,;.._ Denzin , N. K. y Lincoln, Y. S . ( Eds .

) ( 1 99 4 ) Handbook
AR('II
of Qualitati v e Resear ch . Newbury Park : Sage

6
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Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research
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• EGON G . GUBA
':\.'

YVONNA S . L IN CO L N

alog 1>1
pp. ! , _

oret.-:al
~ P. A .
7 - 2~1 4) .

f r.rx . sm
Unive r-
IN this chapter we analyze four pamuigms that
currently are competing, or have unti l recently com-
peted, for acceptance as the paradigm of choice in
ci11f II'·
informing and guiding inquiry, especially quulitative
ss. inquiry: posi tivism, postpositivism. critical theory
of ot'lcr and re lated ideologica l po~i t iuns, ;rnd constructi v-
mat :ri- ism. We acknowledge at once our ow n commi tment
111 illr :1y,
to constructi vism (which we earlie r ca lled "natural -
rl11ame istic inqui ry"; Lincoln & Guba, 1985); the reader
11 Ycrl::
may wish to take that fact into account in judging
the appropriateness and use fu lness uf our analysis.
cxpcri - Although the title of thi s volume, 1/wrdlmok of
lfy, 10. Qualitative Research, impli es that the term qualita-
tive is an umbrella term supe rior to the term para-
:nti.I'Je digm (and, indeed, that usage is nlll um:omrnon). it
). I C. :~.
is our position that it is a term that ought to he
'.).t'O,IIt:,y.
reserved for a description of types of methods. From
our perspective, both qualitati ve and quantitati ve
crew: e.
methods may be used appropriate ly with any re-
l, & -:. search paradigm. Questions of method are secon-
iid ((I n· dary to questions of parudigm, which we de fin e as
e: P..IIT the basic belie f system or world view that gu ides the
investigator, not on ly in choices of method hut in
r. pr>st- ontologically and epistemologically fundamental w;~y s.
y. Stan- It is certainly the case that interest in alternati ve
paradigms has been stimulated hy a growing dissat-
isfaction with the patent ovcrem phas i~ on quant ita ·
tive methods. But as efforts were m:rtk to build a
in
ca:;c for a rem: wed interest qualitative approaehcs,
it became d ear that the metaphysica l assumptions
undergirding the convent ional paradigm (the "re-
cei ved view") muM he seriously questioned. Thus
the e mphasis of th is c hapter is on paradigm s, their
assumption~. and tlu.: impl ica t inu~ oftho~e a ~sum p ­
tions for a varie ty of rc~carch bsucs, not on the
relative utilit y o f qua litat ive versus quantit ati ve
methods. Neverthe less, as di scuss ions of para -
digms/methods over the past decade have o ften he-
guu with a con~ iderat i o n of problems associated
wi th ovcrquantification, we will also begin there,
shiftin g only later 10 our predominant intcrc~t.
The Quantitative/Qualitative
Ois tin ction
lli storica lly, there has been a hea vy emphasis
o n quantificati on in scie nce. Mathematics is often
termed the "quee n of scie nces," and those sci-
e nces, such as phys ics and chemistry. th at lcud
themse lves es pecia fl y well to quantifi cat ion arc
genera lly known as " hard ." Less quantifiable are-
nas , suc h a~ biol ogy (a lthough that is rapidl y
c hanging) ami part ic ularl y th e social scie nces, ;~re

AUTHORS' NOTE: We arc grateful to Henry Giw ux and Hohcn Stake fo r thetr very helpful critiques uf an earl ier
draft of this chapter.

