G.R. No.

L-16578 July 31, 1961

EULALIO PARINGIT, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. HONORATO MASAKAYAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Vizcaya, Branch II; SILVERIO CERTEZA, GAVINA DUA, EVE CERTEZA,
FABIAN LABORIDA, and MARIANO ERIGINO, respondents.

Anselmo M. Calub and Gabriel P. Paringit for petitioner.

Benjamin A. Naldo for respondents.

NATIVIDAD, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya
to review an order entered in Criminal Case No. 390 of that Court, People vs. Silverio
Certeza, et al., dismissing the action on the ground that the Justice of the Peace Court
of Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya from which it originated was without jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the same.

It appears that on April 23, 1959, the petitioner herein, Eulalio Paringit, filed in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya, a complaint charging Silverio
Certeza and seven others with the crime of malicious mischief, which was made to
consist in that on or about March 24, 1959, in the municipality of Aritao, Province of
Nueva Vizcaya, the said accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to cause damage to said
offended party, filled up and covered with earth the irrigation canal belonging to the
latter, thereby making it unusable for conveying water to his ricefield, and causing his
agricultural crop to fail to his damage in the sum of P5,600.00 per year.

Before the case was set for hearing on the merits, counsel for the defendants
challenged the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court of Aritao to take
cognizance of the same. The latter, however, overruled counsel's motion, and the
defendants having pleaded not guilty to the charge, proceeded to hear the case on the
merits. After said hearing, said Justice of the Peace Court convicted five of the
accused, namely Silverio Certeza, Gavina Dua, Eve Certeza, Fabian Laborida and
Mariano Erigino, and acquitted the other three, and sentenced the former, each to pay
a fine of P15.00, to indemnify, jointly and severally, the offended party in the sum of
P15.00, the estimated value of the damage to the irrigation canal allegedly destroyed,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay the proportionate
part of the costs. From this judgment, both the above named accused and the offended
party appealed, the former in so far as it convicted them of the crime charged, and the
latter, as regards its civil aspect.

Upon receipt of the case in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, the provincial
fiscal of that province produced almost filed in that court an information, which
reproduced almost verbatim the complaint filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Aritao. When the case was called for hearing, counsel for the defendants, in a verbal
motion which later on was Confirmed in writing, asked for the quashing of the case, on
the ground that the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya had no jurisdiction to try
the same on appeal as the Justice of the Peace Court of Aritao from which it came had
no jurisdiction to try it originally. After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Vizcaya, then presided by the respondent Judge, dismiss the case with costs de oficio,
in an order dated December 17, 1959, on the ground that the decision appealed from
was void as the Justice of the Peace Court which rendered it had no jurisdiction diction
over the offense charged. Neither the accused nor the prosecution has appealed from
this order, or in any other way questioned it. The offended party, however, herein
petitioner, has brought the present proceeding, asking that said order be reviewed,
vacated and set aside, on the ground that the respondent Judge, in issuing it, abused
his discretion.

We do not see how the present proceeding can be entertained. The writ
of certiorari only lies when an inferior court, board or officer exercising judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of his or its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Rule 67, Section 1, Rules of Court. And it has been held that
although the error complained of is one jurisdiction, the writ of certiorari does not lie, if
an appeal may be taken or there is another adequate remedy, Claudio vs. Zulueta, 64
Phil. 801; Haw Pia vs. San Jose, 78 Phil. 238; Dans vs. Court of Appeals, 49 O.G.
2753; and that where the court has jurisdiction over the case, the errors which may be
committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are errors of judgment which are only
reviewable by appeal. De los Santos vs. Mapa, 46 Phil. 91; Santos vs. Court of First
Instance, 49 Phil. 398; Ello s. Judge of First Instance of Antique, 49 Phil.
152; Gonzales vs. Salas, 49 Phil. 1; Ong Sit vs. Piccio, 79 Phil. 785; Castro vs.
Pena, 80 Phil. 488; Gil vs. Gil III, 80 Phil. 791.

In the case of Haw Pia vs. San Jose, supra, this Court held:

Where an appeal is the proper remedy a petition for certiorari cannot prosper.

And in the case of Castro vs. Pena, supra, it was held that:

In a case which the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction on to decide, whether
its decision was erroneous or correct entirely apart from its jurisdiction and
authority to render and however erroneous such decision might be, the error
would not divest the court of its jurisdiction, and could only corrected if at all, by
appeal.

That an appeal from the order of the respondent Judge December 17, 1959,
dismissing the case with costs de oficio herein complained of lies, and that such
remedy could have been availed of by any one of the parties to the case, including the
offended party, cannot be denied. That order dismissed the action as regards all the
defendants with costs oficio. It is, therefore, final for it completely disposes the pending
action, so that nothing more can be done the trial court. People vs. Makaraig, 54 Phil.
904, San Jose vs. Castillo, 47 O.G. 1843; People vs. Aragon, 50 O.G. 63. The order
complained of might be erroneous. It is clear that the Justice of the Peace Court of
Aritao had jurisdiction over the offense in question the fact that the claim for indemnity
contained in the complaint is for an amount which said court cannot award under the
law notwithstanding. The case at bar is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948,
Republic Act No. 296, prior to its amendment as the acts charged took place and the
complaint by which the case was initiated prior to the amendment of said Act by
Republic Act No. 2613. Section 87 the Judiciary Act of 1948, Republic Act No. 296,
provides in part:

SEC. 87. Original jurisdiction to try criminal cases. — Justices of the peace and
judges of municipal courts of chartered cities shall have original jurisdiction over:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) All criminal cases arising under the laws relative to:

(1) Gambling and management or operation of lotteries; (2) Assaults where the
intent to kill is not charged or evidenced upon the trial;

(2) Larceny, embezzlement and estafa amount of money or property stolen,

embezzled, or otherwise involved, does not exceed the sum or value of two
hundred pesos;

(3) Sale of intoxicating liquors;

(4) Falsely impersonating an officer;

(5) Malicious mischief;

(6) Trespass on Government or private property; and

(7) Threatening to take human life.

It must be noted that the abovequoted legal provision gives justice of the peace and
municipal Courts original jurisdiction over specific crime without any qualification. It
makes no mention whatsoever of the civil liability of the accused, or any other incident
of the crime. It may be safely assumed, therefore, that the legislature intended that the
justices of the Peace and municipal courts shall have original jurisdiction over the
specific crimes therein prescribed and over all the incidents thereof, irrespective of the
penalties provided by law therefor and of the nature of such incidents, although it must
be understood that in cases where the penalty provided for the offense is more than 6
months' imprisonment or a fine of over P200.00, the jurisdiction of the justice of the
peace and municipal courts over the crime is concurrent with the Courts of First
Instance, Section 44, Judiciary Act of 1948, and that where the claim for Civil liability
exceeds the jurisdiction of said inferior courts, the offended party must be deemed to
have waived so much of his claim as would exceed such jurisdiction. For, if the
intention were otherwise, the legislature would have so expressed in clear terms, as it
did in cases of larceny, embezzlement and estafa. Section 87, paragraph (c) — (3),
Republic Act No. 296, Judiciary Act of 1948. And it would be absurd to think that such
jurisdiction, expressly conferred by law, can be defeated by an allegation in the
complaint of a claim of indemnity in an amount exceeding that which the court could
award. Such theory would be subversive of the orderly administration of justice. It
would place in the hands of the offended party the power to dispossess a court of its
jurisdiction clearly conferred by law. Moreover, the civil liability, although determined in
the same criminal action, unless the offended party waives the same or reserves his
right to have the civil damages determined in a separate civil action, is not part of the
punishment for the crime. Such is the rule in this jurisdiction. U.S. vs. Heery, 25 Phil.
600. The error however committed by the respondent Judge in issuing the order
complained of in the instant case is clearly an error of judgment, which, under the
jurisdiction prudence, is only correctible by appeal; it cannot be reviewed by certiorari.

Upon the facts, therefore, we find that the petitioner has failed to make a sufficient
showing to entitle him to the remedy prayed for. Accordingly, the instant proceeding is
hereby dismissed, with the costs taxed against the petitioner.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon and De Le

FELIZARDO S. OBANDO and G.R. No. 138696
JUAN S. OBANDO,
Petitioners, Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

NACHURA,
-versus- PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. July 7, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Felizardo and

Juan Obando seeking to annul and set aside the Decision[1] dated August 13,
1998 and the Resolution[2] dated May 17, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20187.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Sometime in 1964, Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras (Alegria), together with

Eduardo and Francisco Figueras, sons of her husband Jose Figueras by previous
marriage, filed a petition for the intestate proceedings of the estate of Jose Figueras,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 61567. Alegria was named administratrix of
Joses estate without opposition from her stepsons.
 While the settlement of Joses estate was still pending considerations in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Alegria died in May 1979. Eduardo was issued new Letters
of Administration with the duty to administer both Joses and Alegrias estates. Fritz
Strebel, as brother of Alegria, came forth claiming part of Alegrias estate as Alegria
died without issue which the Figueras brothers made no opposition.

Subsequently, the Figueras brothers and Fritz Strebel were served with copies of
a Petition for Probate of the alleged last will and testament of Alegria filed by petitioner
Felizardo Obando, which petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 123948. In
his petition, petitioner Felizardo asked to be named as executor of Alegrias last will
and testament, which bequeathed Alegrias rights and interest in the real properties left
by the Figueras couple, as well as personal properties, including all her pieces of
jewelry to petitioners Felizardo and Juan, and their families. The Figueras brothers
opposed the probate of the alleged will, as well as petitioner Felizardos prayer for the
issuance of a letter of administration, on the ground that the alleged will was done
either under duress or the same was a forgery.

Later, both Special Proceeding Nos. 61567 and 123948 were consolidated under
Branch 17 of the RTC of Manila which, after hearing, denied petitioner Felizardos
prayer to be named as executor. Petitioner Felizardo appealed the matter to the CA
which partially reversed the RTC by appointing Eduardo and petitioner Felizardo as
co-administrators of the joint estates of Jose and Alegria Figueras.

