REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO (G.R. No.

156117 May 26, 2005)

Facts:

Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC,
on 23 September 1998, a single application for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423,
located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the
Subject Lots, which they purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25
June 1976.

Together with their application for registration, respondents submitted the following set of documents:

(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias; and Advance Survey
Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of respondent David;
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;
(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dispensing with
the need for Surveyor's Certificates for the Subject Lots;
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of certificates of title covering
the Subject Lots;
(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR
on its finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and disposable, by virtue of Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June 1963;
(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No. 941800301831, in the name of
Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of
David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in 1994; and
(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan
selling the Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to their sons and respondents herein,
Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to
David.

On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an Opposition to the
respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing that:

(1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by
law;
(2) Respondents' muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and
(3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were not subject to
private appropriation.

The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. All owners of the land adjoining the
Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing. A copy of the Notice was also posted on 27 July
1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of
Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were located. Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official
Gazette on 02 August 1999 and The Freeman Banat News on 19 December 1999.

During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of Special Default, with only
petitioner Republic opposing the application for registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents, through
their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional facts. The MTC
commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive further evidence from the respondents and to submit a Report to
the MTC after 30 days.

On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration and confirmation of the
title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently
issued an Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, final and executory,
and directing the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration for
the Subject Lots.

Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November 2002, affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment
reasoning thus:
 In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be registered has been classified
as within the alienable and disposable zone since June 25, 1963.

Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively provides that:

"All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions of patrimonial
character shall not be the object of prescription" and that "Ownership and other real rights over
immovable also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without
need of title or of good faith."

As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already acquired the subject parcels of
lands, subject matter of this application, since 1950 and that they cultivated the same and planted it with
jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6).

The subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now
be the object of prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of Article 1137,
appellees are, with much greater right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of
P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any manner provided by law. Appellees have been
possessing the subject parcels of land in open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35 years
already when they filed the instant application for registration of title to the land in 1998.

The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the following arguments:
First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945
or earlier.

Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the application
consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by two applicants.

Issues:
1. Whether or not respondents failed to comply with the publication requirements mandated by the Property
Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land registration court?
2. Whether or not respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots for
the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title.

Held:
1. Yes.

Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition did not affect the jurisdiction of
the MTC over the land registration proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the
publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and
proceed with respondents' application for registration.

A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be
constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given Notice of the Initial Hearing of
the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the
Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the following manner:

1. By publication. –
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines:

Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land
involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said
 notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show
cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.

Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property Registration Decree expressly
provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land
registration court, it still affirms its declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals that publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to validly confirm and register
the title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree enumerated and
described in detail therequirements of publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then
all such requirements, including publication of the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is essential
and imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the same case, this Court expounded on the reason
behind the compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, thus
–

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory
when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and
posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process
and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspaper and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the
interested parties on time, if at all.

Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any
other real estate. In sum, the all encompassingin rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the
notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for
publication, mailing and posting.

In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact held, on 03 September 1999 at
8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and
officially released on 10 August 1999, it was published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper
printed in Cebu City and circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas and
Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999, more than three months after the initial hearing.

Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing, would already be
worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was published in The Freeman Banat News and had a
claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late for him to appear before the
MTC on the day of the initial hearing to oppose respondents' application for registration, and to present his
claim and evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the claimant-oppositor
fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial hearing, he would be in default and would forever be
barred from contesting respondents' application for registration and even the registration decree that may be
issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03 September 1999.

The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to
no publication at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice,
the MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents'
application for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the
registration and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422 and 8423,
respectively; as well as
the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory,
and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and
void for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.

2. Yes

While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and proceed with
respondents' application for registration, this Court nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the legal issue
on the required period of possession for acquiring title to public land.

Respondents' application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for their title to the Subject Lots.
They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from their parents, spouses
Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that
his parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since 1950.

Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents themselves, the Subject Lots are
"within Alienable and Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified
under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-
LusaranMananga Watershed Forest Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992."
The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of 25
June 1963.

As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied, from the government; and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land
should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.

The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar
lands, and privately-owned lands which reverted to the State.36 It explicitly enumerates the means by which
public lands may be disposed, as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land Act because there
are specific requirements and application procedure for every mode.38 Since respondents herein filed their
application before the MTC, then it can be reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation
or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.

Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144 hectares, may
be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1073, which reads –
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-
ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b)
hereof.

Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled to judicial
confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or
earlier.

In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period
of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such possession
can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules
on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto. It is very apparent then that respondents could not
have complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to
acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized.

The confirmation of respondents' title by the Court of Appeals was based on the erroneous supposition that
respondents were claiming title to the Subject Lots under the Property Registration Decree. According to the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, Section 14(4) of the Property Registration Decree
allows individuals to own land in any other manner provided by law. It then ruled that the respondents,
having possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, since 25 June
1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their application, have acquired title to the Subject Lots by
extraordinary prescription under Article 1113, in relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.

The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land
Act.

Under the Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which is confirmed by the court; while
under the Public Land Act, the presumption always is that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that
the occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect title or
continuous, open, and notorious possession. As established by this Court in the preceding paragraphs, the
Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain and respondents may have acquired
title thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act.

However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire imperfect or incomplete title
to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their application for judicial confirmation or legalization thereof
must be in accordance with the Property Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads –

SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in right, claiming any
lands or interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter, must in every case present an
application to the proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity of the alleged title or claim
be inquired into and that a certificate of title be issued to them under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act.

Hence, respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots must have complied with the substantial
requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the procedural requirements under the Property
Registration Decree.

Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real rights apply in general to
all types of land, while the Public Land Act specifically governs lands of the public domain. Relative to one
another, the Public Land Act may be considered a special law that must take precedence over the Civil Code,
a general law. It is an established rule of statutory construction that between a general law and a special law,
the special law prevails –Generaliaspecialibus non derogant.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, is REVERSED.
The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999, and its
Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents' application for registration is
DISMISSED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARASIGAN

On 4 November 1986 private respondent, claiming to be one of the heirs of Epifania Alcano, registered owner
of a parcel of land located in Canubing, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, containing an area of 33,294 square
meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the Registry of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro, filed a petition for the reconstitution of "the original and duplicate copy (sic)" of the said Transfer
Certificate of Title on the basis of the owner's duplicate copy. 6 She alleged therein that she is in possession "of
the title subject matter of" the petition but she, however, did not allege the reason why she asked for the
reconstitution.
The trial court set the petition for hearing and required its publication in the Official Gazette, which was done.
Required notices, except to the adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land, were given.

Upon prior authority of the trial court, reception of private respondent's evidence was made by the OIC-
Branch Clerk of Court. Thereafter, on 17 June 1987, the trial court handed down an Order allowing the
reconstitution of the original and the owner's duplicate copies of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in
the name of the registered owners.

Petitioner herein, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed from said Order to the Court of Appeals
on the ground that the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over the case for failure of private respondent
to send notice to the adjoining owners and actual occupants.

Petitioner maintained that the requirement of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional as held in MWSS vs. Sison, et al.

Respondent Court of Appeals brushed aside the arguments of petitioner and held that:

1) Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 which "requires the sending out of notices to the adjoining owners and
actual occupants to vest jurisdiction," appears to have been "at least impliedly amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1529" because it is inconsistent with Section 23 of said Decree which provides
that in original registration cases publication of notices of initial hearing in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court.

2) The MWSS vs. Sison case is not on all fours with the instant case for in the former both the original
and the owner's duplicate copies of the certificate of title were claimed to be lost, unlike in the instant
case where the duplicate copy is intact; it was not shown that the original copy in the custody of the
Register of Deeds was destroyed; the copies of the titles alleged to have been lost were later found
intact in the names of other persons; and, more importantly, the Petition was not published in the
Official Gazette but in the Manila Daily Bulletin, unlike in the instant case.

3) Finally, in the instant case, the private respondent cannot be blamed for the loss of the original copy of
the transfer certificate of title; it was lost by reason of the burning of the Capitol Building; she should
not, therefore, be put to trouble, anxiety and expenses.

Petitioner's motion to reconsider the Decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed the
instant petition 

Issue: WON trial court is without jurisdiction over the instant petition for reconstitution case as there is no
requisite service of notice of hearing to the adjoining owners and actual occupants of the land as required by
Section 13 of R.A. No. 26;

Held:

The petition is impressed with merit.

The questioned Decision of 29 August 1988 and the Resolution of 18 October 1988 of respondent Court of
Appeals, as well as the Order of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro of 17 June 1987,
must be set aside.

Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 has not been altered, modified or amended.1âwphi1 Since the requirement therein
of service of notice of the initial hearing to the adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land was not
complied with in this case, the court below did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over the petition for the
reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66062. Accordingly, the respondent Court of Appeals gravely
erred in affirming the Order of the trial court granting the petition and in holding that said Section 13 has
been "at least impliedly amended" by Section 23 in relation to Section 110 of P.D. No. 1529 which took effect
on 11 June 1978.
The required notice to the adjoining owners and actual occupants are mandatory and jurisdictional and non-
compliance therewith would render all proceedings utterly null and void.