105
 106
referred I n as "~o ft , " l c~s with pejorative inte nt
th an to s ignal their (pu tati ve) imprec is ion nnd
lack of depe ndahi lily. Scierllifi c rnaturity is com-
monly hclieved 10 e me rge as the deg ree of quan -
tifica ti on found within a gi ven fie ld i n c rease~ .
Thai thi s is the c;~sc is hardly surprising . The
"rccci vctl view" cof science (positi vism, transform ed
o ver the course of thi s centu ry inW postpositiv-
ism: sec below) focuses on efforts to verify (posi-
ti vism) or f:~l s ify (postpositivism) a priori hy-
potheses. most usefull y sta led as math emati cal
(quantitati ve) propositions or propositions th nt
ca n he easi ly conve rted into precise mathematical
formula s express ing functi ona l relationships. ror-
mulai c precision h;~ s c rmrmous utility when the
aim of science is the prediclion ami conlrul of
natural phenomena. Further. there is already avail-
ah le n powerful array of statis tical and rnathemali -
cn l models . rina lly, there exists a widespread
co nviction thai onl y quantitative data arc ulti -
mately valid . or of high quality (Sechrest. 1992).
John Stuart Mill ( I !!4311906) is said to have been
the fi rst to urge soc ial scient ists to emu l :~ t e their
o lder. " harder" cousins. promisi ng tlwt if hi s advice
were followed. r:~p i d matumtion of these fields. as
well as the ir cm:mc ipation from the philosophical
and theological stric tures th :~ t limited them, would
follow. Social sc ie ntists took this counsel to heart
(probah ly to a degree th:~t wmffd grc:~ ll y surprise
Mill if he were :~ li ve today) fnr other re:~so n s as well.
They were the " new kids on the block": if quantifi-
c:~tio n could lead to the fulfillment of Mill' s prom-
ise. status and political leverage would accrue th:11
would e normously pro fit the new practitioners. lm i-
lntion mi ght thus lc :~d hoth to greater ncccplancc and
to more vn lid knowledge.
Critiques of the Recei\'cd View
In recent years. however. strong counlcrpressu res
against quantification have emerged. Two critiques,
one internal to the convent ional pnradigm (that is ,
i .
~ in terms of those metaphy sical assumptions thai
i. define the nature of positivist inquiry) and one ex -
te rnal to it (that is, in terms of those assumptions
definin g alternati ve paradigms). have been mounted
that see m not only to wnrrnnl a recon~iderat i o n of
the utility of qualitative d :~t a but to question the very
assumpt ion~ on which the putative superiority of
quantification h;,s been based.
I nternnl (lntrapnrad igm) Critiqu es
A variety of impli cit prohlc ms have surfaced 10
challe nge convc nlionnl wisdom: several of these ;,rc
de$cribed below.
t-.1/\ JOR PARAD I G MS AND I'ER SI'EC TIVE S
Cm11rxt .<trci'l'i"K· Precise quauti tati ve approaches
th at foc u$ on se lec ted subse ts of vnriab les neces-
sarily "stri p" from co ns ide ration. th rough appro-
priat e cont rol s or randorni7.aliou. ot her variables
that ex ist in the context that might , if :~llowed 10
exert their effects. great ly a lt er findin gs. Further,
~ u r h rxc lu$ionary designs. while inc reasing the
theoretical rip.(or of a sllldy. tlet ract from it s rele-
I'CIII CI'. that is. its applicability or gcnera lizabi lity,
heca usc their outcomes can be properly applied
only in other sim ilarly lruncnted or contextually
~tr ipped situations (another lahoralory, for exam-
ple). Qualitali ve data, it is a rgued, ca n redress that
imhalan cc hy prov iding contex tu al information.
l:'l chuinn nf memring and rmrrmse. llurnan be-
havior. unlike I hat of physica l ohjects . cannot be
understood wit hout refereucc lo the meanings and
pu rposes nllachcd by human actors 10 their activi-
ti es. Qun lilativc data, it is asserted . ca n provide
ric h in sight into hu man behavior.
Disj unctirm of grand theories with local CO li·
texts : The eticlemic dilemma. The elic (outsider)
theory brought to bear on an inquiry by an inves-
ti gator (or the hypotheses proposed to be tested)
may h :~ve lilli e or no meaning within the ernie
(insider) view o f stud ied individua ls, groups, so-
cieties. or cultures. Qualitati ve data , it is arfirmed,
arc usefu l for uncoveri ng e rnie views; theori es, to
be valid. should be qualitatively grou nded {Glaser
& St rauss. 1967: Strauss & Corbi n, 1990). Such
grounding is particularly crucia l in view of the
mounting c rit icism of socia l science as failing to
provide adequate accounts of nonmai nstream li ves
(t he "ot her") or to provide the material for a
_criticism of our own Western culture (Marcus &
··Fischer. 1986).
ltwfll' licnbility of general data to individual
cases. This problem is so meli me$ described as the
nomotheti c/idiographic di sjunctio n. Generaliza-
tio ns . although perhaps statistica lly meaningful,
have no applicability in the indi vidu al case (t he
fact, say. that 80% of individu als presenting given
sy mptoms have lung ca ncer is at best incomplete
evidence that a particu lar patient presenting with
such symptoms has lung cancer). Qualitative data,
it is held, can help to avoid such ambiguities.
Exclusion of tire di.fcovery dimension in inquiry.
Conventional emphasis on the verification of spe-
cific. a priori hypotheses glosses over the source of
those hypotheses. usually arri ved at by what is com-
monly termed the discovery process. In the received
view onl y empirica l inquiry dese rves to be called
"science." Quantitative normati ve methodology is
thus privileged over the ins ights of creative and
divergent thinkers. The ca ll for qualitative inputs
is expected lo red ress thi s imbalance.
 Competing Paradigms in Qunlitali"e Research
External (Extraparadigm) Criti ques
The inrraparad igm proble ms noted above o ffer
a weighty challenge to co nvenrionn l mc thOlhl l-
ogy, but could be eli minated, or at least amelio-
rated , by greater use of qualit r.rive d<Jta M~n y
critics of the received view arc co nrent ro Mop :H
rhar point; hence many of rhe calls for more CJIIali-
rati ve inputs have bee n limited ro rh b me thods -
level accommodation. But an even weightier c hal -
lenge ha-s been mounted by c riti c) who have
proposed alrernati1•e paradigms that in volve not
only qualification of approaches but fundamental
adjustments in the basic assumpti ons that gu ide
inquiry altogether. Their rejection of the received
view can be justified on a numhcr of grounds
(Bernstein, 1988; Guba, 1990; llc ssc, 1980; Lin-
coln & Guba, 1985; Renson & Rownn. 1981 ), hut
chief among them are the following.'
Th e the(lry-ladcnness of fa ct.\. Co nventi onal
approaches to research invol vin g the verificat ion
or falsification of hypotheses assume the inde -
pendence of theoretica l and ohsavational la n-
guages. If an inquiry is to be objective. hypotheses
must be stated in ways that arc independent of the
way in which the facts needed to test them arc
collected. But it now seems esrahlishcd beyond ob-
jection that theories and facts are quite inte rdcpcnd- _
ent-that is, that facts are fa cts on ly within some ·-
theoretical framework. Thus a fundamental assump-
tion of the received view is exposed as duhiuu s. If
hypotheses and observations are nor imkpendcnt,
"facts" can be viewed only through a theoretical
"window" and objectivity is unde rmined.
· The underdeterminrrtion of theory. This prob-
' · lem is also known as the problem of induction.
Not only are facts determined by the theory win-
dow throu6h which one looks for them , but dif-
ferent theory windows might be equall y well sup-
ported by the same set of"facts ." A It hough it may
. be possible, given n cohereut theory, to derive hy
deduction what facts ought to exist, it is never
possible, given a coherent set of facts, to arri vc
by induction at a single, inclu.::tab lc theo ry. In-
deed, it is this difficulty th nr led philosophers
such as Popper ( 1961!) to reject the notion of
theory verificmiou in favor of the no tion of theory
fn!sijication. Whereas a million white swa ns can
never establish, with co mpl ete ~:onfidcncc, tl.c
proposition that all swans ate whi te, one black
swan can completely falsify it. The hi storical po-
sition of science that it can, by its methods. ulti -
mately converg~ on the "real" rnrth is thu $ brought
sharply into question.
