32 To 45 Due Process Full Cases

32. Heirs of Jose Deleste v.
Landbank of the Philippines (June 8, 2011)
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside the
October 28, 2004 Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its September 13, 2005
Resolution[2] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the owners of a
parcel of agricultural land located in Tambo, Iligan City, consisting of 34.7 hectares (subject property). Said
spouses were childless, but Gregorio had a son named Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio) by another woman.
Virgilio had been raised by the couple since he was two years old. Gregorio also had two daughters,
Esperanza and Caridad, by still another woman.[3]
When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the subject property.[4] On February
16, 1954, Hilaria and Virgilio sold the subject property to Dr. Jose Deleste (Deleste) for PhP 16,000. [5] The
deed of sale was notarized on February 17, 1954 and registered on March 2, 1954. Also, the tax declaration
in the name of Virgilio was canceled and a new tax declaration was issued in the name of Deleste. The
arrears in the payment of taxes from 1952 had been updated by Deleste and from then on, he paid the taxes
on the property.[6]
On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died.[7] Gregorios brother, Juan Nanaman, was appointed as special
administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses. Subsequently, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as
the regular administrator of the joint estate.[8]
On April 30, 1963, Noel, as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased spouses, filed
before the Court of First Instance, Branch II, Lanao del Norte an action against Deleste for the reversion of
title over the subject property, docketed as Civil Case No. 698.[9]Said case went up to this Court in Noel v.
CA, where We rendered a Decision[10] on January 11, 1995, affirming the ruling of the CA that the subject
property was the conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria and that the latter could only sell
her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property to Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the
intestate estate of Gregorio were held to be the co-owners of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2)
interest in it.[11]
Notably, while Civil Case No. 698 was still pending before the CFI, particularly on October 21, 1972,
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law mandates that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought
under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries. Thus, the subject
property was placed under the said program.[12] However, only the heirs of Gregorio were identified by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the landowners. Concomitantly, the notices and processes
relative to the coverage were sent to these heirs.[13]
In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313, known as the Zoning Regulation of
Iligan City, reclassifying the subject property as commercial/residential.[14]
Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in favor of
private respondents who were tenants and actual cultivators of the subject property.[15] The CLTs were
registered on July 15, 1986.[16]
In 1991, the subject property was surveyed.[17] The survey of a portion of the land consisting of
20.2611 hectares, designated as Lot No. 1407, was approved on January 8, 1999.[18] The claim folder for Lot
No. 1407 was submitted to the LBP which issued a Memorandum of Valuation and a Certificate of Cash
Deposit on May 21, 2001 and September 12, 2001, respectively. Thereafter, Emancipation Patents (EPs) and
Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) were issued on August 1, 2001 and October 1, 2001, respectively, in
favor of private respondents over their respective portions of Lot No. 1407.[19]
Meanwhile, on November 22, 1999, the City of Iligan filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 4 in Iligan Cityfor the expropriation of a 5.4686-hectare portion of Lot No. 1407,
docketed as Special Civil Action No. 4979. On December 11, 2000, the RTC issued a Decision granting the
expropriation. Considering that the real owner of the expropriated portion could not be determined, as the
subject property had not yet been partitioned and distributed to any of the heirs of Gregorio and Deleste, the
just compensation for the expropriated portion of the subject property in the amount of PhP 27,343,000 was
deposited with the Development Bank of the Philippines in Iligan City, in trust for the RTC in Iligan City.[20]
On February 28, 2002, the heirs of Deleste, petitioners herein, filed with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a petition seeking to nullify private respondents EPs. [21] This was
docketed as Reg. Case No. X-471-LN-2002.
On July 21, 2003, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) rendered a
Decision[22] declaring that the EPs were null and void in view of the pending issues of ownership, the
subsequent reclassification of the subject property into a residential/commercial land, and the violation of
petitioners constitutional right to due process of law.
Dissatisfied, private respondents immediately filed their Notice of Appeal on July 22, 2003.
Notwithstanding it, on July 24, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for a Writ of Execution pursuant to Section
2, Rule XII of the Revised Rules of Procedure, which was granted in an Order dated August 4, 2003 despite
strong opposition from private respondents.[23] On January 28, 2004, the DARAB nullified the Order dated
August 4, 2003 granting the writ of execution.[24]
Subsequently, the DARAB, in DARAB Case No. 12486, reversed the ruling of the PARAD in its
Decision[25] dated March 15, 2004. It held, among others, that the EPs were valid as it was the heirs of
Deleste who should have informed the DAR of the pendency of Civil Case No. 698 at the time the subject
property was placed under the coverage of the OLT Program considering that DAR was not a party to the
said case. Further, it stated that the record is bereft of any evidence that the city ordinance has been
approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), as mandated by DAR Administrative
Order No. 01, Series of 1990, and held that whether the subject property is indeed exempt from the OLT
Program is an administrative determination, the jurisdiction of which lies exclusively with the DAR
Secretary or the latters authorized representative. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
by the DARAB in its Resolution[26] dated July 8, 2004.
Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85471,
challenging the Decision and Resolution in DARAB Case No. 12486. This was denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated October 28, 2004 for petitioners failure to attach the writ of execution, the order nullifying
the writ of execution, and such material portions of the record referred to in the petition and other supporting
papers, as required under Sec. 6 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
also denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated September 13, 2005 for being pro forma.
On November 18, 2005, petitioners filed a petition for review with this Court. In Our
Resolution[27] dated February 4, 2008, We resolved to deny the said petition for failure to show sufficiently
any reversible error in the assailed judgment to warrant the exercise by the Court of its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction in this case.
On March 19, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[28] On April 11, 2008, they also
filed a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration.[29]
In Our Resolution[30] dated August 20, 2008, this Court resolved to grant petitioners motion for
reconsideration and give due course to the petition, requiring the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
The Issues
I. [WHETHER THE CA WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING] OUTRIGHT THE

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF PETITIONERS X X X.
II. [WHETHER] THE OUTRIGHT DENIAL OF PETITIONERS MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION BASED ON A MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS IS
JUSTIFIED; AND [WHETHER THE] OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF THE
PETITION IS JUST CONSIDERING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES
RAISED THEREIN.
XXXX
III. [WHETHER PETITIONERS LAND IS] COVERED BY AGRARIAN REFORM
GIVEN THAT THE CITY OF ILIGAN PASSED [CITY] ORDINANCE NO. 1313
RECLASSIFYING THE AREA INTO A STRICTLY RESIDENTIAL AREA IN
1975.
IV. [WHETHER THE LAND] THAT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY AND

PARTIALLY EXPROPRIATED BY A CITY GOVERNMENT [MAY] STILL BE
SUBJECT[ED] TO AGRARIAN REFORM.
V. [WHETHER DAR VIOLATED] THE RIGHTS OF PETITIONERS TO

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
VI. [WHETHER] THE COMPENSATION DETERMINED BY DAR AND LBP IS

CORRECT GIVEN THAT THE FORMULA USED HAD BEEN REPEALED.
VII. [WHETHER] THE ISSUANCE OF EMANCIPATION PATENTS [IS] LEGAL

GIVEN THAT THEY WERE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL PROCEEDING.
VIII. [WHETHER] THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE [ARE] VALID GIVEN THAT

THEY WERE DIRECTLY ISSUED TO THE FARMER-BENEFICIARIES IN
GROSS VIOLATION OF SECTION 16(E) OF R.A. 6657 X X X.[31]
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Effect of non-compliance with the requirements

under Sec. 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
In filing a petition for review as an appeal from awards, judgments, final orders, or resolutions of any
quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, it is required under Sec. 6(c), Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court that it be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of
the award, judgment, final order, or resolution appealed from, with certified true copies of such material
portions of the record referred to in the petition and other supporting papers. As stated:
Sec. 6. Contents of the petition. The petition for review shall (a) state the full names
of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds
relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a
certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from,
together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to
therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum
shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the
specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Non-compliance with any of the above-mentioned requirements concerning the contents of the
petition, as well as the documents that should accompany the petition, shall be sufficient ground for its
dismissal as stated in Sec. 7, Rule 43 of the Rules:
Sec. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other
lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, the CA dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471 for petitioners failure to
attach the writ of execution, the order nullifying the writ of execution, and such material portions of the
record referred to in the petition and other supporting papers.[32]
A perusal of the issues raised before the CA would, however, show that the foregoing documents
required by the appellate court are not necessary for the proper disposition of the case. Specifically:
Is [Lot No. 1407] within the ambit of the [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program]?
Can the OLT by DAR over the subject land validly proceed without notice to the landowner?
Can the OLT be validly completed without a certification of deposit by Land Bank?
[I]s the landowner barred from exercising his right of retention x x x [considering that EPs
were already issued on the basis of CLTs]?
Are the EPs over the subject land x x x valid x x x?[33]
Petitioners complied with the requirement under Sec. 6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when they
appended to the petition filed before the CA certified true copies of the following documents: (1) the
challenged resolution dated July 8, 2004 issued by the DARAB denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration; (2) the duplicate original copy of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated April 6,
2005; (3) the assailed decision dated March 15, 2004 issued by the DARAB reversing on appeal the decision
of the PARAD and nullifying with finality the order of execution pending appeal; (4) the Order dated
December 8, 2003 issued by the PARAD reinstating the writ of execution earlier issued; and (5) the
Decision dated July 21, 2003 issued by the PARAD in the original proceedings for the cancellation of the
EPs.[34]The CA, therefore, erred when it dismissed the petition based on such technical ground.
Even assuming that the omitted documents were material to the appeal, the appellate court, instead of
dismissing outright the petition, could have just required petitioners to submit the necessary documents.
In Spouses Espejo v. Ito,[35] the Court held that under Section 3 (d), Rule 3 of the Revised Internal Rules of
the Court of Appeals,[36] the Court of Appeals is with authority to require the parties to submit additional
documents as may be necessary to promote the interests of substantial justice.
Moreover, petitioners subsequent submission of the documents required by the CA with the motion
for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with Section 6(c), Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.[37] In Jaro v. CA, this Court held that subsequent and substantial compliance may call for the
relaxation of the rules of procedure. Particularly:
The amended petition no longer contained the fatal defects that the original petition
had but the Court of Appeals still saw it fit to dismiss the amended petition. The Court of
Appeals reasoned that non-compliance in the original petition is admittedly attributable to the
petitioner and that no highly justifiable and compelling reason has been advanced to the court
for it to depart from the mandatory requirements of Administrative Circular No. 3-96. The
hard stance taken by the Court of Appeals in this case is unjustified under the circumstances.
There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial

compliance of an appellant may call for the relaxation of the rules of
procedure. In Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz and Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, we ruled that the subsequent submission of the missing documents with the
motion for reconsideration amounts to substantial compliance. The reasons behind the
failure of the petitioners in these two cases to comply with the required attachments were no
longer scrutinized. What we found noteworthy in each case was the fact that the petitioners
therein substantially complied with the formal requirements. We ordered the remand of the
petitions in these cases to the Court of Appeals, stressing the ruling that by precipitately
dismissing the petitions the appellate court clearly put a premium on technicalities at the
expense of a just resolution of the case.[38] (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Time and again, this Court has held that a strict and rigid application of technicalities must be
avoided if it tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.[39] As held in Sta. Ana v. Spouses
Carpo:[40]
Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. If
the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is
always within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their
operation. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance
with the procedural rules, even the most mandatory in character, mindful of the duty to
reconcile the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties right to an
opportunity to be heard.
Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo is instructive:
We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that

merit liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to
set aside technical infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we
dispense with the technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force and
effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently
apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent the
commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried
to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and
the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper
disposition of his cause. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the dismissal of the petition by the CA on mere technicality is unwarranted in the instant
case.
On the coverage of the subject property

by the agrarian reform program
Petitioners contend that the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage of the
agrarian reform program in view of the enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 by the City
of Iligan reclassifying the area into a residential/commercial land.[41]
Unconvinced, the DARAB, in its Decision, noted that the record is bereft of any evidence that the
city ordinance has been approved by the HLURB, thereby allegedly casting doubt on the validity of the
reclassification over the subject property.[42] It further noted that whether the subject property is exempt
from the OLT Program is an administrative determination, the jurisdiction of which lies exclusively with the
DAR Secretary, not with the DARAB.
Indeed, it is the Office of the DAR Secretary which is vested with the primary and exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. [43] However, this
will not prevent the Court from assuming jurisdiction over the petition considering that the issues raised in it
may already be resolved on the basis of the records before Us. Besides, to allow the matter to remain with
the Office of the DAR Secretary would only cause unnecessary delay and undue hardship on the parties.
Applicable, by analogy, is Our ruling in the recent Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph
International v. Department of Labor and Employment Secretary,[44]where We held:
But as the CA did, we similarly recognize that undue hardship, to the point of
injustice, would result if a remand would be ordered under a situation where we are in
the position to resolve the case based on the records before us. As we said in Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals:
[w]e have laid down the rule that the remand of the case to the lower court for
further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position to
resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in
the public interest and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved
actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further
proceedings, such as where the ends of justice, would not be subserved by the
remand of the case.
Thus, we shall directly rule on the dismissal issue. And while we rule that the CA
could not validly rule on the merits of this issue, we shall not hesitate to refer back to its
dismissal ruling, where appropriate. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Pertinently, after an assiduous study of the records of the case, We agree with petitioners that the
subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program in view
of the enactment by the City of Iligan of its local zoning ordinance, City Ordinance No. 1313.
It is undeniable that the local government has the power to reclassify agricultural into
non-agricultural lands. In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. CA,[45] this Court held that pursuant
to Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 2264, amending the Local Government Code, municipal and/or city
councils are empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the
National Planning Commission. It was also emphasized therein that [t]he power of the local government to
convert or reclassify lands [from agricultural to non-agricultural lands prior to the passage of RA 6657] is
not subject to the approval of the [DAR].[46]
Likewise, it is not controverted that City Ordinance No. 1313, which was enacted by the City
of Iligan in 1975, reclassified the subject property into a commercial/residential area. DARAB, however,
believes that the approval of HLURB is necessary in order for the reclassification to be valid.
We differ. As previously mentioned, City Ordinance No. 1313 was enacted by the City of Iligan in
1975. Significantly, there was still no HLURB to speak of during that time. It was the Task Force on Human
Settlements, the earliest predecessor of HLURB, which was already in existence at that time, having been
created on September 19, 1973 pursuant to Executive Order No. 419. It should be noted, however, that the
Task Force was not empowered to review and approve zoning ordinances and regulations. As a matter of
fact, it was only on August 9, 1978, with the issuance of Letter of Instructions No. 729, that local
governments were required to submit their existing land use plans, zoning ordinances, enforcement systems
and procedures to the Ministry of Human Settlements for review and ratification. The Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC) was the regulatory arm of the Ministry of Human Settlements.[47]
Significantly, accompanying the Certification[48] dated October 8, 1999 issued by Gil R. Balondo,
Deputy Zoning Administrator of the City Planning and Development Office, Iligan City, and the
letter[49] dated October 8, 1999 issued by Ayunan B. Rajah, Regional Officer of the HLURB, is the
Certificate of Approval issued by Imelda Romualdez Marcos, then Minister of Human Settlements and
Chairperson of the HSRC, showing that the local zoning ordinance was, indeed, approved on September 21,
1978. This leads to no other conclusion than that City Ordinance No. 1313 enacted by the City of Iligan was
approved by the HSRC, the predecessor of HLURB. The validity of said local zoning ordinance is, therefore,
beyond question.
Since the subject property had been reclassified as residential/commercial land with the enactment of
City Ordinance No. 1313 in 1975, it can no longer be considered as an agricultural land within the ambit of
RA 6657. As this Court held in Buklod nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E.M. Ramos and Sons,
Inc.,[50] To be exempt from CARP, all that is needed is one valid reclassification of the land from
agricultural to non-agricultural by a duly authorized government agency before June 15, 1988, when the
CARL took effect.
Despite the foregoing ruling, respondents allege that the subsequent reclassification by the local
zoning ordinance cannot free the land from the legal effects of PD 27 which deems the land to be already
taken as of October 21, 1972, when said law took effect. Concomitantly, they assert that the rights which
accrued from said date must be respected. They also maintain that the reclassification of the subject property
did not alter its agricultural nature, much less its actual use.[51]
Verily, vested rights which have already accrued cannot just be taken away by the expedience of
issuing a local zoning ordinance reclassifying an agricultural land into a residential/commercial area. As this
Court extensively discussed in Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. CA:[52]
In the main, REMMAN hinges its application for exemption on the ground that the
subject lands had ceased to be agricultural lands by virtue of the zoning classification by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Dasmarias, Cavite, and approved by the HSRC, specifying them as
residential.
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, this Court resolved the issue of
whether lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved by
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its precursor agencies, i.e.,
National Housing Authority and Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, prior to 15
June 1988, are covered by Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. We answered in the negative, thus:
We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of
R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands. As to what constitutes
agricultural land, it is referred to as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in
this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation.
Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable and suitable agricultural lands
and do not include commercial, industrial and residential land.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of
CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the
effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its
Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands
to Non-Agricultural Uses, DAR itself defined agricultural land thus
. . . Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in

R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in
town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June
1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use.
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent
DAR is bound by such conversion. . . . .
However, Natalia should be cautiously applied in light of Administrative Order 04,

Series of 2003, which outlines the rules on the Exemption on Lands from CARP Coverage
under Section (3) of Republic Act No. 6657, and Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No.
44, Series of 1990. It reads:
I. Prefatory Statement
Republic Act (RA) 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL),
Section 3, Paragraph (c) defines agricultural land as referring to land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land.
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, (or DOJ Opinion 44-1990
for brevity) and the case of Natalia Realty versus Department of Agrarian Reform (12
August 2993, 225 SCRA 278) opines that with respect to the conversion of
agricultural land covered by RA 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to approve such conversion may be exercised
from the date of its effectivity, on 15 June 1988. Thus, all lands that are already
classified as commercial, industrial or residential before 15 June 1988 no longer need
any conversion clearance.
However, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural uses shall not operate

to divest tenant[-]farmers of their rights over lands covered by Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 27, which have been vested prior to 15 June 1988.
As emphasized, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural cannot be applied

to defeat vested rights of tenant-farmers under Presidential Decree No. 27.
Indeed, in the recent case of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,
where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether the contentious property therein is
agricultural in nature on the ground that the same had been classified as park since 1979
under the Zoning Ordinance of Cabuyao, as approved by the HLURB, the Court said:
The Court recognizes the power of a local government to reclassify and convert
lands through local ordinance, especially if said ordinance is approved by the HLURB.
Municipal Ordinance No. 110-54 dated November 3, 1979, enacted by
the Municipality of Cabuyao, divided the municipality into residential, commercial,
industrial, agricultural and institutional districts, and districts and parks for open
spaces. It did not convert, however, existing agricultural lands into residential,
commercial, industrial, or institutional. While it classified Barangay Casile into a
municipal park, as shown in its permitted uses of land map, the ordinance did not
provide for the retroactivity of its classification. In Co vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, it was held that an ordinance converting agricultural lands into residential
or light industrial should be given prospective application only, and should not
change the nature of existing agricultural lands in the area or the legal
relationships existing over such land. . . . .
A reading of Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01, series of 1981, does not
disclose any provision converting existing agricultural lands in the covered area into
residential or light industrial. While it declared that after the passage of the measure,
the subject area shall be used only for residential or light industrial purposes, it is not
provided therein that it shall have retroactive effect so as to discontinue all rights
previously acquired over lands located within the zone which are neither residential
nor light industrial in nature. This simply means that, if we apply the general rule,
as we must, the ordinance should be given prospective operation only. The
further implication is that it should not change the nature of existing agricultural
lands in the area or the legal relationships existing over such lands. (Citations
omitted; emphasis supplied.)
This, however, raises the issue of whether vested rights have actually accrued in the instant case. In
this respect, We reckon that under PD 27, tenant-farmers of rice and corn lands were deemed owners of the
land they till as of October 21, 1972. This policy, intended to emancipate the tenant-farmers from the
bondage of the soil, is given effect by the following provision of the law:
The tenant farmer, whether in land classified as landed estate or not, shall be deemed
owner of a portion constituting a family size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated and
three (3) hectares if irrigated. (Emphasis supplied.)
It should be clarified that even if under PD 27, tenant-farmers are deemed owners as of October 21,
1972, this is not to be construed as automatically vesting upon these tenant-farmers absolute ownership over
the land they were tilling. Certain requirements must also be complied with, such as payment of just
compensation, before full ownership is vested upon the tenant-farmers. This was elucidated by the Court
in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform:[53]
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as