We further find to be totally unfounded the view of the Court of Appeals that Section 13 of R.A. No. 26
"appears to have been at least impliedly amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529." There is absolutely
nothing in P.D. No. 1529 which intimates or suggests, indirectly or even remotely, an intention to amend said
Section 13. The Court of Appeals either misapprehended or read out of context that portion of Section 23 of
P.D. No. 1529 reading as follows:

. . . that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.

Worse, it committed a serious blunder when it used this clause to support its proposition of implied
amendment of Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 by virtue of Section 110 of the Decree.

Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 is entitled Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. and provides, inter alia, that:

The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of
(1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.

This proviso was never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by mailing and
by posting.1âwphi1 What it simply means is that in so far as publication is concerned, there is sufficient
compliance if the notice is published in the Official Gazette, although the law mandates that it be published
"once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines." However,
publication in the latter alone would not suffice. This is to accord primacy to the official publication.

That such proviso was never meant to dispense with the other modes of giving notice, which remain
mandatory and jurisdictional, is obvious from Section 23 itself. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said
section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the
petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land.

BENIN vs. TUASON

Facts:

Three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints containing substantially the same allegations. 2

In Civil Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three parcels of
agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of
San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of
approximately 278,928 square meters; that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto
Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in
interest had possessed these three parcels of land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and
exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather, had said
parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of
the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the ownership over said parcels
of land; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that
after the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from
Manila and other places, after having secured the permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses
thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs.

In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of two parcels of
agricultural land, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the Barrio of La Loma (now Barrio
San Jose) in the municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an aggregate area of approximately
148,118 square meters; that these parcels of land were inherited by them from their deceased father Bonoso
Alcantara, who in turn inherited the same from his father, Juan Alcantara; that plaintiffs Juan Alcantara and
Jose Alcantara were the children of Bonoso Alcantara; that these two brothers inherited the land from their
father, and they and their predecessors in interest had been in open, adverse and continuous possession of
the same, planting therein palay and other agricultural products and exclusively enjoying said products; that
on March 28, 1894 plaintiffs' grandfather, Juan Alcantara, had said lands surveyed; that during the cadastral
survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Bonoso Alcantara and the plaintiffs
filed and registered their claims of ownership over said lands; that plaintiffs had said lands declared for
taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2390, of Quezon City; that after the outbreak of the last World
War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after having
secured permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses on said lands and plaintiffs collected
monthly rentals from them.

In Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and possessors of a parcel of agricultural
land located in the Barrio of La Loma (now San Jose), municipality of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an
area of approximately 62,481 square meters; that this parcel of land was inherited by plaintiffs from their
ancestor Candido Pili who in turn inherited the same from his parents; that Candido Pili and his predecessors
in interest owned, possessed, occupied and cultivated the said parcel of land from time immemorial; that
upon the death of Candido Pili his children Luisa Pili, Pascual Pili, Diego Pili and Manuel Pili succeeded to the
ownership and possession and cultivation of said land; that plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest, as
owners and possessors of said land, had openly, adversely and continuously cultivated the land, planting
thereon palay and other agricultural products and enjoying exclusively the products harvested therefrom; that
during his lifetime, Candido Pili ordered the survey of said land sometime on March 11, 1894, and when the
cadastral survey of said land was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in 1933 Candido Pili and plaintiffs filed
and registered their claim of ownership over the said parcel of land; that plaintiffs had the land declared for
taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2597, Quezon City, Philippines; that after the outbreak of the
last World War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places,
after securing permission from plaintiffs, settled and constructed their houses in said land and plaintiffs
collected monthly rentals from their lessees or tenants.

The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in their respective complaint, that sometime in the
year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands, the defendants, particularly the
defendant J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., through their agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men, by
force and intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment, illegally entered and started
defacing, demolishing and destroying the dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the
improvements consisting of rice paddies (pilapiles), bamboos and fruit trees, and permanent improvements
such as old roads, old bridges and other permanent landmarks within and outside the lands in question,
disregarding the objections of plaintiffs, and as a result plaintiffs were deprived of the rentals received from
their lessees; that plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the probable claim of defendants, and in 1953 they
discovered for the first time that their lands, as described in their respective complaint, had either been
fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known
as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the province of Rizal in
the names of the original applicants for registration, now defendants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz,
Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz,
and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz.

The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the registered owners mentioned in Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 had applied for the registration of two parcels of land (known as the Santa Mesa
Estate and the Diliman Estate), located in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte, province of
Rizal, of which parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) contained an area of 8,798,617 square meters; that the
registration proceedings were docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration; that the
application for registration in LRC No. 7681, containing the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas of
parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate) was published in the Official Gazette; that
before the decision was handed down in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries and technical descriptions of
parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the amendments and alterations, which were made after the
publication of the original application, were never published

A decision was rendered in LRC No. 7681 based on the amended plan; a decree of registration was issued,
known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the registration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels of
land (Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate); that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is null
and void because the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of
publication; that Decree No. 17431 issued pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is
likewise null and void from the beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a void decision and because the
boundaries, technical descriptions and areas appearing in the decree are different and not identical with the
boundaries, technical descriptions and areas in the application for registration as published in the Official
Gazette; that the area of parcel No. 1 as mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is bigger than the area of parcel No. 1
appearing in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that Original Certificate of
Title No. 735, referring to parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate), is also null and void from the beginning because it
was issued pursuant to a void decree of registration; that the area, boundaries and technical description of
Parcel No. 1 appearing in Decree of Registration No. 17431 and in the Original Certificate of Title No. 735 are
different from the area, boundaries and technical description appearing in the application for registration as
published in the Official Gazette; that the plaintiffs had not been notified of the proceedings in LRC No. 7681
although the applicants knew, or could have known, by the exercise of necessary diligence, the names and
addresses of the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest who were then, and up to the time the
complaints were filed, in possession and were cultivating the lands described in paragraph V of their
respective complaint; and that during, before, and even after the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No.
735 the defendants had tacitly recognized the ownership of the plaintiffs over their respective lands because
said defendants had never disturbed the possession and cultivation of the lands by the plaintiffs until the
year 1951; and that all transfer certificates of title issued subsequently, based on Original Certificate of Title
No. 735, are also null and void.

The plaintiffs, in the three cases, were allowed by the trial court to litigate as paupers.

On June 23, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss in each of the three cases. This
motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court

On July 18, 1955 the trial court issued an order granting the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the
plaintiffs in their complaints. The preliminary injunction, however, was lifted by order of the trial court on
October 3, 1955, upon the posting by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. of bonds in the total amount of
P14,000.00

On August 11, 1955 defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed in the three cases a motion for reconsideration of
the order of July 20, 1955 denying the motion to dismiss. This motion for reconsideration was denied by order
of the court of September 26, 1955.

After trial, on January 18, 1965, the lower court rendered a decision for the three case in favor of the
Petitioners

A motion for new trial was filed by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. on January 30, 1965. However, before
the motion for new trial was resolved by the court, said defendant, on February 11, 1965, filed a notice of
appeal to this Court and an appeal bond, and on February 12, 1965 he filed the record on appeal. 7 The record
on appeal, after it had been corrected and amended, as ordered and/or authorized by the trial court, was
approved on September 29, 1965

Issues:

1. WON Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void ab initio for LRC’s lack of jurisdiction to issue
decree No. 17431 for failure of the respondents to publish the amendment to the original plan

2. WON Original Certificate of Title No. 735 null and void upon the ground that the decree of registration
was not transcribed in the Registration Book in accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act
496

Held:

I.

We believe that the lower court erred when it held that the Land Registration Court was without jurisdiction
to render the decision in LRC No. 7681. Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or
order, an amendment of the application for registration when it appears to the court that the amendment is
necessary and proper. Under Section 24 of the same act the court may at any time order an application to be
amended by striking out one or more parcels or by severance of the application. The amendment may be
made in the application or in the survey plan, or in both, since the application and the survey plan go
together. If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of
land not previously included in the original application, as published, a new publication of the amended
application must be made. The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons concerned
regarding the amended application. Without a new publication the registration court can not acquire
jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the original application, and
the decision of the registration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included
land.11 The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed with respect to the publicity that
is required in registration proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to present their
claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of failure of notice. 12 But if the amendment consists in the
exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original application and the original plan as previously
published, a new publication is not necessary.  In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the court over the
remaining area is not affected by the failure of a new publication

It is thus shown that the amended plan in LRC No. 7681 did not cover parcels, or areas, that were not
previously included in the original plan which accompanied the application that had been published in the
Official Gazette. There was, therefore, no necessity for a new publication of the amended plan in order to vest
the Court of Land Registration with jurisdiction to hear and decide the application for registration in LRC No.
7681 and to order the issuance of Decree of Registration No. 17431 upon which Original Certificate of Title
No. 735 was based.