The value-ladenness of facts. Just as theories
and facts are not independent, neither arc values
and facts. Indeed, it can be argued rhar theories
107
arc themselves va lu.! ~ t a t e m cnt s . Thu s putative
"facts" arc viewed not only through a theory win-
..
i l '.'
dow bur through a value window as well. The value- tl #
free posture o f the rcce ivcJ view is compromised. ' I!
I '
Tire illleractil'e nature of tire inquirer-inquired
into dyad. The received 'icw of science pic tures
the inquirer as standing be hind a one-way mirro r,
view ing nnlllral ph enomena as they hap pen and
recording the m objec ti ve ly. The inquirer (when
using proper meth odology) docs not infl uence the
phen omena or vice ve rsa. But evidence such as
I he ll cisenhc rg uucc rrainr y principle and the Bohr
complementarity principle have shatte red that idea l
in the hard sciences (Lin co ln & Guha, 1985); even
g:cmcr skepticism must ex ist for the social sci -
ences . Indeed, the notion that t'indiugs are c reated
through the int eractiou of inquirer a nd phenome -
non (whi c h, in the social scie nces, is usually peo-
ple) is o ften a more pl a u ~ i b l c description of the
inq ui ry process than is the noti on thnt findin gs arc
discove red through objecti ve ohscrvation "as they
rFa lly arc. and as they rt'ally work ."
The int r:tparadigm c ritiques , altho ugh ex pos- ·'
ing many inherent proh lcms in the received view
and, inrtccd, propos ing so me useful responses ro r;
them, arc neverthele ss of mu c h less interest-or
wcigh t- th;m the extrapar:~cligm critiques , wh ic h
rai se prohlems of such consequence that the re-
ceived view-is being wide ly questioned . Several
alte rnative pnradigms ha ve been proposed, some
of wh ic h rest on quite unconventional assump-
ti ons. It is useful , the refore , to inquire ahout the
nature of paradigm s and what it is that d istin - , :,
guishes one inquiry pnraJigm from anothe r. . ,~
~~
.,·-·
'1
l ;~
The Nature nf P:uadigrns IJ
Parndigms as Basic n clicf Sys tems
Based on Ontologica l. Episte mologi cal,
and Methodo logica l Assumptions
,I
A par:uligm may h,: vicw.:d as a set o f lmsic
belie}>" (or metaphysics) tlwt deals with ultimates
or first princ iples. It rc p~t: sc nr s a worldview rh <H
defines. fnr it s holder. tla; nat11rc of the "wo rld ,"
the indi vidual 's pla.:c in it . •111d the range of pos -
sible relationships to th~t wor!d and its parts, as .
for example, cos mologies and theologies do.2 The
hcli cfs arc ha si~: in the sense that they must be
accepted simply on fa ith (however we ll argued );
lhcre is no w<ty to c ~t ablish their ultimate truth-
fulness. If the re were. th e philosophi cal debates
rcflcctc!d in these pages would have been resolved
rnillcnui.t ago .
 I '
lOH
l :' In qu iry parad ig n1s de fin e fo r i rrt/t tiu·l .f wh at it
is the y a rc aboul. a nd wha t fall s w ithin and out -
s ide the limits o f legi timat e inquiry . The hask
beli e fs th at defin e inqu iry paradig m s ca n he s um -
marized h y the res po n ses g i vc n hy propo ne nt s of
a n y g ive n pa radi g m to three fund a mc ut al qu e ~ ­
ti o ns. wh ic h a rc inlrre<>n nccted in suc h a way that
the an swer g ivc ul n a n y o ne qu c ~ ti o n . l a k c n in an y
o rde r. cons trains how the other~ may he :IIISWl'l ed .
We h:w c se lected an order that we hc li c vc rc tlcc ts
I a lo g ic a l (i f no t necessary) pri mac y :
I'...
I . Tlw mtlolof(ical qur .f ti mL W ha t is the lo rm
a mi na ture 0f realit y :~nd . the refore. wlwt is
the re tha t can nc know n abo ut it '! h•r ex ampl e.
if :1 " rea l" world is assumed. then what c :~n he
known ahout it is " how th ings really arc" a nd
" ho w things rea ll y work ." The n o nly those
questio ns that rc hltc to mailers of " rcal" ex ist-
ence <Jnd " real" ac tion arc <~d m is s ihlc : other
questio ns. suc h as those conccming matte rs o f
ncs thctie or mora l sig nilica ncc. fall outs ide the
rea lm o f leg itimate sc ie ntific inqu iry.
2 . Tir e l'f' iJtt•mo/og ico/ qtH'.flinn. What is the
nature o f the re latio nship he twccnthc knowe r
o r would-he knower and what ca n he know n?
The nns wc r th at c:111 he given to this ques-
ti o n is con strained hy the ans we r a lread y
g iven to the ontologic al qucsti(ln : that is. no t
jus t nny re lati on ship can no w be postul a ted .
So if, for ex ampl e. a "re al " rea lit y is as-
s umed, the n the posture or the knowe r mus t
h e o ne of o bj ec ti ve de tac hme nt or value
freedom ii-i o rde r to he able to di sco ver " how
things re ally arc" and " lul\v thin gs reall y
wo rk ." (Con verse ly , ass umpti o n of an ob-
j ecti vist posture implies the c xi~ tcnc c a or
"re a l" wor ld to be objecti ve about. )
3. Tire m ellwdn lo~:ica l questio11. I lo w can the
inquire r (wou ld -be knower) go about findin g
~I
out whate ver he or she be lieves can be known?
'
Again. the ans wer that can be given lo this
questio n is constrained by ans we rs already
g iven to the firs t two questions; that is , not just
any methodo logy is appropriate. Fo r example.
a " real" rea lity pu rsued by an "objecti ve" in-
quirer mandates control o f possible confound-
ing fac tors, whethe r the methods are qualita-
tive (say , observational ) or qua nt ita ti ve (say,
analysis of cov arinnce) . (Conversely , selection
of a manipulnti ve methodo logy- the expe ri-
m e nt . say- implies the ability to he ohjecti vc
and a rea l wo rld to he o bjecti ve about. ) The
m etho do logica l qurstion cannot be reduced to
l ·
I
1-I AJil l{ I' A itA il l ( i M S AN tl P E R S I' EC T I VE S
a lJliC'Ii on or IIH.:thoJs ; me thods llliiSt he fit -
led to a prcdc tc rmi nc c.J me thod o logy.
Th ese th ree q uest io ns serve as the major foc i
arou nd w hi c h we w ill a na lyze eac h of the fo u r
p:undigms to he cons ide red .
l':u adig m s il ' I Iuma n C o ns truc tion s
We ha ve alread y noted thnt parndigrns , as se ts
o l bas ic be li e fs. arc no t o pe n to proof in a ny
l·n u vc111io ua l se nse : the re is no way to e leva te one
ew e r a nothe r on th e basis o f ultim ate . fou nda -
ti o na l criteria . ( We sho u ld note, however. th a t
th :ll sta te o f a ffni rs does no t doom us to a radi cal
rela tiv ist pos ture: see Guba. 1992.) In o u r o pin-
io n . an y give n p ;~ ra di g m re presents s imply the
mo st info rmed anc.J so phisti ca ted view that its
propone nt s have bee n a b le to d ev ise , g ive n the
way they have c hos e n to respo nd to the three
d efinin g questio ns . And. we a rg ue, the sets o f
a n swers g iven arc in a ll c nscs lruma 11 co nstruc-
llt iiH; that is. they a rc all in vent ions of the huma n
mimi a nd he nce subject to huma n e rror. No con -
s truc ti o n is or can b e incontro ve rtibl y rig ht ; ad-
voca tes o f a ny pa rtic ul a r cons truc ti o n m ust rely
o n prr-sunsil·en css and ut i l ity rathe r tha n p r oof in
a rguing the ir positio n .
What is true o f pa radigms is true of o ur analyses
as well. Everything tha t we sha ll say s ubseque ntly
is al so a huma n construc tion: ours. The reader can-
not be compelled to accept o ur analyses . or o ur
a rguments . on the bas is o f incontestable logic or
indis putable evide nce: we can only hope to be per-
sunsivc and to de mo nstrate the utility of our pos ition
fo r. sny , the public polic y a re na (Guba & Lincoln,
1989: House. 1977). We do ask the reade r to sus-
pend his or he r di sbel ie f until o ur a rg ume nt is com-
ple te and can be judged as a who le.
T h e Dasic Beliefs of Received
and Alt er native Inquiry Paradigms
We b eg in our anal ysis with d escripti o ns of the
res po nses that we be lieve pro po ne nts o f each
pa radigm would make to the three ques tions out-
lin ed above. These res ponses (as cons truc ted by
us) are di sp layed in Table 6. 1, which cons ists of
three rows correspo nding to the o nto log ica l, epis-
te mo log ica l, and method o lo gical questi o ns, a nd
four co lumns corresponding to the four pa radigms
to be di scussed . The te rm positivism d e notes the
"rccc i\'cd vie w" tha t hns do mina ted the formal
di scourse in the p hysica l and social sciences for
so me 400 years, whereas postpositivism repre-
Competing Paradig ms in Qunliwti l'e Research 109

