LABOR CASES

JANUARY 2018-APRIL 2019

Submitted to:
Atty. Jason Balais

Submitted by:
Deolanar C. Jungco
Rommel O. Mondilla Jr.
Niko R. Parrucho
Theresa Marie T. Tajos

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 JANUARY 2018

DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS. v. NEILSON M. AYAPANA, January 10, 2018

Facts: Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. hired respondent as Key Accounts Manager for its telecommunication
products and services. Respondent successfully sold two (2) FEX lines for Atimonan, Quezon, to Estela Lim . 
Respondent, however, did not remit the subject amount to petitioner on the same date. During a meeting respondent
learned, from his immediate superior, that there was no available FEX line in Atimonan, Quezon due to technical
constraints. Respondent replaced Lim’s 2 official receipts with an acknowledgment receipt. The secretary of Lim, went to
petitioner's business office to pay bills and to ask for the refund, but She found that there was no existing application for
the said service under the name of Star Lala Group of Companies. Santiago informed respondent of Cielo's request for
refund on that same day; but it was only on 28 November 2006, or five (5) days from said notice, that respondent was
able to make the refund. Petitioner issued a Notice to Explain to respondent, asking him to explain: why he offered an
inexistent FEX line; why he withdrew the official receipts issued to Lim and replaced them with an acknowledgment and
why he retained the subject amount for 84 days. Respondent submitted a written response. He explained that he was not
aware of the unavailability of the Atimonan line at the time he offered it to Lim. Petitioner issued a Notice of
Dismissal finding respondent guilty of "breach by the employee of the trust and confidence. Aggrieved, respondent filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint, Respondent then appealed to the NLRC. The
NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It ruled that respondent was merely guilty of imprudence
and not of bad faith or malice. The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling with modification that petitioner was further ordered to
pay full back wages inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, 

Issue: Whether respondent was validly dismissed

Ruling: Yes, The validity of a dismissal based on this ground is premised upon the concurrence of these conditions: (1)
the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence; and (2) there must be a willful act that would
justify the loss of trust and confidence.
The first requisite is present. In a number of cases, the SC has held that rank-and-file employees who are routinely
charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or property are classified as occupying positions of trust and
confidence. The second requisite is also present. It must be emphasized that a finding that an employer's trust and
confidence has been breached by the employee must be supported by substantial evidence, or such amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. It must not be based on the
employer's whims or caprices or suspicions; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the
employer.
The following are committed by the respondent based on the record, in order to consider the dismissal valid. First, he
offered an inexistent FEX line to Lim, for which he received a subscription payment of ₱7,000.00. Even granting he did
not know that the Atimonan line was unavailable. Second, respondent readily admits that when he came to know of the
Atimonan line's unavailability, he did not immediately effect a refund nor inform management of his decision to retain the
money supposedly pending Lim's decision to acquire another line. All the above circumstances militated against
respondent's claim of good faith and clearly established an act that justified the Company's loss of trust and confidence in
him. No bad faith or ill will could be imputed to the company in dismissing respondent because the latter was apprised of
the charges against him and was given an opportunity to submit a written explanation, which he complied with. It is clear
that respondent's act constitutes a willful breach of trust and confidence that justified his dismissal.
However, even with a finding that respondent was validly dismissed, separation pay may be granted as a measure of
social justice. Generally, an employee dismissed for any of the just causes under Article 297 is not entitled to separation
pay. By way of exception, the Court has allowed the grant of separation pay based on equity and as a measure of social
justice, as long as the dismissal was for causes other than serious conduct or those manifesting moral depravity.
Here, while it is clear that respondent's act constitutes a willful breach of trust and confidence that justified his dismissal, it
also appears that he was primarily actuated by zealousness in acquiring and retaining subscribers rather than any intent
to misappropriate company funds; as he admitted in his response to the notice to explain that offering an alternative FEX
line to Lim was part of his strategy to ensure her subscription

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ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION v. REYNOLD CALUMPANG, January 17, 2018

Facts: Petitioner Allied Banking Corporation ("Bank") and Race Cleaners, Inc. entered into a Service Agreement .
Respondent Reynold Calumpang was hired as a janitor by RCI and was assigned at the Bank's Tanjay City Branch.
Petitioner, observed that whenever respondent went out on errands, it takes a long time for him to return to the Branch. It
was eventually discovered that during these times, respondent was also plying his pedicab and ferrying passengers.
Petitioner also found out that respondent had been borrowing money from clients. Because of these acts, Mr. Infante
informed respondent that his services would no longer be required at the Branch. Disgruntled, respondent thereafter filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages against petitioner before the NLRC, The Labor Arbiter ruled
in favor of respondent, Considering its finding of the existence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner
and respondent, the Labor Arbiter further ruled that the reason and manner by which respondent was terminated fell short
of the requirements of the law since due process was not observed Aggrieved, petitioner immediately filed a Notice of
Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal with the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter Petitioner
moved for the reconsideration of the NLRC Decision, but was denied. Thus, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA but
was denied. As to the issue of the propriety of respondent's dismissal, the CA affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC that petitioner Bank failed to give respondent ample opportunity to contest the legality of his dismissal since
no notice of termination was given to him.

Issue: Whether respondent was validly dismissed

Ruling: Yes, petitioner's basis for terminating respondent rests on valid and legal grounds. At the very first instance,
petitioner had already stressed in its position paper that respondent was found committing conduct prejudicial to the
interests of the Branch when it was discovered that 1) respondent was plying his pedicab and ferrying passengers during
his work hours and 2) he had been borrowing money from several clients of the Branch. Nowhere in the records was it
shown that respondent denied these imputations against him. Absent any denial on the part of respondent, the Court is
constrained to believe that respondent's silence can be construed as an admission of these accusations against him. The
very nature of the actions imputed against respondent is serious and detrimental to the Bank's operations and reputation.
Thus, petitioner's decision to relieve respondent from his employment is justified. Nevertheless, the SC agree with the
findings of the appellate court that there were procedural lapses in the dismissal of respondent. Respondent's right to
procedural due process was violated. Section 2(d) of Rule I of Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code provides:
SEC. 2. Standards of due process; requirements of notice.––In all cases of termination of employment, the following
standards of due process shall be substantially observed:

For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Code:
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving said employee
reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side.

(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires is given
opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.

(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances,
grounds have been established to justify his termination.

In the present case, it is uncontested that petitioner failed to give respondent ample opportunity to contest the legality of
his dismissal since he was neither given a notice to explain nor a notice of termination. The first and second notice
requirements have not been properly observed; thus, respondent's dismissal, albeit with valid grounds, is tainted with
illegality.

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TEEKAY SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC. v. ROBERTO M. RAMOGA, JR., January 18, 2018

Facts: Respondent entered into a contract of overseas employment with Teekay Shipping Ltd. to work on board the
vessel M/T "SEBAROK SPIRIT" under the following terms and conditions approved by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration. After the mandatory pre-employment medical examination (PEME), [respondent] was
declared fit for sea duty. He joined the vessel on April 9, 2010. Barely six (6) months after, he slipped and twisted his left
ankle while climbing the stairs on board the said vessel. He underwent an x-ray examination at the Bangkok Hospital in
Pattaya City, Chonburi, Thailand. He was diagnosed to be suffering from a non-displaced fracture base of 2nd and mild
displaced fracture base of 3rd metatarsal bone. A surgery was recommended for open reduction and internal fixation of
the injured ankle to prevent its further displacement. Respondent was repatriated to the Philippines on October 4, 2010.
He underwent a rehabilitation program. He was advised to continue using crutches to aid ambulation and was given
medications. On April 8, 2011, Dr. Chuasuan, Jr. issued a certification stating that [respondent] was fit to return to work.
Unsatisfied with the company doctor's assessment, respondent sought the help of his own doctor, Dr. Rogelio P.
Catapang. The said doctor issued a medical report declaring that respondent still continues to have pain and discomfort
on his left foot and ankle even after his continuous physiotherapy. Thus, he was declared to be permanently unfit in any
capacity to resume his sea duties. Consequently, respondent lodged a complaint for permanent total disability benefits,
sickness allowance, medical expenses, damages and attorney's fees in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
Revised Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-going Vessels.

Issue: Whether petitioner is entitled to Permanent Disability benefits

Ruling: No, As laid down by this Court in Elburg Shipmanagement Phils. Inc., et. al., and in Jebsens Maritime, Inc., Sea
Chefs Ltd., and Enrique M Aboitiz v. Florvin G. Rapiz, the following guidelines shall govern the seafarer's claims for
permanent total disability benefits:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a
period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;

2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable
reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;

3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient
justification (e.g. seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis
and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated
physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and

4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the
seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

In this case, there is a sufficient justification for extending the period. In a Report dated January 11, 2011, the company-
designated physician advised respondent to continue his rehabilitation and medications and to come back on February 1,
2011 for his repeat x-ray of the left foot and for re-evaluation. The company-designated physician has determined that
respondent's condition needed further medical treatment and evaluation. Thus, it was premature for the respondent to file
a case for permanent total disability benefits on March 4, 2011 because at that time, respondent is not yet entitled to such
benefits. The company-designated physician has until June 1, 2011 or the 240th day from his repatriation to make a
declaration as to respondent's fitness to work. Neither is the declaration of respondent's own doctor that respondent is
unfit to return to sea duties conclusive as to respondent's condition. It is well-settled that the assessment of the company-
designated physician prevails over that of the seafarer's own doctor. "The assessment of the company-designated
physician is more credible for having been arrived at after months of medical attendance and diagnosis, compared with
the assessment of a private physician done in one day on the basis of an examination or existing medical records." With
the declaration of the company-designated physician that respondent is already fit to return to work, the latter is not
entitled to his permanent total disability benefits.

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WILFREDO P. ASAYAS v. SEA POWER SHIPPING ENTERPRISES, INC., January 24, 2018

Facts: Respondent Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. employed the petitioner as Third Officer on board
the M/TSamaria, a vessel owned by Avin International SA. On October 25, 2009, prior to the expiration of his employment
contract, the shipowner sold the M/T Samaria to the Swiss Singapore Overseas Enterprise, Pte. Ltd. As a consequence of
the sale, he was discharged from the vessel and repatriated to the Philippines under the promise to transfer him to the
M/T Platinum, another vessel of the respondents. After he was not ultimately deployed on the  M/T Platinum, he was
engaged to work as a Second Mate on board the M/T Kriti Akti. Before his deployment on board the M/T Kriti Akti,
however, the shipowner also sold the vessel to the Mideast Shipping and Trading Limited on April 8, 2010. Thereafter, he
was no longer deployed to another vessel to complete his contract. On April 23, 2010, the petitioner complained against
the respondents in the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) demanding the full payment of his
employment contract. His claim was settled through a compromise agreement with quitclaim, pursuant to which he
received separation pay after deducting his cash advances. Two months thereafter, the petitioner filed another complaint
against the respondents for alleged illegal dismissal and non-payment of the unexpired portion of his contract. On
October 29, 2010, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision in NLRC Case No. 04-05764-10 declaring the termination of
the petitioner's employment as illegal. Apprised of the LA's decision upon receipt of the writ of execution, the respondents
appealed the LA' s decision to the NLRC. However, on May 9, 2011, the NLRC dismissed the respondents' appeal. After
the NLRC denied their motion for reconsideration on June 10, 2011, the respondents brought their petition for certiorari in
the CA, submitting that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their appeal and denying their motion
for reconsideration. On November 28, 2011, the CA promulgated the assailed decision granting the respondents' petition
for certiorari

Issue: Whether petitioner was illegally dismissed

Ruling: No, the instant case is sanctioned by the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino
Seafarers onboard Ocean Going Vessels. We quote the provisions thereof pertinent to the case, specifically Sections 23
to wit: SECTION 23. TERMINATION DUE TO VESSEL SALE, LAY-UP OR DISCONTINUANCE OF VOYAGE-Where the vessel is
sold, laid up, or the voyage is discontinued necessitating the termination of employment before the date indicated in the
Contract, the seafarer shall be entitled to earned wages, repatriation at employer's cost and one (1) month basic wage
as termination pay, unless arrangements have been made for the seafarer to join another vessel belonging to the same
principal to complete his contract which case the seafarer shall be entitled to basic wages until the date of joining the
other vessel."

It is worthy to note that private respondent's non-inclusion of employment contract in the case at bar was due to the
sale of M/T SAMARIA to Swiss Singapore Overseas Enterprise, Pte. Ltd. We find that the requirements under the
Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels were
met, to wit: (a) Seafarer's entitlement to earned wages; (b) Seafarer's repatriation at employer's cost; and (c) one (1)
month basic wage as termination pay.

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CHARLIE HUBILLA v. HSY MARKETING LTD., January 10, 2018

Facts: Respondents are engaged in manufacturing and selling goods under the brand Novo Jeans & Shirt & General
Merchandise (Novo Jeans). Several Novo Jeans employees went to RaffyTulfo's radio program to air their grievances
against their employers for alleged labor violations. They were referred to the Department of Labor and Employment
Camanava Regional Office. These employees claimed that they were not allowed to enter the Novo Jeans branches they
were employed in because they were already dismissed .On the other hand, Novo Jeans claimed that these employees
voluntarily severed their employment. They alleged that the employees' notice of withdrawal was not actually granted by
the Department of Labor and Employment but that the employees nonetheless filed their complaints before the Labor
Arbiter. On May 31, 2011, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the complaints. He found they did not present
any other evidence showing that their employment was terminated or that they were prevented from reporting for
work. The Labor Arbiter likewise ruled that the employees voluntarily severed their employment since the airing of their
grievances on RaffyTulfo's radio program was enough reason for them not to report for work, simply because of a
possible disciplinary action by Novo Jeans

Issue: Whether petitioners were illegally dismissed by respondents.

Ruling: No, Petitioners were not dismissed under any of the causes mentioned in Article 282 of the Labor Code. They
were not validly informed of the causes of their dismissal. When the evidence of the employer and the employee are in
equipoise, doubts are resolved in favor of labor. This is in line with the policy of the State to afford greater protection to
labor.

In illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is on the employer to prove that the employee was dismissed for a valid
cause and that the employee was afforded due process prior to the dismissal. Respondents allege that there was no
dismissal since they sent petitioners a First Notice of Termination of Employment, asking them to show cause why they
should not be dismissed for their continued absence from work. However, no evidence has been presented proving that
each and every petitioner received a copy of the First Notice of Termination of Employment. There is likewise no proof
that petitioners abandoned their employment. To constitute abandonment, the employer must prove that "first, the
employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and second,
[that] there must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship
manifested by some overt act."

An employee who is found to have been illegally dismissed is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges. If reinstatement proves to be impossible due to the strained relations between the parties, the illegally
dismissed employee is entitled instead to separation pay.

MAGSAYSAY MITSUI OSK MARINE, INC v. OLIVER G. BUENAVENTURA, January 10, 2018

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Facts: Petitioner Magsaysay Mitsui OSK Marine, Inc. hired respondent Oliver G. Buenaventura (Buenaventura) as an
ordinary seaman on board the vessel Meridian. The contract was for nine months, with a basic monthly salary of $403.00
and subject to the JSU collective bargaining agreement.  On 25 January 2007, Buenaventura met an accident wherein a
mooring winch crushed his right hand. As a result, he suffered a fracture of the right first metacarpal bone and open
fracture of the right second metacarpal bone, which required emergency surgical procedures both done in Japan.On 21
February 2007, Buenaventura was medically repatriated. He was referred to the Maritime Medical Service, the company-
designated clinic, and was attended to by Dr. Stephen Hebron (Dr. Hebron). Dr. Hebron then referred Buenaventura to Dr.
Celso Fernandez (Dr. Fernandez), an orthopedic surgeon. On 3 August 2007, Dr. Hebron declared Beunaventura fit to
work after undergoing conservative management, continuous rehabilitation physiotheraphy, and occupational therapy.
Nevertheless, Buenaventura still felt pain in his hand especially during cold weather. In a medical certificate Dr. Hebron
stated that according to Dr. Fernandez, the MC plates in Buenaventura's right hand might be contributing to the pain.
According to him, the removal of the MC plates would cost around ₱70,000.00, which would not be shouldered by
Magsaysay. This prompted Buenaventura to consult Dr. Rodolfo Rosales (Dr. Rosales) who found him unfit to work and
recommended a ten-week physical therapy. He also consulted Dr. Venancio Garduce, Jr., an orthopedic surgeon, who
diagnosed him with: (a) inability to extend the right hand; (b) weak grip, grasp and pinch; (c) healed flap, dorsum of hand;
(d) deformity of the thumb right hand atrophy; and (e) traumatic arthritis, carpo-metacarpal joints in his right hand. Dr.
Garduce opined that it would be difficult for Buenaventura to continue to work as a seaman.Based on the differing
opinions of his physicians of choice, Buenaventura filed a complaint for disability compensation under the CBA, recovery
of medical expenses; moral, exemplary, and nominal damages; and attorney's fees.

Issue: Whether respondent is entitled to Permanent Disability Benefit

Ruling: No, the mere lapse of the 120-day period does not automatically render the disability of the seafarer permanent
and total. The period may be extended to 240 days should the circumstances justify the same. In this case, the extension
of the initial 120-day period to issue an assessment was justified considering that during the interim, Buenaventura
underwent therapy and rehabilitation and was continuously observed. The company-designated physicians did not sit idly
by and wait for the lapse of the said period. Buenaventura' s further need of treatment necessitated the extension for the
issuance of the medical assessment. It is noteworthy that the seafarer was declared fit to work after six months from the
time he was medically repatriated or within the allowable extended period of 240 days. In summary, if there is a claim for
total and permanent disability benefits by a seafarer, the following rules (rules) shall govern:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading
within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;

2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any
justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;

3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient
justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis
and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated
physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and

4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then
the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

ALFREDO F. LAYA, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS, January 10, 2018

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Facts: On 1 June 2001, petitioner Alfredo F. Laya, Jr. was hired by respondent Philippine Veterans Bank as its Chief
Legal Counsel with a rank of Vice President. On 14 June, 2007, petitioner was informed thru letter by the private
respondent of his retirement effective on 1 July 2007, but petitioner requested for the extension of his tenure for 2 years
despite his retirement. On 26 June 2008, private respondent issued a memorandum directing the petitioner to continue to
discharge his official duties and functions as chief legal counsel pending his request. However on 18 July 2007, petitioner
was informed thru its president Ricardo A. Balbido Jr. that his request for an extension of tenure was denied. On
December 24, 2008, the petitioner filed his complaint for illegal dismissal against PVB and Balbido, Jr. in the NLRC to
protest his unexpected retirement.7

Issue: Whether the petitioner was validly retired by PVB at age 60.

Ruling: No, Art. 287 of the Labor Code provides that any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age
established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract. In the absence of a
retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon
reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory
retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to
retirement pay

Obviously, the mere mention of the retirement plan in the letter of appointment did not sufficiently inform the petitioner of
the contents or details of the retirement program. To construe from the petitioner's acceptance of his appointment that he
had acquiesced to be retired earlier than the compulsory age of 65 years would, therefore, not be warranted. This is
because retirement should be the result of the bilateral act of both the employer and the employee based on their
voluntary agreement that the employee agrees to sever his employment upon reaching a certain age.

Acceptance by the employees of an early retirement age option must be explicit, voluntary, free, and uncompelled. While
an employer may unilaterally retire an employee earlier than the legally permissible ages under the Labor Code, this
prerogative must be exercised pursuant to a mutually instituted early retirement plan.

To stress, company retirement plans must not only comply with the standards set by the prevailing labor laws but must
also be accepted by the employees as commensurate to their faithful services to the employer within the requisite period.
Although the employer could be free to impose a retirement age lower than 65 years for as long its employees consented,
the retirement of the employee whose intent to retire was not clearly established, or whose retirement was involuntary is
to be treated as a discharge. With the petitioner having been thus dismissed pursuant to the retirement provision that he
had not knowingly and voluntarily agreed to, PVB was guilty of illegal dismissal.

AMERICAN POWER CONVERSION CORPORATION v. JAYSON YU LIM, January 11, 2018

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Facts: On July 1, 1998, respondent Jason Yu Lim was hired to serve as the Country Manager of American Power
Conversion Philippine Sales Office. In 2002, American Power Conversion (Phils.) B. V. (APCP BV) was established in the
country and it acquired APCPI and continued the latter's business here. In November, 2004, respondent was promoted as
Regional Manager for APC North A.SEAN, a division of APC ASEAN. In 2005, Truong was replaced by petitioner George
Kong (Kong).During their stint with Kong, respondent and Shao supposedly discovered irregularities committed by Kong.
Upon being apprised of the issues against him, Kong on September 8, 2005 sent three e-mail messages to respondent
and the other six members of the sales and marketing team indicating his displeasure and that he took the matter quite
personally On September 30, 2005, Kong and Hendy met with Shao, where the latter was asked to resign; when he
refused, he was right then and there terminated from employment with immediate effect. The Letter of Termination
handed to him did not specify any reason why he was being fired from work, and was written on the official stationery of
American Power Conversion Singapore Pte, Ltd. (APCS) and signed by its Human Resource Manager, Samantha Phang
(Phang). Thereafter, Kong arrived in the country and met with respondent on October 17, 2005, where he informed the
latter of a supposed company restructuring which rendered his position as Regional Manager for North ASEAN
redundant. On December 8, 2005, respondent's counsel proceeded to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
to verify if petitioners gave the requisite notice of termination due to redundancy. In a Certification,  the DOLE through
National Capital Region Assistant Regional Director Ma. Celeste M. Valderrama confirmed that there was no record on file
- from September l, 2005 up to November 30, 2005 - of a notice of termination filed by any of the petitioners. Respondent
was paid severance pay, but in a written demand, he sought reinstatement, the payment of backwages and
allowances/benefits, and damages for his claimed malicious and illegal termination.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioner on the ground of redundancy is tenable.

Ruling: No, In the present case, it appeared from the records that the redundancy program was not in existence.
Circumstances obtaining therein never point to the fact of a restructuring being carried out by the company. The
respondents dismally failed to convince this Court that the organizational chart and self-serving affidavits presented are
sufficient proof of the existence of redundancy.

The pieces of evidence presented did not justify the reorganization that led to redundant positions  as claimed by the
respondent. Moreover, records also show that the written notice to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), as
required by Article 283 of the Labor Code.

To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, four elements generally need to be considered,
namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4)
the power to control the employee's conduct. These elements or indicators comprise the so-called 'four-fold' test of
employment relationship.

From the above, it would seem that all of the petitioners are for all practical purposes respondent's employers. He was
selected and engaged by APCC. His salaries and benefits were paid by APCP BV. And he is under the supervision and
control of APCS and APC Japan. But of course, there is no such thing in legitimate employment arrangements. This
bizarre labor relation was made possible and necessary only by the petitioners' common objective: to enable APCC to
skirt the law. For all legal purposes, APCC is respondent's employer. Therefore, SC declared the subject redundancy
scheme a sham, the same being an integral part of petitioners' illegitimate scheme to defraud the public - including
respondent - and the State. It is null and void for being contrary to law and public policy as it is in furtherance of an illegal
scheme perpetrated by APCC with the aid of its co-petitioners. Things that are invalid from the beginning are not made
valid by a subsequent act.

PERFECTO M. PASCUA, v. BANK WISE, INC. and PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, January 31, 2018

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Facts: Pascua was employed by Bankwise as its Executive Vice President for Marketing on July 1, 2002. On September
29, 2004, Philippine Veterans Bank and Bankwise entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for the purchase of
Bankwise's entire outstanding capital stock. On January 12, 2005, Philippine Veterans Bank allegedly assumed full control
and management of Bankwise. Philippine Veterans Bank allegedly elected new members of the Board of Directors and
appointed a new set of officers, including the President and Chief Operating Officer. Pascua was reassigned to a Special
Accounts Unit but his duties, functions, and responsibilities were not clearly delineated or defined. On February 3, 2005,
Pascua was informed by Roberto A. Buhain, President of Bankwise, that as part of the merger or trade-off agreement with
Philippine Veterans Bank, he should tender his resignation. Buhain assured Pascua that he would be paid all his money
claims during this transition. Instead of tendering his resignation, Pascua wrote a letter dated February 7, 2005, wherein
he pleaded, among others, that he stay in office until the end of the year. Seeing as Pascua had yet to submit his
resignation, Vicente Campa (Campa), a director of Bankwise, told him that it was imperative that he submit his resignation
and assured his continued service with Philippine Veterans Bank. Based on Campa's assurance, Pascua tendered his
resignation on February 22, 2005. On March 6, 2005, Pascua wrote a letter to Campa reminding him of his money claims
due to his resignation. In a letter dated March 12, 2005, Pascua informed Buhain that per Buhain's suggestion, he asked
Campa to request Bankwise's Board of Directors for the extension of his service until August 30, 2005. Both Philippine
Veterans Bank and Bankwise, however, denied the request. Due to the inaction of Philippine Veterans Bank and
Bankwise, Pascua sent Buhain a letter dated April 13, 2005, demanding the early settlement of his money claims.   The
demand was not heeded. Thus, Pascua filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salary, overtime pay,
holiday pay, premium pay for holiday, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, separation pay, retirement benefits, actual
damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees against Bankwise and Philippine Veterans Bank.

Issue: Whether or not Pascua was constructively dismissed

Ruling: No, Pascua's resignation letter was unconditional. It contained no reservations that it was premised on his
subsequent claim for severance pay and other benefits. His resignation was also accepted by his employers. In this
instance, Pascua is not considered to have been constructively dismissed. Pascua's third letter likewise indicates that he
has already accepted the consequences of his voluntary resignation but that it would be subject to the payment of
severance pay. However, his claim for severance pay cannot be granted. An employee who voluntarily resigns is not
entitled to separation pay unless it was previously stipulated in the employment contract or has become established
company policy or practice.  There is nothing in Pascua's Contract of Employment that states that he would be receiving
any monetary compensation if he resigns. He has also not shown that the payment of separation pay upon resignation is
an established policy or practice of Bankwise since his third letter indicated that he was unaware of any such policy:

ST. PAUL COLLEGE, PASIG v. ANNA LIZA L. MANCOL, January 4, 2018

10
Facts: Respondents Mancol and Valera were both hired as pre-school teachers of petitioner St. Paul College, Pasig.
Mancol, on May 18, 2010, filed a leave of absence for the period May 21 to June 18, 2010 as she was to undergo a
fertility check-up in Canada. When she returned to the Philippines, Mancol received a letter requiring her to explain why
she should not be dismissed for taking a leave of absence without approval. On June 21, 2010, Mancol reported back to
SPCP, but she was allegedly barred by SPCP and Sister Baricaua from teaching in her class, entering her classroom,
being introduced to her students, preparing teaching aids and materials, and going to other offices within the campus.
Thus, Mancol alleged that all these acts constitute constructive dismissal. Valera, on the other hand, took a leave of
absence without pay from April 13 to June 11, 2010 to undergo surgical operation for scoliosis. On June 15, 2010, Valera
received a letter from Sister Baricaua advising her to file a leave of absence (Sick Leave) for the entire school year 2010-
2011; otherwise, she will be reassigned to a higher grade level where the students are more independent learners. The
letter also required her to submit a waiver absolving SPCP from any liability in case of any untoward incident that may
take place while ·in the performance of her teaching duties as well as notarized certification of her physician as to her
fitness to resume work. Valera, thus, averred that she was constructively dismissed when petitioners stripped her of her
teaching load and being forced to take a leave of absence for the school year 2010-2011.The parties having failed to
strike an amicable settlement during the scheduled mandatory conference, respondents filed on June 22, 2010, a
complaint for constructive dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, holiday premium, rest day premium,
service incentive leave, 13th month pay, nightshift differential overload pay, damages and attorney's fees against SPCP
and Sister Baricaua in her personal and official capacity as Directress of SPCP.

Issue: Whether petitioners were constructively dismissed

Ruling: Yes, From the above findings alone, it is clear that petitioners employed means whereby the respondents were
intentionally placed in situations that resulted in their being coerced into severing their ties with the same petitioners, thus,
resulting in constructive dismissal. An employee is considered to be constructively dismissed from service if an act of
clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so unbearable to the employee as to leave him or
her with no option but to forego with his or her continued employment.  In this case, respondents failed to discharge their
burden of proving the existence of the elements of abandonment of work. The records are replete of proof that Valera had
no intention of abandoning her work. On the contrary, she wanted to resume her duties as a teacher. In fact, on 25 May
2010, she went to the school premises to decorate her classroom and insisted on resuming her duties as a teacher when
respondents unjustifiably and in bad faith refused to give her any teaching load. Also, complainant Valera also filed the
instant complaint for constructive dismissal on 22 June 2010, or a week after 15 June 2010 when complainant Valera
reported back to work but was not given any teaching load and no class was assigned to her. 

CAREER PHILIPPINES SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC. v. DONARD P. SILVESTRE, January 08, 2018

11
Facts: On November 2, 2010, petitioners hired Silvestre as an ordinary seaman on board the vessel M/V Gallia Around
3:45 p.m. on May 6,2011, the bosun directed Silvestre to sound the bilge in Hold No. 2 and while he was climbing out of
the cargo hold, he was hit in the head by the closing hatch cover and sustained an avulsed wound on his right forehead.
Blood steadily dripped on his face, and he experienced blurred vision. He was brought to the CMC Medico Hospital in
Pointe Noire, Congo where his wound was treated. He was discharged from the hospital after five (5) days of confinement
and was given medication for pain relief and antibiotics.

Thereafter, he was declared unfit to work and was recommended for repatriation. He arrived in the Philippines on May 19,
2011. Upon arrival, respondent Silvestre immediately sought medical attention at the NGC Clinic and was seen by
company-designated physician Dr. Nicomedes Cruz. He underwent a CT scan. Subsequently, Silvestre was advised to
undergo revision of the scar as the previously sutured wound was not healing as expected. He was admitted at Manila
Doctors Hospital on June 27, 2011, and was discharged on July 1, 2011. Despite the procedures, Silvestre had
complaints of intermittent pain and throbbing headaches. He was advised to continue taking pain relievers, and was
further observed. On September 20, 2011, Silvestre filed a complaint for disability benefits and damages against
petitioners. 

Issue: Whether Silvestre is entitled to Permanent Disability Benefit

Ruling: Yes, from the evidence offered, there was no indication that the company-designated physician declared that
further medical treatment would address Silvestre's temporary total disability. In fact, petitioners were adamant that
Silvestre was cleared from his condition on August 31, 2011. There was no medical report from the company-designated
physician as to the treatment which Silvestre underwent after August 2011. Petitioners cannot invoke the exceptional 240-
day period for medical treatment and assessment for failure to present substantial evidence that the company-designated
physician justified the extension of assessment.

If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable
reason, then the seafarer's disability is considered permanent and total for the purposes of the award. Here, petitioners
failed to establish that the company-designated physician declared Silvestre's fitness to work within 120 days or to
sufficiently justify the application of the 240-day period in the case. The disability is deemed total and permanent due to
the lack of timely medical assessment of Silvestre's fitness for sea service regardless of his own physician's disability
assessment.

12
GENERATO M. HERNANDEZ v. MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION, January 24, 2018

Facts: Petitioner alleges: that he has been under the employment of respondent agency since 1991 and was rehired
consistently by the said agency that on February 28, 2012, he was hired by respondent agency to work on board "MV
Saga Sapphire" as Head Wine Waiter for a period of six (6) examination by the company designated doctors and was
declared "fit for sea duty; that he departed on March 3, 2012, to join his assigned vessel and everything went well without
any trouble until on November 16, 2012 when he had an accident; that he was then lifting a box of wine when the vessel
suddenly rolled causing him to lose his balance; that he fell on the floor with his back hitting the steel pavement; that he
felt a sharp snap on his lower back accompanied by extreme pain radiating down to his lower extremities; that the ship
doctor gave him a pain reliever and recommended his medical repatriation with a view to physiotherapy; that he was
repatriated on December 22, 2012 and upon arrival he reported to respondents' office for post-employment medical
examination; that he was referred to the company-designated physicians at the Manila Doctors Hospital where he
underwent MRI; that the results of the MRI revealed Lumbar Spondylosis, Disc Protrusion, and Disc Bulges; that he
underwent extensive physical therapy from January 8, 2013 until his latest medical evaluation on March 11, 2013 and
considered petitioner for disability assessment of slight rigidity or one third loss of lifting power that petitioner sought
consultation from Dr. Rogelio P. Catapang, Jr., Orthopaedic Surgeon and Traumatology expert.

Issue: Whether Petitioner is entitled to Permanent Disability Benefit

Ruling: No, Based on the Medical Report dated July 13, 2013, it appears that Dr. Catapang conducted his physical
examination of petitioner only once and that he merely made his own interpretation of the MRI results of the Lumbar Spine
taken on January 21, 2013. While he acknowledged that respondents' company-designated physician examined petitioner
and later underwent physiotherapy, he failed to state that reports were regularly issued to update on petitioner's medical
condition as well as the particular treatment administered and medicines prescribed to him, which eventually became the
basis of Dr. Agbayani's Grade 11 disability assessment on March 8, 2013. Dr. Catapang did not conduct any diagnostic
tests or procedures to support his assessment of a permanent total disability. Moreover, petitioner failed to show any bad
faith that attended the company-designated doctor's medical reports, or that the same were self-serving.

Under Section 20(A)(3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, "[if] a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a
third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctors decision shall be final and
binding on both parties." The provision refers to the declaration of fitness to work or the degree of disability.12 It
presupposes that the company-designated physician came up with a valid, final and definite assessment as to the
seafarer's fitness or unfitness to work before the expiration of the 120-day or 240-day period.13 The company can insist
on its disability rating even against a contrary opinion by another doctor, unless the seafarer signifies his intent to submit
the disputed assessment to a third physician.14 The duty to secure the opinion of a third doctor belongs to the employee
asking for disability benefits.[15 He must actively or expressly request for it.

Here, the Court is bound by the Grade 11 disability grading and assessment by the company-designated physician that
was timely rendered within the 120-day period. Petitioner neither questioned such diagnosis in accordance with the
procedure set forth under the POEA-SEC nor contested the company-designated doctor's competence

13
ARMANDO M. TOLENTINO v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., January 24, 2018

Facts: Tolentino was hired by respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) as a flight engineer on 22 October 1971. As a
pilot, Tolentino was a member of the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP), which had a collective
bargaining agreement with PAL. On 5 June 1998, ALPAP members went on strike. On 7 June 1998, the Secretary of
Labor issued an Order requiring all striking officers and members of ALPAP to return to work within 24 hours from receipt
of the Order and requiring PAL management to accept them under the same terms and conditions of employment prior to
the strike. On 8 June 1998, the Secretary of Labor served the Order on the officers of ALPAP. While the union officers
and members had until 9 June 1998 to comply with the directive of the Secretary of Labor, some pilots – including
Tolentino – continued to participate in the strike. On 26 June 1998, when Tolentino and other striking pilots returned to
work, PAL refused to readmit these returning pilots. Thus, they filed a complaint for illegal lockout against PAL. On 20 July
1998, Tolentino reapplied for employment with PAL as a newly hired pilot, and thus voluntarily underwent the six months
probationary period. After less than a year, Tolentino tendered his resignation effective 16 July 1999. Meanwhile, on 1
June 1999, the Secretary of Labor issued a Resolution declaring the strike conducted by ALPAP on 5 June 1998 illegal for
being procedurally infirm and in open defiance of the return-to-work order of 7 June 1998. Members and officers of
ALPAP who participated in the strike in defiance of the 7 June 1998 return-to-work order were declared to have lost their
employment status. This resolution was affirmed by this Court on 10 April 2002.Tolentino worked for a foreign airline, and
thereafter returned to the Philippines. Upon his return, he informed PAL of his intention of collecting his separation and/or
retirement benefits under the CBA. PAL refused to pay Tolentino the separation and/or retirement benefits as stated in the
CBA. Tolentino filed his complaint against PAL for non-payment of holiday pay, rest day pay, separation pay, and
retirement benefits with prayer for the payment of damages and attorney's fees.

Issues: Whether Tolentino’s heirs are entitled to retirement benefits

Ruling: No, An employee who knowingly defies a return-to-work order issued by the Secretary of Labor is deemed to
have committed an illegal act which is a just cause to dismiss the employee under Article 282 of the Labor Code. Thus,
Tolentino, who did not deny his participation in the strike and his failure to promptly comply with the return-to-work order of
the Secretary of Labor, could not claim any retirement benefits because he did not retire – he simply lost his employment
status. Admittedly, Tolentino was hired again by PAL on 20 July 1998. This was after he reapplied with the company. He
also voluntarily completed the probationary period of six months. It was made clear to Tolentino, and he certainly
admitted, that he was rehired on the condition that his employment would be as a new hire. Reemployment, on the
condition that the employee will be treated as a new employee, is a valid exercise of the employer's prerogative, as long
as it is not done with anti-union motivation. The requirements under the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan must be present at
the time the employee resigns or retires from PAL. Unfortunately for Tolentino, when he finally tendered his resignation
with PAL, he was no longer compliant with the requirements for the retirement benefit – as a new hire, he only completed
less than one year of service. Therefore, he is not entitled to any retirement or resignation benefits under the PAL-ALPAP
RetirementPlan.

14
MANILA SHIPMANAGEMENT & MANNING v. RAMON T. ANINANG., January 31, 2018

Facts: The respondent is a Filipino seafarer, who signed a Contract of Employment as Chief Engineer with
HELLESPONT HAMMONIA GMBH & CO. KG (petitioner), through its manning agent in the Philippines, petitioner
MANILA SHIPMANAGEMENT & MANNING, INC. On June 26, 2010, the respondent commenced his duties and departed
the Philippines on board "MT HELLESPONT CREATION." Sometime thereafter, and while still aboard the vessel, the
respondent experienced chest pain and shortness of breath. As found by the CA, the respondent requested for early
repatriation from the master of the vessel, but was refused, and instead, his contract was extended for another month On
February 2, 2011, the respondent arrived back in the Philippines. It is after this point that the versions of facts of the
petitioners and the respondent diverge. According to the petitioners, after the respondent's repatriation, the latter "never
voiced out any health concern nor did he report for a post-employment medical examination. The petitioners further
alleged that they had no contact whatsoever with the respondent until the time that they (petitioners) received the
complaint filed by the respondent on March 6, 2012. The petitioners pointed out that this complaint was initiated more
than one year after the respondent's disembarkation from "MT HELLESPONT CREATION.
On the other hand, the respondent asserted that upon his arrival in the Philippines, he "immediately went to private
respondent MANSHIP (herein petitioner) for post-employment medical examination, but private respondent MANSHIP
failed to refer him to the company-designated physician."  According to the respondent, petitioners' refusal prompted him
to consult with his personal physician, Dr. Achilles C. Esguerra, who later on diagnosed him with congestive heart
failure, and declared him physically unfit for sea service. According to the respondent, less than two weeks after his arrival
in the Philippines, he underwent ECG, ED Echo, and ultrasound procedures in Clinica Caritas. Few days thereafter, he
suddenly collapsed and was rushed to the Medical City where he was confined for three days. By September 29, 2011,
Dr. Esguerra diagnosed him of his illness. On February 2, 2012, he was once more confined, this time in St. Luke's
Medical Center for eight days, and was diagnosed with "dilated cardiomyopathy (non-ischemic) S/P CVD Infarct (2010)
and chronic atrial fibrillation." On the basis of the foregoing, the respondent sought from the petitioners the payment of
disability benefits; medical, surgical, and hospitalization expenses; and sickness allowance. The petitioners denied the
claim.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent complied with the post-employment medical examination by a company-designated
physician within three working days upon his return to the Philippines

Ruling: Yes, there is no denying that petitioner tried to comply with the mandatory 3-day medical examination deadline
provided in Section 20(B), paragraph (3) of the POEA-SEC by going to private respondent MANSHIP's office after his
repatriation on February 2, 2011 and requesting referral to the company-designated physician. However, private
respondent MANSHIP refused to accommodate him and ignored his request.

According to Section 20(A)(3) of the 2010 "Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-board Ocean-going Ships" (POEA Contract), when the seafarer suffers work-related
illness during the term of his contract, the employer shall be liable to pay for: (1) the seafarer's wages; (2) costs of medical
treatment both in a foreign port and in the Philippines until the seafarer is declared fit to work, or the disability rating is
established by the company-designated physician; (3) sickness allowance which shall not exceed 120 days; and (4)
reimbursement of reasonable medicine, traveling, and accommodation expenses.

However, to be qualified for the foregoing monetary benefits, the same section of the POEA Contract requires the
seafarer to submit himself/herself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within
three working days upon his return to the Philippines, except when he is physically incapacitated to do so. The seafarer is
likewise required to report regularly to the company-designated physician during the course of his treatment. In this case,
the respondent did not present himself to the petitioners for medical treatment within three days from his disembarkation

15
MARILYN B. ASENTISTA v. JUPP & COMPANY, INC., January 24, 2018

Facts: Asentista was employed by JUPP as sales secretary. On March 14, 2008, she became a regular employee of the
company as a sales assistant and was later appointed in July 2010 as a sales agent of JUPP for its Northern Mindanao
area. As a sales agent, Asentista became entitled to a sales commission of two percent for every attained monthly quota.
However, despite reaching her monthly quota, JUPP failed to give Asentista her earned sales commission despite
repeated requests. Meanwhile in 2011, JUPP, through its Administrative and Finance Officer Malou Ramiro, issued a new
Toyota Avanza vehicle to Asentista in view of her sales performance in the Cagayan De Oro area. The ownership of the
car, however, remains with the company. Notwithstanding lack of agreement, JUPP deducted car plan participation
payment amounting to P113,000.00 and oneyear rental payment of P68,721.36 from her unpaid sales commission. On
February 4, 2013, Asentista tendered her resignation effective February 28, 2013 and returned the Avanza vehicle to
JUPP through Emmanuel P. Pabon. Thereafter, she filed a claim for unpaid commission and refund for car plan deduction
based on the computation sent by Ascutia.As a result of the respondents' incessant refusal to pay, Asentista filed a
complaint against JUPP and Ascutia before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No. 10, Cagayan de Oro City for non-
payment for sales commission. For their part, the respondents opposed the allegations of Asentista, arguing the burden of
proof to substantiate her claim for unpaid commission and car participation refund rested upon her. Since the employment
agreement signed by Asentista did not include any remuneration for a sales commission and car participation plan, her
claim lacked any legal basis for entitlement Further, Asentista was only allowed to use the Toyota Avanza with car
participation during the amortization period for both her personal and official use due to the generosity of JUPP.On the
other hand, JUPP admitted that despite lack of explicit provision in the employment agreement, Asentista was given
during her employment discretionary sales commission subject to the sole prerogative of the company. JUPP likewise
acknowledged sole discretion to allow Asentista to own the vehicle after the amortization period.

Issue: Whether the monthly instalments should be deducted from Asentista’s salary

Ruling: No, In the absence of specific terms and conditions governing a car plan agreement between the employer and
employee, the former may not retain the installment payments made by the latter on the car plan and treat them as rents
for the use of the service vehicle, in the event that the employee ceases his employment and is unable to complete the
installment payments on the vehicle. The underlying reason is that the service vehicle was precisely used in the former's
business; any personal benefit obtained by the employee from its use is merely incidental. Any benefit or privilege enjoyed
by Asentista from using the service vehicle was merely incidental and insignificant, because for the most part the vehicle
was under the respondents' control and supervision. Given the high monthly quota requirement imposed upon Asentista
to generate sales for the company, the service vehicle given to her was an absolute necessity. In truth, the respondents
were the ones reaping the full benefits of the vehicle assigned to Asentista in the performance of her function.