It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that only in cases where the original survey plan is amended during
the registration proceedings by the addition of lands not previously included in the original plan should
publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area that was
added after the publication of the original plan.22

The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had acquired jurisdiction over a certain parcel, or
parcels, of land in the registration proceedings in virtue of the publication of the application, that jurisdiction
attaches to the land or lands mentioned and described in the application. If it is later shown that the decree of
registration had included land or lands not included in the original application as published, then the
registration proceedings and the decree of registration must be declared null and void in so far — but only in
so far — as the land not included in the publication is concerned. This is so, because the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the land not included in the publication-the publication being the basis: of the
jurisdiction of the court. But the proceedings and the decree of registration, relating to the lands that were
included in the publication, are valid. Thus, if it is shown that a certificate of title had been issued covering
lands where the registration court had no jurisdiction, the certificate of title is null and void insofar as it
concerns the land or lands over which the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction

II.

 The formal defect in the transcription of Decree of Registration No. 17431 in the Registration Book did not
render null and void Original Certificate of Title No. 735. Consequently, We declare that the two parcels of
land (Parcel 1 which includes the lands claimed by the appellees, and Parcel 2) covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 735 are properly registered under the Torrens System of registration.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO (G.R. No. 102858, July
28, 1997)

Facts:

On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent TeodoroAbistado filed a petition for original registration ofhis title
over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.However, during the pendency of his
petition, applicant died.Hence, his heirs - Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed
Abistado -represented by their aunt JosefaAbistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were
substitutedas applicants.

The land registration courtdismissed the petition "for want ofjurisdiction due to applicant’s failure to comply
with the provisions of Section23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial
Hearing (Exh. "E") ina newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines." However, it found that the
applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been inopen, continuous, exclusive and peaceful
possession of the subject land since 1938.

Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent CA which set aside the decision of the trial court
and ordered the registration of the title in the name of TeodoroAbistado.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court acquired jurisdiction despite the lack of publication requirement.

Held:

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The court shall, within five days from filingof the
application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shallnot be earlier than
forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.

The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration bymeans of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.

1. By publication. -

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner ofLand
Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the OfficialGazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however,that the publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon thecourt. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons
appearing to have an interest in the landinvolved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all
whom it may concern."Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date
andtime to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.

The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of LandRegistration
upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said worddenotes an
imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While concededlysuch literal mandate is
not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately dependsupon its context in the entire
provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood inits normal mandatory meaning.

It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such
proceedingrequires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have
rights to orinterests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This
being so,the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose
rightsmay be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which they had noknowledge
of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the landregistration court must
prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof butthe identity of the same, for
he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery ofrealty. He must prove his title
against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, canbest be achieved when all persons
concerned - nay, "the whole world" - who have rights to or interests inthe subject property are notified and
effectively invited to come to court and show cause why theapplication should not be granted.

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatorywhen the
law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing andposting, all of which
have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due processand the reality that the
Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and isoftentimes delayed in its circulation,
such that the notices published therein may not reach theinterested parties on time, if at all. Additionally,
such parties may not be owners of neighboringproperties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In
sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature ofland registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued
against the whole world and theobjective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand
a mandatoryconstruction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
DIRECTOR OF LANDSvsHEIRS OF ISABEL TESALONA and IAC (G.R. No. 66130, September 8, 1994)

Facts:

The

controversy arose from an application for registration of five (5) parcels of land on the basis of an
allegedpossessory information title. The application was opposed by the government on the ground that the
parcels of landare part of the inalienable land of the public domain.

The subject property is situated in Barrio Butanyog, Mulanay, Quezon, and consists of about 7.4343 hectares
allegedto have been originally acquired by Maria Rosita Lorenzo under a possessory information title dated
May 20, 1896under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894. Maria Rosita Lorenzo was married to Felipe
Lizada. Maria Rosita begottwo (2) sons, Laureano and Cipriano. Cipriano died a bachelor and without any
issue. Upon the death of thespouses, Laureano inherited the land. LaureanoLizada married BaldomeraRoces
and the couple had two (2)children, Andres and Magdalena. Andres died a bachelor and without any issue, so
upon the death of Laureano,Magdalena inherited the land. Magdalena married NerioTesalona and they had
three (3) daughters, Isabel, Consueloand Serapia, applicants herein.

On June 23, 1971, Isabel, Consuelo and SerapiaTesalona filed an application for registration of five (5) parcels
ofLandwith the Court of First Instance of Quezon,Gumaca Branch.Lot No. 1 has an area of 7,583 square
meters; Lot No. 2 has 36,319 square meters; Lot No. 3 has24,347 square meters; Lot No. 4 has 5,388 square
meters; and Lot No. 5 has 706 square meters or a total of74,343 square meters. The possessory information
title covers only an area of 10,481 square meters.

The Director of Lands through the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Quezon filed his opposition to the
applicationalleging that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest had sufficient title of the
land applied for norhad they been in possession thereof for a period of at least thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of theapplication and that the same is public land.

At the initial hearing on the same date, the applicants presented proof of compliance of jurisdictional
requirements.On motion of applicants' counsel, the court issued an order of general default with the
exception of the Director ofLands and the Director of Forestry.

During the hearing on January 18, 1972, the Fiscal moved to withdraw the opposition of the Director of
Forestry andthe same was granted. On May 3, 1972, Assistant Fiscal Antonio Robles likewise moved for the
withdrawal of theopposition of the Director of Lands and the same was again granted.

Constanciodela Pena Tan likewise filed an opposition even as he supported the government's contention that
thelands applied for are part of the public domain. Tan averred that he had possessed the land as lessee for a
period ofmore than thirty five (35) years. Records reveal that Demetriadela Pena, mother of herein private
oppositor occupiedLot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Plan Psu 215382, applied for registration, by virtue of a
fishpond lease granted by theBureau of Fisheries sometime in 1953. Said lands were converted into fishponds
and had been subject of a salesapplication sometime in 1963.

Pending the resolution of whether or not the opposition of Constanciodela Pena Tan should be admitted, the
lower court learned that the special counsel who had withdrawn the government's opposition was not
authorized to do so.Acting accordingly, the court reinstated the opposition of the Director of Lands and
directed that the opposition ofthe private oppositor be considered as evidence in support of the claim of the
government that the land applied foris part of the public domain.

After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment adjudicating Lot Nos. 3, 4 and 5 in favor of the applicants
anddeclaring Lot Nos. 1 and 2 as owned by the government subject to the rights of the lessee, Constanciodela
PenaTan, pending the approval of his sales application.
Not satisfied with the trial court's ruling, herein applicants interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals
seekingconfirmation of title over Lot Nos. 1 and 2 as well.

IAC affirmed the LRC’s decision but declared the confirmation of the title of applicants-appellants over Lots 1
and 2.

Issue:

Whether or not the confirmation of Lot 1 and 2 to applicant absent the tracing cloth plan was valid.

Held:

The original tracing cloth plan, together with the duplicate copy of their application for registration of land
title wereunder the custody of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) at that time. But such does not relieve
the privaterespondents of their duty to retrieve the said tracing cloth plan and submit it before the court.

The basis of the claim of the Heirs of Tesalona, herein private respondents, is a Spanish title, a possessor
information title issued on May 20, 1896 to Maria Rosita Lorenzo pursuant to the Royal Decree of February
13, 1894for 1.0481 hectares. But private respondents did not submit the original of the possessory
information title. Whatwas submitted was an unclear, illegible copy of a Spanish document purporting to be
the title evidencing the landgrant of 1896. Moreover, proof of loss or unavailability of the original document as
required by Section 5, Rule 130 ofthe Rules of Court was not established thus, rendering admissibility of the
said secondary evidence questionableand dubious.

Another point to consider is the fact that there is a glaring and irreconcilable discrepancy between the area
of1.0481 hectares covered by the alleged possessory information title and the actual area of 7.4343 hectares
appliedfor. Law and jurisprudence dictate that applicants have the burden of proving that the title justifies
the considerableincrease in land area, failure in which results in the resolution of the conflict in favor of the
government and againstthem. Well-settled is the rule that land grants, being gratuitous in nature, are always
construed favorably in favor ofthe government and strictly against the grantee, and that possessory
information titles, assuming them to be validand legal, are grants from the State which cannot extend beyond
the terms thereof.

Finally, Lot Nos. 1 and 2 were classified as swampy area and were as early as 1955, filled with mangrove
trees.This belies the contention of herein private respondents that said lots were planted to coconuts in 1909
and,thereafter, to palay and other seasonal crops. Being swampy area covered by mangrove trees and the like,
these lotsmay very well be considered and classified as forest lands.

ALFREDO GIMENO and DR. LEONARDO GIMENOvs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
PRUDENCIO CARTAGENA

FACTS:

This is a simple case of recovery of two hectares of land filed by petitioner Alfredo Gimeno and several others
against respondent Prudencio Cartagena with the Court of First Instance of Davao.