TABLE 6. 1 Bas ic Beliefs (Meta phys ics) of Ahernative Inquiry Paradigms

Item f'ositivi.rm f 'o f lf>ll.,illl'iWI Cr itil'tll Th eory et a/ C otl rtrurtivi.rm

Ontology naive reali'Sm- critical reali snl - hi storical realism- rclati v•sm- loeal and
.. real'' reality but .. rcal .. reality hut only vi rtual rea lity ~ h apcd • pecillc constructed
apprehcndablc impcrfectly and hy social. polit i..:a l. realities
probah1 listicall y cullural. economic,
apprchcndah le ethnic, ami gender
values; cry~t a lli ted
over ti me
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - --------------------------------------------------
Epistemology dualist/objccti vist; modified dualist/ transactional/ transactional/
findings true objectivist; cri tical subjecti vi st: va lue· subjectivist: created
lraJj I ion/CIIIllniU IIi I y; mediated f1ndin gs findmgs
findings pmbahly
true

Methodology experi mental/ modified cxpcri · dia logic/d ia Icc!ica I licrtllcncuticalldialectical :~

manipulati ve ; mcntallmani pulati vc:
verificat ion of cri tical mullipli sm:
hypotheses: chkn y falsifica tion of
quan titati ve hypotheses ; may
llh:thods include qualitati ve
n1e1hculs

