G.R. No.

180027               July 18, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MICHAEL C. SANTOS, VANNESSA C. SANTOS, MICHELLE C. SANTOS and DELFIN SANTOS, all
represented by DELFIN C. SANTOS, Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

For review1 is the Decision2 dated 9 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86300. In the
said decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the 14 February 2005 ruling 3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 15, of Naic, Cavite in LRC Case No. NC-2002-1292. The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals’ decision accordingly reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision dated February 14, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 15) in Naic, Cavite, in LRC Case No. NC-2002-1292 is AFFIRMED in toto. No
costs.4

The aforementioned ruling of the RTC granted the respondents’ Application for Original Registration of a parcel
of land under Presidential Decree No. 1529.

The antecedents are as follows:

Prelude

In October 1997, the respondents purchased three (3) parcels of unregistered land situated in Barangay
Carasuchi, Indang, Cavite.5 The 3 parcels of land were previously owned by one Generosa Asuncion
(Generosa), one Teresita Sernal (Teresita) and by the spouses Jimmy and Imelda Antona, respectively.6

Sometime after the said purchase, the respondents caused the survey and consolidation of the parcels of land.
Hence, per the consolidation/subdivision plan Ccs-04-003949-D, the 3 parcels were consolidated into a single
lot—"Lot 3"—with a determined total area of nine thousand five hundred seventy-seven (9,577) square
meters.7

The Application for Land Registration

On 12 March 2002, the respondents filed with the RTC an Application 8 for Original Registration of Lot 3. Their
application was docketed as LRC Case No. NC-2002-1292.

On the same day, the RTC issued an Order9 setting the application for initial hearing and directing the
satisfaction of jurisdictional requirements pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. The same
Order, however, also required the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to submit a
report on the status of Lot 3.10

On 13 March 2002, the DENR Calabarzon Office submitted its Report 11 to the RTC. The Report relates that the
area covered by Lot 3 "falls within the Alienable and Disposable Land, Project No. 13 of Indang, Cavite per
LC12 3013 certified on March 15, 1982." Later, the respondents submitted a Certification 13 from the DENR-
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) attesting that, indeed, Lot 3 was classified as
an "Alienable or Disposable Land" as of 15 March 1982.

After fulfillment of the jurisdictional requirements, the government, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed the lone opposition14 to the respondents’ application on 13 May 2003.

The Claim, Evidence and Opposition

The respondents allege that their predecessors-in-interest i.e., the previous owners of the parcels of land
making up Lot 3, have been in "continuous, uninterrupted, open, public and adverse" possession of the said
parcels "since time immemorial."15 It is by virtue of such lengthy possession, tacked with their own, that
respondents now hinge their claim of title over Lot 3.

During trial on the merits, the respondents presented, among others, the testimonies of Generosa 16 and the
representatives of their two (2) other predecessors-in-interest. 17 The said witnesses testified that they have
been in possession of their respective parcels of land for over thirty (30) years prior to the purchase thereof by
the respondents in 1997.18 The witnesses also confirmed that neither they nor the interest they represent, have
any objection to the registration of Lot 3 in favor of the respondents.19

In addition, Generosa affirmed in open court a Joint Affidavit 20 she executed with Teresita.21 In it, Generosa
revealed that the portions of Lot 3 previously pertaining to her and Teresita were once owned by her father, Mr.
Valentin Sernal (Valentin) and that the latter had "continuously, openly and peacefully occupied and tilled as
absolute owner" such lands even "before the outbreak of World War 2."22

To substantiate the above testimonies, the respondents also presented various Tax Declarations 23 covering
certain areas of Lot 3—the earliest of which dates back to 1948 and covers the portions of the subject lot
previously belonging to Generosa and Teresita.24

On the other hand, the government insists that Lot 3 still forms part of the public domain and, hence, not
subject to private acquisition and registration. The government, however, presented no further evidence to
controvert the claim of the respondents.25

The Decision of the RTC and the Court of Appeals

On 14 February 2005, the RTC rendered a ruling granting the respondents’ Application for Original
Registration of Lot 3. The RTC thus decreed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court confirming its previous Order of general default, decrees
and adjudges Lot 3 (Lot 1755) Ccs-04-003949-D of Indang, Cadastre, with a total area of NINE THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN (9,577) square meters and its technical description as above-described and
situated in Brgy. [Carasuchi], Indang, Cavite, pursuant to the provisions of Act 496 as amended by P.D. No.
1529, it is hereby decreed and adjudged to be confirmed and registered in the name of herein applicants
MICHAEL C. SANTOS, VANESSA C. SANTOS, MICHELLE C. SANTOS, and DELFIN C. SANTOS, all
residing at No. 60 Rockville Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City.