16
PHILIPPINE GEOTHERMAL, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION v. CHEVRON GEOTHERMAL PHILS. HOLDINGS, INC.,
January 24, 2018

Facts: Petitioner is a legitimate labor organization and the certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of
Chevron Geothermal Phils. Holdings, Inc. On July 31, 2008, the petitioner and respondent formally executed a Collective
Bargaining Agreement which was made effective for the period from November 1, 2007 until October 31, 2012. Under
Article VII, Section 1 thereof, there is a stipulation governing salary increases of the respondent's rank-and-file employees.
On October 6, 2009, a letter dated September 20, 2009 was sent by the petitioner's President to respondent expressing,
on behalf of its members, the concern that the aforesaid CBA provision and implementing rules were not being
implemented properly pursuant to the guidelines and that, if not addressed, might result to a salary distortion among union
members. Respondent responded by letter denying any occurrence of salary distortion among union members and
reiterating its remuneration philosophy of having "similar values for similar jobs", which means that employees in similarly-
valued jobs would have similar salary rates. It explained that to attain such objective, it made annual reviews and
necessary adjustments of the employees' salaries and hiring rates based on the computed values for each job. Finding
the explanation not satisfactory, petitioner, with respondent's approval, referred the subject dispute to the Voluntary
Arbitration of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). It averred that respondent breached their CBA
provision on worker's wage increase because it granted salary increase even to probationary employees in contravention
of the express mandate of that particular CBA article and implementing guidelines that salary increases were to be given
only to regular employees. On the other hand, respondent maintained that it did not commit any violation of that CBA
provision and its implementing guidelines; in fact, it complied therewith. It reasoned that the questioned increases given to
Lanao and Cordovales' salaries were granted, not during their probationary employment, but after they were already
regularized. It further asseverated that there was actually no salary distortion in this case since the disparity or difference
of salaries between Lanao and Cordovales with that of the other company employees were merely a result of their being
hired on different dates, regularization at different occasions, and differences in their hiring rates at the time of their
employment.

Issue: Whether the salary increase of Lanao and Cordovales was violative of the CBA

Ruling: No, the apparent increase in Lanao and Cordovales' salaries as compared to the other company workers who
also have the same salary/pay grade with them should not be interpreted to mean that they were given a premature
increase for November 1, 2008, thus resulting to a wage distortion. The alleged increase in their salaries was not a result
of the erroneous application of Article VII and Annex D of the CBA, rather, it was because when they were hired by
respondent in 2009, when the hiring rates were relatively higher as compared to those of the previous years. Verily, the
setting and implementation of such various engagement rates were purely an exercise of the respondent's business
prerogative in order to attract or lure the best possible applicants in the market. Management prerogative gives an
employer freedom to regulate according to their discretion and best judgment, all aspects of employment including work
assignment, working methods, the processes to be followed, working regulations, transfer of employees, work
supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. This right is tempered only by these
limitations: that it must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of the employees.

17
SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC. v.. HANNIVAL V. RIVERA, January 31, 2018

Facts: The petitioner forged a six-month invoicing services contract with IMSHR Corporate Support, Inc. The parties
agreed that after the contract term expired and they still want to continue their relations but without having to execute a
written renewal, they shall continue to be governed by the same contract in its entirety, except for the term, which should
subsist on a month-to-month basis. In compliance therewith, ICSI assigned its employees, including the respondents, to
the petitioner to perform the invoicing services. Sometime in 2009, however, the petitioner decided to discontinue its
invoicing operations at its JMT/GMA office (head office), where the respondents were assigned, and set up a new one at
its San Fernando, Pampanga, and Nueva Ecija Plants. The petitioner accordingly informed ICSI of this decision and the
latter, in turn, informed its employees, including the respondents, of the said development and that all the affected
employees shall be considered for assignment in San Fernando, Pampanga. Those interested to be transferred were
instructed to submit a Request for Transfer on or before July 13, 2009. Of all the respondents, only one complied with the
said directive while the others submitted their resignation letters, some others continued working and some no longer
reported to work. With the discontinuance of the invoicing operations at the petitioner's head office, the respondents filed
their consolidated Complaints for Constructive Dismissal, Regularization, Underpayment of Salaries and Service Incentive
Leave Pay, Non-Payment of 13th Month Pay, Vacation/Sick Leave, Maternity/Paternity Leave, Refund of Cash Bond, Tax
Refund, Illegal Deduction - Variance Bond, Moral and Exemplary Damages, and Attorney's Fees (Complaints), against the
former before the Labor Arbiter (LA).

Issue: Whether or not there is Constructive Dismissal

Ruling:

No, the invoicing services have never been performed by the petitioner's regular employees, being merely incidental to its
selling activities. While these services, like the invoicing services in this case, may be considered directly related to the
principal business of the employer, nevertheless, they are not necessary in the conduct of the principal business of the
employer. In the case under consideration, respondents applied with and were hired by ICSI, as evidenced by their
individual Personal Information Sheets, employment contracts and Letters of Appointment. Concomitantly, ICSI issued
them their individual identification cards as borne by the records. Even the payment of respondents' wages and other
labor standard benefits were also made by ICSI, as shown by their payrolls and disbursement vouchers. More so, ICSI
itself reported the respondents as its employees with the SSS, Philhealth, PAG-IBIG, and BIR. Also, ICSI was the one that
made the necessary deductions on the respondents' salaries for their contributions (their premium share) thereto, which
were all properly remitted to the said agencies. As to the power of dismissal and to discipline, it was also ICSI that
exercised the same. This is evident from the Notice to Explain and Memorandum it issued to its erring employees who
violated its rules and regulations. Contrary to the claim of the respondents, which the CA affirmed, this Court holds that
the controverted letter dated May 22, 2009 issued by the petitioner to ICSI contained no instruction from the former for the
latter to transfer or even terminate the respondents. It was ICSI's officers who have direct supervision over the
respondents and not petitioner. ICSI's Base Controller and OIC were the ones who gave the respondents their work
schedule and monitored their attendance, respectively.

Not every form of control is indicative of employer-employee relationship. A person who performs work for another and is
subjected to its rules, regulations, and code of ethics does not necessarily become an employee. As long as the level of
control does not interfere with the means and methods of accomplishing the assigned tasks, the rules imposed by the
hiring party on the hired party do not amount to the labor law concept of control that is indicative of employer-employee
relationship.

The Court held that no employer-employee relationship exists between the petitioner and the respondents. It is an error,
therefore, on the part of the CA to order the petitioner to reinstate the respondents and to grant them all the benefits and
privileges of regular employees. Not being petitioner's employees, thus, they cannot attain the regular status. Along side,
the petitioner cannot be charged of constructive illegal dismissal for it is beyond its power to dismiss the respondents as
they were never its employees.

18
LEO V. MAGO v. SUN POWER MANUFACTURING LIMITED , January 24, 2018

Facts: The petitioners are former employees of Jobcrest, On October 10, 2008, Jobcrest and Sunpower entered into a
Service Contract Agreement, in which Jobcrest undertook to provide business process services for Sunpower, Jobcrest
then trained its employees, including the petitioners, for purposes of their engagement in Sunpower.  After the satisfactory
completion of this training, the petitioners were assigned to Sunpower's plant in Laguna Technopark. Leo was tasked as a
Production Operator in the Coinstacking Station on July 25, 2009, while Leilanie was assigned as a Production Operator,
tasked with final visual inspection in the Packaging Station on June 27, 2009. Jobcrest's On-site Supervisor, Allan
Dimayuga (Allan), supervised the petitioners during their assignment with Sunpower. It was alleged that sometime in
October 2011, Sunpower conducted an operational alignment, which affected some of the services supplied by Jobcrest.
Sunpower decided to terminate the Coinstacking/Material Handling segment and the Visual Inspection
segment. Meanwhile, Leo and Leilanie were respectively on paternity and maternity leave because Leilanie was due to
give birth to their common child.When Leo reported for work to formally file his paternity leave, Allan purportedly informed
Leo that his employment was terminated due to his absences. Leo, however, further alleged that he was asked to report
to Jobcrest on December 14, 2011 for his assignment to Sunpower.In their defense, both Jobcrest and Allan denied
terminating Leo's employment from Jobcrest. Leo complied with the directive to go to Jobcrest's office on December 14,
2011. While he was there, Jobcrest's Human Resource Manager, Noel J. Pagtalunan (Noel), served Leo with a "Notice of
Admin Charge/Explanation Slip." The notice stated that Leo violated the Jobcrest policy against falsification or tampering
because he failed to disclose his relationship with Leilanie. Leo denied the charges and explained that he already filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. Leilanie, on the other hand, alleged that when she reported for work at
Jobcrest on November 29, 2011, she was informed by one of the Jobcrest personnel that she will be transferred to
another client company. She was likewise provided a referral slip for a medical examination, pursuant to her new
assignment. Instead of complying with Jobcrest's directives, Leo and Leilanie filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
regularization on December 15, 2011, with the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No. IV. Leo alleged that he was
dismissed on October 30, 2011, while Leilanie alleged that she was dismissed from employment on December 4,
2011. Despite the filing of the complaint, Leilanie returned to Jobcrest on December 16, 2011, where she was served with
a similar "Notice of Admin Charge/Explanation Slip," requiring her to explain why she failed to disclose her co-habitation
status with Leo. During the mandatory conference, Jobcrest clarified that the petitioners were not dismissed from
employment and offered to accept them when they report back to work. The petitioners refused and insisted that they
were regular employees of Sunpower, not Jobcrest.

Issue: Whether petitioners are regular employees of Sunpower, not Jobcrest

Ruling: The petitioners were regular employees of Jobcrest.

The four-fold test is the established standard for determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship:98 (a)
the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the power
of control over the employee's conduct. Of the four elements, the power of control is the most important.

The petitioners themselves admit that they were hired by Jobcrest.In their subsequent engagement to Sunpower, it was
Jobcrest that selected and trained the petitioners. Despite their assignment to Sunpower, Jobcrest paid the petitioners'
wages, including their contributions to the Social Security System (SSS), Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(Philhealth), and Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF, also known as Pag-IBIG). The power to discipline the
petitioners was also retained by Jobcrest, as evidenced by the "Notice of Admin Charge/Explanation Slip" furnished the
petitioners through Jobcrest's Human Resource department. The Court further notes that on December 27, 2010 and
January 25, 2011, Leilanie and Leo were respectively confirmed as regular employees of Jobcrest.104 Jobcrest did not
even deny that the petitioners were their regular employees. Consequently, the petitioners cannot be terminated from
employment without just or authorized cause.

19
 FEBRUARY 2018

AGNES COELI BUGAOISAN v. OWI GROUP MANILA AND MORRIS CORPORATION, February 07, 2018

Facts: OWI offered petitioner full time employment after she underwent a series of three interviews and did a cooking
demonstration. On September 25, 2011, petitioner flew from Manila to Perth, Australia. Upon arrival, she was asked to
sign another offer of full-time employment by Morris. It was indicated in the offer that her position would be of a breakfast
chef. On October 20, 2011, petitioner was transferred to Morris' mining site in Golden Grove, Geraldton, Western
Australia. She still performed the same task only this time she had to prepare a breakfast buffet for Morris' 550 mining
workers. On the evening of November 12, 2011, while preparing the breakfast for the following day, petitioner felt a
tingling sensation followed by numbness on both of her hands. She was referred to Morris' on-site nurse, who gave her
pain reliever. She was diagnosed to be suffering from Carpal Tunnel Syndrome (CTS) and was advised to undergo an
intensive examination for confirmation. Petitioner did not heed the advice of the on-site nurse. Instead, she went back to
her work. In the morning of November 14, 2011, she was distraught when the tingling sensation and numbness on both of
her hands worsened. Consequently, she was again brought to the on-site nurse. Thereafter, she was flown to Perth,
Australia for an extensive medical test.Several physicians, including Morris' preferred physician, conducted a series of
medical examinations on petitioner. She was diagnosed to be suffering from Bilateral CTS and was declared unfit to work
for several days. Dr. Timothy Hewitt strongly advised her to undergo surgery. Petitioner filed a compensation claim with
the Worker's Compensation and Injury Management (WCIM) of Australia to seek compensation for her wages while she
was still unfit for work or reimbursement of her medical expenses. Her application, however, was denied. On December
23, 2011, Morris' representative met with petitioner to inform her that she already exhausted her paid annual leaves.
Nevertheless, they assured her that they would not be terminating her employment. She must, however, be declared fit for
work before they would allow her to report back. Although still employed, petitioner had no other means to support her
daily sustenance and the required medication for her CTS due to the fact that she would not be receiving salary until
declared fit to go back to work. She decided to tender her resignation letter and left for the Philippines. Thus, she was
repatriated and arrived in the Philippines on December 25, 2011. Respondents, commiserating with petitioner's plight,
paid for her transportation and reimbursed her expenses for her excess baggage and meal expenses. Respondents were
later surprised to learn that petitioner filed a labor complaint against them on January 6, 2012. She averred in her Position
Paper that she was illegally dismissed and was not paid her salaries, overtime pay and medical expenses.

Issue: Whether petitioner was illegally dismissed and is entitled to her unpaid salaries for the unexpired portion of the
employment contract.

Ruling: Yes, petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment. It was found that the respondents committed gross
misrepresentation and bad faith in inducing petitioner to work for them. Respondents ordered her to manually prepare a
breakfast buffet for 600 workers all by herself. According to the LA, petitioner's CTS was caused or at least aggravated by
respondents' oppressive acts. Furthermore, the tenor of her resignation letter and the immediate filing of the labor
complaint evinced that she did not voluntarily tender her resignation.

The SC held that CA correctly affirmed the findings of the NLRC in that: (1) petitioner was illegally dismissed; and (2)
petitioner was entitled to her unpaid salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract, damages and
attorney's fees. However, it departed from the issues presented by the parties and decided by the labor tribunals when it
modified the award of unpaid salaries to petitioner notwithstanding the fact that neither party ever raised as an issue the
matter regarding duration of petitioner's employment contract. The labor tribunals ruled that the award of unpaid salaries
should be the amount corresponding to the unexpired portion of the employment contract which is two (2) years. The CA,
on the other hand, modified the award on the ground that the second contract was not clear as to whether or not the
original duration of one (1) year had been extended. Thus, applying the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code regarding
perfection of contracts, it posits that the one (1) year period should be applied.

20
LOURDES SCHOOL QUEZON CITY, INC. vs. LUZ V. GARCIA, February 07, 2018

Facts: Sometime in September 2010, Fr. Cesar Acuin, Rector of LSQC, issued a Memorandum creating two committees
to investigate on the possible irregularities in the purchase of notebooks and the sale of textbooks in the school. In a letter
dated October 1, 2010, Fr. Antonio Ala, Treasurer of LSQC, instructed Garcia to turn-over all the money and other
financial resources of the school. Garcia immediately complied by giving back the passbooks, certificates and receipts of
placements and post-dated checks issued by parents for payment of tuition fees as well as the passbook of Lourdes
Church's placement in a bank. After the physical inventory of notebooks in the stockroom; request of pertinent documents,
records and data; invitation of resource persons (a lawyer and two certified public accountants); and interviews of school
officials and personnel, as well as concerned individuals, the first committee submitted its final report to Fr. Acuin on
October 22, 2010. Garcia was accused of Gross inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of assigned duty,
Habitual neglect of duties prejudicial to employer’s interest, Divulging highly confidential information employer's interest,
and Tampering information. On February 21, 2011, Garcia was placed under a 30-day preventive suspension with
pay. She protested her suspension, treating it as constructive dismissal, at the very least, and demanding her immediate
reinstatement..

Issue: Whether respondent was validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence

Ruling: No, the loss of trust and confidence must be based not on ordinary breach by the employee of the trust reposed
in him by the employer, but, in the language of Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code, on willful breach. A breach is willful if it is
done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly,
thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employers arbitrariness,
whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. It should be
genuine and not simulated; nor should it appear as a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith or a
subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified. There must, therefore, be an actual breach of duty
committed by the employee which must be established by substantial evidence. In this case, the evidence submitted, both
testimonial and documentary, fail to convince that Garcia had malice aforethought at the time the alleged oversupply of
notebooks and theft in the textbook sale were being committed. Thus, when the breach of trust or loss of confidence
alleged is not borne by clearly established facts, as in this case, such dismissal on the cited grounds cannot be allowed.

21
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. v. AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, February 26, 2018

Facts: On 9 December 1997, ALPAP filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a notice of strike alleging that
PAL committed unfair labor practice. On 23 December 1997, the Secretary of DOLE  assumed jurisdiction over the dispute
and thereafter prohibited ALPAP from staging a strike and committing any act that could exacerbate the dispute. Despite
the prohibition by the SOLE, ALPAP staged a strike on 5 June 1998. A return-to-work order was issued by the SOLE on 7
June 1998, but ALPAP defied the same and went on with their strike. Consequently, on 1 June 1999, the SOLE issued a
resolution which declared the illegality of the strike staged by ALPAP and the loss of employment status of the officers
who participated in the strike.

On 22 April 2003, or almost eight (8) months from the finality of the Court's 10 April 2002 Resolution, PAL filed before the
LA a complaint  for damages against ALPAP, as well as some of its officers and members. PAL alleged, among others,
that on 6 June 1998, the second day of the illegal strike conducted by ALPAP, its striking pilots abandoned three (3) PAL
aircraft. Because of the deliberate and malicious abandonment of the said flights, its passengers were stranded, and
rendered PAL liable for violation of its contract of carriage. Thus, PAL was compelled to incur expenses by way of hotel
accommodations, meals for the stranded passengers, airport parking fees, and other operational expenses. PAL further
alleged that its operation was crippled by the illegal strike resulting in several losses from ticket refunds, extraordinary
expenses to cope with the shutdown situation, and lost income from the cancelled domestic and international flights

Issue: Whether the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter have jurisdiction over PAL’s claims

Ruling: Under Article 217, the LA and the NLRC have jurisdiction to resolve cases involving claims for damages arising
from employer-employee relationship.

ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission-- (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the
Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the
following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural:

Unfair labor practice cases;

Termination disputes;
If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of
work and other terms and conditions of employment
Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee relations;
Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code including questions involving the legality of strikes and
lockouts; and
Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising
from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the regular courts do not have jurisdiction over PAL's claim of damages, the same
being intertwined with its labor dispute with the respondents over which the SOLE had assumed jurisdiction. It is
erroneous, therefore, for the CA to even suggest that PAL's complaint should have been ventilated before the trial court.
Since the loss and injury from which PAL seeks compensation have reasonable causal connection with the alleged acts of
unfair labor practice, a claim provided for in Article 217 of the Labor Code, the question of damages becomes a labor
controversy and is therefore an employment relationship dispute.

22
JOSEPHINE A. CASCO v. NLRC, February 19, 2018

Facts: Petitioner Josephine Casco is the Nurse Supervisor of the Operating Room of CAPITOL. She started working for
CAPITOL as a Staff. On 19 June 2006 and 3 July 2006, petitioner received from CAPITOL various equipment such as
vaporizers, patient monitors and Pulse Oximeters for the Operating Room. On 25 January 2008, a representative of Abbot
Laboratories conducted a calibration of the Operating Room's vaporizers.
In the course of the calibration, it was discovered that several hospital equipment in the Operating Room were missing.
Petitioner filed Incident Report dated 31 January 2007 stating that several vaporizers were missing inside the Operating
Complex, including two (2) Mundray Monitors and two (2) Pulse Oximeter. On 7 February 2008, CAPITOL issued a  First
Notice of Investigation stating that a complaint for gross negligence in connection with the loss of hospital equipment has
been filed against the petitioner and requiring her to submit a written explanation on the matter. On 18 December 2008,
CAPITOL issued a Letter of Termination to petitioner. On February 2, 2009, the petitioner filed her complaint for illegal
dismissal and damages against respondents Capitol Medical Center and Thelma N. Clemente in the NLRC.

Issues: Whether the dismissal was valid on the ground of gross and habitual negligence of duty

Ruling: No, Before the petitioner could be held liable for gross and habitual negligence of duty, respondents must clearly
show that part of her duty as a Nurse Supervisor was to be the custodian of hospital equipment and machineries within
her area of responsibility. Yet, there was no evidence submitted that substantially proved that the respondents had
entrusted to her the custody of such property. Even the job description of a Nurse Supervisor  did not include that of being
the custodian of hospital equipment and machines. Even assuming that the petitioner was made the custodian of hospital
property, she could not be found to have been grossly and habitually negligent of her duty.The respondents failed to
establish that the petitioner had wilfully and deliberately intended to be mindless of her responsibilities, or that she had
been reckless as to be blameworthy for her acts or omissions.
She could not be responsible for conducting the annual inventory if there was no standard laid down by the respondents
as the employers. Neither should the blame for failing to secure the equipment fall upon her if access to the operating
room was not under her control, but that of the management to which security of the premises from unauthorized and
undesirable personalities was of utmost importance. Likewise, the responsibility of taking the lead in investigating the loss
could not be expected from her considering that any actions against the supposed perpetrator should be initiated by the
respondents themselves. Under the circumstances, she could not be validly dismissed on the ground of gross negligence.
Neglect of duty, as a ground for dismissal, must be both gross and habitual.27Gross negligence implies a want or
absence of or a failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard
of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one's
duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances.
In termination cases, the burden of proving that the dismissal of the employees was for a valid and authorized cause rests
on the employer, who show by substantial evidence that the termination of the employment of the employee was validly
made; the failure to discharge this duty will mean that the dismissal was not justified and was, therefore, illegal.
Respondent employers did not discharge their burden. Before the petitioner could be held liable for gross and habitual
negligence of duty, respondents must clearly show that part of her duty as a Nurse Supervisor was to be the custodian of
hospital equipment and machineries within her area of responsibility. Yet, there was no evidence submitted that
substantially proved that the respondents had entrusted to her the custody of such property.

23
PHILIPPINE SPAN ASIA CARRIERS CORPORATION v. HEIDI PELAYO, February 28, 2018

Facts: Pelayo was employed by Sulpicio Lines as an accounting clerk at its Davao City branch office. Sulpicio Lines
uncovered several anomalous transactions in its Davao City branch office. Most notably, a check issued to a certain "J.
Josol had been altered from its original amount of P20,804.58 to P820,804.58. The signatories to the check were branch
manager Tirso Tan (Tan) and cashier Fely Sobiaco (Sobiaco). There were also apparent double disbursements. In the
first double disbursement, two (2) checks amounting to P5,312.15 each were issued for a single P5,312.15 transaction
with Davao United Educational Supplies. This transaction was covered by official receipt no. 16527, in the amount of
P5,312.15 and dated January 12, 2008. The first check, Philippine Trust Company check no. 2043921, was issued on
December 15, 2007. This was covered by voucher no. 227275. The second check, PhilTrust Bank check no. 2044116,
was issued on January 19, 2008 and was covered by voucher no. 227909 . There was another double disbursement for a
single transaction. Two (2) checks for P20,804.58 each in favor of Everstrong Enterprises were covered by official receipt
no. 5129, dated January 25, 2008. The first check, PhilTrust Bank check no. 2044156, was dated January 26, 2008 and
covered by voucher no. 228034. The second check, PhilTrust Bank check no. 2044244, was dated February 9, 2008 and
covered by voucher no. 228296. Another apparent anomaly was a discrepancy in the amounts reflected in what should
have been a voucher and a check corresponding to each other and covering the same transaction with ARR Vulcanizing.
Sulpicio Lines' Cebu-based management team went to Davao to. Pelayo was interviewed by members of the
management team as "she was the one who personally prepared the cash vouchers and checks for approval by Tan and
Sobiaco. The management team was unable to complete its investigation by March 5, 2010. Thus, a follow-up
investigation had to be conducted. On March 8, 2010, Pelayo was asked to come to Sulpicio Lines' Cebu main office for
another interview. Sulpicio Lines shouldered all the expenses arising from Pelayo's trip. In the midst of a panel interview,
Pelayo walked out. She later claimed that she was being coerced to admit complicity with Tan and Sobiaco. Pelayo then
returned to Davao City, where she was admitted to a hospital "because of depression and a nervous breakdown."  She
eventually filed for leave of absence and ultimately stopped reporting for work. Following an initial phone call asking her to
return to Cebu, Sulpicio Lines served on Pelayo a memorandum dated March 15, 2010, requiring her to submit a written
explanation concerning "double disbursements, payments of ghost purchases and issuances of checks with amounts
bigger than what were stated in the vouchers." Sulpicio Lines also placed Pelayo on preventive suspension for 30 days.
Sulpicio Lines also sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation, which asked Pelayo to appear before it
on March 19, 2010. Instead of responding to Sulpicio Lines' memorandum or appearing before the National Bureau of
Investigation, Pelayo filed a Complaint against Sulpicio Lines charging it with constructive dismissal.

Issue: Whether or not there was Constructive Dismissal due to the investigation conducted.

Ruling: No, There is no objective proof demonstrating how the interview in Cebu actually proceeded. Other than
respondent's bare allegation, there is nothing to support the claim that her interviewers were hostile, distrusting, and
censorious, or that the interview was a mere pretext to pin her down. Respondent's recollection is riddled with
impressions, unsupported by independently verifiable facts. These impressions are subjective products of nuanced
perception, personal interpretation, and ingrained belief that cannot be appreciated as evidencing "the truth respecting a
matter of fact." Respondent's subsequent hospitalization does not prove harassment or coercion to make an admission
either. The mere fact of its occurrence is not an attestation that respondent's interview proceeded in the manner that she
claimed it did. While it proves that she was stressed, it does not prove that she was stressed specifically because she was
cornered into admitting wrongdoing.

There is constructive dismissal when an employer's act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain becomes so
unbearable on the part of the employee so as to foreclose any choice on his part except to resign from such employment.
It exists where there is involuntary resignation because of the harsh, hostile and unfavorable conditions set by the
employer. We have held that the standard for constructive dismissal is "whether a reasonable person in the employee's
position would have felt compelled to give up his employment under the circumstances."

24
NORMA D. CACHO AND NORTH STAR INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL, INC. vs. VIRGINIA D. BALAGTAS, February 07,
2018

Facts: Petitioner alleged that she was a former employee of respondent TQ3 Travel Solutions/North Star International
Travel, Inc., She also alleged that she was one of the original incorporators-directors of the said corporation and, when it
started its operations in 1990, she was the General Manager and later became the Executive Vice President/Chief
Executive Officer. On March 19, 2004 or after 14 years of service in the said corporation, petitioner was placed under 30
days preventive suspension by the Board of Directors of the respondent Corporation due to her alleged questionable
transactions. On March 20, 2004, she was notified by private respondent Norma Cacho of her suspension and ordered to
explain in writing to the Board of Directors her alleged fraudulent transactions within 5 days from said notice.
On April 5, 2004, while under preventive suspension, petitioner wrote a letter to private respondent Norma Cacho
informing the latter that she was assuming her position as Executive Vice-President/Chief Executive Officer effective on
that date; however, she was prevented from re-assuming her position. Petitioner also wrote a letter dated April 12, 2004 to
the Audit Manager inquiring about the status of the examination of the financial statement of respondent corporation for
the year 2003, which request was, however, ignored. Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint claiming that she was
constructively and illegally dismissed effective on April 12, 2004. Respondents averred that, on March 19, 2004, the
majority of the Board of Directors of respondent corporation decided to suspend petitioner for 30 days due to the
questionable documents and transactions she entered into without authority. Subsequently, the Board of Directors
constituted an investigation committee tasked with the duty to impartially assess the charges against petitioner.
Respondents alleged that petitioner violated her suspension when, on several occasions, she went to the respondent
corporation's office and insisted on working despite respondent Norma Cacho's protestation. Respondents also alleged
that the complaint for constructive dismissal was groundless. They asserted that petitioner was not illegally dismissed but
was merely placed under preventive suspension.

Issue: Whether or not the present case is an intra-corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of the regular courts

Ruling: Yes, the dismissals in these cases were all considered intra-corporate controversies not only because the
complainants were corporate officers, but also, and more importantly, because they were not re-elected to their respective
corporate offices and, thus, terminated from the corporation. "The matter of whom to elect is a prerogative that belongs to
the Board, and involves the exercise of deliberate choice and the faculty of discriminative selection. Generally speaking,
the relationship of a person to a corporation, whether as officer or as agent or employee, is not determined by the nature
of the services performed, but by the incidents of the relationship as they actually exist. The Executive Vice President
position is one of the corporate offices provided in petitioner North Star's By-laws The rule is that corporate officers are
those officers of a corporation who are given that character either by the Corporation Code or by the corporation's by-
laws. From these, it is clear that the termination complained of is intimately and inevitably linked to respondent Balagtas's
role as petitioner North Star's Executive Vice President: first, the alleged misappropriations were committed by respondent
Balagtas in her capacity as vice president, one of the officers responsible for approving the disbursements and signing the
checks. And, second, these alleged misappropriations breached petitioners Cacho's and North Star's trust and confidence
specifically reposed in respondent Balagtas as vice president. That all these incidents are adjuncts of her corporate office
lead the Court to conclude that respondent Balagtas's dismissal is an intra-corporate controversy, not a mere labor
dispute.

25
 MARCH 2018

ROLANDO DE ROCA v. EDUARDO C. DABUYAN, March 5, 2018

Facts: In 2012, private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against "RAF Mansion Hotel Old Management
and New Management and Victoriano Ewayan." Later, private respondents amended the complaint and included
petitioner Rolando De Roca as co-respondent. Summons was sent through registered mail to petitioner but it was
returned. Thereafter, a conference was set but only complainants attended. Thus, another summons was issued and
personally served to petitioner by the bailiff of the NLRC as evidenced by the latter’s return dated 14 March 2012. Despite
service of summons, petitioner did not attend the subsequent hearings prompting the labor arbiter to direct private
respondents to submit their position paper. On 18 April 2012, private respondents submitted their position paper. On the
same day, petitioner filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. He alleged that while he was the
owner of RAF Mansion Hotel building, the same was being leased by Victoriano Ewayan. the owner of Oceanics Travel
and Tour Agency. Petitioner claims that Ewayan was the employer of private respondents, Consequently, he asserted that
there was no employer-employee relationship between him and private respondents and the labor arbiter had no
jurisdiction. On 29 June 2012. the labor arbiter rendered a decision directing petitioner, among others, to pay backwages
and other monetary award to private respondents. In said decision, the labor arbiter also denied the motion to dismiss for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period. Petitioner received a copy of the decision on 3 August 2012. On 4
September 2012, petitioner filed a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction before the
NLRC. However, the petition was dismissed because it was also filed beyond the period allowed by the 2011 NLRC Rules
of Procedure. Petitioner sought reconsideration but the same was also denied. 9

Issue: Whether there is employer-employee relationship between De Roca and the respondents

Ruling: No, It appears on record that petitioner's building was an existing hotel called the "RAF Mansion Hotel", which
Oceanic agreed to continue to operate under the same name. There is no connection between petitioner and Oceanic
other than through the lease agreement executed by them; they are not partners in the operation of RAF Mansion Hotel. It
just so happens that Oceanic decided to continue operating the hotel using the original name – "RAF Mansion Hotel". As
correctly observed by petitioner, such belated attempt to implead him in the labor case must be seen as an afterthought.
Moreover, the fact that respondents recognize petitioner as embodying the "new management" of RAF Mansion Hotel
betrays an admission on their part that he had no hand in the "old management" of the hotel under Ewayan, during which
they were hired and maintained as hotel employees - meaning that petitioner was never considered as Ewayan's partner
and co-employer; respondents merely viewing petitioner as the subsequent manager taking over from Ewayan, which
bolsters petitioner’s allegation that Ewayan had absconded and left respondents without recourse other than to implead
him as the "new management" upon whom the obligation to settle the claims abandoned by Ewayan now fell.

26
MARIA CARMELA P. UMALI v. HOBBYWING SOLUTIONS, INC., March 14, 2018
Facts: The instant case stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Maria Carmela P. Umali against
Hobbywing Solutions, Inc. and its general manager, Pate Tan The petitioner alleged that she started working for the
respondent, an online casino gaming establishment, on June 19, 2012, as a Pitboss Supervisor. Her main duties and
responsibilities involve, among others, supervising online casino dealers as well as the operations of the entire gaming
area or studio of the respondent company. She, however, never signed any employment contract before the
commencement of her service but regularly received her salary every month. Sometime in January 2013, after seven (7)
months since she started working for the respondent, the petitioner was asked to sign two employment contracts. The first
employment contract was for a period of five (5) months, specifically from June 19,2012 to November 19,2012. On the
other hand, the second contract was for a period of three (3) months, running from November 19, 2012 to February 18,
2013. She signed both contracts as directed. On February 18, 2013, however, the petitioner was informed by the
respondent that her employment has already ended and was told to just wait for advice whether she will be rehired or
regularized. She was also required to sign an exit clearance from the company apparently to clear her from
accountabilities. She was no longer allowed to work thereafter. Thus, the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal against
the respondent. For its part, the respondent admitted that it hired the petitioner as Pitboss Supervisor on probationary
basis beginning June 19, 2012 to November 18, 2012. With the conformity of the petitioner, the probationary period was
extended for three (3) months from November 19, 2012 to February 18, 2013. The respondent claimed that the
engagement of the petitioner's service as a probationary employee and the extension of the period of probation were both
covered by separate employment contracts duly signed by the parties. After receiving a commendable rating by the end of
the extended probationary period, the petitioner was advised that the company will be retaining her services as Pitboss
Supervisor. Surprisingly, the petitioner declined the offer for the reason that a fellow employee, her best friend, will not be
retained by the company. Thereafter, on February 18, 2013, she processed her exit clearance to clear herself of any
accountability and for the purpose of processing her remaining claims from the company. As a sign of good will, the
company signed and issued a Waiver of Non Competition Agreement in her favor and a Certificate of Employment,
indicating that she demonstrated a commendable performance during her stint. Thus, the respondent was surprised to
receive the summons pertaining to the complaint for illegal dismissal tiled by the petitioner.

Issue: Whether petitioner was validly dismissed for failure to qualify for regular employment

Ruling: No, it is clear that petitioner has satisfied the requirements for regularization for two reasons: (1) there was no
evaluation upon the expiration of the period of probationary employment; (2) the supposed extension of the probationary
period was made after the lapse of the original period agreed by the parties. Based on the evidence on record, the
respondent only evaluated the performance of the petitioner for the period of June 2012 to November 2013 on February 1,
2013, wherein she garnered a rating of 88.3%, which translates to a satisfactory performance according to company
standards At the time of the evaluation, the original period of probationary employment had already lapsed on November
18, 2012 and the petitioner was allowed to continuously render service without being advised that she failed to qualify for
regular employment. Clearly then, there is no reason to justify the extension since the petitioner had a commendable
rating and, apart from this, there is no more period to be extended since the probationary period had already lapsed.

27
CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS AND ANTONIO STEVEN L. CHAN, PETITIONERS, VS. HEIRS OF ZUELO
APOSTOL March 14, 2018
Facts: The respondent Zuelo Apostol, now deceased and represented herein by his heirs, commenced his 20 years of
employment with petitioner Central Azucarera de Bais (CAB) on March 1, 1982 when he was hired as the latter's Motor
Pool Over-All Repairs Supervisor. According to the petitioners, the respondent, as a supervisor, was in charge of repairing
company vehicles, which necessarily included the responsibilities of (a) assigning the personnel and equipment for each
and every repair job, and (b) taking custody of all repair equipment and materials owned by CAB. Likewise, as a
supervisor, one of the pre-requisites accorded to the respondent was the enjoyment of a company house where the
respondent could live so long as he remains as a CAB employee.

On February 2, 2002, the parties' harmonious working relationship was disturbed when, during the inspection of Tomasito
A. Rosel, one of CAB's security guards, it was discovered that the respondent "was using his company house, as well as
other company equipment to repair privately owned vehicles." This then triggered the CAB management, through its
resident manager, Roberty Y. Dela Rosa, to issue a memorandum addressed to the respondent for violating Rule 9 of
CAB's Rules of Discipline. The memorandum was incorporated with a notice that Zuelo be held on preventive suspension.
Zuelo then wrote a letter of explanation stating his apology that he had violated some rules and denying some of the
allegations subjected to him. On February 9, 2002, the respondent received a copy of the termination letter dated
February 8, 2002, which was signed by CAB's president, herein petitioner Antonio Steven L. Tan.

Thereafter, the respondent vacated the company house assigned to him, and on February 12, 2002, filed a Complaint
before the Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII of Dumaguete City against the petitioners for constructive dismissal,
illegal suspension, unfair labor practice, underpayment of overtime pay, premium pay for holiday, separation pay, holiday
pay, service incentive leave, vacation/sick leave, recovery of actual, moral, and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

Issue: Whether or not Zuelo was illegally dismissed.

Ruling: No. The documents which are admitted by both parties clearly show that CAB complied with the twin
requirements of due process by furnishing the [respondent] two written notices: first, a notice apprising the complainant of
the particular acts for which his dismissal is sought and second, a subsequent notice informing the complainant of the
decision to dismiss him. Likewise, the CA was categorical when it asserted that CAB complied with the twin notice
requirement. It said:

Here, the twin notice requirement was substantially complied with by the petitioners. It is undisputed that Apostol received
two notices. The first notice informed him of his violation and required him to submit his written explanation on the matter.
Thereafter, he received another notice communicating to him that his employment with CAB was being severed by the
company due to his violation of its company's Rules of Discipline.
An employee's right to be heard in termination cases under Article 277(b) [now, Article 292(b)] as implemented by Section
2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code should be interpreted in broad strokes. It is satisfied
not only by a formal face to face confrontation but by any meaningful opportunity to controvert the charges against him
and to submit evidence in support thereof. Having thus ruled on the validity of the dismissal of the respondent, then it
necessarily follows that he is not entitled to both backwages and separation pay

28
LA CONSOLACION COLLEGE OF MANILA, SR. IMELDA A. MORA, OSA, ALBERT D. MANALILI, AND ALICIA
MANABAT, v. VIRGINIA PASCUA, M.D. March 14, 2018

Facts: On January 10, 2000, Pascua's services as school physician were engaged by La Consolacion. She started
working part-time before serving full-time from 2008.

On September 29, 2011, Pascua was handed an Inter-Office Memo from Manalili, La Consolacion's Human Resources
Division Director, inviting her to a meeting concerning her "working condition.”In that meeting, Pascua was handed a
termination of employment letter, explaining the reasons for and the terms of her dismissal, including payment of
separation pay. In the letter it was stated that due to current financial sitauation of the school they were forced to take
such decision to prevent financial losses. Pascua sought clarification of the said decision and opted to file a complaint in
the interim.

On November 28, 2011, Sr. Mora replied to Pascua's letter. She indicated the futility of her response considering that
Pascua had opted to file a complaint in the interim. She nevertheless answered Pascua's queries "as a matter of
courtesy." She explained that Pascua in particular was retrenched because her position, the highest paid in the health
services division, was dispensable.One obvious measure to prevent serious business losses was to downsize the health
services division, by eliminating your position as a full-time physician.
Accordingly, the purpose of the downsizing was to reduce payroll costs, the employees with the highest rates of pay
would be the first to be retrenched, if their services could be dispensed with. For this reason, she was the employee
terminated. This same objective criterion was used in downsizing the nursing faculty which resulted in the retrenchment of
the six highest paid faculty members out of a faculty of eleven.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Virginia Pascua's retrenchment was valid.

Ruling: No. The Labor Code recognizes retrenchment as an authorized cause for terminating employment. 24 It is an
option validly available to an employer to address "losses in the operation of the enterprise, lack of work, or considerable
reduction on the volume of business”
Jurisprudence requires that the necessity of retrenchment to stave off genuine and significant business losses or reverses
be demonstrated by an employer's independently audited financial statements. Documents that have not been the subject
of an independent audit may very well be self-serving. Moreover, it is not enough that it presents its audited financial
statement for the year that retrenchment was undertaken for even as it may be incurring losses for that year, its overall
financial status may already be improving. Thus, it must "also show that its losses increased through a period of time and
that the condition of the company is not likely to improve in the near future.”

La Consolacion's failure was non-compliance with the third substantive requisite of using fair and reasonable criteria that
considered the status and seniority of the retrenched employee.

In Asia World Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, it considered seniority, along with efficiency rating and less-preferred status,
as a crucial facet of a fair and reasonable criterion for effecting retrenchment. In Emcor Inc. v. Sienes, was categorical, a
retrenchment scheme without taking seniority into account rendered the retrenchment invalid”:
Records do not show any criterion adopted or used by petitioner in dismissing respondent. Respondent was terminated
without considering her seniority. Retrenchment scheme without taking seniority into account rendered the retrenchment
invalid. While respondent was the third most senior employee among the 7 employees in petitioner's personnel
department, she was retrenched while her other co-employees junior than her were either retained in the Personnel
Department or were transferred to other positions in the company. There was no showing that respondent was offered to
be transferred to other positions.
La Consolacion's prohibitive financial condition and demonstrated, though imperfect, attempt at devising a reasonable
mechanism for retrenching employees impel this Court to temper its liability for backwages. Accordingly, this Court
upholds Labor Arbiter Roque's order for respondent to be reinstated, but modifies the amount of backwages. Respondent
is deemed to be employed on a part-time basis from the effective date of her wrongful termination and is entitled to
backwages corresponding to such status and period.

29
 ARIEL A. EBUENGA, PETITIONER, VS. SOUTHFIELD AGENCIES, INC., WILHEMSEN SHIP MANAGEMENT
HOLDING LTD., AND CAPT. SONNY VALENCIA March 14, 2018

Facts: Ebuenga was hired by Southfield Agencies, Inc. as a chief cook aboard respondent Wilhemsen Ship Management
Holding Ltd.'s (Wilhemsen) vessel, MTV Super Adventure. Ebuenga boarded the vessel on December 19, 2010.

About two (2) months into his engagement, Ebuenga wrote a letter to Southfield, Wilhemsen, and Captain Sonny Valencia
collectively, asking that he be repatriated as soon as possible "to attend to a family problem."Respondents acted favorably
on this request and Ebuenga was repatriated on March 5, 2011.

Without consulting Southfield's designated physician, Ebuenga had himself checked at St. Luke's Medical Center where
he underwent Magnetic Resonance Imaging. The test revealed that he was afflicted with "Multilevel Disk Dessication,
from C2-C3 to C6-C7.” He was advised to undergo physical therapy.

Ebuenga went back to his hometown in Bogtong, Legaspi City to undergo physical therapy sessions. Thereafter, he
consulted Dr. Misael Jonathan A. Ticman, who issued a Disability Report, finding him to be permanently disabled and no
longer fit to work as a seafarer. Consequently, Ebuenga filed a complaint for permanent disability benefits.

In his Position Paper, Ebuenga disavowed voluntarily seeking repatriation on account of a family concern. He claimed
instead that upon embarkation, a crew member died from overfatigue. He reported this death to the International
Transport Workers' Federation, which took no action. Incensed at Ebuenga's actions, the captain of the vessel, coerced
him to sign a letter seeking immediate repatriation. Ebuenga also claimed to have reported to Capt. Lecias that he was
suffering intense back pain but the latter refused to entertain this because of the animosity between them. He added that
upon repatriation, he sought medical assistance from the company-designated physician, but was refused. Thus, he was
forced to seek treatment on his own.[

In their defense, respondents denied that there was ever an incident where Ebuenga encountered medical problems while
on board the vessel. They added that Ebuenga's claim for disability benefits could not be entertained as he failed to
undergo the requisite post-employment medical examination with the company-designated physician.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Ariel A. Ebuenga is entitled to permanent disability benefits.
Ruling: No. Section 20(B) of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-
SEC)[24] established the procedures for assessing claims for disability benefits. It mandates seafarers to see a company-
designated physician for a post-employment medical examination, which must be done within three (3) working days from
their arrival. Failure to comply shall result in the forfeiture of the right to claim disability benefits. Ebuenga, having failed to
do the same, is disqualified from such benefits.
Petitioner's cause is grossly deficient in several ways. First, he failed to undergo the requisite examination, thereby
creating a situation resulting in the forfeiture of his claims. This alone suffices for the denial of his Petition. Second, he
posited a narrative of indifference and oppression but failed to adduce even the slightest substantiation of it. He asked this
Court to overturn the consistent findings of the three (3) tribunals but offered nothing other than his word as proof. Finally,
he averred a medical condition from which no causal connection can be drawn to his brief engagement as chief cook.
Hence, Ariel Ebuenga is not entitled to such benefits.