sents effons of the pas t few decades to res pond in
a limited _way (th at is, while remnining within
essenti all y. the same se t of basic beliefs) to the.:
most problemati c crit icistiis of posi tivism . The
term critical theory is (for us) a blanket tcrlll
denoting a set of several altern ative paradigms.
includ ing additi onally (h ut not limited to) neo·
Marxism, feminism, materialis m. and p<~rti c ipa ·
tory inquiry. Indeed , criti ca l theory may it se lf
usefully be divided into three substrands: post-
slruclurali sm, postmodernism, and a bl ending of
these two. Whatever their differences. the com·
mon breakaway assumpti on of all th ese variants
is that of the value-dctermined nature of inquiry-
an epistemologica l difference. Ou r grouping o f
these positions in to a s ingle category is a judg-
ment ca ll; we will not try to c.Jo justice to the
individual point s of view. The term co11structi•··
ism denotes an alternative paradi gm whose hrcak ·
away assumption is the move from onto logi cal
realism to on tologica l relati vism . These position ~
will become c lear in the subsequent exposition
Two important caveats need to he mcntioncd.
First, although we arc inclined to helieve that the.:
paradigms we arc about to dcsc ri hc can ha ve
meaning even in the realm o f the physica l M.' i-
ences, we will not defe nd that helicfhere. Accord ·
ingly, our subsequent comments shouh.l he unJcr-
stood to be limited to the socinl scie11ces on ly.
Second, we note that except for positivi sm. the.:
paradigms discussed arc al1 sti11 in formati ve.: sta~c~ :
no final agreements have hcc n reat: hcJ even a1111111~
thei r proponent s ahnut the ir definiti ons, mean -
ings, or implications. Thus our di scuss ion shou ld
be co nsidered 1c11tali vc anJ ~uhjec t to further re-
vision and reformulation.
We will fi rst look down the co lumn s of Table
6. 1 to illu ~ trat c the positions or each paradi gm
with respct:t to the thrcl! questions, fol lowing w it h .(
a look a crn~ ~ row:. to compare <Jnd contras t the {
positions o f the paradigms ..I Limitations of space
make it impossible for us to deve lop our nsscr-
lions in any depth. The render will he able to find
other evidence, pro and co n. in othe r chapters of
this volume, particu larly in Chapters 7- 1 I.
lntraparadigm Analyses
(Columns of Table 6.1)
Column I : Positi vis m
011tolos\': rcaliwr (CulltnHHily callcd"na ivc re-
ali sm''). An apprch c nd<~hlc realit y is assumed to
exist, dri ven hy inu1urlahll! natural la ws anJ mecha -
ni s m ~ . Knowledge of the " wa y things arc" is c on -
ventiona lly SUII\nlari £ed in the form of time - and
co nt ext-frcc general it at ion ~ . some.: of whic h take.:
the.: form of cause-effect laws. Research can, in
principle , t:o nvcrgc on the "true" stale of aff;~irs.
The hasil: postu re of the paradi gm is argued w he
hoth rcJu c ti oni~J and d .:tc rrnini~tic (llc~~c . 19XO).
 I HI
/:'f>t.H('m nln!ly: /) rmlt.\1 and o/>j ('(' /t o'ill. The inves-
ti gator and the investi gated "ohjcc t'' arc n ~sum c d lo
he independent entities. and the investigator to he
c:~pa hl c of sllldying the object without inrlucncing it
or hcing influenced hy it. When influence in either
directio n (threats to validit y) is recoj:!ni 7.ed. or even
suspected. various strateg ies arc fo llowed lo reduce
or eliminate it. Inquiry takes place a ~ through a
one-way mirror. V<olucs <ond hiascs arc preve ntctl
from influ enc ing outcomes. so long as th e pre -
scribed procedures arc rigorou sly foll owed. Rcpl i·
cable findin gs arc. in fac t. "true ."
Mrtlrndo lo11y: Ex,.erimr ntal an d mnnif>rrlatil·r .
Qu esti ons and/or hypotheses arc stated in propo-
s iti o n<~! form and suhjcctcd to cmpiri c<ol test to
verify them: possihlc confounding conditions must
he c<o rdull y co ntrolled (man irulat ed) tn prevent
out comes from being imrrope rly influe nced.
Co lumn 2: Postposi ti vism
Omn logy: Critirnl rrali.wr. Re<olily is assumed to
exist hut to he only imperfectly 01pprehcndahlc hc-
·. cause ofbOJsically flnwed human inte llectual mecha-
nis ms and the fund a me ntnlly inlmct<oblc nature of
phenome na. The ontology is l01belcd as critic01l rea l-
ism (Cook & Campbe ll. 1979) bec au se or the pos-
ture of proponents that cl<oirns <ohout rea lity must he
suhjcctcd to the widest possible critical cxnrn irwtion
to f<oci litaiC ilpprchc ndi ng rc<olity OlS closely OlS flO S·
s ihlc (hut ne ver perfectly).
£1•is tem nlogy: Modified drmlisl!objectivist. Dual-
ism is largely abandoned as not ross ihlc to main -
tain. but objectivity remains a " regulatory ideal":
special e mphasis is placed on external "guard i-
an s" of objectivi ty suc h as critical traditions (Do
the find ings "fit" with preexisting knowledge?) and
the critica l community (such as editors. referees.
01nd professiona l peers). Repli cated findings 01rc
11mhably true (but 01lways suhjcclto falsification).
M etlrodn/ogy: Modified expcrimc ~r tal/ma~riptt ·
lativc. Emphasis is placed on "critical muhiplism"
(a refurbished version of triangulation) as a way
of fa lsifying (rathe r than verifying) hypotheses.
The methodology aiins to redress some of the
problems noted above (intraparad igm critiques)
by doing inquiry in more natural sellin gs. collect -
ing more situational information. and reintrodu c-
ing di scovery as an clement in inquiry. and , in the
soc ial sciences parti cularly. so li citing ernie vie w-
po ints to ass ist in determining the meanings and
purposes that people ascribe to their actions. as
well ns to contribute to "grounded theory" (G laser
& Strauss, 1967; Strau ss & Corbi n, 1990). A II
these aims are accomplished largel y th rough the
inc re01sed ut ili zation of qualitati ve techniqu es.
f.. t AJ() R t'AR /\ Il l ( ; t-.I S AN I J I'ER S I'E C' T I VES
Colu mn J : Critical Th eory
and Related Ideo logica l Pos iti o ns
Onto log 1·: llistorical realism . A rc01l ity is as-
s umed to he arrrchcnd01hl e that was once pl nsti c,
hut that w:1 s, over time. shaped by a congeries of
~oc i al. po litica l. cultur01l. econo mic, e thnic. and
gende r fac tors. :1nd then c rystalli 7.cd (reifi cd) into
a series nf structures tlwt Me no w (inaprropri -
at c ly) taken <~ s "real." that is. nOllura l and imrnu -
lahle. For :11! rractical purposes the stru ctures are
" real," a virtua l or hi sto ri cal rea lity.
F:piJtemo logy: Trmrm r timral a nd s ttbjertivist.
The investigator and the investigated obj ect are
ass umed to be inte racti ve ly linked, with the va l-
ues of the investigator (<ond of situat ed "others" )
incv it01hly influ encing the inqui ry. Findings arc
the refo re m/ur mrtfiatccf. Note that this posture
cfl ccti ve ly challe nges the traditional di stinction
hc twcc n ontology and cpistc molop.y: what can he
known is inextricably intertwined wi th the inte r-
ac tion bet ween a pa rticula r investi gator and a
particular ohjcct o r grour. The dashed line sepa-
rating the ontolog ical and epistemological ro ws
of Tab le 6. 1 is inte nded to reflect thi s fu sion.
/lfNirodolngy : /Jialo~: ic and dialectical. The trans-
acti o nal n01turc of inquiry requires il dia logu e be-
tween the investigat or nnd the subjects of the
inquiry: that dialogue mu st be di alectical in nature
to transform ignorance and misappre he nsions (ac-
cepting historica ll y mediated structures as immu-
tab le) into more informed consciousness (seeing
how the structures might be c hanged and compre-
he nding the actions required to effect change). or.
as G iroux ( 1988) puts it, "as lransformati ve intel-
lectuals . ... to uncover and excavate those forms
of historical and subjugated knowlcdges that point
to experiences of suffering, conflict, and co llec-
tive strugg le; . .. to link the notion o f hi stori cal
understanding to ele me nts of critique a nd hope"
(p. 21 3). Trans fo rm01ti onal inquire rs de monstrate
" trans forrnmi onal leaders hip" (Burns, 1978 ) .
(For more discussion o f c riti ca l theory, see the
contrihuti ons in this volume by Olesen, Chapter
9: Stanfield. Chapter I 0; and Kincheloe & McLaren,
Chapter 8.)
l
Co lumn 4 : Constructivism
011 to logy: Relativist. Realiti es a re apprehe nd- l
ahle in the form of mu lti ple, intangibl e mental
co nstructions, sociall y a nd experienti ally based,
loca l and s recific in natu re (although cle ments
j
I
are o fte n shared among many individua ls and
even across cultures). and de pe nde nt for th eir
form and content on the individu al persons or
l
r
1:
.i
Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research
groups holding the constructions. Constructions
are not more or less "true," in any absol ute sense,
but simply more or less in formed and/or soph is-
ticated. Const ructions are alterab le, as are th eir
associated "realiti es." This pos itio n should be dis -
tinguished from both nominalism and idealism
(see Reese, 1980, for an eKplication of these sev-
eral ideas).
Epistemology: Transactional and subjectivist.
The investigator and the object of investi gation
are assumed to be interactively linked so that the
"findings" are literally created as the investi ga-
tion proceeds. The conventional distinction be-
tween ontology and epis temology disa ppears , as
in the case of cri tical theory. Again , the dashed
line of Table 6. 1 reflects thi s fact.
Meth odology: Hermeneutical and dialectical.
The variable and personal (int ramental) nature of
social constructions suggests that individual con-
structions can be e lici ted and refined only th rough
interaction between and among investigator and
responden ts. These varying constructions are in-
terpreted using conventional hermeneuti cal tech-
niques, and are compared and cont rasted through
a dialectical interchange. The final aim is to distil l
a consensus construction that is more informed
and sophisticated than any of the predecessor
constructions (including, of course, the etic con-
struction of the investigator).
(For more about constructivism, see also Schwandt,
Chapter 7, this vo lume.)
Cross-Paradigm Analyses
(Rows of Table 6.1)
Havi ng noted briefly the positions that propo -
nents of each parad igm might take with respect to
the three paradigm-defining questi ons, it is useful
to look across rows to compare and contrast those
positions among the several paradigms.
Ontology
Moving from left to right across Tahle 6. t . we
note the move from
I. positivism's posi tion of naive rea lism, as-
suming an objecti ve eKternal reality upon
which inqu iry can converge; to
2. postposi tivism' s critical realis m, which st ill
assumes an objecti ve rea lity but grants that
Ill
it can be apprehended on ly imperfectl y and
probab i lbtica lly; to
3. critica l theory 's hi storical rea lism, whi ch
assumes an apprehendable reality consist-
ing of hi storica ll y si tuated structures that
are, in the absence of insight, as limiting and
confin ing as if they were real; to
4. constructi vism' s relativism, which assumes
multiple, apprchendablc, and someti mes con-
flicting social realit ies that are the products
of human imellects, but that may c hange as
their constru ctors become more informed
and sophisticated.
It is the ontological position that most differentiates
constructivi sm from the other th ree paradigms.
Epis temology
We note the move from
I. positivism's dualist, ohjectivist assumption
that enables the investigator to determine
"how th ings really arc" and '' how things
:: rea lly work"; to
2. postposi ti vis m ·~ modilied dualist/objec tivist
assumption that it is possib le to approximate
(hut neve r fully know) rea lit y; to
3. critica l theory's transactional/subjectivist as-
sumption that knowledge is va lue mediated
and hence valu e dependent ; to
4. constructivi sm's somewhat sim ilar but broader
transactional/subjectivist assumpt ion that sees
know ledge as created in interact ion among
in vesti gator and respondents.
It is their epistemo logical positions that most dif-
ferenti ate criti cal theory and constructi vism from
the other two paradigms.
Methodo logy
We note the move from
I. positi vism' s experim e nt allman ipul ;~tive meth-
odo logy that focuses on verification o f hy -
potheses; to
2. pos tpositi vism's mod ified eKperi mental/
mani pulati ve methodology invested in critica l
multiplism focusing on fabifi cati on o f hy-
I j
potheses; to '1
.j
·' I
 ....---------·---
--~~~-- ~.............. ~--..........