Once this decision has become final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued by the
Administrator, Land Registration Authority.26

The government promptly appealed the ruling of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. 27 As already mentioned
earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision on appeal.

Hence, this petition.28

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC ruling granting original
registration of Lot 3 in favor of the respondents.

The government would have Us answer in the affirmative. It argues that the respondents have failed to offer
evidence sufficient to establish its title over Lot 3 and, therefore, were unable to rebut the Regalian
presumption in favor of the State.29

The government urges this Court to consider the DENR Calabarzon Office Report as well as the DENR-
CENRO Certification, both of which clearly state that Lot 3 only became "Alienable or

Disposable Land" on 15 March 1982.30 The government posits that since Lot 3 was only classified as alienable
and disposable on 15 March 1982, the period of prescription against the State should also commence to run
only from such date.31 Thus, the respondents’ 12 March 2002 application—filed nearly twenty (20) years after
the said classification—is still premature, as it does not meet the statutory period required in order for
extraordinary prescription to set in.32

OUR RULING

We grant the petition.

Jura Regalia and the Property Registration Decree

We start our analysis by applying the principle of Jura Regalia or the Regalian Doctrine. 33 Jura Regalia simply
means that the State is the original proprietor of all lands and, as such, is the general source of all private
titles.34 Thus, pursuant to this principle, all claims of private title to land, save those acquired from native
title,35 must be traced from some grant, whether express or implied, from the State. 36 Absent a clear showing
that land had been let into private ownership through the State’s imprimatur, such land is presumed to belong
to the State.37
Being an unregistered land, Lot 3 is therefore presumed as land belonging to the State. It is basic that those
who seek the entry of such land into the Torrens system of registration must first establish that it has acquired
valid title thereto as against the State, in accordance with law.

In this connection, original registration of title to land is allowed by Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
or otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The said section provides:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession
or accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law. (Emphasis
supplied)

Basing from the allegations of the respondents in their application for land registration and subsequent
pleadings, it appears that they seek the registration of Lot 3 under either the first or the second paragraph of
the quoted section.

However, after perusing the records of this case, as well as the laws and jurisprudence relevant thereto, We
find that neither justifies registration in favor of the respondents.

Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529

Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 refers to the original registration of "imperfect" titles to public
land acquired under Section 11(4) in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public
Land Act, as amended.38 Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 specify identical requirements for the judicial confirmation of "imperfect" titles, to wit:39

1. That the subject land forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain;.

2. That the applicants, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide
claim of ownership, and;

3. That such possession and occupation must be since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

In this case, the respondents were not able to satisfy the third requisite, i.e., that the respondents failed to
establish that they or their predecessors-in-interest, have been in possession and occupation of Lot 3 "since
June 12, 1945 or earlier." An examination of the evidence on record reveals so:

First. The testimonies of respondents’ predecessors-in-interest and/or their representatives were patently
deficient on this point.

None of them testified about possession and occupation of the subject parcels of land dating back to 12 June
1945 or earlier. Rather, the said witnesses merely related that they have been in possession of their lands "for
over thirty years" prior to the purchase thereof by respondents in 1997.40

Neither can the affirmation of Generosa of the Joint Affidavit be considered as sufficient to prove compliance
with the third requisite. The said Joint Affidavit merely contains a general claim that Valentin had "continuously,
openly and peacefully occupied and tilled as absolute owner" the parcels of Generosa and Teresita even
"before the outbreak of World War 2" — which lacks specificity and is unsupported by any other evidence. In
Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation,41 this Court dismissed a similar unsubstantiated
claim of possession as a "mere conclusion of law" that is "unavailing and cannot suffice:"

Moreover, Vicente Oco did not testify as to what specific acts of dominion or ownership were performed by the
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest and if indeed they did. He merely made a general claim that they came
into possession before World War II, which is a mere conclusion of law and not factual proof of possession,
and therefore unavailing and cannot suffice.42 Evidence of this nature should have been received with
suspicion, if not dismissed as tenuous and unreliable.

