
paternity action, obtaining child support
depended not merely on whether the
putative father was, in fact, the child's
biological father, but rather on whether
the mother could prove to a court of law
that she was only sexually involved with
one man--the putative father. Allowing
parties the option of entering into private
agreements in lieu of proving paternity
eliminated the risk that the mother would
be unable meet her burden of proof.
It is worth noting that amendments to
Michigans Paternity law have included the
use of DNA testing:[46]
722.716 Pretrial proceedings; blood or
tissue typing determinations as to mother,
child, and alleged father; court order;
refusal to submit to typing or identification
profiling; qualifications of person
conducting typing or identification
profiling; compensation of expert; result of
typing or identification profiling; filing
summary report; objection; admissibility;
presumption; burden of proof; summary
disposition.
Sec. 6.
(1) In a proceeding under this act
before trial, the court, upon
application made by or on behalf of
either party, or on its own motion,
shall order that the mother, child, and
alleged father submit to blood or
tissue typing determinations, which
may include, but are not limited to,
determinations of red cell antigens,
red cell isoenzymes, human leukocyte
antigens, serum proteins,
or DNA identification profiling, to
determine whether the alleged father
is likely to be, or is not, the father of
Page 92 of 131
the child. If the court orders a blood
or tissue typing or DNA identification
profiling to be conducted and a party
refuses to submit to the typing
or DNA identification profiling, in
addition to any other remedies
available, the court may do either of
the following:
(a) Enter a default judgment at the
request of the appropriate party.
(b) If a trial is held, allow the
disclosure of the fact of the refusal
unless good cause is shown for not
disclosing the fact of refusal.
(2) A blood or tissue typing or DNA
identification profiling shall be conducted
by a person accredited for paternity
determinations by a nationally recognized
scientific organization, including, but not
limited to, the American association of
blood banks.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) If the probability of paternity
determined by the qualified person
described in subsection (2)
conducting the blood or tissue typing
or DNA identification profiling is 99%
or higher, and the DNAidentification
profile and summary report are
admissible as provided in subsection
(4), paternity is presumed. If the
results of the analysis of genetic
testing material from 2 or more
persons indicate a probability of
paternity greater than 99%, the
contracting laboratory shall conduct
additional genetic paternity testing
until all but 1 of the putative fathers
is eliminated, unless the dispute
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
involves 2 or more putative fathers
who have identical DNA.
(6) Upon the establishment of the
presumption of paternity as provided in
subsection (5), either party may move for
summary disposition under the court
rules. this section does not abrogate the
right of either party to child support from
the date of birth of the child if applicable
under section 7. (emphasis supplied)
In Rafferty v. Perkins,[47] the Supreme
Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test
results showing paternity were sufficient
to overthrow the presumption of
legitimacy of a child born during the
course of a marriage:
The presumption of legitimacy having
been rebutted by the results of the blood
test eliminating Perkins as Justin's father,
even considering the evidence in the light
most favorable to Perkins, we find that no
reasonable jury could find that Easter is
not Justin's father based upon the 99.94%
probability of paternity concluded by the
DNA testing.
In S.J.F. and J.C.F. v. R.C.W.,[48] the North
Dakota Supreme Court upheld an order for
genetic testing given by the Court of
Appeals, even after trial on the merits had
concluded without such order being given.
Significantly, when J.C.F., the mother, first
filed the case for paternity and support
with the District Court, neither party
requested genetic testing. It was only
upon appeal from dismissal of the case
that the appellate court remanded the
case and ordered the testing, which the
North Dakota Supreme Court upheld.
The case of Kohl v. Amundson,
[49]
decided by the Supreme Court of South
Page 93 of 131
Dakota, demonstrated that even default
judgments of paternity could be vacated
after the adjudicated father had, through
DNA testing, established non-paternity. In
this case, Kohl, having excluded himself as
the father of Amundsons child through
DNA testing, was able to have the default
judgment against him vacated. He then
obtained a ruling ordering Amundson to
reimburse him for the amounts withheld
from his wages for child support. The
Court said (w)hile Amundson may have a
remedy against the father of the child, she
submit(ted) no authority that require(d)
Kohl to support her child. Contrary to
Amundson's position, the fact that a
default judgment was entered, but
subsequently vacated, (did) not foreclose
Kohl from obtaining a money judgment for
the amount withheld from his wages.
In M.A.S. v. Mississippi Dept. of Human
Services,[50] another case decided by the
Supreme Court of Mississippi, it was held
that even if paternity was established
through an earlier agreed order of filiation,
child support and visitation orders could
still be vacated once DNA testing
established someone other than the
named individual to be the biological
father. The Mississippi High Court
reiterated this doctrine in Williams v.
Williams.[51]
The foregoing considered, we find no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the public respondent for upholding the
orders of the trial court which both denied
the petitioners motion to dismiss and
ordered him to submit himself for DNA
testing. Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, the remedy of certiorari
is only available when any tribunal, board
or officer has acted without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.[52] In Land Bank
of the Philippines v. the Court of
Appeals[53] where we dismissed a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, we
discussed at length the nature of such a
petition and just what was meant by grave
abuse of discretion:
Grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction or, in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary
manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility, and it
must be so patent or gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
The special civil action for certiorari is a
remedy designed for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. The raison detre for the rule is
when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an
error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being
exercised when the error is committed. If
it did, every error committed by a court
would deprive it of its jurisdiction and
every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. In such a scenario, the
administration of justice would not
survive. Hence, where the issue or
question involved affects the wisdom or
legal soundness of the decisionnot the
jurisdiction of the court to render said
decisionthe same is beyond the province
of a special civil action for certiorari.
Page 94 of 131
The proper recourse of the aggrieved
party from a decision of the CA is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the
other hand, if the error subject of the
recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act
complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-
judicial officer or agency with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, the proper remedy
available to the aggrieved party is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
said Rules. (emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the petitioner has
in no way shown any arbitrariness,
passion, prejudice or personal hostility
that would amount to grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals. The respondent court acted
entirely within its jurisdiction in
promulgating its decision and resolution,
and any error made would have only been
an error in judgment. As we have
discussed, however, the decision of the
respondent court, being firmly anchored in
law and jurisprudence, was correct.
Epilogue
For too long, illegitimate children have
been marginalized by fathers who choose
to deny their existence. The growing
sophistication of DNA testing technology
finally provides a much needed equalizer
for such ostracized and abandoned
progeny. We have long believed in the
merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly
expressed as much in the past. This case
comes at a perfect time when DNA testing
has finally evolved into a dependable and
authoritative form of evidence gathering.
We therefore take this opportunity to
forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
testing is a valid means of determining
paternity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The Court of Appeals decision dated
January 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80961
is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
C.A. No. 8977 March 22, 1946
TORIBIO P. PEREZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SCOTTISH UNION AND NATIONAL
INSURANCE CO., defendant.
MIGUEL H. MITRE, appellant.
Nicodemus L. Dasig for appellant.
Bonto and Gutierrez Lora, Gregorio
Sabater, Jesus Salazar, Alfredo S.
Rebueno, Francisco Muoz, and Geronimo
P. Vibal for appellee.
PARAS, J.:
The plaintiff is seeking to recover (1)
P6,000, as attorney's fees in a criminal
case for arson against the defendant
Miguel H. Mitre who, in a written contract
(Exhibit D), had covenanted to pay the
same out of the proceeds of a fire
insurance policy (No. 5518308), for
P12,000, issued in his favor by the
defendant Scottish Union and National
Insurance Co., and (2) P1,485, unpaid
balance of attorney's fees owing by the
defendant Miguel H. Mitre in four other
cases (CA-G.R. No. 6398; CA-G.R. No.
Page 95 of 131
6499; civil case No. 3048, Court of First
Instance of Sorsogon; and administrative
case, Mitre vs. Arambulo). The defendant
Miguel H. Mitre acknowledges the
execution of Exhibit D and the fact that
the plaintiff had rendered professional
services, but it is alleged, at the same
time, (a) that the stipulated fee in the
case of arson (P550) had been fully paid,
Exhibit D being a simulation conceived by
the plaintiff and intended merely to bar all
claims to the insurance proceeds arising
from defendant's criminal liability; (b) that
the stipulated fee in CA-G.R. No. 6398 and
CA-G.R. No. 6499 was P100 each, of which
a total of P100 had already been paid in
said cases; (c) that civil case No. 3048 was
not a litigation of the defendant Miguel H.
Mitre who was included therein for being
the husband of the principal defendant
Maria Perez de Mitre; and (d) that the
plaintiff undertook to handle the
administrative case against Arambulo as
part of the arson case.
The judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Albay, from which only the defendant
Miguel H. Mitre has appealed, is in favor of
the plaintiff and orders the Scottish Union
and National Insurance Co. to pay, out of
the proceeds of policy No. 5518308, first,
to the Collector of Internal Revenue the
sum of P1,205.15, as sales tax due from
the defendant Miguel H. Mitre, and,
secondly, to the plaintiff the sum of
P7,640.51, covering P6,000 (attorney's
fees in the arson case) and P1,640.51
(unpaid attorney's fees in four other
cases), with legal interest and costs. The
plaintiff was absolved from the
counterclaims of the defendants, Miguel H.
Mitre and Scottish Union and National
Insurance Co., for damages in the
respective amounts of P500 and P1,000
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
alleged to have been suffered as a result
of the institution of this suit.
In support of appellant's theory that
Exhibit D was prepared merely to fool the
insurance company and possible claimants
of the proceeds that might be due under
policy No. 5518308, it is argued that said
contract was dated April 10, 1939,
although in fact was signed on August 26,
1939, when the plaintiff informed the
appellant of his conviction by trial court.
Even admitting the verity of appellant's
allegation of fact, it does not necessarily
follow that the sense of the document was
not as purported by its plain language.
While third parties in whose fraud the
alleged misrepresentation was made,
might validly avail themselves thereof, the
appellant certainly is not in a parallel
situation. We surmise that the appellant,
in his anxiety to be exonerated and to pay
his attorney's fees in the arson case, had
voluntarily become a party to the alleged
misrepresentation. At any rate, if plaintiff's
reason for antedating Exhibit D was to
show its execution prior to appellant's
conviction, said purpose could well have
been served by dating it August 26, 1939,
because the decision of the trial court in
the arson case was not promulgated until
August 31, 1939.
Page 96 of 131
Appellant's disavowal of Exhibit D is
evidently an afterthought brought about
by his acquittal in the Court of Appeals. If
the plaintiff had really conspired with the
appellant in the scheme to protect the
insurance proceeds, the contract would
have been couched in terms sufficient to
cover the full value of policy (P12,000) or
every cent accruing thereunder. We have
yet to look for an insurance company or a
third person who would dare assail said
contract after appellant's absolute right to
the policy shall have been established.
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to have
fee of P6,000 as provided in Exhibit D, in
compensation for his professional service
in the arson case, is the more fundamental
question before us. The first point that
comes up in this connection is appellant's
intimation that the plaintiff, in view of his
relationship with appellant's wife, not only
had volunteered to defend him
gratuitously, but had insisted in doing so,
plaintiff's idea being gain popularity as a
criminal lawyer, a circumstance which
would help his candidacy for seat in House
of Representatives; that, notwithstanding
the fact that he had his lawyers in Manila
and Sorsogon, the appellant accepted the
offer. Several considerations, however,
militate against the latter's pretensions.
First, the alleged relationship, even if
admitted, does not necessarily carry the
inference that the plaintiff could be
capable of making such gratuitous offer,
much less insistence, for any lawyer will
be devoid of dignity and pride who will do
what is imputed to the plaintiff. Secondly,
appellant's claim is inconsistent with his
admission that he agreed to pay, as he in
fact had paid, the plaintiff the fee of P550.
Thirdly, the appellant had retained
plaintiff's services even after his
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
conviction in the lower court. This would
have been the propitious opportunity for
the appellant to give an end to plaintiff's
alleged insistence to be in the arson case.
His failure to do so engenders the
implication that the contract (Exhibit D)
was binding on him and that he continued
to have confidence in plaintiff's ability.
Fourthly, the appellant does not appear to
be so ignorant as to be easily and blindly
inveigled into accepting the services of a
lawyer whose capacity he doubted, and
into signing an agreement which would
deprive him of P6,000.
Exhibit D should be given its full force and
effect. "A written contract for services
shall control the amount to be paid thereof
unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable." (Rule of
Court 127, section 22.) The arson case
required several days of trial. The gravity
of the situation confronted by the
appellant after the rendition of the
judgment of the court of first instance is
shown by the fact that he was sentenced
to undergo imprisonment for the period of
from ten to twelve years and to pay an
indemnity of P101,115. That the plaintiff
had handled appellant's defense with
competence and success cannot be
gainsaid, it being enough to state that the
appellant was acquitted in the Court of
Appeals before which the plaintiff orally
argued, in addition to a 78-page brief
which had filed therein. We are thus not
prepared to rule that the amount of
P6,000 is excessive or unjust, especially
because said fee is in a sense contingent
upon the acquittal of the appellant, since
no insurance money (P6,000 of which was
ceded to the plaintiff under Exhibit D) was
of course forthcoming if the fire which
destroyed the insured property could be
Page 97 of 131
proven to have resulted from incendiarism
for which the appellant was criminally
liable.
We need not seriously consider the
implication that the appellant wishes to
bring out by mentioning the facts that the
plaintiff was admitted to the bar in 1933,
that he was a justice of the peace with a
monthly salary of P157, that the highest
fee ever previously collected by him was
only P1,500, and that he had to borrow
money from the Philippine National Bank
and Saturnino Benito, a circumstance not
indicative of a lucrative practice. "The
income of a lawyer is not a safe criterion
of his professional ability. Many very good
lawyers earn but small incomes while
lawyers of inferior ability may prosper
financially. Neither is the length of time a
lawyer has practiced a reliable measure of
his ability; his competency must be judged
by the character of his work." (Moran,
Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 669, citing
Haussermann vs. Rahmeyer, 12 Phil., 350;
Delgado vs. De la Rama, 43 Phil., 419;
Panis vs.Yangco, 52 Phil., 499;
Bachrach vs. Teal and Teal Motor Co., 53
Phil., 631; Ingersoll vs. Malabon Sugar Co.,
53 Phil., 745; De Guzman vs. Visayan
Rapid Transit Co., 68 Phil., 643.)
The validity of Exhibit D having been
upheld, appellant's claim that plaintiff's
stipulated fee was only P550 which had
already been paid, necessarily becomes
untenable. We may add, however, in
plaintiff's favor that judicial actions for the
recovery of fees, unless righteous and well
founded and unless forced by an
intolerable attitude assumed by clients,
are seldom, if ever, resorted to, because
they cannot fail to create the impression,
however wrong it may be, that the lawyer
instituting them are mercenary.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
Upon the other hand, we are inclined to
believe that the fees sought to be
recovered for professional services in four
other cases are not supported by a
preponderance of the evidence. It was to
be expected that, if any balance of said
fees was outstanding, the same should
have been included in the complaint, or
made the subject matter of another case.