11 2 f\1ld O R PAR A DI G M S AN I) P E R SPECT I V E S

TAB L E C. .2 Para d! g 111 Pos itiou s on Se lec ted l 'ra~.: ti ca l I ~s u es

/ .t,W C Cntil'ol Tllrfl r)' et ol. Crlll .ftrttc·t lv i.tlrr

Inquiry ~im e~ pl:lnati o n : pred icti on and control c ritiqut: and trans- understandi ng:
format ion: res titut ion r.:construc tion
:111d e 111ancipati on

Nature of ,.e , ific d hypotheses n t~ lllal < ilkd hypn th struct urai/J,i , tori ca l iru.li vidual rccon, tructions
knnwlcdgt: c~ t:ohli < hc tl
as f:Kt' e<eS that MC pruhahJc insi!!hls coa lesci ng aro und
or la w'\ I ;tc.: ls or l aw ~ t.:O II 4i.C II S U.I\

Kn owledge accn:tinn - "huiltling c locks" ;ulrl in g tn hiswri cal rev isioni sm ; 1norc info rmed and
acc umulatiPn "edifice o f knowledge": generali 1.ati ons ge ne ralizati on by soph isticated
:wd c ausc-cff.:ct lin b gcs similarity reconstructions:
v i c~ri ou s experience

Goodness or c l!nvc nt ional hcndnnarks o f "rigllr" : historka l s itu~tt:dm:ss: trustworthiness and

q u~ l it y c rit e ri~ in te rnal and ex ternal va lidi ty. rc li :~ hilit y. e rosio n o f igno rance aut he ntic ity
and objectivity and misa ppre he nsions:
:tel ion sli ruulus

Va lues e xc luded- innuc nce dcnic1l incluclccl - formative

Ethi cs e xtrinsic: tilt toward dece ption intrinsic: mora l tilt intrinsic ; process tilt
toward re ve latio n to ward re velation;
spec ial problems

Voice "di sinte rested sc ie ntist" ~s informer o f "transformJti ve "passio nate partic ipant"
dec is ion makers. po licy makers. ami change inte llec tua l" as as fac ilitator of multi -
~ ge nt s advocate ~ n d ac ti vis t voice reconstruc tion

Traini ng tec hni c ~l and technical : quan titative rcsocializati o n: qual it ati ve and qua ntitative;
qu~ntit~ti ve: and quali tat ive : history: va lues of a ltruism ~ n d empowerment
subs tantive theories substanti ve theories

Accon1111\>tlatiPrl conllnCilSUrahle inCOIIIniCilSUrahlc

lle gcmony in co ntrol of publicati on. fundin g. seeki ng reco gniti on and input
promotion. ~nd tenure