30
 APRIL 2018

ANGELITO N. GABRIEL vs PETRON CORPORATION, ALFRED A. TRIO, and FERDINANDO ENRIQUEZ APRIL 11,
2018

Facts: Gabriel was hired by Petron Corporation as Maintenance Technician sometime in May 1987. Owing to his years of
service and continued education, Gabriel rose from the ranks and eventually became a Quality Management Systems
(QMS) Coordinator However, Gabriel did not get any increase in his salary or any additional benefits despite his new
position in the company.

Gabriel lamented that he was unable to reap the benefits of his promotion because of a complaint letter filed by Ms.
Charina Quiwa, goddaughter of Alfred A. Trio, the General Manager of the Refining Division in Limay, Bataan. As a result,
Gabriel was given notice to explain his side, though the notice failed to include the letter of Quiwa. Nevertheless, Gabriel
denied harassing Quiwa and her family, and explained he had already settled the misunderstanding in confidence.

According to his complaint, Gabriel thereafter suffered a series of harassment acts from private respondents as the
company interpreted all his acts as violations of its rules and regulations. Hence, Gabriel claimed that he was
constructively dismissed from Petron.

On their part, Petron's management explained that Gabriel's assignment as QMS Coordinator was not a promotion but
was a result of company reorganization. Meanwhile, his relief as QMS Coordinator and detail to another office were not
intended to harass or punish him, but were primarily to afford him the opportunity to defend himself in the ongoing
investigation.

Eventually, the investigation on Gabriel was concluded sometime in March 2005, and he was formally charged with
dishonesty, misconduct, misbehavior, and violation of "netiquette" policy, wherein he was required to justify why he should
not be terminated. Gabriel complied through a letter dated 30 March 2005, wherein he stressed that he had been placed
in an unbearable and humiliating situation.
After the hearing committee was convened, Gabriel failed to show up at work so he was given another notice of violation
for absence without official leave. In his explanation, Gabriel said that he was merely following the advice of his
psychiatrist and that he had no work to report back to given that he had been placed under floating status since the
beginning of the investigation.d their respective position papers, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Gabriel
which was later on reversed by NLRC and that it was affirmed by the CA. Upon appeal, Gabriel filed his motion for
reconsideration with prayer to admit the attached petition for certiorari claiming that the factual circumstances of his case
are exceptional and merit a relaxation of the rules of procedure.After considering the submissions of both parties, the CA
maintained that Gabriel's motion failed to present any substantial and meritorious ground which would justify a reversal of
its earlier ruling. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not CA committed a serious error in denying Gabriel’s motion for extension out of sheer technicality
Ruling: No. Under our present labor laws, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the NLRC. In fact, under
1âwphi1

Article 229 of the Labor Code, all decisions of the NLRC shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from
receipt thereof by the parties. Nevertheless, appellate courts - including this Court - still have an underlying power to
scrutinize decisions of the NLRC on questions of law even though the law gives no explicit right to appeal. Simply said,
even if there is no direct appeal from the NLRC decision, the aggrieved party still has a legal remedy. In the motion for
extension to file a petition for certiorari, it was stated that Gabriel had since been working and living in Australia for a few
years subsequent to his separation from Petron. The week before the 60-day deadline for filing, Gabriel's counsel had
already emailed a copy of the petition. Gabriel explained in his motion that he needed more time to secure an
appointment with the Philippine Consular Office in Melbourne, Australia.

Unlike those mentioned exceptions when the period to file a petition for certiorari was not strictly applied, we do not find
Gabriel's reason to meet the deadline compelling. In the first place, his counsel, who is supposed to be well-versed in our
rules of procedure, should have anticipated that Gabriel needed to take his oath before the Philippine Consular Office. By
giving Gabriel only one (1) week to comply with this requirement, his lawyer did not give him much time and simply
assumed that Gabriel could deliver on time. On the other hand, Gabriel, assuming he really wanted to pursue his case
against Petron, could have easily visited the Philippine Consular Office as soon as possible. Instead, he opted to wait for
a few days thinking that time was not of the essence.We must remember that the rationale for the amendments under
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case
or even defeat the ends of justice.

31
RAYMOND A. SON, RAYMOND S. ANTIOLA, and WILFREDO E. POLLARCO vs UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS,
FR. ROLANDO DELA ROSA, DR. CLARITA CARILLO, DR. CYTHIA LOZA, FR. EDGARDO ALAURIN, and the
COLLEGE OF FINE ARTS AND DESIGN FACULTY COUNCIL APRIL 18, 2018

Facts: Petitioners Raymond A. Son (Son), Raymond S. Antiola (Antiola), and Wilfredo E. Pollarco (Pollarco) are full time
professors of the UST Colleges of Fine Arts and Design and Philosophy, and are members of the UST Faculty Union, with
which UST at the time had a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Son and Antiola were hired in June, 2005, while Pollarco was employed earlier, or in June, 2004. Under their respective
appointment papers, petitioners were designated as "faculty member[s] on PROBATIONARY status," whose "accession
to tenure status is conditioned by [sic] your meeting all the requirements provided under existing University rules and
regulations and other applicable laws including, among others, possession of the (prerequisite] graduate degree before
the expiration of the probationary period and by your satisfactory performance of the duties and responsibilities set forth in
the job description.

The CBA provision relative to the requirement of a Master's degree in the faculty member's field of instruction is in line
with the requirement laid down in the 1992 Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.
Petitioners did not possess the required Master's degree, but were nonetheless hired by UST on the condition that they
fulfill the requirement within the prescribed period. Petitioners enrolled in the Master's program, but were unable to finish
the same. In spite of their failure to obtain the required Master's degree, they continued to teach even beyond the period
given for completion thereof.

On March 3, 2010, then CHED Chairman Emmanuel Angeles issued a Memorandum addressed to the Presidents of
public and private higher education institutions, directing the strict implementation of the minimum qualification for faculty
members of undergraduate programs, particularly the Master's degree and licensure requirements, as mandated by
Memorandum Order No. 40-08, "to ensure the highest qualification of their faculty."
Acting on the March 3, 2010 Memorandum, UST wrote the petitioners and other affected faculty members, informing them
of the university's decision to cease re-appointment of those who failed to complete their Master's degrees, but allow a
written appeal from the concerned faculty members who are due for thesis defense/completion of their Master's degrees. 12
Petitioners did not make a written appeal, operating under the belief that they have been vested tenure under the CBA for
their continued employment despite failure to obtain the required Master's degree.

On June 11, 2010, petitioners received termination/thank you letters 14 signed by respondent Dr. Cynthia Loza, Dean of the
College of Fine Arts and Design. The reason given for non-renewal of their appointments is their failure to obtain the
required Master's degree.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were illegally dismissed.

Ruling: No. As early as in 1992, the requirement of a Master's degree in the undergraduate program professor's field of
instruction has been in place, through DECS Order 92 (series of 1992, August 10, 1992) or the Revised Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools. Article IX, Section 44, paragraph 1 (a) thereof provides that college faculty members
must have a master's degree in their field of instruction as a minimum qualification for teaching in a private educational
institution and acquiring regular status therein.
DECS Order 92, Series of 1992 was promulgated by the DECS in the exercise of its rule-making power as provided for
under Section 70 of Batas PambansaBlg. 232, otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982. 29 As such, it has the force
and effect of law.30 In University of the East v. Pepanio,31 the requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education
teachers was held to be not unreasonable but rather in accord with the public interest.
Thus, when the CBA was executed between the parties in 2006, they had no right to include therein the provision relative
to the acquisition of tenure by default, because it is contrary to, and thus violative of the 1992 Revised Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools that was in effect at the time. As such, said CBA provision is null and void, and can have
no effect as between the parties. "A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and it does not
create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation."

32
ALFREDO MALLARI MAGAT vs INTER ORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., INTER ORIENT MARITIME
ENTERPRISE LIBERIA FOR DROMON E.N.E. and JASMIN P. ARBOLEDA APRIL 4, 2018

Facts:Petitioner has started work with respondent Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. \as an Able Seaman on board
different vessels since March 2007. Sometime in May 2011, respondent company once again employed the services of
petitioner on board the vessel MT North Star for a period of nine (9) months. Petitioner underwent a Pre-Employment
Medical Examination (PEME) as a requisite for his latest employment and was certified "fit to work," thus, he was
deployed on July 1, 2011.
Part of petitioner's job assignment was to paint the ship's pump room and due to the poor ventilation in the said room,
petitioner claimed that he was able to inhale residues and vapors coming from the paint and thinner that he used. As
such, petitioner suffered shortness of breath and a chest pain which he claimed to have reported to the Chief Mate but
was told by the latter to just rest. When his condition improved, petitioner continued to perform his duties until he was able
to complete his contract on July 6, 2012.
Upon his repatriation, petitioner reported immediately to respondent company and asked for a referral to the company
physician for a medical examination of his heart condition but the latter ignored petitioner's request.

Petitioner was then asked to execute an Offsigner's Data Slip on July 9, 2012 indicating therein that he did not experience
any illness or injury during his employment on board the vessel, and manifested his willingness to join the vessel again
after three (3) months.The result of petitioner's tests revealed that he had the "Hypertension controlled with ·maintenance
medication; Dilated Cardiomyopathy; R/out ischemic etiology; Renal parenchymal calcification bilateral; Suggest
coronaryangiogram." Petitioner was not deployed due to the said findings.
Thereafter, on March 1, 2013, petitioner again consulted Dr. Casison in order to find out the real status of his medical
condition. The findings of the doctor considered him disabled for work .

Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for payment of permanent disability benefits and other money claims against respondent
company on September 25, 2013 claiming that as certified by his own physician, he developed a cardiovascular disease,
which is listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-
Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). Petitioner claimed that his illness was brought about by his poor diet,
exposure to harmful chemicals and stressful work environment on board the vessel.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.
Ruling: Yes. It is well-settled that in order for disability to be compensable under the POEA-SEC, two elements must
concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during
the term of the seafarer's employment contract.
As for the first element, we find substantial basis to conclude that complainant's heart disease is work-related.
Complainant's case falls under Section 32-A, 11(c) of the 2010 POEA-SEC which states:
If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of
cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim causal
relationship.
In the absence of any supporting evidence for both parties, we resolve to give more credence to complainant's positive
assertion that he suffered shortness of breath and chest pains following his work painting the ship's pump room. To note,
respondents have not refuted having assigned to complainant such task. Adding in complainant's poor diet, advanced age
(he was 52 at the time of the filing of the complaint), the stressful nature of his employment, and repeated hiring of his
services by respondents, we find it reasonable to conclude that complainant's work as Able Seaman caused or
contributed even to a small degree to the development or aggravation of complainant's heart disease.
As for the second element, we note that complainant was repatriated in July 2012. Only about four months thereafter, he
was discovered to have heart disease in November 2012. Simply, complainant's heart disease could not have developed
during that short period between his repatriation and medical examination. Complainant acquired or developed his illness
during the term of his contract.

33
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST and DR. ESTER GARCIA, vs VERONICA M. MASANGKAY and GERTRUDO R.
REGONDOLA APRIL 25, 2018

Facts: Respondents Veronica M. Masangkay (Masangkay) and Gertrudo R. Regondola (Regondola) were regular faculty
members, Associate Professors, and Associate Deans of petitioner University of the East (UE) - Caloocan Campus, prior
to their dismissal on November 26, 2007.
While holding said positions at UE, respondents submitted three (3) manuals, namely: Mechanics, Statics, and Dynamics,
requesting said manuals' temporary adoption as instructional materials. Respondents represented themselves to be the
rightful authors thereof, together with their co-author, a certain Adelia F. Rocamora (Rocamora). Accompanying said
requests are certifications under oath, signed by respondents, declaring under pain of perjury, and openly certifying that
the manuals are entirely original and free from plagiarism.
After review, UE approved the requests for use of said manuals by students of the College of Engineering.
Thereafter, petitioners received two (2) complaint-letters via electronic mail (e-mail) from a certain Harry H. Chenoweth
and Lucy Singer Block. Chenoweth arid Block's father are authors, respectively, of three books, namely: Applied
Engineering Mechanics, Engineering Mechanics, 2nd Edition, 1954, and Engineering Mechanics: Statics & Dynamics, 3rd
Edition, 1975. They categorically denied giving respondents permission to copy, reproduce, imitate, or alter said books,
and asked for assistance from UE to stop the alleged unlawful acts and deal with this academic dishonesty.
Prompted by the seriousness of the allegations, UE investigated the matter. After a thorough evaluation of the alleged
plagiarized portions, petitioner conducted an investigation in which respondents actively participated and filed their
Answer. Eventually, UE's Board of Trustees issued Resolution No. 2007-11-84 dismissing respondents. Notices of
Dismissal effective November 26, 2007 were sent to respondents and Rocamora via registered mail.
Unlike herein respondents, Rocamora sought reconsideration of the decision to the Board of Trustees. Respondents,
however, did not appeal the decision terminating them and instead opted to claim their benefits due them, which consisted
of leave credits, sick leave, holiday pay, bonuses, shares in tuition fee increase, COLA, and RAT A. For her part,
respondent Masangkay requested that a portion of her benefits be applied to her existing car loan. For the amounts that
they received, they signed vouchers and pay slips. These were duly acted upon by UE.

Issue: Whether or not plagiarism, a form of academic dishonesty, is a serious misconduct that justly warrants herein
respondents' dismissal.

Ruling: Yes. The Court finds that there is sufficient basis for dismissing respondents from service, considering the highest
integrity and morality which the profession requires from its teachers. Respondents plagiarized the works of Chenoweth
and Singer by lifting large portions of the text of the works of said writers without properly attributing the copied text, and,
to make matters worse, they represented under oath that no portion of the Manuals were plagiarized when, in truth and in
fact, huge portions thereof were improperly lifted from other materials.
In the case at bar, the court finds no reason to rule that respondents did not waive their right to contest UE's
decision.Based on their actuations subsequent to their termination, it is clear that they were amenable to UE's decision of
terminating their services on the ground of academic dishonesty. Nowhere that the court can find any indication of
unwillingness or lack of cooperation on respondents' part with regard to the events that transpired so as to convince the
court that they were indeed constrained to forego their right to question the management's decision. Neither do we find
any sign of coercion nor intimidation, subtle or otherwise, which could have forced them to simp1y accept said decision. In
fact, based on their qualifications, this Court cannot say that respondents and UE do not stand on equal footing so as to
force respondents to simply yield to UE's decision. Furthermore, there is no showing that respondents did not receive or
received less than what is legally due them in said termination.
In sum, the court is in the view that their acceptance of UE's decision is voluntary and with full understanding thereof,
tantamount to a waiver of their right to question the management's decision to terminate their services for academic
dishonesty. It is as though they have waived any and all claims against UE when they knowingly and willingly acquiesced
to their dismissal and opted to receive the benefits due them instead.

34
LOADSTAR INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC. vs ERNESTO AWITEN YAMSON, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS
GEORGIA M. YAMSON AND THEIR CHILDREN, NAMELY: JENNIE ANN MEDINA YAMSON, KIMBERLY SHEEN
MEDINA YAMSON, JOSHUA MEDINA YAMSON and ANGEL LOUISE MEDINA YAMSON APRIL 23, 2018

Facts: Herein petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the shipping business. On May 7, 2012, petitioner
employed the services of herein respondent Ernesto Yamson (Ernesto) as Third Mate aboard the vessel "M/V Foxhound"
for a period of twelve (12) months. On May 9, 2012 Ernesto commenced his employment on board "M/V Foxhound". His
contract was subsequently extended.

On November 15, 2013, the vessel anchored at Paia Inlet, Papua New Guinea and started to load logs. On November 19,
2013, Ernesto, while performing his regular tasks on an extremely hot day, felt dizzy. In the evening of the same day,
Ernesto started to feel the left side of his body getting numb. Around 9 o'clock of the following morning, Ernesto already
felt very weak while performing his duties. He requested that his blood pressure be checked and that his condition be
reported to the ship captain. Thereafter, he was ordered to rest in his cabin. However, his condition deteriorated as he
could no longer move the left side of his body in the evening of the same day. His predicament worsened when he
suffered from LBM the next day forcing him to request that he be brought to the hospital. Ernesto was, thus, brought to the
Pacific International Hospital in Papua New Guinea where he was confined and was diagnosed to have suffered from
cerebrovascular disease: "left cerebellar infarct" and hypertension, Stage 2.

The attending physician ordered him to cease from working for a period of two (2) weeks. Subsequently, on December 1,
2013, Ernesto was repatriated to the Philippines. Upon arrival in Manila, he was immediately brought to the Philippine
General Hospital where he underwent medical check-up. Finding that he was in a stable condition, the examining doctor
sent him home as he was classified as an "out-patient." However, Ernesto continued to experience headache and
numbness of the entire left side of his body even after arriving home. This prompted his wife to insist that he be admitted
in a private hospital. Thus, on December 4, 2013, Ernesto was admitted at the Manila Doctor's Hospital.
On December 13, 2013, Ernesto was discharged from the hospital. Subsequently, he consulted another physician who
diagnosed him to be suffering from Hypertensive Atherosclerotic Cardiovascular Disease and Cerebrovascular Disease
and was advised to cease from working as a seaman due to his neurologic deficits.

On the basis of the findings of his own doctor, Ernesto, on March 14, 2014, filed the above-mentioned complaint praying
that he be awarded the following: US$60,000.00 as total and permanent disability benefits.

Issue: Whether or nor Ernesto is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.

Ruling: No. For disability to be compensable under the above POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or
illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's
employment contract. To be entitled to compensation and benefits under the governing POEA-SEC, it is not sufficient to
establish that the seafarer's illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled; it must also be shown that
there is a causal connection between the seafarer's illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted.
In other words, while the law recognizes that an illness may be disputably presumed to be work-related, prevailing
jurisprudence requires that the seafarer or the claimant must still show a reasonable connection between the nature of
work on board the vessel and the illness contracted or aggravated. Thus, the burden is placed upon the claimant to
present substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease.

In this case, however, Ernesto was unable to present substantial evidence to show that his work conditions caused, or at
the least increased the risk of contracting his illness. Neither was he able to prove that his illness was pre-existing and
that it was aggravated by the nature of his employment.

RENANTE B. REMOTICADO, PETITIONER, VS. TYPICAL CONSTRUCTION TRADING CORP. AND ROMMEL M.
ALIGNAY April 23, 2018

35
Facts: Remoticado’s services were engaged by Typical Construction Trading Corporation as a helper/laborer in its
construction projects, the most recent being identified as the Jedic Project at First Industrial Park in Batangas.

In separate sworn statements, Pedro Nielo , Typical Construction's Field Human Resources Officer, and two (2) of
Remoticado's co-workers, Salmero Pedros and Jovito Credo, recalled that on December 6, 2010, Remoticado was absent
without an official leave. He remained absent until December 20, 2010 when, upon showing up, he informed Nielo that he
was resigning. Prodded by Nielo for his reason, Remoticado noted that they were "personal reasons considering that he
got sick." Nielo advised Remoticado to return the following day as he still had to report Remoticado's resignation to
Typical Construction's main office, and as his final pay had yet to be computed.

Remoticado returned the following day and was handed P5,082.53 as his final pay. He protested, saying that he was
entitled to "separation pay computed at two (2) months for his services for two (2) years."In response, Nielo explained that
Remoticado could not be entitled to separation pay considering that he voluntarily resigned. Nielo added that if
Remoticado was not satisfied with P5,082.53, he was free to continue working for Typical Construction. However,
Remoticado was resolute and proceeded to sign and affix his thumb marks on a Kasulatan ng Pagbawi ng Karapatan at
Kawalan ng Paghahabol, a waiver and quitclaim.

On January 10, 2011, Remoticado filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Typical Construction and its owner and
operator, Rommel M. Alignay (Alignay). He claimed that on December 23, 2010, he was told to stop reporting for work
due to a "debt at the canteen” and thereafter was prevented from entering Typical
Construction's premises.[15]

Issue: Whether or not Remoticado was illegally dismissed.

Ruling: No. It is true that in illegal termination cases, the burden is upon the employer to prove that termination of
employment was for a just cause. Logic dictates, however, that the complaining employee must first establish by
substantial evidence the fact of termination by the employer. If there is no proof of termination by the employer, there is no
point in even considering the cause for it. There can be no illegal termination when there was no termination:Before the
employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial
evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. If there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to the legality or
illegality thereof.
Petitioner here insists on his version of events, that is, that on December 23, 2010, he was told to stop reporting for work
on account of his supposed indebtedness at the canteen. This bare insistence, however, is all that petitioner has. He
failed to present convincing evidence. Even his basic narrative is bereft of supporting details that could be taken as
badges of veracity. As the Court of Appeals underscored, ]Petitioner only made a general statement that he was illegally
dismissed. He did not state how he was terminated [or] mentioned who prevented him from reporting for work.

Hence, there is no illegal dismissal.

SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and CROWN SHIPMANAGEMENT vs CELESTINO M. HERNANDEZ, JR.
APRIL 16, 2018

36
Facts: On July 2, 2009, petitioner Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., for and in behalf of its foreign principal, petitioner
Crown Shipmanagement, Inc., entered into a Contract of Employment with respondent for a period of nine months as Able
Seaman for the vessel Timberland. Respondent underwent the pre-employment medical examination (PEME), where he
was declared fit for work. He was deployed on August 3, 2009 and boarded the vessel the next day.
During the course of his employment, respondent experienced pain in his inguinal area and pelvic bone. The pain
continued for weeks radiating to his right scrotum and right medial thigh. He informed the Captain of the vessel and was
brought to a hospital in Sweden on February 3, 2010 where he was found unfit to resume normal duties. Consequently,
respondent was medically repatriated to the Philippines on February 6, 2010. 8
On February 8, 2010, respondent was referred to the companydesignated physician at Metropolitan Medical Center for
medical evaluation. On March 26, 2010, the company-designated Urological Surgeon, Dr. Gatchalian performed
Varicocoelectomy on him. The procedure was a success and respondent was immediately discharged the following day.
Thereafter, he continuously reported to Dr. Gatchalian for medical treatment and evaluation.

Despite continuing medical treatment and evaluation with the company-designated physician, respondent filed on July 20,
2010 a complaint with the NLRC for permanent disability benefits, damages, and attorney's fees against petitioners. On
August 12, 2010, respondent consulted his own physician, Dr. Antonio C. Pascual (Dr. Pascual), a Cardiologist, who
diagnosed him with Essential Hypertension, Stage 2, Epididymitis, right, Varicocoele, left, S/P Varicocoelectomy and
certified him medically unfit to work as a seaman.
Meanwhile, on August 24, 2010, Dr. Gatchalian pronounced respondent fit to resume sea duties.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.

Ruling: No. In this case, respondent filed his complaint for total and permanent disability benefits while he was still
considered to be temporarily and totally disabled; while the company-designated physician was still in the process of
assessing his condition and determining whether he was still capable of performing his usual sea duties; and when the
240-day period had not yet lapsed. From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's complaint was prematurely filed. His
cause of action for total and permanent disability benefits had not yet accrued.

MARSMAN & COMPANY, INC. vs RODIL C. STA. RITA APRIL 23, 2018

37
Facts: Marsman hired Sta. Rita as a warehouseman when it was still engaged in the business of distribution and sale of
pharmaceutical and consumer products. Marsman paid Sta. Rita's wages and controlled his warehouse assignments, acts
which can only be attributed to a bona fide employer. Marsman thereafter purchased Metro Drug, now CPDSI, which at
that time, was engaged in a similar business. Marsman then entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with MEU, its
bargaining representative, integrating its employees with CPDSI and transferring its employees, their respective
employment contracts and the attendant employment obligation to CPDSI. The planned integration was then carried out
sometime in 1996, as admitted by Sta. Rita in his pleading. CPDSI rationalised that they could no longer accommodate
Sta. Rita to another work or position. CPDSI however guaranteed Sta. Rita's separation pay and other employment
benefits.

Aggrieved, Sta. Rita filed a complaint in the NLRC, National Capital Region-Quezon City against Marsman on January 25,
2000 for illegal dismissal with damages in the form of moral, exemplary, and actual damages and attorney's fees. Sta.
Rita alleged that his dismissal was without just or authorized cause and without compliance with procedural due process.

Issue: Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between Marsman and Sta. Rita at the time of Sta.
Rita's dismissal

Ruling: No. In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that its dismissal of an
employee was for a valid cause. However, before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee
relationship must first be established. In this instance, it was incumbent upon Sta. Rita as the complainant to prove the
employer-employee relationship by substantial evidence. Unfortunately, Sta. Rita failed to discharge the burden to prove
his allegations.

Sta. Rita also failed to satisfy the four-fold test which determines the existence of an employer-employee relationship. The
elements of the fourfold test are: 1) the selection and engagement of the employees; 2) the payment of wages; 3) the
power of dismissal; and 4) the power to control the employee's conduct. 42 There is no hard and fast rule designed to
establish the aforesaid elements. Any competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted.
Identification cards, cash vouchers, social security registration, appointment letters or employment contracts, payrolls,
organization charts, and personnel lists, serve as evidence of employee status.

SEACREST MARITIME MANAGEMENT, INC. AND/OR HERNING SHIPPING ASIA PTE. LTD. v. ALMA Q. RODEROS,
AS WIDOW AND LEGAL HEIR OF FRANCISCO RODEROS April 23, 2018

38
Facts: The respondent is the widow of Francisco Roderos (Roderos), a Filipino seafarer, who signed a Contract of
Employment with petitioner Heming Shipping Asia Pte. Ltd., through its manning agent in the Philippines, Seacrest
Maritime Management, Inc. He was accepted on board the vessel "MT ANNELISE THERESA" as a Chief Cook for six (6)
months.

Sometime in July 2011, during Roderos's engagement in the vessel, he experienced constipation and abdominal pains.
The symptoms continued until September of the same year causing him to report the incident to the Master of the vessel.
On September 4, 2011, while on the Port of Rostock in Germany, Roderos was brought to the Hamburg-Wilhelmsburg
Hospital in Grob Sand where he was found to have blood in his stool, with swollen intestinal walls and swollen lower
abdomen.7 Few days thereafter, he was repatriated back to the Philippines.

Upon Roderos's arrival on September 8, 2011, he was admitted to St. Luke's Medical Center Hospital on September 29,
2011, where he was diagnosed with "Colon Adenocarcinoma" in a stage four (4) level with "metastasis on the perocolinic
lymph node." One (1) month after, on October 8, 2011, Roderos was discharged from the hospital, but underwent
chemotherapy sessions under the care of the company designated physician, Dr. Natalio Alegre.

On October 22, 2011, Dr. Alegre issued a Progress Report, 8 where he indicated (1) the diagnosis and prognosis of
Roderos's illness, (2) the risk factors for the development of the illness, (3) the cost of the chemotherapy, and (4) the
survival rate of patients suffering from the same illness. Dr. Alegre likewise reported that Roderos's illness was "deemed
not work related.

Thus, Roderos sought the assistance of the Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines
(AMOSUP), of which he was a member, for the collection of disability benefits. Unfortunately, the parties did not reach any
settlement. Hence, Roderos filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter (LA) for disability benefits, illness allowance,
attorney's fees, and medical expenses.

Issue: Whether or not Roderos's illness was work-related, and consequently, whether or not he was entitled to disability
and death benefits.

Ruling: No. Section 20(A) of the contract requires the concurrence of two elements: (1) the injury or illness must be work-
related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment
contract.30

Work-related illnesses, are determined by the following rules:

First, there is work relation if the illness leads to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under
Section 32-A of the POEA SEC with the conditions set therein satisfied;

Second, for illnesses not mentioned under Section 32, the POEA-SEC creates a disputable presumption in favor of the
seafarer that these illnesses are work-related. 31 However, this presumption notwithstanding, the Court has held that the
claimant-seafarer must still prove by substantial evidence that his/her work conditions caused or, at least, increased the
risk of contracting the disease. 32 This is because awards of compensation cannot rest entirely on bare assertions and
presumptions. In order to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease, reasonable proof of work-connection-
but not direct causal relation-is required. It is thus this probability of connection, and not the ultimate degree of certainty,
that is the test of proof of compensation proceedings. 33

Thus, for an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all the following conditions, as
supported by substantial evidence, must be established: The seafarer's work must involve the risk described herein; The
disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks; The disease was contracted within a
period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; There was no notorious negligence on the part
of the seafarer.

Thus, for the respondent's failure to (1) present substantial evidence that would prove reasonable causation, or at the very
least, aggravation of Roderos's work while aboard the petitioners' vessel, and for Roderos's failure to (2) insist on his re-
examination of a third doctor that could determine with finality as to whether or not his diagnosed illness was work-related,
the Court is constrained to rule for the petitioners.

MAY 2018
NO LABOR CASE

39
 JUNE 2018

G.R. No. 209085, June 06, 2018

NICANOR F. MALCABA ET.AL, v. PROHEALTH PHARMA PHILIPPINES, INC., ET.AL
FACTS: ProHealth is a corporation engaged in the sale of pharmaceutical products and health food on a wholesale and retail basis.
Del Castillo is the Chair of the Board of Directors and CEO while Busto is the Exec. VP. Malcaba, Tomas Adona, Jr., Nepomuceno, and
Palit-Ang were employed as its President, Marketing Manager, Business Manager, and Finance Officer, respectively. Malcaba alleged
that Del Castillo did acts that made his job difficult. He asked to take a leave on October 23, 2007. When he attempted to, Del Castillo
insisted that he had already resigned and had his things removed from his office. He attested that he was paid a lower salary in
December 2007 and his benefits were withheld. Malcaba later tendered his resignation. On the other hand, Nepomuceno was given a
notice of termination, which was effective May 5, 2008, on the ground of fraud and willful breach of trust. It stemmed when he failed to
inform respondents of the actual dates of his vacation leave. Palit-Ang was hired to join ProHealth's audit team in 2007. On December
17, 2007, she was handed a notice of termination effective December 31, 2007, for disobeying the order of ProHealth's highest official.
The three persons, separately filed Complaints before the LA for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries and 13th month pay,
damages, and attorney's fees.
The LA found that Malcaba was constructively dismissed. LA likewise ruled that ProHealth's insistence that Malcaba's leave of absence
in October 2007 was an act of resignation was false since he continued to perform his duties through December 2007. The LA declared
that Nepomuceno's failure to state the actual date of his flight was an excusable mistake on his part, considering that this was his first
infraction in his 9 years of service. LA noted that no administrative proceedings were conducted, thereby violating his right to due
process. Palit-Ang's dismissal was also found to have been illegal as delay in complying with a lawful order was not tantamount to
disobedience. The LA further noted that delay in giving a cash advance for car maintenance would not have affected the company's
operations. LA declared that Palit-Ang's dismissal was too harsh. NLRC, affirmed the LA’s decision with modifications on the part of
Adona, complainant Adona is declared to have voluntarily resigned. CA reversed the NLRC decision.
ISSUES: 1. WON the Labor Arbiter and NLRC had jurisdiction over petitioner Malcaba's termination dispute considering the allegation
that he was a corporate officer, and not a mere employee
2. WON petitioner Nepomuceno was validly dismissed for willful breach of trust when he failed to inform respondents of the actual dates
of his vacation leave
3. WON petitioner Palit-Ang was validly dismissed for willful disobedience when she failed to immediately comply with an order of her
superior.
RULING: 1.No, under the Labor Code, the LA exercises original and exclusive jurisdiction over termination disputes between an
employer and an employee while the NLRC exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over these cases. At the time of his alleged
dismissal, petitioner Malcaba was the President of respondent corporation. Under sect. 25 of the Corporation Code, the President of a
corporation is considered a corporate officer and the dismissal thereof is considered an intra-corporate dispute, not a labor dispute.
Finding that petitioner Malcaba is the President of respondent corporation and a corporate officer, any issue on his alleged dismissal is
beyond the jurisdiction of the LA or the NLRC. Their adjudication on his money claims is void for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner Malcaba
is ordered to return all amounts received as judgment award pending final adjudication of his claims. The CA’s finding that NLRC had
no jurisdiction to adjudicate Malcaba’s claims is sustained.

2. Article 294 [279] of the Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate the services of an employee only upon just or
authorized causes. Article 297 [282] enumerates the just causes for termination, among which is "fraud or willful breach by the
employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative". Loss of trust and confidence is a just cause to
terminate either managerial employees or rank-and-file employees who regularly handle large amounts of money or property in the
regular exercise of their functions. For an act to be considered a loss of trust and confidence, it must be first, work-related, and second,
founded on clearly established facts. The breach of trust must likewise be willful, that is, "it is done intentionally, knowingly and
purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently."

As found by the LA and the NLRC, petitioner Nepomuceno turned over all of his pending work to a reliever before he left. He was able
to reach his sales quota and surpass his sales target even before taking his vacation leave. Respondents did not suffer any financial
damage as a result of his absence. None of these circumstances constitutes a willful breach of trust on his part. The penalty of
dismissal, was too severe for this kind of infraction. Considering that petitioner Nepomuceno's dismissal was done without just cause,
he is entitled to reinstatement and full backwages.

3. For disobedience to be considered as just cause for termination, two requisites must concur: first, "the employee's assailed conduct
must have been wilful or intentional," and second, "the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee
and must pertain to the duties which he [or she] had been engaged to discharge." For disobedience to be willful, it must be
"characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the employee's act inconsistent with proper subordination." The
conduct complained of must also constitute "harmful behavior against the business interest or person of his employer." Thus, it is
implied in every case of willful disobedience that "the erring employee obtains undue advantage detrimental to the business interest of
the employer. Petitioner Palit-Ang's failure to immediately give the money to Gamboa was not the result of a perverse mental attitude
but was merely because she was busy at the time. Neither did she profit from her failure to immediately give the cash advance for the
car tune-up nor did respondents suffer financial damage by her failure to comply. The severe penalty of dismissal was not
commensurate to her infraction. Petitioner Palit-Ang,is considered to have been illegally dismissed, her penalty not having been
proportionate to the infraction committed. Thus, she is entitled to reinstatement and full backwages.

G.R. No. 202113, June 06, 2018

40
RICKY B. TULABING v. MST MARINE SERVICES (PHILS.), INC., TSM INTERNATIONAL LTD., AND/OR CAPT.
ALFONSO R. DEL CASTILLO

G.R. No. 202120, June 06, 2018

MST MARINE SERVICES (PHILS.), INC., TSM INTERNATIONAL LTD., AND/OR CAPT. ALFONSO R. DEL
CASTILLO,  v. RICKY B. TULABING

FACTS: MST is a Philippine-registered manning agency engaged in the recruitment of seafarers for its foreign principal,
TSM, a Norwegian shipping company. Tulabing is a seafarer formerly under the employ of TSM. His employment was
covered by the Norwegian International Ship Register collective bargaining agreement between the Norwegian
Shipowners' Association, on the one hand, and the Associate Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines and
the Norwegian Seafarer's Union, on the other.

Sometime in January 2008, while engaged in the performance of his duties, he felt a sudden crack on his back which was
followed by a severe pain and numbness of the left side of his body. Furthermore, Tulabing complained of chest pain,
hence, he was referred by the vessel master to Dr. Voorsluis in Amsterdam, Netherlands for medical examination. Dr.
Voorsluis diagnosed him of cervical neuralgia. On June 17, 2008, Tulabing reported to Dr. Cruz, the company-designated
physician for medical evaluation. Dr. Cruz confirmed Dr. Voorsluis' diagnosis of Tulabing's cervical neuralgia and noted
the persistence of his upper back pain which continued to radiate to his left shoulder and upper left extremities. On
November 14, 2008, Dr. Cruz assessed Tulabing's condition as Grade 10 disability. Tulabing, however, did not agree. He
demanded from MST the payment of maximum disability compensation in the amount of US$70,000.00 pursuant to Article
12 of the NIS-CBA. MST denied Tulabing's claim and instead offered him compensation in the amount of US$14,105.00.
Tulabing refused the offer, insisting that his disability was permanent and total, hence, his entitlement to full
compensation.

On July 20, 2009, Tulabing filed with the NLRC a complaint against MST for payment of permanent total disability benefits
of US$70,000.00 pursuant to the NIS-CBA, reimbursement of medical expenses, and payment of moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees. Tulabing claimed that his disability was of such nature that no amount of medication
or therapy can restore him to his former physical condition and enable him to resume his customary work and that based
on the medical findings, the severity of his disability rendered remote and uncertain the possibility of his future
employment for overseas work.

LA rendered decision in favor of Tulabing, ordering the amount of US$14,105.00 and attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of
the amount adjudged. Unsatisfied with the LA's award of disability compensation, Tulabing appealed to the NLRC and
was subsequently awarded with the full permanent total disability compensation of $70,000.00. CA affirmed the decision
of NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tulabing is entitled to the award of full disability benefits of US$70,000.00.

RULING: No, in a long line of cases, the Court has repeatedly ruled that a disability may be temporary or permanent, it
may be partial or total. Permanent disability is defined as the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120
days (or 240 days, as the case may be), regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. Total
disability, meanwhile, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in same kind of work of similar nature that he
was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do.

In the case of Crew and Ship Management International, Inc. v. Soria, the Court explained that the employment of
seafarers, including claims for death and disability benefits, is governed by the contracts they sign every time they are
hired or rehired, and as long as the stipulations therein are not contrary to law, morals, public order or public policy, they
have the force of law between the parties. There is no question that Tulabing's disability was due to an injury he sustained
while engaged in the performance of his work as MST's employee. Under the provisions of the parties' NIS-CBA, the
maximum disability compensation that may be paid to an employee is US$70,000.00. Award of this maximum amount,
however, presupposes a disability grading of "1" or permanent and total disability. In the case, the company-designated
physician gave Tulabing a final and definite assessment of Grade 10 disability only. The entitlement of an overseas
seafarer to disability benefits is governed by (1) the law, (2) the employment contract, and (3) the medical findings of the
company-designated physician. In sum, the SC holds that the CA erred when it awarded full disability benefits of
US$70,000.00 to Tulabing, in clear disregard of labor laws and settled jurisprudence on the matter.

G.R. No. 217301, June 06, 2018

CONSOLIDATED BUILDING MAINTENANCE, INC. AND SARAH DELGADO v. ROLANDO ASPREC, JR. AND
JONALEN BATALLER

41
FACTS: CBMI is a corporation engaged in the business of providing janitorial, kitchen and allied services to various
entities. Among CBMI's clients is Philippine Pizza, Inc. (PPI). For PPI, CBMI provides kitchen, delivery, sanitation and
other related services pursuant to contracts of services, which are valid for one-year periods.
Asprec, Jr. and Bataller, alleged that they are regular employees of PPI, the former having commenced work as a "Rider"
and the latter as "team member/slice cashier". Asprec averred that after the expiration of his contract on November 4,
2001, PPI advised him to go on leave for 1 month and 10 days. Thereafter, he was called for an interview by PPI's Area
Manager. After passing the same, he was told to proceed to the office of CBMI where he signed a contract. Asprec stated
that except for the fact that the payslips were then issued by CBMI, work proceeded as usual with him being assigned at
the same branch and performing his usual duties as "Rider/Production Person." Bataller had a similar experience. She
related that before the expiration of her employment contract, she was informed by Pizza Hut Restaurant Manager that as
a precondition for continued employment, she had to "submit first a resignation letter, had to pass through CBMI, and after
six months she should go on vacation for one month." Thereafter, she was interviewed by PPI General Manager. Bataller
advanced that after she passed the interview, PPI prepared her documents and then forwarded the same to CBMI. She
then resumed employment in December 2008 until July 23, 2010, with her being assigned at the same branch, performing
her usual duties, and receiving the same salary. The respondents filed their Complaint against the petitioners for
constructive illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, and non-payment of separation pay. The respondents argued two points:
first, that their transfer from PPI to CBMI constituted labor-only contracting and was a mere scheme by PPI to prevent
their regularization; and second, that they were illegally dismissed without cause and due process of law. LA found
respondent companies liable for illegal dismissal and ordered their reinstatement. The NLRC affirmed the LA decision.
The CA held that CBMI falls under the definition of a “labor only contractor” which is prohibited under Article 106 of the
Labor Code. CBMI was deemed to be an agent of Pizza Hut, which in turn, was therefore, the principal of CBMI. An
employer-employee relationship was created between Pizza Hut as principal, and private respondents as employees.
Pizza Hut, as a result is solidarily liable with petitioners for private respondents' claims.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the respondents are employees of CBMI;
2.Whether or not the respondents have been illegally dismissed and as such entitled to their monetary claims.

RULING: 1. Yes, the respondents are employees of CBMI. The resolution of the first issue hinges on the determination of
the status of CBMI, whether or not it is a labor-only contractor or an independent contractor. The court found that CBMI is
an independent contractor. Although DOLE DO No. 18-02 prohibits labor-only contracting, an employer is allowed to farm
out the performance or completion of a specific job, work or service, within a definite or specified period, and regardless of
whether the said task is to be performed or completed within or outside its premises. Job contracting is deemed legitimate
and permissible when the contractor has substantial capital or investment, and runs a business that is independent and
free from control by the principal. Further, in Norkis Trading Co., Inc. v. Gnilo, it is required that "the agreement between
the principal and the contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual employees' entitlement to all labor and
occupational safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization, security of tenure, and social
welfare benefits." The absence of any of these elements results in a finding that the contractor is engaged in labor-only
contracting. In this case, CBMI has established compliance with the requirements of legitimate job contracting in
accordance with the law and jurisprudence. It is indisputable from the respondents' employment contracts that they were
hired by CBMI. It was also the latter who assigned respondents at PPI's Marcos Highway Branch after they were briefed
of company policies and their duties. It is also CBMI who pays the respondents their salaries, and remits premiums to
PhilHealth and Social Security System. The nature of CBMI's agreement with PPI requires the former to assign
employees to perform specific services for the latter. CBMI deploys employees already equipped of the skills based on the
specific service demanded by PPI to be accomplished.

2. Yes. CBMI, as the employer has the power to impose discipline upon the respondents, which includes the imposition of
the preventive suspension pending investigation. However, as noted by the NLRC, the extension of the period of
suspension by the CBMI is unwarranted under the attendant circumstances. The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code is explicit in that the period of preventive suspension should not exceed 30 days, after which, the employee must be
reinstated and paid the wages and other benefits due. Respondents have been under preventive suspension for more
than the maximum period allowed by law, without any word as to the result of the investigation, and without having been
reinstated to their former or to a substantially equivalent position, which thus renders the period of extended suspension
illegal. It bears to stress that the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code requires that the employer act within the
30-day period of preventive suspension by concluding the investigation either by absolving the respondents of the
charges or meting corresponding penalty if liable. Otherwise, the employer must reinstate the employee, or extend the
period of suspension provided the employee's wages and benefits are paid in the interim. Failure by the employer to
comply with these, the preventive suspension is deemed illegal as it amounts to a constructive dismissal.