October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a portion of land
consisting of a family-sized farm except that no title to the land owned by him was to be
actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly
recognized farmers cooperative. It was understood, however, that full payment of the just
compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21,
1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree,
after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers cooperatives and full payment of
just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its
Section 2 that the lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October
21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be
considered as advance payment for the land.
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of
the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the
deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until
then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Prior to compliance with the prescribed requirements, tenant-farmers have, at most, an inchoate right
over the land they were tilling. In recognition of this, a CLT is issued to a tenant-farmer to serve as a
provisional title of ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is awaiting full payment of [just
compensation] or for as long as the [tenant-farmer] is an amortizing owner.[54] This certificate proves
inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn production. It is issued in order
for the tenant-farmer to acquire the land[55] he was tilling.
Concomitantly, with respect to the LBP and the government, tenant-farmers cannot be considered as
full owners of the land they are tilling unless they have fully paid the amortizations due them. This is
because it is only upon such full payment of the amortizations that EPs may be issued in their favor.
In Del Castillo v. Orciga, We explained that land transfer under PD 27 is effected in two (2) stages.
The first stage is the issuance of a CLT to a farmer-beneficiary as soon as the DAR transfers the landholding
to the farmer-beneficiary in recognition that said person is its deemed owner. And the second stage is the
issuance of an EP as proof of full ownership of the landholding upon full payment of the annual
amortizations or lease rentals by the farmer-beneficiary.[56]
In the case at bar, the CLTs were issued in 1984. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, it was
only in 1984 that private respondents, as farmer-beneficiaries, were recognized to have an inchoate
right over the subject property prior to compliance with the prescribed requirements. Considering
that the local zoning ordinance was enacted in 1975, and subsequently approved by the HSRC in 1978,
private respondents still had no vested rights to speak of during this period, as it was only in 1984 that
private respondents were issued the CLTs and were deemed owners.
The same holds true even if EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, since reclassification had taken
place twenty-six (26) years prior to their issuance. Undeniably, no vested rights accrued prior to
reclassification and its approval. Consequently, the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is
outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program.
On the violation of petitioners right to due process of law
Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property under the
coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, their right to due process of law was violated.[57] Citing De
Chavez v. Zobel,[58] both the DAR and the private respondents claim that the enactment of PD 27 is a
statutory notice to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice and/or corn production,[59] implying that
there was no need for an actual notice.
We agree with petitioners. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the
agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it trods roughshod with the essential
requirements of administrative due process of law.[60] Our ruling in Heirs of Jugalbot v. CA[61] is particularly
instructive:
Firstly, the taking of subject property was done in violation of constitutional due
process. The Court of Appeals was correct in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was
denied due process because the DAR failed to send notice of the impending land reform
coverage to the proper party. The records show that notices were erroneously addressed
and sent in the name of Pedro N. Roa who was not the owner, hence, not the proper party in
the instant case. The ownership of the property, as can be gleaned from the records, pertains
to Virginia A. Roa. Notice should have been therefore served on her, and not Pedro N. Roa.
xxxx
In addition, the defective notice sent to Pedro N. Roa was followed by a DAR
certification signed by team leader Eduardo Maandig on January 8, 1988 stating that the
subject property was tenanted as of October 21, 1972 and primarily devoted to rice and corn
despite the fact that there was no ocular inspection or any on-site fact-finding investigation
and report to verify the truth of the allegations of Nicolas Jugalbot that he was a tenant of the
property. The absence of such ocular inspection or on-site fact-finding investigation and
report likewise deprives Virginia A. Roa of her right to property through the denial of due
process.
By analogy, Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals applies to the case at bar since
there was likewise a violation of due process in the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law when the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection and
investigation to be conducted by the DAR before acquisition of the property was to be
undertaken. Neither was there proof that petitioner was given the opportunity to at least
choose and identify its retention area in those portions to be acquired. Both in the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and Presidential Decree No. 27, the right of retention
and how this right is exercised, is guaranteed by law.
Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of
expropriating private property, the law must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance
with legal provisions, especially those which relate to the procedure for acquisition of
expropriated lands should therefore be observed. In the instant case, no proper notice was
given to Virginia A. Roa by the DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and
investigation. Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies that results from
its failure to comply with the proper procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of
constitutional due process and should be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted
with grave abuse of discretion. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Markedly, a reading of De Chavez invoked by both the DAR and private respondents does not show
that this Court ever made mention that actual notice may be dispensed with under PD 27, its enactment
being a purported statutory notice to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice and/or corn production
that their lands are subjected to the OLT program.
Quite contrarily, in Sta. Monica Industrial & Devt. Corp. v. DAR,[62] this Court underscored the
significance of notice in implementing the agrarian reform program when it stated that notice is part of the
constitutional right to due process of law. It informs the landowner of the States intention to acquire a
private land upon payment of just compensation and gives him the opportunity to present evidence that his
landholding is not covered or is otherwise excused from the agrarian law.
The Court, therefore, finds interest in the holding of the DARAB that petitioners were not denied the
right to due process despite the fact that only the Nanamans were identified as the owners. Particularly:
Fourthly, the PARAD also ruled that the petitioners were denied the right to be given
the notice since only the Nanamans were identified as the owners. The fault lies with
petitioners who did not present the tax declaration in the name of Dr. Deleste as of October
21, 1972. It was only in 1995 that Civil Case No. 698 was finally decided by the Supreme
Court dividing the 34.7 hectares between the Delestes and the Nanamans. Note that Dr.
Deleste died in 1992 after PD 27 was promulgated, hence, the subject land or his share was
considered in his name only (see Art. 777, New Civil Code). Even then, it must be borne in
mind that on September 26, 1972, PD No. 2 was issued by President Marcos proclaiming the
whole country as a land reform area, this was followed by PD 27. This should have alarmed
them more so when private respondents are in actual possession and cultivation of the subject
property.
But it was incumbent upon the DAR to notify Deleste, being the landowner of the subject property. It
should be noted that the deed of sale executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste was registered on March 2,
1954, and such registration serves as a constructive notice to the whole world that the subject property was
already owned by Deleste by virtue of the said deed of sale. In Naval v. CA, this Court held:
Applying the law, we held in Bautista v. Fule that the registration of an instrument
involving unregistered land in the Registry of Deeds creates constructive notice and binds
third person who may subsequently deal with the same property.[63] x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)
It bears stressing that the principal purpose of registration is to notify other persons not parties to a
contract that a transaction involving the property has been entered into.[64] There was, therefore, no reason
for DAR to feign ignorance of the transfer of ownership over the subject property.
Moreover, that DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not to the Nanamans, is bolstered by
the fact that the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was already canceled and a new one issued in the
name of Deleste.[65] Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, they are nonetheless good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no
one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive
possession.[66]
Petitioners right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when the DAR failed to notify them that
it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program.
On this note, We take exception to our ruling in Roxas & Co., Inc. v. CA,[67] where, despite a finding
that there was a violation of due process in the implementation of the comprehensive agrarian reform
program when the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection and investigation to be conducted by
the DAR before acquiring the property, thereby effectively depriving petitioner the opportunity to at least
choose and identify its retention area in those portions to be acquired,[68] this Court nonetheless ruled that
such violation does not give the Court the power to nullify the certificates of land ownership award (CLOAs)
already issued to the farmer-beneficiaries, since the DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural
lapses in the acquisition proceedings.
Manifesting her disagreement that this Court cannot nullify illegally issued CLOAs and should first
ask the DAR to reverse and correct itself, Justice Ynares-Santiago, in her Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion,[69] stated that [i]f the acts of DAR are patently illegal and the rights of Roxas & Co. violated, the
wrong decisions of DAR should be reversed and set aside. It follows that the fruits of the wrongful acts, in
this case the illegally issued CLOAs, must be declared null and void. She also noted that [i]f CLOAs can
under the DARs own order be cancelled administratively, with more reason can the courts, especially the
Supreme Court, do so when the matter is clearly in issue.
In the same vein, if the illegality in the issuance of the CLTs is patent, the Court must immediately
take action and declare the issuance as null and void. There being no question that the CLTs in the instant
case were improperly issued, for which reason, their cancellation is warranted.[70] The same holds true with
respect to the EPs and certificates of title issued by virtue of the void CLTs, as there can be no valid transfer
of title should the CLTs on which they were grounded are void.[71] Cancellation of the EPs and OCTs are
clearly warranted in the instant case since, aside from the violation of petitioners right to due process of law,
the subject property is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program.
Issue of Validity of EPs Not Barred by Res Judicata
The LBP maintains that the issue of the EPs validity has already been settled by this Court in Heirs
of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[72] where We held that the EPs and OCTs issued
in 2001 had already become indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time the petitioners therein instituted
the case in 2005; hence, their issuance may no longer be reviewed.[73]
In effect, the LBP raises the defense of res judicata in order to preclude a relitigation of the issue
concerning the validity of the EPs issued to private respondents.
Notably, the doctrine of res judicata has two aspects, namely: (1) bar by prior judgment,[74] wherein
the judgment in a prior case bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause
of action;[75] and (2) conclusiveness of judgment,[76] which precludes relitigation of a particular fact or issue
in another action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.[77]
Citing Agustin v. Delos Santos,[78] this Court, in Spouses Antonio v. Sayman,[79] expounded on the
difference between the two aspects of res judicata:
The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1) bar by prior judgment and (2)
conclusiveness of judgment. This Court had occasion to explain the difference between these
two aspects of res judicata as follows:
There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment
was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first
case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or
decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation
between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or
suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no
identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those
matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters
merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as
conclusiveness of judgment. Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue
directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a
competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled
by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their
privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two
actions is the same. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
To be sure, conclusiveness of judgment merits application when a fact or question has been squarely
put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent
jurisdiction.[80] Elucidating further on this second aspect of res judicata, the Court, in Spouses Antonio,
stated:
x x x The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that
action (and persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind
them while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a
timely motion or petition; the conclusively-settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in
any future or other action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest,
in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a
different cause of action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are required for
the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.[81] (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied.)
Applying the above statement of the Court to the case at bar, We find that LBPs contention that this
Courts ruling in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy that the EPs and OCTs issued in 2001 had already become
indefeasible and incontrovertible precludes a relitigation of the issue concerning the validity of the EPs
issued to private respondents does not hold water.
In the first place, there is no identity of parties in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy and the instant case.
Arguably, the respondents in these two cases are similar. However, the petitioners are totally different.
In Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, the petitioners are the more than 120 individuals who claim to be
descendants of Fulgencio Nanaman, Gregorios brother, and who collectively assert their right to a share in
Gregorios estate, arguing that they were deprived of their inheritance by virtue of the improper issuance of
the EPs to private respondents without notice to them. On the other hand, in the instant case, petitioners are
the heirs of Deleste who seek nullification of the EPs issued to private respondents on grounds of violation
of due process of law, disregard of landowners right of retention, improvident issuance of EPs and OCTs,
and non-coverage of the agrarian reform program, among others. Evidently, there is even no privity among
the petitioners in these two cases.
And in the second place, the issues are also dissimilar. In Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, the issue
was whether the filing of a petition for prohibition was the proper remedy for the petitioners therein,
considering that the EPs and OCTs had already been issued in 2001, four (4) years prior to the filing of said
petition in 2005. In the instant case, however, the issue is whether the EPs and OCTs issued in favor of
private respondents are void, thus warranting their cancellation.
In addition, the factual circumstances in these two cases are different such that the necessity of
applying the rule on indefeasibility of title in one is wanting in the other. In Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy,
the petition for prohibition was filed by the petitioners therein in 2005, notwithstanding the fact that the EPs
and OCTs had already been issued in 2001. For that reason, apart from making a ruling that [p]rohibition, as
a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli, it becomes incumbent upon this Court to
hold that:
x x x Considering that such EPs and OCTs were issued in 2001, they had become
indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time petitioners instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 00365
in 2005, and may no longer be judicially reviewed.[82] (Emphasis supplied.)
On the contrary, in the instant case, the petition for nullification of private respondents EPs and
OCTs was filed on February 28, 2002. Taking into account that the EPs and OCTs were issued on August 1,
2001 and October 1, 2001, respectively, the filing of the petition was well within the prescribed one year
period, thus, barring the defense of indefeasibility and incontrovertibility. Even if the petition was filed
before the DARAB, and not the Regional Trial Court as mandated by Sec. 32 of the Property Registration
Decree,[83] this should necessarily have the same effect, considering that DARABs jurisdiction extends to
cases involving the cancellation of CLOAs, EPs, and even of certificates of title issued by virtue of a void
EP. As this Court held in Gabriel v. Jamias:[84]
It is well-settled that the DAR, through its adjudication arm, i.e., the DARAB and its
regional and provincial adjudication boards, exercises quasi-judicial functions and
jurisdiction on all matters pertaining to an agrarian dispute or controversy and the
implementation of agrarian reform laws. Pertinently, it is provided in the DARAB Revised
Rules of Procedure that the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and
appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and related agrarian reform
laws. Such jurisdiction shall extend to cases involving the issuance, correction and
cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation
Patents which are registered with the Land Registration Authority.
This Court has had the occasion to rule that the mere issuance of an emancipation
patent does not put the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and
scrutiny. Emancipation patents may be cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and
regulations. Section 12 (g) of P.D. No. 946 (issued on June 17, 1976) vested the then Court of
Agrarian Relations with jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of emancipation
patents issued under P.D. No. 266. Exclusive jurisdiction over such cases was later lodged
with the DARAB under Section 1 of Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
For sure, the jurisdiction of the DARAB cannot be deemed to disappear the
moment a certificate of title is issued, for, such certificates are not modes of transfer of
property but merely evidence of such transfer, and there can be no valid transfer of title
should the CLOA, on which it was grounded, be void. The same holds true in the case of
a certificate of title issued by virtue of a void emancipation patent.
From the foregoing, it is therefore undeniable that it is the DARAB and not the
regular courts which has jurisdiction herein, this notwithstanding the issuance
of Torrens titles in the names of the petitioners. For, it is a fact that the
petitioners Torrens titles emanated from the emancipation patents previously issued to them
by virtue of being the farmer-beneficiaries identified by the DAR under the OLT of the
government. The DAR ruling that the said emancipation patents were erroneously issued for
failing to consider the valid retention rights of respondents had already attained finality.
Considering that the action filed by respondents with the DARAB was precisely to annul the
emancipation patents issued to the petitioners, the case squarely, therefore, falls within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB. x x x (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Inevitably, this leads to no other conclusion than that Our ruling in Heirs of Sofia Nanaman
Lonoy concerning the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of the EPs and OCTs issued in 2001 does not
bar Us from making a finding in the instant case that the EPs and OCTs issued to private respondents are,
indeed, void.
With the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to dwell on the other issues raised by the
parties.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the CAs
October 28, 2004 and September 13, 2005 Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 85471. The Emancipation
Patents and Original Certificates of Title covering the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, issued in
favor of private respondents are hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The DAR is ordered to CANCEL the aforementioned Emancipation Patents and Original
Certificates of Title erroneously issued in favor of private respondents. SO ORDERED.
33. LYNVIL FISHING ENTERPRISES VS ARIOLA
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] of the Decision[2] of the Fourteenth Division
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 95094 dated 10 September 2007, granting the Writ of Certiorari
prayed for under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure by herein respondents Andres G.
Ariola, Jessie D. Alcovendas, Jimmy B. Calinao and Leopoldo Sebullen thereby reversing the Resolution of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 31, 2004 rendered
by the National Labor Relations Commission is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In
lieu thereof, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby REINSTATED, except as to the
award of attorneys fees, which is ordered DELETED.[3]
The version of the petitioners follows:
1. Lynvil Fishing Enterprises, Inc. (Lynvil) is a company engaged in deep-sea fishing, operating
along the shores of Palawan and other outlying islands of the Philippines.[4] It is operated and managed by
Rosendo S. de Borja.
2. On 1 August 1998, Lynvil received a report from Romanito Clarido, one of its employees, that on
31 July 1998, he witnessed that while on board the company vessel Analyn VIII, Lynvil employees, namely:
Andres G. Ariola (Ariola), the captain; Jessie D. Alcovendas (Alcovendas), Chief Mate; Jimmy B. Calinao
(Calinao), Chief Engineer; Ismael G. Nubla (Nubla), cook; Elorde Baez (Baez), oiler; and Leopoldo D.
Sebullen (Sebullen), bodegero, conspired with one another and stole eight (8) tubs
of pampano and tangigue fish and delivered them to another vessel, to the prejudice of Lynvil.[5]
3. The said employees were engaged on a per trip basis or por viaje which terminates at the end of
each trip. Ariola, Alcovendas and Calinao were managerial field personnel while the rest of the crew were
field personnel.[6]
4. By reason of the report and after initial investigation, Lynvils General Manager Rosendo S. De
Borja (De Borja) summoned respondents to explain within five (5) days why they should not be dismissed
from service. However, except for Alcovendas and Baez,[7] the respondents refused to sign the receipt of the
notice.
5. Failing to explain as required, respondents employment was terminated.
6. Lynvil, through De Borja, filed a criminal complaint against the dismissed employees for violation
of P.D. 532, or the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974 before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Malabon City.[8]
7. On 12 November 1998, First Assistant City Prosecutor Rosauro Silverio found probable cause for
the indictment of the dismissed employees for the crime of qualified theft[9] under the Revised Penal Code.
On the other hand, the story of the defense is:
1. The private respondents were crew members of Lynvils vessel named Analyn VIII.[10]
2. On 31 July 1998, they arrived at the Navotas Fishport on board Analyn VIII loaded with
1,241 baeras of different kinds of fishes.These baeras were delivered to a consignee named SAS and
Royale.[11]
The following day, the private respondents reported back to Lynvil office to inquire about their new
job assignment but were told to wait for further advice. They were not allowed to board any vessel.[12]
3. On 5 August 1998, only Alcovendas and Baez received a memorandum from De Borja ordering
them to explain the incident that happened on 31 July 1998. Upon being informed about this, Ariola, Calinao,
Nubla and Sebullen went to the Lynvil office. However, they were told that their employments were already
terminated.[13]
Aggrieved, the employees filed with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission-National Capital Region on 25 August 1998 a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for
backwages, salary differential reinstatement, service incentive leave, holiday pay and its premium and
13th month pay from 1996 to1998. They also claimed for moral, exemplary damages and attorneys fees for
their dismissal with bad faith.[14]
They added that the unwarranted accusation of theft stemmed from their oral demand of increase of
salaries three months earlier and their request that they should not be required to sign a blank payroll and
vouchers.[15]
On 5 June 2002, Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. Reyes found merit in complainants charge of
illegal dismissal.[16] The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding that

complainants were illegally dismissed, ordering respondents to jointly and severally pay
complainants (a) separation pay at one half month pay for every year of service; (b)
backwages; (c) salary differential; (d) 13th month pay; and (e) attorneys fees, as follows:
1) Andres Ariola
Backwages P234,000.00
(P6,500.00 x 36 = P234,000.00)
Separation Pay P74,650.00
13th Month Pay P6,500.00

P325,250.00
2) Jessie Alcovendas
(P5,148.00 x 36 = P195,328.00)
13th Month Pay 5,538.00
Salary Differential 1,547.52

P246,717.52
3) Jimmy Calinao
(P6,500.00 x 36 = P234,000.00)
Separation Pay 55,250.00
13th Month Pay P6,500.00 P295,700.00
4) Leopoldo Sebullen
(P4, 290.00 x 36 = P154,440.00)
Salary Differential 4,472.00

P208,455.12
5) Ismael Nubla
Salary Differential P5,538.00

P265, 28.12
___________
TOTAL P 1, 341, 650.76
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.[17]
The Labor Arbiter found that there was no evidence showing that the private respondents received the
41 baeras of pampano as alleged by De Borja in his reply-affidavit; and that no proof was presented that the
8 baeras of pampano [and tangigue] were missing at the place of destination.[18]
The Labor Arbiter disregarded the Resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor Rosauro Silverio on the theft
case. He reasoned out that the Labor Office is governed by different rules for the determination of the
validity of the dismissal of employees.[19]
The Labor Arbiter also ruled that the contractual provision that the employment terminates upon the end of
each trip does not make the respondents dismissal legal. He pointed out that respondents and Lynvil did not
negotiate on equal terms because of the moral dominance of the employer.[20]
The Labor Arbiter found that the procedural due process was not complied with and that the mere notice
given to the private respondents fell short of the requirement of ample opportunity to present the employees
side.[21]
On appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission, petitioners asserted that private respondents
were only contractual employees; that they were not illegally dismissed but were accorded procedural due
process and that De Borja did not commit bad faith in dismissing the employees so as to warrant his joint
liability with Lynvil.[22]
On 31 March 2004, the NLRC reversed and set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING AND SETTING

ASIDE the Decision of the Labor Arbiter a quo and a new one entered DISMISSING the
present complaints for utter lack of merit;
However as above discussed, an administrative fine of PhP5,000.00 for each

complainant, Andres Ariola, Jessie Alcovendas, Jimmy Canilao, Leopoldo Sebullen and
Ismael Nobla or a total of PhP25,000.00 is hereby awarded.[23]
The private respondents except Elorde Baez filed a Petition for Certiorari[24] before the Court of Appeals
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC.
The Court of Appeals found merit in the petition and reinstated the Decision of the Labor Arbiter
except as to the award of attorneys fees. The appellate court held that the allegation of theft did not warrant
the dismissal of the employees since there was no evidence to prove the actual quantities of the missing
kinds of fish loaded to Analyn VIII.[25] It also reversed the finding of the NLRC that the dismissed
employees were merely contractual employees and added that they were regular ones performing activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the business and trade of Lynvil. Finally, it ruled that the
two-notice rule provided by law and jurisprudence is mandatory and non-compliance therewith rendered the
dismissal of the employees illegal.
The following are the assignment of errors presented before this Court by Lynvil:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE

ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN NASIPIT LUMBER COMPANY V.
NLRC HOLDING THAT THE FILING OF A CRIMINAL CASE BEFORE THE
PROSECUTORS OFFICE CONSTITUTES SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR A VALID
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT ON THE GROUNDS OF SERIOUS MISCONDUCT
AND/OR LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

TERMINATION OF RESPONDENTS EMPLOYMENT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT

THE RESPONDENTS EMPLOYMENT, IN ANY EVENT, WERE CONTRACTUAL IN
NATURE BEING ON A PER VOYAGE BASIS. THUS, THEIR RESPECTIVE
EMPLOYMENT TERMINATED AFTER THE END OF EACH VOYAGE
IV

RESPONDENTS WERE NOT ACCORDED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.

RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE PAYMENT OF THEIR MONEY CLAIMS.
VI
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT

PETITIONER ROSENDO S. DE BORJA IS NOT JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
FOR THE JUDGMENT WHEN THERE WAS NO FINDING OF BAD FAITH.[26]
The Courts Ruling
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Under Rule 45,[27] parties may raise only questions of law.
We are not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence introduced in and considered by the
tribunals below. Generally when supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are
conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of
the following recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. (Emphasis supplied)[28]
The contrariety of the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC prevents reliance on the principle
of special administrative expertise and provides the reason for judicial review, at first instance by the
appellate court, and on final study through the present petition.
In the first assignment of error, Lynvil contends that the filing of a criminal case before the Office of
the Prosecutor is sufficient basis for a valid termination of employment based on serious misconduct and/or
loss of trust and confidence relying on Nasipit Lumber Company v. NLRC.[29]
Nasipit is about a security guard who was charged with qualified theft which charge was dismissed
by the Office of the Prosecutor.However, despite the dismissal of the complaint, he was still terminated from
his employment on the ground of loss of confidence. We ruled that proof beyond reasonable doubt of an
employee's misconduct is not required when loss of confidence is the ground for dismissal. It is sufficient if
the employer has "some basis" to lose confidence or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe or to
entertain the moral conviction that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct and that the
nature of his participation therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded
by his position.[30] It added that the dropping of the qualified theft charges against the respondent is not
binding upon a labor tribunal.[31]
In Nicolas v. National Labor Relations Commission,[32] we held that a criminal conviction is not
necessary to find just cause for employment termination. Otherwise stated, an employees acquittal in a
criminal case, especially one that is grounded on the existence of reasonable doubt, will not preclude a
determination in a labor case that he is guilty of acts inimical to the employers interests.[33] In the reverse,
the finding of probable cause is not followed by automatic adoption of such finding by the labor tribunals.
In other words, whichever way the public prosecutor disposes of a complaint, the finding does not
bind the labor tribunal.
Thus, Lynvil cannot argue that since the Office of the Prosecutor found probable cause for theft the
Labor Arbiter must follow the finding as a valid reason for the termination of respondents employment. The
proof required for purposes that differ from one and the other are likewise different.
Nonetheless, even without reliance on the prosecutors finding, we find that there was valid cause for
respondents dismissal.
In illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the termination was for a
valid or authorized cause.[34]
Just cause is required for a valid dismissal. The Labor Code[35] provides that an employer may
terminate an employment based on fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed on the employee. Such breach
is considered willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as
distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It must also be based
on substantial evidence and not on the employers whims or caprices or suspicions otherwise, the employee
would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. Loss of confidence must not be indiscriminately used
as a shield by the employer against a claim that the dismissal of an employee was arbitrary. And, in order to
constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be work-related and shows that the
employee concerned is unfit to continue working for the employer. In addition, loss of confidence as a just
cause for termination of employment is premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of
responsibility, trust and confidence or that the employee concerned is entrusted with confidence with respect
to delicate matters, such as the handling or care and protection of the property and assets of the employer.
The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized.[36]
Breach of trust is present in this case.
We agree with the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and Court of Appeals that the quantity of tubs
expected to be received was the same as that which was loaded. However, what is material is the kind of fish
loaded and then unloaded. Sameness is likewise needed.
We cannot close our eyes to the positive and clear narration of facts of the three witnesses to the
commission of qualified theft.Jonathan Distajo, a crew member of the Analyn VIII, stated in his letter
addressed to De Borja[37] dated 8 August 1998, that while the vessel was traversing San Nicolas, Cavite, he
saw a small boat approach them. When the boat was next to their vessel, Alcovendas went inside the
stockroom while Sebullen pushed an estimated four tubs of fish away from it. Ariola, on the other hand,
served as the lookout and negotiator of the transaction. Finally, Baez and Calinao helped in putting the tubs
in the small boat. He further added that he received P800.00 as his share for the transaction. Romanito
Clarido, who was also on board the vessel, corroborated the narration of Distajo on all accounts in his 25
August 1998 affidavit.[38] He added that Alcovendas told him to keep silent about what happened on that
day. Sealing tight the credibility of the narration of theft is the affidavit [39] executed by Elorde Baez dated 3
May 1999. Baez was one of the dismissed employees who actively participated in the taking of the tubs. He
clarified in the affidavit that the four tubs taken out of the stockroom in fact contained fish taken from the
eight tubs. He further stated that Ariola told everyone in the vessel not to say anything and instead file a
labor case against the management. Clearly, we cannot fault Lynvil and De Borja when it dismissed the
employees.
The second to the fifth assignment of errors interconnect.
The nature of employment is defined in the Labor Code, thus:

Art. 280. Regular and casual employment. The provisions of written agreement to
the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding
paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service,
whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee
with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall
continue while such activity exists.
Lynvil contends that it cannot be guilty of illegal dismissal because the private respondents were
employed under a fixed-term contract which expired at the end of the voyage. The pertinent provisions of
the contract are:
xxxx
1. NA ako ay sumasang-ayon na maglingkod at gumawa ng mga gawain sang-ayon sa
patakarang por viaje na magmumula sa pagalis sa Navotas papunta sa pangisdaan at
pagbabalik sa pondohan ng lantsa sa Navotas, Metro Manila;
xxxx
1. NA ako ay nakipagkasundo na babayaran ang aking paglilingkod sa paraang por viaje
sa halagang P__________ isang biyahe ng kabuuang araw xxxx.[40]
Lynvil insists on the applicability of the case of Brent School,[41] to wit:

Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation
culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as
already observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure,
the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral
agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined therein should be
construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out: agreements
entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. It should have no application to
instances where a fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by
the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the
employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily
appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms
with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter. Unless thus
limited in its purview, the law would be made to apply to purposes other than those explicitly
stated by its framers; it thus becomes pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to
lead to absurd and unintended consequences.
Contrarily, the private respondents contend that they became regular employees by reason of their
continuous hiring and performance of tasks necessary and desirable in the usual trade and business of
Lynvil.
Jurisprudence,[42] laid two conditions for the validity of a fixed-contract agreement between the
employer and employee:
First, the fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by
the parties without any force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon
the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or
Second, it satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt with each
other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by the former
or the latter.[43]
Textually, the provision that: NA ako ay sumasang-ayon na maglingkod at gumawa ng mga gawain
sang-ayon sa patakarang por viaje na magmumula sa pagalis sa Navotas papunta sa pangisdaan at
pagbabalik sa pondohan ng lantsa sa Navotas, Metro Manila is for a fixed period of employment. In the
context, however, of the facts that: (1) the respondents were doing tasks necessarily to Lynvils fishing
business with positions ranging from captain of the vessel to bodegero; (2) after the end of a trip, they will
again be hired for another trip with new contracts; and (3) this arrangement continued for more than ten
years, the clear intention is to go around the security of tenure of the respondents as regular employees. And
respondents are so by the express provisions of the second paragraph of Article 280, thus:
xxx Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such
service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the
activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity
exists.
The same set of circumstances indicate clearly enough that it was the need for a continued source of income
that forced the employees acceptance of the por viaje provision.
Having found that respondents are regular employees who may be, however, dismissed for cause as
we have so found in this case, there is a need to look into the procedural requirement of due process in
Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code.It is required that the employer
furnish the employee with two written notices: (1) a written notice served on the employee specifying the
ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to
explain his side; and (2) a written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.
From the records, there was only one written notice which required respondents to explain within
five (5) days why they should not be dismissed from the service. Alcovendas was the only one who signed
the receipt of the notice. The others, as claimed by Lynvil, refused to sign. The other employees argue that
no notice was given to them. Despite the inconsistencies, what is clear is that no final written notice or
notices of termination were sent to the employees.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the elements of [due] process in cases of
employee's dismissal. The requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of the
employer's intent to dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal. Upon the other hand, the requirement
of hearing affords the employee an opportunity to answer his employer's charges against him and
accordingly, to defend himself therefrom before dismissal is effected.[44] Obviously, the second written
notice, as indispensable as the first, is intended to ensure the observance of due process.
Applying the rule to the facts at hand, we grant a monetary award of P50,000.00 as nominal damages, this,
pursuant to the fresh ruling of this Court in Culili v. Eastern Communication Philippines, Inc.[45] Due to the
failure of Lynvil to follow the procedural requirement of two-notice rule, nominal damages are due to
respondents despite their dismissal for just cause.
Given the fact that their dismissal was for just cause, we cannot grant backwages and separation pay
to respondents. However, following the findings of the Labor Arbiter who with the expertise presided over
the proceedings below, which findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, we grant the 13 th month pay
and salary differential of the dismissed employees.
Whether De Borja is jointly and severally liable with Lynvil
As to the last issue, this Court has ruled that in labor cases, the corporate directors and officers are
solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of employment of employees done with malice or in
bad faith.[46] Indeed, moral damages are recoverable when the dismissal of an employee is attended by bad
faith or fraud or constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is done in a manner contrary to good morals, good
customs or public policy.
It has also been discussed in MAM Realty Development Corporation v. NLRC[47] that:
x x x A corporation being a juridical entity, may act only through its directors, officers and
employees. Obligations incurred by them, acting as such corporate agents, are not theirs but
the direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent. True, solidary liabilities may at
times be incurred but only when exceptional circumstances warrant such as, generally, in the
following cases:
1. When directors and trustees or, in appropriate cases, the officers of a corporation:
xxx
(b) act in bad faith or with gross negligence in directing the corporate affairs;
x x x [48]
The term "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some
motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose."[49]
We agree with the ruling of both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals when they pronounced that there was
no evidence on record that indicates commission of bad faith on the part of De Borja. He is the general
manager of Lynvil, the one tasked with the supervision by the employees and the operation of the
business. However, there is no proof that he imposed on the respondents the por viaje provision for purpose
of effecting their summary dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The 10 September 2007 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 95094 reversing the Resolution dated 31 March 2004 of the National Labor
Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED. The Court hereby rules that the employees were dismissed
for just cause by Lynvil Fishing Enterprises, Inc. and Rosendo S. De Borja, hence, the reversal of the award
for backwages and separation pay. However, we affirm the award for 13th month pay, salary differential and
grant an additional P50,000.00 in favor of the employees representing nominal damages for petitioners
non-compliance with statutory due process. No cost.
34. HON. WALDO Q. FLORES VS MONTEMAYOR
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a Rule 45 petition assailing the October 19, 2005 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 84254. The appellate court, in the said decision, had reversed and set aside the March 23,
2004 Decision[2] and May 13, 2004 Resolution[3] of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 03-1-581
finding respondent Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor administratively liable as charged and dismissing him from
government service.
The facts follow.

Respondent Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor was appointed by the President as Regional Director II of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Region IV, in San Fernando, Pampanga.
On January 30, 2003, the Office of the President received a letter from a concerned citizen dated January 20,
2003 relating Montemayors ostentatious lifestyle which is apparently disproportionate to his income as a
public official. The letter was referred to Dario C. Rama, Chairman of the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) for appropriate action.[4] The Investigating Office of the PAGC immediately
conducted a fact-finding inquiry into the matter and issued subpoenas duces tecum to the responsible
personnel of the BIR and the Land Transportation Office (LTO). In compliance with the subpoena, BIR
Personnel Division Chief Estelita Datu submitted to the PAGC a copy of Montemayors appointment papers
along with a certified true copy of the latters Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) for the year
2002. Meanwhile, the LTO, through its Records Section Chief, Ms. Arabelle O. Petilla, furnished the PAGC
with a record of vehicles registered to Montemayor, to wit: a 2001 Ford Expedition, a 1997 Toyota Land
Cruiser, and a 1983 Mitsubishi Galant.[5]
During the pendency of the investigation, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, a media
organization which had previously published an article on the unexplained wealth of certain BIR officials, also
submitted to the PAGC copies of Montemayors SSAL for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001.[6] In Montemayors
1999 and 2000 SSAL, the PAGC noted that Montemayor declared his ownership over several motor vehicles,
but failed to do the same in his 2001 SSAL.[7]
On the basis of the said documents, the PAGC issued a Formal Charge[8] against Montemayor on May 19, 2003
for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019[9] in relation to Section 8 (A) of RA No. 6713[10] due to
his failure to declare the 2001 Ford Expedition with a value ranging from 1.7 million to 1.9 million pesos, and the
1997 Toyota Land Cruiser with an estimated value of 1 million to 1.2 million pesos in his 2001[11] and
2002[12] SSAL. The charge was docketed as PAGC-ADM-0149-03. On the same date, the PAGC issued an
Order[13] directing Montemayor to file his counter-affidavit or verified answer to the formal charge against him
within ten (10) days from the receipt of the Order. Montemayor, however, failed to submit his counter-affidavit
or verified answer to the formal charge lodged against him.
On June 4, 2003, during the preliminary conference, Montemayor, through counsel, moved for the
deferment of the administrative proceedings explaining that he has filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA[14] questioning the PAGCs jurisdiction to conduct the administrative investigation against him. The
PAGC denied Montemayors motion for lack of merit, and instead gave him until June 9, 2003 to submit his
counter-affidavit or verified answer.[15] Still, no answer was filed.
On June 23, 2003, the CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77285
enjoining the PAGC from proceeding with the investigation for sixty (60) days. [16] On September 12, 2003,
shortly after the expiration of the sixty (60)-day TRO, the PAGC issued a Resolution[17] finding
Montemayor administratively liable as charged and recommending to the Office of the President
Montemayors dismissal from the service.
On March 23, 2004, the Office of the President, through Deputy Executive Secretary Arthur P. Autea, issued
a Decision adopting in toto the findings and recommendation of the PAGC. The pertinent portion of the
Decision reads:
After a circumspect study of the case, this Office fully agrees with the recommendation of
PAGC and the legal premises as well as the factual findings that hold it together. Respondent
failed to disclose in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL high-priced vehicles in breach of the
prescription of the relevant provisions of RA No. 3019 in relation to RA No. 6713. He was,
to be sure, afforded ample opportunity to explain his failure, but he opted to let the
opportunity pass by.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Antonio F. Montemayor is hereby found

administratively liable as charged and, as recommended by PAGC, meted the penalty of
dismissal from the service, with all accessory penalties.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Montemayor sought reconsideration of the said decision.[19] This time, he argued that he was denied his right
to due process when the PAGC proceeded to investigate his case notwithstanding the pendency of his
petition for certiorari before the CA, and its subsequent elevation to the Supreme Court.[20] The motion was
eventually denied.[21]
Aggrieved, Montemayor brought the matter to the CA via a petition for review[22] under Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. He made the following assertions: first, that the PAGC exceeded its
authority when it recommended that he be dismissed from government service since the power to investigate
does not necessarily carry with it the power to impose penalty unless the same was expressly
granted; second, that the PAGC grossly violated his right to due process of law when it did not give him the
opportunity to present his countervailing evidence to the charges against him; third, that the PAGC cannot
validly proceed with the investigation of the charges against him on the basis of an unverified anonymous
letter-complaint without any supporting documents attached thereto, contrary to the requirement of Section 4
(c) of Executive Order (EO) No. 12;[23] fourth, that it was an error for the Office of the President to hold him
liable for violation of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 and Section 8 (A) of RA No. 6713 since the SSAL should
reflect assets and liabilities acquired in the preceding year; and fifth, that the assailed PAGC Resolution was
not supported by substantial evidence.
As aforesaid, the CA in its assailed Decision dated October 19, 2005, ruled in favor of Montemayor. The CA
concluded that Montemayor was deprived of an opportunity to present controverting evidence amounting to
a brazen denial of his right to due process.
Hence, petitioners now appeal the matter before us raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER PETITIONER PAGC HAD A CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO

ACCORD RESPONDENT A SECOND OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE IN PAGC-ADM-0149-03 AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE TRO
ISSUED IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 77285.
II. WHETHER THE MERE PENDENCY OF CA-G.R. SP NO. 77285 WAS A
LEGAL GROUND FOR RESPONDENTS REFUSAL TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
IN [PAGC]-ADM-0149-03.
III. WHETHER THE ALLEGED UNDUE HASTE AND APPARENT

PRECIPITATION OF PROCEEDINGS IN [PAGC]-ADM-0149-03 HAD
RENDERED THE SAME INFIRM.
IV. WHETHER RESPONDENT HAD COMMITTED A MAJOR ADMINISTRATIVE

INFRACTION WARRANTING DISMISSAL FROM [GOVERNMENT] SERVICE.
V. WHETHER THE [OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENTS] DETERMINATION

THAT RESPONDENT COMMITTED THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE
CHARGED IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
VI. WHETHER THE PAGC HAD AUTHORITY TO RECOMMEND TO THE

PRESIDENT THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL, FOLLOWING ITS
INVESTIGATION INITIATED BY AN ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT, AND
DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF ANOTHER INVESTIGATION FOR THE SAME
OFFENSE BEFORE THE [OFFICE OF THE] OMBUDSMAN.[24]
The issues may be summarized as follows:
I. WHETHER RESPONDENT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE

PROCESS WHEN IT PROCEEDED TO INVESTIGATE HIM ON THE BASIS OF
AN ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT, AND ALLEGEDLY WITHOUT
AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN HIS DEFENSE;
II. WHETHER THE PAGC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RECOMMEND

RESPONDENTS DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE;
III. WHETHER THE ASSUMPTION BY THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

OF ITS JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE RESPONDENT FOR THE SAME
OFFENSE DEPRIVED THE PAGC [WITH ITS JURISDICTION] FROM
PROCEEDING WITH ITS INVESTIGATION; AND
IV. WHETHER THE PAGCS RECOMMENDATION WAS SUPPORTED BY

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
We discuss the first three (3) issues jointly as these involve procedural aspects.
The PAGC was created by virtue of EO No. 12, signed on April 16, 2001 to speedily address the problem on
corruption and abuses committed in the government, particularly by officials appointed by the President.
Under Section 4 (b) of EO No. 12, the PAGC has the power to investigate and hear administrative
complaints provided (1) that the official to be investigated must be a presidential appointee in the
government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, and (2) that the said official must be occupying the
position of assistant regional director, or an equivalent rank, or higher.[25]
Respondent contends that he was deprived of his right to due process when the PAGC proceeded to
investigate him on the basis of an anonymous complaint in the absence of any documents supporting the
complainants assertions.
Section 4 (c) of EO No. 12, however, states that the PAGC has the power to give due course to anonymous
complaints against presidential appointees if there appears on the face of the complaint or based on the
supporting documents attached to the anonymous complaint a probable cause to engender a belief that the
allegations may be true.[26] The use of the conjunctive word or in the said provision is determinative since it
empowers the PAGC to exercise discretion in giving due course to anonymous complaints. Because of the said
provision, an anonymous complaint may be given due course even if the same is without supporting documents,
so long as it appears from the face of the complaint that there is probable cause. The clear implication of the said
provision is intent to empower the PAGC in line with the Presidents objective of eradicating corruption among a
particular line of government officials, i.e., those directly appointed by her. Absent the conjunctive word or, the
PAGCs authority to conduct investigations based on anonymous complaints will be very limited. It will decimate
the said administrative body into a toothless anti-corruption agency and will inevitably undermine the Chief
Executives disciplinary power.
Respondent also assails the PAGCs decision to proceed with the investigation process without giving him
the opportunity to present controverting evidence.
The argument is without merit.
We find nothing irregular with the PAGCs decision to proceed with its investigation notwithstanding the
pendency of Montemayors petition for certiorari before the CA. The filing of a petition for certiorari with
the CA did not divest the PAGC of its jurisdiction validly acquired over the case before it. Elementary is the
rule that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a case pending
before a lower court or an administrative body such as the PAGC, does not interrupt the course of the latter
where there is no writ of injunction restraining it.[27] For as long as no writ of injunction or restraining order
is issued in the special civil action for certiorari, no impediment exists, and nothing prevents the PAGC
from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending before its office. [28]And even if such
injunctive writ or order is issued, the PAGC continues to retain jurisdiction over the principal action [29] until
the question on jurisdiction is finally determined.
In the case at bar, a sixty (60)-day TRO was issued by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 77285. However, barely a
week after the lapse of the TRO, the PAGC issued its resolution finding Montemayor administratively liable
and recommending to the Office of the President his dismissal from government service. The CA believes
that there has been undue haste and apparent precipitation in the PAGCs investigation proceedings. [30] It
notes with disapproval the fact that it was barely eight (8) days after the TRO had lapsed that the PAGC
issued the said resolution and explains that respondent should have been given a second chance to present
evidence prior to proceeding with the issuance of the said resolution.[31]
We beg to disagree with the appellate courts observation.

First, it must be remembered that the PAGCs act of issuing the assailed resolution enjoys the presumption of
regularity particularly since it was done in the performance of its official duties. Mere surmises and
conjectures, absent any proof whatsoever, will not tilt the balance against the presumption, if only to provide
constancy in the official acts of authorized government personnel and officials. Simply put, the timing of the
issuance of the assailed PAGC resolution by itself cannot be used to discredit, much less nullify, what
appears on its face to be a regular performance of the PAGCs duties.
Second, Montemayors argument, as well as the CAs observation that respondent was not afforded a second
opportunity to present controverting evidence, does not hold water. The essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.[32] So long as the party is given the opportunity to explain his side, the
requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with.[33]
Significantly, the records show that the PAGC issued an order informing Montemayor of the formal charge
filed against him and gave him ten (10) days within which to present a counter-affidavit or verified
answer.[34] When the said period lapsed without respondent asking for an extension, the PAGC gave
Montemayor a fresh ten (10)-day period to file his answer,[35] but the latter chose to await the decision of the
CA in his petition for certiorari.[36] During the preliminary conference, Montemayor was again informed
that he is given a new ten (10)-day period, or until June 19, 2003 within which to file his
memorandum/position paper as well as supporting evidence with a warning that if he still fails to do so, the
complaint shall be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of available documentary evidence on
record.[37]Again, the deadline lapsed without any evidence being presented by Montemayor in his defense.
We stress that the PAGCs findings and recommendations remain as recommendations until finally acted
upon by the Office of the President. Montemayor, therefore, had two (2) choices upon the issuance of the
PAGC resolution: to move for a reconsideration thereof, or to ask for another opportunity before the Office
of the President to present his side particularly since the assailed resolution is merely recommendatory in
nature. Having failed to exercise any of these two (2) options, Montemayor cannot now be allowed to seek
recourse before this Court for the consequences of his own shortcomings.
Desperately, Montemayor contends that the authority of the PAGC to investigate him administratively, as well
as the power of the Office of the President to act on the PAGCs recommendation, had already ceased
following the initiation and filing of the administrative and criminal cases against him by the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman).[38] He points out that the Ombudsman is mandated by Section 15, paragraph (1)
of RA No. 6770[39] to take over the investigation and prosecution of the charges filed
against him.[40]
We are still not persuaded.
The cases filed against respondent before the Ombudsman were initiated after the Office of the President
decided to dismiss Montemayor.[41]More importantly, the proceedings before the PAGC were already
finished even prior to the initiation and filing of cases against him by the Ombudsman. In fact, it was the
PAGCs findings and recommendations which served as the basis in the Office of the Presidents decision to
dismiss Montemayor from government service. Clearly then, the exercise by the Office of the President of
its concurrent investigatory and prosecutorial power over Montemayor had already been terminated even
before the Ombudsman could take cognizance over the matter. The Ombudsman, therefore, cannot take over
a task that is already a fait accompli.
As to the substantive aspect, i.e., whether the PAGCs recommendation to dismiss Montemayor from government
service is supported by substantial evidence, we find in favor of petitioners.
Montemayors argument that he did not deliberately omit to declare the 2001 Ford Expedition in his 2001 SSAL
and the 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL fails to persuade us. Even if a motor vehicle was
acquired through chattel mortgage, it is a government employees ethical and legal obligation to declare and
include the same in his SSAL. Montemayor cannot wiggle his way out of the mess he has himself created since
he knows for a fact that every asset acquired by a civil servant must be declared in the SSAL. The law requires
that the SSAL be accomplished truthfully and in detail without distinction as to how the property was acquired.
Montemayor, therefore, cannot escape liability by arguing that the ownership of the 2001 Ford Expedition has
not yet passed to him on the basis of a lame excuse that the said vehicle was acquired only on installment basis
sometime on July 3, 2001.[42]
Montemayor also argues that even if ownership of the said vehicle had been transferred to him upon acquisition,
the vehicle was sold to another person on December 15, 2002;[43] hence, there is no need to declare it in his 2001
SSAL. Respondents reasoning is anemic and convoluted. It is evasive of the fact that the said vehicle was not
reported in his 2001 SSAL. Notably, the acquisition value of the 2001 Ford Expedition was P1,599,000.00[44] is
significantly greater than the amount declared by Montemayor under machinery/equipment,
worth P1,321,212.50, acquired by him as of December 31, 2001,[45] and to the P1,251,675.00 worth of
machinery/ equipment acquired by him as of December 31, 2002.[46]This belies Montemayors claim that the said
vehicle has been included among the machinery/equipment assets he declared in his 2001 and 2002
SSAL.[47] Neither did Montemayor satisfactorily reflect the P1,000,000.00 that has come to his hands as payment
for the alleged sale of his 2001 Ford Expedition in his 2002 SSAL.[48]
Respondent apparently fails to understand that the SSAL is not a mere scrap of paper. The law requires that
the SSAL must be accomplished as truthfully, as detailed and as accurately as possible. The filing thereof
not later than the first fifteen (15) days of April at the close of every calendar year must not be treated as a
simple and trivial routine, but as an obligation that is part and parcel of every civil servants duty to the
people. It serves as the basis of the government and the people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of
officials and employees in the government in compliance with the Constitutional policy to eradicate
corruption,[49] promote transparency in government,[50] and ensure that all government employees and
officials lead just and modest lives.[51] It is for this reason that the SSAL must be sworn to and is made
accessible to the public, subject to reasonable administrative regulations.
Montemayors repeated and consistent failure to reflect truthfully and adequately all his assets and liabilities
in his SSAL betrays his claim of innocence and good faith. Accordingly, we find that the penalty of
dismissal from government service, as sanctioned by Section 11 (a) and (b) of RA No. 6713,[52] meted by the
Office of the President against him, is proper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated October 19, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84254 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the March 23,
2004 Decision and the May 13, 2004 Resolution of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 03-1-581
are REINSTATED and UPHELD.
Respondent Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor is hereby DISMISSED from government service.
G.R. No. 191224
35. MONICO K. IMPERIAL, JR.