Second. The supporting tax declarations presented by the respondents also fall short of proving possession
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest declaration submitted by the respondents i.e., Tax Declaration No.
9412,43 was issued only in 1948 and merely covers the portion of Lot 3 previously pertaining to Generosa and
Teresita. Much worse, Tax Declaration No. 9412 shows no declared improvements on such portion of Lot 3 as
of 1948—posing an apparent contradiction to the claims of Generosa and Teresita in their Joint Affidavit.

Indeed, the evidence presented by the respondents does not qualify as the "well-nigh incontrovertible" kind
that is required to prove title thru possession and occupation of public land since 12 June 1945 or
earlier.44 Clearly, respondents are not entitled to registration under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1529.

Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529

The respondents, however, make an alternative plea for registration, this time, under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529. Notwithstanding their inability to comply with Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, the respondents claim that they were at least able to establish possession and occupation of
Lot 3 for a sufficient number of years so as to acquire title over the same via prescription.45

As earlier intimated, the government counters the respondents’ alternative plea by arguing that the statutory
period required in order for extraordinary prescription to set in was not met in this case. 46 The government cites
the DENR Calabarzon Office Report as well as the DENR-CENRO Certification, both of which state that Lot 3
only became "Alienable or Disposable Land" on 15 March 1982. 47 It posits that the period of prescription
against the State should also commence to run only from such date. 48 Hence, the government concludes, the
respondents’ 12 March 2002 application is still premature.49

We find the contention of the government inaccurate but nevertheless deny registration of Lot 3 under Section
14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 sanctions the original registration of lands acquired by
prescription "under the provisions of existing law." In the seminal case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic,50 this Court clarified that the "existing law" mentioned in the subject provision refers to no other than
Republic Act No. 386, or the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Malabanan acknowledged that only lands of the public domain that are "patrimonial in character" are
"susceptible to acquisitive presecription" and, hence, eligible for registration under Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529.51 Applying the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, 52 Malabanan further elucidated that in
order for public land to be considered as patrimonial "there must be an express declaration by the State that
the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth
or that the property has been converted into patrimonial."53 Until then, the period of acquisitive prescription
against the State will not commence to run.54

The requirement of an "express declaration" contemplated by Malabanan is separate and distinct from the
mere classification of public land as alienable and disposable. 55 On this point, Malabanan was reiterated by the
recent case of Republic v. Rizalvo, Jr.56

In this case, the respondents were not able to present any "express declaration" from the State, attesting to the
patrimonial character of Lot 3. To put it bluntly, the respondents were not able to prove that acquisitive
prescription has begun to run against the State, much less that they have acquired title to Lot 3 by virtue
thereof. As jurisprudence tells us, a mere certification or report classifying the subject land as alienable and
disposable is not sufficient.57 We are, therefore, left with the unfortunate but necessary verdict that the
respondent are not entitled to the registration under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

There being no compliance with either the first or second paragraph of Section 14 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, the Regalian presumption stands and must be enforced in this case. We accordingly overturn the
decisions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals for not being supported by the evidence at hand.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 9 October 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 86300 affirming the 14 February 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Naic,
Cavite in LRC Case No. NC-2002-1292 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondents’ application
for registration is, accordingly, DENIED.

Costs against respondents.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157485, March 26, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by AKLAN NATIONAL COLLEGE OF FISHERIES (ANCF)

and DR. ELENITA R. ANDRADE, in her capacity as ANCF Superintendent, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN, namely: SALVACION L. SIN, ROSARIO S. ENRIQUEZ, FRANCISCO L.
SIN, MARIA S. YUCHINTAT, MANUEL L. SIN, JAIME CARDINAL SIN, RAMON L. SIN, and CEFERINA S.
VITA, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65244 dated
February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case
No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of New Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case
No. 1181, segregating from the Aklan National College of Fisheries (ANCF) reservation the portion of land
being claimed by respondents.