Indeed, said fees were pleaded only in the
reply filed by the plaintiff to appellant's
answer, undoubtedly to ward off the
weight of the payment alleged in said
answer.
We are also of the opinion that the trial
court erred in ordering the Scottish Union
and National Insurance Co. to pay to the
Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of
P1,205.15 as sales tax. The latter has not
filed any pleading whatsoever. Besides,
there is no proof as to appellant's liability
therefor. The latter's admission that a
claim was presented by the Government
against him for said amount, refers to the
presentation of the claim and not to
appellant's liability.
The appealed judgment will therefore be
affirmed in so far as it sentences the
appellant, Miguel H. Mitre, to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P6,000 as attorney's
fees in the arson case, from the date of
the filing of the complaint, and orders the
Scottish Union and National Insurance Co.
to pay said amount to the plaintiff out of
the proceeds of policy No. 5518308
accruing in favor of the appellant, Miguel
H. Mitre. Said judgment is hereby reversed
in all other respects, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
Page 98 of 131
RINCONADA TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. CARLOS R. BUENVIAJE, IRIGA TELEPHONE
COMPANY INC. and FRANCISCO
IMPERIAL, respondents.
FACTS:
For and in consideration of the sum of P12,500. 00 in
the form of shares of stocks totalling 125 at P100.00
per share, respondent Francisco Imperial, orally
conveyed to petitioner, a certificate of public
convenience and necessity to operate a telephone
company in Iriga City issued to him by the defunct
Public Service Commission (now Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board).
After the agreement, petitioner started to operate under
the strength of said certificate.
Respondent Imperial again sold the same certificate to
herein respondent Iriga Telephone Company, Inc.
(ITELCO) This second sale was approved by the then
Public Service Commission.
By reason of the second sale, petitioner charged
respondent Imperial of Estafa before the then CFI (now
RTC) of Manila.
Petitioner also filed with the then CFI of Iriga City two
(2) actions against respondent Imperial, one for breach
of contract with damages
Both cases were assigned to respondent judge and
petitioner was represented by Atty. Luciano Maggay.
Because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt, respondent Imperial was absolved in the
criminal case.
He then moved for the dismissal of the civil cases
pending before respondent judge on the ground of res
judicata. 5Petitioner opposed the motion 6 but
nevertheless respondent judge granted the same in two
(2) orders.
Petitioner, thru Atty. Benjamin Santos sought
reconsideration 8 but respondent judge refused to
reconsider the orders of dismissal.9 Thus petitioner,
thru the same counsel, filed a notice of appeal and
appeal bond. Respondent Imperial opposed the appeal
because the same was filed out of time.
Respondent judge in an order denied the notice of
appeal. In agreement with respondent Imperial, the trial
court said.
This is so for the order of dismissal dated September
18, 1977 (sic) was shown to have been received by
Atty. Luciano Maggay for Rinconada Telephone Co. on
October 11, 1977, and 28 days thereafter, or on
November 8, 1978, Atty. Benjamin Santos, another
counsel for the same party filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by proper order on
January 23, 1978. The aforesaid latest order was
received for Rinconada Telephone Co., Inc. through
Atty. Maggay, who has been shown in the records to be
still a counsel of record for the same party on February
2, 1978. Since the notice of Appeal and Appeal Bond
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
appear to have been filed on April 19, 1978 and the
Record on Appeal only on June 7, 1978, and not on
February 4, 1978, which was the last and 30th day
reglementary period for interposing the contemplated.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion in denying it the right to appeal.
Held:
The right of client to terminate his relations with his counsel is
universally recognized.1wphi1 Such termination may be with
or without cause. The light of a client to terminate the authority
of his counsel includes the right to make a change or
substitution at any stage of the proceedings. To be valid, any
such change or substitution must be made: a) upon written
application; b) with written consent of the client; c) upon written
consent of the attorney to be substituted; d) in case the consent
of attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained there must be at
least a proof of notice that the motion for substitution has been
served upon him in the manner prescribed by the rules (Section
26, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Undisputedly, there was no valid substitution in cases at bar.
Neither can it be said that Atty. Maggay formally withdrew as
counsel for petitioner in the cases. Therefore, he continued to
represent petitioner and he remained the counsel of record and
was for all legal purposes, petitioners' attorney upon whom
respondent court's processes may be served. When a party is
represented by counsel, notice should be made upon the counsel
of record at his given address in the absence of notice of change
of address. Since he was the last to appear before any
application for substitution was filed, Atty. Maggay remained
responsible for the conduct of petitioner's cause.
Despite the filing of Atty. Santos of a motion for
reconsideration, copy of which he furnished the opposing
counsel, Atty. Maggay is still considered counsel of record. Not
having formally withdrawn as counsel, the order denying the
notice of appeal and appeal bond was deemed properly served
upon Atty. Maggay. Notice of the order to him was notice to
petitioner and for all legal intents and purposes, the date of his
receipt is considered the starting point from which the period to
appeal prescribed by law starts to run.
However, to the mind of the Court, there are circumstances
present in these cases which warrant a relaxation of the
foregoing rule and jurisprudence. It cannot be denied that
respondent judge recognized Atty. Santos as petitioner's new
counsel. This is apparent when the trial court sent Atty. Santos a
copy of the order considering the motion for reconsideration for
resolution and also when it referred to Attys. Maggay and
Raneses as petitioner's former counsels and Atty. Santos as the
new counsel of petitioner in its order denying reconsideration.
Having acknowledged Atty. Santos as the new counsel of
petitioner, there is a clear case of negligence when said
lawyer was not furnished copy of the order denying
reconsideration as a copy of the order considering that
motion for resolution was furnished to petitioner thru said
lawyer.
Page 99 of 131
In view of respondent judge's recognition of Atty. Santos as new
counsel for petitioner without even a valid substitution or
withdrawal of petitioner's former counsel, said new counsel
logically awaited for service to him of any action taken on his
motion for reconsideration. Respondent judge's sudden change
of posture in insisting that Atty. Maggay is the counsel of record
is, therefore, a whimsical and capricious exercise of discretion
that prevented petitioner and Atty. Santos from taking a timely
appeal from said order. Clearly, respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
denying petitioner's notice of appeal. While it is desirable that
the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed,
courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not
really impair the administration of justice especially when such
strict compliance was apparently relaxed by the trial court itself.
If the rules are intended to insure the orderly conduct of
litigation it is because of the higher objective they seek which is
the protection of substantive right of the parties.
ACCORDINGLY, the writs prayed for are GRANTED
TUMBAGAHAN V. CA
FACTS:
The records show that the petitioner filed two cases with the
Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, namely:
(1) Civil Case No. 1257, for declaration of ownership and
reconveyance of Lot Nos. 3050 and 3051 of the Iligan Cadastre;
and (2) Cadastral Case No. IL-N-4, for the review of the decree
of registration issued by the Land Registration Commission in
favor of Timotea Lasmarias and cancellation of her titles to the
same lots. When the cases were called for joint trial on April 10,
1968, the petitioner relieved Atty. Salise as his counsel. Atty.
Salise filed his withdrawal of appearance which was approved
by the court. On April 15, 1968, the cases were again called for
trial. This time, the petitioner personally appeared and filed a
written motion for postponement on the ground that he still had
no counsel and was not ready for trial. Upon motion of the other
party, the motion for postponement was denied and the court
issued an order dismissing the two cases.
A copy of the order was sent to Atty. Amarga which he received
on April 26, 1968. The petitioner received his copy of the order
on May 17, 1968. Thereafter, he filed his motion for
reconsideration. After the motion was denied, he filed a notice
of appeal and record on appeal which the Court dismissed for
being filed out of time, counting the period to appeal from the
day Atty. Amarga received a copy of the order of dismissal.
The petitioner alleges that he had neither engaged the services
of Atty. Amarga nor authorized the latter to represent him in his
two cases.
ISSUE:
The issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner validly
terminated the services of his counsels of record-Attys. Melvyn
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
Salise and Jose Amarga such that service on them of
processes and notices would no longer bind him.
HELD:
NO
There is a need to observe the legal formalities before a counsel
of record may be considered relieved of his responsibility as
such counsel (Cubar vs. Mendoza, 120 SCRA 768). The
withdrawal as counsel of a client, or the dismissal by the client
of his counsel, must be made in a formal petition filed in the
case Baquiran vs. Court of Appeals, 2 SCRA 873, 878). In this
case, the termination of the attorney-client relationship between
the petitioner and Atty. Salise does not automatically severe the
same relations between the petitioner and Atty. Amarga. Only
Atty. Salise's dismissal was made of record. None was made
with regard to the other counsel.
The attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until
there is a withdrawal made of record; at least so far as the
opposite party is concerned, the relation otherwise continues
until the end of the litigation (Visitacion vs. Manit 27 SCRA
523). Unless properly relieved, the counsel is responsible for the
conduct of the case (Cortez vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 31)
A.C. No. 408 September 30, 1963
GERVASIO DAUZ, complainant, vs. NAPOLEON O.
FONTANOSA, respondent
FACTS:
This is a disbarment proceedings against Atty. Napoleon O.
Fontanosa of Kidapawan, Cotabato, for malpractice.
It appears that the respondent on behalf of the
complainant filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Kidapawan, Cotabato, three separate complaints
against Sergio Orfrecio, Mariano Abellera and
Demetria Abellera) and Hadji to collect from them
P190.00, P280.00 and P150.00, respectively, the
unpaid balance of the purchase price of sewing
machines, interest thereon, attorney's fees and costs;
The complainant and the respondent entered into
written contracts whereby for and in consideration of
P100 for each collection case, the latter undertook to
represent the former in court in the three collection
cases, and the complainant bound himself to pay the
stipulated attorney's fees even if the cases be settled
amicably before trial (
The complainant terminated the services of the
respondent, engaged the services of another attorney
Page 100 of 131
and requested the respondent to return the documents
and papers entrusted to him upon which the complaints
in the collection cases are based;
Respondent refused to return the documents on which
he claimed to have a lien unless his stipulated
attorney's fees be paid;
In view of the respondent's refusal to return the
documents, the complainant asked the Justice of the
Peace Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato, to issue
a subpoena duces tecum requiring the respondent to
appear and produce in court the documents referred to;
Justice of the Peace denied the motion for the issuance
of a subpoena duces tecum on the ground that the
documents are privileged and the respondent as
attorney has a lien on them;
Justice of the Peace Court entered an order requiring
the respondent to appear and show cause why
a subpoena duces tecum should not be issued to compel
him to bring to court the documents in his possession;
Gervacio Dauz filed in this Court a petition, dated and
verified on the 12th day of December 1958, charging
the respondent with malpractice and praying for his
disbarment or suspension.
o (1) respondent's refusal, without cause, to
return or surrender the documents above
referred to unless his attorney's fees be paid
first;
o (2) laxity in the performance of his duties by
asking for and agreeing to numerous
postponements of the trial of the cases
entrusted to him, to the damage and prejudice
of his client;
o (3) an attempt by the respondent to induce the
complainant's common law-wife to execute an
affidavit and state therein that the complainant
intended to kill, the respondent if the latter
would not return the documents; and failing,
in this attempt, the respondent succeeded in
inducing for a consideration the complainant's
common-law wife to run away with the trunk
belonging to the complainant "containing
valuables relative to his business" (Annex G);
and
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
o (4) conspiring with the Municipal Treasurer of
Kidapawan, Cotabato, to prosecute him
(complainant) criminally, for his failure to pay
his municipal license for the 2nd to the 4th
quarters of 1958 (Annex H).
o Upon the admissions made by the respondent
in his answer and the evidence presented
during the investigation, the investigator
recommended the dismissal of the complaint.
The Solicitor General is, however, of the
opinion that the respondent violated his
lawyer's oath by refusing without cause to
return the documents entrusted to him in
connection with the cases in which his service
as attorney had been engaged unless his
attorney's fees be paid first; and was lax or
remiss in the performance of his duties by
asking for and agreeing to numerous
postponements of the hearing of the cases
entrusted to him to the prejudice of his client's
interest, and recommends that the respondent
be reprimanded with a warning that a
repetition of the acts or conduct complained of
will be dealt with more severely. As to the
other charges, the Solicitor General believes
that there is no sufficient evidence to prove or
support them.
Held:
The fact that the hearing of the cases had been postponed
several times not all upon the petition of the respondent because
it was also continued upon petition of the adverse party and in
several instances upon joint motion of the parties is not enough
to support the charge of laxity in the performance by the
respondent of his duties as attorney.1awphl.nt
Likewise, the refusal of the respondent to return the documents
or receipts that had come into his possession as attorney, whose
professional service had been engaged by the complainant to
bring the action against the latter's debtors, may not be the
proper conduct, but is not devoid of justification because the
respondent believed he was entitled to retain them unless his
fees agreed upon in writing be paid first.
So that if the Justice of the Peace was of the opinion that the
respondent could not retain possession or withhold production
or presentation of the documents, he could have issued
such subpoena duces tecum, and if disobeyed by the respondent,
could have punished him for contempt. Nothing appears to have
been done further in the premises. According to the complaint
(par. 9) the Justice of the Peace refused to issue the subpoena
duces tecum. If such refusal by the Justice of the Peace was an
Page 101 of 131
error, the complainant should have appealed from the order of
dismissal without prejudice of the complaints, and as such order
of dismissal is vacated after the appeal had been perfected and
the cases would be tried de novo in and by the Court of First
Instance, the complainant could have renewed, repeated or
reiterated his motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum. This the complainant or his attorney failed to do.
N VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the charges preferred against
attorney Napoleon O. Fontanosa by Gervacio Dauz are
dismissed.
INTON V. MATUTE:
Facts:
Julian Villanueva Matute, as newly appointed co-
administrator of the Testate Estate of Amadeo Matute
Olave, filed a motion with the probate court, praying
that Atty. Antonio Enrile Inton be ordered to surrender
and deliver to him (movant) all certificates of title,
plans, documents, and papers belonging to the Estate
and which were in the possession of said lawyer, in
order that they may be kept in the office of the Estate
in Davao City and be ready for inspection should the
management of the properties require It.
This motion was opposed by Atty. Antonio Enrile
Inton, who alleged that he was the counsel for the
Estate and the former administrator, Celestino Alonzo;
that for said legal services, he filed with the probate
court on October 10, 1962, a claim for payment of his
lawful fees from November 26, 1958 to October
26,1962, at the rate of P1,200.00 a month or a total of
P72,500.00, excluding the compensation for handling
the defense against various claims filed in the testate
proceed-ing, which should be on quantum meruit
basis;
That he came into possession of 20 certificates of
title2 in the course of his work as counsel for the
Estate and the former administrator.
Oppositor, therefore, contended that until his claim
for attorneys f ees is settled, he will be exercising a
retaining lien over the aforesaid documents belonging
to the Estate. After the issues were joined, the court a
quo by order of January 7, 1963, granted the motion of
the co-administrator and ordered Atty. Enrile Inton to
deliver the 19 documents listed in the Opposition and
admitted by the latter to belong to the Estate. Atty.