The land in litigation is part of a 17-hectare parcel situated in barrio Baculin, Municipality of Baganga,
province of Davao, Presently covered by Original Certificate of Title No.1354 dated February 14, 1935 under a
homestead patent issued in favor of Brigido Cartagena, father of Prudencio Cartagena.

During the lifetime of Brigido Cartagena a "Deed of Partition inter Vivos" was executed between spouses
Brigido Cartagena and Isabel Fernando and their four children and a 7-hectare portion was allocated to
Prudencio Cartagena which includes the two hectares now being claimed by petitioners.

In their complaint filed on June 7, 1957, the Gimenos claim:

 1. Sometime in 1926 their predecessor-in-interest, brothers ExequielGimeno and
VictorioGimeno(deceased) and Brigido Cartagena verbally agreed to jointly clear and cultivate the 17
hectares;
2. When the coconuts planted by the Gimenos would have borne fruit, the land cleared by the latter
would be segregated by a competent surveyor;
3. Brigido Cartagena would execute papers of relinquishment in favor of the Gimenos; and
4. As a consideration of agreement, the Gimenos gave P150.00 to Brigido Cartagena to help the latter
cultivate the rest of the property.

In 1948, the 17 hectares were surveyed and subdivided into "lot 2126" of two and lot 332" containing an area
of 15.590 hectares. Lot 2126 is the portion now sought to be recovered by the Gimenos.

The allegations of the complaint and the evidence adduced by the petitioners were controverted by respondent
Prudencio Cartagena who claimed:

1. that his father, Brigido Cartagena, owned and possessed exclusively as a homestead the 17-
hectare land for which the latter was issued Original Certificate of Title 1354 since February 14,
1935;
2. that Brigido Cartagena declared for taxation purposes the entire 17 hectares solely in his name;
3. that a deed of partition was executed between Brigido Cartagena and his four children, and
4. the area allocated to Prudencio Cartagena measured seven hectares of which two hectares are now
being claimed by the Gimenos without justification.

The trial court presided by Judge Macapanton Abbas as well as the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint
of the Gimenos because of "the dubious character of plaintiffs' evidence" as well as "laches in the enforcement
of their alleged right", they having filed this particular complaint only after "22 years, 3 months, and 6 days
from February 14, 1935 when OCT 1354 was issued in the name of Brigido Cartagena" and "31 years from
the date of the alleged verbal agreement of June 21, 1926" between the Gimeno brothers and Brigido
Cartagena.

The CA further stated that petitioners (plaintiffs-appellants) "failed to adduce clear, competent and convincing
evidence that would justify this Court to hold that a fiduciary relation existed between Exequiel and
VictorioGimeno on one hand and Brigido Cartagena on the other, with respect to the two-hectare portion
which is now known as lot 2126 of BagangaCadastre, Davao.

There is no gainsaying the fact that the plaintiffs' evidence falls far short of the required quantum and quality
that can overthrow the homestead patent issued under OCT 1354 which, as mentioned heretofore, has been
in existence, unassailed for more a prior to the institution of the present action."

Petitioners now seek a reversal of the decision of the CA raising a number of legal questions which respondent
appellate court allegedly disposed of erroneously.

ISSUES:

1. Is there clear and convincing evidence - as the CA puts it - to sustain the claim of petitioners that there
was a verbal agreement of purchase entered into in 1926 between their predecessors-in-interest and
respondent's father, Brigido Cartagena, over the two-hectare portion of land? NONE

2. Is there clear and convincing evidence that an implied trust existed in favor of petitioners which respondent
Prudencio Cartagena is bound to respect and comply with? NONE.

HELD:

The appellate court held that there is none. That finding of respondent court is binding on Us in the absence
of any showing that there has been a misapprehension of facts or that a grave abuse of discretion was
committed in the appreciation of the evidence or that the situation calls for an exception to the general rule.
In the first assigned error petitioners submit that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not holding that
private respondent waived the defenses of "indefeasibility of title, prescription, laches and lack of cause of
action," inasmuch as respondent Cartagena failed to assert them in his answer to the complaint, and under
Rule 9, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.

We agree with the appellate court that there is substantial compliance with the Rules considering that in the
answer of respondent Cartagena it was specifically pleaded that the two hectares object of the complaint are
part of a bigger tract of land covered by OCT 1354 issued since February 14, 1935 in the name of
respondent's father Brigido Cartagena, and even prior to that date respondent's predecessors-in-interest were
in possession of said property exclusively as owners thereof, and that respondent Cartagena merely continued
the ion of his father Brigido Cartagena after the partition of the property was executed among the children of
Brigido Cartagena in September of 1952.

It is to be noted that in the overall appreciation of the evidence of petitioners on their claim that there was a
verbal purchase of the two hectares since 1926, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not find the
claim credible, and one of the factors which led the two courts to that conclusion was the inaction of
petitioners and their predecessors-in- interest to assert their supposed right over the property in litigation
notwithstanding the allegation that there was an agreement that a document conveying the two hectares to
the Gimeno brothers would be executed by Brigido Cartagena after the coconut trees the Gimenos planted
shall have home fruit and the two hectares shall have been segregated, which events according to petitioners
occurred since 1943 and 1948 respectively.

It is indeed surprising why no positive step was taken by the Gimeno brothers to enforce the supposed verbal
agreement against Brigido Cartagena during the latter's lifetime.

It was only after Brigido Cartagena died and was no longer in a position to deny or dispute the supposed
agreement that this complaint was filed on June 7, 1957.

In evaluating the evidence, both the court a quo and the appellate court found that the Gimeno's failure to
take positive action since 1926 and before the Brigido Cartagena died sometime in 1954 greatly weakened the
claim of petitioners.

To that We agree.

In PHHC and University of the Philippines vs. Mencias, et al. this Court held among others that an action for
reconveyance of a property that was titled since 1914 and brought only in 1957 is to be barred on grounds of
laches.

In Delima vs. Tio the Court likewise pronounced that inaction for 28 years from the time of the supposed on
invoked by plaintiff before she filed the action for recovery of property amounts to laches and convert what
otherwise could be a valid case into a stale demand.

In Pabalate et al. vs. Echarri. Jr. the land in litigation was covered by an original certificate of title issued by
virtue of a homestead patent dated February 20, 1926 which was sold by the heirs of the patentee to a third
person who since 1927 was in continuous exclusive possession in concept of owner thereof. The of the action
for recovery of said property filed only in 1959 by the heirs of the vendors, was upheld by this Court on the
ground inter alia that by the long period of 37 years and the plaintiffs' inaction or inexclusive neglect their
claim was converted into a "stale demand."

In the second assigned error it is asserted that respondent CA erred in not holding that a certificate of title
issued by reason of a homestead patent is not indefeasible and in support thereof petitioners invoke the
pronouncements of this Court in Nieto vs. Quines to the effect that... a certificate of title based on a patent,
even after the expiration of one year from the issuance thereof, is still subject to certain conditions and
restrictions. As a matter of fact, in appropriate cases and after prior administrative investigations by the
Director of Lands, proper actions may be instituted by said official which may lead to the cancellation of the
patent and the title issued pursuant to Act 2259, after the lapse of 1 year, becomes incontrovertible. The
inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that, while with the due registration and issuance of a certificate of title
over a land acquired pursuant to the Public Land Law, said property becomes registered in contemplation of
Act 496, in view of its nature and manner of acquisition, such certificate of title, when in conflict with one
obtained on the same date through judicial proceedings, must give way to the latter. (L-14643, Sept. 29,
1962, 6 SCRA 74, 80)

The Nieto case has no application to the present action.

In Nieto two certificates of title were issued - one based on a homestead patent while the other was obtained
through a cadastral proceeding, and the issue was which of the two registrations already effected and secured
should prevail.

In this case of the Gimenos all that is involved is the latter's claim that the homestead patentee, Brigido
Cartagena, agreed way back in 1926 to convey to the Gimenos two hectares of that homestead, which
assertion was discarded by the trial court and the Court of Appeals for lack of sufficient credible evidence to
substantiate the same.

Hence, the dismissal of petitioner's complaint for reconveyance.

In their third assigned error, petitioners contend that the survey plan prepared and approved in 1948 by the
Bureau of Lands which segregated the two hectares in question from the rest of the Cartagena property is "the
most eloquent evidence" of their ownership.

Again We state that this is a matter of appreciation of evidence which is best left to the trial court and the
appellate court which are finders of facts. It appears that said piece of evidence was not given weight in the
evaluation of the evidence of the parties.

We note that the sketch plan, Exhibit A, prepared by a private land Surveyor does not bear the approval of the
Director of Lands as claimed in page 12 of the Petition for certiorari. All that appears is a certification of the
Acting District Land Officer that the sketch is a true and correct copy of a plan existing in the Land Office in
Davao City.

At any rate, the existence of a sketch plan of a real Property even if approved by the Bureau of Lands is no
proof in itself of ownership of the land covered by the plan.