Petitioner in this case is the Republic of the Philippines, represented by ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in
her capacity as Superintendent of ANCF. Respondents claim that they are the lawful heirs of the late Maxima
Lachica Sin who was the owner of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Tambac, New Washington, Aklan, and
more particularly described as follows:

A parcel of cocal, nipal and swampy land, located at Barangay Tambac, New Washington, Aklan, containing
an approximate area of FIFTY[-]EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIX (58,606) square meters, more or
less, as per survey by Geodetic Engineer Reynaldo L. Lopez. Bounded on the North by Dumlog Creek; on the
East by Adriano Melocoton; on the South by Mabilo Creek; and on the West by Amado Cayetano and declared
for taxation purposes in the name of Maxima L. Sin (deceased) under Tax Declaration No. 10701 (1985) with
an assessed value of Php1,320.00.2

On August 26, 1991, respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint against Lucio
Arquisola, in his capacity as Superintendent of ANCF (hereinafter ANCF Superintendent), for recovery of
possession, quieting of title, and declaration of ownership with damages. Respondent heirs claim that a
41,231-square meter-portion of the property they inherited had been usurped by ANCF, creating a cloud of
doubt with respect to their ownership over the parcel of land they wish to remove from the ANCF reservation.

The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by respondents was the subject of
Proclamation No. 2074 of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares of land within the
area, which included said portion of private respondents’ alleged property, as civil reservation for educational
purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent furthermore averred that the subject parcel of land is timberland
and therefore not susceptible of private ownership.

Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include ANCF as a party defendant and Lucio Arquisola, who
retired from the service during the pendency of the case, was substituted by Ricardo Andres, then the
designated Officer-in-Charge of ANCF.

The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and Batan, Aklan, in view of the enactment of
Republic Act No. 7659 which expanded the jurisdiction of first-level courts. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 1181 (4390).

Before the MCTC, respondent heirs presented evidence that they inherited a bigger parcel of land from their
mother, Maxima Sin, who died in the year 1945 in New Washington, Capiz (now Aklan). Maxima Sin acquired
said bigger parcel of land by virtue of a Deed of Sale (Exhibit "B"), and then developed the same by planting
coconut trees, banana plants, mango trees and nipa palms and usufructing the produce of said land until her
death in 1945.

In the year 1988, a portion of said land respondents inherited from Maxima Sin was occupied by ANCF and
converted into a fishpond for educational purpose. Respondent heirs of Maxima Sin asserted that they were
previously in possession of the disputed land in the concept of an owner. The disputed area was a swampy
land until it was converted into a fishpond by the ANCF. To prove possession, respondents presented several
tax declarations, the earliest of which was in the year 1945.

On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring plaintiffs [respondent heirs herein] the owner and possessor of
the land in question in this case and for the defendants to cause the segregation of the same from the Civil
Reservation of the Aklan National College of Fisheries, granted under Proclamation No. 2074 dated March 31,
1981.

It is further ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs actual damages for the unearned
yearly income from nipa plants uprooted by the defendants [on] the land in question when the same has been
converted by the defendants into a fishpond, in the amount of Php3,500.00 yearly beginning the year 1988
until plaintiffs are fully restored to the possession of the land in question.

It is finally ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the sum of Php10,000.00 for
attorney’s fees and costs of this suit.3

According to the MCTC, the sketch made by the Court Commissioner in his report (Exh. "LL") shows that the
disputed property is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Furthermore, the land covered by
Civil Reservation under Proclamation No. 2074 was classified as timberland only on December 22, 1960 (Exh.
"4-D"). The MCTC observed that the phrase "Block II Alien or Disp. LC 2415" was printed on the Map of the
Civil Reservation for ANCF established under Proclamation No. 2074 (Exh. "6"), indicating that the disputed
land is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

The MCTC likewise cited a decision of this Court in the 1976 case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 4 where it
was pronounced that:

Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired. The
claims of persons who have settled on, occupied, and improved a parcel of public land which is later included
in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and are usually respected, but where the President, as
authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving certain lands, and warning all persons to depart therefrom,
this terminates any rights previously acquired in such lands by a person who has settled thereon in order to
obtain a preferential right of purchase. And patents for lands which have been previously granted, reserved
from sale, or appropriated are void. (Underscoring from the MCTC, citations omitted.)