Enrile Inton filed the present appeal, which calls only
for the determination of whether or not he has the right
to retain the titles and documents in question, until his
claim or attorneys fees is finally settled.
HELD:
Section 37 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 37. Attorneys liens.An attorney shall have a lien upon
the funds, documents and papers of his client which have
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until
his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, x x x.
Thereunder, there is no question that a lawyer has a retaining
lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client that may
have come lawfully into his possession, until his lawful fees are
duly paid.
In the present case, it is not disputed that appellant was
commissioned to render, as in fact he did render, legal services
to the former administrator of the Estate, Celestino Alonzo.
Thus, said administrator certified:
SEPAN TODOS POR LA PRESENTE:
Sirvase tomar nota que efectivo el dia 15 de Noviembre de
1958 he nombrado el Abogado Sr. Antonio Enrile Inton como
mi unico abogado por el Administrator en Davao de Amadeo
Matute Olave, para representarme en el procedimiento y demas
otros litigios, en donde la Testamentaria Amadeo Matute
It is clear therefrom that appellant was appointed by Alonzo as
his lawyer, to represent him in all suits affecting the Estate
under his trust. This appointment, however, was not in
pursuance to any court order, nor was it approved by the probate
court. It was an act personal to the administrator. The creation of
the professional relationship between appellant and the
administrator did not, therefore, make the Estate also a client of
the said lawyer.
And, it may be stated in this connection, that for legal services
rendered to the administrator, the estate under administration
cannot be directly held liable for payment of the corresponding
attorneys fees. In the case of Uy Tioco v. Imperial and Panis,3
this Court ruled thus:
x x x The services for which fees are claimed are supposed to
have been rendered to the executor or administrator to assist him
in the execution of his trust. The attorney can therefore not held
the estate directly liable for his fees; such fees are allowed to the
executor or administrator and not to the attorney. The liability
for the payment rests on the executor or administrator, but if the
fees paid are beneficial to the estate and reasonable, he is
entitled to reimbursement f rom the estate. Such payments
should be included in his accounts and the reimbursement
therefor settled upon the notice prescribed in section 682 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.4 (See Church on Probate Law and
Practice, pp. 15701588 and authorities therein cited; Woerner
on the American Law of Administration, 2d ed., sections 515
and 516.)"
It follows as a necessary consequence that the lawyer for the
administrator or executor cannot claim to have a retaining lien
over any funds, papers, or documents belonging to the Estate,
even if these properties may have come into his possession in
the course of his work as such counsel for the administrator.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Page 102 of 131
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and ARTURO ALAFRIZ and ASSOCIATES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 86100-03 January 23, 1990]
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and ARTURO ALAFRIZ and
ASSOCIATES, respondent.
PONENTE: REGALADO, J.:
NATURE: Review on certiorari annul the decision of Court
of Appeals ordering Metrobank to pay Arturo Alafriz and
Associates P936,000.00 as attorneys fees on the basis of
quantum meruit.
PROCEDURAL FACTS:
Arturo A. Alafriz and Associates (AAA) handled the civil
cases of Metrobank from March 1974 to September 1983.
o All the cases were declaration of nullity of certain
deeds of sale, with damages.
ANTECEDENT FACTS:
Celedonio Javier bought 7 parcels of land owned by
Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a total area of about 10
hectares.
o Properties were mortgaged by Javier with Metrobank
to secure a loan obligation of one Felix Angelo
Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation.
o Javier defaulted. Metrobank foreclosed the properties.
o Alejandro, on the other hand, alleging deceit, fraud
and misrepresentation committed against him by
Javier in the sale of the parcels of land, brought suits
against Javier et al., and included Metrobank as
defendant therein.
o AAAs services were already acquired here.
While the case was pending, Metrobank sold the
properties to its sister company, Service Leasing
Corporation on March 23, 1983 for the purported price of
P600,000.00. SLC, on the other hand, sold the property to
another company and the cycle went on.
o Metrobank, no longer the possessor of the properties,
moved for substitution of party on July 28, 1983.
o AAA had no knowledge about this. AAA only knew
when Metrobank filed its motion. Thus, they filed on
August 16, 1983 a verified motion to enter in the
records of the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien,
pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of
the actual and current market values of the
litigated properties as its attorney's fees.
o This was granted by the TC because of Metrobanks
failure to appear.
o The Alejandro case was subsequently dismissed as
well.
On May 28,1984, AAA filed a motion to fix its attorney's
fees, based on quantum meruit, which motion
precipitated an exchange of arguments between the
parties. (dismissal of the Alejandro case, etc.)
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
Metrobank: paid in full.
o
AAA: P50,000.00 given by Metrobank could not be
o
considered as full payment but merely a cash advance
o Negotiations up to P600,000.00 were even made to
evade court litigation but to no avail.
CA: Affirmed RTC (sub bullet 3, bullet 2 of AF)
ISSUE: Whether or not the legal fees charged by AAA are
reasonable.
HELD: NO.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138
provides:
. . . He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon
all judgments for the payment of money, and
executions issued in pursuance of such judgments,
which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from
and after the time when he shall have caused a
statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon
the records of the court rendering such judgment, or
issuing such execution, and shall have caused written
notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the
adverse party; and he shall have the same right and
power over such judgments and executions as his
client would have to enforce his lien and secure the
payment of his just fees and disbursements.
Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be
enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's
fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment
for money and execution in pursuance of such
judgment secured in the main action by the attorney
in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to
fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in
the main action in which his services were rendered
when something is due his client in the action from
which the fee is to be paid. .
In the case at bar, the civil cases below were dismissed
upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the frill
satisfaction of their claims." 8 The dismissal order neither
provided for any money judgment nor made any
monetary award to any litigant, much less in favor of
petitioner who was a defendant therein. This being so,
private respondent's supposed charging lien is, under our
rule, without any legal basis. It is flawed by the fact that
there is nothing to generate it and to which it can attach in
the same manner as an ordinary lien arises and attaches to
real or personal property.
RULING: CA Ruling is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Page 103 of 131
NOTES: Quantum meruit means as much as the lawyer
deserves or such amount which his services merit.
It is essential for the proper operation of the principle that there
is an acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be charged for
the services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to
notify him that the lawyer performing the task is expecting to be
paid compensation therefor. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a
device to prevent undue enrichment based on equitable postulate
that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for
it. (Agpalo, R. (2010). LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS. QC:
Rex Printing Company, Inc
53 GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS v NALDOZA
Facts:
Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. filed a
disbarment case against Atty. Promo Naldoza, their
former counsel.
Naldoza appealed a decision of the POEA. In line with
this, Gatchalian assers that the disbarments should
prosper since Naldoza committed the ff acts:
o Appealing a decision, knowing that the same
was already final and executory
o Deceitfully obtaining two thousand, five
hundred and fifty-five US dollars (US$2,555)
from complainant, allegedly for cash bond
in the appealed case
o Issuing a spurious receipt to conceal his illegal
act.
Naldoza was claimed to ask for a Cash Bond in
UNITED STATES DOLLAR amounting to TWO
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE (U.S.
$2,555.00) (for payment) to the Supreme Court in
order that the said appealed case could be heard or
acted upon by the Supreme Court.
Gatchalian came to know that there was no such
Cash Bond paid to the SC, and in fact, the fees were
only nominal (P622). Moreover, the receipt that
Naldoza presented to Gatchalian which allegedly
emanated from the SC was spurious.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
An estafa case was filed against Naldoza. It was
later on dismissed, but he was held liable for the
amount of $2,555.
Naldoza seeks that he not be suspended in the
practice of law.
Issue:
W/N Atty Naldoza should be punished for his acts?
Held:
Yes.
Atty. Primo Naldoza is DISBARRED, not just
suspended.
On the first issue:
o Complainant has failed to present proof
regarding the status of the appeal. Neither
has there been any showing that the appeal
was dismissed on the ground that the
POEA Decision had become final and
executory. Worse, there has been no
evidence that respondent knew that the
case was unappealable. Indeed, the records
of this Court shows that the Petition for
Review was dismissed for petitioners
(Gatchalians) failure to submit an Affidavit of
Service and a legible duplicate of the assailed
Order. Clearly, this charge has no leg to stand
on.
On the next two issues:
o When Naldoza paid P10,000 and issued a
check to complainant as his moral
obligation, he indirectly admitted the
charge. Normally, this is not the actuation of
one who is falsely accused of appropriating
the money of another. This is an admission of
misconduct. (RC Note: Naldoza claims that
Gatchalian owes him P180T in attorneys fees,
and after accounting, he paid him P10T as his
moral obligation)
o the amount of $2,555 was not a part of his
attorneys lien. He demanded the money
from his client on the pretext that it was
needed for the Petition before the Supreme
Court, but he actually converted it to his
personal gain.
Not only did he misappropriate the money entrusted to him;
he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his
money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official receipt of
this Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not
deserve to continue being a member of the bar.
SANTOS V. LLAMOS
Page 104 of 131
Complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the
bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to
your attention and appropriate sanction the
matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a
number of years now, has not indicated the
proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date
& place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all,
he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he
has been using this for at least three years
already, as shown by the following attached
sample pleadings in various courts in 1995,
1996 and 1997.
This matter is being brought in the context of
Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only
a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in
good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law". There is also Rule 139-A,
Section 10 which provides that "default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall
warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment
for one year shall be a ground for the removal
of the name of the delinquent member from
the Roll of Attorneys."
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates
"IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not
indicate any PTR for payment of professional
tax.
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record
of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:
1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per
Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-
CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in
SCRA )
2........his conviction for estafa per Decision
dated June 30, 1994
Complainant filed a certification, by the then president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier,
that respondents "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991.
Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his
membership fees up to the present."
Respondent alleged:]
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule
138, only an admitted member of the bar who
is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainants basis in claiming that the
undersigned was no longer in good standing,
were as above cited, the October 28, 1981
Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the
February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of
Article 316 RPC, concealment of
encumbrances. Chief
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court
dismissal decision was set aside and reversed
and respondent was even promoted from City
Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court
Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995
decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still
pending.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
Complainant need not even file this complaint
if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge
was never set aside and reversed, and also had
the decision of conviction for a light felony,
been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Undersigned himself would surrender his right
or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that
respondent had been delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it
clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the
present, that he had only a limited practice
of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his
principal occupation is a farmer of which he
is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm
is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else,
respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992,
is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act
7432 which took effect in 1992, in the
payment of taxes, income taxes as an
example. Being thus exempt, he honestly
believe in view of his detachment from a total
practice of law, but only in a limited practice,
the subsequent payment by him of dues with
the Integrated Bar is covered by such
exemption. In fact, he never exercised his
rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted
upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of
being covered by the exemption and if only to
show that he never in any manner wilfully and
deliberately failed and refused compliance
with such dues, he is willing at any time to
fulfill and pay all past dues even with
interests, charges and surcharges and
penalties. He is ready to tender such
fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly
saving his skin as again irrelevantly and
frustratingly insinuated for vindictive
purposes by the complainant, but as an honest
act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality
for him to pay such dues despite his candor
and honest belief in all food faith, to the
contrary.
In December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of
Governors passed a resolution[6] adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner which found
respondent guilty, and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for
three months and until he pays his IBP dues.
Respondent moved for a reconsideration of
the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in
a resolution,[7] dated April 22, 1999. Hence,
pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of
Court, this case is here for final action on the
decision of the IBP ordering respondents
suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown
"respondents non-indication of the proper IBP
Page 105 of 131
O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings
(Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter
complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP
Rizal 259060 for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated
March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter
President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that
respondents last payment of his IBP dues was
in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor
categorically admitted by respondent, he has
invoked and cited that "being a Senior
Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt
under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432
which took effect in 1992 in the payment of
taxes, income taxes as an example."
....
The above cited provision of law is not
applicable in the present case. In fact,
respondent admitted that he is still in the
practice of law when he alleged that the
"undersigned since 1992 have publicly made
it clear per his Income tax Return up to the
present time that he had only a limited
practice of law."
Therefore respondent is not exempt from
paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines
On the second issue, complainant claims that
respondent has misled the court about his
standing in the IBP by using the same IBP
O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six
years and therefore liable for his actions.
Respondent in his memorandum did not
discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged
in law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise
admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by
complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in
the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996,
and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter
membership and receipt number for the years in which those
pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only
engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith
that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax,
under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of
the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues
as the Board of Governors shall determine
with the approval of the Supreme Court. A
fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of
the collections from each Chapter shall be set
aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members
of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of
deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. -
Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this
Rule, default in the payment of annual dues
for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default
in such payment for one year shall be a
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17

ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in
the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not
matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A.
No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment
of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable
income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for
that year," the exemption does not include payment of
membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and
thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had
paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL
TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION,
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court
to be misled by any artifice.
Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his
misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit
the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents
advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea
for a more temperate application of the law,[8] we believe the
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until
he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or
until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of
this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all
chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts
in the land.
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.,
B.M. No. 1370 Requesting Exemption from Payment of IBP
Dues
Chico-Nazario,
J.
FACTS:
Petitioners files a motion for exemption for paying his IBP
dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of P12,035.00. He
contends that after admission to the Bar he worked at the
Phil. Civil Service then migrated to the US until his
retirement. His contention to be exempt is that his
employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his law
profession and he did not practice the same while in the US.
The compulsion that he pays his IBP annual membership is
oppressive since he has an inactive status as a lawyer. His
removal from the profession because of non-payment of the
same constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights
bereft of due process of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not inactive practice of the law profession is an
exemption to payment for IBP annual membership.
HELD:
NO.
The court held that the imposition of the membership fee is
a matter of regulatory measure by the State, which is a
necessary consequence for being a member of the
Philippine Bar. The compulsory requirement to pay the fees
subsists for as long as one remains to be a member
regardless whether one is a practicing lawyer or not. Thus,
his petition for exemption from paying his IBP membership
fee dues is denied.
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon:
o Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the
sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to
consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police
power of the State, and under the necessary powers
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondent's right to practice law before the courts of
this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the
fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty
may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary.

Page 106 of 131

ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
o But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not
a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to
exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership
in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, one of
which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide
by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the
gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from
payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay
P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership
fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible
period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a
warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from
the practice of law.
Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera vs. Casiano U. Laput
A.C. No. 217 November 27, 1968
Facts:
Complainant Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera seeks the
disbarment of respondent Casiano U. Laput, upon the ground
that, being her counsel, as administratrix of the estate of her late
husband, Macario Barrera, in Special Proceedings No. 2-J of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, he (Laput) had misappropriated
several sums of money held by him in trust for said estate and
tried to appropriate two (2) parcels of land belonging to the
same, as well as threatened her, in a fit of anger, with a gun, into
signing several papers, despite the fact that she is 72 years of
age.
In his answer, respondent admitted his former
relationship with Mrs. Barrera as attorney and client and, apart
from denying the main allegations of her complaint, averred that
the filing thereof was "part of a scheme to beat off" his claim for
attorney's fees in said Special Proceedings No. 2-J.
Issue:
WON Atty. Laput is guilty of gross misconduct in
office.