In their fourth assigned error petitioners claim that respondent Court of Appeals erred in finding that the
petitioners' witness FelimonManguiob testified that the subdivision plan Exhibit A had no technical
descriptions because in truth there was no such testimony in the record.

We note however that petitioners' contention is premised on a wrong interpretation of a portion of page four of
the appellate court's decision. The clause "without technical description" is a specific finding of respondent
court based on the sketch, Exhibit A, for the truth of the matter is that said sketch plan is without technical
descriptions. What the appellate court meant and in effect stated on page four of its decision was that
according to FelimonMaguiob the subdivision survey was effected in June, 1948, at the instance of Brigido
Cartagena, the registered owner of the title." This testimony of the witness was no, however believed or even
credit both by the court a quo and the Court of Appeals.

In the fifth assigned error it is asserted that respondent court erred in holding that fraud or bad faith is a
necessary allegation in an action for reconveyance.

Petitioners cite Sanchez vs. Vda. deTamsi, L-16736, June 30, 1961, wherein it was held that reconveyance
can be justified on the ground of error. In Sanchez it was stated that where a property is erroneously included
in a homestead patent, the patentee by force of law becomes a trustee under an implied trust for the benefit of
the real owner.
However, that is not the issue in this case now before Us. The Gimenos do not assert that there was error or
that there was fraud on the part of Brigido Cartagena in applying for a homestead patent for the 17 hectares
and in securing the original certificate of title. No; what is alleged is that there was a verbal understanding or
"purchase" in that the two hectares cleared and cultivated by petitioners' predecessors-in-interest would be
"deeded" in their favor, and to enforce that supposed oral agreement entered into in 1926 this complaint was
filed.

Fundamentally, therefore, the action is one for enforcement of a verbal understanding supposedly entered
into between the respective predecessors- in-interest of the petitioners and the respondent herein, and if the
same is to prosper there must be a finding that the Cartagenas held the two hectares in trust for the
Gimenos.

It is in this context that respondent court declared that there was need for petitioners to show that they were
the owners of the property claimed and were being deprived thereof by private respondent.

Respondent Court concluded that the record is "barren of evidence" to established a fiduciary relationship
between the homestead patentee, Brigido Cartagena and the Gimenos.

The sixth assigned error argues that respondent court erred in not holding that petitioners sufficiently
established their claim of ownership and continuous possession on the basis of the allegation in their
complaint that they planted 377 coconuts which was admitted by respondent Cartagena in the latter's answer
to the complaint.

On this point, We examined the answer of respondent Cartagena to the amended complaint and contrary to
the assertion of

petitioners, there is no such admission on the part of defendant, now respondent, Cartagena. Paragraph 9 of
the amended complaint reads:

9. That the property in the case at bar consists of 377 productive coconut trees which produce 30 piculs of
copra every after three months or 120 piculs every year; (p. 14, Record on Appeal)

Paragraph 9 of respondent's answer in turn states:

9. That the Defendant ADMITS that the land in question is planted to 377 fruit-bearing coconut trees but
DENIES that the produce is 30 piculs per quarter; the truth being that the quarterly produce is at best 20
piculs or 80 piculs yearly. (pp. 18-19, Record on Appeal)

It is obvious that what Cartagena admitted was that there were 377 fruit-bearing coconut trees on the two,
but that was all.

Note that the allegation in paragraph 4 of the amended complaint that plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest
introduced the present improvement consisting mainly of coconuts, was specifically denied in paragraph 4 of
the defendant's answer, and it was alleged that it was Brigido Cartagena, the patentee, with the help of his
children one of whom is the defendant, who cleared, cultivated and improved the land in question which is
only a part of the parcel covered by Original Certificate of Title 1354.

All the allegations of petitioners as to their alleged occupation, possession and cultivation of the land in
litigation were not substantiated according to the trial court and the Court of Appeal and We do not disturb
that finding.

The seventh assigned error contends that respondent court erred in not holding that the trial court of Davao
should have allowed counsel of petitioners to cross-examine respondent Cartagena on a letter allegedly sent
by the latter to Mrs. NatividadGimeno wherein ion of the petitioners was supposedly admitted.

The stenographic transcript of the cross-examination of respondent Cartagena shows that petitioners' counsel
presented to the former a certain letter written by Atty. Juanito Hernandez to Mrs. NatividadGimeno. No error
was committed by the trial court in sustaining the timely objection of Cartagenas counsel and ruling that the
best witness competent to testify on that letter was the addressee, Mrs. NatividadGimeno and not Prudencio
Cartagena as the letter would constitute hearsay evidence in so far as the latter was concerned.

WHEREFORE, We find this appeal without merit and We dismiss the same and affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals in toto with costs against petitioners.

SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC. vs. ANGELA V. MADAYAG

FACTS:

On July 12, 2001, respondent Angela V. Madayag filed with the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan an application
for registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,492 square meters located in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta
City, Pangasinan. Attached to the application was a tracing cloth of Survey Plan Psu-01-008438, approved by
the Land Management Services (LMS) of the DENR Region 1, San Fernando City.

On August 20, 2001, petitioner SM Prime Holdings, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Chief, Regional Survey
Division, DENR, Region I, demanding the cancellation of the respondent’s survey plan because the lot
encroached on the properties it recently purchased from several lot owners and that, despite being the new
owner of the adjoining lots, it was not notified of the survey conducted on June 8, 2001.

Petitioner then manifested its opposition to the respondent’s application for registration. The Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas also filed their
respective oppositions.

On February 6, 2002, petitioner filed its formal opposition.

Petitioner alleged that it had recently bought seven parcels of land in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta, delineated
as Lots B, C, D, E, G, H and I in Consolidation-Subdivision Plan No. (LRC) Pcs-21329, approved by the Land
Registration Commission on August 26, 1976, and previously covered by Survey Plan No. Psu-236090
approved by the Bureau of Lands on December 29, 1970. These parcels of land are covered by separate
certificates of title, some of which are already in the name of the petitioner while the others are still in the
name of the previous owners.

On February 20, 2002, the RTC declared a general default the Republic and the heirs of Romulo Visperas,
except as to the petitioner.

Respondent commenced the presentation of evidence.

Meanwhile, acting on petitioner’s request for the cancellation of the respondent’s survey plan, DENR Assistant
Regional Executive Director for Legal Services and Public Affairs, Allan V. Barcena, advised the petitioner to
file a petition for cancellation in due form so that the DENR could properly act on the same.

Accordingly, petitioner formally filed with the DENR a petition for cancellation of the survey plan sometime in
March 2002, alleging the following grounds:

I.THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE PROPERTY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT LOT IN
THIS CASE

II. NO NOTICE WAS MADE UPON PETITIONER (AS ADJOINING LANDOWNER AND WHO BEARS INTEREST
OVER THE SUBJECT LOT) MUCH LESS THE OWNERS OF ADJOINING LANDS.

III.THE CIRCUMSTANCES EVIDENTLY SHOW THAT BAD FAITH AND/OR MALICE ATTENDED THE
APPROVAL OF (PLAN WITH PSU NO. 01-008438).
On July 17, 2002, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the land registration case,
alleging that the court should await the DENR resolution of the petition for the cancellation of the survey plan
"as the administrative case is prejudicial to the determination" of the land registration case.

On October 8, 2002, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion and suspends the proceedings.

Emphasizing that a survey plan is one of the mandatory requirements in land registration proceedings, the
RTC agreed with the petitioner that the cancellation of the survey plan would be prejudicial to the petition for
land registration.

On February 13, 2003, the RTC denied the respondent’s motion for reconsideration of its order.

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the order suspending the proceedings.

On March 19, 2004, finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending the proceedings,
the CA granted the petition for certiorari and the challenged Orders dated October 8, 2002 and February 13,
2003 of the respondent Court are declared NULL and VOID.

The CA ratiocinated that the survey plan which was duly approved by the DENR should be accorded the
presumption of regularity, and that the RTC has the power to hear and determine all questions arising from
an application for registration.

On July 15, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner was compelled to file this petition for review, ascribing the following errors to the CA:

I. The CA committed manifest error in not finding that the suspension of the proceedings in the land
registration case is legal and proper pending the determination and resolution of the administrative case
before the DENR-Region 1.

II. The CA committed manifest error in failing to find that the assailed orders of the lower court have proper
and sufficient bases in fact and in law.

III. The CA committed manifest error in holding that the lower court has acted with grave abuse of discretion
in suspending the proceedings and archiving the case.

IV. The CA committed manifest error in failing to find that the filing of the petition for certiorari, under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, is not the only plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law on the part of herein respondent.

ISSUES:

1.W/N the RTC should suspend the proceedings in the land registration case pending the resolution of the
petition for the cancellation of Madayag’s survey plan filed with DENR? NO.

HELD:

The Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is DIRECTED to continue with the proceedings.