Eduardo and Fritz still opposed the probate of the alleged Alegrias will, insisting
that the will was a forgery. Subsequently, these conflicting parties agreed to submit the
alleged will to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination and
comparison with the common standard signatures of Alegria.[3]

After the examination and comparison of the submitted documents, NBI

Document Examiner Zenaida Torres submitted her report[4] dated March 26, 1990, with
the findings that the questioned and standard sample signatures of Alegria S. Vda. de
Figueras were NOT written by one and same person.

By reason of the forged will which was the basis of the CA in appointing Felizardo
as co-administrator of the Figueras estates, petitioners had taken possession of the
pieces of jewelry, furniture and other personal properties enumerated in the alleged
will, as well as the rentals of the Figueras residence in Gilmore Street, Quezon City
being leased to the Community of Learners.

Eduardo and Fritz questioned these acts of petitioner Felizardo and, since the
latter could not account for these properties which were under his possession when
the probate court required him to do so, they sued him for Estafa thru Falsification of
Public Document since the alleged will which petitioner Felizardo submitted for probate
was found to be forged.

On July 26, 1990, an Information was filed with the RTC of Manila, charging
petitioners Felizardo S. Obando and Juan S. Obando, together with the persons who
signed in the alleged will, namely, Cipriano C. Farrales, Mercedes B. Santos, Victorino
Cruz, and Franklin A. Cordon, with the crime of estafa thru falsification of public
document, committed as follows:
That on or about November 11, 1978, and for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
Felizardo S. Obando, Juan S. Obando, Mercedes B. Santos, [Victorino]
Cruz and Franklin A. Cordon, being then private individuals, and accused
Cipriano C. Farrales, a Notary Public, conspiring and confederating
together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud Eduardo F. Figueras thru falsification of public
document in the following manner, to wit: the said accused forged and
falsified or caused to be forged and falsified, a document denominated as
the Last Will and Testament of Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras, dated
November 11, 1978, duly notarized by accused Cipriano C. Farrales and,
therefore, a public document, by stating in said Last Will and Testament,
among others, that the said Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras had
bequeathed to her nephews, herein accused Felizardo S. Obando and
Juan S. Obando, all her rights and interests over all her jewelries (sic),
except those given to her other relatives, with an aggregate total value
of P2,000,000.00, that she had appointed accused Felizardo S. Obando as
the sole executor of her Last Will and Testament and the exclusive
administrator of her estate, and thereafter, feigning, simulating and
counterfeiting or causing to be feigned, simulated and counterfeited the
signature of the said Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras appearing on the left
hand margin of pages 1 and 2 and over the typewritten name Alegria
Strebel Vda. de Figueras on page 3 of said document, thus making it
appear, as it did appear, that the said Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras
had, in fact, bequeathed all her rights and interests over the said jewelries
(sic) to accused Felizardo S. Obando and Juan S. Obando, and that she
had appointed the said Felizardo S. Obando as the sole executor of her
Last Will and Testament and the exclusive Administrator of her estate, and
causing it to appear further that the said Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras
participated and intervened in the signing of said document when in truth
and in fact as the said accused well knew, such was not the case in that
the said Last Will and Testament is an outright forgery; that the late Alegria
Strebel Vda. de Figueras did not bequeath all her rights or interests over
the aforementioned jewelries to accused Felizardo S. Obando and Juan S.
Obando, that she did not appoint accused Felizardo S. Obando as the sole
executor of her Last Will and Testament and the exclusive Administrator of
her estate, and that she did not participate and intervene in the signing of
said document, much less did she authorize the said accused, or anybody
else, to sign her name or affix her signature thereon; that once the said
document has been forged and falsified in the manner above set forth, the
said accused Felizardo S. Obando and Juan S. Obando presented the
same for probate with the Regional Trial Court of Manila wherein an
ensuing litigation which ultimately reached the Court of Appeals, said
accused Felizardo S. Obando was appointed co-administrator of said
Eduardo F. Figueras, and who, as such co-administrator, forthwith took
possession of the jewelries mentioned above which the said accused
 subsequently, with intent to defraud, misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to their own personal use and benefit to the damage and
prejudice of the said Eduardo F. Figueras in the aforesaid amount
of P2,000,000.00, Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.[5]
Notary Public Farrales asked for a re-investigation claiming innocence and good faith
and was, subsequently, deleted from the Information.

When arraigned, all the accused, with the exception of Franklin Cordon who is
at-large, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge. They posted
bail for their temporary liberty.
Trial thereafter ensued.
In its Order dated October 10, 1992, the RTC stated that the parties stipulated
that whatever testimony of witnesses utilized in the intestate and probate proceedings
of the will, as well as the documentary evidence submitted therein, shall be utilized in
the criminal case in toto subject to further cross of the defense lawyer only on matters
not touched in the former proceedings.[6]

On October 7, 1996, the RTC rendered its Decision,[7] the dispositive portion
of which reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds accused

FELIZARDO S. OBANDO and JUAN S. OBANDO GUILTY of violating
Article 315, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Article 172, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, their culpability
having been proven beyond reasonable doubt and are hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, from
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years. Finding no evidence of culpability in their persons, accused
MERCEDES B. SANTOS and VICTORINO CRUZ are hereby
ACQUITTED.

With respect to accused FRANKLIN A. CORDON, who remains at-large up

to the present, this case against him is hereby ordered ARCHIVED, to be
 revived upon his apprehension. Let an Alias Warrant of Arrest be issued
against accused Franklin A. Cordon for his immediate apprehension.

SO ORDERED.[8]
In so ruling, the RTC found that: the fact of damage was sufficiently established with
the testimonies of Felizardo and Juan that Alegria's rights and interests in the real and
personal properties of the Figueras couple were to go to them, and that they already
gave the pieces of jewelry to their sister, to Juan's wife and his two daughters, and
Felizardo's daughter which showed that they had already profited from the estate of
the Figueras couple even before the same was brought to the court for settlement. As
to the matter of forgery, the RTC gave more credence to the findings of NBI Document
Examiner Zenaida Torres than that of PNP Document Section Chief Francisco Cruz,
since (1) Torres was the common choice of all the parties, thus by which act,
petitioners became bound to the results of said findings; (2) Torres was definite in her
conclusion that the question and standard/ sample signatures of Alegria S. Vda. de
Figueras were not written by one and same person unlike Cruz's report stating that no
definite conclusion can be made due to the limited amount of appropriate standard
signatures for comparison; and (3) Torres was not paid for her services and, therefore,
impartial while Cruz received honorarium from Juan Obando; that while petitioners
presented copies of pictures showing Alegria allegedly signing the will in the presence
of Mercedes Santos Cruz, Victorino Cruz and Franklin Cordon, nothing would establish
what document was being held by them.

The RTC found petitioners to have conspired to commit forgery as established by the
following evidence, to wit: (a) Felizardo admitted that the last will and testament which
Alegria voiced out to him was dictated by him to a certain Atty. Alcantara; (b) that
Felizardo retained the services of Atty. Alcantara and Atty. Farrales who notarized the
alleged will; (c ) Juan was the one who enticed Mercedes Santos Cruz, his sister-in-
law, and Victorino Cruz into acting as attesting witnesses and Juan's taking pictures of
the entire signing ceremony which was a sign of evil intention because it was an
expectancy of future rift or trouble; (d) Felizardo held and kept the alleged will from the
time of alleged signing up to Alegria's death which possession and control lasted for
several months; (e) the testimony of Torres that the first two pages of Exhibit A, which
contained the dispositions of the properties of the Figueras estates, as well as the
forged signatures were substitutes for the originals; and (g) that petitioners and their
respective families gained enormously by reason of said will.
The RTC said that even if the alleged will was found to be authentic, it will still be
contested as the dispositions made therein were contrary to law most particularly that
portion bequeathing to petitioners the whole residential property of the spouses Jose
and Alegria Figueras, which was conjugal, to the exclusion of Eduardo and Francisco
Figueras and Fritz Strebel who are forced heirs; that because of such disposition, the
RTC was convinced that the alleged will was not that of Alegria but of petitioners, since
Alegria being the administratrix of the estate of her husband Jose would be the last
person to give this property outside of the Figueras family. Mercedes Santos and
Victorino Cruz were acquitted for lack of evidence.

Petitioners filed their appeal with the CA.

On August 13, 1988, the CA issued its assailed Decision affirming in toto the decision
of the RTC.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated May 17, 1999.

Hence, this petition for review filed by petitioners on the following grounds:
 A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD OVERLOOKED AND
FAILED TO CONSIDER THE SIGNIFICANT FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE WHICH, IF PROPERLY
CONSIDERED, SHOULD HAVE DRAWN A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION
AND WHICH SHALL CONSIDERABLY AFFECT THE RESULT OF THIS
CASE.

B. THE NON-PRODUCTION AND/OR NON-PRESENTATION OF THE

ORIGINAL COPY OF THE ALLEGED FALSIFIED LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF ALEGRIA STREBEL VDA. DE FIGUERAS BEFORE
THE TRIAL COURT IS A FATAL DEFECT WHICH ENTITLES HEREIN
APPELLANTS TO ACQUITTAL.

C. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO CONSPIRACY TO WARRANT

CONVICTION OF FELIZARDO AND [JUAN] OBANDO.

D. THE WILL OF ALEGRIA STREBEL VDA. DE FIGUERAS DISPOSES

ONLY OF HER RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OVER THE PROPERTIES
BEQUEATHED TO FELIZARDO AND JUAN OBANDO.
E. CONFLICTING EXPERT TESTIMONIES, COUPLED WITH THE
POSITIVE EVIDENCE AS TO THE DUE EXECUTION AND
AUTHENTICITY OF THE WILL SHOULD FAVOR APPELLANTS.

F. THE ABSENCE IN THE NBI FINDINGS (EXHIBIT D-1) AS TO THE

GENUINENESS AND/OR FALSITY OF THE SIGNATURES OF
MERCEDES SANTOS CRUZ, VICTORINO CRUZ AND ATTY. FRANKLIN
CORDON ON THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT (EXHIBIT A),
NEGATES THE FALSIFICATION AND/OR SUBSTITUTION OF THE
FIRST AND SECOND PAGES OF THE SAID LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF DOA ALEGRIA STREBEL VDA. DE FIGUERAS.