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM.
CONCURRING OPINION
CORONA, C.J.:
Petitioner Monico K. Imperial, Jr. was charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service. The case against him was based on his approval as branch manager of the
Naga Field Office of respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) of the requests for salary
loan of eight GSIS Naga Field Office employees who lacked the contribution requirements under GSIS
Policy and Procedural Guidelines (PPG) No. 153-99. In so doing, he allegedly gave unwarranted benefits
through evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross negligence, and caused injury to the pension fund. He
was subsequently found guilty of grave misconduct. He was ordered dismissed from the service with the
accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of eligibility, perpetual disqualification
from re-employment in the government service and prohibition from taking any civil service examination.
Petitioner cries injustice and denial of due process as the venue was transferred to Legazpi City when GSIS
rules clearly provided that the hearings should have been in the GSIS main office. He also denies
administrative liability. He claims that he acted in good faith because his action on the subject loans was
made relying on the common practice of branch managers and with clearance from a ranking officer of the
GSIS. He further points out that there was no damage whatsoever to the GSIS as the subject loans were not
only cleared by the Commission on Audit (COA) but were also repaid in full together with interest.
The ponencia partially grants the present petition, modifies the decision of the Court of Appeals, finds
petitioner guilty of simple misconduct and orders his suspension.
I agree with the ponencia that there is no merit to petitioner’s claim of denial of due process. He was duly
notified of the charges against him and he was heard as to his defenses. I also join the ponencia in finding
that, based on the evidence presented in this case, petitioner should be held liable for simple misconduct
only.
The ponencia ably discussed the factual and legal basis of the Court’s action in this case. Nonetheless, I
submit this concurrence to express my views on the matter.
The GSIS and CSC anchored their finding of petitioner’s alleged grave misconduct on petitioner’s act of
approving the applications for salary loans of eight GSIS Naga Field Office employees who lacked the
contribution requirements under GSIS PPG No. 153-99. This, to my view, is insufficient to hold petitioner
liable for the serious administrative offense of grave misconduct.
There is no question that GSIS PPG No. 153-99 lays down the guidelines governing the grant of salary loans,
including contribution requirements. Thus, there is also no argument that non-compliance with GSIS PPG
No. 153-99 constitutes misconduct, a "transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in
judgment."1
While misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose, it does not necessarily imply corruption,2 the element which qualifies
misconduct as grave misconduct. Thus, unless there is substantial evidence of corruption, the transgression
of an established rule is properly characterized as simple misconduct only.
Indeed, simple misconduct is distinct and separate from grave misconduct.3 In grave misconduct, as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifest.4 A public officer shall be liable for grave misconduct only
when the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are
manifest.5 These qualifying elements must also be established by substantial evidence,6 separate from the
showing of the misconduct itself. Here, as already explained earlier, the administrative agencies considered
the act constituting the misconduct, that is, the non-observance of GSIS PPG No. 153-99, as the very same
proof of the qualifying element of flagrant disregard of an established rule.
Petitioner may not successfully evade liability by invoking an alleged practice, based on previous policy and
procedural guidelines, among branch managers to approve applications for salary loan (though lacking in
contribution requirement). That practice, assuming it existed, cannot override the clear provisions of GSIS
PPG No. 153-99. Neither may petitioner successfully rely on the clearance given by then GSIS Vice
President Romeo Quilatan for him to approve the subject salary loans. Quilatan had no authority to overrule
the requirements of GSIS PPG No. 153-99.
Nevertheless, while these two circumstances did not exculpate him from any administrative liability, they
tended to show that petitioner did not willfully violate GSIS PPG No. 153-99 and that he did not flagrantly
disregard existing rules. On the contrary, they evinced good faith on the part of petitioner and negated the
elements that would have qualified his misconduct as a grave misconduct. In fact, they support the view that
there exists no such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the
conclusion that petitioner had the clear intent to violate GSIS PPG No. 153-99 or to flagrantly disregard it.
In fact, the GSIS decision itself indicates that the GSIS doubted whether it properly characterized
petitioner’s offense as grave misconduct. In imposing the penalty of dismissal for grave misconduct on
petitioner, the GSIS raised the matter of petitioner’s previous administrative liability for gross neglect of
duty and used this circumstance to justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal "as maximum penalty"
for grave misconduct.7 However, the GSIS did not need to invoke this circumstance if it was indeed sure of
its finding that petitioner committed grave misconduct. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service,8 grave misconduct is a grave offense which merits the supreme penalty of
dismissal even if committed for the first time.
The way I see it, the GSIS was in doubt of its own finding of grave misconduct on the part of petitioner.
This doubt should be resolved in favor of petitioner.
In Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) v. Organo,9 respondent Lilia B. Organo, a revenue collection officer of
the BIR Revenue Region 7, Quezon City, was charged with grave misconduct for receiving without proper
authority withholding tax returns with corresponding check payments from several taxpayers. She
subsequently delivered them to a BIR revenue clerk who was also not authorized to receive the same. The
check payments were subsequently deposited in an authorized BIR account with the Land Bank of the
Philippines.
Thereafter, checks were issued to different payees in various amounts drawn against the funds of the said
unauthorized
BIR account and were subsequently encashed to the damage and prejudice of the government. 10 While the
Office of the Ombudsman found Organo liable for grave misconduct as her acts violated Revenue
Regulations No. 4-93, the Court held that she only committed simple misconduct as the qualifying element
of flagrancy was not established.11
Following BIR v. Organo therefore, absent any substantial evidence of corruption or flagrancy independent
of the
substantial evidence of petitioner’s misconduct of non-compliance with GSIS PPG No. 153-99, petitioner
should be held liable for simple misconduct only.
While the penalty provided by the Civil Service Rules for the first offense of simple misconduct is
suspension for one month and one day to six months,12 the records of the case show that this is not his first
administrative offense. He was suspended for one year in Administrative Case No. 04-06 for gross neglect
of duty. And while dismissal is the penalty for the commission of simple misconduct for the second time,13
still petitioner cannot be meted that extreme penalty because his first offense was not for simple misconduct.
Dismissal is imposed where both the second and first offenses are for simple misconduct.
Moreover, it is significant to note here that the loans subject of this case, including the interest thereon, were
all fully settled. The said loans were also cleared by the COA. Thus, any damage to the GSIS would have
been completely negligible at best. Coupled with petitioner’s reliance in good
faith on the then existing common practice of GSIS branch managers and the prior clearance given by his
superior, the totality of the circumstances merit a more lenient treatment of petitioner’s misconduct. In
addition, his 40 years in government service should not be simply ignored but should be taken in his favor as
a mitigating factor, given that there was never any hint or accusation of corruption or flagrancy against him.
Finally, petitioner was one of the prominent leaders of the almost daily protest rallies and demonstrations
against the GSIS management at that time. There was clearly a deep-seated resentment against him because
of that. That triggered the filing of administrative charges against petitioner, including those which led to
this case. The Court must not allow itself to be used as an instrument of personal vendetta.
In view of the above considerations, as well as for considerations of justice and equity, petitioner should just
be deemed suspended for the entire duration of the pendency of this case, reckoned from his receipt of the
GSIS resolution dated June 6, 2007 which denied his motion for reconsideration. In other words, his
suspension for more than four years ought to be more than sufficient penalty for his administrative
transgression.
Accordingly, I vote that the petition be GRANTED in PART. The decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the respective resolution and decision of the Civil Service Commission and the
Government Service Insurance System finding petitioner Monico K, Imperial, Jr. guilty of grave misconduct
and dismissing him from the service with all the accessory penalties, should be MODIFIED insofar as
petitioner should be found guilty of simple misconduct only and considered as SUSPENDED for the entire
duration of the pendency of this case, reckoned from his receipt of the GSIS resolution dated June 6, 2007.
N BANC
36. CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,

G.R. No. 184869
ABAD, J.:
This case concerns the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation that takes property from a
state university, over its objections, for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities.
The Facts and the Case
Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered educational institution owned and run
by the State.[1] In 1958, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401 hectares of lands
of the public domain in Musuan, Bukidnon, as school site for CMU. Eventually, CMU obtained title in its
name over 3,080 hectares of those lands under Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) 0-160, 0-161, and
0-162. Meanwhile, the government distributed more than 300 hectares of the remaining untitled lands to
several tribes belonging to the areas cultural communities.
Forty-five years later or on January 7, 2003 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 310 that takes 670 hectares from CMUs registered lands for distribution to indigenous peoples
and cultural communities in Barangay Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon.
On April 3, 2003, however, CMU filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Executive Secretary,
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Chairperson and Commissioner of the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and Lead Convenor of the National Anti-Poverty
Commission (collectively, NCIP, et al) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City (Branch
9), seeking to stop the implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310 and have it declared
unconstitutional.
The NCIP, et al moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay
RTC over the action, pointing out that since the act sought to be enjoined relates to an official act of the
Executive Department done in Manila, jurisdiction lies with the Manila RTC. The Malaybalay RTC denied
the motion, however, and proceeded to hear CMUs application for preliminary injunction. Meanwhile,
respondents NCIP, et al moved for partial reconsideration of the RTCs order denying their motion to
dismiss.
On October 27, 2003, after hearing the preliminary injunction incident, the RTC issued a resolution
granting NCIP, et als motion for partial reconsideration and dismissed CMUs action for lack of
jurisdiction. Still, the RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional, being a valid State
act. The RTC said that the ultimate owner of the lands is the State and that CMU merely held the same in its
behalf. CMU filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but the RTC denied the same on April 19,
2004. This prompted CMU to appeal the RTCs dismissal order to the Court of Appeals (CA) Mindanao
Station.[2]
CMU raised two issues in its appeal: 1) whether or not the RTC deprived it of its right to due process
when it dismissed the action; and 2) whether or not Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional.[3]
In a March 14, 2008 decision,[4] the CA dismissed CMUs appeal for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that
CMUs recourse should have been a petition for review on certiorari filed directly with this Court, because it
raised pure questions lawbearing mainly on the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310. The CA
added that whether the trial court can decide the merits of the case based solely on the hearings of the
motion to dismiss and the application for injunction is also a pure question of law.
CMU filed a motion for reconsideration of the CAs order of dismissal but it denied the
[5]
same, prompting CMU to file the present petition for review.
The Issues Presented
The case presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not finding that the RTC erred in dismissing its action for
prohibition against NCIP, et al for lack of jurisdiction and at the same time ruling that Presidential
Proclamation 310 is valid and constitutional;
2. Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed CMUs appeal on the ground that it raised purely
questions of law that are proper for a petition for review filed directly with this Court; and
3. Whether or not Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and constitutional.
The Courts Rulings

One. The RTC invoked two reasons for dismissing CMUs action. The first is that jurisdiction over
the action to declare Presidential Proclamation 310 lies with the RTC of Manila, not the RTC of Malaybalay
City, given that such action relates to official acts of the Executive done in Manila. The second reason,
presumably made on the assumption that the Malaybalay RTC had jurisdiction over the action, Presidential
Proclamation 310 was valid and constitutional since the State, as ultimate owner of the subject lands, has the
right to dispose of the same for some purpose other than CMUs use.
There is nothing essentially wrong about a court holding on the one hand that it has no jurisdiction
over a case, and on the other, based on an assumption that it has jurisdiction, deciding the case on its merits,
both with the same results, which is the dismissal of the action. At any rate, the issue of the propriety of the
RTC using two incompatible reasons for dismissing the action is academic. The CA from which the present
petition was brought dismissed CMUs appeal on some technical ground.
Two. Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980[6] vests in the CA appellate
jurisdiction over the final judgments or orders of the RTCs and quasi-judicial bodies. But where an appeal
from the RTC raises purely questions of law, recourse should be by a petition for review on certiorari filed
directly with this Court. The question in this case is whether or not CMUs appeal from the RTCs order of
dismissal raises purely questions of law.
As already stated, CMU raised two grounds for its appeal: 1) the RTC deprived it of its right to due
process when it dismissed the action; and 2) Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional. Did these
grounds raise factual issues that are proper for the CA to hear and adjudicate?
Regarding the first reason, CMUs action was one for injunction against the implementation of
Presidential Proclamation 310 that authorized the taking of lands from the university. The fact that the
President issued this proclamation in Manila and that it was being enforced in Malaybalay City where the
lands were located were facts that were not in issue. These were alleged in the complaint and presumed to be
true by the motion to dismiss. Consequently, the CMUs remedy for assailing the correctness of the dismissal,
involving as it did a pure question of law, indeed lies with this Court.
As to the second reason, the CMU claimed that the Malaybalay RTC deprived it of its right to due
process when it dismissed the case based on the ground that Presidential Proclamation 310, which it
challenged, was constitutional. CMU points out that the issue of the constitutionality of the proclamation
had not yet been properly raised and heard. NCIP, et al had not yet filed an answer to join issue with CMU
on that score. What NCIP, et al filed was merely a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of
the Malaybalay RTC over the injunction case. Whether the RTC in fact prematurely decided the
constitutionality of the proclamation, resulting in the denial of CMUs right to be heard on the same, is a
factual issue that was proper for the CA Mindanao Station to hear and ascertain from the
parties.Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the action on the ground that it raised pure questions of
law.
Three. Since the main issue of the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310 has been raised
and amply argued before this Court, it would serve no useful purpose to have the case remanded to the CA
Mindanao Station or to the Malaybalay RTC for further proceedings. Ultimately, the issue of
constitutionality of the Proclamation in question will come to this Court however the courts below decide
it. Consequently, the Court should, to avoid delay and multiplicity of suits, now resolve the same.
The key question lies in the character of the lands taken from CMU. In CMU v. Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),[7] the DARAB, a national government agency charged with
taking both privately-owned and government-owned agricultural lands for distribution to
farmers-beneficiaries, ordered the segregation for this purpose of 400 hectares of CMU lands. The Court
nullified the DARAB action considering the inalienable character of such lands, being part of the long term
functions of an autonomous agricultural educational institution. Said the Court:
The construction given by the DARAB to Section 10 restricts the land area of the
CMU to its present needs or to a land area presently, actively exploited and utilized by
the university in carrying out its present educational program with its present student
population and academic facility overlooking the very significant factor of growth of the
university in the years to come. By the nature of the CMU, which is a school established
to promote agriculture and industry, the need for a vast tract of agricultural land for
future programs of expansion is obvious. At the outset, the CMU was conceived in the
same manner as land grant colleges in America, a type of educational institution which
blazed the trail for the development of vast tracts of unexplored and undeveloped
agricultural lands in the Mid-West. What we now know
as Michigan State University, Penn State University and Illinois State University,
started as small land grant colleges, with meager funding to support their ever
increasing educational programs. They were given extensive tracts of agricultural and
forest lands to be developed to support their numerous expanding activities in the fields
of agricultural technology and scientific research. Funds for the support of the
educational programs of land grant colleges came from government appropriation,
tuition and other student fees, private endowments and gifts, and earnings from
miscellaneous sources. It was in this same spirit that President Garcia issued
Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for
the Mindanao Agricultural College (forerunner of the CMU) a land reservation of 3,080
hectares as its future campus. It was set up in Bukidnon, in the hinterlands of Mindanao,
in order that it can have enough resources and wide open spaces to grow as an
agricultural educational institution, to develop and train future farmers
of Mindanao and help attract settlers to that part of the country.
xxxx
The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly among the
highest priorities in the government socio-economic programs. In this case, neither need
give way to the other. Certainly, there must still be vast tracts of agricultural land in
Mindanao outside the CMU land reservation which can be made available to landless
peasants, assuming the claimants here, or some of them, can qualify as CARP
beneficiaries. To our mind, the taking of the CMU land which had been segregated for
educational purposes for distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries is a gross
misinterpretation of the authority and jurisdiction granted by law to the DARAB.
The decision in this case is of far-reaching significance as far as it concerns state

colleges and universities whose resources and research facilities may be gradually
eroded by misconstruing the exemptions from the CARP. These state colleges and
universities are the main vehicles for our scientific and technological advancement in
the field of agriculture, so vital to the existence, growth and development of this
country.[8]
It did not matter that it was President Arroyo who, in this case, attempted by proclamation to
appropriate the lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities. As already stated, the
lands by their character have become inalienable from the moment President Garcia dedicated them for
CMUs use in scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture. They have ceased to be
alienable public lands.
Besides, when Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) or Republic Act
8371[9] in 1997, it provided in Section 56 that property rights within the ancestral domains already existing
and/or vested upon its effectivity shall be recognized and respected. In this case, ownership over the subject
lands had been vested in CMU as early as 1958. Consequently, transferring the lands in 2003 to the
indigenous peoples around the area is not in accord with the IPRA.
Furthermore, the land registration court considered the claims of several tribes belonging to the areas
cultural communities in the course of the proceedings for the titling of the lands in CMUs name. Indeed,
eventually, only 3,080 hectares were titled in CMUs name under OCTs 0-160, 0-161 and 0-162. More than
300 hectares were acknowledged to be in the possession of and subject to the claims of those tribes.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the March 14, 2008 decision and
September 22, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 85456, and DECLARES Presidential
Proclamation 310 as null and void for being contrary to law and public policy.
37. ATTY. ROMEO L. ERECE VS MACALINGAY, G.R. No. 166809
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
promulgated on January 7, 2005 affirming the Decision of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which
found petitioner Atty. Romeo L. Erece guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner is the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) Region I, whose
office is located in San Fernando City, La Union. Respondent employees of the CHR Region I filed an
Affidavit-Complaint dated October 2, 1998 against petitioner alleging that he denied them the use of the
office vehicle assigned to petitioner, that petitioner still claimed transportation allowance even if he was
using the said vehicle, and that he certified that he did not use any government vehicle, when in fact he did,
in order to collect transportation allowance.
The Affidavit-Complaint reads:
xxx
4. That on September 10, 1998, we, Atty. Lynn Macalingay and Mr. Lyman Salvador
were denied the use of the office vehicle as evidenced by the hereto attached copy of our
denied Itinerary of Travel marked as Annex B;
5. That on August 5, 1998, I, Brigida Abratique requested for the use of the
government vehicle but the same was denied by Atty. Erece for the reason that we would be
using the same to Teachers Camp as evidenced by a copy of the denied trip ticket with the
marginal notes of Atty. Erece hereto attached as Annex C;
6. That on May 29, 1998, the request of Brigida Cecilia Abratique and
Francisco Bilog to use the vehicle within the City for field work purposes was again denied
by Atty. Erece as he will accordingly use the same;
7. That on April 20, 1998, a proposed trip was likewise postponed by Atty.
Erece on the ground that he will be using the vehicle as evidenced by a copy of the proposed
Itinerary of Travel with marginal note of Atty. Erece xxx;
8. That on April, 1997, I, Atty. Jocelyn Bastian requested for the use of the
vehicle as I need[ed] to go to the Benguet Provincial Jail but I was instructed to commute
because he will use the vehicle. To my dismay, I found him still in the office when I returned
from the Provincial Jail;
9. That such denials of the use of the vehicle are not isolated cases but were
just a few of the numerous instances of conflicts of schedules regarding the use of the
government vehicle and where we found ourselves always at the losing end because we are
the subordinate employees;
xxx
13. That Atty. Erece regularly receives and liquidates his Representation and
Transportation Allowances (RATA) which at present is in the amount of FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00), the payroll of such and its liquidation could be made
available upon request by an authority to the Resident Auditor but his liquidations for the
month of April 1998 and September 1998 [are] hereto attached xxx;
14. That despite regular receipt of his RATA, Atty. Erece still prioritizes himself in
the use of the office vehicle to the detriment of the public service;
15. That to compound things, he certifies in his monthly liquidation of his RATA that
HE DID NOT USE ANY GOVERNMENT VEHICLE FOR THE SAID MONTH xxx which
is a big lie because as already stated, he is the regular user of the government vehicle issued
to CHR, Region I;
16. That I, Rolando C. Ebreo, the disbursing officer of the Regional Field Office
hereby attest to the fact that no deductions in the RATA of Atty. Romeo L. Erece was ever
done in connection with his regular use of the government vehicle x x x.[2]
The CSC-Cordillera Administrative Region issued an Order dated October 9, 1998, directing
petitioner to comment on the complaint.
In compliance, petitioner countered, thus:
xxx
4. In relation to paragraphs 2-D, 2-E and 2-G above cited, it is among the duties as per
management supervisory function of the Regional HR Director to approve use or non-use of
the official vehicle of the Region as it was memorandum receipted to him and the
non-approval of the use of the same if it is not arbitrary and for justifiable reasons; said
function of approval and disapproval rests on the Regional Human Rights Director and that
function is not merely ministerial;
5. That I have issued a guideline that the official vehicle will not be used for the
Mountain Provinces and Halsema Highway/Mountain Trail because of the poor road
condition and to prevent breakdown and early deterioration of same xxx;
6. That Atty. Lynn B. Macalingay, one of the complainants had gone to Mt. Province
to attend the Provincial Peace and Order Council meetings, conduct jail visitations and
follow-up cases on many occasions using the regular bus trips in the spirit of the policy as
mentioned in paragraph 4 xxx;
7. That all employees had used the vehicle on official business without exception, all
complainants included xxx;
8. On September 10, 1998, Atty. Lynn Macalingay and Lyman Salvador had the use
of the vehicle disapproved for the reasons conforming to paragraph 4 xxx;
9. On August 5, 1998, Atty. Erece disapproved the use of vehicle for use of Brigida
Abratique because:
a) The vehicle was available since July 30, 1998 for use in Happy
Hallow but not utilized earlier xxx;
b) On August 6, 1998, a DECS-CHR Seminar on Use Human Rights
Exemplar was held at the Teachers Camp Baguio City and the vehicle was used to
transport HR materials, overhead projector and for the overall use of the seminar
upon the request of the Public Information and Education Office, Central Office,
Commission on Human Rights through Susan Nuguid of CHR, Manila;
xxx
d) That Mrs. Abratique and Co. were asked to explain the

unreasonable delay to attend to the case of Cherry Esteban which was subject of
the disapproved travel;
10. On April 20, 1998, the itinerary of travel of Lyman Salvador was
RESCHEDULED from April 22 & 23, 1998 to April 23 & 24, 1998 as the vehicle was used
by Atty. Erece on an important travel to Manila upon order of no less than the Honorable
Chairperson, Aurora Navarette-Recia of Commission on Human Rights xxx;
xxx
12. As to the use of the vehicle by the Regional HR Director, same shall be
subject to the allowance/disallowance of the COA Resident Auditor, likewise the Regional
HR Director in all his travels outside Baguio City, he does not claim bus and taxi fares per
certification of Danilo Balino, the Administrative Officer Designate and Mr. Rolando Ebreo,
the Cash Disbursing Officer, Annex Z;
13. In many cases, Atty. Romeo L. Erece has to maintain the vehicle
including car washing thereof, garage parking at his residence to maintain and upkeep the
vehicle and same is still in premium condition to the satisfaction of the office at no extra cost
to the Commission;
xxx
15. In support thereof, we move to dismiss this case as pure question on

supervisory and management prerogative, which is reserved for the Office Head and a
harassment move by disgruntled employees who are counter-charged hereof;
16. Annexes E and F of the complaint [are] misplaced and misleading because
a clear and cognate reading of same does not reflect that I checked/marked the use of
government vehicle in the certification and as such no dishonesty is involved; the documents
speak for themselves. x x x Annex E is for the month of April, 1998 where the check marks
are clear. On Annex F of the complaint, no reference is made as to the fact that I did not use
the government vehicle, if so, no allegation as to when I did use same for my personal use.[3]
After a fact-finding investigation, the CSC Proper in CSC Resolution No. 99-1360 dated July 1, 1999
charged petitioner with Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct for using a government vehicle in spite of his
receipt of the monthly transportation allowance and for certifying that he did not use any government
vehicle, when in fact, he did, in order to receive the transportation allowance.
Pertinent portions of the formal charge read:
1. That despite the regular receipt of Erece of his monthly Representation and
Transportation Allowance (RATA) in the amount of P4,000.00, he still prioritizes himself in
the use of the office vehicle (Tamaraw FX) in spite of the directive from the Central Office
that he cannot use the service vehicle for official purposes and at the same time receive his
transportation allowance;
2. That Erece did not comply with the directive of the Central Office addressed to all
Regional Human Rights Directors, as follows: to regularize your receipt of the transportation
allowance component of the RATA to which you are entitled monthly, you are hereby
directed to immediately transfer to any of your staff, preferably one of your lawyers, the
memorandum receipt of the vehicle(s) now still in your name;
3. That he certified in his monthly liquidation of his RATA that he did not use any
government vehicle for the corresponding month, which is not true because he is the regular
user of the government vehicle issued to CHR-Region I.
The foregoing facts and circumstances indicate that government service has been
prejudiced by the acts of Erece.
WHEREFORE, Romeo L. Erece is hereby formally charged with Dishonesty and

Grave Misconduct. Accordingly, he is given five (5) days from receipt hereof to submit his
Answer under oath and affidavits of his witnesses, if any, to the Civil Service
Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR). On his Answer, he should
indicate whether he elects a formal investigation or waives his right thereto. Any Motion to
Dismiss, request for clarification or Bills of Particulars shall not be entertained by the
Commission. Any of these pleadings interposed by the respondent shall be considered as an
Answer and shall be evaluated as such. Likewise, he is advised of his right to the assistance
of counsel of his choice.[4]
After a formal investigation of the case, the CSC issued Resolution No. 020124, dated January 24.
2002, finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
penalizing him with dismissal from the service.
Petitioner filed a petition for review of the CSC Resolution with the CA.
In the Decision promulgated on January 7, 2005, the CA upheld the CSC Resolution, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are hereby AFFIRMED.[5]
Hence, this petition.