G.R. No. 225125, June 06, 2018

MARLON L. ARCILLA, v. ZULISIBS, INC., PIANDRE SALON, AND ROSALINDA FRANCISCO

42
FACTS: Respondent Zulisibs Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws with respondent Francisco
as its President and CEO. Zulisibs operates respondent Piandre Salon, an establishment engaged in the operation of
beauty salons. Petitioner Spouses Arcilla were hired by Piandre on separate dates and were assigned to different
branches. After several years, both spouses were promoted as senior hair stylists earning a monthly salary of P11,672.00
plus commissions from customers and sale of products.
Sometime in September 2014, Zulisibs, through its officers, received information that Marlon was establishing a beauty
salon somewhere near the Piandre Salon. Spouses Marlon and Maricel both received a notice from Piandre and
Francisco placing them under preventive suspension and requiring him to appear Francisco's office.
During the investigative hearing, Marlon was accused of, among other things, being involved in the opening of a salon.
Marlon denied that he had an agreement or contract with the owner of the said salon. However, he admitted the following:
(1) that he extended help to the salon owner who happens to be his brother-in-law; (2) that he called up two former
employees of Piandre and recommended them; and (3) that he gave P50,000.00 which amount was a portion of the
P250,000.00 loan he borrowed from the employees' cooperative. Further investigation revealed that Marlon was often
absent from work and whenever he was working, he would entertain phone calls, thus, disrupting his work. He would be
absent on days when he would be the only stylist available.
Eventually both spouses were terminated since they were both were found guilty of violating the Code of Discipline 3F No.
2: Pagkawala ng tiwala dahil sa ginawang masama. Subsequently, both filed two separate complaints for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of wages, with prayer for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The LA rendered a decision
dismissing the complaints for lack of merit. The NLRC denied their complaint and affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision.
Marlon and Maricel's petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was partially granted by CA. Marlon's termination was held to be
valid. As to Maricel, CA held that the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter erred in upholding the legality of her dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marlon’s dismissal is valid and for just cause, hence, he is not entitled to his money claims.

RULING: Yes. Dismissals under the Labor Code have two facets: the legality of the act of dismissal, which constitutes
substantive due process; and the legality of the manner of dismissal, which constitutes procedural due process. In this
case, the SC did not dispute the findings of the LA, the NLRC, and the CA that the manner of Marlon's dismissal was legal
and in accordance with law. The requirement of procedural due process was met when Marlon was served with a first
written notice containing the specific causes or grounds for his termination, when Marlon was called to attend an
investigative hearing to explain his side, and when Marlon was served with a second written notice containing the
justification for his termination. Thus, the only issue to be resolved is the legality of the act of dismissal by re-examining
the facts and evidence on record.
Respondent justified Marlon's dismissal by citing paragraphs (a) and (c), Article 297 of the Labor Code. An employer may
terminate an employee for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of
the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work. (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee
of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative.
From the facts and circumstances obtaining with respect to petitioner Marlon Arcilla, there exists a valid cause in
terminating his employment. It was clearly stated in par. 8 of the Agreement signed by petitioners that they are prohibited
from setting up or being involved in a business similar to that of private respondents' during the course of their
employment. Considering that the petitioners have neither controverted nor denied the existence of the Kasunduan, they
are therefore bound by the terms and conditions thereof. Eventually, petitioners were later discovered to be involved in
setting up another salon near the private respondents' salon, albeit the involvement was only indirect by means of
extending a financial assistance. Marlon admitted and substantially proves two things: 1) that a new salon has indeed
been established; and 2) that he willfully disobeyed his contract of employment with the private respondents. His
involvement in setting up a competing salon, which albeit indirect, constitutes serious misconduct because of his blatant
disregard of the terms and conditions of his contract with the private respondents. His act of allowing himself to be
involved with his brother-in-law's business displays an act of disloyalty to the company which is likewise sufficient to
warrant his dismissal for loss of trust and confidence.

G.R. No. 204307, June 06, 2018

ORIENT HOPE AGENCIES, INC. AND/OR ZEO MARINE CORPORATION, v. MICHAEL E. JARA, 

FACTS: Jara was hired by Orient Hope, on behalf of its foreign principal, Zeo Marine, as engine cadet on board M/V
Orchid Sun. The employment contract was for a duration of 10 months with a basic monthly salary of US$230.00. On its
way to Oman, M/V Orchid Sun sank off Muscat on July 12, 2007, during which Jara sustained leg injuries. He was treated
43
in Oman and thereafter repatriated and admitted on August 3, 2007 at the Metropolitan Hospital in Manila. Jara was
diagnosed to have suffered from "fracture, shaft of left ulna and left fibula." On August 28, 2007 and January 9, 2008, he
underwent knee operations. He did not return to the company-designated doctor after his check up on March 17, 2008.
Meanwhile, on March 6, 2008, Jara filed a complaint with the LA, insisting that he was entitled to total permanent disability
benefits amounting to US$60,000.00. On May 29, 2008, Assistant Medical Coordinator Dr. Cruz Balbon of the Marine
Medical Services of Metropolitan Medical Center issued a letter, which Medical Coordinator Dr. Lim noted Jara’s disability
grading is Grade 11.

LA found Jara entitled to compensation equivalent to Grade 11 disability. He solely relied on the assessment of the
company-designated physician. He found no evidence or other medical report on record to dispute the company
designated physician's determination and to support Jara's claim. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's award. It
rejected Jara's unsubstantiated allegation that he was permanently and fully disabled. It found no evidence, such as a
credible assessment from another doctor, to overturn the company-designated physician's finding that indeed Jara was
suffering from a Grade 11 disability. Insisting that he was entitled to permanent disability compensation, Jara elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. CA held that Jara was "entitled to
permanent disability benefits because the assessment of the company-designated physician that he was suffering from a
grade '11' disability was issued after nine months or more than 120 days from the time he was medically repatriated.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Jara is entitled to permanent and total disability compensation considering that there was a Grade
11 disability grading given by the company-designated physician.

RULING: Yes, the Court of Appeals properly found that NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it overlooked the
company-designated physician's failure to issue a final and definitive medical assessment within the 240-day extended
period, which under the law and jurisprudence transforms respondent's disability to permanent and total. Section 20(B)70
of the POEA-SEC mandated the 120-day period within which a company-designated physician should declare a
seafarer's fitness for sea duty or degree of disability. It should be harmonized with Article 198 [192](c)(1) of the Labor
Code, in relation with Book IV, Title II, Rule X of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, or the Amended Rules on
Employee Compensation. Book IV, Title II, Article 198 [192](c)(1) of the Labor Code, as amended. Also, jurisprudence
emphasized that there must be a sufficient justification to extend the medical treatment from 120 days to 240 days. In
other words, the 240-day extended period remains to be an exception, and as such, must be clearly shown to be
warranted under the circumstances of the case before it can be applied.

Furthermore, the POEA-SEC clearly provides the primary responsibility of a company-designated physician to determine
the disability grading or fitness to work of seafarers. To be conclusive, however, company-designated physicians' medical
assessments or reports must be complete and definite to give the proper disability benefits to seafarers. The company-
designated physician issued an assessment simply stating that "based on his last follow-up, his suggested disability
grading is Grade 11 – stretching leg or ligaments of a knee resulting in instability of the joint." Moreover, other than this
statement, the report is devoid of any explanation to back up the findings of the company-designated physician or of any
detail of the progress of respondent's treatment, and the approximate period needed for him to fully recover.

In conclusion, failure of the company-designated physician to render a final and definitive assessment of a seafarer's
condition within the 240-day extended period transforms the seafarer's temporary and total disability to permanent and
total disability.

G.R. No. 205953, June 06, 2018

DIONELLA A. GOPIO, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE, JOB ASIA MANAGEMENT SERVICES, 
v. SALVADOR B. BAUTISTA, 

FACTS: On September 26, 2008, respondent Bautista was hired as a Project Manager for Shorncliffe Limited in Papua
New Guinea through Job Asia Management Services, a single proprietorship owned by petitioner Dionella A. Gosio, which
44
is engaged in the business of recruitment, processing, and deployment of land -based manpower for overseas work.
Bautista's contract stated that his employment shall be valid and effective for 31 months. On July 6, 2009, or just nine
months after his deployment in Papua New Guinea, Bautista was served a notice of termination effective July 10, 2009 on
the alleged grounds of unsatisfactory performance and failure to meet the standards of the company. The basis of
termination is Article 4.3 of the employment contract which states that “The Employer or Employee may terminate this
contract on other grounds. The Employer should give one month's written notice of his intention to terminate or in lieu
thereof pay the Employee a sum equivalent to one month's salary.” He was paid his salary for the period July 1 to 10,
2009, annual leave credits, and one-month pay net of taxes.
Bautista then lodged a complaint with the arbitration branch of the NLRC against Job Asia, Gopio, and Shorncliffe for
illegal dismissal and monetary claims. He claimed that he was terminated without just cause since there had been no job
evaluation conducted prior to Shorncliffe's. decision to dismiss him from employment. As a result, he is entitled to the
payment of his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract, or for 22 months. He alleged that while his contract
contained an understated monthly income of P40,000.00, he was actually being paid the amount of P115,850.00 a month.
Petitioner, argued that Bautista's employment was terminated because he failed to meet Shorncliffe's standards.
LA rendered Bautista to have been illegally dismissed as the dismissal was not proven to be for a just cause and
Shorncliffe failed to observe due process. NLRC set aside the decision of the LA and dismiss the complaint for lack of
merit. However, CA annulled the decision of NLRC and reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista was illegally dismissed from employment.

RULING: Yes, the Court uphold with modification the decision of the CA.
In termination disputes or illegal dismissal cases, it has been established by law and jurisprudence that the employer has
the burden of proving that the dismissal is for just and valid causes; and failure to do so would necessarily mean that the
dismissal was not justified and is, therefore, illegal. Taking into account the character of the charges and the penalty
meted to an employee, the employer is bound to adduce clear, accurate, consistent, and convincing evidence to prove
that the dismissal is valid and legal. This is consistent with the principle of security of tenure as guaranteed by the
Constitution and reinforced by Article 292(b) of the Labor Code. The SC found that Bautista's incompetence as the
alleged just cause for his dismissal was not proven by substantial evidence. Also, Bautista was not accorded due process.
Here, Bautista was dismissed under Article 4.3 of the employment contract which allegedly permits his employer, to
terminate the contract on unspecified "other grounds" by giving one month's written notice of its intention to terminate, or
in lieu thereof, to pay the employee a sum equivalent to one month's salary. Bautista was notified on July 6, 2009 that his
services will be terminated effective on the close of business hours on July 10, 2009, allegedly because his performance
was "unsatisfactory and did not meet the standards of the Company." He was also paid one-month salary in lieu of one
month's notice of the termination of his employment. This is not in accordance with the two-notice requirement mandated
by the Labor Code in effecting a valid dismissal. The requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee concerned
of the employer's intent to dismiss him and the reason for the proposed dismissal. On the other hand, the requirement of
hearing affords the employee an opportunity to answer his employer's charges against him and accordingly defend
himself therefrom before dismissal is effected. In this case, Bautista was not given a chance to defend himself. Five days
after the notice was served, he was repatriated. Clearly, he was denied his right to due process.
The SC struck down the validity of Article 4.3 of the employment contract as it contravenes the constitutionally-protected
right of every worker to security of tenure. It deprives the employee of his right to due process of law as it gives the
employer the option to do away with the notice requirement provided that it grants one-month salary to the employee in
lieu thereof. It denies the employee of the right to be apprised of the grounds for the termination of his employment
without giving him an opportunity to defend himself and refute the charges against him.

G.R. No. 214940, June 06, 2018

MARIA DE LEON TRANSPORTATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY MA. VICTORIA D. RONQUILLO, v. DANIEL M.
MACURAY

FACTS: On November 21, 2011, respondent Macuray filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner Maria De
Leon Transportation, Inc. before the Regional Arbitration Branch of San Fernando City, La Union. Respondent claimed

45
that, in April, 1991, he was employed as a bus driver of petitioner, that he received a monthly pay/commission of
P20,000.00; that, in November 2009, petitioner's dispatcher did not assign a bus to him, for no apparent reason; that for a
period of one month, he continually returned to follow up if a bus had already been assigned to him; that finally, when he
returned to the company premises, the bus dispatcher informed him that he was already considered AWOL, without giving
any reason therefor; that he went back to follow up his status for about six months in 2010, but nobody attended to him;
that he was not given any notice or explanation regarding his employment status; that he felt betrayed by the petitioner,
after having served the latter for 18 years; that he considered himself illegally dismissed; that during this time, he was
already 62 years old, but he received no benefits for his service; and that petitioner owed him three months' salary for the
year 2009. Thus, he prayed that he be awarded back wages, separation pay, retirement pay, 13th month pay, damages,
attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
However, petitioner claimed that respondent was hired on commission basis, on a "no work, no pay" and "per travel, per
trip" basis; that respondent was paid an average of P10,000.00 commission per month without salary; that, contrary to his
claim of illegal dismissal, respondent permanently abandoned his employment effective March 31, 2009, after he failed to
report for work. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for lack of merit. NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter's judgment by
awarding in favor of respondent the amount of P50,000.00 as financial assistance because of old age. Nevertheless, CA
found Macuray to have been to have been illegally dismissed by respondent company from employment.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macuray was illegally dismissed from employment.

RULING: No, respondent was not illegally dismissed from employment but rather availed of petitioner's company practice
and unwritten policy – of allowing its bus drivers to take needed breaks or sabbaticals to enable them to recover from the
monotony of driving the same route for long periods – and obtained work elsewhere. Petitioner itself admitted that it
sanctioned the practice of allowing its drivers to take breaks from work in order to afford them the opportunity to recover
from the stresses of driving the same long and monotonous bus routes by accepting jobs elsewhere, as some form of
sabbatical or vacation, without losing productivity and in come and to safeguard the interests of the company and its
patrons, as well as to avoid fatal accidents were the drivers to be suffered to work under continuous stressful conditions
occasioned by driving on the same monotonous routes day in and day out. Thus, since respondent was not dismissed
from work, petitioner may not be held liable for his (respondent's) monetary claims, except those that were actually owing
to him by way of unpaid salary/commission, and retirement benefits, which are due to him for the reason that he reached
the age of retirement while under petitioner's employ. As for retirement benefits, respondent is entitled to them considering
that he was never dismissed from work, either for cause or by resignation or abandonment. As far as petitioner is
concerned, he merely went on a company-sanctioned sabbatical.
Thus, since respondent was not dismissed from work, petitioner may not be held liable for the monetary claims, except
those that were actually owing to him by way of unpaid salary/commission, and retirement benefits, which are due to him
for the reason that he reached the age of retirement while under petitioner's employ.
As for retirement benefits, respondent is entitled to them considering that he was never dismissed from work, either for
cause or by resignation or abandonment. As far as petitioner is concerned, he merely went on a company-sanctioned
sabbatical. It just so happened that during this sabbatical, he reached the retirement age of 60; by this time, he is already
67 years old. By filing the labor case, he may have pre-empted the payment of his retirement benefits; but it is a clear
demand for retirement benefits nonetheless.

G.R. No. 215111, June 20, 2018

ABOSTA SHIPMANAGEMENT CORPORATION, PANSTAR SHIPPING CO., LTD., AND/OR GAUDENCIO
MORALES, v. RODEL D. DELOS REYES

46
FACTS: Petitioner Abosta Shipmanagement Corp. is a duly licensed manning agency while petitioner Panstar Shipping,
Co., Ltd. (Panstar) is a foreign principal agency based in Korea. Petitioner Gaudencio Morales, on the other hand, is an
officer of petitioner Abosta. On March 30, 2010, De los Reyes was employed as a bosun on board the MV Stellar Daisy
for a period of nine months. He was declared fit to work as per his pre-Employment Medical Examination. In July 2010, he
complained about a pain in his groin and was sent for a treatment in South Korea and was diagnosed with Inguinal
Hernia. In August 2010, he was repatriated, underwent right inginual herniorrhaphy with mesh imposition, and was
discharged from the hospital and was paid two months sickness allowance. In September, he was declared fit to work.
However, on July 19, 2011, respondent consulted Dr. Orencia, who found him to be permanently unfit to work and
suffering from a Grade 1 disability.

ISSUE: Whether respondent was likewise entitled to total and permanent disability compensation.

RULING: No. There is total disability when employee is unable "to earn wages in the same kind of work or work of similar
nature that he or she was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his or her mentality
and attainments could do. " On the other hand, there is permanent disability when the worker is unable "to perform his or
her job for more than 120 days [or 240 days, as the case may be,] regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any
part of his or her body." In this case, respondent was repatriated for medical treatment. Upon the advice of the company-
designated physician, respondent underwent right inginual hemiorrhaphy with mesh imposition. Two months after his
surgery or within the 120-day period, he was declared fit to work by the company-designated physician.
In Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc. v. Osias, the Court declared that-Based on the above-cited provision, the referral to
a third doctor is mandatory when: (1) there is a valid and timely assessment by the company-designated physician and (2)
the appointed doctor of the seafarer refuted such assessment.
Respondent failed to refer the conflicting medical assessments to a third doctor.The Court has consistently ruled that in
case of conflicting medical assessments, referral to a third doctor is mandatory; and that in the absence of a third doctor's
opinion, it is the medical assessment of the company-designated physician that should prevail.
Under prevailing jurisprudence, "the assessment of the company-designated physician is more credible for having been
arrived at after months of medical attendance and diagnosis, compared with the assessment of a private physician done
in one day on the basis of an examination or existing medical records."

G.R. No. 229302, June 20, 2018

CONSOLIDATED DISTILLERS OF THE FAR EAST, INC. v. ROGEL N. ZARAGOZA

FACTS: The present case is an offshoot of the petition entitled Consolidated Distillers (Condis) of the Far East, Inc. v.
Rogel N. Zaragoza and docketed as G.R. No. 196038 an Illegal Dismissal Case. The First Division of the Court denied the
petition in a Resolution dated June 22, 2011, which became final and executory on March 30, 2012. In G.R. No. 196038,
the Court affirmed the CA decision in favor of respondent therein Rogel Zaragoza (Rogel) which had affirmed the NLRC's

47
and LA's findings that Condis had illegally dismissed Rogel, and ordered his reinstatement and payment of his
backwages.

After the finality of the resolution of the Court in G.R. No. 196038 on March 30, 2012, Rogel moved for the issuance of an
alias writ of execution against Condis for his reinstatement, and the payment of full backwages, accrued salaries and
allowances as of December 3, 2012, less the P454,986.98 that was already released to him by the LA pending appeal.
Condis opposed the motion and argued that its execution of the Asset Purchase Agreement with Emperador Distillers,
Inc. was a supervening event that made it impossible to reinstate Rogel to his former position. In a Resolution dated
August 3, 2013, the LA ruled in favor of Rogel and directed Condis to pay P2,135,256.45 representing the
backwages/reinstatement salaries, including allowances, from December 3, 2007, the date of Rogel's illegal dismissal, up
to August 3, 2013, the date of the LA resolution.

Condis filed a petition for extraordinary remedy with the NLRC, which granted the petition and declared the LA's
Resolution null and void in a Decision dated January 13, 2014. The NLRC ruled that the reinstatement was indeed
rendered impossible because of the Asset Purchase Agreement, but that backwages should be computed only until the
finality of the Court's Resolution in the Illegal Dismissal Case (i.e., G.R. No. 196038) on March 30, 2012.
Rogel filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. In a Decision dated March 17, 2016, the CA affirmed the
NLRC but with modification that the backwages should be computed from the date of illegal dismissal until the finality of
the decision of the CA, and separation pay computed from the date of employment until finality of the CA Decision.

ISSUE: What is the correct reckoning point of payment of backwages and separation pay?

RULING: To recall, the Decision in G.R. No. 196038 became final and executory on March 30, 2012. As modified, the
decision awarded backwages and directed Condis to reinstate Rogel. It was only during the Execution Proceedings that
the NLRC, in reversing the LA, directed the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. The Court agrees with the
CA that Condis is liable for backwages and separation pay until the finality of the decision awarding separation pay as
ruled in the case of Bani. In Bani, the decision there finding that the employee was illegally dismissed and directing his
reinstatement had also already attained finality. During the execution proceedings, since the employees manifested that
they no longer wanted to be reinstated, the LA directed that separation pay be given to them in lieu of reinstatement. On
appeal, the NLRC affirmed the payment of separation pay but modified the basis of the computation. This also became
final and executory.
The LA then recomputed the award and ruled that backwages should only be paid until the date that the employees
manifested that they no longer wanted to be reinstated. The NLRC and the CA, however, both ruled that the backwages
should be counted until the finality of the NLRC decision awarding separation pay. The Supreme Court held therein that
when there is a supervening event that renders reinstatement impossible, backwages is computed from the time of
dismissal until the finality of the decision ordering separation pay.

The Court explained in the case of Bani that "when there is an order of separation pay (in lieu of reinstatement or when
the reinstatement aspect is waived or subsequently ordered in light of a supervening event making the award of
reinstatement no longer possible), the employment relationship is terminated only upon the finality of the decision ordering
the separation pay. The finality of the decision cuts-off the employment relationship and represents the final settlement of
the rights and obligations of the parties against each other."
Here, Condis failed to show that in 2007 it had closed its business and that it had complied with all the statutory
requirements for the closure. All it alleged was the execution of the Asset Purchase Agreement and the termination of the
Service Agreement with EDI -but this does not mean, nor was it argued to mean, that Condis had closed its business. In
fact, Condis failed to submit any document which showed that in 2007, it had notified the DOLE or its employees of the
closure of its business and the reason for its closure. It also failed to show that Rogel was affected by this purported
closure of its business.

G.R. No. 226002, June 25, 2018

LINO A. FERNANDEZ, JR. v. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO)

FACTS: Petitioner Fernandez was an employee of respondent MERALCO from October 3, 1978 until his termination on
September 14, 2000 for allegedly participating in an illegal strike. As a result, he filed a case for illegal dismissal. Contrary
to the conclusion reached by the (LA) and the NLRC, the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 95923, declared that Fernandez was
illegally dismissed. The CA ruling was sustained dated January 16, 2008. With the denial of the motion for
reconsideration, the judgment became final and executory on May 26, 2008.
During the execution proceedings, both parties filed several motions regarding the inclusions to, and computation of, the
monetary awards due to Fernandez. On the bases of which, LA Suarez summarized the issues for resolution as follows:

48
1. Whether he is entitled to additional backwages despite receipt of P3,307,362.05 monetary award covering the period
from September 14, 2000 up to June 26, 2008; 2. Whether he is entitled to [P1,950,525.53] additional backwages
consisting, among others, of CBA salary increases, covering the period from September 14, 2000 to June 26, 2008, and
whether said computation by Felix Dalisay of the Computation Unit and adopted by LA Borbolla is correct; 3. Whether he
is entitled to additional backwages starting January 31, 2009 when [MERALCO] [in its Motion to Declare Full Satisfaction
of Fernandez's Monetary Awards Granted by the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court dated January 13, 2009]
manifested that it was exercising its option to pay Fernandez's separation pay instead of reinstatement; and 4. Whether
he should be reinstated. In the Order dated June 27, 2014, LA Suarez disposed the motions. On July 4, 2014, Fernandez
received a copy of the June 27, 2014 Order. Prior to the expiration of the 10-day reglementary period, he filed a Notice of
Appeal and Memorandum on Appeal14 on July 11, 2014.

Despite his submissions, the appeal and motion were merely "NOTED WITHOUT ACTION" in the July 30, 2014 Order of
LA Suarez, who opined that these are prohibited pleadings under Section 5 (i) and (j), Rule V of the NLRC Rules. After
Fernandez received a copy of the Order on August 14, 2014, he filed a Verified Petition on August 26, 2014.

On August 29, 2014, the NLRC Fifth Division resolved to deny Fernandez's Verified Petition. His motion for
reconsideration was denied on October 20, 2014.

Meantime, MERALCO also filed a Verified Petition to assail the June 27, 2014 Order. On July 31, 2014, it was dismissed
by the NLRC Fifth Division for insufficiency in form and substance. A motion for reconsideration was filed. On October 31,
2014, the Verified Petition was reinstated, but was denied for lack of merit. Fernandez elevated the case to the CA via a
petition for certiorari, which was denied for lack of merit. His motion for reconsideration suffered the same fate; hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether the NLRC, in noting without action petitioner's Notice of Appeal from the Order issued by the LA during
the execution proceedings, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
RULING: The NLRC Rules of Procedure must be liberally applied so as to prevent injustice and grave or irreparable
damage or injury to an illegally dismissed employee. The matter should be remanded to the NLRC for determination of the
inclusions to, and the computation of, the monetary awards due to Fernandez.
Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement as a matter of
right. The award of separation pay is a mere exception to the rule. It is made an alternative relief in lieu of reinstatement in
certain circumstances, like: (a) when reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the passage of a long period of
time or because of the realities of the situation; (b) reinstatement is inimical to the employer's interest; (c) reinstatement is
no longer feasible; (d) reinstatement does not serve the best interests of the parties involved; (e) the employer is
prejudiced by the workers' continued employment; (f) facts that make execution unjust or inequitable have supervened; or
(g) strained relations between the employer and employee. Reinstatement cannot be barred especially when the
employee has not indicated an aversion to returning to work, or does not occupy a position of trust and confidence in, or
has no say in the operation of the employer's business.

Here, Fernandez's intent and willingness to be reinstated to his former position is evident as early as July 10, 2008 when
he filed his Comment with Motion for Re-computation of Monetary Award. He reiterated this on December 17, 2008 in his
Urgent Motion41 to require MERALCO to reinstate him and on January 21, 2009 in his Comment/Opposition to
MERALCO's motion to declare full satisfaction of his monetary awards.

G.R. No. 237487, June 27, 2018

ALDRINE B. ILUSTRICIMO v. NYK-FIL SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC./INTERNATIONAL CRUISE SERVICES, LTD.
AND/OR JOSEPHINE J. FRANCISCO

FACTS: Petitioner Ilustricimo was engaged by respondent International Cruise Services Ltd., through respondent NYK-Fil
Ship Management, Inc. (NYK), as a Quarter Master onboard its vessels from 1993 to 2014. In November 2014, while MV
Crystal Serenity was on its way to Florida, USA, petitioner started experiencing gross hematuria, or blood in his urine. He
reported the matter to his superiors and was given antibiotics for suspected urinary tract infection. Due to his medical
condition, petitioner was brought to a hospital in Key West, Florida, where he was subjected to a CT Scan. The results
revealed the presence of three polypoid masses in his bladder. Petitioner was medically repatriated on November 22,
2014 and immediately referred to the company-accredited hospital for treatment. Dr. Cruz, the company-designated
doctor, diagnosed him with "urothelial carcinoma of the urinary bladder, low grade" or "bladder cancer”, with a final
assessment of Grade 7 disability-moderate residuals or disorder of the intra-abdominal organ. The seafarer then
consulted his own doctor who assessed him to be permanently unfit to work. On this basis, the seafarer engaged counsel
who wrote a letter to the company claiming full disability benefits and informing them of the second medical opinion they
49
obtained. Notwithstanding petitioner's communication, respondents failed to respond, eventually he filed a formal
complaint with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board/Voluntary Arbitrator .

The company denied the claim considering that the illness of the seafarer is not work-related and even if it is work-related,
the entitlement should only be limited to the equivalent of the disability grading issued. Further, the company argued that
the Ilustricimo failed to comply with the third doctor procedure under the POEA Contract when the second medical opinion
was only presented after the complaint was filed. The VA ruled in favor of the seafarer and awarded him maximum
disability benefits and held that the company-designated doctor’s assessment is not reflective of the seriousness of the
seaman’s condition. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals modified the award to that equivalent to the grade “7”
assessment of the company-designated doctor.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.

RULING: Yes. For disability to be compensable under Section 20(A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, two elements must concur:
(1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of
the seafarer's employment contract. In the present case, it is undisputed that petitioner suffered an illness while on board
the M/V Crystal Serenity. The court agree with the findings of the VA that the illness is work related, based on section 32
of POEA-SEC, which is “cancer of the urinary bladder” due to the malignant tumors found in his urinary bladder. The
Supreme Court noted that the company-designated doctor mentioned in his medical opinion that one of the risk factors for
the seafarer in acquiring urinary bladder cancer was occupational exposure to aromatic amines. This statement from the
company-designated doctor is tantamount to a declaration that the illness of the seaman is work-related as his occupation
exposed him to risks of acquiring his illness. Also, the Court noted that the seaman was with the company for almost 20
years and such, it is plausible to conclude that seafarer’s work may have caused, contributed or at least aggravated his
illness. The SC concur with the conclusion of the VA that petitioner's illness is serious in nature considering the company
doctors' requirement for him to undergo periodic cystoscopy despite having undergone chemotherapy and surgery. It
further observed that petitioner was never declared "cancer-free" and "fit to work" by his attending physicians and his
illness persisted despite the final disability grade of 7 given. For the VA, this means that petitioner could no longer return
to the seafaring profession and is, thus, permanently and totally disabled.
Petitioner's disability being permanent and total, he is entitled to 100% compensation in the amount of US$95,949.00 as
stipulated in par. 20.9 of the parties' CBA and as adjudged by the VA

JULY 2018

G.R. No. 206800, July 02, 2018

STRADCOM CORPORATION AND JOSE A. CHUA v. JOYCE ANNABELLE L. ORPILLA

FACTS: This involves a claim for constructive dismissal case filed by Stradcom’s Human Resource Administration
Department (HRAD) Head, Orpilla. According to Orpilla she was employed by Stradcom as HRAD Head with duties
involving administrative and training matters. The President and CEO, Chua of Stradcom issued a memorandum
announcing a reorganization of the HRAD. After the turn-over of the documents and equipment of HRAD, Orpilla inquired
from Chua as to her status in the light of the said reorganization. Chua replied that the management has lost its trust and
confidence in her and it would be better if she resigned. Orpilla protested the resignation and insisted that if there were
charges against her, she was open for formal investigation. Chu, however, was not able to come up with any charges.
Thereafter, a meeting was held wherein, Atty. Pilapil, the Chief Legal Officer offered a settlement to Orpilla in exchange
for her employment, otherwise, Orpilla would have to undergo the burden of litigation in pursuing the retention of her
employment. Atty. Pilapel set another meeting on January 13, 203 with Orpilla, and told her to take a leave in the
meantime to think about the settlement offer. Atty. Pilapil also assured Orpilla that she would continue to receive her

50
salary. She reported for work but the guards refused her entry and advised her to take a leave of absence. Furthermore,
she claimed that she was informed by Accounting Manager that her January 15, 2003 salary was already deposited in her
bank account which included the proportionate 13 th month pay. After such, Orpilla no longer received any kind of payment
from Stradcom. Orpilla claimed that she was constructively dismissed on January 2, 2003 and turned into an actual
dismissal on January 15, 2003 when she received her last pay.
The version of petitioners states the following: Sometime in December 2002, Pagdanganan gave instructions to Orpilla to
commence preparations for Stradcom's 2002 Christmas party. Contrary to Chua’s instruction, Orpilla then called a staff
lunch meeting for Stradcom’s 2002 Christmas party, wherein Orpilla conveyed her intention of easing out Lare’s
employees from the part. In addition, the Christmas Party Committee was surprised to find out that the price of the food
was actually P200 per head and not P250 per head as represented by respondent. After the investigation, Stradcom also
discovered that respondent required her staff to prepare presentation/training materials/manuals using company
resources for purposes not related to the affairs of the company, on overtime and on Sundays.
Before, Orpilla’s scheduled leave, she approached Chua to discuss the reorganization and her previous conference with
Pagdanganan regarding her said infractions. Chua told Orpilla that the management has lost its trust and confidence in
her due to her wilful disobedience in excluding the employees of Lares in the Christmas Party and for wilful breach of trust
in connection with the canvassing of the caterer.
LA ruled that Orpilla was illegally dismissed and Chua is solidarily liable with Stradcom for the payment of the monetary
awards to Orpilla. NLRC modified the decision of LA and ruled that Orpilla was validly dismissed on the ground of loss
and trust and confidence. However, the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC and ruled that Orpilla was illegally
dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was validly dismissed from employment on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.

RULING: Yes, among the just causes for termination is the employer's loss of trust and confidence in its employee. Article
297 (c) [formerly Article 282] of the Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate the services of an employee for
fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed in him/her. In order for the said cause to be properly invoked, however, certain
requirements must be complied with, namely: (1) the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and
confidence; and (2) there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence.

It is undisputed that at the time of respondent's dismissal, she was holding a managerial position, which was HRAD Head
of Stradcom and directly reported to the President, herein Chua and other high ranking officials of Stradcom. Likewise,
respondent performed key and sensitive functions, as her duties and responsibilities included the administration,
personnel and training matters of the company. Respondent held a trust and critical position which required the
conscientious observance of the company rules and procedures. The presence of the first requisite is thus certain. Anent
to the second requisite, the Court finds that the petitioners meet their burden of proving that the respondent's dismissal
was for a just cause. The acts alleged to have caused the loss of trust and confidence of the petitioners in the respondent
was her mishandling of Stradcom's 2002 Christmas party, dishonesty in preparing the budget thereof, misrepresentation
in her application for employment, and using company personnel and resources for purposes not beneficial to the interest
of Stradcom. The evidence on record support Stradcom's claims. Nevertheless, SC held that even if there is a just cause
to terminate respondent's employment, her right to due process was not satisfied. Here, the cause for termination was
loss of trust and confidence but Stradcom failed to comply with the twin-notice requirement, thus, as a measure of equity,
the SC order Stradcom to pay respondent nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.

G.R. No. 225803, July 02, 2018

SHERYLL R. CABAÑAS v. ABELARDO G. LUZANO LAW OFFICE/ABELARDO G. LUZANO

FACTS: Complainant-herein petitioner Cabañas stated that she was employed as an Administrative Secretary for
respondent Abelardo G. Luzano Law Office from June 27, 2012 to September 18, 2013. She was tasked to act as
receptionist/lawyer's staff, monitor petty cash disbursements and office employees, make demand letters and do other
clerical tasks. Her performance was satisfactory as she was employed as a regular employee on January 30, 2013 per
her employment contract. Respondent Law Office is a service provider in the collection of delinquent credit cards and
personal loan accounts to different banks.

Sometime in 2013, Cabañas received a final warning in a Memorandum. The memorandum notified her that her
performance as Administrative Secretary failed to meet the performance requirements of the position due to the following:
(1) erroneous entry of data for the liquidation of petty cash; (2) erroneous computation of accounts for mailing; (3)
erroneous breakdown of expenses for cash payments; (4) instructions from colleagues are not being strictly followed; and
(5) not strict in releasing gas allowance for messengers. Cabañas was warned that a similar violation in the future would
mean termination of her employment. At this point, Cabañas said that the office manager, Mary Ann Detera, began
meddling with her office equipment. Detera would also lose her requests relating to the demand letters that she (Cabañas)

51
prepares. She was even asked to cover-up irregularities. Cabañas stated that as she was in charge of the petty cash
disbursements, which was used to defray the transport expenses of messengers, she would ask for receipts for the
disbursements of Jomari Delos Santos, a messenger assigned to Detera. Detera wanted her to cover-up any irregularity
which may have been committed by her messenger and not report the same to the General Manager. Cabañas' job
performance allegedly did not improve despite repeated warnings. Since the final warning did not work, a Memorandum
was issued, requiring Cabañas to explain why her employment will not be terminated due to gross incompetence and
negligence.

On September 20, 2013, Cabañas submitted her written explanation on the charges contained in the Memorandum dated
September 19, 2013. The following Monday, September 23, 2013, she stopped reporting for work. Since she abandoned
her work and went on absence without leave, respondents' decision whether to terminate her or not became moot and
academic.

On October 1, 2013, petitioner filed before the NLRC a Complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims against herein
respondent Abelardo G. Luzano Law Office and its manager, Mary Ann Z. Detera. LA held that Cabañas was illegally
dismissed and which was affirmed later by the NLRC. However, CA annulled and set aside the decision of NLRC. CA held
that Cabañas was not illegally dismissed but abandoned her job.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cabañas abandoned her employment.

RULING: No. Petitioner Cabañas has proven that she was dismissed since she was not only asked to resign by
respondent Atty. Luzano, which she refused to do, but on September 20, 2013, she was asked to turn over all the files
assigned to her, and when she asked Atty. Luzano why she was not given any work, she was told that it was her last day
of work and that her unpaid salary would just be deposited in her ATM account. The petitioner’s turnover of all the files in
her custody was considered an act of dismissal

As petitioner Cabañas has proven that she was dismissed, the burden to prove that such dismissal was not done illegally
is now shifted to her employer, respondents herein. It is incumbent upon the employer to show by substantial evidence
that the dismissal of the employee was validly made and failure to discharge that duty would mean that the dismissal is
not justified and therefore illegal.

Moreover, the termination of an employee must be effected in accordance with law. Therefore, the employer must furnish
the worker or employee sought to be dismissed with two (2) written notices, i.e., (a) notice which apprises the employee of
the particular acts or omissions for which his/her dismissal is sought; and (b) subsequent notice which informs the
employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him/her. In this case, as observed by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC,
respondents did not issue a notice to apprise/explain and a notice of termination on the ground of abandonment; hence,
respondents failed to comply with procedural due process.

G.R. No. 205688, July 04, 2018

VALENTINO S. LINGAT AND APRONIANO ALTOVEROS v. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., MONTE
DAPPLES TRADING, AND DAVID LYONS

FACTS: On May 5, 2008, petitioners filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees against Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. (CCBPI), Monte Dapples Trading Corp. (MDTC), and David Lyons (Lyons)
(respondents).

Petitioners averred in their Position Paper and Reply that, in August 1993 and January 1996, CCBPI employed Lingat and
Altoveros as plant driver and forklift operator, and segregator/mixer respectively. They added that they had continually
worked for CCBPI until their illegal dismissal in April 2005 (Lingat) and December 2005 (Altoveros).

According to petitioners, they were regular employees of CCBPI because it engaged them to perform tasks necessary
and desirable in its business or trade. They explained that CCBPI made them part of its operations, and without them its
products would not reach its clients. They asserted that their work was the link between CCBPI and its sales force.
Petitioners further stated, that after becoming regular employees (as they had been employed for more than a year), and
52
by way of a modus operandi, CCBPI transferred them from one agency to another. The latest agency to where they were
transferred was MDTC. They claimed that such transfer was a scheme to avoid their regularization in CCBPI. Finally,
petitioners argued that CCBPI dismissed them after it found out that they were "overstaying." As such, they posited that
they were illegally dismissed as their termination was without cause and due process of law.

The LA ruled that petitioners were illegally dismissed. On appeal, the NLRC dismissed the complaint of Lingat on the
ground of prescription while the complaint of Altoveros was bereft of merit. It, nonetheless, ordered MDTC to pay
Altoveros separation pay amounting to P10,725.00. The CA modified the decision of NLRC by ordering MDTC to pay
separation pay to both petitioners. Also, the CA found that the illegal dismissal case filed by Lingat had not yet prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are regular employees of CCBPI.

RULING: Yes, petitioners are regular employees of CCBPI. To ascertain if one is a regular employee, it is primordial to
determine the reasonable connection between the activity he or she performs and its relation to the trade or business of
the supposed employer. Relating petitioners' tasks to the nature of the business of CCBPI – which involved the
manufacture, distribution, and sale of soft drinks and other beverages – it cannot be denied that mixing and segregating
as well as loading and bringing of CCBPI's products to its customers involved distribution and sale of these items. Simply
put, petitioners' duties were reasonably connected to the very business of CCBPI. They were indispensable to such
business because without them the products of CCBPI would not reach its customers. Similarly, herein petitioners have
worked for CCBPI since 1993 (Lingat) and 1996 (Altoveros) until the non-renewal of their contracts in 2005. Aside from
the fact that their work involved the distribution and sale of the products of CCBPI, they remained to be working for CCBPI
despite having been transferred from one agency to another. Hence, such repeated re-hiring of petitioners, and the
performance of the same tasks for CCBPI established the necessity and the indispensability of their activities in its
business. Moreover, CCBPI and Lyons' contention that MDTC was a legitimate labor contractor and was the actual
employer of petitioners does not hold water.

Finally, as regular employees, petitioners may be dismissed only for cause and with due process. These requirements
were not complied with here. It was not disputed that petitioners ceased to perform their work when they were no longer
given any new assignment upon the alleged termination of the Warehousing Management Agreement between CCBPI
and MDTC. However, this is not a just or authorized cause to terminate petitioners' services. Otherwise stated, the
contract expiration was not a valid basis to dismiss petitioners from service. At the same time, there was no clear showing
that petitioners were afforded due process when they were terminated. Therefore, their dismissal was without valid cause
and due process of law; as such, the same was illegal.

G.R. No. 199162, July 04, 2018

PHIL-MAN MARINE AGENCY, INC., AND DOHLE (10M) LIMITED v. ANIANO P. DEDACE, JR., SUBSTITUTED BY
HIS SPOUSE LUCENA CAJES DEDACE, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF THEIR THREE [3] CHILDREN, NAMELY,
ANGELICA, ANGELO AND STEVE MAC, ALL SURNAMED DEDACE

FACTS: On 18 June 2003, petitioner Phil-Man Marine Agency, Inc, a domestic corporation, engaged the services of
respondent Dedace, Jr. to work on board the vessel M/V APL Shanghai for and on behalf of its principal, the petitioner
Dohle (IOM) Limited. Sometime in January 2004, Dedace started feeling frequent intermittent pains on his lower right
abdomen and left groin. On 20 February 2004, he was admitted in Singapore where he was examined and attended to by
Dr. CK Lee which diagnosed him to be suffering from Disseminated Sepsis with Multiple Liver Abscesses. Consequently,
he was repatriated to the Philippines on 1 March 2004, and was referred to Dr. Cruz. It appeared that Phil-Man inquired
from Dr. Cruz on whether Dedace's illness was work-related. In his Reply, dated 20 May 2004, Dr. Cruz stated that their
gastroenterologist was of the opinion that Dedace's illness is not work-related.

On 7 June 2004, Phil-Man, through its President/General Manager, Captain Gacutan wrote a letter to Dedace informing
him that his illness is not work-related and therefore not compensable. Dedace was further informed that all payments and

53
treatment will be stopped and any further claims with regard to his condition shall likewise be denied. This denial
prompted Dedace to file his claims before the NLRC.

LA ruled that Dedace's illness was not work-related. It observed that Dedace failed to prove that his “Disseminated Sepsis
with Multiple Liver Abscesses” is among the compensable occupational diseases. Nevertheless, the LA awarded Dedace
sickness allowance equivalent to thirty (30) days of pay. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA. Nevertheless, the CA
overturn the decision of NLRC since the company failed to overcome the disputable presumption that Dedace's illness
was work-related.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dedace's illness is workrelated.

RULING: Yes, Dedace's illness is work-related. The company-designated physician failed to make an assessment within
the 120-day period. Every employment contract between a Filipino seafarer and his employer is governed, not only by
their mutual agreements, but also by the provisions of the POEA-SEC, as provided under Department Order No. 4, series
of 2000 of the DOLE, which contains the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing The Employment of Filipino
Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels. For disability to be compensable under Section 20(B) of the 2000 POEA-
SEC, it must be the result of a work-related injury or a work-related illness. The POEA-SEC defines work-related injury as
"injuries resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the course of employment." On the other hand, work-related
illness has been defined as "any sickness resulting in disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed
under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied."

However, the POEA-SEC's definition of a work-related illness does not necessarily mean that only those illnesses listed
under Section 32-A are compensable. Section 20(B)(4) of the POEA-SEC provides that illnesses not listed under Section
32 are disputably presumed as work-related. This disputable presumption operates in favor of the employee as the
burden rests upon his employer to overcome the statutory presumption. Hence, unless contrary evidence is presented by
the seafarer's employer, this disputable presumption stands.