Held:
Improper and censurable as these acts inherently are,
they become more so when we consider that they were
performed by a man dealing with a woman 72 years of age. The
offense in this case is compounded by the circumstance that,
being a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, the
offender should have set the example as man of peace and a
champion of the Rule of Law. Worse still is the fact that the
Page 107 of 131
offended party is the very person whom the offender was
pledged to defend and protect his own client.
There are, of course, two (2) extenuating circumstance
in favor of respondent herein, namely: (1) he evidently
considered himself insulted by Mrs. Barrera and was obfuscated
because she clearly indicated her lack of confidence in him, by
stating bluntly that she wanted somebody else to read the papers
to her; and (2) he required her to do something really harmless.
Still, it cannot be denied that his intent in placing the gun on his
lap was to intimidate his client.
Atty. Laput was found guilty of gross misconduct and
accordingly suspended from practice of law for a period of one
(1) year from date of entry of judgment.
Barrientos vs. Daarol
A.C. No. 1512
Facts:
1 Victoria Barrientos, was about 20 years
old during the time of her relationship
with respondent; while respondent
Transfiguracion Daarol, married, General
Manager of Zamboanga del Norte
Electric Cooperative, and 41 years old at
the time of the said relationship.
2 That respondent is married to Romualda
A. Sumaylo with whom be has a son; and
that said respondent had been separated
from his wife for about 16 years at the
time of his relationship with complainant;
3 The respondent promised to marry
Victoria in six months of the in
relationship. However, complainant
became pregnant.
4 They agreed that complainant would
deliver her child in Manila, where Daarol
admitted to her that he is not capacitated
to marry because of the previous
marriage. But he promised to fix things.
Later on, Victoria decided to deliver the
child in Cebu City in order to be nearer to
Dipolog City. During her stay here in
Manila and later in Cebu City, the
respondent defrayed some of her
expenses; that she filed an administrative
case against respondent with the National
Electrification Administration; which
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
complaint, however, was dismissed; and
then she instituted the present disbarment
proceedings against respondent.
ISSUE:
Should Daarol be disbarred?
Holdings:
1 Victoria was never informed of the status of Daarol and
was led to believ that he is single. It was deception that
Daarol promised to marry her when he knew as an
Attorney that he is not capacitated to marry.
2 Daarols claim that he embraced the Muslim religion
does not excuse him since his first marriage is under
the Christian religion, therefore it follows the Civil
Code. This is also contradicting to his reason to
Victoria that he will be charged with bigamy if he
marries her.
3 Grounds for his disbarment:
a Deceit and grossly immoral conduct under Section
27 of Rule 138
b Lack of good moral character under Section 2 of
Rule 138.
Bernabe vs Beltran
Tabas vs Malicden
Sesbrano vs CA
FACTS: Fifty-two employees sued the Province of Cebu
and Governor Rene Espina for reinstatement and
backwages imploring Atty. Pacquiao as counsel who was
later replaced by Atty. Sesbreno. The employees and Atty.
Sesbreno agreed that he is to be paid 30% as attorneys
fees and 20% as expenses taken from their back salaries.
Trial court decided in favor of the employees and ordered
the Province of Cebu to reinstate them and pay them back
salaries. The same was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals and ultimately the Supreme Court. A compromise
agreement was entered into by the parties in April 1979.
Page 108 of 131
The former employees waived their right to reinstatement
among others. The Province of Cebu released
P2,300,000.00 to the petitioning employees through Atty.
Sesbreno as Partial Satisfaction of Judgment. The
amount represented back salaries, terminal leave pay and
gratuity pay due to the employees. Ten employees filed
manifestations before the trial court asserting that they
agreed to pay Atty. Sesbreno 40% to be taken only from
their back salaries. The lower court issued two orders,
with which petitioner complied, requiring him to release
P10,000.00 to each of the ten private respondents and to
retain 40% of the back salaries pertaining to the latter out
of the P2,300,000.00 released to him. On March 28, 1980,
the trial court fixed the attorneys fees a total of 60% of all
monies paid to the employees. However, trial court
modified the award after noting that petitioners attorneys
lien was inadvertently placed as 60% when it should have
been only 50%. Atty. Sesbreno appealed to the Court of
Appeals claiming additional fees for legal services but was
even further reduced to 20%.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals had the authority to
reduce the amount of attorneys fees awarded to petitioner
Atty. Raul H. Sesbreo, notwithstanding the contract for
professional services signed by private respondents
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court noted that the contract of
professional services entered into by the parties 6
authorized petitioner to take a total of 50% from the
employees back salaries only. The trial court, however,
fixed the lawyers fee on the basis of all monies to be
awarded to private respondents. Fifty per cent of all
monies which private respondents may receive from the
provincial government, according to the Court of Appeals,
is excessive and unconscionable, not to say, contrary to
the contract of professional services. What a lawyer may
charge and receive as attorneys fees is always subject to
judicial control. A stipulation on a lawyers compensation
in a written contract for professional services ordinarily
controls the amount of fees that the contracting lawyer
may be allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated
amount unreasonable unconscionable. A contingent fee
arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally
recognized as valid and binding but must be laid down in
an express contract. if the attorneys fees are found to be
excessive, what is reasonable under the circumstances.
Quantum meruit, meaning as much as he deserves, is
used as the basis for determining the lawyers professional
fees in the absence of a contract. The Supreme Court
averred that in balancing the allocation of the monetary
award, 50% of all monies to the lawyer and the other 50%
to be allocated among all his 52 clients, is too lop-sided in
favor of the lawyer. The ratio makes the practice of law a
commercial venture, rather than a noble profession. It
would, verily be ironic if the counsel whom they had hired
to help would appropriate for himself 50% or even 60% of
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
the total amount collectible by these employees. 20% is a
fair settlement.
Petition is DENIED.
KOMATSU INDUSTRIES INC. V. CA
Syllabus: Pleadings and Practice; Attorneys; Responsible
litigants need not be told that only pleadings formulated
with intellectual honesty on facts duly ascertained can
subserve the ends of justice and dignify the cause of the
pleader.The Padilla Law Office, counsel for respondent
private corporation, has submitted its response to the
imputations against it, thus calling for petitioner to prove
its charges. The same burden is also imposed upon
petitioner for the aspersions it has cast upon respondent
Court of Appeals. We, therefore, leave it to the aforesaid
law firm, Justice Teodoro Padilla and the Court of
Appeals, on the one hand, and to herein petitioner, on the
other, to decide for themselves whether to further pursue
this incident in the proper proceedings. On such
contingency, this Court will content itself for the nonce
with a stern admonition that petitioner refrain from
conduct tending to create mistrust in our judicial system
through innuendos on which no evidence is offered or
indicated to be proffered. Responsible litigants need not
be told that only pleadings formulated with intellectual
honesty on facts duly ascertained can subserve the ends of
justice and dignify the cause of the pleader.
Facts: National Investment and Development Corp.
(NIDC) granted Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. (KIPI) a
direct loan of P8,000,000 and a P2,000,000 guarantee to
secure PNB. As security thereof, a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage was executed by KIPI in favour of NIDC
covering a parcel of land with all its improvements
embraced in TCT No. 469737. KIPI then executed an
Amendment of Mortgage Deed covering the same parcel
of land regarding letters of credit by PNB in favour of
KIPI with foreign suppliers worth US$1,564,826. Upon
full payment of KIPIs account with NIDC and the
2,000,000 credit line with PNB, NIDC executed a Deed of
Release and Cancellation of Mortgage. By virtue of this
release, NIDC returned the owners copy of the TCT to
KIPI and registered the Deed of Release with the Registry
of Deed. However, PNB requested the return of the TCT
due to unsettled accounts based on the subsequent
amendment of the mortgage. The return was made but
after a year, PNB filed for extrajudicial foreclosure of the
property. KIPI contests the foreclosure saying that the
release by NIDC had the effect of releasing the real estate
mortgage.
Issue: W/N NIDCs Deed of Release is binding on PNB?
Page 109 of 131
Held: NO. PNB was not a signatory to such agreement. It
is a separate and distinct personality from NIDC. NIDC
was in no position to state that Komatsus direct obligation
PNB has been fully paid.
In relation to Legal Ethics: The Court reprimanded KIPI
for insinuating that Padilla Law Offices used the
friendship and connection of retired Justice Teodoro
Padilla with the ponente of the CA decision for disposing
the case in their favour as a birthday and parting gift.
When the said ponente declined and unloaded case, it was
still allegedly raffled to another good friend of Justice
Padilla. However, based on the records, the case was
directly raffled to the Second Division and there was no
prior ponente to whom it was assigned.
The Court said that it should prove its charges and refrain
from conduct tending to create mistrust our judicial
system through innuendos on which no evidence is offered
or indicated to be proffered.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989
ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
Syllabus: Candidates and many of the participants in the
election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also
the ethics of the legal profession imposed on all lawyers.
The candidates and many of the participants in that
election not only violated the ByLaws of the IBP but also
the ethics of the legal profession imposes on all lawyers,
as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the
constitution and the laws, the duty to promote respect for
law and legal processes and to abstain from activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of
Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely
eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be
minions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and
cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP
formulated for their observance.
FACTS: In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International
Convention Center, the newly-elected officers were set to take their
oath of office on July 4,1989 before the Supreme Court en banc.
However, disturbed by the widespread reports received by some
members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated
in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns
of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and
overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists for the
office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo,
Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government
planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to
influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-
Laws which prohibit such activities, the Supreme Court en banc,
exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to
suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
veracity of the reports. Media reports done by Mr.Jurado, Mr. Mauricio
and Mr. Locsin in the newspapers opened the avenue for investigation
on the anomalies in the IBP Elections. The following violations are,
Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for
president, executive vice-president, the officers or candidates for the
House of Delegates and Board of Governors, Use of PNB plane in the
campaign, Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and
alternates, Formation of tickets and single slates, Giving free hotel
accommodations, food, drinks, and entertainment to delegates,
Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon, Paying the
dues or other indebtedness of any member (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws),
Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one
page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws), Causing
distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those
authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-
Laws) and Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to
vote for or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws). The
prohibited acts are against the IBP By-Laws more specifically Article I,
Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political"
character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Sec. 14. Prohibited
acts and practices relative to elections and Section 12[d] of the By-
Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules: Any
violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the
prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 [Prohibited Acts and
Practices Relative to Elections) of the By-laws of the Integrated Bar
shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal
from office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions
upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar.
ISSUE: Is the principal candidates for the national positions in the
Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on
June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a
travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined
in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
DECISION: It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the
provision in the 1987 Constitution [See. 8, Art. VIII] providing for a
Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven [7] members among
whom is "a representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate
in the selection of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the
judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president has
attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted
"power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have
caused the corruption of the IBP elections. The decision are:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby
annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the
House of Delegates [approved by this Court in its Resolution of July 9,
1985 in Bar Matter No. 287] of the following national officers:
[a] the officers of the House of Delegates;
[b] the IBP president; and
[c] the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal
the By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-
President elected by the Board of Governors [composed of the
governors of the nine (9) IBP regions] from among themselves [as
provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws] should be
restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-
President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term
[which was abolished by this Court's Resolution dated July 9,1985 in
Bar Matter No. 287] should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-
President shall automatically succeed to the office of President. The
incoming Board of Governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-
President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-
Page 110 of 131
President shall be rotated among the nine [9] IBP regions. One who has
served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-
President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the
presidency among the nine [9] regions shall have been completed;
whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 47. National Officers. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
shall have a President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the
Board of Governors from among nine [9] regional governors, as much
as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio
Vice-President for their respective regions. There shall also be a
Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Board.
6. Section 33[b], Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:
[b] The President and Executive Vice-President of the IBP shall be the
Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates.
The Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33[g] of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman,
Vice-Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer and Sergeant-at-Arms of the
House of Delegates, is hereby repealed.
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of
nine [9] Governors from the nine [9] regions as delineated in Section 3
of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one [1] Governor
for each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates
from that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated
among the different Chapters in the region.
9. Section 39, Article V, is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one [1]
month before the national convention. - The delegates from each
region shall elect the Governor for their region, the choice of which
shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
10. Section33 [a], Article V, is hereby amended by adding the following
provision as part of the first paragraph:
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general
membership shall be held prior to any election in an election year.
11. Section 39 [a], [b], [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], and [7] of Article VI
should be, as they are hereby, deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws, including its amendment by the
Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 [Bar Matter No. 287]
that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the
nine [9] IBP regions within three [3] months, after the promulgation of
the Court's Resolution in this case. Within thirty [30] days thereafter,
the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila
to elect from among themselves, the IBP National President and
Executive Vice-President. In these special elections, the candidates in
the election of the national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly
identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of
Tickets and Single Slates", as well as those identified in this Resolution
as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that election,
are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidates for any
position.
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker Board shall be appointed
by the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear
that the dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in
due time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the
premises.
Berenguer vs. Carranza
Facts: A complaint against respondent Pedro B. Carranza
was filed on July 15, 1966, for deception practiced on the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, in that aware of the
falsity of an Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
executed by the mother of his client to the effect that her
own mother left no legitimate ascendants or descendants
or any other heirs except herself, when, as a matter- of
fact, the deceased was survived by four other daughters
and one son, father of the complainant, he introduced the
same in evidence.3
Respondent Carranza was required in our resolution of
July 22, 1966, to file an answer. Thereafter, on August 17,
1966, he did so, alleging as the truth of the matter that the
aforesaid Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer was
introduced in evidence only to prove the fact of such
transfer of the property in question to his client,
respondent having "no hand in the making of said affidavit
nor of the petition, both of which were prepared in Pasay
City."
Issue: WON the act of respondent in falsifying the
Affidavit of Adjuducation and Transfer is a violation of
his oath.
Ruling: Yes. For presenting evidence therein containing a
false statement, which thus caused confusion and
prolongation of a cadastral suit, respondent lawyer was
charged with "violation of his oath of office." Respondent
interposed the defense that he had no hand in the
preparation of the evidence (an Affidavit of Adjudication
and Transfer of Land) and that he presented the same as
evidence without knowledge that it contains certain false
statements. The Solicitor General found that the charge of
deliberate deception obviously cannot be sustained. Would
that of itself entirely exculpate him from any
responsibility?
Every member of the bar must be on his guard, lest
through oversight or inadvertence, the way he conducts
his case or the -evidence he presents could conceivably
result in a failure of justice. Time and time again, lawyers
have been admonished to remember that they are officers
of the court, and that while they owe their clients the duty
of complete fidelity and the utmost diligence, they are
likewise held to strict accountability insofar as candor and
honesty towards the court is concerned. Even if there be
no intent to deceive, therefore, a lawyer whose conduct, as
in this case, betrays inattention or carelessness should not
be allowed to free himself from a charge thereafter
instituted against him by the mere plea that his conduct
was not wilful and that he has not consented to the doing
of the falsity.