The petition has no merit. Petitioner contends that, since the respondent’s cause of action in the land
registration case depends heavily on the survey plan, it was only prudent for the RTC to suspend the
proceedings therein pending the resolution of the petition for cancellation of the survey plan by the DENR. It
insists that recourse to a petition for certiorari was not proper considering that respondent was not arbitrarily
deprived of her right to prosecute her application for registration.
Undeniably, the power to stay proceedings is an incident to the power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of the cases in its dockets, with economy of time and effort for the court, counsel and litigants.
But courts should be mindful of the right of every party to a speedy disposition of his case and, thus, should
not be too eager to suspend proceedings of the cases before them.

Hence, every order suspending proceedings must be guided by the following precepts: it shall be done in order
to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between
litigants and courts, or when the rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until
the questions raised in the first action are settled. Otherwise, the suspension will be regarded as an arbitrary
exercise of the court’s discretion and can be corrected only by a petition for certiorari.

None of the circumstances that would justify the stay of proceedings is present.

In fact, to await the resolution of the petition for cancellation would only delay the resolution of the land
registration case and undermine the purpose of land registration.

The fundamental purpose of the Land Registration Law (Presidential Decree No. 1529) is to finally settle title
to real property in order to preempt any question on the legality of the title – except claims that were noted on
the certificate itself at the time of registration or those that arose subsequent thereto.

Consequently, once the title is registered under the said law, owners can rest secure on their ownership and
possession.

Glaringly, the petition for cancellation raises practically the very same issues that the herein petitioner raised
in its opposition to the respondent’s application for registration. Principally, it alleges that the survey plan
should be cancelled because it includes portions of the seven properties that it purchased from several
landowners, which properties are already covered by existing certificates of title.

Petitioner posits that it is the DENR that has the sole authority to decide the validity of the survey plan that
was approved by the LMS.20 It cites Section 4(15), Chapter 1, Title XIV, Administrative Code of 1987 which
provides that the DENR shall (15) Exercise (of) exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all
lands of the public domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification,
surveying and titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies.

However, respondent argues that the land registration court is clothed with adequate authority to resolve the
conflicting claims of the parties, and that even if the DENR cancels her survey plan, the land registration
court is not by duty bound to dismiss the application for registration based solely on the cancellation of the
survey plan.

Without delving into the jurisdiction of the DENR to resolve the petition for cancellation, we hold that, as an
incident to its authority to settle all questions over the title of the subject property, the land registration court
may resolve the underlying issue of whether the subject property overlaps the petitioner’s properties without
necessarily having to declare the survey plan as void.

It is well to note at this point that, in its bid to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote the expeditious
resolution of cases, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 eliminated the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the latter’s limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration
court.

Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even controversial and contentious cases, as well
as those involving substantial issues. When the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to
have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective. It may, therefore, hear and
determine all questions that arise from a petition for registration.

In view of the nature of a Torrens title, a land registration court has the duty to determine whether the
issuance of a new certificate of title will alter a valid and existing certificate of title. An application for
registration of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title, which is not allowed
by law.

But the RTC need not wait for the decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel the survey plan in order to
determine whether the subject property is already titled or forms part of already titled property. The court
may now verify this allegation based on the respondent’s survey plan vis-à-vis the certificates of title of the
petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest.

After all, a survey plan precisely serves to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not
overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall
the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land.

Should the court find it difficult to do so, the court may require the filing of additional papers to aid in its
determination of the propriety of the application, based on Section 21 of P.D. No. 1529:

SEC. 21.Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection. – The court may require facts to be
stated in the application in addition to those prescribed by this Decree not inconsistent therewith and may
require the filing of any additional papers.

The court may also directly require the DENR and the Land Registration Authority to submit a report on
whether the subject property has already been registered and covered by certificates of title, like what the
court did in Carvajal v. Court of Appeals. In that case, we commended such move by the land registration
court for being "in accordance with the purposes of the Land Registration Law."

ALFREDO GIMENO and DR. LEONARDO GIMENO *,petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ** and PRUDENCIO CARTAGENA, respondents
FACTS:
This is a simple case of recovery of two hectares of land filed by petitioner Alfredo Gimeno and several
othersagainst respondent Prudencio Cartagena with the Court of First Instance of Davao.

The land in litigation is part of a 17-hectare parcel situated in barrio Baculin, Municipality of Baganga,
province ofDavao, Presently covered by Original Certificate of Title No.1354 dated February 14, 1935 under a
homesteadpatent issued in favor of Brigido Cartagena, father of Prudencio Cartagena.

During the lifetime of Brigido Cartagenaa "Deed of Partition inter Vivos" was executed between spouses
Brigido Cartagena and Isabel Fernando and theirfour children and a 7-hectare portion was allocated to
Prudencio Cartagena which includes the two hectares nowbeing claimed by petitioners.

In their complaint filed on June 7, 1957, the Gimenos claim:

1. Sometime in 1926 their predecessor-in-interest,brothers ExequielGimeno and
VictorioGimeno(deceased) and Brigido Cartagena verbally agreedto jointly clear and cultivate the 17 hectares;
2.When the coconuts plantedby the Gimenos would have borne fruit, the land cleared by the latter
would be segregated by a competent surveyor;
3. Brigido Cartagena would execute papers of relinquishment in favor of the Gimenos; and
4. As a consideration ofagreement, the Gimenos gave P150.00 to Brigido Cartagena to help the latter
cultivate the rest of the property.
In 1948, the 17 hectares were surveyed and subdivided into "lot 2126" of two and lot 332" containing
an area of15.590 hectares. Lot 2126 is the portion now sought to be recovered by the Gimenos.

The allegations of the complaint and the evidence adduced by the petitioners were controverted by
respondentPrudencio Cartagena who claimed:
1. that his father, Brigido Cartagena, owned and possessed exclusively as ahomestead the 17-hectare
land for which the latter was issued Original Certificate of Title 1354 since February 14,1935;
2. that Brigido Cartagena declared for taxation purposes the entire 17 hectares solely in his name;
 3. that a deed ofpartition was executed between Brigido Cartagena and his four children, and
4. the area allocated to PrudencioCartagena measured seven hectares of which two hectares are now
being claimed by the Gimenos withoutjustification.

The trial court presided by Judge Macapanton Abbas as well as the Court of Appeals dismissed the
complaint of theGimenos because of "the dubious character of plaintiffs' evidence" as well as "laches in the
enforcement of theiralleged right", they having filed this particular complaint only after "22 years, 3 months,
and 6 days from February14, 1935 when OCT 1354 was issued in the name of Brigido Cartagena" and "31
years from the date of the allegedverbal agreement of June 21, 1926" between the Gimeno brothers and
Brigido Cartagena.

The CAfurther stated that petitioners (plaintiffs-appellants) "failed to adduce clear, competent and
convincing evidence that wouldjustify this Court to hold that a fiduciary relation existed between Exequiel
and VictorioGimeno on one hand and BrigidoCartagena on the other, with respect to the two-hectare portion
which is now known as lot 2126 of BagangaCadastre,Davao.

There is no gainsaying the fact that the plaintiffs' evidence falls far short of the required quantum and
quality that canoverthrow the homestead patent issued under OCT 1354 which, as mentioned heretofore, has
been in existence, unassailedfor more a prior to the institution of the present action."

Petitioners now seek a reversal of the decision of the CA raising a number of legal questions which
respondentappellate court allegedly disposed of erroneously.

ISSUES:
1. Is there clear and convincing evidence - as the CAputs it - to sustain the claim of petitioners that there was
a verbal agreement of purchase entered into in 1926between their predecessors-in-interest and respondent's
father, Brigido Cartagena, over the two-hectare portion ofland? NONE

2. Is there clear and convincing evidence that an implied trust existed in favor of petitioners which
respondentPrudencio Cartagena is bound to respect and comply with? NONE.

HELD:
The appellate court held that there is none. That findingof respondent court is binding on Us in the
absence of any showing that there has been a misapprehension of factsor that a grave abuse of discretion was
committed in the appreciation of the evidence or that the situation calls foran exception to the general rule.

In the first assigned error petitioners submit that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not holding
that private respondentwaived the defenses of "indefeasibility of title, prescription, laches and lack of cause of
action," inasmuch as respondentCartagena failed to assert them in his answer to the complaint, and under
Rule 9, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court,defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
We agree with the appellate court that there is substantial compliance with the Rules considering that
in the answer ofrespondent Cartagena it was specifically pleaded that the two hectares object of the complaint
are part of a bigger tract ofland covered by OCT 1354 issued since February 14, 1935 in the name of
respondent's father Brigido Cartagena, and evenprior to that date respondent's predecessors-in-interest were
in possession of said property exclusively as owners thereof,and that respondent Cartagena merely continued
the ion of his father Brigido Cartagena after the partition of the propertywas executed among the children of
Brigido Cartagena in September of 1952.