3 . c r itic a l Ihcor y·s dialog irldialertica l met h-
odo logy aimed at I h e recons tructio n of pre-
v io u s ly held con stru c ti o n s: to
4 . construc ti visrn · s he rmcneuti c/di :~ le c t ic m eth -
odology ai m ed :~t the re c o n struction o f pre-
vious ly he ld con sl ruc tions.
Implications of
Each Paradigm's Position
on Selected Pract ical Issues
(Rows of Table 6.2)
Differe nc es in p nr<tdigm a ss umpt io ns cannol be
tl is mi ssed <ts me re "ph il o s ophic <t l" difference s :
impli c itl y o r exp lic itly, t hese p os itio ns h ave im-
portanl con sequ e nces fo r the practi c al conduc t of
inquiry. as we ll as for the inte rpre ta tion of find-
ings a nd po li cy c h o ices. We h ave e lected to dis-
c uss these consequences for ten sa lient issu es.
The en tri es in Table 6.2. w h ich con sis ts o f four
c o lu mns corre s ponding to the fo u r paradigms and
te n rows c orrespond ing to the ten is s ue s , summa-
riz e our interp re ta tion of t he maj o r im pli c a ti o ns.
The reader wi ll note tha t the fi rst four is s ues
( inqu iry aim. nature o f kn o wledge, k now ledge
a ccumula ti on . a nd quality c rite ria) are among those
deemed e s pec ia ll y important by posi ti vists and
postpos iti vists ; they are the re fore the issues o n .·1
w hic h alterna tive paradigms are most f requently
allack ed. The fifth a n d s i x th (value s a nd eth ics)
a re issue s taken serio u s ly by a ll p a rad ig m s , a l-
thou g h conve nti o n a l and e m e rgent res ponse s are
'l
Competi11 g Paradigms in Qttaliratil•e Research
quite different. Finally, the las t four issues (voice,
training, accommodation, and hegemony) arc those
deemed especially import an t by altern ati ve pro -
ponents; they represent areas on whi ch th e re-
ceived view is considered purticularly vu lnerable.
The entries in the table are based on ly in part on
public posi ti ons, given that noi all issues ha ve
been addressed by all paradigms' proponents. In
some cases, therefore, we have supplied en tries
that we beli eve follow logica lly from the basic
metaphysical (onto logical, epistemological, and
methodological) postures of the parad igms. To
take one examp le, the issue of voice is rare ly
addressed directly by positivists or postpositi vists,
but we believe the entry ..d isinterested scienti st..
•,l.· is one that would be given by those propon..: nts
were they to be cha llenged on this maller.
An immediately apparent difference hctwccn Ta-
ble 6.1 and Table 6.2 is that whereas in the former
case it was possible to make a distinct entry forev..:ry
cell, in the case of Table 6.2 there is considerab le
overlap within rows, particularly for the positi vist
and postpositivist columns. Indeed, even for those
issues in which the entries in those two columns arc
different, the differences appear to he minor. In
contrast, one may note the major differences found
between these two paradigms and the critica l theory
and constructivist paradigms, which tend also to
differ among themselves.
We have form ulated the iss ues as questi ons,
which follow .
Row I : What is
the aim or purpose of inquiry?
Positivism a11d pos tp ositi ~>ism . f o r both these
paradigms the aim of inquiry is expla11atio11 (von
Wright, 1971 ), ultimately enabling the prediction
and control of pheno mena, whether physical or
human. As Hesse ( 1980) has suggested, the ultimate
criterion for progress in these paradigms is that the
capability of .. scientis ts" to prcdiu <llld co nlrnl
should improve over time. The reductionism and
determin ism impli ed by this posi tion should he
noted. TI1e inquirer is cast in the role of ..ex pen:· a
situation that seems to award special. perhaps even
unmerited, privilege to the investigator.
Critical theory. The aim of inquiry is the cri-
tique a11d tra11sjo rmMion of lhc socia l, political.
cultura l, economit.:, clhni c, anJ gcnd..:r structures
that constrain and ex ploit htunankind. hy engage-
ment in confrontation, even co nflit:t. The nitc-
rion for progress is that over time. rc~ titution aml
emanci pation should occur and p c r~ i s t. Advocacy
and acti vism are key concepts. The inquirer is cast
in the role of instigator and facilitalnr, implying
that the inquirer unde rstands a priori what trans -
formations arc needed. llut we should note that
11 3
so me o f the more rad ical s tances in th e critica li st
camp ho ld that juJgmcnt about needed tran sfor-
mations should be rese rved to th ose whose li ves
arc most affected hy transformatio ns: the inquiry
parti cip <ull s themselves (Linco ln , in press).
CoiiJtructil•ism . Th e aim of inqu iry is wule r -
sllmc.ling and recons truction of the constructions that
people (including the inquirer) initially hold, aiming
toward consensus but Mill open to new interpreta-
tions as information and sophi sti cation improve. The
criterion for progress is that over time, everyone
formul ates more informed and sophisticated con-
structions and becomes more aware of lhe content
and meaning of compeling constructions. Advocacy
and acti vism arc also key concepts is thi s view. The
inquirer is cast in the role of partici pant and faci litator
in thi s process, a posi ti on that some crilics have
faulted on the grounds that it expands the inquirer' s
role beyond reasonable expectations of expertise aud
competence (Carr & Kcmmis, 19!!6).
Row 2: What is
the nature of know ledge ?
f'ositi1•ism . Knowledge consists of verifi ed hy-
potheses that can be acce pt ed as facts nr laws.
f'oslf>Ositil•iJm. KnuwlcJgc consis ts of liOn fal-
sifi ed hypotheses that can he rcg;.m.led as probab le
facts or laws.
C ritical theory. Knowledge cons ists of a seri es
of structural/hi storica l in si ght s th at will he trans-
fnrm ed as time passes. Trans fo rm ati o ns occ ur
when ignorance anJ mi sapprehensions give way
to more informed insight s hy means of a dialec-
ti ca l interaction .
CotiJtructil•ism . Kn ow ledge consists o f th ose
constru ctions ahout whi ch there is relati ve con-
sensus (or at least some move ment toward con-
sensus) among those competent (and , in the case
of more arcane material, tru sted ) to interpret the
substance o f the co nst ru ction. Multiple " know l-
edgcs" C<lll coexist when c4uall y competent (or
tru sted) inl..:rpreters di sagree, and/or depending
o n socinl. political. cultural, eco nomic. ethni c,
and ge nder factors that d iffe renti ate the interpret-
ers. These con~ tru..: ti o n s arc ~ uhj ec l to continuous .,
rcvbion, wi th chan ges lll<"t lik ely tn occur when ·i
re lati vel y d!ITcrc nt t:o n ~ t •uclions arc hrought intu •f
juxtapo ~i li o n in a dial c..:lica l contex t. ·tJ
Ro w :l: llow docs J..n ow1cd ge acclunulale'1
l'ositil•ism anti flllStpo.l ltil•illll. Know ledge ac-
cumulat es hy a pro cc~s o f accreti on. with eac h
11 4
·fa ct (or probable fa ct) ~erv ing "~" k ind of huil tl -
ing hlock th<tt , w he n pl :~ce<.l into it s proper ni che.
<tuds to the grow ing "ed ifice o f knowle<.lge." When
the fa cts take the form o f gcncrali7.<ttions o r cause-
e ffect linkages, they may h e used m os t effi c ie ntly
for pred iction and control. Gener ali zat io ns m ay
then be nwde, w ith pre ui ctaol e cc;mfidence. to a
popu lation o f se ttings .
Critit·a /th rn ry. Know ledge docs not accumu -
late in a n abso lut e se nse; mthcr. it grows and
c hanges thro u gh a dialc<.:t ica l process o f his tori ca l
rev is ion that continuou s ly erodes ig no rance and
rni ~a ppre h e n s i o n s and enlarges m ore info rmed
ins ig hts . Gencra li 1.ation ca n o ccur w hen the m ix
o f so c ial. politi c<t l, cu ltural , eco cwmi c. e thn ic.
<t nd gender ci rc ums ta nces <tnd vn lues is simi lar
ac ross sett ings.
Constmctivism. Knowledge <tccumulates only in
a re lative sense throug h the fo rmation o f ever more
informed and sophi sticated constructio ns via the
hermeneutica l/dia lectical process. as v:~ r yi n g con -
struc ti ons arc brought into juxt<tpos itio n. One im-
portant mec hanism for trans fer of kno wledge from
one sett ing to ano the r is the provisio n o f vicarious
experi ence, often su pplied h y ca se study reports (sec
Stake. C hapter 14, thi s volum e).
Ro w 4 : What crit eria are
appropriat e fo r judg in g the
goodn ess or qu ality o f an inq ui ry?
Positil'ism and poslf'OJ itivism. The appropri<tte
criteria are the con venti o nal oenchrnarks of " rigor":
inte rnal va li d ity ( iso mo rp h is m o f finding s w ith
reality). externa l valid it y (gene rali zability). re li -
a bility (in the sen se o f stabil ity) , <tnd objecti vity
(dis ta nced and neu tral oose rver) . These criteria
de pend o n the realist o nto log ica l po s itio n: wit h-
o ut the assumptio n . is omorphis m o f findin gs wi th
rea lity can h ave no mea ning. s tric t genera li zabi l-
ily to a parent population is imposs ible, stab ilit y
cannot be assessed for inquiry into a pheno me non
if the pheno m enon it se lf can c hange, and objec-
tiv ity cannot be ac hieved beca\)se there is no thing
from which one can be "dis tant."
Critical theory. T he appro priate criteria are hi s-
tori c:~ !
situatedness of the inquiry (i.e .. that it takes
account o f the social. po li tica l, cultural . economic,
ethn ic, and ge nder antecedents o f the studied situ -
ation) , the ex tent to whic h the iuquiry m:ts to erode
ignor<tnce <t lld mis <tpp!ehcnsi(HIS. and the el\te ut tu
w hich it provides" stimulus to actio u. that is. to the
transformation o f the exis ting structure.
Con structivi.rm . Two sets of c riteria have been
proposed : the trustworthin ess criteria o f credibil -
~ 1 A JOR I ' ARAD I G~ 1 S /\NO I'ERSI'ECT I VES
ity (parall e ling int erna l va lidi ty). trnnsferabil ity
(paralle ling Cl\lernal va lidity). depe ndability (paral-
leling re liabil it y). and confirm abi lity ( paralle ling
obj cct i vity) (G uba . 198 1; Lin co ln & G uba , 1985);
and the authenric ity cr iteri a o f fairness , onto logi -
cal authenticity (en larges pe rsona l constructions),
cducmi ve au thent icit y ( leads to improved under-
stauding of coustructions of o thers). c<ttal ytic authen-
tici ty (stimu lates to action) . and t<tctica l authenticity
(empo wers <tctio n) (Guba & Linco ln . 1989). The
fo rmer set rep resent s <t n ea rl y effort to reso lve the
qualit y iss ue for con stru cti vis m: a ltho u gh these
criter ia have been we ll recei ved . th eir paralle li sm
to pos it ivist c ri teria m akes t hem s us pect. The
Iauer set overlaps to some extent those of c ritical
theory nut goes beyond the m. particu luly the two
o f o nt o log ical authe nt ic it y nnd ed ucnti ve authen-
tic ity. The issue of qua lity criteria in con structi v-
is m is ueve rtheless no t we ll reso lved . and further
crit ique is needed.
Row 5: What is th e
ro le of va lues in inqui ry?
Po.riril'ism and posrpn.ri1i1•ism . In both these
pa radiJ! ms values arc s pec ifi ca ll y excluded ; in-
deed, the parad ig m is cl<timed to oe "va lue free"
hy v irtue of its episte mo logical pos tu re. Va lues
arc seen as confo und ing variables that can not be
allowed a ro le in a putatively objecti ve inquiry
(even whe n obj ecti vity is, in the case of postpo-
siti vis m , but a regu lato ry idea l).
Critical theory and constructivism. In both these
pa r11d ig ms v11 lues have prid e o f p lace : they are
seen as inelu c table in s h aping (in the case of
co nstructi vis m, c rea ting) inquiry outcomes. Fur-
the rmo re, even if it were possible, excluding val-
ues would no t be counten anced . To do so wou ld
be inimica l lo the interests o f the powerless and
o f"at -ris k" audiences, whose o rig inal (ernie) con-
struc tio n s deserve equ al cons ide ration with those
o f o ther, mo re powe rful audiences and of the
inquirer (eti c). Co nstruct ivi s m. wh ich sees the
inquirer as orchestrato r and faci litator o f the in-
qui ry process. is more like ly to s tress thi s po int
than is critical theory , which tends to cast the
inquirer in a m ore autho ritative ro le.
Row 6 : Wh at is th e
p lace of eth ics in inqu iry?
/'osirivi.fm and po.Hf'OSith •i.fm. In both these
paradi g ms et h ics is <tn import ant cons id e ratio n,
and it is taken very serio u s ly by inquire rs. but it
is extrins ic to the inquiry process itself. He nce
et hi cal be hav ior is fo rmally po li ced by external
mec hanisms. suc h as profess io n al codes o f con-

'< Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research
·~
duct and human subjects comrniuees. Fun her, the
realist ontology undergirding these paradigms pro-
vides a till toward the use of decepti on, which, it
is argued in ccn ain cases, is warranted 10 deter·
mine how "things really are and work" or for the
aake of some "higher social good" or some ··clea rer
tnnh" (Bok. 1978, 1982; Diener & Cra ndall, 1978).
Critical theory. Ethics is more nea rly intrinsic
to thi s paradigm , as implied by the inlent to erode
Ignorance and misapprehensions, and to tak e full
account of values and hi storical situatedn ess in
the inquiry process. Thus there is a mora l tilt that
'• the inquirer be reve latory (in the rigorous mean-
ing of "full y in fo rmed consent") rather than de-
ceptive. Of course, these considerations Jo not
prevent unethical behavior, but they do provide
some process barriers that make it more di fficull .
Constmctivism. Ethics is intrins ic 10 thi s para-
digm also because of th e inclusio n of parti cipanl
values in the inquiry (start ing wi th respondent s'
existing constructi ons and working towa rd in -
creased informat ion and sophi sti cation in their
constructions as well as in th e inq ui rcr' s ca nst ruc-
tion). There is an incenti ve- a prncess tilt- for
revelation; hiding the inquirer"s int ent is destruc-
tive of the aim of uncovering and improving con-
structions. In addit ion, the hcrmencuti ca lldial cc-
tical methodology itse lf provides a s trong but not
infallible safeguard against dece ption. However,
the close personal interactions required hy the
methodology may produce special and often sticky
problems of confidenti ality and anonymity, as
well as other interpersonal difficulties (Guha &
Linco ln , 1989).
Row 7: What "voice" is mirrored
in the inquirer's acti vities,
especiall y those directed at change?
Positivism a nd postpositivism. The inquirer's
voice is that of the "disinterested scienti st" in-
forming decision makers, policy makers, and change
agents, who independently usc this scientifi c in-
formation, at least in pari, to form, explain, and
justify actions, policies, and change proposa ls.
Critical theory. The inquirer 's voice is th ~t of
the "transformati vc intellectual" ((iinHax . I11KK)
who has ex pandcJ co n sc iuu s nc s~ ami ~~~ i ~ in a
position 10 confront ignorance and mi ~ apprch c n ·
sions. Change is fac ilitated as individuals develop
greater ins ight into the existing state of alTa ir~
(the nature and ex tent of their explo it ation) and
are stimulated to act on it.
Constructivism. The inquirer's voice is that of
the "passionate participant" (Lincoln, I'J9 I J ac -
·I
11 5
lively engaged in facilitating the ··muhi vo ice"
reconst ructi on of his or her own construction as
well as thmc of all other part ic ipants. C hange is
facil itated as reconstructions arc fo rmed and in -
di vidu als are stimulated to act on them.
Row 8: Wh at arc the impli cati ons
o f each paradigm for the
training of nov ice inquirer~ '?
Positivism. Novices arc trained primarily in
technica l knowledge about measurement, design,
and quantitative meth ods, with less but substan-
tial emphasis on formal theories o f the phenom-
cml in th ei r s uh ~ta nt ive spec ialties.
PostflOSiti••ism. Novices arc trained in ways
parall eling the positivist mode, but with the addi -
ti on o f qualitative methods, ofte n for the purpose
of ameli orating the prohlcms no ted in the opening
paragraphs of th is chapter.
Crittcal theo ry and CUIB'tructi1•ism. Novices must
firs t be rcsocial iL.cd from their early aml usuall y
intense exposure 10 the received view of science.
That rcsocia li£at ion c.mnot he accomplished without
thorough schoo ling in the postures and techniques
u f pos itivis m and pnstpos iti vism. Student s mu ~ l
come to appreciate paradigm Jiffcrcnccs (sumllla-
rizcd in Tahlc 6.1) and, in that context, to master
hoth qualitative and quantitative method s. The
former nrc essen tia l because of th eir ro le in car-
rying out the dialogic/dialecti cal or hermeneutical/
dia lectica l methodolugics ; the latter txcause they
can play a useful informational role.: in a ll paradigms.
They must also he he lped to unde r~tand the social,
poli tica l, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender hi s-
tory :1nd structure that serve as the surround for their
inquiries, and 10 incorporate the values of altmism
and empowcnnenl in their work.
Row 9 : Arc these paradigms
necessarily in confl ict?
Is it p os ~ ihl c to accommodJ IC
these several views within
a sin gle conceptua l framework?
fo.riti1•ism wul po.ltfW.Iitil•tmL Proponents of
these two p.1radig111\, given thei r found ational
uricntataun, taJ..c the pmi ti un th.11 all paradigms
ca n he acccun nwJalcd - that i ~ . that there exists,
or will he found to cxi~ t . ~ omc co mmon rati onal
~ truc t urc to whi ch all quc ~ tion ) of differe nce can
he refe rred tor re ~u lnti on . The pO)turc is rcduc-
tionist anJ a~)um.:~ the po)~ i hilily of poinl-by -
puinl c ompari ~o n s (comaHCII) Urahility), an issue
ahout wht ch there ~:cu llinu c~ to he a great deal o f
t.lbagrcc mcnt.
 1\1,\ J 0 R I' A IU \
Critir n ltlrt•nfT 1111d rr!IIJirttdll'ilm. Propone nt ~
of these two parat.l ig msjuin in aflinning the basic
inco mmc nsurahilit y of the paradi!,!lllS (a lthough
they woul d <tp.rec th at p o ~ it i vis 1u ;~ u d pustposi ti v-
is m are comme nsur able. and wou ld probnhl y agree
tlwt crit ica l theory and constru cti vism arc co m-
rncnsurahl e) . The ha ~ic be liefs of the p :1radip.m~
arc believed In he essentinll y co ntradi ctc•ry . Ft•r
co ns truc ti vists. eit her the re is a "real " rea lit y nr
the re is not (n lthough one might wish to resol ve
this pruh lc m di ffcrcnt ly in considc1ing the ph ysi-
ca l versus th e ln11nan realms). and thu s co nstruc-
ti vis m and pos iti vism/po stpositi vi s m cn nnot he
log ic11 lly acco mmodat ed anymore than . sny. the
ideas of flat ve rsus round earth can be logica ll y
acco mm odated . For cri ti ca l th eorists and co n-
structivist s . inqui ry is e ith e r v:"t lue free or it is not:
agai n . lngi c nl acnunn•oda tio n see ms imposs ibl e.
Reali s m and re lativi sm. value lrccdt•m and \':J iuc
houndedness. ca nnot coexist in any inte rna lly con-
s iste nt metap hysica l sy ste m. whic h co ndi tion of
co nsist r ncy. it is stipulated . is essenti a ll y met by
eac h of the ca m.lidate paradigms. Resolution of
thi s tlile mrna wi ll necessaril y a wil il the emer-
gence of a melaparad igm thil t re nde rs the o ltler.
accom mod:11ed parad ig ms not less true. hut si m-
pl y irrelev ant.
Row I 0: Whic h of the
parad igms cxcn:iscs hege mon y over
the others? That is.
w hi c h is predo min antly influ enti a l?
l'o.ritivi.rm a nd fWS ifW.I itil•i.rm . l'roponc nl s of
pos it ivis m gained hegemony over the past !'cvcr:ll
centuri es r~ s earli er Aristote lian ami thco logicrt l
pr~radigms were rthandonctl . 13 ut the mantle of
hegemony has in recent dccr~ d es grad uall y fr~tl cn
o n the shou lde rs of the postposi ti vists. the "natu-
ral" he irs o f pos itiv ism. Postpos itivi sts (and in -
deed man y res itlua l po~itivists) te nd to con tro l
publi cation outlets. fund ing sources. promotion
rtnd te nure mec hani sms, dis se rt r~ ti o n co mmillccs.
and othe r sources of power and in n ucnce. T hey
were. at least until about 1980. the "i n" group. and
co nt inue to re present the st ro ngest vo ice in pro-
fessional decisio n making .
Critical tltrnry ond ro11.rtructil·i.rm . Proponents
of crit ica l theory and cons tru c tivism arc stilt seek-
ing recognitio n r~nd :~ve nu es for input. O ver t he
past decade. it hns hccome more and more poss i-
ble fo r the m to nc hic vc acce ptnnce. :1s all ested hy
increasing inc lusion of re levant p:~pe r s in journals
and profession<~ ! meetin gs. the tlevelnpment of
new j o urn:~l outlets, the g row ing acce ptab ility o f
"quali tative" dissertations. the inc lusion of "quali -
tat ive" gui de lines hy some funding agencies and
program s, and the like . 13ut in all like lihood, criti -
I) I U 1\1 S AN I> I' ~ R S I' E C T I V E S
ca l th cory and co nstru ctivism will continu e to
p lay secondary. although impo rt ant and progres-
sively more influ ential. ro les in the nc:1 r futu re.
Co nclu s io n
The metaphor of the "parad igm wr~rs" described
hy Gage ( I 989) is undoubtedly ove rdrawn. De-
sc ribi ng the di scuss ions and altercation s of the
past d ecr~dc or two as wars paints the matte r as
more confronlrltional th an necessary. A resolu-
tio n o f paradigm differen ces can occur onl y when
a new paradi gm emerges that is more informed
and sophi sticated th11n a ny e xi sting one. That is
most likely to occur if a nd whe n proponents of
these seve ral poi nts of view co me together to
discuss th eir differences , not to r~rgue the sa nctity
o r th e ir views. Continuing di a logue among para-
di gm proponents of a ll s tripes wi ll a fford the best
ave nu e for moving toward a responsive and con-
ge ni al relati onship.
We hope that in thi s chapte r we have illustrated
the need for such a di scussion by clearly deti ne-
:lling t he differences th at currentl y exist, and by
s howing that those differe nces have significant
imp li ca tions a t the practi ca l leve l. Paradigm is-
s ues arc cruc ia l: no inquire r. w e maintain, ought
to gn about the business of inquiry withou t bei ng
c lear nbout just what parad igm informs and guides
hi s or her approac h.
Notes
I. 1\lan y of the objections listed here were first enun."
ciatcd by pos itivists themselves; indeed. we might ar-
gue 1hat the poslposi tivist position represents an allempl
10 transform positi vism in ways that take account of
lhese same objections. The naive positivist position of
1hc s i ~ tce nth through the nineteenth centuries is no
longer held by anyone even casually acquainted with
these problems. Although we would concede thai the
postpos iti vist position. as enunciated, for example, by
Denis Phillips ( 1987, 1990a. 1990b). represents a con·
siderable improvement over classic positi vism, it fails
to make a clean break. It represents a kind of "damage
control" rather than a reformulation of basic principles.
The notion that these problems required n paradigm
shift was poorly recognized until the publication of
Thomas Kuhn's landmark work. The S tructure of Sci-
t'tlliji<" Rt'volutionJ ( 1962. 1970). and even then pro-
ceeded but s lowly. Nevertheless. the conlributions of
pre-Kuhnian cri tic.~ should he recognized and applauded.
2. We arc reminded by Robert Stake (pe rsonal com-
munication. 1993) that the view of pa radi gms that we
present here should not "excl ude a belief that there are
Competing Paradigms '" Qua/iwti1•e l<es£•arch
worlds w i1l11n worlds. unending. each wi lh 11s own
paradigms . lnfinllc~ unal s have lheirown cosmologic:s."
3. II is unflkc:ly 1ha 1 a prac1i1ionc:r of any paradigm
would agree 1ha1 o ur summaries closely d.:scnh.: w hal
he or s he 1hinks or doc:s. Wo rkaday scicn1is1s rarely
have eilher 1hc 111ne or lhe inclina1ion 10 assess whal
1hey do m philosophical lcrms . We: do conh.:nd. how-
e ver, 1ha1 1hesc descripllo ns arc apl as broad hrus h
slrokes. if nol always a l I he mdi viduallcvel.
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