In this case, the SC agrees with the CA that the petitioners failed to overcome the presumption that Dedace's illness is
work-related. Dr. Cruz's reply, dated 20 May 2004, in response to Phil-Man's query on whether Dedace's illness is work-
related, cannot be considered as an effective assessment for purposes of the POEA-SEC. The statement that his illness
is not workrelated was not sufficiently explained. The aforesaid statement was unsubstantial to support respondents'
position that Dedace's illness is not compensable. The POEA-SEC requires the company-designated physician to make
an assessment on the medical condition of the seafarer within 120 days from the seafarer's repatriation. Otherwise, the
seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled. It must be stressed that the duty of a seafarer to consult with
his own physician arises only if the company-designated physician was able to issue an assessment within 120-days from
the date of his repatriation. In this case, since the petitioners' companydesignated physician, Dr. Cruz, failed to make an
assessment within the aforesaid period, Dedace's failure to adduce a medical certificate from a physician of his choice is
not fatal to his cause. It is not the issuance of a medical certificate showing that the seafarer's illness is work-related or
that he is totally and permanently unfit for sea duties which makes the employer liable. A seafarer's cause of action for
total and permanent disability benefits accrues when, among others, the company-designated physician fails to issue a
declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or disability rating even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there
is no indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary total disability.

G.R. No. 229920, July 04, 2018

SAMUEL MAMARIL v. THE RED SYSTEM COMPANY, INC., DANILO PADRIGON, AGNES TUNPALAN,
ALEJANDRO ALVAREZ, JODERICK LOZANO, ENRIQUE ROMMEL MIRAFLORES, DOMINGO RIVERO

FACTS: Red System is a company engaged in the business of transporting Coca-Cola Products from Coca-Cola
warehouses to its various customers. Red System owns and operates several delivery trucks. Red System employed
Mamaril as a delivery service representative. He was assigned in Davao and was tasked to transport goods from various
depots to the end users.

Prior to his employment as a delivery service representative, Mamaril was required to undergo seminars to orient him on
the rules and regulations of Red System. During the orientation, drivers, were reminded to always observe the following
safety rules, namely, to put a tire choke (kalso), engage the hand brake, and shift the transmission to first gear, before
leaving the parked vehicle. Apparently, three days after Mamaril's employment, he failed to put a tire choke, and worse,
shifted the gear to neutral after parking the truck he was driving. This caused the truck to move, which caused damage
valued at Php 14,556.00. Mamaril did not report the incident, and even concealed the matter. Upon discovering Mamaril's
mishap, he was immediately re-assigned as a warehouse yard driver. However, days after the transfer, he was involved in

54
yet another accident and caused damage amounting to Php 25,500.00. Mamaril concealed the matter again. Red System
suddenly received a Job Order amounting to Php 25,500.00, for the repair of the truck. Surprised and curious as to how
the truck incurred such heavy damage, Red System conducted an investigation. The investigation pointed to Mamaril as
the person responsible for the damage. Red System sent a Notice to Explain. In the said Notice, Mamaril was likewise
apprised that the charges against him were serious and may warrant the penalty of dismissal. He submitted his written
explanation, where he admitted that he violated the safety rules, which caused damage to the truck. Red System held an
administrative hearing. Mamaril admitted that his failure to engage the hand brake and put a tire choke on the vehicle
resulted to damage. Additionally, Red System discovered during the investigation that Mamaril had also committed
several other infractions that were not reported to the company, such as pilferage, tardiness and other violations of the
company's safety rules. To protect the safety of the company personnel and equipment, Red System placed Mamaril
under preventive suspension for a period of one month, which took effect on August 3, 2012. Subsequently, prior to the
expiration of the 30-day preventive suspension, Raga contacted Mamaril and told him to report for work on September 4,
2012. He did not comply with the directive, and belatedly returned on September 18, 2012.

After the completion of the administrative investigation, Red System found Mamaril guilty of violating the Company Code
of Conduct. Accordingly, he was terminated for willful disobedience and willful breach of trust as provided under Article
297 of the Labor Code. Aggrieved, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with damages and attorney's fees. LA
dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal. NLRC affirmed the decision of LA but awarded 13th month pay and SIL pay
in favor of Mamaril. CA affirmed the decision of NLRC.

ISSUE: WON Mamaril was illegally dismissed by Red System.

RULING: No, Mamaril was validly dismissed on account of his willful disobedience of the lawful orders of Red System.
Article 297 of the Labor Code affirms the right of an employer to dismiss an employee on account of the latter's willful
disobedience. Jurisprudence provides that for an employee to be validly dismissed on the ground of willful disobedience,
the employer must prove by substantial evidence that: (i) "the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or
intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (ii) the order violated must have
been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to
discharge."

Red System imposed stringent guidelines to ensure the safe and efficient delivery of all the products. It bears noting that
Red System was not remiss in reminding its drivers of the importance of abiding by their safety regulations. To ensure a
strict observance of the rules, the company required its drivers to attend various safety seminars. In fact, Mamaril
attended a pre-orientation seminar and five safety seminars over the course of his two-year stint. Added to this, the safety
rules were also written in Red System's Code of Conduct. There can be no doubt as to the lawfulness, reasonableness
and necessity of Red System's safety instructions. Moreover, the rules pertained to the duties performed by Mamaril.
Accordingly, Mamaril was duty-bound to comply with such safety orders, as his main task consisted in driving and
delivering fragile products. This notwithstanding, Mamaril still willfully and negligently failed to abide by the safety rules.
Mamaril violated Red System's safety rules twice, and caused damage amounting to over Php 40,000.00. To make
matters worse, he even deliberately and willfully concealed his wrongdoings. Such deliberate violation of the rules,
coupled with the perversity of concealing the incidents, patently show a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering
Mamaril 's acts inconsistent with proper subordination. Indubitably, this shows that Mamaril was indeed guilty of willful
disobedience of Red System's lawful orders.

G.R. No. 200712, July 04, 2018

MARIO A. ABUDA, RODOLFO DEL REMEDIOS ET.AL v. L. NATIVIDAD POULTRY FARMS, JULIANA NATIVIDAD
AND MERLINDA NATIVIDAD

FACTS: The workers of L. Natividad Poultry filed complaints for "illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, overtime pay,
holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, thirteenth month pay, and moral and
exemplary damages" against it and its owner, Juliana Natividad and manager, Merlinda Natividad. The workers claimed
that L. Natividad employed and terminated their employment after several years of employment. These workers are
Maintenance Personnel assigned in the farm and sales outlets. Petitioners also stated that as maintenance personnel,
they repaired and maintained L. Natividad's livestock and poultry houses, facilities, and sales outlets. They worked from
Monday to Saturday, from 7:15 a.m. to 5:15 p.m., with their attendance checked by the guard on duty.

LA Jerez dismissed the complaint due to lack of employer-employee relationship between the workers and L. Natividad.
He ruled that San Mateo General Services (San Mateo), Wilfredo Broñola (Broñola), and Rodolfo Del Remedios (Del
Remedios) were the real employers as they were the ones who employed the workers, not L. Natividad. The workers
appealed LA’s decision, and on August 31, 2010, NLRC modified the assailed Decision. NLRC found that the workers
55
were hired as maintenance personnel by San Mateo and Del Remedios on pakyaw basis to perform specific services for
L. Natividad. However, it found Broñola, Jeremias Capellan (Jeremias), Arnel Capellan (Arnel), Temmie Nawal (Nawal),
and Eduardo Capillan (Eduardo) to be regular employees and ordered L. Natividad to reinstate them and pay their
thirteenth month pay and service incentive leave pay.

The CA modified the decision of NLRC and ruled that San Mateo and Del Remedios were labor-only contractors, and as
such, they must be considered as L. Natividad's agents. It deemed them to be L. Natividad's regular employees. However,
the CA upheld the NLRC’s finding that the maintenance personnel were only hired on a pakyaw basis to perform
necessary repairs or construction within the farm as the need arose. As for the issue of illegal dismissal, CA also affirmed
the finding that the workers failed to substantiate their bare allegation that L. Natividad verbally notified them of their
dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the maintenance personnel in L. Natividad Poultry Farms can be considered as its regular
employees.

RULING: Yes, a careful review of petitioners' activity as maintenance personnel and of the entirety of respondents'
business convinced the SC that they performed activities which were necessary and desirable to respondents' business of
poultry and livestock production. Respondents did not refute petitioners' claims that they continuously worked for
respondents for a period ranging from 3 years to 17 years. Thus, even if the CA is of the opinion that carpentry and
masonry are not necessary or desirable to the business of livestock and poultry production, the nature of their
employment could have been characterized as being under the second par.of Article 280. Thus, petitioners' service of
more than 1 year to respondents has made them regular employees for so long as the activities they were required to do
subsist.

As maintenance personnel, petitioners performed "repair works and maintenance services such as fixing livestock and
poultry houses and facilities as well as doing construction activities within the premises of L. Natividad's farms and other
sales outlets for an uninterrupted period of 3 to 17 years." Respondents had several farms and offices in Quezon City and
Montalban, including Patiis Farm, where petitioners were regularly deployed to perform repair and maintenance work.

The necessity or desirability of the work performed by an employee can be inferred from the length of time that an
employee has been performing this work. If an employee has been employed for at least one (1) year, he or she is
considered a regular employee by operation of law. Being regular employees, petitioners, who were maintenance
personnel, enjoyed security of tenure and the termination of their services without just cause entitles them to
reinstatement and full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits.

G.R. No. 209166, July 09, 2018

DEMETRIO ELLAO Y DELA VEGA v. BATANGAS I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (BATELEC I), RAQUEL
ROWENA RODRIGUEZ BOARD PRESIDENT

FACTS: BATELEC I is an electric cooperative engaged in the business of distributing electric power in the province of
Batangas. Petitioner, Ellao was employed by BATELEC I initially as Office Supplies and Equipment Control Officer until
he was appointed as General Manager.

A complaint was filed against Ellao, charging him of committing irregularities in the discharge of his functions as General
Manager and he was eventually placed under preventive suspension. Ellao submitted his explanation refuting the charges
against him. The scheduled hearing was postponed at Ellao's instance. The re-scheduled hearing did not push through,
and instead, the fact-finding body issued a report recommending Ellao's termination. The Board of Directors adopted and
issued Board Resolution No. 24-09 terminating Ellao on the grounds of gross and habitual neglect of duties and
responsibilities and willful disobedience or insubordination resulting to loss of trust and confidence.

56
On December 9, 2009, the NEA confirmed BATELEC I's board resolution and approved Ellao's termination. Ellao filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims before the LA against BATELEC I and/or its President Rowena A.
Rodriguez. Ellao complained that the charges against him were unsubstantiated and that there was no compliance with
procedural due process as he was not afforded the opportunity to explain and there was no written notice of termination
specifying the grounds of his termination. BATELEC I, on the other hand, moved to dismiss Ellao's complaint on the
ground that it is the NEA and not the NLRC which has jurisdiction over the complaint. Assuming the NLRC enjoys
jurisdiction, BATELEC I nevertheless asserts that Ellao was validly dismissed.

LA rendered his decision affirming jurisdiction over the complaint. It held that Ellao was illegally dismissed as the grounds
for his dismissal were unsubstantiated. The NLRC held that BATELEC I is not a corporation registered with the SEC, but
that it was formed and organized pursuant to P.D. 269 and that Ellao is not an officer but a mere employee. The CA found
that Ellao, as BATELEC I's General Manager, is a corporate officer. As such, the CA concluded that Ellao's dismissal is
considered an intra-corporate controversy which falls under the jurisdiction of the SEC, now the RTC's, and not with the
NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not jurisdiction over Ellao's complaint for illegal dismissal belong to the labor tribunals.

RULING: No, labor tribunals have no jurisdiction over the complaint of Ellao. Complaints for illegal dismissal filed by a
cooperative officer constitute an intra-cooperative controversy, jurisdiction over which belongs to the regional trial courts.

By jurisprudence, termination disputes involving corporate officers are treated differently from illegal dismissal cases
lodged by ordinary employees. An "office" is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected by the
directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an "employee" usually occupies no office and generally is employed not by
action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the
compensation to be paid to such employee. As a rule, the illegal dismissal of an officer or other employee of a private
employer is properly cognizable by the LA pursuant to Article 217 (a)238 of the Labor Code, as amended. By way of
exception, where the complaint for illegal dismissal involves a corporate officer, the controversy falls under the jurisdiction
of the SEC, because the controversy arises out of intra-corporate or partnership relations between and among
stockholders, members, or associates, or between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership, or association of
which they are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership, or
association and the State insofar as the controversy concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; or
because the controversy involves the election or appointment of a director, trustee, officer, or manager of such
corporation, partnership, or association. With the advent of R.A. 8799 or The Securities Regulation Code, the SEC's
jurisdiction over all intra-corporate disputes was transferred to the regional trial courts.

Evidently, the functions of the office of the General Manager, i.e., management of the Cooperative and to keep the Board
fully informed of all aspects of the operations and activities of the Cooperative are specifically laid down under BATELEC
I's By-laws itself. It is therefore beyond cavil that Ellao's position as General Manager is a cooperative office. Accordingly,
his complaint for illegal dismissal partakes of the nature of an intra-cooperative controversy; it involves a dispute between
a cooperative officer on one hand, and the Board of Directors, on the other. An officer's dismissal is a matter that comes
with the conduct and management of the affairs of a cooperative and/or an intra-cooperative controversy, and that nature
is not altered by reason or wisdom that the Board of Directors may have in taking such action. Accordingly, the case a quo
is not a labor dispute requiring the expertise of the LA or of the National Labor Relations Commission. It is an intra-
cooperative dispute that is within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018
THE PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PBOAP), THE SOUTHERN LUZON
BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC. (SO-LUBOA), THE INTER CITY BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION
(INTERBOA), AND THE CITY OF SAN JOSE DEL MONTE BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION (CSJDMBOA)
v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE) AND LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND
REGULATORY BOARD (LTFRB)

FACTS: To ensure road safety and address the risk-taking behavior of bus drivers as its declared objective, the LTFRB
issued Memorandum Circular No. 2012-0011 on January 4, 2012, requiring "all Public Utility Bus operators ... to secure
Labor Standards Compliance Certificates" under pain of revocation of their existing certificates of public convenience or
denial of an application for a new certificate. Five days later, the DOLE issued Department Order No. 118-12, elaborating
on the part-fixed-part-performance-based compensation system referred to in the LTFRB Memorandum Circular No.
2012-001. Department Order No. 118-12, among others, provides for the rule for computing the fixed and the
performance-based component of a public utility bus driver's or conductor's wage.

57
On January 28, 2012, Atty. Emmanuel A. Mahipus, on behalf of different bus operators association wrote to then
Secretary of Labor and Employment Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz, requesting to defer the implementation of Department
Order No. 118-12. The request, however, was not acted upon. Meanwhile, on February 27, 2012 and in compliance with
Rule III, Section 3 of Department Order No. 118-12, the National Wages and Productivity Commission issued NWPC
Guidelines No. 1 to serve as Operational Guidelines on Department Order No. 118-12.

On July 4, 2012, petitioners filed before this Court a Petition with Urgent Request for Immediate Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, impleading the DOLE and the LTFRB as respondents. They
pray that this Court enjoin the implementation of Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001
for being violative of their right to due process, equal protection, and nonimpairment of obligation of contracts.

ISSUE: Whether or not Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 is constitutional.

RULING: The SC dismiss the Petition. Petitioners fail to respect the doctrine of hierarchy of courts by directly invoking this
Court's jurisdiction without any special reason. They fail to present an actual controversy ripe for adjudication and do not
even have the requisite standing to file this case. Lastly, petitioners fail to show the unconstitutionality of the DOLE
Department Order No. 118-12 and the LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001.

These regulations and guidelines put an end to the long-standing boundary payment scheme (i.e., purely commission-
based compensation scheme) for public utility bus drivers and conductors. LTFRB MC No. 2012-001 now requires all
PUB operators to secure a Labor Standards Compliance Certificate and provides for part-fixed-part-performance-based
compensation system for PUB drivers and conductors.

DOLE D.O. No. 118-12 elaborates on the part-fixed-part-performance-based compensation and computation of the new
payment scheme. These rules and policies seek to provide PUB drivers and conductors better economic status and
ensure the general welfare of the riding public. The part-fixed-part-performance-based compensation scheme means that
PUB drivers and conductors shall now receive fixed wages and additional performance-based pay. The fixed wage shall
be in amount mutually agreed upon by the owner/operator and shall not be lower than the applicable minimum wage in
the region. The performance-based component shall be based on the net income of the PUB operator or owner and on
employee safety records, such as involvement in road accidents, commission of traffic violations, and observance of
elementary courtesies of the road. PUB drivers and conductors shall also be entitled to other mandatory compensation
such as overtime, night shift differential, rest day, and service incentive leave pays.

In holding that D.O. No. 118-12 and LTFRB MC No. 2012-001 do not violate the non-impairment clause, the Supreme
Court reasoned that not all contracts are protected under the non-impairment clause. Contracts that touch upon public
welfare are contingent on the police power of the State and their terms may be altered in whole or in part without
contravening the Constitution. The Supreme Court stated that the relations between capital and labor are not merely
contractual and labor contracts are impressed with public interest. The Supreme Court also emphasized that certificates
of public convenience granted to bus operators are subject to amendment. By imposing this compensation scheme, the
State upholds the Constitutional mandate to protect and provide a decent living wage to labor.

G.R. No. 221813, July 23, 2018

MARICALUM MINING CORPORATION v. ELY G. FLORENTINO, GLENN BUENVIAJE, RUDY J. GOMEZ, REPRESENTED BY HIS
HEIRS THELMA GOMEZ, ALEJANDRO H. SITCHON, NENET ARITA, FERNANDO SIGUAN, DENNIS ABELIDA, NOEL S.
ACCOLADOR, WILFREDO TAGANILE, SR., MARTIR S. AGSOY, SR., MELCHOR APUCAY, DOMINGO LAVIDA, JESUS
MOSQUEDA, RUELITO A. VILLARMIA, SOFRONIO M. AYON, EFREN T. GENISE, ALQUIN A. FRANCO, PABLO L. ALEMAN,
PEPITO G. HEPRIANA, ELIAS S. TRESPECES, EDGAR SOBRINO

G.R. No. 222723, July 23, 2018

ELY FLORENTINO, GLENN BUENVIAJE, RUDY J. GOMEZ, REPRESENTED BY HIS HEIRS THELMA GOMEZ, FERNANDO
SIGUAN, DENNIS ABELIDA, NOEL S. ACCOLADOR,WILFREDO TAGANILE, SR., MARTIR S. AGSOY, SR., MELCHOR APUCAY,
DOMINGO LAVIDA, JESUS MOSQUEDA, RUELITO A. VILLARMIA, SOFRONIO M. AYON, EFREN T. GENISE, ALQUIN A.
FRANCO, PABLO L. ALEMAN, PEPITO G. HEPRIANA, ELIAS S. TRESPECES, EDGAR SOBRINO, ALEJANDRO H. SITCHON,
NENET ARITA, WELILMO T. NERI, ERLINDA FERNANDEZ, AND EDGARDO PEÑAFLORIDA,  v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION - 7TH DIVISION, CEBU CITY, "G" HOLDINGS, INC., AND TEODORO G. BERNARDINO, ROLANDO DEGOJAS,
MARICALUM MINING CORPORATION.

FACTS: The dispute traces its roots back to when PNB and DBP transferred its ownership of Maricalum Mining to the National
Government for disposition or privatization because it had become a non-performing asset. On October 2, 1992, the National
58
Government thru the Asset Privatization Trust executed a Purchase and Sale Agreement with G Holdings, a domestic corporation.
Afterwards, some of Maricalum Mining's employees retired and formed several manpower cooperatives. In 2000, each of the said
cooperatives executed identical sets of Memorandum of Agreement with Maricalum Mining wherein they undertook, among others, to
provide the latter with a steady supply of workers, machinery and equipment for a monthly fee.

On June 1, 2001, Maricalum Mining's Vice President and Resident Manager wrote a Memorandum to the cooperatives informing them
that Maricalum Mining has decided to stop its mining and milling operations effective July 1, 2001 in order to avert continuing losses
brought about by the low metal prices and high cost of production. On December 2, 2010, complainants and CeMPC, one of the
cooperatives formed, Chairman Sitchon filed the complaint for illegal dismissal and corresponding monetary claims with the LA against
G Holdings, its officerin-charge and CeMPC. Thereafter, the complaints were consolidated by the LA. The LA ruled in favor of
complainants. It held that G Holdings is guilty of labor-only contracting with the manpower cooperatives thereby making all of them
solidarily and directly liable to complainants. The NLRC modified the LA ruling. It held that Neri, Fernandez and Sobrino are not entitled
to the monetary awards because they were not able to establish the fact of their employment relationship with G Holdings or Maricalum
Mining because Sipalay Hospital has a separate and distinct corporate personality. As to the remaining complainants, it found that no
evidence was adduced to prove that the salaries and the 13th month pay had been paid. However, the NLRC imposed the liability of
paying the monetary awards imposed by the LA against Maricalum Mining, instead of G Holdings, stating that it was the former, not G
Holdings who entered into service contracts by way of a Memorandum of Agreement with each of the manpower cooperatives.
Complainants and Maricalum Mining filed their respective motions for reconsideration before the NLRC. The CA affirmed the NLRC in
all respects. The CA denied the petitions and affirmed the decision of the NLRC. It ratiocinated that factual issues are not fit subjects for
review via the extraordinary for review via the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case may be remanded to labor tribunal

RULING: No. In the case at bar, Maricalum Mining is seeking to have the case remanded because the LA allegedly miscomputed the
amount of the monetary awards. However, it failed to offer any reasonable argument why the proceedings conducted before the NLRC
or LA were "grossly inadequate to settle factual issues," especially as regards the computation of monetary awards. Its bare allegations
- that the monetary awards were improperly computed because prescribed claims have been granted, that the net surpluses of the
manpower cooperative were not properly distributed, and that the awards in favor of some of the complainants were improbable - do
not warrant the invocation of SC’s power to have the case remanded back to the LA. Also, it is not imperative for the Court to remand
the case to the LA for the determination of the amounts of net surpluses that each of the manpower cooperatives had received from
Maricalum Mining. The records show that Maricalum Mining was guilty of entering into a labor-only contracting arrangement with the
manpower cooperatives, thus, all of them are solidarily liable to the complainants by virtue of Article 10644 of the Labor Code.

The SC held that it is not imperative to remand the case to the LA for the determination of the amounts of net surpluses that each of the
manpower cooperatives had received from Maricalum Minng. The records show that Maricalum mining was guilty of entering into a
labor-only contracting arrangement with the manpower cooperatives, thus, all of them are solidarily liable to the complainants by virtue
of Article 106 of the Labor Code.

G.R. No. 220898, July 23, 2018

MON C. ANUAT v. PACIFIC OCEAN MANNING, INC./TRAS STAR SHIPPING AGENCY CORPORATION, MASSOEL
MERIDIAN LTD. AND/OR HERNANDO S. EUSEBIO

FACTS: Petitioner Mon C. Anuat (Anuat) was hired by Pacific, a domestic corporation which is licensed to engage in the
recruitment and deployment of Filipino seafarers on board the vessel M/V Satigny. Pacific and Anuat entered into a POEA
standard employment contract. However, Anuat had an accident during unloading operations in Venezuela. He suffered
injuries on his neck, back and knee. Anuat was confined in the hospital in Venezuela and was advised by the hospital
physician to continue treatment in the Philippines. Anuat was referred to Dr. Cruz, Pacific's company-designated
physician. Anuat's MRI examinations showed that Anuat's lumbosacral spine still suffered from "disc dessication and mild
loss of height at L5-S1 with associated annular tear/fissure”; that his left knee still suffered from an "inferior surface tear
involving the body and posterior horn of the medial meniscus." Dr. Cruz found that Anuat still suffered from a blunt
traumatic injury in his back, muscular spasm of the cervical muscle, swelling and medial meniscus tear in his left knee. Dr.
Cruz recommended that Anuat undergo surgery to repair his left knee and was advised to come back but he did not come
back.

59
Anuat claimed that after surgery and despite a month of physical therapy his condition did not improve and he continued
to suffer pain in his left knee. Anuat claimed that due to his injuries he could no longer work as an able seaman. Hence,
he filed a Complaint with the LA for total and permanent disability benefits, reimbursement of medical expenses, sickness
allowance, damages and attorney's fees against Pacific. He alleged that the injuries he sustained during his employment
contract with Pacific were undoubtedly work-connected. The Labor Arbiter granted total and permanent disability benefits
to Anuat. Anuat filed a Memorandum of Partial Appeal with the NLRC, claiming that the CBA should apply in the
determination of the amount of total and permanent disability and that attorney's fees should likewise be awarded
because he was compelled to litigate and incur expenses for litigation. The NLRC granted Anuat's Memorandum of Partial
Appeal and modified the Labor Arbiter's Decision. The CA granted Pacific's petition for certiorari. The CA held that Anuat's
cause of action for total and permanent disability had not yet accrued. The CA ruled that the extension of another 120
days is justified since Anuat was required by Pacific's company-designated physician to have further treatment on 30
September 2011, but Anuat decided to file his disability claim instead on 26 October 2011.
ISSUE: Whether or not Anuat is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits under the Labor Code.

RULING: No. Anuat's cause of action for total and permanent disability benefits has not yet accrued. By jurisprudence, in
disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather the incapacity to work resulting in the
impairment of one's earning capacity. Thus, as a general rule, permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform
his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. However, the Rules
provide that the period of 120 days may be extended to 240 days when further medical treatment is required.

In the present case, Anuat was initially diagnosed by the company-designated physician as having sustained a blunt
traumatic back and head whiplash injury. Pacific's company-designated physician found that Anuat was still experiencing
moderate pain on both the lumbosacral region and his left knee. The report also stated that Anuat's physical therapy was
still on-going. On 22 September 2011, Pacific's company-designated physician once again examined Anuat and issued a
medical report recommending that Anuat undergo further surgery to medically repair the existing tear in his left knee.
Lastly, Anuat was advised by the company-designated physician to come back on 30 September 2011. But Anuat no
longer went back to Pacific's company-designated physician on the said date. Instead, Anuat filed a claim against Pacific
for total and permanent disability benefits on 26 October 2011 or 160 days from the onset of his work-connected injury.

SC ruled that Anuat prematurely filed his total and permanent disability claim. When Anuat filed his disability claim he was
still under medical treatment by Pacific's company-designated physician. Notably, the 240-day extended period of medical
treatment provided by Sections 2 and 3(1), Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation had not yet
lapsed. Pacific was still addressing Anuat's medical condition and the company-designated physician was still in the
process of determining whether Anuat was permanently disabled or fit to resume his duties as an able seaman. Following
Gomez v. Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., Anuat's temporary total disability had not yet become permanent since the
240-day extended period for Anuat's medical treatment had not yet lapsed when he filed his claim. However, he is still
entitled to partial and permanent disability benefits of "Grade 10" and "Grade 11" in accordance with the CBA.

G.R. No. 229955, July 23, 2018

MELCHOR BARCENAS DEOCARIZA v. FLEET MANAGEMENT SERVICES PHILIPPINES, INC., MODERN ASIA
SHIPPING CORPORATION, A.B.F. GAVIOLA, JR., AND MA. CORAZON CRUZ

FACTS: Petitioner was initially hired in 2010 as Chief Officer by Fleet Management Services Philippines., Inc., for and in
behalf of its principal, Modern Asia Shipping Corporation (collectively, respondents) on board the vessel, M.V. Morning
Carina. On June 15, 2011, he was re-hired by respondents for the same position under a six month contract with a basic
monthly salary of US$1,350.00, exclusive of overtime pay and other benefits, and covered by a CBA. His duties entailed,
among others, the supervision in the loading and unloading of vehicles in the vessel. After undergoing the required pre-
employment medical examination, where the company-designated physician declared him fit for sea duty, petitioner
boarded the vessel on July 19, 2011.

In the course of his employment, petitioner complained of bruises on both thighs, rashes on his neck, delayed healing of
abrasion wound on his left forearm, fever, sore throat, and loss of appetite. Thus, on December 18, 2011, he was brought
to the Medical Center in Singapore, where he was noted to have "decreased hemoglobin, total white cell count and
platelet count on complete blood count" for which reason he was declared a "high-risk patient with mechanical heart
valves." Petitioner was thereafter confined with the following diagnosis: "to Consider Autoimmune Disease, Hypoplastic
Anemia, Viral induced Pantocytopenia and Acute Leukemia.” He was medically repatriated and was, consequently,
60
referred to a company-designated physician at the Metropolitan Medical Center who diagnosed him to be suffering from
"Aplastic Anemia."

The company-designated physician expressed that the work-relatedness of petitioner's illness would depend on his
exposure to such factors. However, the company-designated physician informed respondents that after petitioner was
seen on August 29, 2012, the latter no longer appeared at his next scheduled follow-up session on September 3, 2012.
Meanwhile, claiming that his illness rendered him incapacitated to resume work as a seafarer for more than 240 days,
petitioner filed a complaint for the payment of total and permanent disability benefits in accordance with the CBA, in the
amount of US$148,500.00, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees, before the NLRC. The LA dismissed the
complaint for failure of petitioner to establish that his illness was work-related. NLRC agreed with the findings of the LA
that petitioner was not able to discharge the burden of proving that his non-listed illness was work-related, and that the
same occurred during the term of his employment. The CA affirmed the decision of NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly held that petitioner is not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.

RULING: No, petitioner is entitled to the payment of total and permanent disability benefits.

It is settled that the entitlement of a seafarer on overseas employment to disability benefits is governed by law, by the
parties' contracts, and by the medical findings. By law, the relevant statutory provisions are Articles 197 to 19953 (formerly
Articles 191 to 193) of the Labor Code in relation to Section 2 (a), Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employee
Compensation.

Pursuant to Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, the employer is liable for disability benefits when the seafarer suffers
from a work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract. In this regard, Section 20 (E) thereof mandates the
seafarer to disclose all his pre-existing illnesses or conditions in his PEME; failing in which shall disqualify him from
receiving disability compensation. Petitioner's illness is an occupational disease listed under Sub-Item Number 7 of
Section 32-A of the 2010 POEA-SEC

According to records, it was not disputed that petitioner, as Chief Officer, actively supervised the loading and unloading
operations of cars/motor vehicles in every voyage that constantly exposed him to an atmosphere of cargoes with nearly
6,000 cars in just one voyage alone. Benzene, an important component of gasoline, is emitted from the engines of these
cars in the course of their loading and unloading. Since studies show that Benzene is highly volatile, and exposure occurs
mostly through inhalation, it cannot be denied that petitioner was constantly exposed to the hazards of benzene in the
course of his employment. The use of safety gears in the performance of his duties, as advanced by respondents, did not
foreclose the possibility of petitioner's exposure to such harmful chemical, given that he was in fact diagnosed with
Aplastic Anemia brought about by chronic exposure to benzene. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is evident that
petitioner's illness is clearly work-related in accordance with the POEA-SEC.

G.R. No. 229192, July 23, 2018

MAGSAYSAY MOL MARINE,INC. AND/OR MOL SHIP MANAGEMENT (SINGAPORE) PTE. LTD v. MICHAEL
PADERES ATRAJE

FACTS: On February 11, 2014, Atraje entered into a Contract of Employment with Mol Ship, through its local manning
agent, Magsaysay Mol, to work on board the vessel Carnation Ace as Second Cook. The employment contract was for 9
months with a basic monthly salary of US$599.00. It was his 7th contract with the company. On March 4, 2014, Atraje
slipped and fell while holding a casserole containing water and sliced vegetables. His head hit the stainless disposer and
the floor. He had seizure and lost his consciousness for about five hours. He was diagnosed to have suffered Epileptic
Seizure with post-fit neurological deficit. He was declared unfit to work and recommended to be repatriated. He arrived in
the Philippines on March 12, 2014, and was referred to Shiphealth, Inc. for further medical evaluation and treatment.
Atraje was examined by an Orthopedic Spine Surgeon wherein the assessment was Ossified Posterior Longitudinal
Ligament. Atraje completed his 12 sessions of physical therapy. However, persistence of gait instability and weakness on
his left side were still noted. Additionally, he reported intermittent recurrences of lower back pain. On June 25, 2014 or
105 days from disembarkation, Shiphealth issued an Interim Disability Grading of Grade 10. In a letter Dr. Quetulio, the
Medical Director of Ygeia Medical Center, stated that Atraje's illnesses are not work-related.

Atraje sought payment of disability benefits from Magsaysay Mol and Mol Ship, invoking Article 28 of the CBA between
All Japan Seamen's Union/Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines, and Mol Ship, represented
61
by Magsaysay Mol. However, Atraje's demands proved futile. Thus, he filed a complaint against Magsaysay Mol and Mol
Ship for payment of total and permanent disability benefits, damages, and attorney's fees. The parties agreed to terminate
the mediation and to convene a Voluntary Arbitration Panel. The Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators of NCMB awarded
disability benefits of US$95,949.00 plus 10% of this amount as attorney's fees in favor of Atraje. The CA affirmed the
Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators' decision and denied Magsaysay Mol and Mol Ship's subsequent motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether respondent is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

RULING: Yes, respondent is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.The argument that respondent's illnesses are
not work-related is without merit. Petitioner anchor their position on Dr. Quetulio's declaration in her letter that without any
past medical results or examinations, it was difficult to trace the causes of the illnesses, thereby concluding that they were
not work-related. However, the same letter relied upon by petitioners likewise acknowledged that "Herniated Nucleus
Pulposus is considered work-related if there is history of trauma or carrying of heavy objects. Carpal Tunnel Syndrome is
considered work-related if there is history of repetitive movement of the involved wrist/hand." In this case, it has been
established that there was history of trauma at work involving respondent while on board the vessel. The Panel of VA held
that substantial evidence exists showing that respondent indeed suffered a fall while on board the ship, which caused
injury to his neck area and his wrist.

To be compensable, reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation, is sufficient. "Thus, probability, not
the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings." The SC agreed with the VA and the CA
that respondent's illnesses are work-related.

Furthermore, petitioners argue that referral to a third doctor in case of conflicting findings of the company-designated
doctor and the seafarer's personal doctor is mandatory. Since respondent failed to comply with this requirement, the
assessment of the company-designated doctor should prevail. Under Section 20(A)(3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, "If a
doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the
Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties." The assessment refers
to the declaration of fitness to work or the degree of disability, as can be gleaned from the first paragraph of Section 20(A)
(3). It presupposes that the company-designated physician came up with a valid, final, and definite assessment on the
seafarer's fitness or unfitness to work before the expiration of the 120- or 240-day period. In this case, the third doctor-
referral provision does not apply because there is no definite disability assessment from the company-designated
physicians. The rigorous process for disability claims prescribed in the POEA SEC seeks a balance between a seafarer's
right to receive a just compensation for his or her injuries and an employer's interest to determine the veracity of disability
claims against it. In line with this policy, the third doctor rule was added to enable the parties to expeditiously settle
disability claims in case of conflict between the findings of the company-designated physicians and the seafarer's doctor.
It was not to be construed to mean that "it is only the company-designated physician who could assess the condition and
declare the disability of seamen." Certainly, it cannot be used by employers to limit or defeat the legitimate claims of
seafarers.

G.R. No. 232275, July 23, 2018

SOLPIA MARINE AND SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC. v. MICHAEL V. POSTRANO

FACTS: Respondent Postrano was engaged by petitioner Solpia as seaman aboard MV Daebo IBT, for and in behalf of its principal
Daebo Ship Management Co., Ltd. on a 10-month. Postrano's work involved strenuous manual work. Postrano sustained a fracture on
his right hand and an open wound on his left hand when he was pinned while arranging a ladder. Postrano was advised to undergo
physical therapy. However, he opted, with permission, to continue the same in Compostela Valley as it is his place of residence. The
permission secured was with the condition that Postrano must return to the company-designated physician for follow-up. After
completing 10 sessions of physical therapy in Tagum, Postrano complied with the company-designated physician's order to come back
for a follow-up. During such consultation, the latter advised him to continue with the physical therapy and to return thereafter. But he
instead merely continued with physical therapy and failed to return after completing another series of sessions.
Postrano asked twice for the release of his remaining sickness allowance through letters to enable him to continue his required
treatment but to no avail. Subsequently, he forwarded to Solpia the certification issued that he underwent physical therapy sessions, for
which he demanded the reimbursement of medical and transportation expenses. As he was worried of his condition, Postrano
consulted an independent physician who pronounced that he suffered a Grade 9 disability. Postrano filed a complaint for permanent
total disability benefits against petitioners. He argued that the 120/240 day-period had lapsed without the company-designated
physician's diagnosis of his condition. Petitioner contended that it was because of Postrano's own doing that the company-designated
physician was prevented from making his medical assessment as he failed to return. The LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
The NLRC, affirmed the ruling of the LA and maintained that Postrano prematurely consulted an independent physician as he was
obligated to report to the company-designated physician after undertaking physical therapy sessions .The CA reversed and set aside
the NLRC; it ruled that the failure of the company-designated physician to give a definitive impediment rating of respondent's disability
is sufficient basis to declare that he suffered permanent and total disability.

62
ISSUE: Whether or not Postrano is entitled to the award of permanent and total disability benefits.
RULING: No. Postrano was duty-bound to complete his medical treatment until declared fit to work or assessed with a permanent
disability grading. Under the POEA-SEC, such a refusal negated the payment of disability benefits.
Rule X, Section 2 of the AREC Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation provides that the income benefit shall be paid beginning
on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where
such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which
case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at anytime
after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or
mental functions as determined by the System. Section 20(3) of the POEA-SEC states that in addition to the above obligation of the
employer to provide medical attention, the seafarer shall also receive sickness allowance from his employer in an amount equivalent to
his basic wage computed from the time he signed off until he is declared fit to work or the degree of disability has been assessed by the
company-designated physician. The period within which the seafarer shall be entitled to his sickness allowance shall not exceed 120
days. Payment of the sickness allowance shall be made on a regular basis, but not less than once a month. For this purpose, the
seafarer shall submit himself to a post- employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days
upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period
is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the
right to claim the above benefits.
In this case, Postrano was repatriated on January 1, 2013. Upon his return, he was referred to the company-designated physician for
examination and the latter prescribed medication for Postrano's condition. He was then advised to undergo physical therapy sessions
for the betterment of his condition. After completing ten sessions of physical therapy he reported to the company-designated physician
who further advised him to continue with said therapy as his condition was notably improving. He was also asked to report again for a
follow-up. However, Postrano failed to return to the company-designated physician after completing another series of physical therapy
sessions. It bears stressing that when Postrano reported on March 14, 2013, it had only been 72 days since he was first attended to by
said doctor. During such time, Postrano was only suffering from temporary total disability since the 120 day-period had not yet lapsed.
SC did not give credence to Postrano's position that the company-designated physician's failure to give him a disability grading
automatically amounts to a declaration that he is indeed suffering from a total permanent disability. A careful examination of the records
shows that it was important for Postrano to report to the company-designated physician after undergoing the physical therapy sessions
because only then can the latter definitely assess his condition. The advice of undergoing additional physical therapy sessions was an
indicia that Postrano's temporary total disability would be greatly addressed. Thus, the assessment of the company-designated
physician would be dependent on the outcome of said sessions, as Postrano's condition was notably improving as a result of the
treatment. When Postrano failed to report to the company-designated physician, there was no way for the latter to make a definitive
findings. Without the final assessment of the company-designated physician, Postrano is deemed suffering from temporary total
disability. More so, the 120 day-period provided by law had not yet lapsed.
All told, without any final assessment from the company-designated physician, Postrano's claim for permanent total disability benefits
must fail. Section 20(D) of the POEA-SEC instructs that no compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of any injury,
incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties.
G.R. No. 219774, July 23, 2018
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION v. ROSITA DE LEON

FACTS: Respondent began working for petitioner on September 1, 1976 as a Restaurant and Bar Cashier. She was
promoted to Front Office Cashier in October 1977, as Front Office Cashier's Shift Leader in August 1986, and as Head
Cashier in January 1988. In March 1989, she assumed the post of Income Auditor. Seven years later, she accepted the
position of Assistant Credit and Collection Manager. In March 2000, petitioner turned over to her the functions of the
General Cashier who had resigned.

On June 7, 2011, respondent received petitioner's June 6, 2011 letter, captioned as a Notice of Compulsory Retirement.
At the time she received said Notice, respondent was 57 years oldand held the position of Assistant Credit and Collection
Manager/Acting General Cashier. She had by then rendered 34 years of service to petitioner.

Respondent subsequently filed against petitioner and its officers, a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of
salaries and 13th month pay, non-payment of service charges, transportation allowance and other related benefits, and
illegal deductions, with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, backwages, actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees. Respondent claimed that she had been forced to retire without due process. Petitioner
countered that there was no dismissal because respondent voluntarily accepted its offer to avail the compulsory
retirement program under the CBA between petitioner and its rank-and-file employees. Under the CBA, an employee's
retirement is compulsory when he or she reaches the age of 60 or has rendered 20 years of service, whichever comes
first. Petitioner pointed out that respondent already rendered 14 years in excess of the 20-year cut-off period for
compulsory retirement, thus, it allegedly had all the right to terminate her services. LA ruled in respondent's favor, the LA
held that respondent was a managerial employee. LA concluded that the CBA did not apply to respondent and her
compulsory retirement resultantly constituted constructive dismissal. NLRC dismissed the complaint of constructive
dismissal for lack of merit. The CA overturns the decision of NLRC and ordered the payment of backwages.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent De Leon was illegally dismissed.

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RULING: Yes, the letter given to respondent was not an offer for compulsory retirement but rather a notice of severance
or termination of employment through compulsory retirement.

The body of the letter signifies that retirement was no longer a choice or a decision to be made by respondent, as the
termination of her services was already fait accompli - an accomplished or consummated act. First, the Notice specified
the effectivity date of respondent's retirement, i.e., at "close of office hours of June 10, 2011," or barely three days from
the time she received the Notice. Second, it also stated that the management was exercising its prerogative to
compulsorily retire respondent. Thus, petitioner was invoking its exclusive judgment and discretion in terminating
respondent's employment through compulsory retirement. Third, petitioner thanked respondent for her services and
wished her luck in her future endeavors, which indicates that from petitioner's perspective, cessation of employment was
certain and final, and respondent's future was no longer as its employee.

In the instant case, respondent's early retirement arose not from a bilateral act but a unilateral decision on the part of
petitioner. Respondent's consent was neither sought nor procured by petitioner in deciding to prematurely retire her
services. For this reason, respondent's compulsory retirement, as imposed by petitioner in its June 6, 2011 letter,
constitutes illegal dismissal.

Although the employer could be free to impose a retirement age lower than 65 years for as long its employees consented,
the retirement of the employee whose intent to retire was not clearly established, or whose retirement was involuntary is
to be treated as a discharge.