A lawyer's oath is one impressed with the utmost
seriousness; it must not be taken lightly. Every lawyer
must do his best to live up to it. There would be a failure
of justice ii courts cannot rely on the submission as well as
the representations made by lawyers, insofar as the
presentation of evidence, whether oral or documentary, is
concerned. If, as unfortunately happened in this case, even
Page 111 of 131
without any intent on the part of a member of the bar to
mislead the court, such deplorable event did occur, he
must not be allowed to escape the responsibility that justly
attaches to a conduct far from impeccable.
Respondent is reprimanded.
Austria vs Masaquel
Syllabus: A judge cannot prevent any personeven a
litigant or counsel in a case before himto enter-tain an
opinion about him as a judge. Certainly, any person is
entitled to his opinion about a judge, whether that opinion
is flattering to the judge or not. It would be different if a
person would deliberately and maliciously express an
adverse opinion about a judge, without reason, but simply
to malign and discredit him. A citizen of this Republic is
entitled to expect that our courts of justice are presided by
judges who are free from bias and prejudiceand it
should not be made to count against the citizen if he so
expresses himself truthfully, sincerely, and respectfully. A
judge, as a public servant, should not be so thin-skinned or
sensitive as to feel hurt or offended if a citizen expresses
an honest opinion about him which may not altogether be
flattering to him. After all, what matters is that a judge
performs his duties in accordance with the dictates of his
conscience and the light that God has given him. A judge
should never allow himself to be moved by pride,
prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his
duties.
Facts: Petitioner was one of the plaintiffs in the above-
mentioned Civil Case No. 132581 against Pedro Bravo for
the recovery of three parcels of landone parcel being
located at Bayambang and two parcels in San Carlos, in
the province of Pangasinan. On April 19, 1963, after trial,
respondent Judge rendered a decision declaring the
plaintiffs the owners of the three parcels of land in
question and ordering the def endant to vacate the lands
and pay the plaintiffs damages only with respect to the
land located at Bayambang. On June 14, 1963, the
defendant, through Atty. Sica (former associate of
respondent judge)t, filed a supersedeas bond to stay the
execution of the judgment, and on June 20, 1963
respondent Judge granted the stay of execution, over the
objection of plaintiffs, and ordered the sheriff to restore
the possession of the lands in San Carlos to the defendant.
The petitioner likewise had asked for the appointment of a
receiver over the parcel of land located. at Bayambang,
which prayer was granted by respondent Judge on July 8,
1963.
Before the opening of the court's session in the morning of
February 10, 1964, Atty. Daniel Maracaeg, counsel for
petitioner and his co-plaintiffs, saw respondent Judge in
his chamber and verbally transmitted to him the request of
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
petitioner that he (the Judge) inhibit himself from further
hearing the case upon the ground that the new counsel for
the defendant, Atty. Mariano C. Sikat, was his former
associate. Respondent announced before the start of the
hearing that Atty. Austria is guilty of contempt and was
ordered to pay 500.00.
Issue: WON the action of respondent in declaring Austria
guilty of contempt is proper.
Ruling: No. We do not agree with the respondent Judge. It
is our considered view that when the petitioner requested
respondent Judge to inhibit himself from further trying the
case upon the ground that the counsel for the opposite
party was the former associate of the respondent Judge,
petitioner did so because he was impelled by a justifiable
apprehension which can occur in the mind of a litigant
who sees what seems to be an advantage on the part of his
adversary; and that the petitioner made his request in a
manner that was not disrespectful, much less insulting or
offensive to the respondent Judge or to the court.
We are in accord with the statement of respondent Judge
in his memorandum that the circumstance invoked by
petitioner in asking him to inhibit himself from further
trying the casethat Atty. Sicat was his former associate
in his practice of lawis not one of the grounds
enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137
of the new Rules of Court for disqualifying a judge. While
it is true that respondent Judge may not be compelled to
disqualify himself, the fact that Atty. Sicat, admittedly his
former associate, was counsel for a party in the case being
tried by him, may constitute a just or valid reason for him
to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case on a
retrial, if he so decides, pursuant to the provision of the
second paragraph of Section 1 of the said Rule 137.5
The power to punish for contempt, being drastic and
extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless
necessary in the interest of justice.13
IN RE: PONCIANO B. JACINTO
Facts: The Court has injitiated this action motu proprio
because of the improvident language and conduct of Atty.
Jacinto, counsel in the Palmario v. SSS case. Palmario v
SSS case was about the question of Palmario where she
was considered resigned from her last day of actual
service by the CSC. She was considered resigned after she
failed to report to SSS after being absent for one year.
There were several motions for reconsideration filed to the
SC but the SC dismissed the same because it just alleged
facts without legal basis. Atty. Jacinto included in his
Special and Very Urgent Manifestation to the SC insults
and threats in the most boorish and insolent manner. He
was warned it of a looming danger ahead if his motions
Page 112 of 131
are not granted ; averred that denial of his petition will
make the Court as superfluous as a hole in the head;
broadly hinted that he will then give the media news of
the most nauseating kind involving the Court and made
other irresponsible charges and insinuations that
besmiorch the higher tribunal and undermine popular faith
in its integrity.
Issue: WON the statement of Jacinto is contemptuous.
Held: The Court suspended Atty. Jacinto. The above
statements are clearly contemptuous. Every lawyer is
expected to maintain the proper decorum in his dealings
with the courts of justice and is never justified in using
scurrilous and threatening language in pleading his clients
cause. While criticism of jusidical conduct is not
forbidden and zeal in advocacy is in fact encouraged, the
lawyer must always act within the limits of propriety and
good taste and with deference for the judges before whom
he pleads.
IN RE: ALMACEN
FACTS:
31 SCRA 562 Legal Ethics A Lawyers Right to
Criticize the Courts
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay
in a civil case. They lost in said civil case but Almacen
filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the
opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate the
time and place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his
motion was denied. He then appealed but the Court of
Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court
with regard to the motion for reconsideration. Eventually,
Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme
Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute
resolution.
This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute
resolutions as unconstitutional. He then filed before the
Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyers
certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to
continue practicing his profession when members of the
high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice,
who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute
resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without
knowing the reasons why and that he became one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy. He also
stated that justice as administered by the present
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb.
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacens
petition as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to
ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender
his lawyers certificate though as he now argues that he
chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be
permitted to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary
action should be taken against him . . . in an open and
public hearing. He said he preferred this considering that
the Supreme Court is the complainant, prosecutor and
Judge. Almacen was however unapologetic.
ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute
resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court cannot
accept every case or write full opinion for every petition
they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to
effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper
role of the Supreme Court is to decide only those cases
which present questions whose resolutions will have
immediate importance beyond the particular facts and
parties involved. It should be remembered that a petition
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so
there is no need to fully explain the courts denial. For one
thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the
Court of Appeals opinion.
On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court, the High
Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is
insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the
court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts
of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the
decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and
the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has
always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the
cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacens criticism is misplaced. As a
veteran lawyer, he should have known that a motion for
reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party
of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and
will not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to
blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen
was suspended indefinitely.
Marcelino vs Alejandro
Syllabus: Political law; Constitutional law; Right of
accused to fair and impartial hearing; Trial by publicity;
Page 113 of 131
Where publicity was focused on the responsibility of the
Government instead of guilt of accused.Where the
publicity did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but
rather on the responsibility of the Government for what
was claimed to be a massacre of Muslim trainees, there
is no trial by publicity which would prejudice the right
of the accused to a fair and impartial hearing. If there was
a trial by newspaper at all, it was not of the petitioners
but of the Government.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judge must be unduly
influenced by the publicity.In order to warrant a finding
of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and
proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not
simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity.
FACTS: Major Eduardo Martelino is charged with the
violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of War, as a result
of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some
Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training on
the island of Corregidor.
On August 12, 1969 Martelino sought the disqualification
of the President of the general court-martial, following the
latter's admission that he read newspaper stories of the
Corregidor incident. Martelino contended that the case had
received such an amount of publicity in the press and
other news media and in fact was being exploited for
political purposes in connection with the presidential
election on November 11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a
fair trial. After deliberating, the military court denied the
challenge.
Respondents assert that despite the publicity which the
case had received, no proof has been presented showing
that the court-martial's president's fairness and impartiality
have been impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the
petitioner's own counsel expressed confidence in the
"integrity, experience and background" of the members of
the court.
ISSUE:
WON the publicity given to the case against the
petitioners was such as to prejudice their right to a fair
trial
HELD:
NO, the spate of publicity in this case did not focus on the
guilt of the petitioners but rather on the responsibility of
the Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre"
of Muslim trainees.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the
petitioners but of the Government. Absent here is a
showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the
accused from massive publicity encouraged by those
connected with the conduct of the trial either by a failure
to control the release of information or to remove the trial
to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of
prejudicial publicity shall have subsided. Indeed we
cannot say that the trial of the petitioners was being held
under circumstances which did not permit the observance
of those imperative decencies of procedure which have
come to be identified with due process.
Granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial"
publicity, since the petitioners here do not contend that the
respondents have been unduly influenced but simply that
they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that
the suspension of the court-martial proceedings has
accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners'
challenge for cause, by postponing the trial of the
petitioner until calmer times have returned. The
atmosphere has since been cleared and the publicity
surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated that
we believe the trial may now be resumed in tranquility.
Cantilang vs Medina
FACTS: This case seeks to annul the decision and prevent
the execution of the judgment of one, Judge Medina in a
case involving forcible entry and illegal detainer. The
lawyer who initiated this case is Atty. Revelo. In the
previous case the party represented by Atty. Revelo (who
were squatters) received an adverse decision declaring that
his clients should vacate the property in question and to
pay attorneys fees and reasonable compensation. Upon
losing the case, Atty. Revelo failed to file a motion for
reconsideration or a motion for new trial or to appeal the
decision. Hence the judgment became final and executory.
However instead of accepting the decision, Atty. Revelo
filed a separate case in a different CFI (the case at bar)
seeking to invalidate the decision in the earlier case and
preventing the execution of the judgment.
Issue: WON the duty to inform clients about the status of
their case is incumbent upon lawyers.
RULING: Yes. Atty. Revelos case is without merit and is
obviously resorted to solely as a maneuver to prevent or
defeat the execution of the final and executory decision of
Judge Medina. Certiorari is limited to correction of defects
of jurisdiction solely; it cannot be used for any other
purpose much less to defeat the right of the prevailing
party to the execution of a valid and final judgement.
Certiorari is not a substitute for appeal.
As an officer of the Court it was Atty. Revelos duty to
advise his clients, petitioners herein of the real merits of
Page 114 of 131
their case or the lack of it. Had he done so, petitioners
could have realized the futility of filing the present case
and spared them the need to spend their hard earned
money by way of court fees (P 4,000+). Atty. Revelo
failed in his duty to his clients, to be mindful of their
welfare and interest. The present petition is a sham and
clearly unmeritous. He also failed in his duty to the court
to promote and enhance instead of defeat and frustrate the
objectives and policies of society. The court says that in
delaying the execution of the judgment, Atty. Revelo was
encouraging other squatters to continue in breaking the
law as relief from the courts could easily be delayed.
SALAZAR VS DEE CASTRODES
FACTS:
SALAZAR V. DE CASTRODES
Facts: This is a case stemming from a
quiet title instituted by Bernardo Salazar
regarding a parcel of land planted with
coconuts situated in Guindulman, Bohol
against Bienvenido Libres, the brother of
the defendants, whom he acquired the
land by virtue of a sale. Libres with neither
legal right nor valid reason whatsoever,
and employing threat and intimidation,
claimed ownership of the piece of land
and gathered its coconuts and bamboos.
The CFI of Bohol ruled in favor of Salazar
declaring him as the owner and ordering
the defendants to vacate the land. A writ
of execution was issued by the court,
however, the defendants asserted a new
claim on the same property saying that it
was part of the inheritance left to them by
their father, Alipo Libres. The new claim
was never alleged in the initial case which
was ruled in favor of Salazar. The latter
case was easily shot down by the lower
court, stating the stipulation of the parties
that they would be bound by the judgment
in the previous case. However, the
defendants continued their appeal,
alleging errors that were clearly devoid of
merit. The Court of Appeals confirmed the
decision of the lower court and declared
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
plaintiff-appellant Salazar as the owner of
the parcel of land. The CA likewise
declared the deed of sale executed by
Bienvenido c. Libres in favor of Bernardo
O. Salazar as valid and legal.
ISSUE:
W/N the claim of De Castrodes et al is
tenable?
RULING:
No. The claims of the defendants are
nothing more than a form of harassment
being totally bereft of any support in law.
The appeal was found to be made too late
by the Court and runs contrary to the
elementary principle that the Supreme
Courts jurisdiction is limited to questions
of law given that the grounds stated in the
appeal are merely factual in nature. As the
Court stated:
It is thus apparent that on its
face the brief for defendants-
appellants is notable only for its
flagrant and obvious disregard of
what the proprieties, not to say
the decencies, of such a serious
matter as an appeal to the
Tribunal requires. Even if due
regard be had for the state of
mind under which claimants to a
piece of land, possessed of more
than an ordinary degree of
obduracy, might be laboring
under, still respect for the rule of
law ought to have cautioned
defendants in attempting,
perhaps thoughtlessly, to delay
unduly the termination of a
pending litigation and thus
accord respect to the just claims
of others. Nor is their counsel free
from blame when he could have
Page 115 of 131
informed them not only about the
futility of such efforts, which was
bad enough, but also the barrier
thus interposed against a fair,
speedy and efficient
administration of justice. As a
member of the bar and an officer
of the court, he owes such
minimum obligation to this
Tribunal. Unfortunately, he failed
to live up to it. He should not
escape responsibility.
PAJARES VS ABAD SANTOS
FACTS:
Udharam Bazar & Co. filed a case against
Gloria Pajares for recovery of money
(collection case). It was alleged that
Pajares, in the business of buying/selling
merchandise in her stall in Sta. Mesa
Market, ordered ready-made goods from
Udharam. She made partial payment but
failed to pay the balance of P 354.85.
Pajares, instead of filing an answer, moved
for a bill of particulars; requesting an
itemization of goods, purchase dates,
person who received the goods and
purchase price. The MTC Judge Estrella
Abad Santos denied the motion for a bill of
particulars. She filed for certiorari to the
CFI, alleging grave abuse of discretion of
Judge Abad Santos in denying the motion
for a bill of particulars. Udharam filed a
motion to dismiss petition for certiorari on
the ground that (1) the allegations of the
complaint are clear, specific and sufficient
to prepare defendant for her defenses and
(2) the things prayed in the motion of a
bill of particulars are evidentiary matters
beyond the nature of such motion. The CFI
denied the certiorari. Thus, she elevated
the issue to the SC.
ISSUE:
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
W/N the allegations in the complaint
sufficiently appraise Pajares of the nature
of cause of action against her.
W/N the items prayed for in the bill of
particulars constitute evidentiary matters.