Noting that there was no warning in Proclamation No. 2074 requiring all persons to depart from the reservation,
the MCTC concluded that the reservation was subject to private rights if there are any.

The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the disputed land by virtue of their and their
predecessors’ open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession amounts to an imperfect title, which
should be respected and protected.

Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, where the case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 6130.

On May 2, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the MCTC judgment with modification:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is modified absolving Appellant Ricardo Andres
from the payment of damages and attorney’s fees. All other details of the appealed decision are affirmed in
toto.5

The RTC stressed that Proclamation No. 2074 recognizes vested rights acquired by private individuals prior to
its issuance on March 31, 1981.

The RTC added that the findings of facts of the MCTC may not be disturbed on appeal unless the court below
has overlooked some facts of substance that may alter the results of its findings. The RTC, however, absolved
the Superintendent of the ANCF from liability as there was no showing on record that he acted with malice or in
bad faith in the implementation of Proclamation No. 2074.6

Petitioner Republic, represented by the ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her capacity as the new
Superintendent of the ANCF, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Review. The
petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65244.

On February 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. In
addition to the findings of the MCTC and the RTC, the Court of Appeals held:

Moreover, petitioner had not shown by competent evidence that the subject land was likewise declared a
timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960. Considering that lands adjoining to that of the
private respondents, which are also within the reservation area, have been issued original certificates of title,
the same affirms the conclusion that the area of the subject land was agricultural, and therefore disposable,
before its declaration as a timberland in 1960.

It should be noted that Maxima Lachica Sin acquired, through purchase and sale, the subject property from its
previous owners spouses Sotera Melocoton and Victor Garcia on January 15, 1932, or 28 years before the
said landholding was declared a timberland on December 22, 1960. Tacking, therefore, the possession of the
previous owners and that of Maxima Lachica Sin over the disputed property, it does not tax ones imagination
to conclude that the subject property had been privately possessed for more than 30 years before it was
declared a timberland. This being the case, the said possession has ripened into an ownership against the
State, albeit an imperfect one. Nonetheless, it is our considered opinion that this should come under the
meaning of "private rights" under Proclamation No. 2074 which are deemed segregated from the mass of civil
reservation granted to petitioner.7 (Citation omitted.)

Hence, this Petition for Review, anchored on the following grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN UPHOLDING RESPONDENTS’

CLAIM TO SUPPOSED "PRIVATE RIGHTS" OVER SUBJECT LAND DESPITE THE DENR CERTIFICATION
THAT IT IS CLASSIFIED AS TIMBERLAND.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE DECISIONS
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS RELEASING THE
SUBJECT LAND BEING CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS FROM THE MASS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN AND
AWARDING DAMAGES TO THEM.8

The central dispute in the case at bar is the interpretation of the first paragraph of Proclamation No. 2074:

Upon recommendation of the Director of Forest Development, approved by the Minister of Natural Resources
and by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do
hereby set aside as Civil Reservation for Aklan National College of Fisheries, subject to private rights, if any
there be, parcels of land, containing an aggregate area of 24.0551 hectares, situated in the Municipality of New
Washington, Province of Aklan, Philippines, designated Parcels I and II on the attached BFD Map CR-203, x x
x [.]9

The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals unanimously held that respondents retain private rights to the
disputed property, thus preventing the application of the above proclamation thereon. The private right referred
to is an alleged imperfect title, which respondents supposedly acquired by possession of the subject property,
through their predecessors-in-interest, for 30 years before it was declared as a timberland on December 22,
1960.

At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have not filed an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the Property Registration Decree. Nevertheless, the courts a quo
apparently treated respondents’ complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and declaration of
ownership as such an application and proceeded to determine if respondents complied with the requirements
therefor.

The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are found in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, as follows:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming
to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
An equivalent provision is found in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

This Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title
under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time
immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and

(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.10

With respect to the second requisite, the courts a quo held that the disputed property was alienable and
disposable before 1960, citing petitioner’s failure to show competent evidence that the subject land was
declared a timberland before its formal classification as such on said year. 11 Petitioner emphatically objects,
alleging that under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and that lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.