It is to be noted that in the overall appreciation of the evidence of petitioners on their claim that there
was a verbalpurchase of the two hectares since 1926, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not
find the claim credible,and one of the factors which led the two courts to that conclusion was the inaction of
petitioners and theirpredecessors-in- interest to assert their supposed right over the property in litigation
notwithstanding the allegationthat there was an agreement that a document conveying the two hectares to the
Gimeno brothers would beexecuted by Brigido Cartagena after the coconut trees the Gimenos planted shall
have home fruit and the twohectares shall have been segregated, which events according to petitioners
occurred since 1943 and 1948respectively.

It is indeed surprising why no positive step was taken by the Gimeno brothers to enforce the
supposedverbal agreement against Brigido Cartagena during the latter's lifetime.
It was only after Brigido Cartagena died andwas no longer in a position to deny or dispute the
supposed agreement that this complaint was filed on June 7,1957.
In evaluating the evidence, both the court a quo and the appellate court found that the Gimeno's
failure totake positive action since 1926 and before the Brigido Cartagena died sometime in 1954 greatly
weakened the claimof petitioners.

To that We agree.
In PHHC and University of the Philippines vs. Mencias, et al. this Court held among others that an
action forreconveyance of a property that was titled since 1914 and brought only in 1957 is to be barred on
grounds of laches.
In Delima vs. Tio the Court likewise pronounced that inaction for 28 years from the time of the
supposed on invoked byplaintiff before she filed the action for recovery of property amounts to laches and
convert what otherwise could be a validcase into a stale demand.
In Pabalate et al. vs. Echarri. Jr. the land in litigation was covered by an original certificateof title
issued by virtue of a homestead patent dated February 20, 1926 which was sold by the heirs of the patentee
to a thirdperson who since 1927 was in continuous exclusive possession in concept of owner thereof. The of
the action for recovery ofsaid property filed only in 1959 by the heirs of the vendors, was upheld by this Court
on the ground inter alia that by the longperiod of 37 years and the plaintiffs' inaction or inexclusive neglect
their claim was converted into a "stale demand."

In the second assigned errorit is asserted that respondent CA erred in not holding that a certificate
oftitle issued by reason of a homestead patent is not indefeasibleand in support thereof petitioners invoke
thepronouncements of this Court in Nieto vs. Quines to the effect that... a certificate of title based on a patent,
even after the expiration of one year from the issuancethereof, is still subject to certain conditions and
restrictions. As a matter of fact, in appropriate casesand after prior administrative investigations by the
Director of Lands, proper actions may be institutedby said official which may lead to the cancellation of the
patent and the title issued pursuant to Act2259, after the lapse of 1 year, becomes incontrovertible. The
inescapable conclusion, therefore, isthat, while with the due registration and issuance of a certificate of title
over a land acquired pursuant tothe Public Land Law, said property becomes registered in contemplation of
Act 496, in view of itsnature and manner of acquisition, such certificate of title, when in conflict with one
obtained on thesame date through judicial proceedings, must give way to the latter. (L-14643, Sept. 29, 1962,
6 SCRA74, 80)

The Nieto case has no application to the present action.

In Nieto two certificates of title were issued - one based ona homestead patent while the other was
obtained through a cadastral proceeding, and the issue was which of thetwo registrations already effected and
secured should prevail.
In this case of the Gimenos all that is involved is thelatter's claim that the homestead patentee, Brigido
Cartagena, agreed way back in 1926 to convey to the Gimenostwo hectares of that homestead, which
assertion was discarded by the trial court and the Court of Appeals for lack ofsufficient credible evidence to
substantiate the same.
Hence, the dismissal of petitioner's complaint forreconveyance.

In their third assigned error, petitioners contend that the survey plan prepared and approved in 1948
by the Bureauof Lands which segregated the two hectares in question from the rest of the Cartagena property
is "the mosteloquent evidence" of their ownership.
 Again We state that this is a matter of appreciation of evidence which is best leftto the trial court and
the appellate court which are finders of facts. It appears that said piece of evidence was not given weightin the
evaluation of the evidence of the parties.
We note that the sketch plan, Exhibit A, prepared by a private land Surveyordoes not bear the
approval of the Director of Lands as claimed in page 12 of the Petition for certiorari. All that appears is
acertification of the Acting District Land Officer that the sketch is a true and correct copy of a plan existing in
the Land Office inDavao City.
At any rate, the existence of a sketch plan of a real Property even if approved by the Bureau of Lands
is no proofin itself of ownership of the land covered by the plan.

In their fourth assigned errorpetitioners claim that respondent Court of Appeals erred in finding that
the petitioners'witness FelimonManguiob testified that the subdivision plan Exhibit A had no technical
descriptions because in truththere was no such testimony in the record.
We note however that petitioners' contention is premised on a wronginterpretation of a portion of page
four of the appellate court's decision. The clause "without technical description" is a specificfinding of
respondent court based on the sketch, Exhibit A, for the truth of the matter is that said sketch plan is
withouttechnical descriptions. What the appellate court meant and in effect stated on page four of its decision
was that according toFelimonMaguiob the subdivision survey was effected in June, 1948, at the instance of
Brigido Cartagena, the registeredowner of the title." This testimony of the witness was no, however believed or
even credit both by the court a quo and theCourt of Appeals.

In the fifth assigned errorit is asserted that respondent court erred in holding that fraud or bad faith is
a necessaryallegation in an action for reconveyance.
Petitioners cite Sanchez vs. Vda. de Tamsi, L-16736, June 30, 1961, whereinit was held that
reconveyance can be justified on the ground of error. In Sanchez itwas stated that where a property is
erroneously included in a homestead patent, the patentee by force of law becomes atrustee under an implied
trust for the benefit of the real owner.
However, that is not the issue in this case now before Us. TheGimenos do not assert that there was
error or that there was fraud on the part of Brigido Cartagena in applying for ahomestead patent for the 17
hectares and in securing the original certificate of title. No; what is alleged is that there was averbal
understanding or "purchase" in that the two hectares cleared and cultivated by petitioners' predecessors-in-
interestwould be "deeded" in their favor, and to enforce that supposed oral agreement entered into in 1926
this complaint was filed.

Fundamentally, therefore, the action is one for enforcement of a verbal understanding supposedly
entered into between therespective predecessors- in-interest of the petitioners and the respondent herein, and
if the same is to prosper there must bea finding that the Cartagenas held the two hectares in trust for the
Gimenos.
It is in this context that respondent courtdeclared that there was need for petitioners to show that they
were the owners of the property claimed and were beingdeprived thereof by private respondent.
Respondent Court concluded that the record is "barren of evidence" to establisheda fiduciary
relationship between the homestead patentee, Brigido Cartagena and the Gimenos.

The sixth assigned errorargues that respondent court erred in not holding that petitioners sufficiently
establishedtheir claim of ownership and continuous possession on the basis of the allegation in their
complaint that they planted377 coconuts which was admitted by respondent Cartagena in the latter's answer
to the complaint.
On this point, We examined the answer of respondent Cartagena to the amended complaint and
contrary to the assertion of
petitioners, there is no such admission on the part of defendant, now respondent, Cartagena. Paragraph 9 of
the amendedcomplaint reads:
9. That the property in the case at bar consists of 377 productive coconut trees which produce
30piculs of copra every after three months or 120 piculs every year; (p. 14, Record on Appeal)
Paragraph 9 of respondent's answer in turn states:
9. That the Defendant ADMITS that the land in question is planted to 377 fruit-bearing coconut
treesbut DENIES that the produce is 30 piculs per quarter; the truth being that the quarterly produce
is atbest 20 piculs or 80 piculs yearly. (pp. 18-19, Record on Appeal)

It is obvious that what Cartagena admitted was that there were 377 fruit-bearing coconut trees on the
two, but thatwas all.
Note that the allegation in paragraph 4 of the amended complaint that plaintiffs' predecessors-in-
interestintroduced the present improvement consisting mainly of coconuts, was specifically denied in
paragraph 4 of thedefendant's answer, and it was alleged that it was Brigido Cartagena, the patentee, with the
help of his children oneof whom is the defendant, who cleared, cultivated and improved the land in question
which is only a part of theparcel covered by Original Certificate of Title 1354.
All the allegations of petitioners as to their alleged occupation, possession and cultivation of the land
in litigationwere not substantiated according to the trial court and the Court of Appeal and We do not disturb
that finding.

The seventh assigned errorcontends that respondent court erred in not holding that the trial court of
Davao shouldhave allowed counsel of petitioners to cross-examine respondent Cartagena on a letter allegedly
sent by the latter toMrs. Natividad Gimeno wherein ion of the petitioners was supposedly admitted.
The stenographic transcript of the cross-examination of respondent Cartagena shows that petitioners'
counsel presented tothe former a certain letter written by Atty. Juanito Hernandez to Mrs. Natividad Gimeno.
No error was committed by the trialcourt in sustaining the timely objection of Cartagenas counsel and ruling
that the best witness competent to testify on thatletter was the addressee, Mrs. Natividad Gimeno and not
Prudencio Cartagena as the letter would constitute hearsayevidence in so far as the latter was concerned.