RULING:
Yes to both. The complaint filed by
Udharam contained complete ultimate
facts constituting the cause of action to
appraise Pajares. In addition, it was
improper for appellant to request a bill of
particulars, specifying in detail the goods,
the purchase price, the purchase dates
and the person whom received such
goods. These are all evidentiary matters
and do not come within the scope of a bill
of particulars. It was observed that
Udharam was one of Pajares creditors
whom she used to buy on credit ready-
made goods. Pajares does not need
evidentiary particulars to prepare her
answer to the complaint. She cannot
pretend ignorance and require a detailed
itemization and purchase of the goods. It
was also found out that a month before
Udharam filed a complaint, it gave a
demand letter to Pajares, requesting for
the balance of payment. Pajares,
acknowledging her indebtedness, reason
that she sustained financial losses in her
operation. She requested that she be
allowed to pay the debt in installments;
P10 every 15th and end of the month.
There was no error of law or grave abuse
of discretion by the Judge Abad Santos in
denying the motion for bill of particulars.
The circumstances surrounding the
litigation is frivolous and merely a plain
trick to delay payment and prolong
litigation. It was supposed to be just a
simple collection case. But due to the
actions of Pajares, it dragged on for 7
Page 116 of 131
years. Had the counsel of Pajares (Atty.
Moises Nicomedes) advised her to
confessed judgment and ask for
reasonable time to pay the debt, there
would have been no reason to incur
litigation expenses and filing feels, as well
as loss of time. Now, she incurred all of
them, in addition to the accumulated
interest of her original debt. Lawyers
should remember that there should be
faithful adherence to Rule 7, Section 5 of
the Rules of Court, which provides that
any pleading filed in court, should have
good ground to support it and it is not
interposed for delay. Pajares is ordered to
pay the debt and costs of litigation. The
case shall be noted in the personal record
of the Pajaress counsel.
ECONOMIC VS UY
FACTS:
DOCTRINE: That procedural rules are
intended as an aid to justice, not as a
means for its frustration.
1. A complaint for Ejectment was filed
by Uy Realty against Economic Insurance.
Economic Insurance then filed an answer
with counterclaims, seeking dismissal of
such a suit as well as a counterclaim for
reimbursement in the amount of
P15,000.00 for alleged improvements
made on the leased premises and for
damages in the amount of P5,000.00 for
alleged bad faith on the part of the lessor.
2. The decision of the City Court of
Manila ordered the defendant and those
claiming under him to vacate the premises
as well as to pay the sum of P4,100.00
representing rents in arrears plus the sum
of P1,500.00 a month beginning
September, 1966 for the use and
occupation of such premises.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
3. Upon an appeal being taken, which
fell to the sala of respondent Judge, a
supersedes bond was executed by such
defendant as well as by the petitioner, the
Economic Insurance Co., Inc.
4. During the appeal, a motion for
dismissal of the case and for payment of
the supersedeas bond was filed by the
plaintiff, respondent Uy Realty Co.
because:
a. Possession of the property had
been restored to Uy Realty
b. Withdraw the supersedeas
bond in lieu of rental payments by
Economic Insurance to Uy Realty.
5. Judge Cloribel issued an order
dismissing the case, but overlooked the
prayer for the payment of the supersedeas
bond.
6. Within the thirty-day period,
respondent sought for an amendment of
the above order to include execution on
the bond filed to cover the past rentals
due.
7. Judge Cloribel granted the prayer for
a writ of execution. It was issued at a time
when the matter was still subject to
cognizance by respondent Judge.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the judge erred in granting
the inclusion of the writ of execution
PROVISION:
In computing net income, there shall be
allowed as deductions: (a) Expenses: All
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business
Page 117 of 131
RULING + RATIO: No
1. Unfortunately, through haste or
inadvertence, respondent Judge ignored
that portion of the prayer for execution
and merely ordered that the appealed
case be dismissed. Within the period,
however, before such order attained the
stage of finality, a modification thereof
was secured as a result of a manifestation
and a motion of respondent Uy Realty Co.
to execute on the bond filed by petitioner.
Under the circumstances, what
respondent Judge did was clearly within
his authority, and the challenged order
can stand the test of the most exacting
scrutiny. Hence, this petition should fail.
2. One last observation. It is
understandable for a party in the situation
of petitioner to make full use of every
conceivable legal defense the law allows
it. In the appraisal, however, of such
attempts to evade liability to which a
party like petitioner should respond, it
must ever be kept in mind that procedural
rules are intended as an aid to justice, not
as a means for its frustration. Even if the
petition were impressed with a greater
degree of plausibility, it would be,
considering all the circumstances, to
crown with success an unworthy scheme
to evade a just obligation by perverting
the ends procedural requisites are
intended to accomplish. Not once but
several times, from Alonso v. Villamor, we
have stressed that we are not to lend the
imprimatur of our approval to any such
effort, the result of which would be to
render illusory substantive rights. We do
so again. Technicalities, in the appropriate
Language of Justice Makalintal, "should
give way to the realities of the situation.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by us by
virtue of our resolution of September 25,
1967 is set aside, and this petition for
prohibition is denied. With costs against
petitioner Economic Insurance Co., Inc.
SAMAR V. ARNADO
FACTS:
In 1958, Rufino Abuyen won a labor case
against Samar Mining Company. Abuyen
was awarded compensation
hospitalization expenses for a disease he
incurred while working for Samar Mining.
The decision was rendered by Pompeyo
Tan, a labor lawyer duly appointed by
Francisco Arnado, a regional administrator
of the Department of Labor. In 1961,
Samar Minings lawyer, Atty. Benedicto
Arcinas, filed an action for certiorari before
CFI Cebu contending that Tan has no
authority or jurisdiction over said case
because he was a mere labor lawyer
who had no authority to render the award
being complained of. CFI Cebu dismissed
the petition of Arcinas.
Meanwhile, in the same year, the Supreme
Court made a ruling in the case of Caltex
v. Villanueva (L-15658, August 21, 1961)
that duly appointed hearing officers by
regional administrators of the labor
department may issue awards.
Notwithstanding this ruling, Arcinas still
filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal has merit.
HELD:
No. It is obvious that the purpose of the
filing is just to delay and prolong the
Page 118 of 131
litigation in the hope of draining the
resources of the poorer party and of
compelling it to submit out of sheer
exhaustion. The conduct of Atty. Arcinas
is hardly compatible with the duty of the
Bar to assist in the Administration of
Justice, not to obstruct or defeat the same.
The Supreme Court ordered Samar Mining
and Atty. Arcinas to shoulder the litigation
costs of this case jointly and severally.
Ethics: One other point must be stressed.
The illness on which Abuyen's claim is
plus
based took place in 1956. Yet, through the
present case, and Civil Case No. 42836 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila (which
was dismissed for improper venue)
petitioner has succeeded in prolonging the
litigation, for the compensation involved
therein, for twelve (12) years. What is
more, petitioner's contention was based
upon a theory that had been rejected by
this Court as early as August, 1961. Then
again, the compensability of Abuyen's
disability had never been questioned by
petitioner herein. Hence, it is manifest
that the purpose of this case, like the
previous one, has been merely to delay, a
policy "Often resorted to" in the
language of Mr. Justice Reyes (J.B.L.) "as
a means of draining the resources of the
poorer party" in this case a tuberculosis
patient "and of compelling it to submit
out of sheer exhaustion."9 Thus, the
conduct of petitioner's counsel is hardly
compatible with the duty of the Bar to
assist in the Administration of Justice, not
to obstruct or defeat the same.
MENDOZA V. DUAVE
FACTS:
Mendoza filed a case of forcible entry
against Duave in the Justice of Peace
Court. Duave contested the allegations
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17

and claimed ownership of the land. The did not have certain papers needed to
summary judgment was rendered in favor prepare him for trial.
of Mendoza, making Duave appeal to the
ISSUE:
Court of First Instance (CFI). In CFI, Duave
was declared in default for failure to W/N the motion for reconsideration by
submit an answer. A default judgment and Duave should be granted.
writ of execution was rendered against
him. However, upon finding out that the RULING:
cause of Duaves failure was the ignorance
No. There was sufficient time for Atty.
of legal procedure (the notice of docketing
Deloso to procure the documents from his
was served on Duave, not his counsel),
client. Atty. Deloso entered as counsel on
the default judgment was set aside and
Sept 12, 1962. The hearing was on Nov
court gave him another chance to file
28, 1982. There was a two months
his answer. Before the hearing,
difference, ample time to get the papers.
defendants counsel filed a motion for
The court also presumed that Atty. Deloso
postponement but was denied. On the day
discussed the case when he accepted
of hearing, both parties failed to appear.
Duaves case, making him ready for trial.
Plaintiffs counsel reason that the bridge in
In addition, he could not have declared his
Bagsit, Zambales was impassable. Thus,
readiness for trial if he did not have all the
the hearing was reset to another day.
papers required. Even on technical
However, it was again postponed to the
grounds, the denial of motion for
motion of defendants counsel on the
postponement was valid, considering that
ground that he just recovered from an
counsel did not specify what papers he
illness and cannot make the trip to
needs to secure. Under the Rules of Court,
Zambales. As the hearing was reset for
a motion must be supported by an
2nd time, defendants counsel again filed
affidavit showing materiality of the
a motion to postpone the hearing on the
evidence and due diligence in securing
ground that he need to secure certain
that evidence, which defendants counsel
documents from his client. But the court
failed do to so. Defendants counsel even
denied such motion as the case was
failed to attend the hearing, believing the
already submitted for decision. The court
motion for postponement is surely to be
discovered that the land in question was
granted. It should be stressed that a
inherited by Mendoza from their mother,
motion for postponement is up to the
Emiliana Tuason. It was also found out that
sound discretion of the court. Lawyers
Mendoza already declared the land for
should not assume that the postponement
taxation and that Duave grabbed
would be granted and deliberately be
possession of the land from Mendoza.
absent on the day of hearing. It should
Judgment was rendered against Duave.
also be considered that the case was one
Duave asked for a motion for
of forcible entry. It has the nature of
reconsideration. He argues that his
summary procedure. Any kind of
counsel, Atty. Amor Deloso was the 3rd
postponements are not encouraged to
lawyer to represent him. He adds that
protect the real possessors of the land.
when Atty. Deloso accepted the case, he
The case was expected to be done
expedient and efficient manner. The claim

Page 119 of 131

ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
that the trial court erred in reinstating its
judgment in default on the ground that the
defendant is no longer in default is a mere
technicality. The decision would not be any
different were the court to render a new
decision, because it would still be in favor
of plaintiff. The lawyer is admonished for
such dilatory tactics that undermine the
nature of the action. The decision of the
CFI is affirmed.
UY CHENG SENG VS MAGAT
FACTS:
On March 27, 1979, Uy Chung Guan Seng
and Ching Uy Seng filed a verified
Complaint for Disbarment against
respondent Atty. Jose C. Magat alleging
that the following circumstances
warranted his exclusion from the Roll of
Attornies:
On 22 August 1977 (should be 11
August 1977), Complainant CHING
UY SENG a ROBERT CHING received
a letter from Respondent Atty. JOSE
C. MAGAT, threatening to report him
to the government authorities if he
would not get in touch with him
(MAGAT) and his clients with respect
to a bunch of documents and papers
pertaining to Complainants'
business. Such documents turned
out to be a part of the articles which
were stolen from the
office/residence of Complainants on
2 June 1977. In the morning of 13
August 1977, UY CHUNG GUAN
SENG a HENRY CHING; his lawyer,
Atty. ELISEO LEGASPI; and NBI Agent
RODOLFO DAHIROC went to the
Office of Atty. MAGAT at Room 512
Madrigal Bldg., Escolta, Manila, in
response to the above-mentioned
letter. Atty. MAGAT initially
Page 120 of 131
demanded the sum of P500,000.00
in exchange for the robbed
documents. CHING, LEGASPI and
Agent DAHIROC insisted on seeing
the documents first and to talk with
Atty. MAGAT's clients before they
negotiate the terms of the return of
the documents. The meeting was
reset on 15 August 1977 at 3:00
p.m., during which Atty. MAGAT
informed them that their demand
was reduced to P300,000.00 on a
"take it or leave it" basis. Atty.
MAGAT's "clients" who brought in
the robbed documents turned out to
be the suspects in the robbery of the
office/residence of Complainants on
2 June 1977, Atty. MAGAT insisted
that HENRY CHING produce
P30,000.00 to show his good faith in
pushing through with the
negotiation. It was at this juncture
that the NBI Agents confronted the
group and brought them to the NBI
office together with the robbed
documents for investigation.
On June 5, 1979, upon consideration of the
Complaint and the Comment, this Court
resolved to suspend respondent from the
practice of law effective immediately upon
notice, and until further orders.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of the respondent
constitute gross misconduct.
HELD:
Yes. The actuations of respondent Atty.
Magat constitute malpractice and gross
misconduct.
Writing and sending the letter Exhibit C
and demanding from the complainants the
amount of P500,000.00, later on reduced
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
to P300,000.00, with P30,000.00 as down
payment to show good faith, in
consideration for the return of anomalous
invoices and documents, is highly
reprehensible. Such acts constitute not
only threat but extortion.
He knew too that the decree of Cruz and
his group to extort money from the
complainants in exchange for the
anomalous documents was illegal. Despite
such knowledge and awareness, he
connived with his clients in violating the
law. And for what? It is in consideration of
the one-third share he would receive from
the proceeds of the transaction. The
assistance he extended to his clients'
dishonest scheme and his connivance with
them in violating the law render the
respondent guilty of unprofessional
conduct which warrants his disbarment or
suspension.
The promoting of organizations, with
knowledge of their objects, for the
purpose of violating or evading the laws
against crime constitutes such misconduct
on the part of an attorney, an officer of the
court, as amounts to malpractice or gross
misconduct in his office, and for which he
may be removed or suspended (Code of
Civil Procedure, sec. 21). The assisting of a
client in a scheme which the attorney
knows to be dishonest, or the conniving at
a violation of law, are acts which justify
disbarment. (In Re Terrel 2 Phil. 266, 267-
268; Emphasis supplied).
The grounds for disbarment or suspension
enumerated in the statute should not be
taken as a limitation of the general power
of the courts to disbar or suspend a
lawyer. For the power of the court over its
officers cannot be restricted. A lawyer may
be removed not only for malpractice or
Page 121 of 131
dishonesty in his profession but also for
his gross misconduct which shows him to
be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which the law confers upon him
(In Re Puno, 19 SCRA 439).
It has been repeatedly ruled that the
purpose of disbarment is to protect the
courts and the public from the misconduct
of officers of the court and to ensure the
administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function
shag be competent, honorable and
trustworthy men in whom courts and
dents may repose confidence (Santos vs.
Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). In the case at bar,
respondent has not exercised honesty and
trustworthiness and has failed to have up
to the high standards of the law
profession.
It is the duty of a member of the bar to
avoid all appearances of impropriety and
his actuations should be beyond suspicion.
It is true that an attorney enjoys the legal
presumption of innocence until the
contrary is proved, but this presumption
has been rebutted by the clear and
convincing evidence presented by the
complainants and their witnesses.
The dismissal of the criminal complaint for
Light Threats against respondent by the
City Fiscal's Office (Exhibits "2", "2-A", "2-
B" and "3", pp. 81-84, Record) will not
preclude the fact that respondent has not
exhibited honesty nor show
trustworthiness in the discharge of his
duties as a member of the Bar. The
dismissal of the criminal complaint does
not exonerate him of profession al
misconduct.