Petitioner raises these issues:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner was not denied due
process despite the admitted facts that respondents failed to identify and testify on their
Affidavit-Complaint and that petitioner was denied of his right to cross-examine respondents
on their Affidavit-Complaint.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in adopting in toto the conclusions of
the CSC although they were based on mere assumptions.
Petitioner contends that he was denied due process as he was not afforded the right to cross-examine
his accusers and their witnesses. He stated that at his instance, in order to prevent delay in the disposition of
the case, he was allowed to present evidence first to support the allegations in his Counter-Affidavit. After
he rested his case, respondents did not present their evidence, but moved to submit their position paper and
formal offer of evidence, which motion was granted by the CSC over his (petitioners)
objection. Respondents then submitted their Position Paper and Formal Offer of Exhibits.
Petitioner submits that although he was allowed to present evidence first, it should not be construed
as a waiver of his right to cross-examine the complainants. Although the order of presentation of evidence
was not in conformity with the procedure, still petitioner should not be deemed to have lost his right to
cross-examine his accusers and their witnesses. This may be allowed only if he expressly waived said right.
The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner was not denied due process when he failed to
cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses since he was given the opportunity to be heard and
present his evidence. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to
explain ones side.[6]
Velez v. De Vera[7] held:
Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with judicial process for a
trial in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in
judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon
different principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and
its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character,
the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional
requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established
administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of
a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all objections
and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and considered. One
adequate hearing is all that due process requires. . . .
The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. Nor is
an actual hearing always essential. . . . [8]
Next, petitioner contends that the CA erred in adopting in toto the conclusions of the CSC.
Petitioner contends that the conclusion of the CSC proceeded from the premise that the petitioner
was using the subject vehicle as his service vehicle, which he disputes, because he did not use the vehicle
regularly. The evidence showed that the service vehicle was being used by the employees of the regional
office for official purposes. He argues that although the service vehicle is still in his name, it should not be
concluded that it is assigned to him as his service vehicle, thus disqualifying him from receiving
transportation allowance.
The Court is not persuaded. The pertinent conclusion of the CSC referred to by petitioner reads:
At the outset, it must be stated that the entitlement to transportation allowance by

certain officials and employees pursuant to RA 6688 presupposes that they are not assigned
government vehicles. This was clarified by the Supreme Court in the case of Aida Domingo
vs. COA, G.R. No. 112371, October 7, 1998, where it ruled, as follows:
The provision of law in point is found in Section 28 of Republic Act

6688, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1989, to wit:
Sec. 28. Representation and Transportation Allowances. ... The

transportation allowance herein authorized shall not be granted to officials
who are assigned a government vehicle or use government motor
transportation, except as may be approved by the President of
the Philippines. Unless otherwise provided by law, no amount appropriated in
this Act shall be used to pay for representation and/or transportation
allowances, whether commutable or reimbursable, which exceed the rates
authorized under this Section. Previous administrative authorization not
consistent with the rates and conditions herein specified shall no longer be
valid and payment shall not be allowed.
xxx
In the case of Bustamante vs. Commission on Audit, 216 SCRA 134,

decided by this Court on November 27, 1992, COA also disallowed the claim
for transportation allowance of the legal counsel of National Power
Corporation because he was already issued a government vehicle. Involving
the circular aforementioned and almost the same facts as in this case, it was
therein held that COA Circular No. 75-6 is categorical in prohibiting the use of
government vehicles by officials receiving transportation allowance and in
stressing that the use of government motor vehicle and claim for transportation
allowance are mutually exclusive and incompatible.
The issue need no longer be belabored for no less than this Court ruled
in the aforesaid case that a government official, to whom a motor vehicle has
been assigned, cannot, at the same time, claim transportation allowance.
(Underscoring supplied)
It is clear from the records that Director Edmundo S. Ancog, CHR-Central office
(Field Operations office), issued a Memorandum dated February 27, 1998, addressed to all
CHR Regional Directors in respect to Transportation Allowance. The Memorandum states
that transportation allowance shall not be granted to Regional Directors whenever a
government vehicle or use of government motor transportation is already assigned to them. It
further emphasized that should they want to avail regularization of their RATA, the Regional
Directors must immediately transfer the vehicle to any of their staff/lawyer.
Records show that Erece was issued a government vehicle since August 10, 1997 and
he did not transfer the vehicle to any of his staff.Notwithstanding this fact and the said
memorandum, he received transportation allowance particularly for the months of April and
September 1998, as reflected in the Certification/s signed by him. This clearly resulted in
undue prejudice to the best interest of the service.
The foregoing facts logically lead to the conclusion that the act of Erece in certifying
that he has not used any government vehicle and consequently collecting Transportation
Allowance despite the fact that a government vehicle was assigned to him constitutes the
offenses of Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.[9]
The above conclusion,as well as the Memorandum dated February 27, 1998 issued by Director
Ancog to the CHR Regional Directors, are both very clear. Once a vehicle is assigned to a regional director,
like petitioner, he is no longer entitled to transportation allowance unless he assigns the vehicle to another
staff/lawyer. Since petitioner did not assign the subject vehicle assigned to him to someone else, he is not
entitled to transportation allowance.
Contrary to the argument of petitioner, there is no qualification that the assigned vehicle should be
for the exclusive use of the service vehicle of the regional director alone to disqualify him from receiving
transportation allowance.
Since the records show that petitioner collected transportation allowance even if a government
vehicle had been assigned to him, the CA did not err in sustaining the decision of the CSC finding petitioner
guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and penalizing him with
dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated
on January 7, 2005 is AFFIRMED.
38. DATUPAX MANGUDADATU VS HRET
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction[1] assailing Resolution Nos. 07-179[2] dated August 16, 2007 and
07-300[3] dated September 19, 2007, of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in HRET
Case No. 07-021, entitled Angelo O. Montilla v. Datu Pax Pakung S. Mangudadatu.
Datu Pax Pakung S. Mangudadatu (petitioner) and Angelo O. Montilla (private respondent) were
congressional candidates for the First District of Sultan Kudarat during the May 14, 2007 national
elections. Petitioner won by 17,451 votes and was proclaimed on May 22, 2007by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers as the duly elected Representative of the said congressional district.
On May 31, 2007, respondent filed with the HRET a Petition of Protest (Ad Cautelam)[4] contesting the
results of the elections and the proclamation of petitioner.
On June 14, 2007, the Secretary of the HRET caused the service of summons[5] upon petitioner through
registered mail at Purok Losaria,[6]Tamnag (Poblacion), Lutayan, Sultan Kudarat, requiring petitioner to file
an Answer to the protest within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
On July 11, 2007, the HRET received the Registry Return Receipt Card, [7] showing that a certain Aileen R.
Baldenas[8] (Baldenas) received the summons on June 27, 2007.
On August 16, 2007, the HRET issued Resolution No. 07-179[9] which noted the aforementioned Registry
Return Receipt Card and that despite the fact that 43 days from June 27, 2007 had passed since Baldenas
received the summons, petitioner had not filed an answer in accordance with Rule 27[10] of the 2004 HRET
Rules. In the same Resolution, the HRET considered petitioner to have entered a general denial of the
allegations of the protest.
In an Order dated August 17, 2007, the HRET set the preliminary conference on September 27,
2007 at 11:00 a.m.
Meanwhile, petitioner informally learned of respondents protest, prompting petitioner to request his lawyers
to verify the same from the records of the HRET. Thereafter, his lawyers entered their appearance
on September 4, 2007 and requested that they be furnished with copies of the petition of protest as well as
notices, orders and resolutions pertaining to the protest.
On September 10, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion to Reconsider[11] Resolution No. 07-179 and Motion to
Admit Answer with Counter-Protest, alleging that he never received the summons issued by the HRET. In
his affidavit[12] attached to the motion, petitioner denied that Baldenas was a member of his household or his
employee. He further claimed that she was not authorized to receive any important documents addressed to
him. And assuming that he had authorized her, the summons received by her was never brought to his
attention.
On September 19, 2007, the HRET issued Resolution No. 07-300[13] denying for lack of merit, petitioners
Motion to Reconsider Resolution No. 07-179, as well as his Motion to Admit Answer with Counter-Protest,
the latter for having been filed out of time. The HRET explained that:
In the instant case, the recipient, Ailene R. Baldenas, could not have received the summons
had she not been found in said address or had she not been present therein as to have been in
a position to have acted in behalf of the resident of the house, the protestee herein. The act of
a person in receiving a mail matter cannot be easily defied by simply denying that the receipt
was unauthorized. We doubt protestees self-serving allegation of lack of knowledge of Ailene
R. Baldenas. This denial of authority, or of knowledge of the recipients identity must be
supported by conclusive proof, the burden of which belongs to no other than the one making
such assertion, the protestee himself. The ruling cited by protestee in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs.
Fernandez does not apply herein as the summons was served at protestees residence and not
just at any house owned by him. In that case, service of summons was made in a house, but
not the defendants residence or dwelling place. Thus, such service was ineffective and
improper which is not the case herein as the service of the summons was made to protestees
residence in the province.
The records of the case bear that protestees residence is Purok Lo[sa]ria, Tamnag (Poblacion),
Lutayan, Sultan Kudarat. Aside from the protest, a Manifestation filed by protestant to submit
the Roll of Attorneys Numbers of his counsels indicates that a copy thereof was sent to the
same address on June 5, 2007, through registered mail. The summons was sent and was
received at the same address stated in the protest. Accordingly, the registry return receipt card
shows proper receipt by Ailene R. Baldena[s] on June 27, 2007. In all instances of posting,
either by protestant or by the Tribunal, the presumption is that mailed matters were duly
received by the addressee, by himself or his representatives. The Tribunal should not be taken
to task to ascertain or cause the Postmasters personnel to first determine whether or not the
person receiving was or was not known to protestee. With the proof of service, such as the
registry return receipt card, at hand, the Tribunal is satisfied that jurisdiction was acquired
over protestee.
After the preliminary conference on September 27, 2007, the HRET issued a Preliminary Conference Order,
of even date, granting respondents motion for the revision of ballots and directing the Secretary of the HRET
to conduct the same in all or 100% of the protested precincts in the instant case. The HRET also noted
petitioners manifestation in open court that his participation in the preliminary conference was without
prejudice to whatever legal remedies he may avail for the reconsideration of Resolution No. 07-300
dated September 13, 2007, denying his Motion to Reconsider Resolution No. 07-179 with Motion to Admit
Answer with Counter-Protest.
Petitioner filed the instant petition imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the HRET for issuing Resolution Nos. 07-179 and 07-300. He also prayed for a
temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction for this Court to enjoin the HRET from
further proceeding with HRET Case No.07-021.
Petitioner contended that the HRET never acquired jurisdiction over his person because of the
absence of a valid service of summons.He argued that a substitute service of summons is made only when
the defendant cannot be served personally at a reasonable time after efforts to locate him have failed.[14] In
his case, since the process servers return failed to show on its face the impossibility of personal service, then
the substituted service was improper and invalid.
In the Resolution of this Court dated October 16, 2007, we required respondent to file his comment
on the petition for certiorari within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice.
In his comment, respondent countered that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing Resolution Nos. 07-179 dated August 16, 2007 and 07-300 dated September 19, 2007. He argued
that Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules merely states that the Secretary of the Tribunal shall issue the
corresponding summons to the protestee or respondent, as the case may be. He posited then that the intent of
the HRET in not expressly specifying personal service of summons on the protestee or respondent was to
give it a reasonable discretion or leeway in serving the summons by other means such as registered
mail. Thus, service of summons on petitioner through registered mail did not violate Rule 22 of the 2004
HRET Rules. Further, respondent claimed that Rule 14, Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules of Court were
inconsistent with Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules and therefore should not be given suppletory application
to HRET proceedings.
Petitioner, in his reply, posited that Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules was not inconsistent with
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. According to petitioner, the Secretary of the Tribunal is
equivalent to the Clerk of Court, and both the regular courts and the HRET have process servers and sheriffs
who may serve notices, orders, and summons. Petitioner further contends that there is nothing in the 2004
HRET Rules that allows service of summons by registered mail and strongly asserts that service of summons
by registered mail is susceptible to fraud and manipulation.
We grant the petition.

Rule 22 of the 2004 HRET Rules provides:
RULE 22. Summons. If the petition is not summarily dismissed in accordance with Rule 21 of
these Rules, the Secretary of the Tribunal shall issue the corresponding summons to the
protestee or respondent, as the case may be, together with a copy of the petition, requiring
him within ten (10) days from receipt thereof to file his answer.
The 2004 HRET Rules on summons is silent on how the summons should be served on the
protestee. Significantly, Rule 80[15] of the 2004 HRET Rules provides that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
applies by analogy or suppletorily in so far as the latter may be applicable and not inconsistent therewith as
well as with the orders, resolutions and decisions of the HRET. In view of the failure of the HRET Rules to
specify the authorized modes of service of summons, resort then is necessary to Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which state:
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served
handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for
it, by tendering it to him.
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving copies at defendants office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
In the case at bar, the service of the summons was made through registered mail, which is not among
the allowed modes of service under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
In Federico S. Sandoval II v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and Aurora

Rosario A. Oreta,[16] this Court has held that in the matter of service of summons, Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court apply suppletorily to the rules of the HRET. To quote from that case:
The matter of serving summons is governed by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which applies suppletorily
to the Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunalthrough its Rule 80.23 Sections 6 and
7 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide -
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by
handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him.
Sec. 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies
of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof.
It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant (i.e., petitioner

herein) must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to
receive it, by tendering it to him. Personal service of summons most effectively ensures
that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is
accomplished. If however efforts to find him personally would make prompt service
impossible, service may be completed by substituted service, i.e., by leaving copies of the
summons at his dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein or by leaving the copies at his office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof.
Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an

extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the respondent or the defendant to the
consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is served not upon him but
upon another to whom the law could only presume would notify him of the pending
proceedings. As safeguard measures for this drastic manner of bringing in a person to answer
for a claim, it is required that statutory restrictions for substituted service must be
strictly, faithfully and fully observed. In our jurisdiction, for service of summons to be
valid, it is necessary first to establish the following circumstances, i.e., (a) impossibility of
service of summons within a reasonable time, (b) efforts exerted to locate the petitioners and,
(c) service upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein or some competent
person in charge of his office or regular place of business. It is also essential that the pertinent
facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or officers return itself and
only under exceptional terms may they be proved by evidence aliunde. Failure to comply
with this rule renders absolutely void the substituted service along with the proceedings taken
thereafter for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the respondent.
We find no merit in respondent Oretas austere argument that personal service need not be
exhausted before substituted service may be used since time in election protest cases is of the
essence. Precisely, time in election protest cases is very critical so all efforts must be realized
to serve the summons and a copy of the election protest by the means most likely to reach the
protestee. No speedier method could achieve this purpose than by personal service
thereof. As already stated, the preferential rule regarding service of summons found in
the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to the Revised Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Hence, as regards the hierarchy in the service of
summons, there ought to be no rational basis for distinguishing between regular court
cases and election protest cases pending before the HRET. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Indeed the doctrine in Sandoval has been reiterated by this Court in subsequent decisions to reiterate
that in ordinary civil cases, personal service of summons is preferred and resort to substituted service not
only must be fully justified but also comply strictly with requirements of the Rules of Court for substituted
service.[17] In the early case of Olar v. Cuna,[18] we held that:
In the case at bar, the summons were served by registered mail, which is not among
the modes of service under Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Besides, under Section 5
of aforesaid rule, the summons "may be served by the sheriff or other proper officer of the
province in which the service is to be made, or for special reasons by any person especially
authorized by the judge of the court issuing the summons." The postmaster of Bato, Leyte,
not being a sheriff or court officer, or a person authorized by the court to serve the summons
cannot validly serve the summons. The petitioners, therefore, were not duly served with the
summons in Civil Case No. B-674.
Indeed, if in ordinary civil cases (which involve only private and proprietary interests) personal
service of summons is preferred and service by registered mail is not allowed on jurisdictional and due
process grounds, with more reason should election cases (which involve public interest and the will of the
electorate) strictly follow the hierarchy of modes of service of summons under the Rules of Court.
We note that the HRET, in its Resolution No. 07-300, justified its resort to registered mail in this
wise:
In cases filed before the Tribunal involving distant legislative districts and provinces,
it has been its practice to serve the summons through registered mail, it being impracticable
to send the same by personal service to protestees or respondents who reside in said far
provinces. Since protestee resides in Sultan Kudarat, summons was served to him through
registered mail.
We do not agree. The Court sees no reason why the HRET cannot make use of its own process
servers to personally serve the summons, or alternatively, delegate the matter to the process server of a court
with territorial jurisdiction over the place of residence of the respondent/protestee in the election case, at the
expense of the petitioner/protestant. Considering that the proper service of summons on the
respondent/protestee is a jurisdictional requirement and goes to heart of due process, we cannot allow
service of summons by a method not sanctioned by the HRET Rules in relation to the Rules of Court.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in considering
petitioner to have entered a general denial of the allegations in respondents petition of protest and in denying
his motion to reconsider as well as his motion to admit answer with counter-protest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Resolution Nos. 07-179 and
07-300 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case No. 07-021 are SET
ASIDE and the HRET is directed to admit the Answer with Counter-Protestof petitioner Datu Pax Pakung S.
Mangudadatu.
No pronouncement as to costs.
39. DEPED VS CUANAN
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[1] dated May 16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87499 which set aside Resolution No.
041147 dated October 22, 2004 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) finding
respondent Godofredo G. Cuanan (Cuanan) guilty of sexual harassment and dismissing him from service, and the CA
Resolution[2] dated July 18, 2005 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the Department of Education
(DepEd).
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 11, 1996, Luzviminda Borja and Juliana Castro, on behalf of their respective minor daughters,
Lily Borja and Charo Castro, filed before the Department of Education, Culture and Sports - Regional Office No. III
(DECS-RO No. III), Cabanatuan City, two separate administrative complaints[3] for Sexual Harassment and Conduct
Unbecoming a Public Officer against Cuanan, then Principal of Lawang Kupang Elementary School in San
Antonio, Nueva Ecija.
Acting on the complaints, DECS-RO No. III Regional Director Vilma L. Labrador constituted an Investigating
Committee, composed of three DepEdofficials from the province, to conduct a formal investigation. Following the
investigation, the Investigating Committee submitted its Investigation Report[4] dated December 14, 1999,
finding Cuanan guilty of sexual harassment and recommending his forced resignation without prejudice to benefits. In a
Decision[5] dated January 28, 2000, Regional Director Labrador concurred in the findings of the Investigating Committee
and meted out the penalty of forced resignation to Cuanan without prejudice to benefits.
In an Order[6] dated April 13, 2000, then DepEd Secretary Andrew Gonzales affirmed the Decision of Regional Director
Labrador. On May 30, 2000, Cuanan filed a Petition for Reconsideration[7] thereof, but the same was denied for lack of
merit by Secretary Gonzales in a Resolution[8] dated June 19, 2000.
Cuanan elevated his case to the CSC. On January 20, 2003, the CSC issued Resolution No. 030069,[9] which set aside
the June 19, 2000 Resolution of Secretary Gonzales and exonerated Cuanan from the charge of sexual
harassment. On January 23, 2003, copies of the resolution were duly sent to the parties, including
the DepEd.[10] Cuanan received a copy of Resolution No. 030069 on January 31, 2003.[11]
In a Letter dated February 3, 2003, Cuanan requested his reinstatement as Elementary School Principal I.[12] In a
1st Indorsement, the District Supervisor recommended appropriate action.[13] In a 2nd Indorsement dated February 4, 2003,
Schools Division Superintendent Dioscorides D. Lusung(Superintendent) recommended that Cuanan be reinstated to
duty as School Principal of San Antonio District upon finality of the decision of the CSC.[14]In a Letter[15] dated February
10, 2003, Regional Director Ricardo T. Sibug informed the Superintendent that Cuanan could not be immediately
reinstated to the service until an order of implementation was received from the Department Secretary.
Sometime in March 2003, DepEd Undersecretary Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon sent a letter to the CSC requesting a copy
of CSC Resolution No. 030069 dated January 20, 2003. In a Letter[16] dated March 25, 2003, the CSC informed
the DepEd that a copy of the requested resolution was duly sent to it on January 23, 2003. Nonetheless, the CSC sent
another copy of the resolution to the DepEd for its reference. The DepEd received said reference copy on March 28,
2003.[17]
On April 11, 2003, then DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. de Jesus filed a