G. THERE IS NO ESTAFA COMMITTED BY APPELLANTS, NEITHER

DID THE PROSECUTION PROVE THE COMPLEX CRIME OF ESTAFA
THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT.[9]

Petitioners contend that the non-presentation of the original copy of the alleged
falsified will before the RTC was a fatal defect which entitles them to an acquittal.

We are not persuaded.

We note that during the trial of this case, petitioners did not raise any objection when
the alleged will was presented and testified to by NBI Document Examiner Torres. We
also note that in the Offer of Prosecution Evidence,[10]where the machine copy of the
alleged will was marked as Exhibit A, the prosecution, in the last paragraph of such
offer, stated that all these (documents) form the bulk of evidence in Special
Proceeding Nos. 123948 and 61567 and were simply reproduced here as agreed
upon by the parties. We are compelled to mention this so that the accused will have no
reason for questioning their authenticity.[11] In their Comment/Objection to the Offer of
Prosecution Evidence,[12] petitioners merely stated that: If this particular document is
the original copy of the Last Will and Testament of Doa Alegria Strebel Vda. de
Figueras, which was marked as Exhibits J, J-1 to J-17 in Special Proceedings Nos.
61567 and 123948, then the accused admits not only of its existence but also its
validity, authenticity and due execution of said Last Will and Testament, but nowhere
did they object to such submission of the machine copy. In fact, petitioners never
sought reconsideration when the RTC admitted the machine copy of the alleged will.

More importantly, we note that a duplicate original copy of the alleged will was formally
offered in evidence[13] as one of petitioners' documentary evidence and the same was
already admitted by the RTC. Thus, a duplicate original copy of the alleged will was
already admitted in the records of the case which the RTC used for comparison of the
questioned signatures with that of the standard signatures of Alegria.
Petitioners fault the RTC and the CA for giving more weight to the findings of NBI
Document Examiner Torres that the signature in the alleged will was forged as against
the findings of PNP Document Examination Chief Cruz that the questioned signature
was genuine.
The rule is that the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of
the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive
effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the
trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
generally binding upon this Court unless when that determination is clearly without
evidentiary support on record, or when the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts or overlooked certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion,[14] which we do not find in this case.
In examining the questioned signatures of Alegria, Torres used the standard specimen
signatures submitted by petitioners, Eduardo and Fritz, the parties in the probate
proceedings. Torres found that the questioned and standard/sample signatures of
Alegria were not written by one and the same person. However, as petitioners did not
agree with such findings, petitioners moved for another examination of the same
documents together with three additional documents to be conducted by the PNP.
PNP Document Examiner Chief Francisco Cruz submitted his report where he found
that the questioned signatures and the standard signatures executed in 1978 indicated
that they were written by one person. Both Torres and Cruz testified in court.

Torres, in her direct and cross-examinations, thoroughly explained her findings by

establishing the fundamental differences in the writing characteristics and habits
existing in the questioned and standard signatures.

First, in the alignment characteristics, i.e., the relationship of the letters in the
name with the base line or where the letters rest. She pointed out that in the standard
signatures, all the letters in the name were written in an even straight base
notwithstanding that some of the standard signatures were written without the
horizontal line. In the questioned signatures, the name Alegria S. Vda. de Figueras
was written either in a going up or going down direction, i.e., there was no even
placement of the letters.[15]

Second, in the arrangement characteristics, i.e., the position of the written

signature in relation to the typewritten name. Torres found that the one who wrote the
questioned signatures had the habit of affixing the signatures across and covering the
entire typewritten name. While in the standard signatures, the writer affixed the
signatures above the typewritten name and there was no instance where the signature
crossed the typewritten name. Torres intimated that such arrangement characteristic in
handwriting identification was very significant, because it was considered to be an
inconspicuous characteristic which meant that even the writers themselves would not
notice that manner of signing.[16]

Third, the slight but consistent difference in the slant of the letter g in the name Alegria.
Torres stated that slant meant the slope of the letter in relation to the base line. She
found that in the standard signatures, the slopes of the letter g in Alegria formed an
angle of less than 90 degrees; that the letter g was slanting to the right. While in the
questioned signatures, the slopes of letter g formed an angle of more than 90
degrees.[17]

Fourth, the proportion characteristic which meant the relationship of one letter to
the next letter.[18]
 Fifth, the manner of execution of the questioned signatures was different from
that of the standard signatures. Torres found that in the questioned signatures, there
were presence of hesitations, tremors, slow drawing movement, and consciousness
which were not found in the standard signatures, which she had explained in details in
her testimony.

On the other hand, PNP Document Examiner Cruz stated that there was a wide range
of variations existing between the questioned signatures made in 1978 and the
standard signatures executed in 1974, 1976 and 1978, indicating that there was a
radical change in the physical condition of the writer wherein the muscle and nerves
were affected resulting in the loss of muscular control. He also stated that while the
questioned signatures and the standard signatures were dissimilar in the manner of
execution, quality of lines, alignment and size of letter, no definite conclusion can be
reached in view of the wide gap of execution. He then stated that the questioned
signatures executed on November 11, 1978 and the standard signature executed in
December 1978, which was most contemporaneous to the date of the execution of the
questioned signatures, he found they were similar and showed that they were written
by one person.[19]

We note that Cruzs findings as to the loss of muscular control in Alegrias hand
allegedly due to her physical condition was contradicted by Torres' testimony that the
standard signature executed by Alegria in December 1978, i.e., one month after the
alleged will was executed, showed that she was in good physical condition, because
her signature was smooth with flowing strokes with an even alignment which indicated
that Alegria had good muscular control and coordination.[20] Notably, Dr. Elena
Cariaso, the doctor who was tasked by the probate court to examine the physical and
mental condition of Alegria in December 1978, testified that Alegria was physically and
mentally fit with only a weakness in her lower extremities; thus, corroborating Torres
finding that Alegria's hand had good muscular control and coordination. In fact, Torres
established that the standard signatures written in 1966, 1974, 1976 and in December
1978, all showed that the signatures were made in a continuous, spontaneous and
unconscious manner[21] unlike that of the questioned signatures.
Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive. They are generally regarded as
purely advisory in character. The courts may place whatever weight they choose upon
and may reject them, if they find them inconsistent with the facts in the case or
otherwise unreasonable. When faced with conflicting expert opinions, as in this case,
courts give more weight and credence to that which is more complete, thorough, and
scientific.[22] The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his
mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he
may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in
and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape
notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.[23]

We agree with the RTC and the CA in giving more weight and credence to the
testimony of Torres as the examination conducted by Torres was complete, thorough
and scientific. We find that the RTC had the opportunity to examine the relevant
documents and make comparisons thereof. In fact, upon our own comparison of the
questioned signatures and the standard signatures taking into consideration
inconspicuous differences noted by Torres on the questioned and standard signatures,
we find that the questioned signatures showed substantial differences with that of the
standard signatures of Alegria.
 Petitioner claims that the testimonies of the notary public, as well as the two
attesting witnesses that they saw Alegria sign the will in their presence, should have
outweighed the testimony of Torres.

We are not persuaded.

In his testimony, Notary Public Farrales testified that when he, together with another
lawyer, Atty. Cordon, went inside the room of Alegria who was in bed, he presented to
her copies of the will which he brought from his office;[24]that Alegria read the same
and called in petitioner Felizardo to bring some small board where she could write;
after Felizardo handed the same, he again left the room. Farrales said that Alegria
signed the will in his presence, as well as in the presence of Atty. Cordon and the
other attesting witnesses, Mercedes and Victorino; that petitioner Felizardo was just
outside the room when the signing was on-going;[25] that Farrales was the one who
assisted Alegria in turning the pages of the documents and was the one who pointed
to her the portion where she was to affix her signatures;[26] and that after the signing
and notarization of the will, Alegria requested them to call on petitioner Felizardo and
once Felizardo was inside the room, Alegria gave the documents to the latter who
placed the will in an envelope.[27]

On the other hand, Mercedes testified that when she and Victorino entered Alegria's
room, she saw Alegria, Felizardo, Attys. Farrales and Cordon; that Alegria instructed
petitioner Felizardo to read aloud the will which Felizardo did;[28] and that Alegria and
the other witnesses signed the will in the presence of each other and was duly
notarized; and that she saw Felizardo keep the will inside the vault. [29]
Victorino testified that when he and Mercedes entered Alegria's room, he saw Atty.
Farrales, Cordon, Felizardo and Alegria who was in a reclined position in her bed; that
Alegria asked Felizardo to get the sealed document from a cabinet;[30] that Alegria told
petitioner Felizardo to give each one of them a copy of the document and instructed
petitioner Felizardo to read the contents of the will aloud;[31] and that he saw Alegria
signed the will in their presence.

Notably, their testimonies showed material inconsistencies which affected their

credibilities. Farrales testified that the copies of the alleged will came from his office
and he was the one who gave the same to Alegria which, however, was contrary to
Victorinos claim that petitioner Felizardo got the alleged will from the cabinet. Farrales
testified that petitioner Felizardo was not inside the room when the signing was
ongoing which was again contrary to the claims of both Mercedes and Victorino that
petitioner Felizardo was inside the room while the signing was on-going; and that
Alegria even instructed Felizardo to read aloud the contents of the same to them.
Notably, Farrales testified that he was the one who turned the pages of the will and
was also the one who pointed to Alegria the portion where to affix her signatures and
that no other person rendered such assistance except him.[32] However, in petitioner
Felizardo's testimony, he said that he was present when the will was being signed by
Alegria.[33] In fact, petitioner Felizardo submitted photographs which were admittedly
taken by co-petitioner Juan to prove the former's presence during the signing and to
show that he was the one assisting Alegria in signing the will.

Such contradictory statements coming from persons who allegedly were present when
the will was executed render doubtful the genuineness of the alleged forged will. Thus,
we find no error committed by the RTC in not giving credence to their testimonies.
We find the elements of falsification of public document present in this
case. Essentially, the elements of the crime of Falsification of Public Document under
Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) that the offender is a private
individual; (2) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated
under Article 171; and (3) that the act of falsification is committed in a public
document. Under paragraph 2 of Article 171, a person may commit falsification of a
public document by causing it to appear in a document that a person or persons
participated in an act or proceeding, when such person or persons did not, in fact, so
participate in the act or proceeding.