WHEREFORE, We find this appeal without merit and We dismiss the same and affirm the decision of
the Court ofAppeals in toto with costs against petitioners.
So Ordered.

SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
ANGELA V. MADAYAG, Respondent
FACTS:
On July 12, 2001, respondent Angela V. Madayag filed with the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinanan
application for registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,492 square meters located in Barangay
Anonas,Urdaneta City, Pangasinan.Attached to the application was a tracing cloth of Survey Plan Psu-01-
008438,approved by the Land Management Services (LMS) of the DENR Region 1, San Fernando City.

On August 20, 2001, petitioner SM Prime Holdings, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Chief, Regional
SurveyDivision, DENR, Region I, demanding the cancellation of the respondent’s survey plan because the lot
encroachedon the properties it recently purchased from several lot owners and that, despite being the new
owner of theadjoining lots, it was not notified of the survey conducted on June 8, 2001.

Petitioner then manifested its opposition to the respondent’s application for registration. The Republic
of thePhilippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas also filed their
respectiveoppositions.

On February 6, 2002, petitioner filed its formal opposition.

Petitioner alleged that it had recently bought sevenparcels of land in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta,
delineated as Lots B, C, D, E, G, H and I in Consolidation-Subdivision Plan No. (LRC) Pcs-21329, approved by
the Land Registration Commission on August 26, 1976, andpreviously covered by Survey Plan No. Psu-
236090 approved by the Bureau of Lands on December 29, 1970.These parcels of land are covered by
separate certificates of title, some of which are already in the name of thepetitioner while the others are still in
the name of the previous owners.

On February 20, 2002, the RTC declared a general defaultthe Republicand the heirs ofRomulo
Visperas,except as to the petitioner.
Respondent commenced the presentation of evidence.
Meanwhile, acting on petitioner’s request for the cancellation of the respondent’s survey plan, DENR
AssistantRegional Executive Director for Legal Services and Public Affairs, Allan V. Barcena, advised the
petitioner to file apetition for cancellation in due form so that the DENR could properly act on the same.

Accordingly, petitionerformally filed with the DENR a petition for cancellation of the survey plan
sometime in March 2002, alleging thefollowing grounds:
I.THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE PROPERTY WHICH IS THESUBJECT
LOT IN THIS CASE
II.NO NOTICE WAS MADE UPON PETITIONER (AS ADJOINING LANDOWNER AND WHO
BEARSINTEREST OVER THE SUBJECT LOT) MUCH LESS THE OWNERS OF ADJOINING LANDS.
III.THE CIRCUMSTANCES EVIDENTLY SHOW THAT BAD FAITH AND/OR MALICE ATTENDED
THEAPPROVAL OF (PLAN WITH PSU NO. 01-008438).

On July 17, 2002, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the land registration
case, allegingthat the court should await the DENR resolution of the petition for the cancellation of the survey
plan "as theadministrative case is prejudicial to the determination" of the land registration case.

On October 8, 2002, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion and suspends theproceedings.
Emphasizing that a survey plan is one of the mandatory requirements in land registration
proceedings, the RTCagreed with the petitioner that the cancellation of the survey plan would be prejudicial to
the petition for landregistration.

On February 13, 2003, the RTC denied the respondent’s motion for reconsideration of its order.

Respondentfiled a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the order suspending the proceedings.

On March 19, 2004, finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending the
proceedings, theCA granted the petition for certiorari andthe challenged Orders datedOctober 8, 2002 and
February 13, 2003 of the respondent Court are declared NULL and VOID.

The CA ratiocinated that the survey plan which was duly approved by the DENR should be accorded
thepresumption of regularity, and that the RTC has the power to hear and determine all questions arising
from anapplication for registration.

On July 15, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner was compelled to file this petition for review, ascribing the following errors to the CA:
I. The CA committed manifest error in not finding that thesuspension of the proceedings in the
land registration case is legal andproper pending the determination and resolution of the
administrative casebefore the DENR-Region 1.
II. The CA committed manifest error in failing to find that theassailed orders of the lower court
have proper and sufficient bases in factand in law.
III. The CA committed manifest error in holding that the lowercourt has acted with grave abuse
of discretion in suspending theproceedings and archiving the case.
 IV. The CA committed manifest error in failing to find that thefiling of the petition for certiorari,
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules ofCivil Procedure, is not the only plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in theordinary course of law on the part of herein respondent.

ISSUES:
1.W/N the RTC should suspend the proceedings in the land registration case pending the resolution of the
petition for the cancellation of Madayag’s survey plan filed with DENR? NO.

HELD:
The Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan isDIRECTED to continue with the proceedings.

The petition has no merit.Petitioner contends that, since the respondent’s cause of action in the land
registration case depends heavily on thesurvey plan, it was only prudent for the RTC to suspend the
proceedings therein pending the resolution of thepetition for cancellation of the survey plan by the DENR. It
insists that recourse to a petition forcertiorari was not proper considering that respondent was not arbitrarily
deprived of her right to prosecute herapplication for registration.

Undeniably, the power to stay proceedings is an incident to the power inherent in every court to
control thedisposition of the cases in its dockets, with economy of time and effort for the court, counsel and
litigants. But courtsshould be mindful of the right of every party to a speedy disposition of his case and, thus,
should not be too eager tosuspend proceedings of the cases before them.
Hence, every order suspending proceedings must be guided by thefollowing precepts: it shall be done
in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflictingjudgments, confusion
between litigants and courts,or when the rights of parties to the second action cannot beproperly determined
until the questions raised in the first action are settled.Otherwise, the suspension will beregarded as an
arbitrary exercise of the court’s discretion and can be corrected only by a petition for certiorari.

None of the circumstances that would justify the stay of proceedings is present.

In fact, to await the resolution of thepetition for cancellation would only delay the resolution of the
land registration case and undermine the purpose ofland registration.

The fundamental purpose of the Land Registration Law (Presidential Decree No. 1529) is to finally
settle title to realproperty in order to preempt any question on the legality of the title – except claims that were
noted on the certificateitself at the time of registration or those that arose subsequent thereto.
Consequently, once the title is registeredunder the said law, owners can rest secure on their
ownership and possession.

Glaringly, the petition for cancellation raises practically the very same issues that the herein petitioner
raised in itsopposition to the respondent’s application for registration. Principally, it alleges that the survey
plan should becancelled because it includes portions of the seven properties that it purchased from several
landowners, whichproperties are already covered by existing certificates of title.

Petitioner posits that it is the DENR that has the sole authority to decide the validity of the survey plan
that wasapproved by the LMS.20 It cites Section 4(15), Chapter 1, Title XIV, Administrative Code of 1987
which provides thatthe DENR shall(15) Exercise (of) exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition
of all lands of the public domain andserve as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification,
surveying and titling of lands inconsultation with appropriate agencies.
However, respondent argues that the land registration court is clothed with adequate authority to
resolve theconflicting claims of the parties, and that even if the DENR cancels her survey plan, the land
registration court is notby duty bound to dismiss the application for registration based solely on the
cancellation of the survey plan.
 Without delving into the jurisdiction of the DENR to resolve the petition for cancellation, we hold that,
as an incidentto its authority to settle all questions over the title of the subject property, the land registration
court may resolve theunderlying issue of whether the subject property overlaps the petitioner’s properties
without necessarily having todeclare the survey plan as void.

It is well to note at this point that, in its bid to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote the
expeditious resolution ofcases, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 eliminated the distinction between the
general jurisdiction vested in theRTC and the latter’s limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land
registration court.
Land registration courts, assuch, can now hear and decide even controversial and contentious cases,
as well as those involving substantialissues. When the law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is
deemed to have all the necessary powers toexercise such jurisdiction to make it effective. It may, therefore,
hear and determine all questions that arise from apetition for registration.
In view of the nature of a Torrens title, a land registration court has the duty to determine whether the
issuance of anew certificate of title will alter a valid and existing certificate of title. An application for
registration of an alreadytitled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title, which is not allowed by
law.
But the RTC need notwait for the decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel the survey plan in
order to determine whether the subjectproperty is already titled or forms part of already titled property. The
court may now verify this allegation based onthe respondent’s survey plan vis-à-vis the certificates of title of
the petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest.
Afterall, a survey plan precisely serves to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does
not overlap a parcelof land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall
the possibility that it willbe overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land.

Should the court find it difficult to do so, the court may require the filing of additional papers to aid in
itsdetermination of the propriety of the application, based on Section 21 of P.D. No. 1529:
SEC. 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection. – The court may
require facts to be statedin the application in addition to those prescribed by this Decree not
inconsistent therewith and may require the filingof any additional papers.

The court may also directly require the DENR and the Land Registration Authority to submit a report
on whether thesubject property has already been registered and covered by certificates of title, like what the
court did in Carvajal v.Court of Appeals. In that case, we commended such move bythe land registration court
for being "in accordance with the purposes of the Land Registration Law."