Petition for Review/Reconsideration[18] with the CSC. No copy of the pleading was served upon Cuanan.
On July 29, 2003, Secretary De Jesus filed a Supplemental Petition for Review/Reconsideration[19] reiterating the prayer
for reversal of the resolution.Again, no copy of the pleading was served upon Cuanan.
Subsequently, pursuant to Division Special Order No. 001 series of 2003 dated June 18, 2003, Cuanan was reinstated to
his former position as school principal effective April 30, 2003.[20] In Division Special Order No. 285, series of 2003
dated July 8, 2003, Cuanan was directed to return to duty.[21]Based thereon, Cuanan requested payment of salaries and
his inclusion in the payroll, which the Division School Superintendent of Nueva Ecija duly endorsed on November 7,
2003.[22]
However, on October 22, 2004, the CSC issued Resolution No. 041147[23] setting aside CSC Resolution No. 030069
dated January 20, 2003. It found Cuanan guilty of Sexual Harassment, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Grossly
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits, cancellation of his service eligibility, and perpetual disqualification from holding public
office. Cuanan received a copy of the Resolution on November 9, 2004.[24]
Thirteen days later, or on November 22, 2004, Cuanan filed a petition for certiorari[25] with the CA seeking to annul
Resolution No. 041147, alleging that the CSC should not have entertained the petition for review/reconsideration since
the DepEd was not the complainant or the party adversely affected by the resolution; that the petition for
review/reconsideration was filed out of time; and that Cuanan was not furnished copies of the pleadings filed by
the DepEdin violation of procedural due process.
The DepEd sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper remedy, the mode of review from a decision
of the CSC being a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
On May 16, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision[26] granting the petition for certiorari and setting aside CSC Resolution
No. 041147 dated October 12, 2004. The CA held that while a motion for reconsideration and a petition for review under
Rule 43 were available remedies, Cuanan's recourse to a petition for certiorari was warranted, since the act complained
of was patently illegal; that the CSC gravely abused its discretion in granting the petition for review/reconsideration filed
by the DepEd without regard for Cuanan's fundamental right to due process, since he was not duly notified of the petition
for review/reconsideration, nor was he required by the CSC to file a comment thereon, much less, given a copy of the
said petition; that the DepEd failed to establish that the resolution was not yet final and executory when it filed its petition
for review/reconsideration.
DepEd filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[27] but the CA denied the same in its Resolution[28] dated July 18, 2005.
Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:
I
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
LAW IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 87499, THE SAME
NOT BEING THE PROPER REMEDY IN ASSAILING CSC RESOLUTION NO. 041147
DATED OCTOBER 22, 2004.
II
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
LAW IN ADJUDGING CSC AS HAVING COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ISSUING RESOLUTION NO. 041147 DATED OCTOBER 22, 2004.[29]
DepEd contends that the CA should have dismissed outright the petition for certiorari because CSC decisions
are appealable to the CA by petition for review under Rule 43; that the filing of a motion for reconsideration was a
precondition to the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65; that the DepEd, even if not the complainant, may
question the resolution of the CSC; that Cuanan failed to prove that the CSC's petition for review/reconsideration was not
seasonably filed; that even if Cuanan was not served a copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd, the CSC was not
bound by procedural rules.
Cuanan, on the other hand, contends that the DepEd cannot file a motion for reconsideration from the CSC Resolution
exonerating him, since it is not the complainant in the administrative case and therefore not a party adversely affected by
the decision therein; that even if DepEd may seek reconsideration of the CSC Resolution, the petition for
review/reconsideration was filed out of time; and that Cuanans right to due process was violated when he was not given a
copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd or given the opportunity to comment thereon.
The Court finds it necessary, before delving on the grounds relied upon by the DepEd in support of the petition, to first
resolve the question of whether the DepEd can seek reconsideration of the CSC Resolution exonerating Cuanan.
In a long line of cases, beginning with Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,[30] and reiterated in Philippine National
Bank v. Garcia, Jr.,[31] the Court has maintained that the disciplining authority qualifies as a party adversely affected by
the judgment, who can file an appeal of a judgment of exoneration in an administrative case. CSC Resolution No.
021600[32] allows the disciplining authority to appeal from a decision exonerating an erring employee, thus:
Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms. x x x (l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to
the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been rendered or to the disciplining
authority in an appeal from a decision exonerating the said employee. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, Cuanan's exoneration under CSC Resolution No. 030069 may be subject to a motion for reconsideration by
the DepEd which, as the appointing and disciplining authority, is a real party in interest.
Now, as to the merits of DepEd's arguments, the Court finds none.
The remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution issued by the CSC is to file a petition for review thereof
under Rule 43[33] of the Rules of Court within fifteen days from notice of the resolution. Recourse to a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 renders the petition dismissible for being the wrong remedy.Nonetheless, there are
exceptions to this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the
broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order
amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.[34] As will be shown forthwith, exception (c) applies to the
present case.
Furthermore, while a motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari,
immediate recourse to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is warranted where the order is a patent nullity, as where
the court a quo has no jurisdiction; where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceeding was ex parte or one
in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object.[35] These exceptions find application to Cuanan's petition
for certiorari in the CA.
At any rate, Cuanan's petition for certiorari before the CA could be treated as a petition for review, the petition having
been filed on November 22, 2004, or thirteen (13) days from receipt on November 9, 2004 of CSC Resolution No.
041147, clearly within the 15-day reglementary period for the filing of a petition for review.[36] Such move would be in
accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice.[37]
Furthermore, CSC Resolution No. 030069 has long become final and executory. It must be noted that the records show
that copies of CSC Resolution No. 030069 were duly sent to the parties, including DepEd, on January 23,
2003.[38] Cuanan received a copy thereof on January 31, 2003,[39] while the DepEd requested a copy sometime in March
2003, or about two months later. Under the Rules of Evidence, it is presumed that official duty has been regularly
performed, unless contradicted.[40] This presumption includes that of regularity of service of judgments, final orders or
resolutions.
Consequently, the burden of proving the irregularity in official conduct -- that is, non-receipt of the duly sent copy of
CSC Resolution No. 030069 -- is on the part of the DepEd, which in the present case clearly failed to discharge the
same.[41] Thus, the presumption stands that CSC Resolution No. 030069 dated January 20, 2003 had already become
final and executory when the DepEd filed its Petition for Review/Reconsideration on April 11, 2003, more than two
months later.
It is elementary that once judgment has become final and executory, it becomes immutable and can no longer be
amended or modified. In Gallardo-Corrov. Gallardo,[42] this Court held:
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby
becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the
highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case.
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and
sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become
final at some definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to
naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.[43]
Moreover, while it is true that administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements, they are bound by law and practice to observe the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them.[44] The relative freedom of the CSC from the
rigidities of procedure cannot be invoked to evade what was clearly emphasized in the landmark case
of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations:[45] that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process.
Furthermore, Section 43.A.[46] of the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides:
Section 43.A. Filing of Supplemental Pleadings. - All pleadings filed by the parties with the
Commission, shall be copy furnished the other party with proof of service filed with the
Commission.
Any supplemental pleading to supply deficiencies in aid of an original pleading but which should not
entirely substitute the latter can be filed only upon a favorable action by the Commission on the motion
of a party to the case. The said motion should be submitted within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of
the original pleading and it is discretionary upon the Commission to allow the same or not or even to
consider the averments therein.(Emphasis supplied)
Cuanan undoubtedly was denied procedural due process. He had no opportunity to participate in the proceedings for the
petition for review/ reconsideration filed by the DepEd, since no copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd were served
upon him or his counsel; nor was he even required by the CSC to file his comments thereon. Considering that pleadings
filed by the DepEd were not served upon Cuanan, they may be treated as mere scraps of paper which should not have
merited the attention or consideration of the CSC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 87499 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
40. ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial
Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has
filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the
following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para
una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado
para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con
ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso
en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo
fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que
cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion
penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que
dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado deser
empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement
rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for
a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG
TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is
entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native
dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine
Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of
leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite
the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by
Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed
memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective
representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and
continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the
salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always
been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the
National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of
Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion for a new
trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon
the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new
trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of
orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make
several observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize
certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have
re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case,
and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union
affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of
a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to
suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel have no
evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its
creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial
system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of
justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that
are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear
from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or
quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions
in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide,
and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and
employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention,
arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or
conditions of tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the
number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or
agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the
controversy and certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as
existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall,
before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce
them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the
President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all industries established in a designated locality,
with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a
minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the
"inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration
in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to
the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific
controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of
executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of
governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13,
1939, we had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated
September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity
and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by
any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may
inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No.
103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial
or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which
may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further
industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this
Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by
this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of
Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not
mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes,
in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen
shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice
Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court
in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the
part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom
the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when
directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental is
contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin,
G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be
"substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S.
142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir.,
93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15;
Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The
statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.'
The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of
technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial
proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194
U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and
Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and
Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
(Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p.
131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S.
88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed
to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not,
however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the
authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the
controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts
in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.)
The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its
consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any
public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate
to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may
deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers.
(Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to
decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment
of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the right to
appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the
alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record
is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a
conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent
National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was
but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from
work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of
Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood
Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and
functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition
to prove his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of
Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far reaching importance
and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and
large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be
better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his
motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created
the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue
involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion
for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded
to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may
be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-26803 October 14, 1975
41. AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, ATTYS. AMANDO L. MARQUEZ, TEOFILO P. VELASCO,
RUSTICO A. CASIA and HECTOR D. BUENALUZ, respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
ANTONIO, J.:
In this petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction, petitioners challenge the validity of Rule 168 of
the "Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as amended,
authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear "inter
partes" proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that "all judgments determining the merits of the case shall
be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him." These proceedings refer to the
hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the
purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or
service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office.
Petitioners are parties, respectively, in the following opposition, interference and cancellation proceedings in
said Office: Inter Partes Cases Nos. 157, 392, 896, 282, 247, 354, 246,332, 398, 325, 374, 175, 297, 256,
267, 111, 400, 324, 114, 159, 346, and 404.
Under the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166 ), the Director of Patents is vested with jurisdiction over
the above-mentioned cases. Likewise, the Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases contains a similar
provision, thus:
168. Original jurisdiction over inter partes proceeding. — the Director of Patents shall have original
jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. In the event that the Patent Office should be provided with an
Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner shall have the original jurisdiction over these cases, instead of the
Director. In the case that the Examiner of Interferences takes over the original jurisdiction over inter
partes proceedings, his final decision subject to appeal to the Director of Patents within three months of the
receipt of notice of decisions. Such appeals shall be governed by sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15 and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofar as said sections are applicable and appropriate, and the
appeal fee shall be P25.00.
The Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases were drafted and promulgated by the Director of Patents and
approved by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.. 1
Subsequently, the Director of Patents, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
amended the afore-quoted Rule 168 to read as follows:
168. Original Jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. — The Director of Patents shall have original
jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, [In the event that the Patent Office is provided with an Examiner
of Interferences, this Examiner shall then have the original jurisdiction over these cases, instead of the
Director. In the case that the Examiner of Interferences takes over the original jurisdiction over inter
partes proceedings, his final decisions shall be subject to appeal to the Director of Patents within three
months of the receipt of notice decision. Such appeals shall be governed by Sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8,10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15, and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofar as said sections are applicable and
appropriate, and the appeal fee shall be [P25.00.] Such inter partes proceedings in the Philippine Patent
Office under this Title shall be heard before the Director of Patents, any hearing officer, or any ranking
official designated by the Director, but all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally
and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him. (Emphasis supplied.)
In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners' cases to
hearing officers, specifically, Attys. Amando Marquez, Teofilo Velasco, Rustico Casia and Hector Buenaluz,
the other respondents herein.
Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging that the
amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under the law the Director must personally hear and
decide inter partes cases. Said objections were overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the present
petition for mandamus, to compel The Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu
of the hearing officers.
It would take an extremely narrow reading of the powers of the Director of Patents under the general
law2 and Republic Acts Nos. 1653 and 166 3 * to sustain the contention of petitioners. Under section 3 of RA
165, the Director of Patents is "empowered to obtain the assistance of technical, scientific or other qualified
officers or employees of other departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including corporations owned, controlled or operated by the Government, when deemed
necessary in the consideration of any matter submitted to the Office relative to the enforcement of the
provisions" of said Act. Section 78 of the same Act also empowers "the Director, subject to the approval of
the Department Head," to "promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the
conduct of all business in the Patent Office." The aforecited statutory authority undoubtedly also applies to
the administration and enforcement of the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166).
It has been held that power-conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a statute
is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out
its purposes and provisions maybe an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless
by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld.4 There is no provision either in
Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such authority, so far as the designation of hearing
examiners is concerned. Nor can the absence of such authority be fairly inferred from contemporaneous and
consistent Executive interpretation of the Act.
The nature of the power and authority entrusted to The Director of Patents suggests that the aforecited laws
(Republic Act No. 166, in relation to Republic Act No. 165) should be construed so as to give the aforesaid
official the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the
administration of said laws. As such officer, he is required, among others, to determine the question of
priority in patent interference proceedings,5 decide applications for reinstatement of a lapsed
patent,6 cancellations of patents under Republic Act No. 165,7 inter partes proceedings such as
oppositions,8 claims of interference, 9 cancellation cases under the Trade-mark Law 10and other matters in
connection with the enforcement of the aforesaid laws. It could hardly be expected, in view of the magnitude
of his responsibility, to require him to hear personally each and every case pending in his Office. This would
leave him little time to attend to his other duties. 11 For him to do so and at the same time attend personally
to the discharge of every other duty or responsibility imposed upon his Office by law would not further the
development of orderly and responsible administration. The reduction of existing delays in regulating
agencies requires the elimination of needless work at top levels. Unnecessary and unimportant details often
occupy far too much of the time and energy of the heads of these agencies and prevent full and expeditious
consideration of the more important issues. the remedy is a far wider range of delegations to subordinate
officers. This sub-delegation of power has been justified by "sound principles of organization" which
demand that "those at the top be able to concentrate their attention upon the larger and more important
questions of policy and practice, and their time be freed, so far as possible, from the consideration of the
smaller and far less important matters of detail." 12
Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by
law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of
the administrative agency will be
made. 13
The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not
preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to
investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. 14 It is
sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.
Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of
testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not
deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is
supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair
trial are fully met. 15 In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as
the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. 16 It is, however, required that to "give the
substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who
makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them." 17
In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions raised
at the hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on the merits of all the issues and questions involved is
left to the Director of Patents. Apart from the circumstance that the point involved is procedural and not
jurisdictional, petitioners have not shown in what manner they have been prejudiced by the proceedings.
Moreover, as the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, now a Member of this Court has correctly pointed
out, the repeated appropriations by Congress for hearing officers of the Philippine Patent Office form 1963
to 1968 18 not only confirms the departmental construction of the statute, but also constitutes a ratification of
the act of the Director of Patents and the Department Head as agents of Congress in the administration of the
law. 19
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioners.
Castro (Actg., C.J.), Muñoz Palma, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J, is on leave.
Barredo, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 Under Sec. 78 of Republic Act No. 165 (Act creating Patent Office, etc.) "the Director, subject to the
approval of the Department Head, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations not inconsistent with
law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office."
2 Section 550, 551, 553, 554, 557 to 559 and 580, Rev. Administrative Code.
3 An Act creating a Patent Office, prescribing its powers and duties, regulating the issuance of patents, etc.
3* An Act to provide for the registration and protection of trade-marks, trade names and service-marks,
defining unfair competition and false marking and providing remedies against the same, and for other
purposes.
4 Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111-124,9 L. ed. 1385.
5 Sections 10 and 16, Republic Act No. 165.
6 Section 23, ibid.
7 Sections 32 and 31, Ibid.
8 Sections 8 and 9, Republic Act No. 166.
9 Section 10-A, Ibid.
10 Section 17 to 19, Ibid.
11 The Director of Patents has the following duties, as specified under the WAPCO Guide or Classification
of Position for the Philippine Patent Office:
"Directs the functions and operation of the Patent Office; approves and authorizes the registration and
issuance of patents and the registration of the marks and names; hears appeals from negative decisions of the
examining staff on ex parte cases as well as inter partes cases involving opposition, interferences,
compulsory licensing cancellation and renders decisions thereon which are appealable only to the Supreme
Court; formulates and recommends the adoption of rules and forms relating to the statutory functions of the
office; drafts and recommends amendments to the Patent Law and Rules of Practice; formulates and puts
into effect rules and regulations for the administration of the office; prescribes the functions of the
organizational appointments as well as of the employees of the office; recommends appointments,
promotions and discharges and makes other personal actions; reviews and approves or modifies requisitions
for supplies, materials and equipment; supervises the formulation of budget requests; directs the preparation
of annual special reports and represents the Patent Office before Congress and other official bodies."
12 Davis, Administrative Law, p. 201.
13 Sec. 9, C.A. 103; Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., 69 Phil. 635; National Union v. Asian Printing, 99 Phil.
589; Ruperto v. Torres, Feb. 25, 1957; Orlanes, et al. v. Public Service Commission, 57 Phil. 634; Northern
Luzon Transportation, Inc. v. Sambrano, 58 Phil. 35; Cebu Transit, Inc. v. Jereza 58 Phil. 760.
"It is well established that a delegate may, without delegating his power, exercise his authority through
persons he appoints to assist him in his functions, particularly where an act performed by a subordinate is
subsequently ratified or approved by the responsible official. Also, even though delegation may be regarded
as existing, the question of permissible delegation is regarded as one of degree.
"No matter how strict or stubborn the statutory requirement may be, the law does not preclude practicable
administrative procedure in obtaining the aid of assistants in the department, apparently to any extent so
long as the agency does not abdicate its power and responsibility and preserves for itself the right to make
the final decision. Thus, without any statutory authority therefor and without any unlawful delegation of its
power, an agency may appoint a referee to hear and report testimony." (2 Am. Jur. 2d, section 224, pp.
54-55.)Likewise, it has been said that:
"While particular statutes may create certain restrictions, it is generally regarded that the fact that the power
to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by statute with such power does not preclude a
delegation of the power to hold a hearing and conduct the proceedings on the basis of which the decision
will be made. Neither does due process of law or the concept of a fair or full hearing require that the actual
taking of testimony be before the same officers as are to determine the matter involved. Whether or not
expressly authorized by statute, it is permissible, and does not render a hearing inadequate or unlawful, for
an admistrative agency to employ the panel method of hearing in which one or more of the members of the
agency takes the testimony in the matter before the agency, or to employ other persons, such as an examiner,
investigator or referee, to obtain the evidence and conduct the hearings and make a report to the upon which
the agency makes its decision. Such a procedure is a practical "necessity." (2 Am. Jur. 2d, sec. 407, pp.
217-218. Emphasis supplied.)
14 "This necessary rule ('the one who decides must hear') does not preclude practicable administrative
procedure in obtaining the aid of assistants in the department. Assistants may prosecute inquiries. Evidence
may be taken by an examiner. Evidence thus taken may be sifted and analyzed by competent subordinates.
Arguments may be oral or written. The requirements are not technical. But there must be a hearing in a
substantial sense. And to give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations
upon evidence, the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which
justifies them." (Morgan v. United States, 298 US 468, 481-482, [1935], 80 L. ed. 1288, 1295-1296.)
15 Manila Trading and Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor Union, 71 Phil. 124.
16 "While 'the one who decides must hear,' it must be remembered that 'hear' is used in the technical sense
of requiring certain procedural minimums to insure an informed judgment by the one who has the
responsibility of making the final decision and order, but that this does not require the deciding agency to
take the evidence itself. Southern Garment Mgrs. Asso. v. Fleming, [1941] 74 App DC 228, 122 F 2d
622 ... ." (18 ALR 2d, section 3, p. 609.).
17 Morgan v. U.S., supra.
18 Rep. Act No. 3845, Items 26-28, p. 2009, for the fiscal year 1963-64; Rep. Act No. 4164, Items 21-24, p.
2204, for the fiscal year 1964-65; Rep. Act No. 4642, Items 22-25, p. 2318, for the fiscal year 1966-67; Rep.
Act No. 5170, Items 22-25, p. 2318, for the fiscal year 1967-68.
19 "Any doubt as to the authority of the President under the Legislative Appropriation Act of June 30, 1932,
as amended March 3, 1933, 47 Sta. at L. 413, 1517, to transfer the function of the United States shipping
Board to the Department of Commerce by Executive order, and as to whether the conditions of the exercise
of such authority were met, is set at rest by the subsequent recognition by Congress of the validity of the
transfer in making appropriations to the Department of Commerce for salaries and expenses to carry out the
provisions of the Shipping Act and in referring, in S 204 (a) of the Merchant Marine Act of June 29, 1936;
48 Sta. at L. 1985, chap. 858, to the functions of the Shipping Board as having been vested in the
Department of Commerce pursuant to an executive order." (Isbrandtse-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U.S.
139-149 [1936], 81L. ed. 563.)
"The repeated appropriations of the proceeds of the fees thus covered and to be covered into the Treasury,
not only confirms the departmental construction of the statute, but constitutes a ratification of the action of
the Secretary as the agent of Congress in the administration of the act."(Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 300-362
[1940], 85 L. ed. 1403.
G.R. No. 78763 July 12,1989
42. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and APOLINARIO M.
SIGNO, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.
Dominador Maglalang for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the resolution
of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated March 12, 1987 (p. 28, Rollo) in NLRC Case
No. NCR-8-3808-83, entitled, "Apolinario M. Signo, Complainant, versus Manila Electric Company,
Respondents", affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter which ordered the reinstatement of private
respondent herein, Apolinario Signo, to his former position without backwages.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Private respondent Signo was employed in petitioner company as supervisor-leadman since January 1963 up
to the time when his services were terminated on May 18, 1983.
In 1981, a certain Fernando de Lara filed an application with the petitioner company for electrical services at
his residence at Peñafrancia Subdivision, Marcos Highway, Antipolo, Rizal. Private respondent Signo
facilitated the processing of the said application as well as the required documentation for said application at
the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. In consideration thereof, private respondent received from Fernando de
Lara the amount of P7,000.00. Signo thereafter filed the application for electric services with the Power
Sales Division of the company.
It was established that the area where the residence of de Lara was located is not yet within the serviceable
point of Meralco, because the place was beyond the 30-meter distance from the nearest existing Meralco
facilities. In order to expedite the electrical connections at de Lara's residence, certain employees of the
company, including respondent Signo, made it appear in the application that the sari-sari store at the corner
of Marcos Highway, an entrance to the subdivision, is applicant de Lara's establishment, which, in reality is
not owned by the latter.
As a result of this scheme, the electrical connections to de Lara's residence were installed and made possible.
However, due to the fault of the Power Sales Division of petitioner company, Fernando de Lara was not
billed for more than a year.
Petitioner company conducted an investigation of the matter and found respondent Signo responsible for the
said irregularities in the installation. Thus, the services of the latter were terminated on May 18, 1983.
On August 10 1983, respondent Signo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unpaid wages, and separation
pay.
After the parties had submitted their position papers, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision (p. 79, Rollo) on
April 29, 1985, which stated, inter alia:
Verily, complainant's act of inducing the Meralco employees to effectuate the installation on Engr. de Lara's
residence prejudiced the respondent, and therefore, complainant himself had indeed became a participant in
the transactions, although not directly, which turned out to be illegal, not to mention that some of the
materials used therein belongs to Meralco, some of which were inferior quality. . . .
While complainant may deny the violation, he cannot do away with company's Code on Employee
Discipline, more particularly Section 7, par. 8 and Section 6, par. 24 thereof However, as admitted by the
respondent, the infraction of the above cited Code is punishable by reprimand to dismissal."
... . And in this case, while considering that complainant indeed committed the above-cited infractions of
company Code of Employee Discipline, We shall also consider his records of uninterrupted twenty (20)
years of service coupled with two (2) commendations for honesty. Likewise, We shall take note that subject
offense is his first, and therefore, to impose the extreme penalty of dismissal is certainly too drastic. A
penalty short of dismissal is more in keeping with justice, and adherence to compassionate society.
WHEREFORE, respondent Meralco is hereby directed to reinstate complainant Apolinario M. Signo to his
former position as Supervisor Leadman without backwages, considering that he is not at all faultless. He is
however, here warned, that commission of similar offense in the future, shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Both parties appealed from the decision to the respondent Commission. On March 12, 1987, the respondent
Commission dismissed both appeals for lack of merit and affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
On June 23, 1987, the instant petition was filed with the petitioner contending that the respondent
Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter. A
temporary restraining order was issued by this Court on August 3, 1987, enjoining the respondents from
enforcing the questioned resolution of the respondent Commission.
The issue to resolve in the instant case is whether or not respondent Signo should be dismissed from
petitioner company on grounds of serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence.
Petitioner contends that respondent Signo violated Sections 6 and 7 of the company's Code on Employee
Discipline, which provide:
Section 6, Par. 24—Encouraging, inducing or threatening another employee to perform an act constituting a
violation of this Code or of company work, rules or an offense in connection with the official duties of the
latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced to commit such offense.
Penalty—Reprimand to dismissal, depending upon the gravity of the offense.
Section 7, Par. 8—Soliciting or receiving money, gift, share, percentage or benefits from any person,
personally or through the mediation of another, to perform an act prejudicial to the Company.
Penalty—Dismissal. (pp. 13-14, Rollo)
Petitioner further argues that the acts of private respondent constituted breach of trust and caused the
petitioner company economic losses resulting from the unbilled electric consumption of de Lara; that in
view thereof, the dismissal of private respondent Signo is proper considering the circumstances of the case.
The power to dismiss is the normal prerogative of the employer. An employer, generally, can dismiss or
lay-off an employee for just and authorized causes enumerated under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor
Code. However, the right of an employer to freely discharge his employees is subject to regulation by the
State, basically in the exercise of its paramount police power. This is so because the preservation of the lives
of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, more vital than the preservation of corporate profits (Euro-Linea,
Phil. Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 75782, December 1, 1987,156 SCRA 78).
There is no question that herein respondent Signo is guilty of breach of trust and violation of company rules,
the penalty for which ranges from reprimand to dismissal depending on the gravity of the offense. However,
as earlier stated, the respondent Commission and the Labor Arbiter found that dismissal should not be meted
to respondent Signo considering his twenty (20) years of service in the employ of petitioner, without any
previous derogatory record, in addition to the fact that petitioner company had awarded him in the past, two
(2) commendations for honesty. If ever the petitioner suffered losses resulting from the unlisted electric
consumption of de Lara, this was found to be the fault of petitioner's Power Sales Division.
We find no reason to disturb these findings. Well-established is the principle that findings of administrative
agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are
generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Judicial review by this Court on labor cases does not
go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor officer or office based
his or its determination but is limited to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion (Special Events
and Central Shipping Office Workers Union v. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. Nos. L-51002-06, May
30,1983,122 SCRA 557).
This Court has held time and again, in a number of decisions, that notwithstanding the existence of a valid
cause for dismissal, such as breach of trust by an employee, nevertheless, dismissal should not be imposed,
as it is too severe a penalty if the latter has been employed for a considerable length of time in the service of
his employer. (Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. L- 54280, September 30,1982,117 SCRA
523; Meracap v. International Ceramics Manufacturing Co., Inc., et al., G.R. Nos. L-48235-36, July 30,1979,
92 SCRA 412; Sampang v. Inciong, G.R. No. 50992, June 19,1985,137 SCRA 56; De Leon v. NLRC, G.R.
No. L-52056, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 691; Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. PALEA, G.R. No. L-24626,
June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 489).
In a similar case, this Court ruled:
As repeatedly been held by this Court, an employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the
employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of breach of trust towards his employer and whose
continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to its interest. The law in protecting the rights of
the laborers, authorized neither oppression nor self- destruction of the employer.
However, taking into account private respondent's 'twenty-three (23) years of service which undisputedly is
unblemished by any previous derogatory record' as found by the respondent Commission itself, and since he
has been under preventive suspension during the pendency of this case, in the absence of a showing that the
continued employment of private respondent would result in petitioner's oppression or self-destruction, We
are of the considered view that his dismissal is a drastic punishment. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
The ends of social and compassionate justice would therefore be served if private respondent is reinstated
but without backwages in view of petitioner's obvious good faith. (Itogon- Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. NLRC, et al.,
11 7 SCRA 528)
Further, in carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and its implementing regulations, the
workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. This kind of interpretation
gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of
the New Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions
of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor"
(Abella v. NLRC, G.R. No. 71812, July 30,1987,152 SCRA 140).
In view of the foregoing, reinstatement of respondent Signo is proper in the instant case, but without the
award of backwages, considering the good faith of the employer in dismissing the respondent.
ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission dated March 12, 1987 is AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining
order issued on August 3, 1987 is lifted.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-68288 July 11, 1986