In this case, petitioners are private individuals who presented the alleged will to the
probate court and made it appear that Alegria signed the alleged will disposing of her
rights and interest in the real properties, as well as all of her personal properties to
petitioners when in fact petitioners knew that Alegria never signed such alleged will as
her signatures therein were forged.

We find apropos the findings of the RTC that petitioners conspired to perpetuate
such forgery, to wit:

1. The so-called Will and Testament was admitted by Felizardo S.

Obando in open hearing to have been dictated by him to a certain
Atty. Alcantara allegedly as voiced out to him by Alegria;
2. He said he procured the service of said lawyer and the very
notary public, one Atty. C. Farrales to notarize it;
3. Juanito Obando enticed the couple Mercedes B. Santos and
Victorino Cruz into acting as witnesses, Mercedes being his sister-
in-law, and his taking pictures of the entire ceremony of signing
such document. This taking of such pictures is itself a sign of evil
intention, because it is an expectancy of future rift or trouble;
 4. Felizardo held and kept the questioned document with him from
its inception to its alleged signing and up to Alegrias death which
possession and complete control lasted for several months;
5. Felizardo and Juanito Obando and their respective families
again by their joint admissions, gained enormously and by reason
of said will.

The crime of falsification of public document was the means for petitioners to commit
estafa. The elements of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC[34] are as
follows: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in
trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such
receipt; and (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another.

Petitioner Felizardo argued that he already had in his possession the personal
properties of Alegria which included the pieces of jewelry by virtue of an alleged
general power of attorney executed by Alegria in his favor. However, as correctly
argued by the Solicitor General, such agency between Alegria and petitioner
Felizardo, was terminated upon Alegrias death; thus, he had no basis for taking
possession and custody of Alegrias properties after her death. However, by virtue of
the falsified will which petitioners presented for probate, and by which petitioner
Felizardo became a co-administrator of the estate of the Figueras couple, and had
gained possession of the jewelry, he was not able to account for the same when
ordered to do so by the probate court.
On the other hand, co-petitioner Juan admitted that the pieces of jewelry went to his
daughters and nieces, while the real properties were already sold even while the
intestate and probate proceedings were still pending in court.

Petitioners' misappropriation of the jewelry was to the prejudice of Eduardo Figueras

who also has the right to Alegria's jewelry in general which were part of the declared
conjugal estate of his father Jose and Alegria Figueras. Notably, Alegria, as
administratrix of the estate of Jose, submitted in 1966 an inventory of the conjugal real
and personal properties of the Figueras couple and one of those listed under conjugal
personal properties was jewelry in the amount of P2,150.00. Such inventory was
contained in the Order dated September 10, 1980 of the probate court and which was
submitted in evidence by petitioners.

The crime committed was estafa through falsification of public document. Being a
complex crime, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum
period.[35] While we sustain the conviction of petitioners of the crime charged, we
found, however, that the penalty imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals was not proper.

The amount of damages is the basis of the penalty for estafa. However, we note
that the prosecution failed to satisfactorily show that the amount of jewelry
misappropriated was indeed two million pesos. The only evidence on record which
would establish the amount of the jewelry was the inventory submitted in 1966 by
Alegria where she listed the jewelry in the amount of P2,150.00.
 Since the amount misappropriated by petitioners was established to be only in
the amount of P2,150.00, the applicable provision is paragraph (3) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, which imposes the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period, where the amount defrauded is
over P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00. Thus, in this case, it appears that the
most serious crime, which should be the basis of penalty for the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document, would be the falsification and, under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty is prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00.

Thus, the maximum penalty to be imposed in this case is the medium period
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, there being no mitigating
or aggravating circumstances. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is arresto
mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum in any of its period.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 13, 1998 and
the Resolution dated May 17, 1999 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposable. Petitioners are
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days
of prision correccional, as the maximum, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
LTC. ROBERTO K. GUILLERGAN G.R. No. 185493
(Ret.),
Petitioner, Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:

February 2, 2011
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the conviction of an accused for an offense other than that charged

in the Information based on a claim that the essential elements of the offense of which

he was convicted are also elements of the offense charged in the Information.

The Facts and the Case

On June 20, 1995 the Office of the Ombudsman indicted petitioner Roberto K.

Guillergan (Guillergan) for estafa through falsification of public documents before the

Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 22904.[1]

The evidence shows that sometime in 1987, petitioner Guillergan, a Lieutenant

Colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), directed Master Sergeant Edna
Seclon (Seclon), Chief Clerk of the Comptrollers Office, to cause the preparation of the

payrolls of their civilian intelligence agents (CIAs) with supporting time record and

book. The agents names were copied and, based on their appointment papers,

certified as correct by Guillergan and then approved by Brigadier General Domingo T.

Rio (Rio).[2]

Each time the processing unit returned the payrolls for lack of signatures of the

payees, Guillergan would direct Technical Sergeant Nemesio H. Butcon (Butcon), the

Budget and Fiscal Non-Commissioned Officer, to affix his initial on

the Remarks/Sig column of the payrolls to complete the requirements and facilitate the

processing of the time record, book, and payrolls.[3]

Also on Guillergans instruction, the CIAs payrolls in Region 6 for 1987,

totaling P732,000.00, were covered by cash advances payable to Captain Roland V.

Maclang, Jr. (Maclang, Jr.), which advances were issued upon his request as

disbursing officer for that purpose. When ready, Guillergan received the corresponding

cash or checks then turned them over to Rio.[4]

At the end of 1987, Rio further received P787,000.00 in administrative funds to

be paid out to contractors for repairs in the mens barracks, the firing range, the

guesthouse and others. But Rio requested that this administrative funds be re-aligned

to intelligence funds in order to facilitate clearing.[5]

On April 14, 1989 the AFP Anti-Graft Board filed a complaint[6] against Rio,

Butcon, Maclang, Jr., Seclon, and Guillergan for violating Articles of War 94 in relation

to Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

 After preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas issued a

resolution[7] dated May 24, 1991, recommending the dismissal of the case for lack of

merit. On April 21, 1992, however, the ombudsman investigator issued a

memorandum, recommending the filing of charges of illegal use of public funds

against Rio and the exoneration of the other respondents. In a memorandum[8] dated

February 11, 1993, the review panel in the Office of the Special Prosecutor affirmed

the recommendation.

On June 20, 1995, however, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended

the filing of charges against all the accused before the Sandiganbayan. Consequently,

an Information was filed against them for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a),[9] in

relation to Article 171[10] of the RPC.

While the case was pending, Rio died, prompting the Sandiganbayan to dismiss

the case against him.[11]

On January 20, 2006, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts with motion for

judgment[12] based on such stipulations. On June 30, 2008, the Sandiganbayan

Second Division rendered judgment,[13] finding Guillergan guilty of falsification

penalized under Article 172[14] of the RPC and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of

imprisonment for 2 years and 4 months as minimum to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days

as maximum. The court acquitted the other accused on the ground of lack of proof of

their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

 The Issues Presented

The issues presented in this case are:

1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan can convict Guillergan of violation of Article

172 of the RPC under an Information that charged him with estafa in relation to Article
171 of the code; and

2. Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

falsification of public documents.

The Courts Rulings

The Information alleged that Guillergan committed falsification by making it appear in

several public documents that P1,519,000.00 in AFP funds intended for the CIAs

payroll were paid for that purpose when in truth these were just given to Rio, resulting

in damage and prejudice to the government. Although the charge was estafa in relation

to Article 171 of the RPC, the facts alleged in the information sufficiently made out a

case for violation of Article 172 of which Guillergan was convicted. What is important is

that the Information described the latter offense intelligibly and with reasonable

certainty, enabling Guillergan to understand the charge against him and suitably

prepare his defense.[15]

What is punished in falsification of a public document is the violation of the public faith

and the destruction of the truth as solemnly proclaimed in it.[16] Generally, the elements

of Article 171 are: 1) the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; 2) he

takes advantage of his official position; and 3) that he falsifies a document by

committing any of the ways it is done.[17]

On the other hand, the elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1,

Article 172 are: 1) the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee

who did not take advantage of his official position; 2) the offender committed any of the

acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171; [18] and 3) the falsification was committed

in a public or official or commercial document.[19] All of the foregoing elements of Article

172 are present in this case.

First. Guillergan was a public officer when he committed the offense charged. He was

the comptroller to the PC/INP Command in Region 6. While the Information said that

he took advantage of his position in committing the crime, the Sandiganbayan found

that his work as comptroller did not include the preparation of the appointments and

payrolls of CIAs. Nor did he have official custody of the pertinent documents. [20] His

official function was limited to keeping the records of the resources that the command

received from Camp Crame.[21] Still, he took the liberty of intervening in the preparation

of the time record, book, and payrolls in question.

Second. The Information alleged that Guillergan committed the offense charged by

causing it to appear that persons participated in an act or a proceeding when they did

not in fact so participate.[22] In People v. Yanson-Dumancas,[23] the Court held that a

person may induce another to commit a crime in two ways: 1) by giving a price or

offering a reward or promise; and 2) by using words of command. In this case, the

Sandiganbayan found that Guillergan ordered Butcon to sign the receive portion of the
payrolls as payee to make it appear that persons whose names appeared on the same

had signed the document when they in fact did not.[24]

Third. There is no dispute that the falsification was committed on the time record,

book, and payrolls which were public documents.

What is more, given that some of the essential elements of Article 171 constitute the

lesser offense of falsification of public documents under Article 172, then the

allegations in the Information were sufficient to hold Guillergan liable under Article 172.

As a rule, the Court regards as conclusive on it the factual findings of the

Sandiganbayan unless these fall under certain established exceptions.[25] Since none

of those exceptions can be identified in this case, the Court must accord respect and

weight to the Sandiganbayan's findings. It had the better opportunity to examine and

evaluate the evidence presented before it.[26] As aptly pointed out by the

Sandiganbayan, to wit:

There are tell-tales signs that the agents listed on the payrolls did not
receive their salaries. First, x x x Guillergan declared that he
personally turned over the entire amount of [P1,519,000.00] to Gen.
Rio. Second, Butcons narration that he was instructed by Guillergan,
to [affix his] initial at the receive portion of the payrolls. Lastly,
according to the records of the case, the office of Guillergan had no
business in processing the payroll of these personnel. x x x

Additionally, the appointment papers from which these payrolls were

based do not reveal any information about the acceptance of the
appointments by the agents. In a letter dated April 14, 1989 of the
Anti-Graft Board of the Armed forces of the Philippines x x x [to
Ombudsman Vasquez], it was stated that the appointment papers of
the agents must be accompanied by the acceptance of the
 agents. These papers should ordinarily be attached to the payrolls for
proper clearing purposes. Since there were no acceptance papers
presented, it only suggests that the lists on the payrolls are names of
ghost agents. Even more, the board made a comment that x x x
Guillergan denies knowledge of the persons appointed even if he
certified to the correctness of the payrolls.