AUGUST 2018
G.R. No. 213731, August 01, 2018
C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC./MANNY SABINO AND/OR NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD. v. JOWELL P.
SANTOS

FACTS: Santos was hired as an environmental operator by CF Sharp for and in behalf of its principal, Norwegian Cruise
Line, Ltd., collectively known as petitioners, on board the vessel "MIS Norwegian Gem" for a period of nine (9) months.
Sometime in December 2011, Santos experienced dizziness, over fatigue, frequent urination and blurring of the eyesight.
He was brought to the ship's clinic for initial medical examination and was found to have elevated blood sugar and blood
pressure. He was immediately referred to a hospital in Miami, Florida, USA, where he was found to have a history of
diabetes and has been smoking a pack of cigarettes daily for ten years. On January 12, 2012, Santos was repatriated to
the Philippines. The next day, he was immediately referred to CF Sharp's company-designated physicians. The
physicians subjected Santos to different tests and treatments, which were recorded in several medical reports. It was
confirmed that he had Diabetes Mellitus II and hypertension. On May 4, 2012, Santos was examined by a nephrologist
who noted that he was asymptomatic with a BP of 120/70. His urinalysis and serum creatinine were normal. Thus, he was
cleared from a nephrological standpoint and was again advised to continue his maintenance medications. Thereafter,
after 118 days from repatriation, the company-designated physicians issued a certification stating that Santos's condition
was not work-related and that his final disability grading assessment for hypertension and diabetes was Grade 12.
Unconvinced, Santos consulted Dr.Donato-Tan. In her medical certificate, Dr. Donato-Tan noted that Santos had high
blood pressure and uncontrolled diabetes mellitus. She also opined that Santos's condition was work-related due to the
pressure in the cruise ship, which elevated his blood pressure, and that the food therein was not balanced, which elevated
his blood sugar. She concluded that Santos was permanently disabled to discharge his duties as a seafarer. Hence,
Santos filed a complaint for disability and sickness benefits with damages before the LA. LA ruled in favor of Santos.
NLRC held that Santos did not suffer from a permanent and total disability because he failed to prove that the diabetes
and hypertension he suffered were work-related. The NLRC gave credence to the medical assessment and finding of the
company-designated physicians, which stated that Santos only suffered a partial disability of Grade 12. CA reinstated the
LA decision

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ISSUE: Whether or not Santos is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits due to his hypertension and diabetes.

RULING: NO. The SC held that while a seafarer is entitled to temporary total disability benefits during his treatment
period, it does not follow that he should likewise be entitled to permanent total disability benefits when his disability was
assessed by the company-designated physician after his treatment. He may be recognized to have permanent disability
because of the period he was out of work and could not work, but the extent of his disability (whether total or partial) is
determined, not by the number of days that he could not work, but by the disability grading the doctor recognizes based
on his resulting incapacity to work and earn wages. It is the doctor’s findings that should prevail as he or she is equipped
with the proper discernment, knowledge experience and expertise on what constitutes total or partial disability. The
physician’s declaration serves as the basis for the degree of disability that can range anywhere from Grade 1 to Grade 14.
Notably, this is a serious consideration that cannot be determined by simply counting the number of treatment lapsed
days. The Court held that merely having hypertension does not warrant an award of disability benefits. While Essential
Hypertension is listed as an occupational disease under the POEA Contract, its mere work-relation and compliance with
the requirements of the contract will not make it automatically compensable. The POEA Contract requires an element of
gravity. It speaks of essential hypertension only as an overture to the impairment of function of body organs like kidneys,
heart, eyes and brain. This impairment must then be of such severity as to be resulting in permanent disability. In this
case, the company-designated physician opined that seafarer’s hypertension is not essential or primary, hence it was not
severe for which reason, only a partial disability was given.

On the other hand, diabetes is not among the listed occupational disease in the POEA Contract. The Court held that such
condition is a metabolic and a familial disease to which one is pre-disposed by reason of heredity, obesity or old age. It
does not indicate work-relatedness and by its nature, is more the result of poor lifestyle choices and health habits for
which disability benefits are improper. The company-designated physician likewise opined that seafarer’s diabetes is not
severe and in fact, his examinations showed good results and was merely advised to take maintenance medications.

The Court held that the crew's conditions do not in itself warrant an award of permanent and total disability benefits. The
POEA Contract even recognizes that a seafarer can still be employed even if he has hypertension and/or diabetes
provided that he shows compliance with the prescribed maintenance medications and doctor-recommended lifestyle
changes. Thus, the Grade 12 disability benefits was sustained by the Court.

G.R. No. 219324, August 08, 2018

DEBRA ANN P. GAITE v. FILIPINO SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS, INC., ARTURO LUI
PIO, NOEL G. CABANGON, ALVIN F. DE VERA, LEOCADIO ERNESTO A. SANCHEZ III, ADORACION SATURNO
AND CEASAR* APOSTOL

FACTS: On May 16, 2006, FILSCAP employed Gaite as its General Manager. In 2012, several issues pertaining to Gaite
were brought to the attention of FILSCAP's Board of Trustees which include the following: (1) the erroneous filing of a
case against a records company without prior notice to the Board, which eventually resulted in FILSCAP being ordered to
pay P1,000,000.00 in damages; (2) her non-disclosure of her receipt of an e-mail inviting one of the board members to a
regional digital licensing conference; (3) her willful delay in taking action on the collection of proxy forms from members for
the May 28, 2011 FILSCAP elections and, consequently, collection of an insufficient number of proxy forms for the said
election; (4) her non-disclosure of the complete list of members to a board member who wanted to help in securing the
proxy forms; and (5) the appropriation for her personal benefit of show tickets given to FILSCAP, which were supposed to
be used for monitoring purposes. CISAC, the umbrella organization of copyright societies around the world, advised
FILSCAP to settle the matter amicably. Thus, FILSCAP discussed a graceful exit and separation package with Gaite and
scheduled the signing of Quitclaim which provided that FILSCAP would release, waive and discharge Gaite from any and
all actions, whether civil, criminal or administrative, or from any and all claims of any kind or character arising out of or in
connection with her employment with FILSCAP in exchange of money. Days before the scheduled signing, however,
FILSCAP discovered that from 2009 to 2011, Gaite had been allowing funds from its Special Accounts to be used to cover
the company's Operating Expenses without the knowledge, consent, or authorization of the Board and in contravention of
Distribution Rules. FILSCAP decided to defer the settlement with Gaite and in lieu of the Quitclaim-signing scheduled,
FILSCAP commenced a specific inquiry into the matter. During said investigation, FILSCAP confirmed Gaite's
unauthorized misappropriation, which she committed together with the then Distribution Manager, Mr. Kasiguran,
amounting to P17,720,455.77. In fact, she even admitted the same in her email to a board member. In view of said
discovery, FILSCAP issued a Show Cause Notice to Gaite dated July 10, 2012 requiring her to explain why no disciplinary
sanctions should be imposed on her and likewise placed her under preventive suspension with pay, pending the

65
administrative investigation. In her reply, Gaite denied any misappropriation and informed the Board that she had already
filed a case for constructive dismissal against FILSCAP on June 28, 2012, or two (2) days after the cancelled signing of
the Quitclaim and even before the July 10, 2012 show-cause notice was sent to her. LA ruled for Gaite. NLRC affirmed.
CA reversed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gaite was legally dismissed.

RULING: Yes. Basic is the rule that an employer may validly terminate the services of an employee for any of the just
causes enumerated under the Labor Code. In this case, SC found that Gaite's actuations constitutes serious misconduct.
First, the seriousness of the same cannot be denied. Not only is the amount involved herein a staggering amount but the
alleged reallocation violated an express provision of the company's Distribution Rules and was accomplished without the
authorization of the Board. Second, Gaite committed said transfer in the performance of her duties as General Manager,
who is responsible for the overall operations thereof. Third, it caused the depletion of the company's Special Accounts
held in trust for the rightful copyright owners, Gaite's ability to duly perform and accomplish her duties and responsibilities
has been seriously put into question. The SC found that FILSCAP validly terminated Gaite's employment on the ground of
loss of trust and confidence. First, there is no doubt that she held a position of trust and confidence. The law contemplates
two classes of positions of trust. The first class consists of managerial employees. They are as those who are vested with
the power or prerogative to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign
or discipline employees. The second class consists of cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc. who, in the normal and
routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. Gaite clearly falls under the
first class of employee, she was responsible for the overall operations thereof. Hence, the first requisite is present in this
case. Second, the act of transferring the aforementioned staggering amount without the knowledge and consent of the
Board of Directors, and in direct contravention of distribution rules is sufficient reason for the loss of trust and confidence
in Gaite. It bears stressing that as managerial employee; Gaite could be terminated on the ground of loss of confidence by
mere existence of a basis for believing that she had breached the trust of her employer. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is
not required. It would already be sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the
employer has reasonable ground to believe that the concerned employee is responsible for the purported misconduct and
the nature of his participation therein. This distinguishes a managerial employee from a fiduciary rank-and-file where loss
of trust and confidence, as ground for valid dismissal, requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question, and
that mere uncorroborated assertion and accusation by the employer will not be sufficient.

G.R. No. 232905, August 20, 2018

OSCAR D. GAMBOA v. MAUNLAD TRANS, INC. AND/OR RAINBOW MARITIME CO., LTD. AND CAPT. SILVINO
FAJARDO

FACTS: On January 17, 2014, Gamboa entered into a nine month contract of employment with respondent Maunlad Trans, Inc.
(MTI), for its principal, RMCL, on board MV Oriente Shine, a cargo vessel transporting logs. One time, Gamboa assisted in the
unloading of raw logs from the vessel, as well as in the clean-up thereafter of the debris and log residue. As Gamboa could not
withstand the strong odor of the logs and was gasping for breath, the latter asked for leave which was granted, and as such, was
excused from the activity. However, the incident already triggered an asthma attack on Gamboa which initially started as a
cough that was later accompanied by wheezing breath. On February 12, 2014, during the rigging operation, Gamboa
experienced back pain and difficulty in breathing that prompted Captain Cloa to disembark him for medical consultation in
Canada. While the foreign port doctor, Dr. Karon, took note of Gamboa's back pain, it was his diagnosed asthma that prompted
the said doctor to declare him unfit for duty. Thus, on February 15, 2014, Gamboa was medically repatriated and brought to
Marine Medical Services where he was seen by a company-designated physician, Dr. Cruz-Balbon, who confirmed his bronchial
asthma. Subsequent check-ups further disclosed that Gamboa was suffering from "Degenerative Changes, Thoracolumbar
Spine" and was found to have a "metallic foreign body on the anterior cervical area noted on x-ray," which, as pointed out by the
company-designated physician, was not related to the cause of Gamboa's repatriation. Gamboa was thereafter referred to
orthopedic doctors for expert evaluation and management. On May 14, 2014, the company-designated physician, Dr. Hao-
Quan, issued a medical report to respondent stating that Gamboa still has occasional asthma attacks that have not been totally
controlled despite three months of maintenance medication. Likewise, the orthopedic specialist, Dr. Escano, consistently
reported that Gamboa has not been relieved of his back pain despite rehabilitation, and further recommended that the latter
undergo MRI of the spine, which she pointed out could be done only after the removal of the foreign bodies embedded in
Gamboa's neck area. Since MTI refused to shoulder the extraction procedure as it was not part of the cause for Gamboa's
repatriation, the latter had the procedure done at his expense. However, MTI still denied Gamboa's request for MRI, and instead,
issued medical certificates indicating Gamboa's illness as "Bronchial Asthma; Degenerative Changes, Thoracolumbar Spine,
Left Parathoracic Muscle Strain." Thus, on June 4, 2014, Gamboa filed a complaint for non-payment of his sickness allowance,
medical expenses, and rehabilitation fees, against MTI. The complaint was subsequently amended on June 18, 2014 to include

66
a claim for permanent total disability benefits pursuant to the CBA for failure of the company-designated physician to make a
final assessment within the mandated 120-day period. LA ruled for Gamboa. NLRC affirmed. CA reversed. It ruled that Gamboa
had no cause of action at the time he filed his complaint given that the May 14, 2014 assessment was not final, and that he was
still undergoing treatment well within the allowable 240- day treatment period. It likewise found no basis to support Gamboa's
claim that he is entitled to permanent total disability benefits, holding that the latter's independent physician examined him only
once and that the lapse of the 120-day period did not automatically entitle him thereto.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gamboa is entitled to permanent total disability benefits

RULING: YES. In a medical report, the company-designated physician gave Gamboa an "interim" assessment of Grades 8 and
12 for his orthopedic and pulmonary conditions, respectively. While the orthopedic specialist, in his medical report dated July 10,
2014, opined that Gamboa's Degenerative Changes, Thoracolumbar Spine, Left Parathoracic Muscle Strain "may be [a] pre-
existing" condition, and therefore not work-related, the pulmonary specialist, on the other hand, merely reiterated the previous
disability rating of Grade 1. From the foregoing medical report, it can be reasonably inferred that Gamboa's bronchial asthma
was deemed a work-related illness unlike his degenerative changes of the spine, which was declared by the specialist to be not
work-related in view of the specialist's observation that it was a pre-existing condition that "could not have developed during his
period on board." Under the 2010 POEA-SEC, a "work-related" illness is defined as "any sickness as a result of an occupational
disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied." However, there are conditions that
should be met before an illness, such as degenerative changes of the spine, can be considered as pre-existing under the 2010
POEA-SEC, namely: (a) the advice of a medical doctor on treatment was given for such continuing illness or condition; or (b) the
seafarer had been diagnosed and has knowledge of such illness or condition but failed to disclose the same during PEME, and
such cannot be diagnosed during the PEME, none of which had been established in this case.

Moreover, degenerative changes of the spine, also known as osteoarthritis, is a listed occupational disease under Sub-Item
Number 21 of Section 32-A of the 2010 POEA-SEC if the occupation involves any of the following: a. Joint strain from carrying
heavy loads, or unduly heavy physical labor, as among laborers and mechanics; b. Minor or major injuries to the joint; c.
Excessive use or constant strenuous usage of a particular joint, as among sportsmen, particularly those who have engaged in
the more active sports activities; d. Extreme temperature changes (humidity, heat and cold exposures) and;e. Faulty work
posture or use of vibratory tools.

Here, Gamboa, as Bosun of respondents' cargo vessel that transported logs, undeniably performed tasks that clearly involved
unduly heavy physical labor and joint strain. Hence, the NLRC cannot be faulted in finding Gamboa's back problem to be work-
related. In the same vein, Gamboa's bronchial asthma, which is also a listed occupational disease, undeniably progressed while
in the performance of his duties and in the course of his last employment contract.

G.R. No. 231096, August 15, 2018

LORNA B. DIONIO v. ND SHIPPING AGENCY AND ALLIED SERVICES, INC., CARIBBEAN TOW AND BARGE
(PANAMA) LTD.

FACTS: On May 9, 2006, Gil T. Dionio, Jr., the husband of petitioner, was hired by ND Shipping, for its foreign principal,
Caribbean Tow and Barge (Panama), Ltd., collectively referred as respondents, to serve as a Second Engineer on board
the vessel MT Caribbean Tug for a period of six months. On January 30, 2007, while in the course of his extended
employment, Gil suffered from a UTI and prostate enlargement. While the vessel was in Turk and Caicos Islands, he was
examined by Dr. Victoria Smith and confirmed that Gil indeed suffered UTI and an enlarged prostate. Gil was medically
repatriated in the Philippines. He immediately went to ND Shipping's office where he was issued a Referral Slip for
medical examination at the Micah Medical Clinic and Diagnostic Laboratory. The referral slip, however, stated that the
expenses shall be paid for by Gil. On the same day, a representative of the ND Shipping sent an email to K. Arnesen
Shipping, the owner of the vessel, requesting for the medical check-up of Gil at the ship owner's expense. The request
was denied and stated that Gil must arrange for his own medical check-up. Thus, Gil was never examined by the
company-designated physician. Gil's health condition became worse. On April 2, 2007, Gil signed a quitclaim in favor of
respondents and he received the total amount of P31,200.00. According to petitioner-wife, his husband was in a hapless
condition when he signed the waiver. On May 4, 2008, after more than a year of battling cancer, Gil succumbed to his
illness. Thus, the legal wife of Gil, filed a complaint before the LA for payment of death benefits, sickness allowance, burial
expenses, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Respondents denied any liability arguing that Gil's death is
not compensable because he did not die during the term of his contract and his illness is not one of those listed as an
occupational disease under Section 32 of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Respondents also argued that Gil failed to submit himself
for a post-employment medical examination within three days after repatriation even though he was issued a referral slip
to the company-designated physician. LA ruled in favor of petitioner however NLRC reversed and set aside the LA ruling.
Nevertheless, CA held that petitioner failed to prove with substantial evidence that the illness of Gil was work-related.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to death benefits and damages.

67
RULING: YES, a seafarer claiming disability benefits is required to submit himself to a post-employment medical
examination by a company-designated physician within three working days from repatriation. Failure to comply with such
requirement results in the forfeiture of the seafarer's claim for disability benefits. There are, however, exceptions to the
rule: (1) when the seafarer is incapacitated to report to the employer upon his repatriation; and (2) when the employer
inadvertently or deliberately refused to submit the seafarer to a post-employment medical examination by a company-
designated physician. Moreover, it is the burden of the employer to prove that the seafarer was referred to a company-
designated doctor. Respondents failed to properly refer Gil to the company-designated physician. Petitioner argues that
Gil sufficiently complied with the mandatory post-employment medical examination under the POEA-SEC. However, ND
Shipping did not heed his request for an extended medical check-up at the ship owner's expense and the company-
designated physician did not conduct the said medical examination. Thus, he was forced to seek medical assistance at
his own expense elsewhere.

The POEA-SEC defines work-related injury as injury resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the course of
employment and as any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Sec.
32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied

However, the list of illness/diseases in Sec. 32-A does not exclude other illnesses/diseases not so listed from being
compensable. The POEA-SEC cannot be presumed to contain all the possible injuries that render a seafarer unfit for
further sea duties. So much so that Sec. 20(B) (4) of the same explicitly provides that the liabilities of the employer when
the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows: those illnesses not listed in
Sec. 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work-related. In other words, a disputable presumption is created in
favor of compensability. Illnesses not listed in Sec. 32 are disputably presumed as work-related. This means that even if
the illness is not listed under Sec. 32-A of the POEA-SEC as an occupational disease or illness, it will still be presumed as
work-related, and it becomes incumbent on the employer to overcome the presumption.

In relation to the waiver signed by the deceased, the Court finds that the said waiver must be set aside. In this case, the
release, waiver and quitclaim did not state the specific consideration that Gil received from respondents. Nevertheless,
petitioner stated that respondents gave Gil a total amount of P31,200.00, which was confirmed by the court and tribunals
a quo. This consideration is greatly disproportionate to the illness that Gil suffered. He already had prostate cancer and
respondents still refused to grant him medical treatment as provided under the POEA-SEC.

G.R. No. 215504, August 20, 2018

SOCIETE INTERNATIONALE DE TELECOMMUNICATIONS AERONAUTIQUES (SITA), SITA INFORMATION
NETWORKING COMPUTING B.V. (SITA, INC.), EQUANT SERVICES, INC. (EQUANT) AND LEE CHEE WEE
v. THEODORE L. HULIGANGA

FACTS: Huliganga was hired by Societe International De Telecommunications Aeronautiques (SITA) on April 16, 1980 as
Technical Assistant to the Representative-Manager. Eventually, he became the Country Operating Officer, the highest
accountable officer of SITA in the Philippines and his current position at the time of his retirement on December 31, 2008.
He received his retirement benefits computed at 1.5 months of basic pay for each year of service, or the total amount of
P7,495,102.84 in retirement and other benefits. On January 27, 2009, Huliganga filed a Complaint against SITA, SITA,
INC. and EQUANT for unfair labor practices, underpayment of salary/wages, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees, underpayment of sick and vacation leave and retirement benefits. In his Position Paper, Huliganga alleged the
following: (1) The coefficient/payment factor that applies to him should be 2 months and not 1.5 months for every year of
service in accordance with the 2005-2010 Collective Bargaining Agreement; (2) The coefficient/payment factor as
provided under the 2005-2010 is the applicable rate because it is already a well-established company practice of SITA to
adopt, update and apply the new and/or additional economic benefits arising from the CBA as amendments to the
Employee Regulations manual; (3) SITA, INC. is a foreign corporation created by SITA in 2003 to concentrate on
providing Air Transport Industry application whereas EQUANT was created by SITA in the mid-1990s to cater to its non-
airline customers; and (4) He was required by EQUANT to represent and manage its Philippine operations and was given
the additional task of managing SITA, INC. but was not compensated for his work at EQUANT and SITA, INC. Petitioners,
on the other hand, raised the following counter-arguments: (1) Huliganga has already received from SITA the full amount
of his retirement and other monetary benefits; thus, his claim for any supposed deficiency has simply no basis; (2) There
is no employer-employee relationship between Huliganga, SITA, INC. and EQUANT which will entitle the former to a claim
for salary and other monetary benefits from said entities; and (3) Having received the full amount of his retirement and
other benefits from his employer SITA, Huliganga has no right to claim moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees. LA ruled for petitioners. NLRC affirmed. CA modified, directing SITA to pay Huliganga the amount of

68
Php2,645,175.87 representing the deficiency in his retirement benefit plus legal interest of six percent (6%)per annum
from the date of filing of his complaint up to actual payment.

ISSUE: Whether or not Huliganga is entitled to his money claims.

RULING: NO. It is an indisputable fact that Huliganga was a managerial employee of SITA and, as such, he is not entitled
to retirement benefits exclusively granted to the rank-and-file employees under the CBA. It must be remembered that
under Article 245 of the Labor Code, managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization.
To be entitled to the benefits under the CBA, the employees must be members of the bargaining unit, but not necessarily
of the labor organization designated as the bargaining agent. To be considered a company practice, the giving of the
benefits should have been done over a long period of time, and must be shown to have been consistent and deliberate.
The test or rationale of this rule on long practice requires an indubitable showing that the employer agreed to continue
giving the benefits knowing fully well that said employees are not covered by the law requiring payment thereof. To prove
that the giving of the benefits claimed by Huliganga had been a company practice, he presented the affidavit of Delia M.
Beaniza who was the Administrative Assistant to the Country Manager/Representative stating that SITA had adopted the
formulation provided in the CBA to its managerial employees. The NLRC, however, is correct in ruling that the said
affidavit deserves scant consideration because Beaniza lacks the competency to determine what is considered as a
company practice: The said affidavit deserves scant consideration considering that Ms. Beaniza had been retired from
service since 1997 or 12 years ago. She, therefore, lacks the competency to determine with accuracy what is considered
a company practice. SC also noted that though Ms. Beaniza stated that company policies have been implemented as
early as the time when SITA Employees' Union was formed in the 1970s, she was employed by respondent SITA only in
September 1980. Accordingly, she cannot testify on matters or circumstances that happened before she was employed by
SITA.

G.R. No. 217036, August 20, 2018

SKIPPERS UNITED PACIFIC, INC., AND/OR IKARIAN MOON SHIPPING, CO., LTD. v.ESTELITO S. LAGNE

FACTS: Lagne was hired by Skippers United Pacific, Inc. to serve as oiler on board the vessel "Nicolaos M". On
September 14, 2009, Lagne signed his employment contract which included the standard terms and conditions governing
the employment of Filipino seafarers as prescribed by the POEA. The contract has a duration of nine months. Part of his
pre-employment requirements, Lagne was subjected to a Pre-Employment Medical Examination where he was declared
"fit for sea duty." Sometime in January 2010, Lagne started to feel pain on his anus whenever he carries heavy weights or
performs laborious tasks. He also experienced chest pains and difficulty in breathing during his work which he tried to
endure. Later, Lagne felt that there was a protruding mass on his anus which he noticed to be increasing in size. On May
12, 2010, Lagne was brought to a certain clinic in France. He was diagnosed to have a "rectal mass" and was
recommended for medical repatriation after having been declared "unfit for duty." Lagne was repatriated to the
Philippines. Upon his arrival, Lagne was referred for medical check-up at the General Med Health Services. After a series
of laboratory tests, he was advised to undergo surgical evaluation and biopsy of the rectal mass. Subsequently, Lagne
was endorsed at the Metropolitan Medical Center, under the care of Dr. Go, the company- designated physician, who
conducted colonoscopy and biopsy on Lagne. The results confirmed the presence of "an orectal mass." While his medical
assessment was ongoing, Lagne filed a complaint before the arbitration branch of the NLRC claiming permanent total
disability benefits, sick wages, damages and attorney's fees against petitioners. Dr. Go diagnosed Lagne as suffering from
"Moderately Differentiated Rectosigmoid Adenocarcinoma." Lagne was advised to undergo Abdominal Perineal Resection
of the Rectosigmoid Tumor which includes the placement of permanent colostomy as management for his condition. Dr.
Go, likewise, recommended transfusion of two units of packed red blood cells in preparation for his surgery. Lagne,
however, refused and manifested his desire to seek second opinion from his private doctor. Lagne then sought the
expertise of Dr. Donato-Tan, a specialist at the Philippine Heart Center. Dr. Donato-Tan have the same declared Lagne
unfit for duty.

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In his claim for disability compensation, Lagne asserted that his illness was directly caused by his employment with
petitioners. Lagne further claimed entitlement to sickness allowance as provided under Section 20 (B), paragraph 3 of the
POEA Standard Contract for Seafarers, to wit: Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled
to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability
has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed 120 days. LA dismissed
Lagne's claim for total permanent disability benefits for his failure to substantiate his claim that his illness is work-related.
NLRC reversed. CA affirmed the NLRC’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lagne is entitled to permanent disability benefits.

RULING: Yes. For disability to be compensable under Section 20(B)(4) of the POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1)
the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of
the seafarer's employment contract. The POEA-SEC defines a work-related injury as "injury(ies) resulting in disability or
death arising out of and in the course of employment," and a work-related illness as "any sickness resulting to disability or
death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein
satisfied." For illnesses not mentioned under Section 32, the POEA-SEC creates a disputable presumption in favor of the
seafarer that these illnesses are work-related. However, notwithstanding the presumption, the claimant-seafarer must still
prove by substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or, at least, increased the risk of contracting the disease.
This is because awards of compensation cannot rest entirely on bare assertions and presumptions. In order to establish
compensability of a non-occupational disease, reasonable proof of work-connection is sufficient – direct causal relation is
not required. Thus, probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings. In
the instant case, a careful review of the findings of the NLRC and the CA would show that Lagne was able to meet the
required degree of proof that his illness is compensable as it is work-connected. Considering the manual and laborious job
that Lagne does, court surmised that he was able to reasonably prove that his working conditions exposed him to factors
that could have aggravated his medical condition. As to the second element SC found the same to be likewise present in
this case. It is undisputed that Lagne boarded the vessel on September 25, 2009. He began experiencing pain in his anus
sometime in January 2010. Later, on May 12, 2010, he was in fact brought to a clinic in France. It was also during said
time when he was first diagnosed to have a rectal mass and was recommended for medical repatriation on May 17, 2010.
Clearly, from the foregoing, it can be assumed Lagne's illness started to exist or developed during his nine-month
employment contract.

G.R. No. 188492, August 28, 2018

GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES v. COURT OF APPEALS, GNC FACULTY AND LABOR UNION AND GNC NON-TEACHING
MAINTENANCE LABOR UNION

FACTS: Under Section 5(2)3 of RA 6728, 70% of the increase in tuition fees shall go to the payment of salaries, allowances and other
benefits of the teaching and non-teaching personnel. Pursuant to this provision, the petitioner imposed a 7% increase of its tuition fees
for school year 2006-2007. Shortly thereafter, and in order to save the depleting funds of the petitioner's Retirement Plan, its Board of
Trustees approved the funding of the retirement program out of the 70% net incremental proceeds arising from the tuition fee
increases. Respondents GNC-Faculty Labor Union and GNC Non-Teaching Maintenance Labor Union challenged the petitioner's
unilateral decision by claiming that the increase violated the law. The parties referred the matter to voluntary arbitration after failing to
settle the controversy by themselves. After hearing the parties, Voluntary Arbitrator rendered decision in favor of petitioner GNC,
holding that retirement benefits fell within the category of "other benefits" that could be charged against the 70% net incremental
proceeds pursuant to Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 6728. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss and was subsequently granted by the
CA. The petitioner argues that the CA went beyond its jurisdiction when it denied the Motion to Dismiss despite the finality of the
decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator pursuant to Article 276 of the Labor Code; that following the pronouncement in Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc and other jurisprudence. The CA was no longer authorized to exercise its appellate jurisdiction; that the CA's reliance
on the rulings in Manila Midtown Hotel v. Borromeo and Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, was misplaced because said rulings did not
define the reglementary period to appeal the decision or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator; and that the CA misapplied the rule on equity
in the absence of strong or compelling reasons to suspend the rules of procedure. The petitioner posits that the appeal from the
decision or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator should be filed within 10 days in view of Article 276 of the Labor Code. However, the
respondent argued that a long line of jurisprudence set the remedy of appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as applicable in
challenging the decisions or awards of the Voluntary Arbitrator.

ISSUE: What is the correct period for appealing the decision or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator?

RULING: Article 276 is an amendment introduced by R.A. No. 6715. Prior to the effectivity of the amendment on March 21, 1989,
Article 262 (former provision) stated that voluntary arbitration decisions would be final, unappealable and executory. Despite such

70
immediately executory nature of the decisions and awards of the VA’s, however, the Court pronounced in Oceanic Bic Division (FFW)
v. Romero that the decisions or awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators involving interpretations of law were within the scope of the Court's
power of review. Accordingly, the decisions and awards of VA’s, albeit immediately final and executory, remained subject to judicial
review in appropriate cases through petitions for certiorari. Such was the state of things until the promulgation in 1995 of the ruling in
Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees. Therein, the Court noted the silence of R.A. No.
6715 on the availability of appeal from the decisions or awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators. In declaring the VA’s as quasi-judicial
instrumentalities, the case pronounced the decisions or awards to be appealable to the CA. In the 2004 ruling in Sevilla Trading
Company v. Semana, the Court ruled that the decision of the VA became final and executory after the expiration of the 15-day
reglementary period within which to file the petition for review under Rule 43.

In 2005, the Court promulgated the decision in Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., wherein it made reference for the first time to the
10-day period for the filing of the petition for review vis-a-vis decisions of the VA provided in Article 262-A (now Article 276). Within the
same year, Philex Gold Philippines, Inc. v. Philex Bulawan Supervisors Union applied the period of 10 days in declaring the appeal to
have been timely filed. Thereafter, the Court has variantly applied either the 15-day or the 10- day period as the time within which to
appeal the decisions or awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panels of Arbitrators.

Notably, the Court opined in PHILEC v. Court of Appeals that despite the period provided in Rule 43, the 10-day period should apply in
determining the timeliness of appealing the decision or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Arbitrators. In the 2010 ruling in
Teng v. Pagahac, the Court clarified that the 10-day period set in Article 276 of the Labor Code gave the aggrieved parties the
opportunity to file their motion for reconsideration, which was more in keeping with the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, holding thusly: “In the exercise of its power to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, an implementing agency, such
as the Department of Labor, is restricted from going beyond the terms of the law it seeks to implement; it should neither modify nor
improve the law. The agency formulating the rules and guidelines cannot exceed the statutory authority granted to it by the legislature.”

“By allowing a 10-day period, the obvious intent of Congress in amending Article 263 to Article 262-A is to provide an opportunity for the
party adversely affected by the VA's decision to seek recourse via a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court filed with the CA. Indeed, a motion for reconsideration is the more appropriate remedy in line with the doctrine of
exhaustion. of administrative remedies. For this reason, an appeal from administrative agencies to the CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court requires exhaustion of available remedies as a condition precedent to a petition under that Rule.”

Hence, the 10-day period stated in Article 276 should be understood as the period within which the party adversely affected by the
ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Arbitrators may file a motion for reconsideration. Only after the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration may the aggrieved party appeal to the CA by filing the petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within 15
days from notice pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 43. The Court notes that despite the clarification made in Teng v. Pagahac, the DOLE
and the NCMB have not revised or amended the Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings
insofar as its Section 7 of Rule VII is concerned. This inaction has sown confusion, particularly in regard to the filing of the motion for
reconsideration as a condition precedent to the filing of the petition for review in the CA. SC directed DOLE and NCMB to cause the
revision or amendment of the said guideline.

SEPTEMBER 2018

Ariel P Horlador v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, INC., MARINE *SHIPMANAGEMENT LTD., and CAPTAIN
MARLON L. MALANAO September 05, 2018

Facts: Respondent Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTCI), for and on behalf of its foreign principal, respondent
Marine Shipmanagement Ltd. (Marine), hired petitioner as a Chief Cook on board the vessel PRAIA for a period of eight
(8) months starting from his deployment on June 19, 2012. On January 3, 2013 and while on board the vessel, petitioner,
while carrying provisions, suddenly felt a severe pain on his waist, abdomen, and down to his left scrotum. As the pain
persisted for a number of days, he was airlifted to a hospital in Belgium where he was diagnosed with "infection with the
need to rule out Epididymitis and Prostatitis" and advised to undergo repatriation. Upon arrival in the Philippines, petitioner
claimed that he immediately reported to PTCI and asked for referral for further treatment, but was ignored. As such, he
used his health card in order to seek treatment at the Molino Doctors Hospital where he was diagnosed with hernia.
Thereafter, petitioner consulted two (2) other physicians who similarly concluded that the nature and extent of his illness
permanently and totally prohibited him from further working as a seaman due to his "Chronic prostatitis.” Thus, he filed a
complaint for, inter alia, permanent and total disability benefits against PTCI, Marine, and respondent Captain Marlon L.
Malanao as the crewing manager (respondents). Respondents averred that petitioner is not entitled to permanent and
total disability benefits, contending that petitioner: (a) was not medically repatriated as his discharge from the vessel was

71
due to contract completion; (b) failed to comply with the mandatory post-deployment medical examination; and (c) failed to
prove his allegation that he had contracted and was diagnosed with hernia.

Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed petitioner's complaint for lack of merit. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the NLRC. The
NLRC reversed and set aside the LA's ruling which was upheld by CA with modification deleting attorney’s fees. Hence,
this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the award of attorney’s fees.

Ruling: Yes. In labor cases involving employees' wages and other benefits, the Court has consistently held that when the
concerned employee is entitled to the wages/benefits prayed for, he/she is also entitled to attorney's fees amounting to
ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award due him/her.

In this case, suffice it to say that the CA erred in deleting the award of attorney's fees, considering that petitioner was
found to be entitled to permanent and total disability benefits and was forced to litigate to protect his valid claim. Thus, the
reinstatement of such award is in order.

SALVADOR P. ALMAGRO, BASILIO M. CRUZ, FRANCISCO M. JULIANO, ARTURO L. NOVENARIO and the HEIRS
OF DEMOSTHENES V. CAñete, PETITIONERS, v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., LUCIO TAN and JOSE ANTONIO
Garcia September 12, 2018

Facts: This case arose out of the labor dispute in the 1990's between PAL, a domestic corporation organized under the
laws of the Republic of the Philippines operating as a common carrier transporting passengers and cargo through aircraft,
and Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP), the legitimate labor organization and exclusive bargaining agent
of all PAL's commercial pilots.

On December 9, 1997, ALPAP filed a notice of strike before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board on grounds of
unfair labor practice and union-busting by PAL (strike case). The Department of Labor and Employment Secretary
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Despite the assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary, ALPAP declared and
commenced a strike on June 5, 1998. After failed conciliation efforts, the Secretary issued a return-to-work order on June
7, 1998 addressed to all striking officers and members of ALPAP. The strike, however, continued until June 26, 1998
when ALPAP's officers and members attempted to report for work. [The employees who attempted to return to work signed
PAL's logbook for "Return to Work Returnees/Compliance" (PAL security logbook) on June 26, 1998. PAL, however,
refused to accept these returning employees on the ground that the deadline imposed by the return-to-work order on June
9, 1998 had already lapsed.

This refusal of PAL to accept ALPAP's officers and members back to work prompted ALPAP to file an illegal lockout case
against PAL with the NLRC. With the Secretary still exercising jurisdiction over the dispute, the illegal lockout case was
consolidated with the strike case in the DOLE. In a Resolution the Secretary: (1) declared the loss of employment status of
all officers and members who participated in the strike in defiance of the return-to-work order; and (2) dismissed the illegal
lockout case against PAL. This Resolution was questioned by ALPAP but eventually upheld by this Court. On January 13,
2003, ALPAP filed a motion with the Secretary to determine who among its officers and members should be reinstated or
deemed to have lost their employment with PAL for their actual participation in the strike but the secretary of labor denied
their claim.
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After PAL's rehabilitation was declared a success by the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 28, 2007,
petitioners moved for the resumption of the consolidated cases before the Labor Arbiter.

In his July 16, 2008 Decision, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the consolidated complaints.
The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision. The same decision was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the pilots who signed the PAL security logbook should be reinstated.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that petitioners were among the hundreds of ALPAP members who signified their
intention to return to work by signing the PAL security logbook only on June 26, 1998; this is an admission that they,
indeed, participated in the illegal strike staged by ALPAP. Further, despite the opportunity given to them, petitioners did
not dispute that they were the persons depicted in the photographs submitted by PAL. He thus gave credence to the
affidavit of Candido Tamayo, the Senior Field Agent of PAL's Security and Fraud Prevention Department at that time, who
testified that he took the photographs that captured some of the petitioners participating in the strike. Because of
petitioners' participation in the illegal strike and their willful defiance of the return-to-work order, petitioners lost their
employment status in PAL.

Jonald O. TORREDA, VS. INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES September 05, 2018

Facts: Jonald O. Torreda was hired by Investment and Capital Corporation of the Philippines (respondent) on May 17,
2010 as an IT Senior Manager He reported to William M. Valtos, Jr. (Valtos), the Officer in-Charge of the IT Department
and the Group President of the Financial Service of respondent. Petitioner claimed that he instituted reforms in the IT
management because the system was outdated and the staff members were unproductive. He had a falling out with the
senior management as the Senior Vice President for the Pueblo De Oro Development Corporation wanted to interfere
with the functions of the IT department. Further, in November 2011, respondent decided to create an IT-SAP project
without the approval of petitioner. On January 5, 2012, petitioner went to the office of Valtos for a closed-door conference
meeting supposedly regarding his IT projects. In said meeting, Valtos discussed another matter with petitioner and told
him that if his performance were to be appraised at that time, Valtos would give him a failing grade because of the
negative feedback from the senior management and the IT staff. The performance appraisal of petitioner, however, was
not due until May 2012. Valtos then gave petitioner a prepared resignation letter and asked him to sign; otherwise, the
company would terminate him. The said letter indicated that the resignation of petitioner would be effective on February 4,
2012. Petitioner refused to sign the resignation letter but Valtos did not accept his refusal. Thus, Valtos edited the
resignation letter. Petitioner thought of leaving the room by making an excuse to go to the restroom, but Valtos and
respondent's legal counsel followed him. Because of Valtos' insistence, petitioner placed his initials in the resignation
letter to show that the letter was not official. Valtos then accompanied petitioner to his room to gather his belongings and
escorted him out of the building. Petitioner was not allowed to report for work anymore and his company e-mail address
was deactivated. Six (6) days after the incident, petitioner filed the instant complaint for illegal dismissal (constructive),
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against respondent before the LA. The LA ruled in favor of the
petitioner which was affirmed by the NLRC upon appeal.

Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which reversed the LA and NLRC’s ruling stating that
petitioner voluntarily resigned from the company because he willingly signed the resignation letter. The CA opined that
even though Valtos presented a prepared resignation letter, it was petitioner who edited the same and voluntarily added

73
words of courtesy. It also held that it was improbable for petitioner to be intimidated by Valtos due to his managerial
position and high educational attainment. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was constructively dismissed.

Ruling: Yes. In this case, respondent argues that even though it was Valtos who initially presented the resignation letter,
petitioner still voluntarily signed the same because he substantially edited the letter and added words of courtesy.
Respondent insists that petitioner failed to overcome the validity of his resignation letter but the Court is not convinced.

In Fortuny Garments/Johnny Co v. Castro the Court clarified the procedure to determine the voluntariness of an
employee's resignation, viz.: the intention to relinquish an office must concur with the overt act of relinquishment. The act
of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered to determine whether in fact, he or she
intended to relinquish such employment. If the employer introduces evidence purportedly executed by an employee as
proof of voluntary resignation and the employee specifically denies the authenticity and due execution of said document,
the employer is burdened to prove the due execution and genuineness of such document.

Before the alleged resignation of petitioner, several circumstances would show that he did not contemplate or had no
intention of resigning from the company.

In effect, his resignation was not voluntary and thus it can be inferred that he was constructively dismissed by Valtos.

OCTOBER 2018

REYNALDO S. GERALDO v. THE BILL SENDER CORPORATION/MS. LOURDES NER CANDO October 03, 2018
Facts: Respondent The Bill Sender Corporation, engaged in the business of delivering bills and other mail matters for and
in behalf of their customers, employed petitioner Reynaldo S. Geraldo as a delivery/messenger man to deliver the bills of
its client PLDT. He was paid on a "per-piece basis," the amount of his salary depending on the number of bills he
delivered. On February 6, 2012, Geraldo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal alleging that on August 7, 2011, the
company's operations manager, Mr. Nicolas Constantino, suddenly informed him that his employment was being
terminated because he failed to deliver certain bills. He explained that he was not the messenger assigned to deliver the
said bills but the manager refused to reconsider and proceeded with his termination.
Thus, he claims that his dismissal was illegal for being done without the required due process under the law and that the
company and its president, respondent Lourdes Ner Cando, be held liable for his monetary claims.

For its part, the company countered that Geraldo was not a full time employee but only a piece-rate worker as he reported
to work only as he pleased and that it was a usual practice for messengers to transfer from one company to another to
similarly deliver bills and mail matters. As such, he would only be given bills to deliver if he reports to work, otherwise, the
bills would be assigned to other messengers. Moreover, contrary to Geraldo's claims, the company asserts that he was
not illegally dismissed for he was the one who abandoned his job when he no longer reported for work. Thus, the burden
was on him to substantiate his claims for illegal dismissal.
Issue: Whether or not Geraldo was illegally dismissed.

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Ruling: Yes. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the company was engaged in the business of delivering bills and
other mail matters for and in behalf of their customers, and that Geraldo was engaged as a delivery/messenger man
tasked to deliver bills of the company's clients. Clearly, the company cannot deny the fact that Geraldo was performing
activities necessary or desirable in its usual business or trade for without his services, its fundamental purpose of
delivering bills cannot be accomplished. On this basis alone, the law deems Geraldo as a regular employee of the
company.
Having established that Geraldo was a regular employee of the company, it becomes incumbent upon the latter to show
that he was dismissed in accordance with the requirements of the law for the rule is long and well settled that, in illegal
dismissal cases like the one at bench, the burden of proof is upon the employer to prove that the employee's termination
from service is for a just and valid cause. 14 Here, the company claims that Geraldo was not illegally dismissed for he was
the one who abandoned his job when he no longer reported for work. The Court, however, finds that apart from this self-
serving allegation, the company failed to adduce proof of overt acts on the part of Geraldo showing his intention to
abandon his work. Time and again, the Court has held that to justify a finding of abandonment of work, there must be
proof of a deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of an employee to resume his employment. The burden of proof is
on the employer to show an unequivocal intent on the part of the employee to discontinue employment. Mere absence is
not sufficient. It must be accompanied by manifest acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not
want to work anymore. Hence, it bears emphasis that the fact that Geraldo filed the instant illegal dismissal complaint
negates any intention on his part to sever his employment with the company. The records reveal that he even sought
permission to return to work but was rejected by the company. Contrary to the company's assertion, moreover, the mere
lapse of seven (7) months from Geraldo's alleged dismissal to the filing of his complaint is not a material indication of
abandonment, considering that the complaint was filed within a reasonable period during the three (3)-year period
provided under Article 291 of the Labor Code.