DIOSDADO GUZMAN, ULYSSES URBIZTONDO, and ARIEL RAMACULA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY and DOMINGO L. JHOCSON in his capacity as President of National
University, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado and Haydee Yorac for petitioners.
Samson S. Alcantara for respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National
University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's "continued and
persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies
with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they allege:
1) that respondent University's avowed reason for its refusal to re-enroll them in their respective courses is
"the latter's participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University.
2) that this "attitude of the (University) is simply a continuation of its cavalier if not hostile attitude to the
student's exercise of their basic constitutional and human rights already recorded in Rockie C. San Juan vs.
National University, S.C. G.R. No. 65443 (1983) and its utter contempt for the principle of due process of
law to the prejudice of petitioners;" and
3) that "in effect petitioners are subjected to the extreme penalty of expulsion without cause or if there be
any, without being informed of such cause and without being afforded the opportunity to defend
themselves. Berina v. Philippine Maritime Institute (117 SCRA 581 [1983]).
In the comment filed on September 24, 1986 for respondent University and its President pursuant to this
Court's requirement therefor1 , respondents make the claim:
1) that "petitioners' failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own
fault and not because of their allegedexercise of their constitutional and human rights;"
2) that petitioner Urbiztondo, sought to re-enroll only on July 5, 1986 "when the enrollment period was
already closed;"
3) that as regards petitioner Guzman, his "academic showing" was "poor", "due to his activities in leading
boycotts of classes"; that when his father was notified of this development sometime in August, 1982, the
latter had demanded that his son "reform or else we will recall him to the province"; that Guzman was one of
the petitioners in G.R. No. 65443 entitled "Rockie San Juan, et al. vs. National University, et al.," at the
hearing of which on November 23, 1983 this Court had admonished "the students involved (to) take
advantage and make the most of the opportunity given to them to study;" that Guzman "however continued
to lead or actively participate in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit
from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein;" that moreover, Guzman "is facing
criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Crim. Case No.
066446) in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent University on September 12, 1983 ",
and "is also one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 8320483 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
entitled 'National University, Inc. vs. Rockie San Juan et al.' for damages arising from destruction of
university properties
4) that as regards petitioner Ramacula, like Guzman "he continued to lead or actively participate, contrary to
the spirit of the Resolution dated November 23, 1983 of this ... Court (in G.R. No. 65443 in which he was
also one of the petitioners) and to university rules and regulations, within university premises but without
permit from university officials in activities that disturbed or disrupted classes;" and
5) that petitioners have "failures in their records, (and) are not of good scholastic standing. "
Respondents close their comment with the following assertions, to wit:
1) By their actuations, petitioners must be deemed to have forfeited their privilege, if any, to seek enrollment
in respondent university. The rights of respondent university, as an institution of higher learning, must also
be respected. It is also beyond comprehension why petitioners, who continually despise and villify
respondent university and its officials and faculty members, should persist in seeking enrollment in an
institution that they hate.
2) Under the circumstances, and without regard to legal technicalities, it is not to the best interest of all
concerned that petitioners be allowed to enroll in respondent university.
3) In any event, petitioners' enrollment being on the semestral basis, respondents cannot be compelled to
enroll them after the end of the semester.
On October 2, 1984 this Court issued a resolution reading as follows:
... Acting on the Comment submitted by respondent, the Court Resolved to NOTE the same and to require a
REPLY to such Comment. The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a MANDATORY INJUNCTION,
enjoining respondent to allow the enrolment of petitioners for the coming semester without prejudice to any
disciplinary proceeding to which any or all of them may be subjected with their right to lawful defense
recognized and respected. As regards petitioner Diosdado Guzman, even if it be a fact that there is a pending
criminal charge against him for malicious mischief, the Court nonetheless is of the opinion that, as
above-noted, without prejudice to the continuation of any disciplinary proceeding against him, that he be
allowed to resume his studies in the meanwhile. As shown in Annex 2 of the petition itself, Mr. Juan P.
Guzman, father of said petitioner, is extending full cooperation with petitioners to assure that whatever
protest or grievance petitioner Guzman may have would be ventilated in a lawful and peaceful manner.
Petitioners' REPLY inter alia—
1) denied that Urbiztondo attempted to enroll only on July 5, 1984 (when enrollment was already closed), it
being alleged that "while he did try to enroll that day, he also attempted to do so several times before that
date, all to no avail, because respondents ... persistently refused to allow him to do so" respondents'
ostensible reason being that Urbiztondo (had) participated in mass actions ... within the school premises,"
although there were no existing disciplinary charge against petitioner Urbiztondo" at the time;
2) asserted that "neither the text nor the context of the resolution 2 justifies the conclusion that "petitioners'
right to exercise their constitutional freedoms" had thereby been restricted or limited; and
3) alleged that "the holding of activities (mass action) in the school premises without the permission of the
school ... can be explained by the fact that the respondents persistently refused to issue such permit
repeatedly sought by the students. "
On November 23, 1984, this Court promulgated another resolution, this time reading as follows:
... The Court, after considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in the petition for
extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction as well as the
respondents' comment on the petition and the reply of counsel for petitioners to the respondents' comment,
Resolved to (a) give DUE COURSE to the petition; (b) consider the respondents' comment as ANSWER to
the petition; and (c) require the parties to file their respective MEMORANDA within twenty (20) days from
notice. ... .
Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that they had
never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or
participated "in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school
authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and
intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University
authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages and a criminal case for malicious
mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or
debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly
published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic
standing.
Under the Education Act of 1982, 5 the petitioners, as students, have the right among others "to freely
choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,
except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations." 6 Petitioners were being
denied this right, or being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the admonition in the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools 7 that "(n)o penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as
defined in ... (the) Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due
investigation shall have been conducted." 8 This Court is therefore constrained, as in Berina v. Philippine
Maritime Institute, 9 to declare illegal this act of respondents of imposing sanctions on students without due
investigation.
Educational institutions of course have the power to "adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed
expedient for ... (its) government, ... (this being)" incident to the very object of incorporation, and
indispensable to the successful management of the college." 10 The rules may include those governing
student discipline. Indeed, the maintenance of "good school discipline" is a duty specifically enjoined on
"every private school" by the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools; 11 and in this connection, the
Manual further provides that-
... The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding sanctions therefor must be clearly specified
and defined in writing and made known to the students and/or their parents or guardians. Schools shall have
the authority and prerogative to promulgate such rules and regulations as they may deem necessary from
time to time effective as of the date of their promulgation unless otherwise specified. 12
But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. And it
bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in
student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not, 'contrary to petitioners' view, an
essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with
the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall
have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to re-enroll
or otherwise continue with their respective courses, without prejudice to any disciplinary proceedings to
which any or all of them may be subjected in accordance with the standards herein set forth.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-58610 September 30, 1982
44. BABELO BERINA, MARILOU ELAGDON, ERNESTO ROBERTO and JESUS

SORIAO, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE MARITIME INSTITUTE, TOMAS CLOMA and JAIME CLOMA, respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Babelo Beriña, Marilou Elagdon, Ernesto Roberto and Jesus Soriao are students of the Philippine
Maritime Institute, PMI for short. In their petition which is styled FOR EXTRAORDINARY AND
EQUITABLE REMEDY WITH PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, they claim that PMI, five weeks
after school had started, posted sometime in August, 1981, a notice that there would be a 15%
increase in tuition fees retroactive to the start of the current semester; that the students met and took
positive steps in respect of the problem; that their representatives held dialogues with the school
administration; "that, in reaction to these legitimate student activities and without compliance with
due process respondents commencing on October 15, 1981 issued expulsion orders against Jesus
Soriao, Ernesto Roberto, and Babelo Berina and an indefinite suspension against Marilou Elagdon;"
that the penalties were imposed without due process and had the effect of negating the petitioners'
right to free speech, peaceful assembly and petition for redress of grievances. The petitioners pray
that the expulsion and suspension orders be annulled and that while the case is pending resolution
they be restored to their status as students of the PMI,
On November 10, 1981, We required PMI and its officers who were included as respondents to
comment on the petition. We also issued a temporary restraining order commanding the respondents
to refrain from carrying out the expulsion and suspension orders.
PMI filed its comment as required where it said that the 15% increase in tuition fee had been
authorized by the Ministry of Education and Culture; and denied that the action taken against the
petitioners was in response to their activities in connection with the tuition fee increase. The comment
also advances the arguments that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petition because it
involves "matters that are well within the competence and jurisdiction of the lower courts to pass
upon, as even more serious matters and cases of greater consequences are normally brought before
them at the first instance prior to any appeal to the Supreme Court, and there are no valid and
impelling excuses to warrant a direct recourse to the Highest Tribunal in the judicial hierarchy."
We are not called upon to determine the validity or propriety of the tuition fee increase of 15% five
weeks after the classes for the current semester had started. The issue in this case is limited to the
question as to whether or not the petitioners were denied by the respondents their constitutional
rights to due process, free speech, peaceful assembly and petition to redress of grievances. Treating
the petition as having been filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as the petitioners assert, We have
no doubt that there is no absence of jurisdiction.
Typical of the expulsion orders is that which was issued to petitioner Jesus Soriao on October 15, 1981,
which has been marked as Annex A of the petition and which reads as follows:
For conduct unbecoming as a Cadet, you are hereby dropped from the roll of students of the School.
That your actuations and behavior as reported and seen leave no other recourse hence this action.
That on September 9th, you with another student was (sic) caught inside the STC Building,
distributing leaflets, enticing and coercing other students to join the slated demonstration.
In the subsequent days, you were caught again by the undersigned campaigning and distributing
leaflets, enjoining other students to join the boycott.
That all these actions are contrary to MEC regulations and directives that appropriate action had to
be taken.
For your guidance.
The suspension order which was issued for Marilou Elagdon on October 20, 1981, which has been
marked Annex C of the petition reads:
Please be informed that C/miss ELAGDON, Marilou is hereby suspended from her classes for
conduct unbecoming of a Cadetee as against the rules and regulation of the School.
Let the above-named student see the undersigned and in the meantime she remained suspended until
clearance is given by this office.
For your guidance.
The comment does not positively assert that in imposing the expulsion and suspension orders there
was observance of due process which simply means that the petitioners should have been given an
opportunity to defend themselves. It was only after the petitioners had said in their reply that the
respondents failed to traverse the denial of due process that the latter invoked the legal presumption
"that the ordinary course of business has been followed" (Sec. 5(q), Rule 131, Rules of Court)."
It is obvious from the expulsion and suspension orders that the petitioners were denied due
process, res ipsa loquitur. For the orders are bereft of the sides of the petitioners. Hence the legal
presumption of regularity cannot be availed in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the expulsion and suspension orders are hereby set aside but
without prejudice to the power of the respondents to formally charge the petitioners for violation(s) of
reasonable school rules and regulations and after due notice to hear and decide the charge. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
45. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., G.R. No. 12798

VS
THE COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
NAGTATAGIS sa kasong ito ang karapatang mag-aral ng apat na estudyante na nasangkot sa away
ng dalawang fraternity at ang karapatang akademiko ng isang pamantasan.
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr.
are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and
College of Saint Benilde (CSB)[1] Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive action
causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity.This is
the backdrop of the controversy before Us pitting private respondents right to education vis-a-vis the
Universitys right to academic freedom.
ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
are the following: (1) Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 30, 1996 dismissing DLSUs
petition for certiorari against respondent Judge and private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung, Reverente,
and Valdes, Jr.;[2] (2) Resolution of the CA dated October 15, 1996 denying the motion for
reconsideration;[3] (3) Order dated January 7, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36 Manila
granting private respondent Aguilars motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction;[4] and (4) Resolution
No. 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) exonerating private
respondent Aguilar and lowering the penalties for the other private respondents from expulsion to
exclusion.[5]
Factual Antecedents
Gleaned from the May 3, 1995 Decision of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, two violent
incidents on March 29, 1995 involving private respondents occurred:
x x x From the testimonies of the complaining witnesses, it appears that one week
prior to March 29, 1995, Mr. James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manangs Restaurant
near La Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at Domino
Lux. He ignored the comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding house, he
mentioned the remarks to his two other brods while watching television. These two brods had
earlier finished eating their dinner at Manangs. Then, the three, together with four other
persons went back to Manangs and confronted the two who were still in the restaurant. By
admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was a member of the
Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence then.
After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity
through the intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking
for an apology. Kailangan ng apology in the words of respondent Aguilar. But no apology
was made.
Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity went to the tambayan of the
Domino Lux Fraternity in the campus. Among them were respondents Bungubung, Reverente
and Papio. They were looking for a person whose description matched James Yap. According
to them, this person supposedly nambastos ng brod. As they could not find Mr. Yap, one of
them remarked Paano ba iyan. Pasensiya na lang.
Came March 29, 1995 and the following events.
Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., Mr. James Yap went out of the campus
using the Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to
re-cross Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys were running
towards him. He panicked. He did not know what to do. Then, respondent Bungubung
punched him in the head with something heavy in his hands parang knuckles. Respondents
Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punching him. Respondents Bungubung and Valdes
who were in front of him, were also punching him. As he was lying on the street, respondent
Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and the group of attackers left.
Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who attacked him. With
respect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita
sumuntok siya. What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also running with the group.
Two guards escorted Mr. Yap inside the campus. At this point, Mr. Dennis Pascual
was at the Engineering Gate. Mr. Pascual accompanied Yapto the university clinic; reported
the incident to the Discipline Office; and informed his fraternity brods at
their tambayan. According to Mr. Pascual, their head of the Domino Lux Fraternity
said: Walang gagalaw. Uwian na lang.
Mr. Ericson Cano, who was supposed to hitch a ride with Dennis Pascual, saw him
under the clock in Miguel Building. However, they did not proceed directly for home. With a
certain Michael Perez, they went towards the direction of Dagonoy Street because Mr.
Pascual was supposed to pick up a book for his friend from another friend who lives
somewhere in the area.
As they were along Dagonoy Street, and before they could pass the Kolehiyo ng
Malate Restaurant, Mr. Cano first saw several guys inside the restaurant. He said not to mind
them and just keep on walking. However, the group got out of the restaurant, among them
respondents Reverente, Lee and Valdes. Mr. Cano told Mr. Lee: Ayaw namin ng gulo. But,
respondent Lee hit Mr. Cano without provocation. Respondent Reverente kicked Mr. Pascual
and respondent Lee also hit Mr. Pascual. Mr. Cano and Mr. Perez managed to run from the
mauling and they were chased by respondent Lee and two others.
Mr. Pascual was left behind. After respondent Reverente first kicked him, Mr. Pascual
was ganged-upon by the rest. He was able to run, but the group was able to catch up with
him. His shirt was torn and he was hit at the back of his head with a lead pipe. Respondent
Lee who was chasing Cano and Perez, then returned to Mr. Pascual.
Mr. Pascual identified respondents Reverente and Lee, as among those who hit
him. Although Mr. Pascual did not see respondent Valdes hit him, he identified
respondent Valdez (sic) as also one of the members of the group.
In fact, Mr. Cano saw respondent Valdes near Mr. Pascual. He was almost near the
corner of Leon Guinto and Estrada; while respondent Pascual who managed to run was
stopped at the end of Dagonoy along Leon Guinto. Respondent Valdes shouted: Mga
putang-ina niyo. Respondent Reverente hit Mr. Pascual for the last time. Apparently being
satisfied with their handiwork, the group left. The victims, Cano, Perez and Pascual
proceeded to a friends house and waited for almost two hours, or at around 8:00 in the
evening before they returned to the campus to have their wounds treated. Apparently, there
were three cars roaming the vicinity.[6]
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap
and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the Domino Lux Fraternity, while
the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and
Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity, a rival fraternity.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint[7] with the Discipline Board of
DLSU charging private respondents with direct assault. Similar complaints[8] were also filed by Dennis
Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and Reverente. Thus, cases
entitled De La Salle University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul
Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325),
Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (AB-MGT/9251227) were docketed as
Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar,
Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to answer.
Private respondents filed their respective answers.[9]
As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB[10] were involved in the mauling incidents, a joint
DLSU-CSB Discipline Board[11]was formed to investigate the incidents. Thus, petitioner Board Chairman
Emmanuel Sales sent notices of hearing[12] to private respondents on April 12, 1995. Said notices uniformly
stated as follows:
Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to
hear and deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from
the written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.
You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19,
1995 at 9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and
present evidence in your behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your
testimony or those of your witnesses.
On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board, through
the Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their
proposed testimony.
Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list of
witnesses and the sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be considered a waiver on
your part to present evidence and as an admission of the principal act complained of.
For your strict compliance.[13]
During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents interposed
the common defense of alibi, summarized by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board as follows:
First, in the case of respondent Bungubung, March 29, 1995 was one of the few
instances when he was picked-up by a driver, a certain Romeo S. Carillo. Most of the time,
respondent Bungubung goes home alone sans driver. But on this particular date, respondent
Bungubung said that his dad asked his permission to use the car and thus, his dad instructed
this driver Carillo to pick-up his son. Mr. Carillo is not a family driver, but works from 8:00
a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for the Philippine Ports Authority where the elder Bungubung is also
employed.
Thus, attempting to corroborate the alibi of respondent Bungubung, Mr. Carillo said
that he arrived at La Salle at 4:56 p.m.; picked-up respondent at 5:02 p.m.; took the Roxas
Blvd. route towards respondents house in BF Paraaque (on a Wednesday in Baclaran); and
arrived at the house at 6:15 p.m. Respondent Bungubung was dropped-off in his house, and
taking the same route back, Mr. Carillo arrived at the South Harbor at 6:55 p.m. the
Philippine Ports Authority is located at the South Harbor.[14]
xxxx
Secondly, respondent Valdes said that he was with his friends at McDonalds Taft just
before 6:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that he left McDonald at 5:50 p.m. together to
get some medicine at the university clinic for his throat irritation. He said that he was at the
clinic at 5:52 p.m. and went back to McDonald, all within a span of 3 or even 4 minutes.
Two witnesses, a certain Sharon Sia and the girlfriend of respondent Valdes, a certain
Jorgette Aquino, attempted to corroborate Valdez alibi.[15]
xxxx
Third, respondent Reverente told that (sic) the Board that he was at his home at 5:00
p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that he was given the responsibility to be the paymaster of
the construction workers who were doing some works in the apartment of his
parents. Although he had classes in the evening, the workers according to him would wait for
him sometimes up to 9:00 p.m. when he arrives from his classes. The workers get paid
everyday.
Respondent Reverente submitted an affidavit, unsigned by the workers listed there,
supposedly attesting to the fact that he paid the workers at the date and time in question.[16]
xxxx
Fourth, respondent Aguilar solemnly sw[ore] that [he] left DLSU at 5:00
p.m. for Camp Crame for a meeting with some of the officers that we were preparing.[17]
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution[18] finding private
respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion,[19] pursuant to CHED
Order No. 4.[20] The dispositive part of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN
AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403),
ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty
of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby orders their automatic expulsion.
In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board