The proper disciplinary action against
respondent is disbarment for malpractice
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
and gross misconduct. He has shown
himself unfit for the office and unworthy
of' the privileges which the law confers
upon him. 6
The assisting of a client in a
scheme which the attorney
knows to be dishonest, or the
conniving at a violation of law,
are acts which justify
disbarment. (In Re Terrel 2
Phil, 266, 267-268).
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose C.
Magat is hereby disbarred; his name is
ordered stricken off the Rollo of attorneys;
and his Certificate of Admission to the Bar
is hereby recalled.
PUYAT VS DE GUZMAN
FACTS:
In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group
were elected as directors of the
International Pipe Industries. The election
was subsequently questioned by
Eustaquio Acero (Puyats rival) claiming
that the votes were not properly counted
hence he filed a quo warranto case before
the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to Aceros
filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez,
then a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock
of IPI from a member of Aceros group.
And during a conference held by SEC
Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from
May 25-31, 1979) to have the parties
confer with each other, Estanislao
Fernandez entered his appearance as
counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he
argued that it is unconstitutional for an
assemblyman to appear as counsel (to
anyone) before any administrative body
(such as the SEC). This being cleared,
Page 122 of 131
Fernandez inhibited himself from
appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead
filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in
the said SEC case for him to intervene, not
as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI
shares and as a person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC
Commissioner granted the motion and in
effect granting Fernandez leave to
intervene.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a
stockholder of IPI, can appear and
intervene in the SEC case without violating
the constitutional provision that an
assemblyman must not appear as counsel
in such courts or bodies?
HELD:
No
The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by
virtue of the motion for intervention,
Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to
be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is
not appearing on behalf of another,
although he is joining the cause of the
private respondents. His appearance could
theoretically be for the protection of his
ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of
the matter in litigation.
However, certain salient circumstances
militate against the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case.
He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of
stock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of
262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired
them after the fact that is, after the
contested election of directors, after the
quo warranto suit had been filed before
the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled
hearing of the case before the SEC. And
what is more, before he moved to
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
intervene, he had signified his intention to
appear as counsel for respondent Acero,
but which was objected to by petitioners.
Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the
objection, he decided, instead, to
intervene on the ground of legal interest in
the matter under litigation.
Under those facts and circumstances, the
Court is constrained to find that there has
been an indirect appearance as counsel
before anadministrative body. In the
opinion of the Court, that is a
circumvention of the Constitutional
prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII
(now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention
was an afterthought to enable him to
appear actively in the proceedings in
some other capacity.
WHEREFORE, respondent
Commissioner's Order granting Atty.
Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene
in SEC Case No. 1747 is hereby reversed
and set aside. The temporary Restraining
Order heretofore issued is hereby made
permanent.
LIBARIOS VS DABALOS
FACTS:
An administrative complaint was filed by
Roan I. Libarios for and on behalf of his
client Mariano Corvera, Jr. against
respondent Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos, for
grave ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
discretion, gross misconduct and
partiality, relative to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest of the respondent judge
against the accused Tranquilino Calo Jr.
and Belarmino Alloco for the crime of
murder fixing their bail without any prior
hearing.
ISSUE:
Page 123 of 131
W/N Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos violated the
New Code of Judicial Conduct.
HELD:
Yes. A judge should endeavor diligently to
ascertain the facts and the applicable law
unswayed by partisan or personal
interests, public opinion or fear of
criticism. He should not have allowed
himself to be swayed into issuing an order
fixing bail for the temporary release of the
accused charged with murder, without a
hearing, which is contrary to established
principles of law. It has been an
established legal principle or rule that in
cases where a person is accused of a
capital offense, the trial court must
conduct a hearing in a summary
proceeding, to allow the prosecution an
opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all evidence it may
desire to produce to prove that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong, before resolving the issue of bail
for the temporary release of the accused.
A judge should not only render a just,
correct and impartial decision but should
do so in a manner as to be free from any
suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality
and integrity.
The respondent judge is imposed of a FINE
of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00) and WARNED to exercise
more care and diligence in the
performance of his duties as a judge, and
that the same or similar offense in the
future will be dealt with more severally.
GO VS CA
FACTS:
An information was filed charging herein
petitioner Rolito Go for murder before the
Regional Trial Court of Metro Manila.
Petitioner voluntarily presented himself
together with his two lawyers to the police
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
upon obtaining knowledge of being hunted
by the latter. However, he was
immediately detained and denied his right
of a preliminary investigation unless he
executes and sings a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code. Upon omnibus motion for
immediate release on recognizance or on
bail and proper preliminary investigation
on the ground that his warrantless arrest
was unlawful and no preliminary
investigation was conducted before the
information was filed, which is violative of
his rights, the same was granted but later
onreversed by the lower court and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court in sustaining the decision
of the lower court held that petitioner's
warrantless arrest was valid in view of the
fact that the offense wascommitted, the
petitioner was clearly identified and there
exists valid information for murder filed
against petitioner
Hence, the petitioner filed this present
petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the warrantless arrest of
herein petitioner was lawful, and
2. Whether or not petitioner waived his
right to preliminary investigation
HELD:
The general rule on arrest provides that
the same is legitimate if effected with a
valid warrant. However, there are
instances specifically enumerated under
the law when a warrantless arrest may be
considered lawful. Despite that,the
warrantless arrest of herein petitioner
Page 124 of 131
Rolito Go does not fall within the terms of
said rule. The police were not present at
the time of the commission of the offense,
neither do they have personal knowledge
on the crime to be committed or has been
committed not to mention the fact that
petitioner was not a prisoner who has
escaped from the penal institution. In view
of the above, the allegation of the
prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code before a
preliminary investigation may be
conducted is baseless. In this connection,
petitioner has all the right to ask for a
preliminary investigation to determine
whether is probable cause that a crime
has been committed and that petitioner is
probably guilty thereof as well as to
prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and
aggravation brought by a criminal
proceeding. This reason of the accused is
substantial, which he should not be
deprived of. On the other hand, petitioner
did not waive his right to have a
preliminary investigation contrary to the
prosecutor's claim. The right to
preliminary investigation is deemed
waived when the accused fails to invoke it
before or at the time of entering a pleas at
arraignment. The facts of the case show
that petitioner insisted on his right to
preliminary investigation before his
arraignment and he, through his counsel
denied answering questions before the
court unless they were afforded the proper
preliminary investigation. For the above
reasons, the petition was granted and the
ruling of the appellate court was set aside
and nullified. The Supreme Court however,
contrary to petitioner's allegation,
declared that failure to accord the right to
preliminary investigation did not impair
the validity of the information charging the
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
latter of the crime of murder.
(Note: What is related to ethics is actually
found in the concurring opinion of Justice
Gutierrez)
I am at a loss for reasons why an
experienced Judge should insist on
proceeding to trial in a sensational murder
case without a preliminary investigation
despite vigorous and continued objection
and reservation of rights of the accused
and notwithstanding the recommendation
of the prosecutor that said rights be
respected I agree with Justice Isagani
Cruz that the trial court has apparently
been moved by a desire to cater to public
opinion to the detriment of the impartial
administration of justice. Mass media has
its duty to fearlessly but faithfully inform
the public about events and persons.
However, when a case has received wide
and sensational publicity, the trial court
should be doubly careful not only to be fair
and impartial but also to give the
appearance of complete objectivity in its
handling of the case.
SABITSANA V. VILLAMOR
FACTS:
It was discovered that there were 87
cases undecided by respondent judge
beyond the 90-day reglementary period.
The dismal state of the Courthouse of the
respondent judge which was described as
bereft of any dignity as a court of law has
been noted. Judge Villamor however shifts
the blame on his clerk of court, Atty.
Jocobo who he claims was inefficient in the
management of the court records.
Also, in the case of theft by Lipango,
Villamor designated Judge Pitao as acting
judge of the MCTC. Villamor warned Pitao
to acquit Lipango because the case was
Page 125 of 131
being backed up by someone powerful. He
did this by sending a letter to Pitao
through Lipangos wife. However, Pitao
still convicted Lipango because the
evidence of guilt was strong. When Pitao
was away for some conference, he found
out that Villamor revoked his designation
and appointed another as judge of the
MCTC. And finally, when the case was
elevated to the RTC where Villamor was
assigned he acquitted Lipango.
HELD:
Villamor violated Canon3 and Canon2
A judge sits not only to Judge litigated
cases with the least possible delay but
that his responsibilities include being an
effective manager of the Court and its
personnel. Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, provides: A judge
should diligently discharge administrative
responsibilities, maintain professional
competence in court management, and
facilitate the performance of the
administrative functions of other judges
and court personnel. Also, under Rule
3.09 is that: A judge should organize and
supervise the court personnel to ensure
the prompt and efficient dispatch of
business, and require at all times the
observance of high standards of public
service and fidelity.
Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should
avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities. The Canons
mince no words in mandating that a Judge
shall refrain from influencing in any
manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another Court
(Canon 2, Rule 2.04). Interference by
members of the bench in-pending suits
with the end in view of influencing the
course or the result of litigation does not
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
only subvert the independence of the
judiciary but also undermines the people's
faith in its integrity and impartiality
TAN V. ROSETE
Facts:
Before the cases were decided, respondent
judge allegedly sent a member of his staff to talk
to complainant. The staff member told
complainant Tan that Judge Rosete was asking for
P150,000.00 in exchange for the non-dismissal of
the cases. She was shown copies of respondent
judges decision in the criminal cases, both still
unsigned, dismissing the complaints against the
accused. She was told that respondent judge
would reverse the disposition of the cases as soon
as she remits the amount demanded.
Complainant, however, did not accede to
respondents demand because she believed that
she had a very strong case, well supported by
evidence. The criminal cases were eventually
dismissed by respondent judge.
Held:
We have repeatedly admonished our judges
to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct.
They must be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence. The exacting
standards of conduct demanded from judges are
designed to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because
the peoples confidence in the judicial system is
founded not only on the magnitude of legal
knowledge and the diligence of the members of
the bench, but also on the highest standard of
integrity and moral uprightness they are expected
to possess. When the judge himself becomes the
transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply,
he places his office in disrepute, encourages
disrespect for the law and impairs public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount that a
judges personal behavior both in the performance
of his duties and his daily life, be free from any
appearance of impropriety as to be beyond
reproach.
Respondents act of sending a member of
his staff to talk with complainant and show copies
of his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with
litigants outside the office premises beyond office
hours violate the standard of judicial conduct
Page 126 of 131
required to be observed by members of the Bench.
They constitute gross misconduct which is
punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of
Court
***END***
GR no. 127107 October 12, 1998
Peter Paul Dimatulac and Veronica
Dimatulac, petitioners vs. Hon. Sensinando
Villon, et. al., respondents.
Facts:
SP03 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his
residence in Pampanga. A complaint for
murder was filed in the MTC and after
preliminary investigation, Judge Designate
David issued warrants of arrest against the
accused.
Only David, Mandap, Magat, and Yambao were
arrested and it was only Yambao who
submitted his counter-affidavit. Judge David
then issued a resolution finding reasonable
ground that the crime of murder has been
committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof.
Though it was not clear whether Pampanga
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia
Alfonso-Flores acted motu proprio, or upon
motion of the private respondents, she
conducted a reinvestigation and resolved
that the Yabuts and Danny were in
conspiracy, along with the other accused,
and committed homicide.
Before the information for homicide was filed,
the Petitioner appealed the resolution of
Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of Justice.
However, Provincial Proseutor Maranag
ordered for the release of David, Mandap,
Magat, and Naguit. An information for
homicide was also filed before the Regional
Trial Court.
Judge Raura approved the cash bonds of the
Yabuts and recalled the warrants of arrest
against them.
Private Prosecutor Amado Valdez then filed a
Motion to issue hold departure order and
Urgent Motion to defer proceedings. Judge
Roura deferred the resolution of the first
Motion and denied the second. He also set
the arraignment of the accused.
The petitioners filed a Motion to inhibit Judge
Roura for hastily setting the date for
arraignment pending the appeal in the DOJ
and for prejudging the matter. They also
filed a Petition for prohibition with the Court
of Appeals.
Public Prosecutor Datu filed a Manifestation and
Comment with the trial court and opposed
the inhibition of Roura. He also stated that
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
he will no longer allow the private
prosecutor to participate. Judge Roura
voluntarily inhibited himself and was
replaced by Judge Villon.
The Petitioners filed with the RTC a
Manifestation submitting documentary
evidence to support their contention that
the offense committed was murder.
Judge Villon ordered for the resetting of the
arraignment. The Yabuts entered a plea of
not guilty. The petitioners then filed a
Urgent Motion to set aside arraignment.
Secretary Guingona of the DOJ resolved the
appeal in favor of the petitioners. He also
ruled that treachery was present.
The Yabuts opposed the Manifestation because
they have already been arraigned and they
would be put under double jeopardy.
The Secretary of Justice then set aside his order
and the appeal was held not and academic
due to the previous arraignment of the
accused for homicide.
Judge Villon denied the Motion to set aside
arraignment. The motion for reconsideration
was also denied. Hence, this petition for
certiorari/prohibition and mandamus.
Issues:
Whether the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
committed grave abuse of discretion in
reinvestigating the case without having the
respondents within the custody of the law
and for filing the information pending the
appeal of the resolution with the DOJ.
Whether Hon. Villon acted with grave abuse of
discretion in proceeding with the
arraignment and for denying the Motions to
set aside the arraignment.
Whether the Secretary of Justice committed
grave abuse of discretion in reconsidering
his order.
Decision:
Petition is GRANTED.
Alfonso-Reyes was guilty of having acted
with grave abuse of discretion for conducting a
reinvestigation despite the fact that the Yabuts
were still at large. Though Sec. 5, Rule 112 states
that the prosecutor is not bound by the findings of
the judge who conducted the investigation, the
resolution should be based on the review of the
record and evidence transmitted. Hence, she
should have sustained the recommendation since
all the accused, except Yambao, failed to file their
counter-affidavits. It is impossible for Alfonso-
Reyes to not have known the appeal filed with the
DOJ. The filing of an appeal is provided in Sec. 4,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. There is nothing in
Page 127 of 131
the law which prohibits the filing of an appeal once
an information is filed.
Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of
discretion for deferring the resolution to the motion
for a hold departure order. Since the accused were
out on bail, the Motion should have been granted
since they could have easily fled. Though he is not
bound to the resolution of the DOJ, he should have
perused the documents submitted.
The DOJ was also in grave abuse of its
discretion for setting aside its order. In doing so, it
has relinquished its power of control and
supervision of the Public Prosecutor. The state has
been deprived of due process. Hence, the dismissal
of the case is null and void and double jeopardy
cannot be invoked by the accused.
***END***
FERNANDEZ V. HAMOY
Facts:
Despite the lapse of more than 10 years,
respondent judge failed to render judgment in the
case were complainant was counsel to plaintiff.