JOSE JOHN C. GUERRERO v. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., CELEBRITY CRUISES, AND CARLOS
C. SALINAS October 03, 2018

Facts: Guerrero alleged he was employed by PTCI, represented by its President, Carlos Salinas, on behalf of its
principal, CC, as a Casino Dealer on board the vessel GTS Constellation for a period of six (6) months.
Guerrero averred that: sometime in January 2012 during a gastro-intestinal outbreak in the ship, he and other crew
members were tasked and ordered to bring elderly guests out of the ship through wheelchairs; since the platform was not
levelled with the ship's door exit, and the bridge connecting the platform and the door exit was too steep, they decided that
the best way to move and transfer the elderly passengers was by pulling the wheelchairs; while he was pulling a
wheelchair with a passenger, a sudden motion occurred which caused him to lose his balance but managed to prevent
the wheelchair, the passenger and himself from falling; in order to keep the passenger safe, he had to push the
wheelchair really hard to gain control over it; after said incident, he started experiencing back pains which he just ignored
due to the demands of his work as a casino dealer.

While his vessel was docked at a port in the Caribbean, Guerrero underwent a Magnetic Resonance Imaging ( MRI)
procedure at the Isle Imaging Center of St. George, Caribbean, and after which, the attending physician made the
following Impression: Degenerative Disc Disease & Disc Herniation L3-L4 & L4-L5 Moyamoya Disease, resolved. After
Guerrero's surgery, he continued his therapy sessions with Dr. Catbagan until January 15, 2013.

Guerrero alleged that since the pain still persisted notwithstanding the medical procedures performed on him, he
consulted, on January 17, 2013, Dr. Cesar H. Garcia (Dr. Garcia), an orthopedic surgeon/bone and joint disease, who

75
issued on even date a medical certificate 7 declaring him "UNFIT for further sea service in whatever capacity as a
SEAFARER." Guerrero alleged that despite his permanent unfitness for further sea service as determined by his
physician, respondents failed to compensate him of permanent and total disability benefits. He maintained that he
sustained a spinal injury due to an accident arising out, and in the course of, his employment. 8\

In their Position Paper, respondents maintained that Guerrero is not entitled to disability benefits because he sustained
the alleged injury during an incident at the crew gym. They posited that Guerrero's injury is not compensable since it has
not arisen from a work-related incident. They contended that going to the gym and the use of gym facilities are not part of
Guerrero's job and could not have any relation to his duties as a Casino Dealer. Respondents theorized that disability
benefits are compensable only when the seafarer, such as Guerrero, suffers work-related injury or illness during the term
of his contract.
Issue: Whether or not Guerrero is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.
Ruling: No. For disability to be compensable, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related;
and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract.Work-
related injury pertains to injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of, and in the course of, employment.
Jurisprudence elucidates that the words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of
its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes
place. As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of employment" when it takes
place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his
duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto. Work-relatedness of an injury or illness means that the
seafarer's injury or illness has a possible connection to one's work, and thus, allows the seafarer to claim disability
benefits therefor. The oft-repeat d. rule is that whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish
his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. Thus, the burden is placed upon Guerrero to present substantial evidence,
or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion that there is a causal
connection between the nature of his employment and his injury. The onus probandi fell on Guerrero to establish his claim
for disability benefits by the requisite quantum of evidence that would serve as basis for the grant of the relief.

Unfortunately, Guerrero utterly failed to prove a reasonable connection between his work as a Casino Dealer and his
alleged lumbar disc injury.
Thus, he is not entitled to such benefits.

MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION, FLEET MARITIME SERVICE INTERNATIONAL LTD. AND/OR MARLON
ROÑO, AND M/V AZURA v. MANUEL R. VERGA October 10, 2018
Facts: In February 2010, Verga signed his 13th contract of deployment with petitioner Magsaysay Maritime Corporation
for a nine-month stint as a "technical rating" aboard the vessel Azura-D/E. He started his duties on board said vessel on
31 March 2010.
On 20 October 2010, while on board the vessel, Verga slipped and fell on his back. He was taken to a medical center
where he had an x-ray. He was found to be suffering from Stable Anterior Wedge Fracture T10. Because of this, Verga
was repatriated to the Philippines on 29 October 2010. 7
Upon his return, Verga was examined by the company-designated physician. The physician's initial evaluation was that
Verga had a Compression Fracture T12 and was advised to use a Jewett brace for immobilization.
By February 2011, Verga was still complaining of some pain in his left lateral trunk area, and the physician assessed his
condition to be Grade 8, with moderate rigidity or loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk. On 17 March 2011, Verga
had another x-ray and evaluation with one of the company-designated physicians. With the continued pain in his back, he
was advised to continue his rehabilitation and medication.
On 31 March 2011, Verga came back for re-evaluation. The company physician issued Verga a certification that he was fit
to work. Verga also signed a pro forma Certificate of Fitness to Work. He then waited to be called back for re-deployment.
By July 2011, Verga had still not been re-deployed, so he consulted with another doctor about the pain in his back.
According to the doctor, although the injury has partly healed, Verga still suffered through some back pain because of it,
and diagnosed his impediment to be Grade 11. Dr. Quintero's recommendation was that Verga could return to work but
was not allowed to lift heavy objects.
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On 31 August 2011, Verga consulted orthopedic surgeon Dr. Renato Runas. Dr. Runas concluded that Verga was "not fit
for further sea duty permanently in whatever capacity." On 2 September 2011, Verga filed a complaint for total disability
benefits and damages.
Issue: Whether or not Verga is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.
Ruling: No. In a long line of cases, most recently Tulabing v. MST Marine Services (Phil.), Inc., the Court has held that
the conflicting findings of the company-designated physician and the seafarer's chosen doctor "shall be settled by
referring the matter to a neutral third-party physician, whose assessment shall be final and binding.” Since his doctors had
findings contrary to those of the company-designated physician, Verga had the right to impugn the latter's certification.
However, it is Verga who "bears the burden of positive action to prove that his doctor's findings are correct, as well as
the burden to notify the company that a contrary finding had been made by his own physician.”On the other hand, "the
company carries the burden of initiating the process for the referral to a third doctor commonly agreed between the
parties[.]"54 The third doctor's ruling is final and binding on the parties.
To reiterate, the referral to a third doctor agreed upon by the parties is  mandatory.55 Failure to comply with the procedure
"may militate against the claim for permanent total disability in cases where the company-designated doctor declared
otherwise. This is especially so if the seafarer failed to explain why recourse to the said remedy was not made."
Verga never questioned the company-designated physician's certification, nor informed the company of the contrary
diagnosis by his doctors. There is likewise no evidence that Verga ever gave the company any chance to seek a third
doctor's opinion. The diagnosis of Dr. Runas was made on 31 August 2011. Two days later, Verga filed his complaint.
The Court, therefore, holds that the Certificate of Fitness to Work issued by the company-designated physician to Verga is
conclusive and binding on the parties. In effect, he is not entitled to such benefits.

RENERIO M. VILLAS, Petitioner, v. C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., Respondent; G.R. No. 221561, October 3, 2018 -
C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., Petitioner, v. RENERIO M. VILLAS,

Facts: Villas was engaged by C.F. Sharp for Blue Ocean Ship Management and for and in behalf of General Ore Carrier Corporation
XIX, Ltd. (General Ore). Villas was hired as a Second Engineer for six months on board Villas' employment was covered by a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the International Transport Worker's Federation Fleet Agreement and General Ore (ITF TCC
Fleet Agreement).

Villas underwent a Pre-Employment Medical Examination and was declared fit for sea duty by the company-designated physician. On
10 February 2013, while Villas was on sea duty doing a routine inspection, his right hand was crushed. Villas was subjected to an
immediate surgery which resulted to the amputation of his right middle finger with debridement and suturing of his 4 th digit. Villas was
declared unfit to work and was repatriated on 11 February 2013.
On 12 February 2013, after reporting to the office of C.F. Sharp, Villas was referred to the company-designated physician. He was then
referred to another company-designated physician. Villas then underwent rehabilitation, with the consent of C.F. Sharp and the
company-designated physician, for the next three months under the care of Dr. Flordelis. Despite his treatment, Villas remained
incapacitated and experienced limitation of motion on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th digits of his right hand.
During his check-up on 6 June 2013, one Dr. Marzan, another company-designated physician, wrote to Dr. Chan to ask if Villas can be
declared fit to work. Dr. Chan declared that Villas was already fit to work. Villas wrote a letter on 24 June 2013 reiterating his request
and informing C.F. Sharp that he decided to consult with an independent physician. AVillas then consulted with Dr. Manuel Fidel M.
Magtira (Dr. Magtira) who arrived at a conclusion that Villas had become partially and permanently disabled with Grade 9 impediment.
Villas sought payment of disability benefits, which C.F. Sharp denied. According to C.F. Sharp, Villas sustained an amputated right
middle finger injury in February 2013 when he inserted the tip of his finger to the lubricator and it was cut by the cam shaft. C.F. Sharp
alleged that Villas was immediately given first aid medications and was prescribed antibiotics. When the vessel was diverted to
Singapore, Villas sought medical management for his immediate treatment.

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C.F. Sharp alleged that on 26 February 2013, Villas had a follow-up examination. The examining doctor noted that he had no subjective
complaints. C.F. Sharp alleged that Villas returned for check-up on 16 April 2013.
On 30 May 2013, the company-designated physician noted that Villas had improved grip ability in his right hand. On 2 July 2013, the
company-designated physician assessed Villas and declared him fit to resume sea duties.
C.F. Sharp alleged that despite being medically fit to work, Villas refused to sign the medical certification of fitness to work issued by the
company-designated physician. Instead, Villas filed a claim for disability benefits, sickness allowances, damages, and attorney's fees.
Issue: Whether or not Villas' injury amounted to permanent total disability.
Ruling: Yes. The current rule provides: (1) that mere inability to work for a period of 120 days does not entitle a seafarer to permanent
and total disability benefits; (2) that the determination of the fitness of a seafarer for sea duty is within the province of the company-
designated physician, subject to the periods prescribed by law; (3) that the company-designated physician has an initial 120 days to
determine the fitness or disability of the seafarer; and (4) that the period of treatment may only be extended to 240 days if a sufficient
justification exists such as when further medical treatment is required or when the seafarer is uncooperative.
For as long as the 120-day period under the Labor Code and the POEA-SEC and the 240-day period under the IRR co-exist, the Court
must bend over backwards to harmoniously interpret and give life to both of the stated periods. Ultimately, the intent of our labor laws
and regulations is to strive for social justice over the diverging interests of the employer and the employee.
In  Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr., this Court set forth the following guidelines, to wit:
1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120
days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then
the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;
3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g.
seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be
extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to
extend the period; and
4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's
disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.
In the instant case, the first fit to work certificate was issued by Dr. Marzan 115 days from the time of Villas' repatriation. However, as
we stated earlier, there was no basis for the issuance of the fit to work certificate to Villas at that time. The Final Medical Report was
issued by Dr. Ong-Salvador 141 days from the time of repatriation. Following the guidelines in Elburg, Villas' disability had become total
and permanent. The company-designated physician failed to give the final medical assessment within 120 days and failed to justify that
Villas still needed further medical treatment to extend the medical assessment to 240 days. In fact, Dr. Marzan issued a fit to work order
within 115 days, and it appears that it was made just to comply with the 120-day period but records would show that treatment had to
be extended beyond that period. It was further established that Villas immediately sought the assistance of C.F. Sharp after he was
issued the fit to work certificate on 6 June 2013 but his letter was unheeded, forcing him to seek further consultation. The records
further show that Villas continued to have physical therapy until 5 September 2013, even beyond the issuance of the Final Medical
Report. Hence,Villas’ disability was total and permanent.

PHILIPPINE HAMMONIA SHIP AGENCY, NARCISSUS L. DURAN, DORCHESTER MARITIME LIMITED v.

FERDINAND Z. ISRAEL October 03, 2018

Facts: Petitioner PHSA, the local manning agent, on behalf of petitioner DML, the foreign principal, hired respondent
Ferdinand Z. Israel as a Bosun on board the vessel NASR. While performing his duties on board vessel NASR,
respondent accidentally fell from a height of 2 to 2.5 meters while he was conducting an inspection of the crew's
maintenance work. Respondent's right arm and shoulder hit the deck first, absorbing the impact of his fall. He was then
brought to the Orthopedic Department of Cedars-Jebel Ali International Hospital in Dubai where respondent was
examined by Dr. El-Din. Dr. El-Din diagnosed respondent with "supraspinatus tendonitis right shoulder," and
recommended his repatriation.
On September 11, 2005, respondent was repatriated to the Philippines. Respondent reported to petitioner PHSA, which
referred him to company doctors Dr. Lim and Dr. Cruz-Balbon. Since respondent lives in Misamis Oriental, Dr. Lim
referred him to Dr. Grace Cid (Cid) of Polymedic Medical Center in Cagayan de Oro City. After a clinical evaluation, Dr.
Cid diagnosed respondent with "Rotator Cuff Tear with Adhesive Capsulitis" for which respondent underwent physical
therapy sessions from September 27, 2005 to January 28, 2006. Dr. Cid then referred respondent back to Dr. Lim for final
disposition on January 28, 2006.
On January 31, 2006, Dr. Cruz-Balbon declared respondent "Fit to Resume Sea Duties."  However, petitioner PHSA
refused to re-employ respondent because of his condition, or to pay him disability benefits.
On June 7, 2007, respondent filed a Complaint against petitioners for disability compensation, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees.

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Petitioners argued that, in case of conflicting medical findings between the company-designated physicians, on one hand,
and the doctors of choice of the seafarer, on the other hand, the company-designated physicians' assessment should
prevail because the POEA-SEC specifically designated the company-designated physician as the person who must
determine the seafarer's fitness or degree of disability, and Dr. Lim and Dr. Cruz-Balbon, as company-designated
physicians, were the ones who actually monitored and treated respondent's shoulder injury from his repatriation on
September 11, 2005 until he was declared fit to work.
Additionally, respondent executed a Certificate of Fitness to Work dated January 31, 2006 wherein he waived any benefits
and released petitioners from my liability arising from the Contract of Employment. Thus, respondent is barred from
claiming disability benefits from petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not Israel is deemed suffering from permanent total disability.
Ruling: Yes. Respondent, in this case, filed his Complaint before the NLRC on June 7, 2007, prior to October 6, 2008;
therefore, the 120-day rule in Crystal Shipping v. Natividad29 applies herein. The Court reiterates below the pertinent ruling
in Crystal Shipping:
Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he
loses the use of any part of his body. As gleaned from the records, respondent was unable to work from August 18, 1998
to February 22, 1999, at the least, or more than 120 days, due to his medical treatment. This clearly shows that his
disability was permanent.
Although the company-designated doctors and respondent's physician differ in their assessments of the degree of
respondent's disability, both found that respondent was unfit for sea-duty due to respondent's need for regular medical
check-ups and treatment which would not be available if he were at sea. There is no question in our mind that
respondent's disability was total.
Petitioners tried to contest the above findings by showing that respondent was able to work again as a chief mate in
March 2001. Nonetheless, this information does not alter the fact that as a result of his illness, respondent was unable to
work as a chief mate for almost three years. It is of no consequence that respondent was cured after a couple of years.
The law does not require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his
customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability. An award of a total and permanent
disability benefit would be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the employee in making ends meet at
the time when he is unable to work.

NOVEMBER 2018
HENRY DIONIO, v. TRANS-GLOBAL MARITIME AGENCY, INC., GOODWOOD SHIPMANAGEMENT PTE LTD., AND
MICHAEL ESTANIEL November 19, 2018

Facts: Henry Dionio was engaged by Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. as Bosun on board the vessel MIT "Samco
Asia" for and in behalf of Goodwood Shipmanagement, PTE, Ltd. (Goodwood). His Contract of Employment with Trans-
Global. He embarked on February 2, 2011. On February 25, 2011, Dionio experienced dizziness, slurred speech, chest
pain, difficulty in breathing, repeated vomiting and minor loss of strength in his right hand. He was brought to a hospital in
Cape Town, South Africa on March 7, 2011 where he was diagnosed with a "possible transient Ischaemic
Attack/Labyrinthitis." On March 8, 2011, he was repatriated to the Philippines and was referred to the Metropolitan
Medical Center (MMC) for further evaluation and treatment. The initial evaluation conducted on March 9, 2011 considered
"Transient Ischemic Attack." He was later referred to a neurologist and an ear, nose and throat specialist. He received
medical attention and treatment as reflected in Medical Reports dated March 28, April 18, 2027, May 10, 18, June 8, 9,
and September 5, 2011 issued by Dr. Frances Hao-Quan. Dionio's last diagno is was "Bilateral Cerebellar Infarct" with a
disability grading of 10. On November 10, 2011, Dionio filed a complaint against Trans-Global, Goodwood and Michael
Estaniel for permanent disability benefits, as well as actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees.

On March 14, 2012, Dionio consulted Dr. Antonio Pascual of the Philippine Heart Center who diagnosed him with "S/P
Cerebrovascular Disease, Bilateral Cerebellar Infarct" and concluded that he was medically unfit to work as seaman.

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Dionio also consulted Dr. Enrique Puentespina of The Lord's Hospital in Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan whose undated
neurological assessment stated that Dionio had "Vertebro Bassilar Insufficiency.

Issue: 1. Whether or not TRANS-GLOBAL MARITIME AGENCY, INC., GOODWOOD SHIPMANAGEMENT PTE
LTD.failed to appoint a third physician to resolve the conflicting opinions of the company-designated physician and his
doctor's second opinion's disability assessment. (2.) Whether or not Dionio is entitled to permanent total disability.

Ruling: 1. Yes. It is settled that the company-designated physician will have the first opportunity to examine the seafarer
and, thereafter, issue a certification as to the seafarer's medical status. On the basis of the said certification, seafarers
would be initially informed if they are entitled to disability benefits. The seafarers, however, are not precluded from
challenging the diagnosis of the company-designated physicians should they disagree with such findings. They have the
option to seek another opinion from a physician of their choice and, in case the latter's findings differ from that of the
company designated physician, the conflicting findings shall be submitted to a third-party doctor, as mutually agreed upon
by the parties.

2. Yes. It has been held that there is total disability when the employee is unable to earn wages in the same kind
of work or work of similar nature that he or she was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a
person of his or her mentality and attainments could do. Meanwhile, there is permanent disability when the worker is
unable to perform his or her job for more than 120 or 240 days, as the case may be, regardless of whether or not he loses
the use of any part of his or her body. In this case, while much weight is given to the company-designated doctor's
findings, as a result of Dionio's failure to initiate the referral to a third doctor, an assessment of the medical certificate
issued by the company doctor itself shows that Dionio's claim for permanent and total disability is in order.

DAYLINDA ALBARRACIN v. PHILIPPINE TRANSWORLD SHIPPING AND/OR UNIX LIN PTE LTD. AND/OR
ERLINDO M. SALVADOR November 19, 2018

Facts: On September 5, 2006, Albarracin was hired by Transworld, acting for and in behalf of Unix, as Second Officer.
Prior to his employment, Albarracin was made to undergo a rigorous pre-employment medical examination (PEME).
Despite the fact that his Treadmill Stress Test showed that he had an Abnormal Resting ECG and was found to have
"uninterpretable STT wave changes for ischemia due to left ventricular hypertrophy, he was nonetheless declared "fit for
sea duty.” Upon completion of his contract, in line with Albarracin's desire for reemployment, he underwent PEME on July
18, 2007. It was then discovered that he is suffering from Hepatitis Band. On March 31, 2008, Albarracin died leaving
behind his wife, Daylinda (petitioner), and minor child Rexlyn. On December 11, 2008, the petitioner filed the complaint
below against Transworld, Unix, and Transworld's president, Erlindo M. Salvador (hereafter, respondents). She alleged, in
essence, that Albarracin's work constantly subjected the latter to mental and physical pressure and exposed him to
chemicals which suddenly affected his health.

The petitioner claimed that, after Albarracin's death, she requested respondents to pay Albarracin's death benefits and
burial expenses but the latter refused to do so. Asserting that the respondents' refusal is unjust, malicious, and in bad
faith, she prayed that the respondents be held liable not only for death benefits and burial expenses but also for
reimbursement of medical expenses and for damages. The respondents denied the petitioner's claims that Albarracin
suffered or complained of illness during his employment and that the latter sought for, but was refused, medical
examination and assistance after disembarkation. They contended that their refusal to pay the petitioner's claims was
justified because Albarracin did not undergo post-medical examination within three working days from disembarkation and

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his death occurred long after the employment contract with them had expired. Moreover, Albarracin's death is not work-
related considering that no evidence was presented showing that HCC is work-related.

Issue: Whether or not Daylinda is entitled to death benefits and burial expenses.

Ruling: No. Section 32-A of the POEA Contract considers the possibility of compensation for the death of the seafarer
occurring after the termination of the employment contract on account of a work-related illness. But, for death under this
provision to be compensable, the claimant must fulfill the following: 1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks
described herein; 2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks; 3. The
disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and 4. There
was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. In fulfilling these requisites, respondent must present no less
than substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It must reach the level of relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.

Applying the foregoing, to obtain compensation for the death of Albarracin even if such death occurred after the
termination of the employment contract, it is incumbent on the petitioner to present substantial evidence that Albarracin's
work caused or increased the risk of HCC. It must be the petitioner who should present substantial evidence because "the
claimants of death benefits, and not the employers, carry the burden of  proof.

Hence, the petitioner is not entitled to such benefits.

DECEMBER 2018

LINGNAM RESTAURANT v. SKILLS & TALENT EMPLOYMENT POOL, INC., AND JESSIE COLASTE December 03, 2018

Facts: Respondent Skills & Talent Employment Pool, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in manpower management and technical
services, and one of its clients is petitioner Lingnam Restaurant, a business enterprise owned and operated by Liberty C. Nacion. In a
contract of employment, respondent Jessie Colaste is a project employee of respondent STEP assigned to work with petitioner Lingnam
Restaurant as assistant cook.

On March 5, 2008, at about 10:00 a.m., Colaste reported to the main office of STEP at Ortigas Center, Pasig City. He was informed by
one Katherine R. Barrun that his contract with Lingnam Restaurant had expired. He was given a clearance form to be signed by his
supervisor at Lingnam Restaurant. However, he reported for work as usual at Lingnam Restaurant.

On March 7, 2008, he reported for work at Lingnam Restaurant. However, the Chief Cook told him that he was already terminated from
work. After a few minutes, the Chief Cook handed him the telephone, and Supervisor Philipp Prado of the main office of Lingnam
Restaurant was on the line and told him, "finish contract ka na, hindi kana pwede pumasok sa trabaho mo, tanggal ka na." Hence,
Jessie Colaste filed this case for illegal dismissal against Lingnam Restaurant and STEP, and prayed for reinstatement, payment of
backwages and other employment benefits, moral and exemplary damages and ten percent (10%) attorney's fees based on his total
judgment award. In its Position Paper dated August 8, 2008, Lingnam Restaurant denied that it is the employer of complainant Jessie
Colaste and alleged that STEP is Colaste's real employer. Hence, it is not liable for the claims and causes of action of Colaste, and that
the complaint should be dismissed insofar as it is concerned.

In a Decision, Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. He ruled that Jessie Colaste's real employer is STEP because it
directly exercised all powers and responsibilities over Colaste. The Labor Arbiter also dismissed Colaste's money claims for lack of
81
merit. STEP filed a Cautionary Pleading, manifesting the lack of service of summons upon it. Nevertheless, it alleged that it is an
independent contractor engaged in the business of rendering management and technical services. STEP averred that Colaste's
employment was co-terminus and dependent upon its contract with Lingnam Restaurant, and STEP has the right to transfer Colaste to
another assignment, project or client. Aside from assailing the lack of service of summons, STEP also argued that the complaint for
illegal dismissal has no cause of action, since Jessie Colaste is still on floating status and has yet to be enlisted to its other business
clients within a period of six months. STEP alleged that it did not terminate complainant's services. Hence, it prayed that the complaint
be dismissed for lack of merit. Meanwhile, Lingnam Restaurant filed anew its Position Paper, stating that it is a franchisor of the
business establishment Lingnam Restaurant. The franchisee who hired and retained complainant Jessie Colaste was Ms. Liberty
Nacion at its franchise business establishment. It was at the said business establishment that Jessie Colaste rendered services through
STEP. Thus, it is not liable for any claims or causes of action of Jessie Colaste.

Issue: 1. Whether or not STEP is engaged in labor-only contracting. 2. Whether or not Colaste was illegally dismissed.

Ruling: 1. Yes. There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital
or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by
such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer. In such cases, the person or
intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and
extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.

In the instant case, it can be inferred that STEP is engaged in labor-only contracting the fact that it merely provides the personnel to
work for the principal employer, Lingnam Restaurant. This falls under the definition of labor-only contracting under Section 5 of Rule
VIII-A, Book III of the Amended Rules To Implement The Labor Code, since the contractor, STEP, merely supplied Jessie Colaste as
assistant cook to the principal, Lingnam Restaurant; the job of Colaste as assistant cook is directly related to the main business of
Lingnam Restaurant, and STEP does not exercise the right to control the performance of the work of Colaste, the contractual
employee.

2. Yes. The reason for the termination of Jessie Colaste was his contract with petitioner Lingnam Restaurant through respondent STEP
had expired. Lingnam Restaurant explained that Colaste's real employer is STEP. But since respondent STEP is engaged in labor-only
contracting, petitioner Lingnam Restaurant is deemed the employer of Colaste. Thus, the reason for Colaste's termination is not a just
or authorized cause for his dismissal under Articles 282 to 284 of the Labor Code. Moreover, Colaste was not afforded procedural que
process, since petitioner failed to comply with the written notice requirement under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code. The lack of valid
cause for dismissal and petitioner's failure to comply with the twin-notice requirement rendered the dismissal of respondent Colaste
illegal.

JANUARY 2019
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. Mamaril et al. January 16, 2019

Facts: Petitioner Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company (Lepanto) hired respondent Maximo C. Mamaril (Mamaril) as
security guard on November 14, 2003. On 8 October 2006, at around 7 :25 p.m., Lepanto Security Guard Intelligence
Operatives Arthur Bangkilas (Bangkilas) and Romeo Velasco (Velasco) apprehended Eliseo Sumibang, Jr. (Sumibang),
an employee of Lepanto Mine Division who worked as a mucker, for stealing skinned copper wires from the Lepanto Mine
Division located in Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. Mamaril, the guard on duty at that time, was also apprehended since he
was the one who allegedly opened the man door of the Tubo Collar gate and allegedly conspired with Sumibang so that
the wires would be brought out and loaded into a tricycle. Thereafter, Sumibang and Mamaril were both placed under
preventive suspension by the company for qualified theft of skinned copper wires. Lepanto’s Legal Office submitted a
Resolution finding Mamaril guilty of qualified theft for conspiring with Sumibang in pilfering or stealing skinned copper
wires on the night of 8 October 2006. Lepanto dismissed Mamaril from employment for dishonesty and breach of trust and
confidence. Mamaril filed a complaint against Lepanto with the NLRC RAB-CAR for illegal dismissal with claims for
payment of his full backwages or in lieu thereof, payment of separation pay, overtime pay, rest day pay, damages and
attorney’s fees. In a Joint Decision, the LA ruled in favor of Lepanto. The Labor Arbiter declared that as a security guard in
charge of the handling, custody, care, and protection of company property, Mamaril occupied a position of trust and
confidence. Thus, he was terminated for a just cause. The NLRC partially granted the appeal and declared that the
dismissal of Mamaril from the service was without any valid and just cause. The CA decided in favor of Mamaril, et al.
Lepanto filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration which was denied by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in holding that (1) Mamaril was dismissed by
Lepanto without a just and valid cause and thus entitled to separation pay and full backwages, and (2) Mamaril and the
other respondents are entitled to be compensated for work rendered on overtime, holiday, and rest days.
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Ruling: The appellate court did not commit any reversible error in holding that (1) Mamaril was dismissed by Lepanto
without a just cause and is thus entitled to separation pay and full backwages, and (2) Mamaril and the other respondents
are entitled to be compensated for the overtime, holiday and rest day work that they rendered during the period specified
therein. In dismissal cases, the burden of proof is on the employer to show that the employee was dismissed for a valid
and just cause. Here, Lepanto dismissed Mamaril based on loss of trust and confidence. To be a valid ground for
dismissal, the loss of trust and confidence must be based on a willful breach and founded on clearly established facts.
Lepanto contends that Mamaril is not an ordinary outsourced security guard but an in-house security officer and a
member of Lepanto's SRF, thus, holding a position of trust and confidence. However, the records show that when the theft
occurred on 8 October 2006, Mamaril was no longer a member of the SRF. Thus, on the night in question, Mamaril was
no longer a member of the SRF but was transferred to regular security duty in charge of securing the Tubo Collar gate as
well as patrolling and inspecting adjacent buildings. Also, even if Mamaril was occupying a position of trust as an ordinary
security guard, to be a valid cause for termination of employment, the act or acts constituting breach of trust must have
been done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely; and they must be founded on clearly established facts. The Supreme
court agree with the NLRC and the CA that this can hardly be believed as an accurate report or one founded on clearly
established facts given that the incident occurred at night and the witnesses were at a considerable distance away from
the man door. Also, the breach of trust was not shown to have been done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely. In
Damasco v. NLRC, the court held that an employer's formal admission that an employee worked beyond eight hours
should entitle the employee to overtime compensation. In this case, such admissions, that respondents rendered overtime
work and work during their holiday and rest days on the period specified therein, can be gleaned from the affidavits
executed by Lepanto's managers, Atty. Weldy Manlong, and Capt. Edgar Langeg. Thus, respondents are clearly entitled
to these benefits. the daily time sheets presented by petitioner are not substantial proof that private respondents did not
render overtime work. It can be plainly observed from these daily time sheets that the number of hours worked by private
respondents were uniform and were written by the same hand. For this reason, these daily time sheets should be taken
with a grain of salt. There was no reason to overturn the rulings of the NLRC and the CA in awarding overtime pay,
holiday pay, and rest day pay to the other respondents.

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Edgar Torillos v. Eastgate Maritime Corporations January 10, 2019

Facts: For a period of 15 years, Eastgate Maritime Corporation (Eastgate), for and on behalf of its foreign principal, F.J. Lines, Inc.,
Panama, continuously hired Torillos under various contracts. His last contract of employment dated November 3, 2010 on
board the vessel MV Corona Lions as Chief Cook was duly approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) and was covered by the International Bargaining Forum All Japan Seamen's Union/Associated
Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines-International Mariners Management Association of Japan (IBF
JSU/AMOSUP-IMMAJ) Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).Torillos underwent the requisite Pre-Employment Medical
Examination (PEME) and was found fit for sea duty. Torillos boarded the vessel on December 4, 2010. Sometime in
November 2011, while in the performance of his duties, Torillos experienced pain in his right leg radiating to his lower
extremities. He reported the matter to the Master of the vessel who, in turn, brought him to a hospital in Reihoku, Japan
on November 14, 2011. There, he was diagnosed to be suffering from urinary stone in his right urinary tract and was
prescribed pain reliever drugs. The doctor recommended his repatriation for further treatment. Upon arrival in Manila, he
was referred to a medical specialist and was found to be suffering from Lumbar Spondylosis; L4-L5 Diffuse Bulge with
Resultant Bilateral Neural Foraminal Stenosis; L5-S1 Diffuse Disc Bulge with Radial Tear; and L5-S1 Disc Desiccation.
Torillos continued with his physical therapy as well as occupational therapy with the company-designated physicians.
However, despite continued therapy sessions, he filed on May 8, 2012 a complaint with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) against Eastgate for payment of permanent total disability benefits, medical expenses, sickness
allowance, damages and attorney's fees. according to him, his illness was a result of an accident that occurred while he
was performing his duties as chief cook. The Labor Arbiter found Torillos entitled to permanent total disability benefits
under the CBA amounting to US$118,800.00. Eastgate appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC agreed with the Labor Arbiter
that Torillos indeed suffered an accident. Eastgate filed a Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Application for the Issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the enforcement of the NLRC Decision. The
Court of Appeals reduced the disability benefit and attorney’s fees. Both parties filed their respective motions for
reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not Torillos is entitled to total permanent disability under the POEA-SEC and attorney’s fees.
Ruling: The court is not convinced as there was no evidence to show that Torillos met an accident on board the vessel
that caused his injury. There was no accident report or any medical report issued. As the court find the CBA inapplicable,
Torillos’ entitlement to disability  benefits is therefore governed by the POEA-SEC and relevant labor laws which are
deemed written in the contract of employment with Eastgate. Torillos suffers from a work-related and compensable illness
as found by the labor arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA. The Court is not inclined to depart from these findings of the Labor
Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA. Where the factual findings of the labor tribunals or agencies conform to, and are affirmed
by the CA, the same are accorded respect and finality and are binding upon the court. Torillos' complaint for total and
permanent disability benefits was premature. As aforementioned, Torillos' entitlement to disability benefits is governed not
by the parties' CBA but by the POEA-SEC and relevant labor laws. Evidently, it was premature for him at this time to
invoke his claim for total and permanent disability inasmuch as the 240-day period had not yet lapsed. At the time he filed
his complaint, he was still under temporary total disability. Instead of continuing his treatment which is still within the 240-
day period allowed for the company-designated physician to evaluate his condition, he filed a case for total and
permanent disability benefits despite the absence of a definite finding from the company-designated physician. He was
armed only with the interim assessment of the company-designated physician which did not give him the cause of action
for his claim. From the foregoing, Torillos had no cause of action for total and permanent disability claim. At most, he is
only qualified to claim partial permanent disability benefits equivalent to Grade 8 disability rating under the POEA-SEC, as
reflected in Dr. Cruz' last assessment report. Moreover, Torillos is not entitled to attorney’s fees. In labor cases, attorney's
fees are awarded when there is unlawful withholding of wages or benefits due,[44] forcing the employee to litigate.[45] In
the present case, there was no unlawful withholding of benefits to speak of. As discussed, Torillos filed a case against
Eastgate while he was still undergoing treatment and without yet a final disability assessment from the company-
designated physician. His act was premature which stripped him of entitlement to attorney's fees.

84
Augustin International Center, Inc. V. Elfrenito B. Bartolome January 28, 2019

Facts: In 2010, Bartolome and Yamat applied as carpenter and tile setter, respectively, with AICI, an employment agency
providing manpower to foreign corporations. They were eventually engaged by Golden Arrow Company, Ltd. (Golden
Arrow), which had its office in Khartoum, Republic of Sudan. Thereafter, they signed their respective employment
contracts stating that they would render services for a period not less than twenty-four (24) months.[6] In their contracts,
there was a provision on dispute settlement that reads:” 14. Settlement of disputes: All claims and complaints relative to
the employment contract of the employee shall be settled in accordance with Company policies, rules[,] and regulations.
In case the Employee contests the decision of the employer, the matter shall be settled amicably with [the] participation of
the Labour Attaché or any authorized representative of the Philippines Embassy nearest the site of employment”. Upon
their arrival in Sudan sometime in March and April 2011, Golden Arrow transferred their employment to its sister
company, Al Mamoun Trading and Investment Company (Al Mamoun). A year later, or on May 2, 2012, Al Mamoun
served Notices of Termination of Service[8] to respondents, causing them to return to the Philippines. On May 22, 2012,
they filed their complaint[9] before the NLRC seeking that AICI and A1 Mamoun be held liable for illegal dismissal, breach
of contract, and payment of the unexpired portion of the contract. The LA held that respondents were illegally dismissed,
and accordingly, ordered AICI and Al Mamoun to pay the former P69,300.00 each, representing their salaries for the
unexpired portion of their contract. The LA explained that AICI and Al Mamoun failed to overcome their burden to prove
that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause. They likewise failed to show that respondents abandoned their
duties. The NLRC affirmed the LA's ruling, noting that AICI and Al Mamoun failed to discharge their burden to prove by
substantial evidence that the termination of respondents' employment was valid. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.
It explained that, as a rule, termination disputes should be brought before the LA, except when the parties agree to submit
the dispute to voluntary arbitration pursuant to then Article 262 (now Article 275) of the Labor Code, provided that such
agreement is stated "in unequivocal language." Citing jurisprudence, the CA added that the phrase "all disputes" is not
sufficient to divest the LA of its jurisdiction over termination disputes. In the same manner, the phrase "all claims and
complaints" in respondents' employment contracts does not remove the LA's jurisdiction to decide whether respondents
were legally terminated.

Issue: Whether or not AICI is liable for respondent’s illegal dismissal.

Ruling: Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law[34] and cannot be acquired or
waived by agreement of the parties.[35] As herein applied, the dispute settlement provision in respondents' employment
contracts cannot divest the LA of its jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case. Hence, it correctly took cognizance of the
complaint filed by respondents before it. Considering that the parties did not submit the present illegal termination case to
the voluntary arbitration mechanism, the dispute remained under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the LA, which
therefore correctly took cognizance of the case. Hence, the Court modifies the CA's ruling on this matter accordingly. AICI
argues in its petition that it cannot be held liable for illegal dismissal because it only recruits employees for foreign
employers, and as such, it does not have an employee-employer relationship with the overseas workers. This argument
does not hold water. Section 10 of RA 8042, as amended; expressly provides that a recruitment agency, such as AICI, is
solidarily liable with the foreign employer for money claims arising out of the employee-employer relationship between the
latter and the overseas Filipino worker. Jurisprudence explains that this solidary liability is meant to assure the aggrieved
worker of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due him, as well as to afford overseas workers an additional layer
of protection against foreign employers that tend to violate labor laws. In view of the express provision of law, AICI's lack
of an employee-employer relationship with respondents cannot exculpate it from its liability to pay the latter's money
claims.

85
Abosta Shipmanagement Corp. V. Dante C. Segui January 16, 2019

Facts: Respondent Dante C. Segui alleged that he was hired by the petitioners Abosta ShipManagement Corporation as
an able seaman and that his employment was covered by an ITF IBF JSU Collective Bargaining Agreement. Prior to his
deployment, he underwent the required pre employment medical examination of which he was declared fit to work. He
boarded the vessel om June 16, 2009 and that during his employment, he would be on duty more than 12 hours a day
resulting in extreme fatigue and exhaustion; that on October 26, 2010, while on duty, he felt cramps followed by a severe
back pain; that he informed the master who advised him to rest; that the next day, he was unable to stand and remained
in his cabin for the rest of the voyage; that when the vessel arrived in South Africa, he was admitted to a medical facility
and he underwent an x-ray of his back and injection on his left knee; that the same procedure was taken in Colombia and
again in Panama where he was diagnosed with a lumbar disc problem and was recommended repatriation; that on
December 2, 2010, he arrived in Manila and was referred to the Manila Doctors Hospital where a CT Scan showed he
was suffering from "Circumferential Disc Bulge at L4-L5 with Posteromedial Herniation of the Nucleus Pulposus as well as
associated Spinal Canal and Neuroforaminal Narrowings as described; Lumbar Spondylosis". The doctor who conducted
the treatment and examinations concluded that the nature and extent of his injury rendered him permanently and totally
unable to work as a seafarer. The petitioners refused to pay respondent’s total and permanent disability. The Labor arbiter
rendered a decision in favor of respondent. The LA held that Segui is entitled to maximum disability benefit after finding
that he suffered from a work-related illness/injury while on board the vessel, and applying the terms and conditions of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), which is incorporated in
his employment contract. Section 20.B of POEA-SEC provides that the employer shall be liable for disability
compensation for work-related illness/injury sustained during the term of the contract. On appeal to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), the commission affirmed the Decision of the LA on January 4, 2013.The NLRC
pronounced that since the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) Standard Agreement provides for higher
disability compensation than the POEA-SEC, the former should prevail over the latter. The CA resolved that the NLRC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming the LA's award of permanent total disability benefits and maximum
disability benefits to respondent Segui. The CA expounded that the disability is considered total if there is disablement of
an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform,
or any kind of work, which a person of his mentality and attainments could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness.

Issue: Whether or not disability compensation is determined not by the number of days of treatment but rather, by the
disability grading issued by the company-designated physicians and whether or not the total and permanent disability is
awarded to respondent.

Ruling: The records reveal that from Segui's repatriation and immediate referral to the company-designated physician on
December 2, 2010 until the 120-day period on March 31, 2011, the latter did not issue a medical assessment on Segui's
disability grading. It was only on the 219 thday or on July 8, 2011, when Segui reached the maximum medical cure, that the
company-designated physician issued a disability rating of "Grade 8 disability - moderate rigidity or 2/3 loss of motion or
lifting power of the trunk." Notably, the company-designated physician did not determine Segui's fitness to work. Clearly,
there was non-compliance with Items 1 and 2 of the rules on claim for total and permanent disability benefits cited in
the Elburg case. The company-designated physician failed to issue a medical assessment within the 120-day period from
the time Segui reported to him, and there was no justifiable reason for such failure. Likewise, there was no sufficient
justification to extend the 120-day period to 240 days. Thus, following the above rules, Segui's disability becomes
permanent and total, and entitles him to permanent and total disability benefits under his contract and the collective
bargaining agreement. The Court observed that the company-designated physician's medical reports for the month of
June 2011 are consistent with the medical assessment of Segui's own physician, that is, he is unfit for sea duty in any
capacity. Despite the lack of medical assessment from a third independent physician, the Court, on several
occasions, can determine which between the two medical findings has merit. Here, the records of the case are replete
with support that Segui's injury is permanent and total, and that he is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits as
unanimously declared by the LA, the NLRC and the CA.

86
Danny Boy C. Monterona v. Coca- Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. January 14, 2019

Facts: In September 2003, petitioners Danny Boy C. Monterona (Monterona), Joselito S. Alvarez (Alvarez), Ignacio S.
Samson (Samson), Joey P. Ocampo (Ocampo), Role R. Demetrio (Demetrio), Elpidio P. Metre, Jr. (Metre) and their co-
employees filed before the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment
of backwages, damages and attorney's fees (first illegal dismissal case) against respondents Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc. (Coca-Cola) and its officer, Giovanni Acorda. They alleged that they were hired by Coca-Cola on various
dates from 1986 to 2003. Coca-Cola, however, terminated their employment in August 2003. In a Decision dated August
30, 2004, the LA dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The LA ruled that no employer-employee
relationship existed between Coca-Cola and the complainants because the latter were hired by Genesis Manpower and
General Services, Inc. (Genesis), a legitimate job contractor and it was Genesis which exercised control over the nature,
extent and degree of work to be performed by the complainants. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA's Decision. The
complainants moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated November 29,
2005. Subsequently, on July 14, 2009, petitioners filed before the LA a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for
reinstatement, payment of backwages, separation pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, damages and
attorney's fees (second illegal dismissal case) against respondents. The LA dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription and res judicata. The LA found that Monterona was dismissed from service in May 2002, Metre in February
2003, and Alvarez, Samson, Ocampo and Demetrio in August 2003; thus, four years had elapsed when they filed the
case in July 2009. The LA further opined that the second complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims could
no longer be entertained on the ground of res judicata considering that the first illegal dismissal case had long attained
finality. The NLRC affirmed the ruling of the LA but only on the ground of res judicata. In a Decision dated August 30,
2012, the CA dismissed the appeal on the ground of laches and estoppel. 

Issue: Whether or not res judicata is not applicable in the case.

Ruling: The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the
case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two
cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior judgment" would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity
of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of judgment" applies. The
Court finds that the subject case satisfies all the requisites of res judicata under the first concept of bar by prior judgment.
The first illegal dismissal case, which was decided in favor of petitioners' co-employees, attained finality on July 28, 2008.
It is likewise beyond dispute that the judgment on the first illegal dismissal case has been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as over the parties and it was a judgment on the merits. Further, there can be
no question as to the identity of the parties. Petitioners were among the complainants in the first illegal dismissal case
which was instituted against the same respondents. Here, the two cases involve the same cause of action,  i.e.,
respondents' act of terminating petitioners' employment. The facts in the two cases are identical and petitioners presented
the same evidence to prove their claims in both cases. Matters settled by a Court's final judgment should not be litigated
upon or invoked again. Relitigation of issues already settled merely burdens the Courts and the taxpayers, creates
uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable time and energy that could be devoted to worthier causes. 