acquits him of the charge.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration[22] before the Office of the Senior
Vice-President for Internal Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in a
Letter-Resolution[23] dated June 1, 1995.
On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against petitioners a
petition for certiorari and injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74122
and assigned to respondent Judge of Branch 36. The petition essentially sought to annul the May 3,
1995Resolution of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board and the June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the
Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Affairs.
The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO[24] directing DLSU, its
subordinates, agents, representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain and desist
from implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to
immediately desist from barring the enrollment of Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.
Subsequently, private respondent Aguilar filed an ex parte motion to amend his petition to correct an
allegation in paragraph 3.21[25]of his original petition. Respondent Judge amended the TRO[26] to conform to
the correction made in the amended petition.[27]
On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with copies of the case records of Discipline
Case No. 9495-3-25121,[28] in view of the authority granted to it under Section 77(c) of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools (MRPS).
On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and Reverente, and later, Valdes, filed
petitions-in-intervention[29] in Civil Case No. 95-74122. Respondent Judge also issued corresponding
temporary restraining orders to compel petitioner DLSU to admit said private respondents.
On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to dismiss[30] in behalf of all petitioners, except
James Yap. On June 20, 1995, petitioners filed a supplemental motion to dismiss[31] the
petitions-in-intervention.
On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an Order[32] denying petitioners (respondents there)
motion to dismiss and its supplement, and granted private respondents (petitioners there) prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. The pertinent part of the Order reads:
For this purpose, respondent, its agents, representatives or any and all other persons
acting for and in its behalf is/are restrained and enjoined from
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering

the automatic expulsion of petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention from the De
La Salle University and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995, affirming the
Resolution dated May 3, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrolment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in the

courses offered at respondent De La Salle University and to immediately allow them
to enroll and complete their respective courses/degrees until their graduation thereat
in accordance with the standards set by the latter.
WHEREFORE, the ancillary remedy prayed for is granted. Respondent, its agents,
representatives, or any and all persons acting for and its behalf are hereby restrained and
enjoyed from:
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering

the automatic expulsion of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention and the
Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrollment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in the

courses offered at respondent (De La Salle University) and to forthwith allow all said
petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention to enroll and complete their respective
courses/degrees until their graduation thereat.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall take effect upon petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention posting an injunctive bond in the amount of P15,000.00 executed
in favor of respondent to the effect that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention will pay to
respondent all damages that the latter may suffer by reason of the injunction if the Court will
finally decide that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention are not entitled thereto.
The motion to dismiss and the supplement thereto is denied for lack of
merit. Respondents are directed to file their Answer to the Petition not later than fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof.
SO ORDERED.[33]
Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU when
he attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus, on September 25,
1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in
contempt of court.[34] Aguilar also prayed that petitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU in accordance
with respondent Judges Order dated September 20, 1995. On September 25, 1995, respondent Judge
issued[35] a writ of preliminary injunction, the relevant portion of which reads:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

OF MANILA that until further orders, you the said DE LA SALLE University as well as
your subordinates, agents, representatives, employees and any other person assisting or acting
for or on your behalf, to immediately desist from implementing the Resolution dated May 3,
1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and the intervenors in DLSU, and the
letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995 affirming the said Resolution of May 3, 1995 and to
immediately desist from barring the enrolment of petitioner and intervenors in the courses
offered at DLSU and to allow them to enroll and complete their degree courses until their
graduation from said school.[36]
On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari[37] (CA-G.R. SP No.
38719) with prayer for a TROand/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of respondent
Judges September 20, 1995 Order and writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995.
On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners prayer for preliminary injunction.
On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily
disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be
reinstated, while other private respondents were to be excluded.[38] The Resolution states:
RESOLUTION 181-96
RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY
(DLSU), TAFT AVENUE, MANILA FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OF
EXPULSION IMPOSED ON MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG,
ROBERT R. VALDES, JR., ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V. REVERENTE BE, AS IT IS
HEREBY IS, DISAPPROVED.
RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TO

IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND THE
LOWERING OF THE PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, MR. ROBER R.
VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR. ALVIN LEE AND MR. RICHARD V. REVERENTE FROM
EXPULSION TO EXCLUSION.[39]
Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent Aguilar from
enrolling and/or attending his classes, prompting his lawyer to write several demand letters[40] to petitioner
DLSU. In view of the refusal of petitioner DLSU to enroll private respondent Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter
dated June 26, 1996 addressed to petitioner Quebengco requesting that private respondent Aguilar be
allowed to continue attending his classes pending the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of
Resolution No. 181-96.However, petitioner Quebengco refused to do so, prompting CHED to promulgate an
Order dated September 23, 1996 which states:
Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr. Aguilar through counsel enjoining De

La Salle University (DLSU) to comply with CHED Resolution 181-96 (Re: Expulsion Case
of Alvin Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU) directing DLSU to reinstate Mr. Aguilar and finding the
urgent request as meritorious, there being no other plain and speedy remedy available,
considering the set deadline for enrollment this current TRIMESTER, and in order to prevent
further prejudice to his rights as a student of the institution, DLSU, through the proper school
authorities, is hereby directed to allow Mr. Alvin Aguilar to provisionally enroll, pending the
Commissions Resolution of the instant Motion for Reconsideration filed by DLSU.
SO ORDERED.[41]
Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, still refused to
allow private respondent Aguilar to enroll. Thus, private respondent Aguilars counsel wrote another demand
letter to petitioner DLSU.[42]
Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar, using CHED Resolution No. 181-96, filed a
motion to dismiss[43] in the CA, arguing that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 rendered the CA case moot and
academic.
On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to dismiss of
private respondent Aguilar, disposing thus:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, dismissal of herein petition is hereby directed.
SO ORDERED.[44]
On October 15, 1996, the CA issued its resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration, as follows:
It is obvious to Us that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 is immediately executory in

character, the pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding.
After considering the Opposition and for lack of merit, the Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.[45]
On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case records to the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) from the CHED.[46] Petitioners claimed that it is the DECS, not CHED, which
has jurisdiction over expulsion cases, thus, necessitating the transfer of the case records of Discipline Case
No. 9495-3-25121 to the DECS.
On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
38719 and the automatic lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, private respondent Aguilar filed an
urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 before
respondent RTC Judge of Manila.[47]
On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its questioned order granting private respondent
Aguilars urgent motion to reiterate preliminary injunction. The pertinent portion of the order reads:
In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilars urgent motion to reiterate writ of

preliminary injunction is hereby granted, and respondents motion to dismiss is denied.
The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 is declared to be in force
and effect.
Let a copy of this Order and the writ be served personally by the Courts sheriff upon
the respondents at petitioners expense.
SO ORDERED.[48]
Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was allowed to conditionally enroll in petitioner DLSU,
subject to the continued effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 and to the
outcome of Civil Case No. 95-74122.
On February 17, 1997, petitioners filed the instant petition.

On June 15, 1998, We issued a TRO[49] as prayed for by the urgent motion for the issuance of
a TRO[50] dated June 4, 1998 of petitioners, and enjoined respondent Judge from implementing the writ of
preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 issued in Civil Case No. 95-74122, effective immediately
and until further orders from this Court.
On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his manifestation[51] stating that he has long
completed his course at petitioner DLSU. He finished and passed all his enrolled subjects for the second
trimester of 1997-1998, as indicated in his transcript of records[52]issued by DLSU. However, despite having
completed all the academic requirements for his course, DLSU has not issued a certificate of
completion/graduation in his favor.
Issues
We are tasked to resolve the following issues:
1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review decisions of
institutions of higher learning that impose disciplinary action on their students found violating
disciplinary rules.
2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private respondents.
2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law?
2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom?
2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence?
3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents is proportionate to their
misdeed.
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of petitioners[53] that while CHED Resolution No.
181-96 disapproved the expulsion of other private respondents, it nonetheless authorized their exclusion
from petitioner DLSU. However, because of the dismissal of the CA case, petitioner DLSU is now faced
with the spectacle of having two different directives from the CHED and the respondent Judge CHED
ordering the exclusion of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge
ordering petitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll and complete their degree courses until their graduation.
This is the reason We opt to decide the whole case on the merits, brushing aside technicalities, in
order to settle the substantial issues involved. This Court has the power to take cognizance of the petition at
bar due to compelling reasons, and the nature and importance of the issues raised warrant the immediate
exercise of Our jurisdiction.[54] This is in consonance with our case law now accorded near-religious
reverence that rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when
its rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court has the duty to
suspend their operation.[55]
I. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the

power of supervision and review over
disciplinary cases decided by institutions
of higher learning.
Ang CHED, hindi ang DECS, ang may kapangyarihan ng pagsubaybay at pagrepaso sa mga
desisyong pandisiplina ng mga institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral.
Petitioners posit that the jurisdiction and duty to review student expulsion cases, even those
involving students in secondary and tertiary levels, is vested in the DECS not in the CHED. In support of
their stance, petitioners cite Sections 4,[56] 15(2) & (3),[57] 54,[58] 57(3)[59]and 70[60] of Batas Pambansa (B.P.)
Blg. 232, otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982.
According to them, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS power of
supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning. They say that unlike B.P.
Blg. 232, R.A. No. 7722 makes no reference to the right and duty of learning institutions to develop moral
character and instill discipline among its students. The clear concern of R.A. No. 7722 in the creation of the
CHED was academic, i.e., the formulation, recommendation, setting, and development of academic plans,
programs and standards for institutions of higher learning. The enumeration of CHEDs powers and functions
under Section 8 does not include supervisory/review powers in student disciplinary cases. The reference in
Section 3 to CHEDs coverage of institutions of higher education is limited to the powers and functions
specified in Section 8. The Bureau of Higher Education, which the CHED has replaced and whose functions
and responsibilities it has taken over, never had any authority over student disciplinary cases.
We cannot agree.
On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722, otherwise known as An Act Creating the
Commission on Higher Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof and for other purposes.
Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the creation of the CHED, provides:
Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher Education. In pursuance of the

abovementioned policies, the Commission on Higher Education is hereby created, hereinafter
referred to as Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) and attached to the office of the President for administrative
purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public and private institutions of higher education as
well as degree-granting programs in all post secondary educational institutions, public and
private.
The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. They include
the following:
Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
xxxx
n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and
functions as may be necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and
objectives of this Act; and
o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective operations
and for the continued enhancement of growth or development of higher
education.
Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not transfer to the
CHED the DECS power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher
learning.
First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing. They make no reservations of powers to the
DECS insofar as institutions of higher learning are concerned. They show that the authority and supervision
over all public and private institutions of higher education, as well as degree-granting programs in all
post-secondary educational institutions, public and private, belong to the CHED, not the DECS.
Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to decide disciplinary cases involving
students on the tertiary level would render nugatory the coverage of the CHED, which is both public and
private institutions of higher education as well as degree granting programs in all post secondary educational
institutions, public and private. That would be absurd.
It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a private educational institution which offers
tertiary degree programs. Hence, it is under the CHED authority.
Third, the policy of R.A. No. 7722[61] is not only the protection, fostering and promotion of the right
of all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and the taking of appropriate steps to ensure that
education shall be accessible to all. The law is likewiseconcerned with ensuring and protecting academic
freedom and with promoting its exercise and observance for the continued intellectual growth of students,
the advancement of learning and research, the development of responsible and effective leadership, the
education of high-level and middle-level professionals, and the enrichment of our historical and cultural
heritage.
It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were aware that
disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level would continue to arise in the future, which would
call for the invocation and exercise of institutions of higher learning of their right to academic freedom.
Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim that the Bureau of Higher Education,
which CHED replaced, never had authority over student disciplinary cases. In fact, the responsibilities of
other
government entities having functions similar to those of the CHED were transferred to the CHED.[62]
Section 77 of the MRPS[63] on the process of review in student discipline cases should therefore
be read in conjunction with the provisions of R.A. No. 7722.
Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating that [j]urisdiction over DECS-supervised
or chartered state-supported post-secondary degree-granting vocational and tertiary institutions shall be
transferred to the Commission [On Higher Education]. This provision does not limit or
distinguish that what is being transferred to the CHED is merely the formulation, recommendation, setting
and development of academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher learning, as what
petitioners would have us believe as the only concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus: Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the CHED, necessarily
includes the transfer to the CHED of any jurisdiction which the DECS might have possessed by virtue of
B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule for that matter.
IIa. Private respondents were accorded

due process of law.
Ang mga private respondents ay nabigyan ng tamang proseso ng batas.
The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights
based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed
fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history.[64] The constitutional behest that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law is solemn and inflexible.[65]
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline, [t]here
are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process
and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to
adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.[66]
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he
cannot complain of deprivation of due process.[67] Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due
process,
the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative
proceedings.[68] The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.[69] So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or
defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process.[70]
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process it is
enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. [71] To be heard does
not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court one may also be heard through pleadings and
where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.[72]
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the
DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the
charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also informed of the
evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private
respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline
Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its resolution
in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed to
cross-examine the witnesses against them. This argument was already rejected in Guzman v. National
University[73] where this Court held that x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of
procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does
not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of
justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross examination is not, x x x an
essential part thereof.
IIb. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of
higher learning, possesses academic
freedom which includes determination
of who to admit for study.
Ang petitioner DLSU, bilang institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral, ay nagtataglay ng
kalayaang akademiko na sakop ang karapatang pumili ng mga mag-aaral dito.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic
freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself,
its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly
when the overriding public interest calls for some restraint.[74] According to present jurisprudence, academic
freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for
itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to
study.[75]
It cannot be gainsaid that the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if
not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches
discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom what to
teach.[76] Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982 that students have a right to
freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation,[77] such right is subject to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the
academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic freedom, which
includes its free choice of students for admission to its school.
IIc. The guilt of private respondents

Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes,
Jr. was proven by substantial evidence.
Ang pagkakasala ng private respondents na sina Bungubung, Reverente at Valdes, Jr. ay napatunayan
ng ebidensiyang substansyal.
As has been stated earlier, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi. However, in
order that alibi may succeed as a defense, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a)
his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility
of his presence at the scene of the crime.[78]
On the other hand, the defense of alibi may not be successfully invoked where the identity of the
assailant has been established by witnesses.[79] Positive identification of accused where categorical and
consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the
alibi and denial of appellants whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.[80] Well-settled is the rule that denial and alibi, being weak defenses, cannot overcome the positive
testimonies of the offended parties.[81]
Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to the crime who can positively identify the
accused.[82] Alibi is an inherently weak defense and courts must receive it with caution because one can
easily fabricate an alibi.[83] Jurisprudence holds that denial, like alibi, is inherently weak and crumbles in
light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters that accused were at
the scene of the crime and were the victims assailants. As between categorical testimonies that ring of truth
on one hand and a bare denial on the other, the former must prevail.[84] Alibi is the weakest of all defenses
for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is for this reason that it cannot prevail over the
positive identification of accused by the witnesses.[85]
The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline cases, is neither proof
beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence. According to Ang
Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,[86] it means such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Viewed from the foregoing, We reject the alibi of private respondents Bungubung, Valdes Jr., and
Reverente. They were unable to show convincingly that they were not at the scene of the crime on March 29,
1995 and that it was impossible for them to have been there.Moreover, their alibi cannot prevail over their
positive identification by the victims.
We hark back to this Courts pronouncement affirming the expulsion of several students found guilty
of hazing:
No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of respondent

students who have been investigated and found guilty by the Disciplinary Board to have
violated petitioner universitys disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine the
authority of the administration of the school. This we would be most loathe to do.
More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner universitys academic freedom

which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitution.[87]
Certainly, private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. do not deserve to claim a venerable
institution as their own, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the students currently
enrolled, as well as those who come after them.[88] It must be borne in mind that universities are established,
not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and
attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.[89]
As for private respondent Aguilar, however, We are inclined to give credence to his alibi that he was
at Camp Crame in Quezon City at the time of the incident in question on March 29, 1995. This claim was
amply corroborated by the certification that he submitted before the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, to
wit:
CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
We, the undersigned, hereby declare and affirm by way of this

Certification that sometime on March 29, 1995, at about and between 4:30
P.M. and 5:30 P.M., we were together with Alvin A. Aguilar, at Kiangan Hall,
inside Camp Crame, Quezon City, meeting in connection with an affair of our
class known as Class 7, Batch 89 of the Philippine Constabulary discussing on
the proposed sponsorship of TAU GAMMA PHI from said Batch 89 affair.
That the meeting was terminated at about 6:30 P.M. that evening and Alvin Aguilar
had asked our permission to leave and we saw him leave Camp Crame, in his car with the
driver.
April 18, 1995, Camp Crame, Quezon City.[90]
The said certification was duly signed by PO3 Nicanor R. Faustino (Anti-Organized Crime CIC, NCR), PO3
Alejandro D. Deluviar (ODITRM, Camp Crame, Quezon City), PO2 Severino C. Filler (TNTSC, Camp
Crame, Quezon City), and PO3 Ireneo M. Desesto (Supply Center, PNPLSS). The rule is that alibi assumes
significance or strength when it is amply corroborated by credible and disinterested witnesses. [91] It is true
that alibi is a weak defense which an accused can easily fabricate to escape criminal liability. But where the
prosecution evidence is weak, and betrays lack of credibility as to the identification of defendant, alibi
assumes commensurate strength. This is but consistent with the presumption of innocence in favor of
accused.[92]
Alibi is not always undeserving of credit, for there are times when accused has no other possible
defense for what could really be the truth as to his whereabouts at the crucial time, and such defense may, in
fact, tilt the scales of justice in his favor.[93]
III. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU

on private respondents is disproportionate
to their misdeed.
Ang parusang expulsion na ipinataw ng DLSU sa private respondents ay hindi angkop sa

kanilang pagkakasala.
It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students as subsumed in their
academic freedom and that the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly
those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient
operation of the institution, but to its very survival.[94] This power, however, does not give them the
untrammeled discretion to impose a penalty which is not commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If
the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an
element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process question.[95]
We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed by private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and
Valdes, Jr. Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only for few seconds and the victims did not suffer any
serious injury. Disciplinary measures especially where they involve suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut
significantly into the future of a student. They attach to him for life and become a mortgage of his future,
hardly redeemable in certain cases.Officials of colleges and universities must be anxious to protect it,
conscious of the fact that, appropriately construed, a disciplinary action should be treated as an educational
tool rather than a punitive measure.[96]
Accordingly, We affirm the penalty of exclusion[97] only, not expulsion,[98] imposed on them by the
CHED. As such, pursuant to Section 77(b) of the MRPS, petitioner DLSU may exclude or drop the names of
the said private respondents from its rolls for being undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions

dated July 30, 1996 and dated October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, Order
dated January 7, 1997 are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, while CHED Resolution 181-96 dated May 14,
1996 is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation in favor of private

respondent Aguilar. On the other hand, it may exclude or drop the names of private respondents Bungubung,
Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and their transfer credentials immediately issued.

32 To 45 Due Process Full Cases

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

32 To 45 Due Process Full Cases

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

32. Heirs of Jose Deleste v.

Landbank of the Philippines (June 8, 2011)

I. [WHETHER THE CA WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING] OUTRIGHT THE

II. [WHETHER] THE OUTRIGHT DENIAL OF PETITIONERS MOTION FOR

IV. [WHETHER THE LAND] THAT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY AND

V. [WHETHER DAR VIOLATED] THE RIGHTS OF PETITIONERS TO

VI. [WHETHER] THE COMPENSATION DETERMINED BY DAR AND LBP IS

VII. [WHETHER] THE ISSUANCE OF EMANCIPATION PATENTS [IS] LEGAL

VIII. [WHETHER] THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE [ARE] VALID GIVEN THAT

The petition is meritorious.

Effect of non-compliance with the requirements

Are the EPs over the subject land x x x valid x x x?[33]

There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial

Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo is instructive:

We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that

On the coverage of the subject property

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in

However, Natalia should be cautiously applied in light of Administrative Order 04,

However, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural uses shall not operate

As emphasized, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural cannot be applied

It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

On the violation of petitioners right to due process of law

Issue of Validity of EPs Not Barred by Res Judicata

33. LYNVIL FISHING ENTERPRISES VS ARIOLA

The version of the petitioners follows:

5. Failing to explain as required, respondents employment was terminated.

On the other hand, the story of the defense is:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding that

Separation Pay P74,650.00

13th Month Pay P6,500.00

Separation Pay P44,304.00

13th Month Pay 5,538.00

Salary Differential 1,547.52

Separation Pay 55,250.00

13th Month Pay P6,500.00 P295,700.00

Separation Pay P44,073.00

13th Month Pay 2,473.12

Salary Differential 4,472.00

Separation Pay P58,149.00

13th Month Pay 2,473.12

Salary Differential P5,538.00

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING AND SETTING

However as above discussed, an administrative fine of PhP5,000.00 for each

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT

The Courts Ruling

The nature of employment is defined in the Labor Code, thus:

Lynvil insists on the applicability of the case of Brent School,[41] to wit:

Whether De Borja is jointly and severally liable with Lynvil

34. HON. WALDO Q. FLORES VS MONTEMAYOR

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

The facts follow.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Antonio F. Montemayor is hereby found

I. WHETHER PETITIONER PAGC HAD A CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO

III. WHETHER THE ALLEGED UNDUE HASTE AND APPARENT

IV. WHETHER RESPONDENT HAD COMMITTED A MAJOR ADMINISTRATIVE

V. WHETHER THE [OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENTS] DETERMINATION