After Hamoy was transferred, complainant learned
he brought the records of the case to his new
station. Hamoys excuse was that his utility aid
mixed the records up and because the dockets
were congested with so many family-cases his
court being the only family court in the area. He
also failed to comply with the directives of the
OCA. Also, he was able to collect his salary when
he claimed in his certification that he had no
pending cases.
Held:
Respondent Judge cannot be absolved from
liability for the inefficiency of his court personnel.
Judges are charged with the administrative
responsibility of organizing and supervising his
court personnel to secure the prompt and efficient
dispatch of business, requiring at all times the
observance of high standards of public service and
fidelity.
More importantly, judges have a duty to
decide their cases within the reglementary period.
On meritorious grounds, they may ask for
additional time. It must be stressed, however, that
their application for extension must be filed before
the expiration of the prescribed period. Upon his
transfer to another post, respondent Judge should
have asked the permission of the Court
Administrator to bring the records of the cases to
his new assignment or should have apprised the
parties of his action with respect thereto.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
Furthermore, respondent Judge should be
held liable for his failure to obey directives from
this Court and the Court Administrator. Needless to
say, judges should respect the orders and
decisions of higher tribunals, much more so this
Court from which all other courts should take their
bearings
In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than
a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. Respondent
Judge must bear in mind that the exacting
standards of conduct demanded of judges are
designed to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
A judge who fails to decide cases within the
prescribed period but collects his salary upon a
false certificate is guilty of dishonesty amounting
to gross misconduct and deserves the
condemnation of all right thinking men. In view of
the primordial role of judges in the administration
of justice, only those with irreproachable integrity
and probity must be entrusted with judicial powers.
***END***
DAWA V. DE ASA
Facts:
Presiding judge Armando de Asa was
charged with sexual harassment and/or acts of
lasciviousness by Floride Dawa, Femenina Lazaro-
Barreto and Noraliz Jorgensen. Dawa and Barreto
were employed as stenographic reporters while
Jorgensen was a casual employee in the Office of
the Mayor of Caloocan City and detailed to the
Office of the Clerk of Court. They charged de Asa
for allegedly forcing himself on them and kissing
them on the lips.
Issue:
Whether de Asa violated Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Ethics
Ruling.
Yes.
Canon 2 provides that a judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all activities. He should behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. It is therefore
paramount that a judge's personal behavior, both
in the performance of his duties and in his daily
life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as
to be beyond reproach.
In the present case, the Court found totally
unacceptable the temerity of the respondent judge
in subjecting herein complainants, his subordinates
all, to his unwelcome sexual advances and acts of
lasciviousness. Not only do the actions of
respondent judge fall short of the exacting
standards for members of the judiciary; they stand
no chance of satisfying the standards of decency
Page 128 of 131
even of society at large. His severely abusive and
outrageous acts, which are an affront to women,
unmistakably constitute sexual harassment
because they necessarily ". . . result in an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for
the employees. Let it be remembered that
respondent has moral ascendancy and authority
over complainants, who are mere employees of the
court of which he is an officer. The Court
concludes with moral certainty that he acted
beyond the bounds of decency, morality and
propriety and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The bench is not a place for persons like him. His
gross misconduct warrants his removal from office.
***END***
IN RE JUDGE MARCOS
Facts:
Two complaints were filed by Romeo T.
Zacarias and a concerned citizen of Gerona,
Tarlac. These Complaints identically charged Judge
Martonino R. Marcos (Formerly of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tarlac City) and Clerk
of Court Shirley M. Visaya (of the 5 th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Gerona, Tarlac) with immoral
conduct and illegal solicitation from litigants.
Zacarias alleged that, on two occasions, Judge
Marcos and Visaya tried to extort money from him
in exchange for a favorable decision in a criminal
case against Zacarias and for his provisional
release. He further alleged that upon some
inquiries, he was informed that the respondent
Judge does not approve bailbonds without bribe
money and that the respondents are engaged in an
illicit love affair which is common knowledge to
municipal and court personnel and as well as to
the people of Gerona.
Issue:
Whether respondents violated the Code of
Judicial Conduct
Ruling:
Yes.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that
a magistrate should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities and
should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence. Since appearance
and reality fuse in the performance of judicial
functions, the judge -- like Caesars wife -- must not
only be pure, but also be beyond suspicion. The
actions of respondent judge were not free from all
appearances of impropriety. His conduct lacked
the meticulous care expected of one ever mindful
of the image of the judiciary that one portrays. It
is the kind of behavior for which he must be
administratively dealt with, as it erodes public
confidence in the judicial system.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
As to respondent clerk, we find that she was
equally remiss in the performance of her duties.
By her own admission, she required complainant to
post the cash bond, even though she had not been
instructed to do so by respondent judge. She
thereby arrogated judicial power unto herself. The
determination of whether to require a cash bond,
like the approval of bail or the release of the
accused, is purely a judicial function. It was
certainly not among the mandated duties of
respondent clerk. It has been stressed that the
conduct and behavior of everyone charged with
the dispensation of justice is circumscribed by the
trust and confidence reposed in a public office. The
image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored
in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men
and women who work therein, from the judge to
the lowliest clerk.
***END***
LACHICA V. FLORDELIZA
Facts:
Dr. Amparo A. Lachica, the Municipal Health
Officer of Jose Abad Santos, Davao del Sur,
charged the respondent, Judge Rolando A.
Flordeliza of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jose
Abad Santos-Sarangani, Davao del Sur, with abuse
of judicial position and intimidation, for allegedly
compelling her to sign a death certificate even
though she was not the attending physician.
According to Lachica, during a party, Judge
Flordeliza, who was drunk at that time, threatened
to file an administrative case against her if she will
refuse to sign the death certificate.
Issue:
Whether respondent-judge is guilty as
charged of abuse of judicial position and
intimidation amounting to violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct
Ruling:
Yes. A judges official conduct should be free
from the appearance of impropriety, and his
personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in
the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
From all the foregoing, as well as the
evidence on record, this Court is convinced that
the charge of misconduct against the respondent
judge has been established by substantial
evidence, which is the quantum of proof required
in administrative cases. His undue interest in
having complainant sign the Death Certificate is
highly questionable, to say the least. Further, his
inebriated demeanor and incoherent behavior
during the festivities, as attested to by a witness is
reprehensible in a judge and should be subjected
to disciplinary action. Respondent was FINED in the
Page 129 of 131
amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
***END***
SIBAYAN-JOAQUIN V. JAVELLANA
Facts:
Eliezer A. Sibayan-Joaquin charged Judge
Roberto S. Javellana, acting presiding judge of the
RTC of San Carlos City, Branch 57, with grave
misconduct in the performance of official duties,
graft and gross ignorance of the law. The
complaint was an offshoot of a case for estafa filed
by Sibayan-Joaquin for and in behalf of Andersons
Group, Inc., against Romeo Tan before the San
Carlos City RTC. Complainant averred that there
was an undue delay in the rendition of judgment in
the criminal case, the decision that had acquitted
the accused Romeo Tan, having been rendered
only on the tenth month after the case was
submitted for decision. Respondent judge was also
cited for impropriety by complainant because he
was often seen with Attorney Vic Agravante,
counsel for the accused, whose vehicle respondent
judge would even use at times.
Issue:
Whether Judge Javellana violated Canon 2
of the Code of Judicial Ethics
Ruling:
Yes.
The Investigating Justice has seen
impropriety on the part of respondent judge in his
close association with a counsel for a litigant.
The Court shares the view and disquisition
of the Honorable Justice. Judges, indeed, should be
extra prudent in associating with litigants and
counsel appearing before them so as to avoid even
a mere perception of possible bias or partiality. It
is not expected, of course, that judges should live
in retirement or seclusion from any social
intercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for
instance, that they continue, time and work
commitments permitting, to relate to members of
the bar in worthwhile endeavors and in such fields
of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the
noble aims and objectives of the legal
profession. In pending or prospective litigations
before them, however, judges should be
scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may
tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal,
social or sundry relations could influence their
objectivity, for not only must judges possess
proficiency in law but that also they must act and
behave in such manner that would assure, with
great comfort, litigants and their counsel of the
judges' competence, integrity and independence.
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
The respondent was ADMONISHED to constantly be
circumspect in his conduct and dealings with
lawyers who have pending cases before him.
SAMSON V. CABALLERO
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint for
dishonesty and falsification of a public document
against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero.
Complainant Olga M. Samson alleged that
respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero should not
have been appointed to the judiciary for lack of the
constitutional qualifications of proven competence,
integrity, probity and independence, and for
violating the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any
applicant for judgeship with a pending
administrative case.
According to the complainant, respondent,
during his JBC interviews, deliberately concealed
the fact that he had pending administrative
charges against him. She disclosed that, on behalf
of Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva Ecija),
Inc., she had filed criminal and administrative
charges for grave abuse of authority, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
violation of Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code
against respondent in the Office of the
Ombudsman on July 23, 2003.
At that time a public prosecutor, respondent
allegedly committed certain improprieties and
exceeded his powers by overruling the Secretary of
Justice in a reinvestigation he conducted.
Issue:
Whether respondent violated the Code of
Judicial Ethics
Ruling:
Yes. Since membership in the bar is an
integral qualification for membership in the bench,
the moral fitness of a judge also reflects his moral
fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the
basic rules of judicial conduct also violates his oath
as a lawyer. In this particular case, respondents
dishonest act was against the lawyers oath to do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court.
It cannot be denied that respondents
dishonesty did not only affect the image of the
judiciary, it also put his moral character in serious
doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the
practice of law. Possession of good moral character
is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar
but also a continuing requirement to the practice
of law. If the practice of law is to remain an
honorable profession and attain its basic ideals,
those counted within its ranks should not only
master its tenets and principles but should also
accord continuing fidelity to them. The
requirement of good moral character is of much
Page 130 of 131
greater import, as far as the general public is
concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
The first step towards the successful
implementation of the Courts relentless drive to
purge the judiciary of morally unfit members,
officials and personnel necessitates the imposition
of a rigid set of rules of conduct on judges. The
Court is extraordinarily strict with judges because,
being the visible representation of the law, they
should set a good example to the bench, bar and
students of the law. The standard of integrity
imposed on them is and should be higher than
that of the average person for it is their integrity
that gives them the right to judge.
Respondent was DISBARRED for violation
of Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and his
name STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
***END***
DIMO REALTY V. DIMACULANGAN
Facts:
Leonardo P. Dimaculangan, respondent,
filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for
specific performance against Dimo Realty &
Development, Inc. (Dimo Realty) and spouses
Gregorio and Luz Mojares Dizon, petitioners. The
complaint alleges that sometime in 1967 to 1968,
petitioners engaged the services of respondent as
geodetic surveyor to subdivide (into subdivision
lots) 2 parcels of land situated in Barrio Namuco,
Rosario, Batangas. As payment for respondents
services, petitioner agreed to give him 1
subdivision lot at Villa Luz Subdivision and pay him
P9,200.00 in cash. After the completion of
respondents work, petitioners paid him P9,200.00
in installments and delivered to him possession of
the lot. However, despite respondents demands,
petitioners failed to deliver the title of the lot,
prompting him to file with the RTC a complaint for
specific performance and damages. The trial court
issued an order dismissing the complaint for
improper venue. Respondent then filed a motion
for reconsideration with motion for inhibition
alleging partiality on the part of the presiding
judge Hon. Pedro T. Santiago. CA denied the
motion for inhibition.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in denying the motion
for inhibition
Ruling:
No. Suffice it to state that whether judges
should inhibit themselves from a case rests on
their own "sound discretion." Otherwise stated,
inhibition partakes of voluntariness on the part of
the judges themselves. This Court has to be shown
acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of
ETHICS CASE DIGESTS 03-11-17
arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be
branded the stigma of being biased or partial. In a
catena of cases, we held that "bias and prejudice,
to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary
inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and
convincing evidence. Bare allegations of partiality
and prejudgment will not suffice. These cannot be
presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred
obligation of judges whose oaths of office require
them to administer justice without respect to
person and to do equal right to the poor and the
rich." Here, petitioners merely alleged the arbitrary
issuance of a temporary restraining order without
however showing bias or prejudice on the part of
the trial judge. In fact, the Court of Appeals held
that "such error of the respondent judge does not
necessarily warrant his inhibition in the case."
***END***
PIMENTEL V. SALANGA
Facts:
Challenged here in an original petition for
certiorari and/or prohibition is the right of
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur (Branch IV) to sit in judgment in cases
where petitioner, a practicing attorney, appears as
counsel.
Petitioner's misgivings stem from the fact
that he is complainant in an administrative case he
himself lodged in this Court on May 12, 1967,
against respondent judge upon averments of
"serious misconduct, inefficiency in office,
partiality, ignorance of the law and incompetence."
Petitioner moved in the court below to have
respondent judge disqualify himself from sitting in
Civil Case 21-C, Criminal Cases 4898 and C-5, and
Election Case 2470 aforesaid. He there prayed that
the records of those cases be transferred to
another sala.
Respondent judge rejected the foregoing
motion. He stood his ground with the statement
that the administrative complaint against him is no
cause for disqualification under the Rules of Court
Issue:
Is a judge disqualified from acting in
litigations in which counsel of record for one of the
parties is his adversary in an administrative case
said counsel lodged against him? NO.
Page 131 of 131
Held:
Rule 126 [of the old Rules] enumerates the
grounds for disqualification of a judge upon being
challenged and under which he should disqualify
himself. The rule, however, has never been
interpreted to prohibit a judge from voluntarily
inhibiting himself, in the absence of any challenge
by either party, due to his close blood relationship
with counsel for one of said parties. Considering
the spirit of the Rule, it would seem that cases of
voluntary inhibition, based on good, sound and/or
ethical grounds, is a matter of discretion on the
part of the judge and the official who is empowered
to act upon the request for such inhibition.
The exercise of sound discretion
mentioned in the rule has reference exclusively
to a situation where a judge disqualifies himself,
not when he goes forward with the case.7 For, the
permissive authority given a judge in the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, is only in the
matter of disqualification, not otherwise. Better
stated yet, when a judge does not inhibit himself,
and he is not legally disqualified by the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, the rule remains
as it has been he has to continue with the case.
A judge cannot be disqualified by a litigant or his
lawyer for grounds other than those specified in
the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137.
This is not to say that all avenues of relief
are closed to a party properly aggrieved. If a
litigant is denied a fair and impartial trial, induced
by the judge's bias or prejudice, we will not
hesitate to order a new trial, if necessary, in the
interest of justice.
Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial
and decision, have a natural and alluring appeal.
But, we are not licensed to indulge in unjustified
assumptions, or make a speculative approach to
this ideal. It ill behooves this Court to tar and
feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply
because counsel for a party litigant happens to
complain against him. To disqualify or not to
disqualify himself then, as far as respondent judge
is concerned, is a matter of conscience.
In the end we are persuaded to say that
since respondent judge is not legally under
obligation to disqualify himself, we may not, on
certiorari or prohibition, prevent him from sitting,
trying and rendering judgment in the cases herein
mentioned
***END***