The only conclusion x x x is the deliberate falsification of the

payrolls; causing it to appear that persons have participated in any
act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.[27]

The Court finds no error in the decision of the Sandiganbayan that found Guillergan

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Public Documents under Article 172

of the RPC.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the

Sandiganbayans decision dated June 30, 2008 and Resolution dated January 7, 2004

which found petitioner Roberto K. Guillergan guilty of violation of Article 172 of the

Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case 22904.

SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES REVELO VILLAMAR G.R. No. 178652
and CORAZON PENULIAR-
VILLAMAR, Present:
Petitioners,
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
- versus - ABAD,
PEREZ,* and
MENDOZA, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. December 8, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

This is a petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The

petition challenges the 27 June 2007 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR

No. 29524. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the 11 August 2005

Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region 1, Branch 40, Dagupan

City, in Criminal Case No. 2005-0172-D, affirming the 8 February 2005 Decision[4] of

the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Judicial Region 1, Branch 1, Dagupan City,

in Criminal Case No. 42907.

On 20 April 1967, Elena Manantan (Elena) sold a parcel of land to her nine children:

Cornelia Penuliar (Cornelia), Simplicio Penuliar (Simplicio), Modesta Flores (Modesta),

Eulalia Penuliar (Eulalia), Hermogenes Penuliar (Hermogenes), Lucia Penuliar (Lucia),

Pedro Penuliar (Pedro), Felipe Penuliar (Felipe), and Jose Penuliar (Jose). On 6 June

1983, Cornelia Eulalia, Hermogenes, Lucia, Pedro, and Jose sold their share to

Simplicio. Modesta and Felipe did not sell their share.

On 7 September 1989, Simplicio sold his total share to his daughter, petitioner

Corazon Penuliar-Villamar (Corazon). Corazon is married to petitioner Revelo Villamar

(Revelo). Corazon and Revelo possessed and registered with the Office of the

Provincial Assessor of Lingayen, Pangasinan, a signed and notarized deed of sale

dated 23 November 1989. Notary Public Quirico Bachar notarized the deed. In the

deed, it was made to appear that all of Elenas children, including Modesta and Felipe,

sold the property to the spouses. The signatures of Modesta, Hermogenes, and Lucia

were forged. Corazon and Revelo alleged that employees of the Assessors Office

committed the falsification.

In 1999, Modesta discovered the 23 November 1989 deed of sale. In an

information[5] dated 7 September 2000, Second Assistant City Prosecutor Regulus V.

Reyes charged Corazon and Revelo with falsification of public document.

In its 8 February 2005 Decision, the MTCC found Corazon and Revelo guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of falsification of public document. The MTCC sentenced the

spouses to an indeterminate penalty of four months and one day arresto mayor as

minimum to three years, six months and 20 days prision correccional as maximum, and

to pay Modesta P20,000 moral damages. The MTCC held that:

There is no question that the signature of the private complainant in the
Deed of Sale, dated November 23, 1989 was falsified. In fact, even the
accused admitted that indeed private complainant Modesta Penuliar Flores
was not one of the vendors in the said document.But the accused maintain
that they could not be held guilty of the crime charged because they were
not the ones who falsified the document as it was prepared by somebody in
the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Lingayen, Pangasinan without their
knowledge.The accused insisted that when they went to the said office to
register the Deed of Sale marked Exhibit 2, they were asked to leave it, and
when they returned to get their document, they were given another
document particularly Exhibit A which is the reason why they were charged
with falsification because it appears in the said document that private
complainant Modesta Penuliar Flores was one of the signatories when, in
fact, she was not. In other words, the accused maintain that they could not
be held liable for falsification of public document because criminal intent
was lacking. But if the accused acted in good faith, why did they not
immediately inform the private complainant about the matter. Moreover,
they should not have received the falsified document from the Assessors
Office knowing that it was not the document that was given to their office for
registration. The actuation and the behavior of the accused negate their
claim of innocence. It is very unusual that they entrusted such very
important document to somebody whose name they dont even
know. Furthermore, why did the accused waited [sic] for the advice of the
Brgy. Captain of their place to settle their problem with the private
complainant. Their silence work [sic] against them as it goes against the
principle that the first impulse of an innocent was [sic] when accused of
wrongdoing is to express his innocence at the first opportune time. Besides,
other than the self-serving testimonies of the accused, no other evidence
was presented by them to substantiate their pretense of innocence. They
should have presented the person from the Assessors Office who gave
them Exhibit A to corroborate their claim if indeed they have no hand in its
falsification. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the person who stood to
benefit by the falsification of a public document and was in possession of it
is presumed to be the material author of the falsification. Hence, the
defense of good faith of the accused is not acceptable as it is not supported
by clear and convincing evidence.

All told, the prosecution has succeeded in rebutting the presumption of

innocence accorded the accused who, on their part, have dismally failed to
substantiate their pretense of innocence.[6]
Corazon and Revelo appealed to the RTC. In its 11 August 2005 Decision, the RTC

found Corazon and Revelo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of public

document. The RTC held that:

After a careful review of the decision appealed from, the Court finds no
reversible error committed by the court a-quo as the same is duly
supported by evidence.

The prosecutors evidence has duly proved that the signature of the private
complainant in the Deed of Sale dated November 23, 1989 was
falsified. Even the accused admitted that indeed private complainant
Modesta Penuliar Flores was not one of the vendors in the said document.

The accused, while admitting that private complainant Modesta Penuliar

Flores was not one of the vendors in the said document, they maintained
that they could not be held guilty of the crime charged because they were
not the ones who falsified the document as it was prepared by somebody in
the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Lingayen, Pangasinan without their
knowledge, and put up the defense of good faith.

As correctly held by the Court a-quo, the actuation and behavior of the
accused in not immediately informing the complainant about the inclusion
of her name in the subject Deed of Sale as one of the vendors therein
negate their claim of innocence.

The Court is in consonance with the ruling of the court a-quo that the
person who stood to benefit by the falsification of a public document and
was in possession of it is presumed to be the material author of the
falsification.

As held by the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Manansala (105
Phil. 1253), it is an established rule that when a person has in his
possession a falsified document and makes use of the same, the
presumption or inference is justified that such person is the forger.[7]

Corazon and Revelo appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its 27 June 2007 Decision,

the Court of Appeals found Corazon and Revelo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
falsification of public document. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the

MTCCs and RTCs decisions by adding one day to the maximum penalty. The Court of

Appeals held that:

Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents.

The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
and a fine of not more than 5,000 shall be imposed upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications

enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document
or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; and

xxxxxxxxx

On the other hand, Article 171 of the same Code provides:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee; or notary or ecclesiastical

minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking
advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing
any of the following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;

xxxxxxxxx

From the foregoing, the elements of the crime of falsification under

paragraph 1 of Article 172 are: (i) that the offender is a private individual;
(ii) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Art. 171;
and (iii) that the falsification was committed in a public or official or
commercial document. All these elements are present in the instant case.

It is not disputed that Modestas signature in the questioned Deed of Sale

was forged. Indeed, petitioner-spouses admitted that Modesta and Felipe
never participated in the sale of the property subject of the Deed of Sale in
their favor. They argue, however, that they were not the authors of the
falsification, claiming that the employees of the Assessors Office of
Lingayen, Pangasinan were the ones who falsified the document. They
maintain that the deed of sale they submitted to the Assessors Office did
 not include Modesta as one of the vendors but when they returned to said
Office after one month, the employees therein gave them the questioned
document which included Modesta as one of the vendors. We are not
convinced.

That petitioners were the authors and/or masterminds of the falsification is

presumed from the fact that they actually benefited from it. In Maliwat vs.
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of
satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged
document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification. If a person had in
his possession a falsified document and he made use of it, taking
advantage of it and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the
material author of the falsification.

In the instant case, petitioners failed miserably to rebut the above

presumption. Clearly, they were the ones who benefited from the falsified
document, the same having been executed in their favor. To emphasize,
they were the ones who caused the registration of the deed of sale and
were the ones who received the falsified document from the Assessors
Office. Their bare-faced assertion that the employees of the Assessors
Office committed the falsification is flimsy and unsupported by evidence.

In the first place, a comparison of the September 7, 1989 Deed of Sale

allegedly submitted by petitioners to the Assessors Office and the falsified
November 23, 1989 Deed of Sale returned to them by the said Office
reveals that the two documents are totally different from each other, both in
the print or font of the contents and the location of the names of the
signatories. We cannot, therefore, see how the employees could have
inserted the names of Modesta and Felipe in the questioned document,
much less falsified their signatures, without anyone noticing it. What is
taxing to the mind is: Why would the employees include the names of
Modesta and Felipe and falsify their signatures, and what could they gain
therefrom?[8]

Hence, the present petition. Corazon and Revelo raise as issue that:

The facts of the case x x x is [sic] that petitioners were innocent of the
existence of the falsified document on the ground that what was submitted
to the Office of the Assessos [sic], Lingayen, Pangasinan to be the basis of
the petitioners ownership was a genuine document which truly did not
include the share of the private complainant, now the private
respondent. What was in the mind of the perpetrators employees of the
 Assessors Office whom petitioners sought assistance for the transfer of the
document in their favor was beyond their control as they were never
informed beforehand of the execution of the questioned document.[9]

The petition is unmeritorious.

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari

shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. In Pagsibigan v.

People,[10] the Court held that:

A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only
questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law
exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A
question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts.

There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved

without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The issue to
be resolved must be limited to determining what the law is on a certain set
of facts. Once the issue invites a review of the evidence, the question
posed is one of fact.[11]

Whether Corazon and Revelo were innocent of the existence of the falsified document

is a question of fact. It is not reviewable.