87
 FEBRUARY 2019
Ramiro Lim& Sons Agricutural Co., Inc. V. Armando Guilaran February 6, 2019

Facts: Respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and non-payment of allowance,
separation pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay, and for moral and exemplary damages against
petitioners. They alleged that they were agricultural workers of the petitioners, employed to work in all the agricultural
stages of work on the 84-hectare hacienda owned by petitioners. Respondents also alleged that they were paid on a
mixed pakyaw and daily basis. Respondents further alleged that they were illegally dismissed on 22 July 2000, when they
asked to be paid based on the rates prescribed by the prevailing Wage Order. Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that
respondents – except Romeo Frias who was paid purely on a daily basis – were employed as labourer’s on
a pakyaw basis. When their attention was called to the plan to conduct stricter measures to prevent wastage and
production losses due to their half-hearted performance, respondents refused to return to work, paralyzing operations for
about three weeks. Because of their unjustified absence even after show-cause notices, petitioners considered them to
have abandoned their respective jobs. The Labor Arbiter adopted the computation of the Fiscal Examiner who awarded to
respondents their backwages in the amount of Five Million Fifty Eight Thousand Two Hundred Sixty Four Pesos and
64/100 (P5, 058,264.64). Petitioners filed a Memorandum of Appeal to the NLRC. The NLRC annulled and set aside the
Order of the Labor Arbiter finding that the computation used was erroneous and adopted the method used by petitioners
to compute the amount of backwages due to the respondents, which is to get the average monthly income of respondents
based on the payrolls for the twelve-month period immediately preceding their dismissal, taking into consideration the
Wage Orders prevailing during the period. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents was denied by the NLRC
in a Resolution dated 21 March 2011. Thereafter, respondents filed a petition for  certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA.
The CA found that the NLRC erred in relying on the payrolls presented by petitioners as these payrolls were self-serving,
unreliable, and unsubstantial evidence. The inconsistencies in the signatures of respondents were so questionable to the
naked eye that the CA found that its genuineness is doubtful. Moreover, the signatures on the payrolls pertained to
different or unknown persons who were not shown to be authorized.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave error in disregarding the payrolls submitted by the petitioners
as basis for the computation of respondents’ backwages and in applying the social policy justice of labor laws in favor of
the respondents.
Ruling: The court found that the CA did not err when it found that the inconsistencies in the signatures of respondents are
so questionable to the naked eye that there exists doubt on their genuineness. Respondents vehemently deny and refute
the payrolls submitted as being incomplete, irregular, and forged. They allege that they were never given copies of these
payrolls. The allegation that their signatures were forged or signed by unauthorized persons can hardly be overlooked.
The CA, after a painstaking scrutiny of the voluminous records, found inconsistencies in the signatures and even
signatures of unknown or unauthorized persons. Thus, while the payrolls in question enjoyed the presumption of regularity
as entries made in the course of business, this presumption of regularity was effectively overthrown by evidence to the
contrary. Petitioners argue that not one of the respondents rendered service for more than six months a year, and that 21
out of the 30 respondents did not even render service for one month in a year. We find these allegations baseless and
unconvincing. It has already been settled by this Court that respondents herein were regular seasonal workers. Although
petitioners do not work throughout the year and their employment depends upon a specific season, like for instance,
milling seasons; and for only a specific task like, weeding, plowing, fertilizing, to name a few, inasmuch as they have been
performing services necessary and desirable to private respondents' business, serve as badges of regular employment.
The fact that petitioners "do not work continuously for one whole year but only for the duration a season does not detract
from considering them regular employees. It is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that seasonal workers who are called
from time to time and are temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from service in said period, but are
merely considered on leave until re-employed. petitioners herein failed to adduce any evidence on the agreed amount of
payment for work based on pakyaw basis, and whether such amount was determined and approved by the Secretary of
Labor. Thus, the Labor Arbiter was correct in applying the minimum wage rates based on the applicable Wage Orders to
determine the amount of backwages due to respondents. Consequently, we find that the amount awarded to respondents
was not based on social justice but rather was in accordance with law.

88
Ruby C. Del Rosario v. CW Marketing & Development Corporation February 20, 2019
Facts: Since 2007, Del Rosario has been in the employ of CW Marketing, initially as Sales Consultant and eventually as
Sales Supervisor, detailed at its Home Depot, Balintawak Branch. As Sales Supervisor, she was assigned a computer
which is part of a shared network of computer users of CW Marketing and is connected to a printer/scanner. Del Rosario
alone was taught by CW Marketing's Information Technology (IT) personnel how to operate the machine although the
network connection enabled other computer users to print documents through the printer/scanner connected to Del
Rosario's computer. Sometime in October 2010, CW Marketing received a report from Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation (HSBC) that several individuals applying for credit cards submitted ostensibly falsified payslips and
identification cards issued by CW Marketing's Balintawak Branch. The questionable documents indicated higher positions
and salaries of purported CW Marketing employees. Based on the report prepared by its IT Department, which conducted
an investigation on the information given by HSBC,CW Marketing issued a Notice to Explain  dated November 4, 2010
addressed to Del Rosario. Del Rosario wrote an email to CW Marketing, admitting that she knew the three mentioned
individuals and the occasions they used her computer and the printer/scanner, she denied that she had a hand in the
falsification of the documents. CW Marketing issued a second Notice to Explain, dated November 9, 2010, requiring her to
answer why she should not be dismissed for additional violations of CW Marketing's Employee Handbook. Del Rosario
explained further that she did not falsify the questioned documents nor was she the sole user of the computer assigned to
her. On November 30, 2010, CW Marketing found Del Rosario liable for three violations of its Employee Handbook and
terminated her employment. Del Rosario filed before the Arbitration branch of the NLRC the complaint for illegal dismissal,
non-payment of wages/salary, overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, separation pay,
emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA), and commission; and other causes of action. The LA held that CW
Marketing failed to establish that Del Rosario directly committed the falsification of the questioned documents. Both CW
Marketing and Del Rosario appealed the ruling of the LA to the NLRC, the former questioning the finding that it illegally
dismissed Del Rosario, and the latter questioning the denial of her other money claims. The NLRC reversed the ruling of
the LA and found that CW Marketing correctly dismissed Del Rosario for loss of trust and confidence.  Thereafter, Del
Rosario filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion
in the NLRC's reversal of the LA's ruling. In its Decision dated October 9, 2013, the CA ruled that there is no grave abuse
of discretion in the NLRC's ruling that Del Rosario was validly dismissed for loss of trust and confidence. For the CA, Del
Rosario should have at least called the attention of the concerned subordinates and instructed them to stop using
company property for personal transactions, more so for editing and falsifying documents issued by CW Marketing.
Issue: Whether or not Del Rosario was illegally dismissed by Respondent.
Ruling: Two requisites must concur to constitute a valid dismissal from employment: (1) the dismissal must be for any of
the causes expressed in Article 282 (now Article 297) of the Labor Code; and (2) the employee must be given an
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is
premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. Specifically in this instance,
Del Rosario was entrusted with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property. Del Rosario
attempted to extricate herself from liability by insisting that she never falsified any of the questioned documents and that
only her subordinates who used her computer effected the falsification thereof. Unfortunately for Del Rosario, the charge
against her is not the criminal act of falsification but the totality of her acts as supervisor, including her negligence and
want of care for company property entrusted to her. It cannot be over emphasized that there is no substitute for honesty
for sensitive positions which call for utmost trust. Fairness dictates that the respondent should not be allowed to continue
with the employment of the petitioner who has breached the confidence reposed on him. Unlike other just causes for
dismissal, trust in an employee, once lost, is difficult, if not impossible, to regain. Clearly, while the actions of Del Rosario
do not point to her direct participation in the fraudulent scheme, which negatively bore on CW Marketing's reputation and
credit standing with banks, in general, and HSBC in particular, her actions evinced that she knew fully well that some of
her subordinates were falsifying documents using company property. From this point on, Del Rosario deliberately kept
silent over her subordinates' actions resulting in damage to CW Marketing. Moreover, her awareness of the identities of
the culprits and her insistence that she did not herself falsify documents demonstrate her sheer apathy to CW Marketing
not worthy of her position as Sales Supervisor. Petition is denied.

89
German Marine Agencies v. Teodolah Caro February 13, 2019
Facts: German Marine is a domestic corporation which recruited Eduardo for and in behalf of its foreign principal, Baltic
Marine. Since May 1996, German Marine had continuously hired Eduardo until he signed his last employment contract
with them as Second Officer on February 15, 2005 for a period of nine months. Prior to the signing of this contract,
Eduardo underwent the Pre-Employment Medical Examination and was declared fit to work. Eduardo thereafter boarded
the vessel "Pacific Senator" on March 16, 2005. On January; 3, 2006, Eduardo finished his contract of employment and
was repatriated. On June 25, 2007, Eduardo died of "acute respiratory failure" while he was confined at the National
Kidney and Transplant Institute. On August 28, 2007, Teodolah filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for death benefits,
medical expenses, and attorney's fees. Teodolah alleged that: (1) during Eduardo's employment, he suffered dry cough
and experienced difficulty in breathing and urinating; (2) Eduardo's illness, which he tried to address by self-medication, is
attributed to exposure to chemicals on board the vessel; (3) Eduardo felt very ill at the time of his repatriation but he
merely endured it in the hopes of getting another contract; and (4) Eduardo consulted a physician at the Lung Center of
the Philippines who diagnosed him to be suffering from bronchial asthma induced by chemicals. The Labor Arbiter, in his
Decision, dismissed Teodolah's complaint for lack of merit. He ruled that Eduardo's death is not compensable because it
occurred after the expiration of his employment contract. Upon appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision,
noting that Teodolah would be entitled to death benefits only if Eduardo died during the term of his employment contract.
The CA reversed the ruling of the NLRC. It held that a perusal of the record reveals that Teodolah was able to present
substantial evidence to show her entitlement to death benefits. The CA found that Eduardo acquired bronchial asthma, an
occupational disease under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC, within the period of his service with Baltic Marine. For
the CA, there was at least a reasonable connection between Eduardo's job as a Second Officer and his bronchial asthma,
which eventually developed into acute respiratory failure. It likewise held that it is of no moment that Eduardo died after
the expiration of his last contract, because what is controlling is the fact that he acquired his lung disease while he was
still rendering sea services.
Issue: Whether or not Respondent is entitled to death benefits and burial expenses.
Ruling: Teodolah was able to prove through substantial evidence the causal connection between Eduardo's work as a
seafarer and his cause of death. Evidence substantiating the same included an enumeration of Eduardo's exposure to
chemicals, noise and whole-body vibrations, strong draft winds and stormy weather, cold stress and heat stress,
excessive heat from burners and steam pipes, and ultraviolet radiation during welding operations while on board and in
the exercise of his duties as a Second Officer for petitioners. In point of fact, Teodolah already established the causal link
between the nature of Eduardo's work and the cause of the deterioration of his health leading to his repatriation at the first
instance in her complaint before the Labor Arbiter. There, she contended, among others, that after his repatriation, a
physician at the Lung Center of the Philippines diagnosed him then to have been suffering from bronchial asthma, which
was chemical-induced. These claims were not dispelled by the Labor Arbiter but were merely disregarded on the
reasoning that Eduardo's death was not compensable because it occurred after the expiration of his employment contract.
Upon full consideration of the evidence presented by Teodolah, the CA correctly found that there is at least reasonable
correlation established between the nature of Eduardo's work and the cause of his death. Under settled jurisprudence,
reasonable correlation is all that is required to prove a rightful claim for death benefits. It is not required that the
employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the
benefits provided therefor. It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development
of the disease and in bringing about his death. It is indeed safe to presume that, at the very least, the nature of Faustino
Indicatives’ employment had contributed to the aggravation of his illness-if indeed it was pre existing at the time of his
employment and therefore it is but just that he be duly compensated for it. It cannot be denied that there was at least a
reasonable connection between his job and his lung infection, which eventually developed into septicemia and ultimately
caused his death. As a utility man on board the vessel, he was exposed to harsh sea weather, chemical irritants, dusts,
etc., all of which invariably contributed to his illness. Eduardo's causes of death included acute respiratory failure which
was diagnosed as secondary to pulmonary thromboembolism. It does not demand a stretch of the imagination to
reasonably presume that the conditions to which Eduardo was exposed to during the fulfillment of his duties as Second
Officer aboard petitioners' vessel at the very least contributed to either the contracting of said respiratory illness or the
aggravation thereof. Petition is denied.

90
Oscar M. Paringit v. Global Gateway Crewing Services, inc. February 6, 2019
Facts: On June 1, 2010, Paringit entered into a six (6)-month employment contract with Mid-South Ship and Crew
Management, Inc., representing Seaworld Marine Services, S.A. He was employed as Chief Mate of the Panaman vessel
Tsavliris Hellas with a basic monthly salary of US$1,700.00 for 48 hours a week, overtime pay of US$1,500.00, and
vacation leave with pay of US$200.00.[6] Prior to his deployment, Paringit underwent a pre-employment medical
examination, where he disclosed that he had high blood pressure. Still, he was declared fit for duty. A few months later,
Paringit began to feel constantly fatigued and stressed. He also noticed blood in his feces beginning October 1, 2011.
Since then he was in different hospitals for treatment. He was soon medically repatriated and arrived in Manila on
February 9, 2012. He underwent different operations and treatment. On March 5, 2012, Dr. Quetulio noted that Paringit
was a candidate for open heart surgery. She also advised him to continue his medication while waiting for his employer's
go signal on his recommended procedures. Paringit underwent repeat 2D echocardiogram, which showed that he had a
severe valvular problem. The cardiologist who examined him recommended that he undergo open heart surgery for valve
replacement or repair, with possible coronary bypass graft. On March 22, 2012, Paringit underwent a coronary
angiography. While the procedure revealed that he had no blocked coronary vessels, the attending cardiologist opined
that he still had to undergo open heart surgery for valve replacement or repair. Dr. Quetulio again advised him to continue
his medication while awaiting his employer's approval of the recommended open-heart surgery. On May 18, 2012, Dr.
Quetulio noted that Paringit hesitated to undergo the recommended open-heart surgery and wanted to undergo a herbal
treatment instead. On June 4, 2012, Paringit consulted Dr. May S. Donato-Tan (Dr. Donato-Tan), a cardiologist at the
Philippine Heart Center. After evaluating Paringit and reviewing the results of his laboratory examinations, Dr. Donate-Tan
concluded that with his heart condition, he would need regular medication, further laboratory procedures, and periodic
check-ups with a cardiologist to prevent any aggravation of his illness. She declared him to be permanently disabled and
unfit for duty as a seaman. On June 11, 2012, Paringit filed a Complaint for medical expenses and other money claims
against Global Gateway Crewing Services, Inc. (Global Gateway), Mid-South Ship & Crew Management, Inc., Seaworld
Marine Services, S.A., and Captain Simeon Flores (Captain Flores), president of Global Gateway. On June 13, 2012,
Paringit executed a quitclaim,  where he acknowledged receiving US$6,636.70 from St. Tsavliris Hellas as his sickness
allowance from February 8, 2012 to June 8, 2012. On June 18, 2012, Dr. Quetulio informed Global Gateway that Paringit
seemed hesitant to undergo the recommended operation and instead opted for herbal treatment. She also stated that
Paringit's heart condition was preexisting, not work-related. In her October 4, 2012 Decision, Labor Arbiter Lilia S. Savari
(Labor Arbiter Savari) granted Paringit's Complaint. She found that his various illnesses were work-related or work-
aggravated, brought about by the type of food served and the stressful nature of his job aboard the ship. The NLRC
affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision while the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Issue: Whether or not the ailment of petitioner was work related and whether or not he is entitled to a disability benefit.
Ruling: To grant a seafarer's claim for disability benefits, the following requisites must be present: (1) [H]e suffered an
illness; (2) he suffered this illness during the term of his employment contract; (3) he complied with the procedures
prescribed under Section 20-B; (4) his illness is one of the enumerated occupational disease[s] or that his illness or injury
is otherwise work-related; and (5) he complied with the four conditions enumerated under Section 32-A for an
occupational disease or a disputably-presumed work-related disease to be compensable. It is not disputed that petitioner
was initially diagnosed with heart disease, anemia, renal dysfunction, and that he fell ill while he was aboard the Tsavrilis
Hellas. Petitioner took medication to normalize his high blood pressure, but the working conditions and mandatory diet
aboard the vessel made it difficult and nearly impossible for him to maintain a healthy lifestyle. The court agree with the
Labor Arbiter's finding that complainant's current medical condition was a work-acquired illness. As correctly noted by the
Labor Arbiter, complainant was subjected to several tests by the respondents prior to embarkation and was "declared fit
for sea duty" thus the conclusive presumption that complainant's illness was acquired while on-board the ocean-going
vessel. The POEA Standard Employment Contract spells out the conditions for compensability. Here, the compensability
of petitioner's condition is clear; however, instead of fulfilling its responsibilities, respondent Global Gateway delayed his
treatment and raised technical procedural barriers that were clearly unwarranted. His persistent symptoms hinder him
from sufficiently performing his work as a seaman. He is therefore given permanent disability and declared unfit for duty in
whatever capacity as a seaman.

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Slord Development Corporation v. Benerando M. Noya February 4, 2019
Facts: Respondent was employed on September 9, 2008 as a welder by petitioner, a domestic corporation engaged in
the business of manufacturing and processing of sardines and other canned goods. Respondent's employment was
covered by a CBA effective April 14, 2009 to April 15, 2014 between petitioner and Nagkakaisang Lakas ng
Manggagawa-Katipunan (NLM-Katipunan), the company's sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all the regular rank-
and-file employees. Petitioner claimed that sometime in December 2013, respondent asked several employees to affix
their signatures on a blank sheet of yellow paper for the purpose of forming a new union, prompting the president of NLM-
Katipunan to file expulsion proceedings against him for disloyalty. Subsequently, or on February 9, 2014, respondent
organized a new union named the Bantay Manggagawa sa SLORD Development Corporation (BMSDC), which he
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on February 20, 2014. In the ensuing investigation,
respondent failed to appear and participate at the scheduled hearings before the union. Thus, NLM-Katipunan resolved,
with the ratification of its members, to expel respondent on the ground of disloyalty. Accordingly, a notice of expulsion
dated February 27, 2014 was issued by NLM-Katipunan to respondent. Subsequently, a letter dated March 16, 2014 was
sent by NLM-Katipunan to petitioner, demanding his termination from employment pursuant to the union security clause of
the CBA. Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and illegal deduction
against petitioner before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), asserting that he did not violate any CBA
provision since he validly organized BMSDC during the freedom period. The LA dismissed the case for lack of merit,
ruling that respondent's dismissal was neither illegal nor an unfair labor practice. Among others, the LA held that petitioner
was duty-bound to terminate respondent's employment after having been expelled by NLM-Katipunan for organizing a
rival union. Notably, NLM-Katipunan has a valid closed shop agreement in the CBA that required the members to remain
with the union as a condition for continued employment. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA with modification,
ordering petitioner to pay respondent P10, 000 as nominal damages. The CA granted respondent's petition, finding his
dismissal to be illegal. Accordingly, it ordered petitioner to immediately reinstate respondent and pay his full backwages
and other allowances, computed from the time he was illegally dismissed up to the time of actual reinstatement, plus
attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.
Issue: Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed.
Ruling: "Union security is a generic term which is applied to and comprehends 'closed shop,' 'union shop,' 'maintenance
of membership' or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union
membership as a condition affecting employment. There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to
join the union within a certain period for their continued employment. There is maintenance of membership shop when
employees, who are union members as of the effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter become members, must
maintain union membership as a condition for continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the
bargaining unit, or the agreement is terminated. This is consistent with the State policy to promote unionism to enable
workers to negotiate with management on an even playing field and with more persuasiveness than if they were to
individually and separately bargain with the employer. Thus, the law has allowed stipulations for "union shop" and "closed
shop" as means of encouraging workers to join and support the union of their choice in the protection of their rights and
interest vis-a-vis the employer. To validly terminate the employment of an employee through the enforcement of the union
security clause, the following requisites must concur: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting
for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision
of the union to expel the employee from the union. t is undisputed that the CBA contains a closed shop agreement
stipulating that petitioner's employees must join NLM-Katipunan and remain to be a member in good standing; otherwise,
through a written demand, NLM-Katipunan can insist the dismissal of an employee. Notably, the Court has consistently
upheld the validity of a closed shop agreement as a form of union security clause. The NLRC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in ruling that there existed just cause to validly terminate respondent's employment. This notwithstanding,
petitioner, however, failed to observe the proper procedure in terminating respondent's employment, warranting the
payment of nominal damages. The records fail to show that petitioner accorded respondent ample opportunity to defend
himself through written notices and subsequent hearing. Thus, as held by the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, respondent's
right to procedural due process was violated, entitling him to the payment of nominal damages, which the Court deems
proper to increase from P10, 000.00 to P30, 000.00 in line with existing jurisprudence. It is settled that in cases involving
dismissals for just cause but without observance of the twin requirements of notice and hearing, the validity of the
dismissal shall be upheld, but the employer shall be ordered to pay nominal damages in the amount of P30, 000.00.

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 MARCH 2019

Myra Moral v. Momentum Properties Management Corporation March 6, 2019

Facts: Petitioner alleged that, on 26 June 2013, respondent hired her as a probationary employee, with her designation
being that of a Leasing Assistant. She worked eight hours a day from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Six months after her
employment, specifically on 27 December 2013, she was informed of her dismissal and was advised to no longer report
for work. According to petitioner, upon inquiring the reason for her dismissal, respondent coldly ignored her query and
thereafter, no longer contacted her. She contended that respondent failed to provide any notice or justifiable cause as to
why her employment was being severed. Because of respondent's failure to comply with both substantive and procedural
due process requirements, as mandated by law, petitioner alleged that she was illegally dismissed. In its defense,
respondent denied the illegal dismissal allegation of petitioner. Respondent acknowledged, however, that petitioner was
hired by it as a probationary employee, particularly as a Leasing Assistant. According to respondent, in line with the
provisions of their Employment Agreement, petitioner was subjected to the respondent's evaluation procedure on the fifth
month of her employment. Hence, sometime in November 2013, petitioner's over-all performance and capacity to meet
the demands of her work were assessed by her immediate superiors. On 29 November 2013, petitioner was likewise
asked to report to respondent's head office in Makati City to take the Verbal, Non-Verbal, and Numerical Examinations
which were administered by the Human Resources (HR) Department. Petitioner garnered below average (BA) scores in
the aforesaid tests, rendering her qualifications for regularization doubtful under HR Standards. Thereafter, Tungol was
instructed to talk to petitioner about possibly extending her employment contract and improving her performance, during
such an extension period. Unexpectedly, however, petitioner no longer reported for work as of 27 December 2013. In line
with standard procedure, on 7 January 2014, Ocampo prepared a Notice of Absence without Official Leave (NAWOL)
requiring petitioner to submit a written explanation as to why her employment should not be considered terminated due to
her absence within five days from receipt thereof. Petitioner was likewise invited to the head office for a meeting with
Ocampo. Respondent averred that, on 13 January 2014, as it awaited petitioner's response to various invitations for her to
report to the head office, petitioner filed a Request for Assistance (RFA) before the NCR Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC. After conciliation and mediation efforts between petitioner and respondent failed, they submitted their respective
Position Papers, Replies, and Rejoinders. Thereafter, the case was submitted for resolution. The Labor Arbiter ruled in
favor of petitioner and declared that she was illegally dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal with the NLRC.
The NLRC upheld the view of the Labor Arbiter that respondent failed to defend its argument that it did not dismiss
petitioner, Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled that, based on
the evidence, petitioner's performance evaluation was not up to par and the fact that petitioner was duly apprised of her
probationary status at the time of her hiring and was made aware of the evaluation that she had to undergo in order for
her to become a regular employee of respondent, the Court of Appeals held that respondent had every right to refuse
petitioner's regularization. However, it ruled that, while respondent had the right to terminate petitioner's employment,
such termination was carried out in a manner not in accordance with the standards set forth under the law.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed by respondent.
Ruling: A probationary employee is one who is placed on trial by an employer, during which the latter determines whether
or not the former is qualified for permanent employment.[36] By virtue of a probationary employment, an employer is given
an opportunity to observe the fitness and competency of a probationary employee while at work. During the probationary
period of employment, an employer has the right or is at liberty to decide who will be hired and who will be denied
employment. Based on petitioner’s test results, respondent was only exercising its statutory hiring prerogative when it
refused to hire petitioner on a permanent basis, upon the expiration of her six-month probationary period. It is a well-
established principle that an employer has the right or is at liberty to choose who will be hired and who will be denied
employment. Accordingly, it is within the exercise of the right to select one's employees that an employer may set or fix a
probationary period within which the latter may test and observe the conduct of the former before the former is hired on a
permanent basis.[49] As long as the employer has made known to the employee the regularization standards at the time
of the employee's engagement, the refusal of the former to regularize the latter, by reason of the latter's failure to comply
with the regularization standards, is within the ambit of the law. A perusal of the records reveals that petitioner's dismissal
was effected through a series of text messages from Tungol instead of the mandated procedure. Hence, in view of the
procedural infirmity attending the termination of petitioner, respondent is liable to pay nominal damages. With respect to
the proper amount of damages to be awarded in the instant case, the Court notes that petitioner's dismissal proceeded
from her failure to comply with the standards required for her regularization. Hence, it is indisputable that the dismissal
process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee, akin to dismissals due to just causes under Article
297 of the Labor Code. Therefore, the Court deems it appropriate to fix the amount of nominal damages in the sum of
P30, 000.00, consistent with its ruling in Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission.

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Minda Topinio Cadavas March 20, 2019
Facts: Petitioner Minda Cadavas was hired as a Staff Nurse by respondent Davao Doctors Hospital (DDH) on January
16, 1989. She was promoted to Nurse Supervisor in the course of her employment until her dismissal on May 11, 2012.
Sometime in February 2012, petitioner Cadavas' aunt, Shirley Aninion, was confined at DDH for breast cancer, stage four.
To help lessen the hospital expenses of her aunt, Cadavas, with the help of some hospital staff, was able to obtain
supplies and medicines used in her aunt's operation from the Emergency Department and Operating Room Central
Supply Service without being entered in the records so that the said supplies and medicines would not be charged to her
aunt's bill, but Cadavas would replace these items (purchased at a lower price outside the hospital). The items taken were
valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and were eventually replaced by Cadavas. On May 2, 2012, an administrative hearing
was conducted regarding the complaint against petitioner Cadavas. In the said hearing, Cadavas reiterated that she
asked Nursing Aide Añasco if the supplies used on her aunt could be replaced, with the intention to help lessen the
hospital expenses of her aunt. Cadavas admitted that she was aware of the hospital policy that they are not allowed to
purchase medicines outside the hospital and that employees are not allowed to borrow supplies for personal use, but it
has long been a practice that employees are allowed to replace supplies or medicines from the emergency room, instead
of charging them to the patient. Thereafter, Cadavas received a Memorandum dated May 9, 2012, informing her that her
employment was being terminated for dishonesty and loss of trust and confidence. On May 16, 2012, Cadavas filed a
Complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims against DOH with the Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI, NLRC
in Davao City. On October 12, 2012, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of complainant-herein petitioner
Cadavas. Although the Labor Arbiter agreed with respondent DDH that Cadavas committed some lapses in participating
in the open practice of borrowing and replacing later the hospital supplies and medicines used during the
operation/treatment of a hospital staff or the staff’s relative, the Labor Arbiter held that the penalty of dismissal is not
commensurate to the offense committed. Respondent DDH appealed the Labor Arbiter's Decision before the NLRC,
Cagayan de Oro City. On February 28, 2013, the NLRC rendered a Resolution in favor of respondent DDH. The Court of
Appeals held that petitioner Cadavas was not denied due process. She was neither barred from being heard nor deprived
of her right to be assisted by a counsel. Evidence showed that she was given ample time to prepare for her defense. She
was first notified on April 16, 2012 about the charge against her and was given time to explain. She then gave her written
explanation on April 18, 2012. The hearing was conducted on May 2, 2012, which gave her two weeks, more or less, to
engage the services of a counsel. The appellate court stated that loss of trust and confidence will validate an employee's
dismissal only upon compliance with certain requirements, namely: (1) the employee concerned must be holding a
position of trust and confidence; and (2) there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence. And in
order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be work-related such as would show the
employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the employer. In this case, the Court of Appeals found the above
requirements for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence present.
Issue: Whether or not respondent DDH satisfied the requirements of due process in terminating petitioner’s employment
whether or not petitioner Cadavas was validly dismissed for willful breach of the trust reposed in her by her employer,
respondent DDH.
Ruling: Based on the notice of termination, respondent DDH terminated petitioner Cadavas on the ground of loss of trust
and confidence for her act of dishonesty in getting medicines and supplies from the Emergency Department and
Operating Room Central Supply Service without having the transaction recorded, which is against the hospital's policy and
practice. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an employment for “fraud or willful breach by
the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative."
The requisites for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence are: 1) the employee concerned must be holding
a position of trust and confidence; and (2) there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence. In
addition to these, such loss of trust relates to the employee's performance of duties. petitioner Cadavas was a managerial
employee. Petitioner was the Nurse Supervisor of the OR-DR, Neonatal ICU, and Hemodialysis Departments at the time
of the incident; hence, she held a position of trust and confidence as she managed the said departments, having been
tasked with the scheduling of the staff nurses within her departments and overseeing the quality of bedside care being
delivered by her staff. Since the requisites for dismissal due to loss of trust and confidence have been met, respondent
DDH validly dismissed petitioner. While the State can regulate the right of an employer to select and discharge his
employees, an employer cannot be compelled to continue the employment of an employee in whom there has been a
legitimate loss of trust and confidence. The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that petitioner was not denied due
process. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process in the dismissal of
employees. As to the requirement of notice, the employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before
termination of employment can be legally effected: (a) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or
omissions for which his/her dismissal is sought; and (b) subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's
decision to dismiss him/her. With regard to the requirement of a hearing, this Court has held that the essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, and not that an actual hearing should always and indispensably be held. In
this case, respondent DDH complied with the twin requirements of notice and hearing.

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Edmund C. Mawanay v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers Inc. March 06, 2019

Facts: The petitioner was hired by respondent Rizzo-Bottiglieri-De Carlini Armatorispa through its local manning agency
in the Philippines - respondent Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTCI) on July 10, 2013. Under the employment
contract, the petitioner was employed as an ordinary seaman on board the ocean-going vessel Giovanni Battista
Bottiglieri for a period of eight (8) months which commenced on July 24, 2013, with a basic monthly salary of US$430.00.
On August 30, 2013, while removing rust at the ship's deck, the petitioner experienced severe headache and dizziness.
He brushed these aside thinking that they were merely caused by the exhaustion of having to work continuously for three
days. The pain, however, persisted the whole day. The next day, while performing his usual tasks at the deck, the
petitioner collapsed after experiencing shortness of breath and suffocation. The petitioner was then given first aid and
allowed to rest. The next day, the petitioner again lost consciousness while he was returning the tools and equipment
used in his work. With this, it was decided that the petitioner was to be brought to a medical facility at the next port of
destination. Petitioner was medically repatriated to the Philippines. Upon his arrival, the petitioner immediately reported to
PTCI, which then referred him to the company's accredited physician for post-employment medical examination. Due to
his recurring headache, the petitioner was advised to consult with an ENT specialist, and was found to have vertiginous
migraine. He was prescribed medications to manage his pain, and was told to return for another check-up on October 18,
2013. As the petitioner's headache persisted, he was told to undergo an MRI, which nonetheless yielded normal results.
Despite oral medications, the petitioner claimed that he remained to experience headache. He was then referred to and
seen by the company-designated neurologist on January 17, 2014 which found the petitioner to be suffering from cluster
headache thereby prescribing medications to alleviate pains and attacks. On January 21, 2014, the company-designated
physician issued a medical report reflecting the treatments the petitioner has undergone, his present medical condition,
and concluded on the basis thereof that his interim disability assessment is Grade 10. On August 26, 2014, the petitioner
filed a complaint for permanent and total disability benefits before the NLRC. The petitioner submits that since the
company-designated physician stopped treatment after five sessions despite the fact that he has yet recovered from
illness, he was constrained to consult with another doctor, Dr. May Donato-Tan (Dr. Donato-Tan). On August 18, 2014, on
the basis of the results of laboratory tests and examinations, Dr. Donato-Tan issued a medical certificate declaring the
petitioner permanently and totally disable to perform his work as a seaman. The LA dismissed petitioner’s claim for
permanent and total disability benefits. The petitioner appealed to the NLRC, which rendered its Decision on July 10,
2015, reversing and setting aside the decision of the LA and finding the petitioner to be entitled to permanent and total
disability benefit. The CA declared that the NLRC erred in relying fully with the company-designated physician's
assessment, as it is settled that the latter's findings are not binding on the labor tribunals and the courts.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.

Ruling: The petition is not meritorious. Initially, it must be stated that the compensability of the petitioner's illness is a
factual issue that is beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari. Nonetheless, the conflicting ruling of the
NLRC and the CA present an exception to the rule and justifies the Court's examination. Primarily, the mere lapse of 120
days with the petitioner remaining incapacitated to resume his duties and earn a gainful occupation does not automatically
entitle him to permanent total disability benefits. The Court, in the recent case of Oriental Shipmanagement Co., Inc. v.
Ocangas, clarified that the 120-day rule applies only in cases where the complaint for maritime disability compensation
was filed prior to October 6, 2008. Consequently, the succeeding claims, as in the case at bar where the complaint was
filed by the petitioner on August 26, 2014, are covered by the 240-day rule. The determination of the rights of a seafarer
for disability compensation, when covered by the 240-day rule, requires a balance in application by Philippine law, the
parties' contractual obligations under the POEA SEC and/or Collective Bargaining Agreement, and the pertinent medical
findings of the seafarer's condition by his own physician and the company-designated physician. the company-designated
physician rendered his assessment within the specified period. The petitioner, instead of expressing his disagreement to
the said findings, consulted a physician of his choice five months thereafter, and then filed a Complaint for permanent total
disability benefits on this basis. The petitioner, by pursuing his claim before the labor tribunals without referring the
conflicting opinions to a third doctor for final determination, committed a breach of his contractual obligation and renders
final upon the Court the assessment by the company-designated physician that the petitioner is fit to work. Notably, the
conflicting opinions of the two physicians as to the type of illness the petitioner is suffering highlights even more the
importance of seeking the opinion of a third doctor. As between the two opinions nonetheless, even setting the mandatory
procedure aside, the Court still finds the assessment and the disability rating by the company-designated physician to be
more worthy of belief and credence. The Court, in making such conclusion, is particularly mindful of the efforts exerted by
the company-designated physician to examine, diagnose, and treat the petitioner. It was the company-designated
physician who initially attended to the petitioner after repatriation, the one who referred him to the proper medical
specialists, and consistently monitored his progress until he was eventually declared lit to work on March 5, 2014.

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 APRIL 2019

Philippine Journalist Inc., v. Erika Marie R. De Guzman and Edna Quirante April 1, 2019
Facts: Erika R. Marie de Guzman and Edna Quirante are both employees of Philippine Journalists, Inc. ('PJI'). De
Guzman started with the company on 11 May 1994 and left the company on 15 November 2008. She was an Ad
Taker/Account Executive with a salary of Php23,000.00 plus commission. On the other hand, Quirante was employed
since 05 September 1989 and was the HRD Supervisor at the time of the cessation of her employment on 15 March 2009
with a salary of Php25,522.20. On 28 October 2008 and 23 January 2009 respectively, [respondents], in separate letters,
informed the company of their desire to avail of the company's optional retirement plan as embodied in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. Because of PJI's failure and refusal to process the payment of the optional retirement benefits due
them, [respondents] filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and money claims, nonpayment of optional retirement
benefits and service incentive leave against PJ1 and its corporate officers. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit. The NLRC ruled in favor of the respondents and ordered petitioners to pay respondents. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
Issue: Whether or not the optional retirement can be demanded by a regular employee who voluntarily resigns even
without an optional retirement program approved by the management.
Ruling: Petitioners claim that respondents are not entitled to optional retirement benefits since PJI was in fact suffering
business losses, such that it implemented a retrenchment program in 2005. However, this fact is not evident from the
record. Quite the contrary, in Philippine Journalists, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, It became evident that
PJI was not suffering from claimed business reverses such that it was compelled to reinstate several employees it
originally fired as a result of a retrenchment program it undertook but which the NLRC officially found to be without basis.
There were also the undisputed findings of fact that during that time, PJI office renovations were being made as
evidenced by numerous purchase orders; that certain employees were granted merit increases; that a Christmas party for
employees was held at a plush hotel; and that PJI executives refused to forego their quarterly bonuses. Petitioners' claim
of business reverses is supported solely by a statement contained in a supposed 2005 agreement between PJI and its
employees, a "Memorandum of Understanding to the effect that PJI "suffered financial reverses since 1997, as declared
by the Supreme Court" - which is otherwise self-serving, at the very least, and untrue, within the context of the findings of
facts. The CA's ruling is correct in light of PJI's conduct of pursuing a scheme to reduce its personnel by any means
necessary, which is both unfair and prejudicial to the interests of labor. Take for example respondents' case. Operating
under the honest belief that they could avail of an optional retirement scheme that PJI allowed with respect to other
employees in the past, respondents tendered their respective resignation letters on the sole ground that they were
availing of the company's optional retirement package. Instead of clarifying the matter with respondents, petitioners
treated the latter’s' actions with a lack of understanding and sympathy. If petitioners believed that respondents were not
entitled to avail of the optional retirement scheme which respondents in good faith thought was available to them, and
which was obviously the sole reason for tendering their resignations, then petitioners should have at least put their
respective resignations on hold pending clarification of the issues. Instead, petitioners immediately took a hostile stance,
and quickly grabbed the opportunity to declare respondents separated from PJI by voluntary resignation with its
concomitant effects such as non-payment of benefits, separation pay, etc. They did not take time to explain, if so, that the
optional retirement program was no longer in effect and give respondents the opportunity to reconsider their actions. This
is tantamount to bad faith, considering the factual milieu and petitioners' conduct, where they have consistently shown an
interest in dismissing their employees, yet keeping for themselves their corporate bonuses, perks, and privileges. The
grant of optional retirement benefits to two management employees in the past was voluntary, deliberate, and done with
sufficient regularity as would indicate that this had become a company practice within PJI, which petitioners now refuse to
apply in the case of respondents, on the pretext that the company was losing money at that time. But PJI was not
incurring losses, and was in fact exhibiting conduct inconsistent with the claim. What is clear is that it engaged in unfair
labor activities and took an anti-labor stance at the expense of its employees, including respondents. PJI has shown that
its employees' interests take a backseat to the perks and prerogatives of management. This cannot be countenanced.

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Maunlad Trans, Inc. V. Romeo Rodelas, Jr. April 01, 2019
Facts: Respondent was hired by petitioner Seachest, through its manning agent, Maunlad, as Galley Steward on-board
MV Carnival After several months; respondent started experiencing seasickness and extreme low back pains. Despite
medications administered by the ship's clinic, the pain persisted and extended down to respondent's left thigh.
Subsequently, respondent was repatriated and arrived in the Philippines on 23 January 2010. He reported to petitioner
Maunlad, was referred to the Metropolitan Hospital where he underwent physical therapy sessions, among others, and
was diagnosed with 'lumbar spondylosis with disc extrusion, L3-L4.' Respondent was advised to undergo surgery, spine
laminectomy, but did not approve of the same and instead underwent physical therapy sessions. According to
respondent, as per petitioners' medical doctors, surgery was not a guarantee on the return of his normal condition, thus,
he refused. As respondent's condition did not improve for purposes of resuming his regular duties as a seafarer, he filed a
Complaint on 14 May 2010 for total and permanent disability, reimbursement of medical and transportation expenses,
damages, attorney's fees and legal interest against petitioners. Petitioners, in their Position Paper, insisted that
respondent is only entitled to a Grade 8 disability assessment as found by the company physician, with the equivalent
monetary benefits of (US$16,795.00), which they offered but was refused. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision on 22
June 2012 ruling that: 1) the assessment of the company-designated physician giving a Grade 8 disability rating was
premature, made only to comply with the 120-day period as mandated in the POEA Contract; and 2) the work-related
disability incurred by respondent prevented him from seeking employment and thus, he was entitled to the payment of
permanent disability benefits. Petitioners appealed the said Decision to the NLRC. However, the NLRC affirmed the
findings of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for US$60,000 representing total and permanent disability benefits.
Ruling: Upon respondent's repatriation on January 23, 2010, he underwent treatment under the auspices of the
company-designated physician. He was diagnosed with "lumbar spondylosis with disc extrusion, L3-L4" and advised to
undergo surgery - spine laminectomy - but respondent refused to undergo the procedure; instead, he underwent physical
therapy sessions. On May 6, 2010, or well within the 120-day period prescribed by the labor law, the company-designated
physician assessed respondent's condition as a "Grade 8 - 2/3 loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk" and advised
him to return for rehabilitation after three weeks. However, on May 14, 2010, respondent filed the instant labor case for
total and permanent disability benefits, reimbursement of medical and transportation expenses, damages, attorney's fees
and legal interest against petitioners. He did not return to the company-designated physician to continue with the latter's
prescribed treatment. By failing to continue with the treatment prescribed by the company-designated physician and
instead filing the labor case before the expiration of the 120-day period, respondent violated the law and his contract with
petitioners; he was guilty of abandoning his treatment. He filed the labor case on May 14, 2010 - or just 110 days from his
repatriation on January 23, 2010 - before the 120/240-day periods allowed under the Labor Code could elapse, and
before the company-designated physician could render a definite assessment of his medical condition. For this reason,
the filing of the labor case was premature. Respondents did not comply with the terms of the POEA-SEC. The failure of
the company-designated doctor to issue an assessment was not of his doing but resulted from respondent's refusal to
cooperate and undergo further treatment. Such failure to abide with the procedure under the POEA-SEC results in his
non-entitlement to disability benefits. The court agree with petitioners' contention that at the time of filing of the Complaint,
respondent has no cause of action because the company-designated physician has not yet issued an assessment on
respondent's medical condition; moreover, the 240-day maximum period for treatment has not yet lapsed. The records
clearly show that respondent was still undergoing treatment when he filed the complaint. On November 12, 2009, the
physiatrist even advised respondent to seek the opinion of an orthopedic specialist. Respondent, however, did not heed
the advice instead; he proceeded to file a Complaint on November 23, 2009 for disability benefits. And, it was only a day
after its filing that respondent requested from the company-designated doctor the latter's assessment on his medical
condition. Thus, consistent with the ruling in the C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Orbeta case cited above, it must
be held that respondent is entitled only to compensation equivalent to or commensurate with his injury. In the absence of
an opinion from a physician of his own choice, or a third one as the case may be, respondent must abide by the findings
of the company-designated physician, which in this case remains unrefuted precisely since respondent plainly abandoned
his treatment. The Grade 8 assessment of the company-designated physician therefore stands, and for this, respondent is
entitled only to the equivalent monetary benefit of US$16,795.00 pursuant to the schedule of disability benefits under the
POEA Standard Employment Contract. On the issue of attorney's fees, the Court finds that, since there was no ground for
the institution of the instant labor case to begin with, respondent has no right to demand the payment of such fees.

97