After a thorough review of the records, we agree with petitioner. As this Court held in the fairly recent case of
Valiao v. Republic12:

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have
been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain
part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or
disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the
public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and
be registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of
the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.

There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable.1âwphi1 To
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. (Citations omitted.)

This Court reached the same conclusion in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources v. Yap,13 which presents a similar issue with respect to another area of the same province of Aklan.
On November 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among
other islands, caves and peninsulas of the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). On September 3, 1982, PTA Circular 3-82 was issued
to implement Proclamation No. 1801. The respondents-claimants in said case filed a petition for declaratory
relief with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular 3-82 precluded
them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes.
The respondents claim that through their predecessors-in-interest, they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945 or earlier
since time immemorial.

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition for review of the above case with this Court, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400)
hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96)
hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). Petitioner-claimants and other landowners in Boracay
filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064,
alleging that it infringed on their "prior vested right" over portions of Boracay which they allege to have
possessed since time immemorial. This petition was consolidated with the petition for review concerning
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular 3- 82.
This Court, discussing the Regalian Doctrine vis-à-vis the right of the claimants to lands they claim to have
possessed since time immemorial, held:

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State
ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such
as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have
been "officially delimited and classified."

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must still be a
positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of
an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of
years is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification
was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable
and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that
lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof. 14 (Emphases in the original; citations
omitted.)

Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to show competent evidence that the subject
land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960 does not lead to the
presumption that said land was alienable and disposable prior to said date. On the contrary, the presumption is
that unclassified lands are inalienable public lands. Such was the conclusion of this Court in Heirs of the Late
Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,15 wherein we held:

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public forests,
the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as
mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition. x x
x. (Emphasis supplied, citation deleted.)

The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended, and the equivalent provision in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was furthermore
painstakingly debated upon by the members of this Court in

Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic. 16 In Malabanan, the members of this Court were in disagreement as to
whether lands declared alienable or disposable after June 12, 1945 may be subject to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. There was, however, no disagreement that there must be a declaration to that effect.

In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and by their
predecessors-in-interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership. Accordingly, respondents
cannot be considered to have private rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the
application of said proclamation to the subject property. We are thus constrained to reverse the rulings of the
courts a quo and grant the prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss Civil Case No. 1181 (4390) for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial
Court of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington
and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181 (4390), segregating from the Aklan National College of Fisheries
reservation the portion of land being claimed by respondents is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No.
1181 (4390) of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington and Batan, Aklan is hereby
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199310               February 19, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and
set aside the Decision2 dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90503. The
CA affirmed the Decision3 dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 69, in
Land Registration Case No. N-11465.

The Facts

On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed an application 4 with the RTC for judicial
confirmation of title over two parcels of land situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, identified as
Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastre, with an area of 29,945 square meters and 20,357
sq m, respectively.

On December 13, 2001, the RTC issued the Order 5 finding the respondent’s application for registration
sufficient in form and substance and setting it for initial hearing on February 21, 2002. The scheduled initial
hearing was later reset to May 30, 2002. 6 The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette,
April 1, 2002 issue, Volume 98, No. 13, pages 1631-16337 and in the March 21, 2002 issue of People’s
Balita,8 a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was likewise posted
in a conspicuous place on Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, as well as in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of
the City hall of Taguig, Metro Manila.9

On May 30, 2002, when the RTC called the case for initial hearing, only the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except LLDA,
which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to the respondent’s application for registration.10

On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition 11 to the respondent’s application for registration, asserting that
Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. On the other
hand, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise filed its Opposition, 12 alleging that
the respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Trial on the merits of the respondent’s application ensued thereafter.

The respondent presented four witnesses: Teresita Villaroya, the respondent’s corporate secretary; Ronnie
Inocencio, an employee of the respondent and the one authorized by it to file the application for registration
with the RTC; Cenon Cerquena (Cerquena), the caretaker of the subject properties since 1957; and Engineer
Mariano Flotildes (Engr. Flotildes), a geodetic engineer hired by the respondent to conduct a topographic
survey of the subject properties.

For its part, the LLDA presented the testimonies of Engineers Ramon Magalonga (Engr. Magalonga) and
Christopher A. Pedrezuela (Engr. Pedrezuela), who are both geodetic engineers employed by the LLDA.