The factual findings of the lower courts are binding on the Court. The exceptions to this

rule are (1) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are

grounded on speculation; (3) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4)

when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)

when the factual findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond
the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7)

when the Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered,

would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the facts set forth by the petitioner are not

disputed by the respondent; and (9) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are

premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on

record.[12] Corazon and Revelo did not show that any of these circumstances is

present.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 27 June 2007

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29524.

SO ORDERED.
ROBERT LASTRILLA, G.R. No. 160257
Petitioner,

Present:

Puno, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona,
Azcuna, and
Garcia, JJ.

RAFAEL A. GRANDA, Promulgated:

Respondent.
January 31, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Petitioner Robert Lastrilla seeks the partial reversal of the July 18, 2003 Decision of the

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 26273 which modified the May 8, 2002

Resolution of the Department of Justice (DOJ), finding probable cause to file three

(3) informations charging him with the crime of Falsification of Public Document under

Article 172 (1), in relation to Article 171 (1), (2) and (5) of the Revised Penal Code.

The facts are as follows:

Respondent Rafael Granda is a grandson and legal heir of the deceased spouses

Rafael and Aurora Granda, who died in June 1989 and September 16, 2000,

respectively. The Granda spouses had ten children, namely: BlanquitaSerafica,

Jesse[1] Granda, Aurora Sumcad, Violeta Cuenca, Rafael R. Granda, Olivia Walker,

Lourdes Manabat, Fernando Granda, Benjamin Granda and Silvina Granda.

Respondent's father, Jesse Granda, predeceased the spouses.

During Aurora's lifetime, she owned several parcels of land with some

improvements thereon in Tacloban City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)

Nos. T-249, T-1312, T-816 and T-9874, all registered in her name.[2] Said parcels of

land were allegedly sold by the Granda spouses, as evidenced by the following deeds

of absolute sale, all dated December 7, 1985, witnessed by petitioner and the

deceased spouses' youngest daughter Silvina and notarized by

Atty. Camilo Camenforte, to wit:

(a) The first Deed of Absolute Sale involved two parcels of land
covered by TCT Nos. T-249 and T-1312, which were sold by
the Granda spouses, as vendors, in favor of petitioner's siblings Necita Uy,
Elsa Uy, Andres Uy, Tinong Uy and Rosa Uy, as vendees, for a
consideration of P3,800,000.00, receipt of which was acknowledged by the
spouses;[3]
 (b) The second Deed of Absolute Sale involved two (2) parcels of
land covered by TCT No. T-816, which were likewise sold by
the Granda spouses, as vendors, in favor of petitioner's siblings
Mary Uy Cua, NecitaUy, Elsa Uy, Andres Uy, Tinong Uy and Rosa Uy, as
vendees, for a consideration of P5,000,000.00, receipt of which was also
acknowledged by the spouses;[4] and

(c) The third Deed of Absolute Sale involved three (3) parcels of land
covered by TCT No. T-6736, which were sold by the Granda spouses, as
vendors, in favor of petitioner and his spouse Norma Lastrilla, as vendees,
for a consideration of P200,000.00, receipt of which was also
acknowledged by the deceased spouses.[5]

On February 28, 2000, the deeds of absolute sale involving the properties

covered by TCT Nos. T-1312, T-816 and T-249 were annotated at the back of their

corresponding TCTs. Consequently, TCT Nos. T-1312, T-816, and T-249 were

cancelled and TCT Nos. T-6696, T-54400, and T-54401, respectively, were issued in

the names of the respective vendees.[6] The deed of absolute sale involving the

properties covered by TCT No. 6736 was not annotated as said TCT was found to be

non-existent.

On February 21, 2001 or more than five months after Aurora's death, respondent

filed the instant complaint[7] for Violation of Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal

Code against petitioner, Silvina, Atty. Camenforte, Norma Lastrilla,

Mary Uy Cua, Necita Uy, Elsa Uy, Andres Uy, Tinong Uy and Rosa Uy, docketed as

I.S. No. 2001-343. Respondent claimed that a month after his grandmother's death, he

learned that all of the latter's properties in Tacloban were sold to different persons

sometime in 1999-2000. To verify such reports, he requested copies of the purported

deeds of absolute sale with the Register of Deeds and was able to obtain copies of the

three (3) deeds of absolute sale in question. Upon careful scrutiny of the subject

deeds, he noticed that the signatures of his deceased grandparents were falsified.

Upon verification, the examining officers of the PNP Crime Laboratory confirmed that

the signatures of respondent's deceased grandfather Rafael in the deeds and his

specimen signatures "were not written by one hand and the same person." They also

found that the signatures of his deceased grandfather and the signatures of the

deceased spouses' youngest daughter Silvina "reveal some similarities in stroke

structure, indicative of one writer." Likewise, the examining officers found that the

signatures of respondent's grandmother Aurora in the questioned deeds and her

specimen signatures "were not written by one and the same person." [8] Respondent
also claimed that the three deeds of absolute sale were antedated. While the sales

took place in 1999 or 2000, it was made to appear that the transactions took place

on December 7, 1985, at a time when both of the Granda spouses were still

alive. Respondent alleged that: (a) Petitioner himself told respondent that it was in

1999 that he bought the lots covered by TCT No. T-816; (b) Silvina could not have

signed as a witness on December 7, 1985 as she was then cloistered in

the Cariana Movement Monastery under Fr. Odon Castro who certified that as a

member of said religious community, she could "not go out of the monastery unless

there was a very valid reason" and "she was not sent out for any errant (sic) nor went

to the province" for the whole year of 1985;[9] (c) Aurora was still exercising rights of

ownership over the properties subject of the assailed deeds after December 7, 1985,

as evidenced by the General Power of Attorney (GPOA),[10] dated February 14, 1999,

executed by Aurora in favor of her youngest daughter Silvina, to administer her

properties subject of the assailed deeds and to collect and receive all rentals from the

occupants of the buildings therein; (d) As attorney-in-fact, Silvina executed lease

contracts dated February 4, 2000[11] with some of the lessees of the office spaces in

the commercial building located in the two lots covered by TCT Nos. T-1312 and T-

249; (e) As per Certification from the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of the

8th Judicial Region, the three deeds of absolute sale were not among the available

notarized documents submitted to said office for the year 1985; and (f) the subject

deeds were registered with the Register of Deeds only on February 28, 2000 or almost

fifteen (15) years after the alleged sales. Respondent claimed that petitioner conspired

with Silvina and Atty. Camenforte in falsifying the three deeds by signing as an

instrumental witness therein. Also, petitioner and the other vendees allegedly

conspired by benefiting from the use of said public documents in transferring the titles

of the properties from the name of Aurora to their names.

Petitioner's co-respondent sibling Elsa Uy submitted her counter-

affidavit,[12] averring that sometime in 1998, Aurora repeatedly offered the sale of the

subject properties to her. After conferring with her siblings, she agreed to buy Aurora's

properties for a total consideration of P18,000,000 subject to the conditions: (1) That
the preparation, documentation, notarization and registration of the document of sale,

the cancellation of the TCTs in Aurora's name and the issuance of the new TCTs in the

names of the vendees would be Aurora's sole and exclusive responsibility; (2) That all

the expenses for documentation, registration of documents, capital gains tax,

documentary stamps tax, transfer tax, sales tax, fees for the cancellation and issuance

of titles and expenses for similar purposes would be for the exclusive and sole account

of Aurora; (3) That as soon as the TCTs in the names of the vendees are issued,

Aurora would turn over the new TCTs to them; (4) That all the necessary documents

would be executed by Aurora and/or by any and all persons who may have any

interest, lien or claim over the properties at the instance of Aurora and at her expense,

in order that the said properties would be free from any lien or encumbrance; and

(5) That the mode and manner of payment for the consideration of the sale would be

as directed by Aurora.

Aurora allegedly agreed to the said terms and conditions subject to an increase

in the total consideration from P18,000,000 to P18,800,000. As directed by Aurora,

periodic payments were made to her totaling P8,800,000.Partial advance payments

of P1,000,000 each were likewise made to Aurora's

children Silvina and Lourdes. Thereafter, Elsa and her siblings,

Mary Uy Cua, Necita Uy, Rosa Uy, Tinong Uy and Andres Uy, gave Aurora's

children P1,000,000 each or a total of P8,000,000. The share of Aurora's deceased

son Jesse Granda was divided equally among the latter's seven (7) children, one of

whom is respondent, who received his share of P142,857.14. Subsequently, all the

heirs of Aurora executed separate documents denominated as "Deed of

Assignment."[13] The Deed of Assignment dated April 20, 2000, signed by respondent

under the name "Rafaelito" on "2/16/2000," together with the latter's siblings, states

that:
For and in consideration of the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS
(P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, receipt of the amount from MARY
UY CUA, NECITA UY, ELSA UY, ANDRES UY, TINONG UY and ROSA
UY, is hereby acknowledged and confessed by us to our entire and full
satisfaction x x x and

We do hereby confirm and acknowledge the fact that our

grandmother, Aurora Ratcliffe de Granda, has the lawful right to dispose of
the above described parcels of land and such other real properties she
has wherever located, as she is the absolute and exclusive owner being
her exclusive and paraphernal properties.[14] (citation omitted)
Elsa contended that she and her siblings were innocent purchasers in good faith and

for valuable consideration. It was sometime in September 2000 when TCT Nos. T-

6696 and T-54401 were presented to them, together with the ten (10) separate Deeds

of Assignment executed by Aurora's heirs. Her siblings, namely

Mary Uy Cua, Necita Uy, Andres Uy, Tinong Uy and Rosa Uy, never met or personally

conferred with Aurora or her heirs. Nor were they in possession or control of the three

(3) subject deeds and the owner's duplicates of TCT Nos. T-1312, T-249, T-816 and T-

9874 as said documents remained in the absolute control of Aurora. They were never

involved in the preparation, execution, notarization and registration of the three (3)

deeds of absolute sale and the payment of the required fees, taxes, the cancellation of

the certificates of title and the issuance in their names of TCT Nos. T-6696, T-54400

and T-54401 as the same were all made and effected by Aurora. She denied having

taken advantage of or profited from the subject deeds and certificates of title. She

contended that the filing of the instant complaint is "an act of utter bad faith, done for

some evil motives and with malicious criminal intent"[15] as complainant was the very
same person who gave his conformity and consent to the questioned sales, confirmed

the sales and acknowledged receipt of P1,000,000 by executing, together with his

siblings, the Deed of Assignment dated April 20, 2000. Allegedly, it was complainant

who unjustly enriched himself at their expense when he received from them his share

of P142,857.14. That respondent filed the instant case only after his grandmother's

death allegedly shows his sinister scheme to preclude his grandmother from divulging

the truth. She claimed that complainant was a party to the alleged falsification and

perpetrated an act of fraud to their damage and prejudice.

