RESIDENCY

The pertinent provision sought to be enforced is Section 39 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, which
provides for the qualifications of local elective officials, as follows:

"SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect."

To sum, local elective officials must possess the following qualifications:

1. a citizen of the Philippines

2. a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province where he intends to be elected
3. a resident therein for at least 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election
4. able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect

Coquilla v. Comelec

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation,"
but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain (animus manendi)." A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where
the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of
choice).

In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S.
Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner
was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to
stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.

Also, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen.

Immigration to the United States by virtue of a "greencard," which entitles one to reside permanently in that
country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a
foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.

Having been naturalized abroad, one loses his Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines.
Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship one does not reacquire his legal residence in this
country.

The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately, when one acquires the status of a
resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship.
As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under §13 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and
an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he
may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine
national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which case he waives
not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien.

In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioner’s status when he entered the country on October 15, 1998,
December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999, and June 23, 2000 is the statement "Philippine Immigration [–]
Balikbayan" in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on August 5, 2000, the stamp bore the added
inscription "good for one year stay." Under §2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term
balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to
the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a "visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one
(1) year" (§3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner entered the country on the dates in question, he did
so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner can only be
held to have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath
as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the
mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar.

Torayno v. Comelec

Emano was the Governor of Misamis Oriental. Emano was actually and physically residing in Cagayan de Oro City
while discharging his duties as governor of Misamis Oriental. He owned a house in the city and resided there
together with his family. He even paid his 1998 community tax and registered as a voter therein. To all intents and
purposes of the Constitution and the law, he is a resident of Cagayan de Oro City and eligible to run for mayor
thereof.

It was his third consecutive term as governor of the province and in his Certificate of Candidacy his residence was
declared to be in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.

Cagayan de Oro City is a highly urbanized city whose voters cannot participate in the provincial elections.

Such political subdivisions and voting restrictions, however, are simply for the purpose of parity in representation.
The classification of an area as a highly urbanized or independent component city, for that matter, does not
completely isolate its residents, politics, commerce and other businesses from the entire province -- and vice versa
-- especially when the city is located at the very heart of the province itself, as in this case.

Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of Misamis Oriental and remains a geographical part of
the province. Not only is it at the center of the province; more important, it is itself the seat of the provincial
government. As a consequence, the provincial officials who carry out their functions in the city cannot avoid
residing therein; much less, getting acquainted with its concerns and interests. Vicente Y. Emano, having been the
governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms and consequently residing in Cagayan de Oro City within that period,
could not be said to be a stranger or newcomer to the city in the last year of his third term, when he decided to
adopt it as his permanent place of residence.

We stress that the residence requirement is rooted in the desire that officials of districts or localities be acquainted
not only with the metes and bounds of their constituencies but, more important, with the constituents themselves -
- their needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and development, and all matters vital to their common
welfare. The requisite period would give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with their desired constituencies,
and likewise for the electorate to evaluate the former's qualifications and fitness for the offices they seek.

In other words, the actual, physical and personal presence of herein private respondent in Cagayan de Oro City is
substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and for the voters to evaluate his
qualifications for the mayorship. Petitioners' very legalistic, academic and technical approach to the residence
requirement does not satisfy this simple, practical and common-sense rationale for the residence requirement.

On Emano’s qualification as governor while being a resident of CDO:

To petitioners' argument that Emano could not have continued to qualify as provincial governor if he was indeed a
resident of Cagayan de Oro City, we respond that the issue before this Court is whether Emano's residence in the
city qualifies him to run for and be elected as mayor, not whether he could have continued sitting as governor of
the province. There was no challenge to his eligibility to continue running the province; hence, this Court cannot
make any pronouncement on such issue. Considerations of due process prevent us from adjudging matters not
properly brought to us. On the basis, however, of the facts proven before the Comelec, we hold that he has
satisfied the residence qualification required by law for the mayorship of the city.