Alleging the same statement of facts and defenses, petitioner's other

siblings, Necita Uy, Rosa Uy, Mary Uy Cua, Tinong Uy and Andres Uy, filed their Joint

Counter-Affidavit[16] and petitioner's spouse, Norma Lastrilla, filed her own counter-

affidavit.[17] Atty. Camenforte also submitted his counter-affidavit[18] containing his

personal defenses. In response, respondent filed his Reply Affidavit,[19] contending that

petitioner and Silvina should be deemed to have admitted the allegations in the

complaint for their failure to file their respective counter-affidavits despite due
notice. Petitioner eventually submitted his own counter-affidavit[20] on the same day

that his co-respondent siblings and spouse filed their Rebuttal-Affidavits.[21]

In his defense, petitioner adopted the allegations of his co-respondents insofar as

they were material to the charges against him. He contended that the charge against

him is "malicious and bereft of truth, designed mainly to cast a cloud of doubt on the

title of the vendees."[22] He claimed that the filing of the complaint was merely aimed at

making him and his siblings submit to additional monetary consideration being

demanded by respondent

who must have felt shortchanged because he had to share his deceased

father's P1,000,000-share with his six (6) siblings. Respondent allegedly threatened

him with criminal prosecution after he and his siblings refused to heed his

demands. Petitioner claimed that it was only Elsa and Aurora who negotiated for the

sale of the properties in question. His other siblings participated only with respect to

their respective contributions to the purchase price and he was the one tasked to
ensure that the signatures on the subject deeds were all authentic and genuine

as they were parting with millions of hard earned money. Upon Aurora's request,

he readily agreed to affix his signatures in the subject deeds as a witness, thinking that

such act would seal the validity of the sale. He contended that the fact that the sale

was only registered on February 28, 2000 is not evidence of falsification. In fact, he

and his wife were the named vendees in one of the deeds and paid a total of P200,000

for the properties therein described. However, they did not benefit from the said sale

because contrary to what was stated in the deed of sale, only Lot 4691 was covered by

T-6736, Lot 2455 was an unregistered land and has an adverse claimant thereto

while Lot 4693 was covered by TCT No. T-9874. In view of the misrepresentation, they

never acquired title to the properties they bought and in fact suffered pecuniary loss in

the amount of P200,000.

Further, petitioner claimed that "although the Application in the Office of the

Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, denominated as Control No. 183, requesting

registration of title to the properties" subject of the deeds of absolute sale bears his
signature, the same "is not evidence that it was not Aurora Granda who caused the

registration of said Deeds of Sale... because the truth of the matter is that the same

application was just given to [him] by someone sent by Aurora Granda requesting that

[he] affix [his] signature thereto." It is likewise "not evidence that [he] was the one who

personally submitted the same to the Office of the Register of Deeds." [23] He did not

deny that the corresponding real property tax and special (SEF) tax for the parcels of

land were in his name and that of Washington Trading but he contended that the same

does not prove that respondent vendees were the ones who paid said taxes, for the

truth of the matter is that Aurora, in consonance with her agreement with Elsa Uy,

fulfilled her part of the conditions of the sale that she would cause the preparation,

documentation and notarization of the deeds of absolute sale and paid the taxes in his

name and Washington Trading.

On May 5, 2001, the Office of the City Prosecution of Tacloban issued a

Resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:

In view of the foregoing, it appearing
that Camilo Camenforte and Silvina Granda conspired with each other to
falsify the three Deeds of Sale, the filing of three (3) informations, one for
 each Deed of Sale, charging the respondents with the crime of
Falsification by Public Officers by forging the signatures of Aurora and
Rafael Granda to make it appear that the said persons have participated in
an act or proceedings when they did not in fact participated (sic) penalized
and defined in Art. 171, sub-par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.[24]

In dismissing the complaint against petitioner, his wife and his siblings, the

investigating prosecutor reasoned that:

The question to be resolved is, [w]ho falsified these documents? It
can not be the respondents, Elsa Uy, Tinong Uy, Necita Uy, Andres Uy,
Mary Uy Cua, as alleged by the complainant since they have paid a total
amount of P18,800,000.00 to Aurora Granda and her heirs for the
purchase of said properties.
It must be noted that the complainant himself never denied that they
received the amount. In fact, in the Deed of Assignment that the
complainant and his co-heirs executed they admitted having
received P1,000,000.00 as their share in the purchase of the said
properties. It is highly improbable for someone to part with such an amount
as a consideration for the purchase of a property and at the same time
conspire to forge the very same documents that is the basis of the
sale. Why pay P18.8M and risk losing the said amount on a forged
document?
Nor can it be Robert and Normal (sic) Lastrilla for the same
reason. In fact, these two respondents incurred losses since they have
already paid the consideration of P200,000.00 without having acquired the
property since the description of the property in the Deed of Sale is
erroneous.
The ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of People
vs. Sandangdiego, 81 SCRA 120, cited by the complainant does not apply
to the above-named respondents because it cannot be said that they took
advantage of it and profited thereby since the respondents acquired the
said properties for valuable consideration.[25]

Respondent filed a petition for partial review of the Resolution of the Office of the

City Prosecution of Tacloban with the DOJ, questioning the dismissal of the complaint
against petitioner, his spouse and his siblings. The petition for partial review was

dismissed by then Secretary Hernando B. Perez, holding that:

Suffice it to state that apart from the bare allegations of complainant

that respondents-appellees conspired with
respondents Silvina Granda and Camilo Camenforte in the falsification of
the subject deeds, no evidence has been presented to substantiate the
charge. From the record, it is unclear how respondents-
appellees participated in the falsification of the subject documents. x x x

While respondent-appellee Robert signed as a witness in all of the

three (3) subject documents, the determination of probable cause against
him will not depend alone on a finding of forgery because a careful
scrutiny of the evidence adduced reveals that there are valid and complete
defenses available in his (Robert) favor that would negate any criminal
intent on his part to commit the offense of falsification.
Firstly. It is significant to note that the complainant did not question
the effectiveness and consummation of the sale transactions in questions
(sic) much less did he assail the authority of Aurora to do so. In fact,
complainant himself confirmed the validity of the sale made by Aurora of
her properties by executing the Deed of Assignment dated April 20,
2000 and which deed he signed on February 16, 2000, the day he
received his share from the proceeds thereof as one of the children of the
late Jessie Granda.

Secondly. Neither did complainant allege that the sales transactions

were without or for inadequate, fictitious or simulated consideration. It is
without dispute that respondent-appellee Robert Lastrilla, together with his
brothers and sisters, paid the sum of P18.8 M. By paying such a
substantial sum of P18.8 M, it was unlikely for respondent-appellee Robert
to have intentionally and maliciously participated in the falsification of the
subject documents because it would be adverse to his own interests and
that of his siblings. It would be the height of absurdity that respondent-
appellee would have consented to having falsified documents evidencing
the subject transactions considering that his primary and paramount
concern was to protect his own interests and that of his siblings.
Thirdly. It is worthy to note that complainant was not joined in his
complaint by any of the surviving heirs of Aurora Granda. If, indeed,
complainant and the other heirs of the estate of Aurora were cheated by
respondents-appellees of the properties in question because of the
execution of the subject documents, the least that the other heirs could
have done was to join complainant in the instant complaint. Such failure
lends credence to the claim of respondents-appellees that the sale
transactions in question were regular and that they bought the subject
properties from Aurora in good faith and for a valuable consideration.

Fourth. No right of complainant was violated by the execution of the

subject deeds. The deceased Aurora had the free disposition of the
properties such that whatever means and method adopted by Aurora in
causing the transfer of her properties to the respondents-appellees is
beyond complainant's concern much less did he have any right
whatsoever to question the said disposition. Obviously, complainant could
not allege that he had sustained damage as a result of the sale simply
because no right of his could have been violated. On the contrary,
complainant admittedly benefited from the sale.

Fifth. We find it rather odd for complainant to have initiated the

instant action only after the death of her (sic) grandmother Aurora. It is
noted that as early as October 1999 and February 2000, complainant
admits having learned about the sale of Aurora's properties to other
persons. In fact, as earlier stated, on February 16, 2000 he signed a
document denominated as Deed of Assignment wherein he not only
recognized the validity of the sale by Aurora in favor of the respondents-
appellees of the properties described therein but he also acknowledged
receipt of the amount of P142,857.14 representing his share of the
proceeds of the said sale as heir of the deceased Jesse Granda. These
facts clearly create doubt as to the real motive of the complainant in filing
the instant complaint.
Indeed, the foregoing circumstances clearly establish respondent-
appellee Robert Lastrilla's lack of criminal intent in the falsification of the
subject document. Par. no. 1 of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code in
conjunction with Par. no. 1 of Article 171 of the same Code penalizes a
private individual who forges a signature of another in public
document. However, in the absence of criminal intent, there is no
falsification and the absence of damage negates criminal intent. x x x[26]
Subsequently, respondent filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of

Court with the CA. In its Decision dated July 18, 2003, the CA modified the Resolution

dated May 8, 2002 issued by the Secretary of Justice, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated May 8, 2002 issued by the
Department of Justice is hereby MODIFIED. Finding probable cause
against private respondent Robert Lastrilla, we hereby direct the Office
of the Prosecutor of Tacloban City to issue a recommendation for
the filing of three (3) informations charging Robert Lastrilla of the
crime of Falsification of Public Document under Article 172 (1), in
relation to Article 171 (1), (2) and (5) of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[27] (emphases supplied)

The CA ratiocinated that:

In the case of Robert Lastrilla, there are allegations that: first, he
knew that the three deeds of sale were falsified and, despite such
knowledge, he still signed them as an instrumental witness; second, he
was personally and directly responsible for registering the falsified deeds
with the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City; third, he caused the
cancellation of the Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of
Aurora Granda; finally, he effected the issuance of the new Transfer
Certificates of Title.

The foregoing circumstances convinces us of the presence of

probable cause against private respondent Robert Lastrilla, as the
evidence will show that there is a reasonable ground for presumption that
a falsification exists as would lead the prosecutor to believe that he is
probably guilty of the offense charged and can be held for trial.[28]

Petitioner's partial motion for reconsideration proved futile.[29] Hence, he filed the

instant petition, assigning as lone error that:

 [THE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING PROBABLE
CAUSE AGAINST [PETITIONER] ROBERT A. LASTRILLA FOR
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT UNDER ARTICLE 172 (1), IN
RELATION TO ARTICLE 171 (1), (2), AND (5) OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE.[30]

Articles 172 (1) and 171 (1), (2) and (5) of the Revised Penal Code, state that:
Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified
documents.-- The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000 shall be imposed
upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications

enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document
or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; x x x
Article 171. x x x
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or

proceeding when they did not in fact so participate; x x x

5. Altering true dates; x x x

In the case at bar, there is no question that all the elements of falsification are

present. The issue is whether there is probable cause to engender the belief that

petitioner is one of the authors of the falsification.

Petitioner questions the findings of the CA that: (a) he knew that the three deeds

of absolute sale in question were falsified but still signed the same as an instrumental
witness; and (b) despite such knowledge, he personally and directly caused the

registration of the same with the Register of Deeds of Tacloban, the cancellation of

the TCTs in the name of Aurora and the issuance of the new TCTs in the names of the

respective vendees. He contends that the decision of the CA finding probable cause to

file three (3) informations for Falsification of Public Document under Article 172(1) in

relation to Article 171(1), (2) and (5) of the Revised Penal Code against him is merely

based on the allegations of respondent, unsubstantiated by any evidence on record. [31]

We disagree.

In a preliminary investigation, probable cause for the filing of an information by

the prosecutor has been defined as "the existence of such facts and circumstances as

would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge

of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was

prosecuted."[32] It is well-settled that "a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on

evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was

committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond

reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of

guilt."[33]

From the records, there is no question that petitioner signed as an instrumental

witness to the subject deeds of absolute sale. As such, he attested that

the Granda spouses, as vendors, signed the said deeds in his

presence on December 7, 1985. By petitioner's own admission, however, the

negotiations for the sales only started in 1998, thus, the deeds were admittedly

antedated. The investigating prosecutor, the DOJ and the CA also unanimously found

probable cause to believe that the signatures of the Granda spouses were falsified as

evidenced by: (a) the PNP Crime Laboratory report which concluded that the specimen

signatures of the spouses did not match the signatures affixed in the subject deeds;

and (b) the undisputed fact that vendor-spouse Rafael died in June 1989. The

disputable presumption is that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his

voluntary act and takes ordinary care of his concerns.[34] This presumption assumes
greater significance to the case of petitioner who, as "the one tasked [by his siblings] to

ensure that the signatures on the subject deeds were all authentic and genuine," is

naturally expected to not have voluntarily affixed his signature in the subject deeds

unless he understood the clear significance of his act.

Moreover, there is sufficient evidence to prove that petitioner "was personally

and directly responsible for registering the falsified deeds with the Register of Deeds

of Tacloban City" and that "he caused the cancellation of the Transfer Certificates of

Title in the name of Aurora" and "effected the issuance of the new Transfer Certificates

of Title." The following pieces of evidence support such findings: (a) a copy of Control

No. 183 dated February 28, 2000 and the certification of the Register of Deeds state

that petitioner "presented for registration" the three deeds in question to the Register of

Deeds;[35] and (b) a copy of the entries in the Receiving and Releasing Book of the

Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City and the Certification dated July 4,

2001 of the Register of Deeds show that the deeds in question were released to

petitioner on March 3, 2000.[36] Petitioner's defense that it was actually Aurora who
effected the transfer cannot overcome the presumption in favor of the Register of

Deeds that in issuing the certifications, official duty has been regularly

performed.[37] Notably, other than his bare assertion, petitioner did not present any

other evidence to corroborate his claim, i.e., the testimony of the alleged representative

of Aurora who made him sign the questioned application form. In the absence of

satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document

is the forger of said document.[38] If a person had in his possession a falsified

document and he made use of it, taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the clear

presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.[39]

The presumptions elicited by the evidence on record are not of little

significance. The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the

need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which,

if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail.[40]

Petitioner lays stress on the ruling of the DOJ that "in the absence of criminal

intent, there is no falsification and the absence of damage negates criminal intent."
The following circumstances allegedly show lack of criminal intent on his part, viz: (a)

Respondent did not question the effectiveness and consummation of the sale

transactions in question or assail the authority of Aurora to do so. In fact, complainant

himself confirmed the validity of the sale made by Aurora of her properties by

executing the Deed of Assignment dated April 20, 2000; (b) Petitioner and his siblings

paid the sum of P18,800,000, hence, could not have intentionally and maliciously

participated in the falsification of the subject documents as it would be adverse to their

interests; (c) The other heirs of Aurora did not join respondent in filing the instant

complaint, thus, giving credence to the claim of petitioner that the sale transactions

were regular, done in good faith and for valuable consideration; (d) Respondent had

no right which was violated by the execution of the subject deeds as Aurora had the

free disposition of her properties during her lifetime; and (e) It is rather "odd" for

complainant to have initiated the instant action only after the death of his grandmother

Aurora. Finally, petitioner also invokes the defense of good faith. He contends that

assuming he knew or had a hand in the falsification of the three (3) deeds of absolute
sale and used the same to process the issuance of the new TCTs, said act is not a

punishable act of falsification as the same was authorized by the heirs of Aurora,

including respondent.[41]

The arguments are unmeritorious.

The mentioned circumstances in the ruling of the DOJ which allegedly negate

the existence of criminal intent on the part of petitioner are unavailing. First, the

contention that the validity of the sale transactions was not disputed is contrary to the

allegations of respondent and the evidence on record. In his complaint-affidavit,

respondent alleged that "the purported sale of the subject properties on 07 December

1985 is false and fraudulent."[42] Moreover, the new TCTs issued in the names of the

vendees through the deeds in question have an annotation of respondent's adverse

claim that "the deed[s] of sale are simulated."[43] Second, petitioner's reliance on the

deeds of assignment signed by respondent and his co-heirs to prove the validity of the

sale transactions is shaky. By said deeds, the heirs of Aurora merely acknowledged

that they received certain sums of money from the Uys and that they "assign[ed],
transfer[red] and convey[ed] unto and in favor of" Aurora "all [the] rights, interests, and

participation that [they] have or may have in any and all parcels of land,[44] wherever

located, together with all the improvements thereon, two parcels of land" of which were

particularly described as the ones covered by TCT No. T-816. No reference was made

to the alleged contracts of sale between Aurora and the Uys. Likewise, said deeds

contain a marked contradiction: if indeed, the properties were the "exclusive

and paraphernal properties" of Aurora, why was there a need for her heirs (which

included respondent) to assign their rights to her? Finally, the attribution of ill-motive to

respondent by the fact that the complaint was only filed after Aurora died and that

respondent was not joined in by his co-heirs in filing the complaint are speculative and

are not sufficient to overcome the legal presumptions establishing a prima facie case

for falsification against petitioner.

In any case, even assuming that the payment of the sum of P18,800,000 shows

lack of damage on the part of respondent and his co-heirs, petitioner's conclusion that

there can be no criminal intent in the absence of damage is hasty, to say the
least. Criminal intent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by the overt

acts of a person.[45] We have clarified that the absence of damage does not necessarily

imply that there can be no falsification as it is merely an element to be considered to

determine whether or not there is criminal intent to commit falsification.[46] It is a settled

rule that in the falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there

be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that

in the falsification of a public document, the principal thing punished is the violation of

the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. [47] In

this case, petitioner's voluntary acts of: (a) signing as witness to the three antedated

notarized deeds of absolute sale, attesting that the Granda spouses, as vendors,

signed the same in his presence, when there is probable cause to believe that such

signatures were falsified; and (b) knowingly causing the registration of the three

falsified deeds with the Register of Deeds to effect the cancellation of the old TCTs and

the issuance of the new TCTs in his name and the names of his siblings, evidence

malice and willful transgression of the law.

 We likewise reject petitioner's defense of good faith. As pointed out by

respondent, the contention that even assuming petitioner had a hand in the falsification

and use of the falsified instruments, he is not liable because he was authorized by

Aurora and her heirs, was belatedly raised on appeal. Also, as logically pointed out by

respondent, he is an heir of Aurora and definitely, he did not authorize petitioner to

falsify the subject deeds and use the same to effect the transfer of the TCTs from the

name of Aurora to his name and that of his siblings. Furthermore, the finding that there

is probable cause to believe that the signatures of both Aurora and Rafael were

falsified and the dates of the instruments were antedated lay serious doubt on the

claim that the conveyance was indeed authorized by Aurora herself. To further sow

doubt on the claim of authority, respondent's claim that in 1999, his grandmother

Aurora was already "too sickly and frail to execute said documents," finds support in

the evidence on record. A certain Rebecca Araza, a househelp in the residence of

Aurora, attested that in 1999, she was one of those who took care of Aurora who was

then "very sickly," "could hardly recognize faces, remember names and events and
very rarely talked" and whose "condition worsened starting January 1999." [48] Also

bolstering respondent's claim is the noticeable fact that Aurora signed the GPOA

dated February 14, 1999 in favor of Silvina by affixing her thumbmark instead of her

customary signature.[49]

While it is this Courts general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary

investigations, leaving the investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine

probable cause,[50] we have nonetheless made some exceptions to the general rule,

such as when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority. [51] Although

there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since

the same must be decided inthe light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and

its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge

conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the

judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason.[52] From the records of the case

at bar, it is clear that a prima facie case for falsification exists against petitioner.
 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The July 18, 2003 Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 26273 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.