Essentially, the testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses showed that the respondent and its predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of land long
before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador (Salvador)
and Bella Mijares (Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were originally owned and possessed
by Veronica Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and planted different kinds of crops in the said lots, through her
caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said parcels of land to Salvador
and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the same were purchased by the respondent in 1989.

The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).

In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the following documents: (1) Deed of
Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor of the respondent;13 (2)
survey plans of the subject properties;14 (3) technical descriptions of the subject properties;15 (4) Geodetic
Engineer’s Certificate;16 (5) tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002;17 and (6) certifications dated
December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno (Calamno), Senior Forest Management Specialist of the
DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain.18

On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent’s application for registration should be denied since
the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed
out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of Republic Act No. 4850 19 (R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding the Laguna
de Bay, located at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which form part of
the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed that, upon preliminary
evaluation of the subject properties, based on the topographic map of Taguig, which was prepared using an
aerial survey conducted by the then Department of National Defense-Bureau of Coast in April 1966, he found
out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon actual area verification of the
subject properties on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the subject
properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.

On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the actual topographic
survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the elevations of the subject
properties, contrary to LLDA’s claim, are above 12.50 m. Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No. 3068
has an elevation ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot No. 3077 ranges from 12.60 m to
14.80 m.

The RTC Ruling

On May 16, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, 20 which granted the respondent’s application for registration
of title to the subject properties, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered confirming the title of the applicant Remman
Enterprises Incorporated over a parcels of land [sic] consisting of 29,945 square meters (Lot 3068) and 20,357
(Lot 3077) both situated in Brgy. Napindan, Taguig, Taguig,

Metro Manila more particularly described in the Technical Descriptions Ap-04-003103 and Swo-00-001769
respectively and ordering their registration under the Property Registration Decree in the name of Remman
Enterprises Incorporated.

SO ORDERED.21

The RTC found that the respondent was able to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. The RTC opined that the elevations of the subject properties are very
much higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.50 m and, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The
RTC pointed out that LLDA’s claim that the elevation of the subject properties is below 12.50 m is hearsay
since the same was merely based on the topographic map that was prepared using an aerial survey on March
2, 1966; that nobody was presented to prove that an aerial survey was indeed conducted on March 2, 1966 for
purposes of gathering data for the preparation of the topographic map.

Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not always remain the same; that the
elevations of the subject properties may have already changed since 1966 when the supposed aerial survey,
from which the topographic map used by LLDA was based, was conducted. The RTC likewise faulted the
method used by Engr. Magalonga in measuring the elevations of the subject properties, pointing out that:

Further, in finding that the elevation of the subject lots are below 12.5 meters, oppositor’s witness merely
compared their elevation to the elevation of the particular portion of the lake dike which he used as his
[benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of the subject lots. Also, the elevation of the said
portion of the lake dike that was then under the construction by FF Cruz was allegedly 12.79 meters and after
finding that the elevation of the subject lots are lower than the said [benchmark] or reference point, said
witness suddenly jumped to a conclusion that the elevation was below 12.5 meters. x x x.

Moreover, the finding of LLDA’s witness was based on hearsay as said witness admitted that it was DPWH or
the FF Cruz who determined the elevation of the portion of the lake dike which he used as the [benchmark] or
reference point in determining the elevation of the subject lots and that he has no personal knowledge as to
how the DPWH and FF Cruz determined the elevation of the said [benchmark] or reference point and he only
learn[ed] that its elevation is 12.79 meters from the information he got from FF Cruz.22

Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed below 12.50 m, the RTC opined that
the same could not be considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC held that, under Section 41(11) of
R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to those areas that can be covered by the lake water when it is at
the average annual maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only those parcels of land that
are adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna Lake form part of its bed and not those that are already far
from it, which could not be reached by the lake water. The RTC pointed out that the subject properties are
more than a kilometer away from the shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are dry and waterless even when the
waters of Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise found that the respondent was able to prove
that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the subject properties as early as 1943.

The petitioner appealed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

On November 10, 2011, the CA, by way of the assailed Decision, 23 affirmed the RTC Decision dated May 16,
2007. The CA found that the respondent was able to establish that the subject properties are part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; that the same are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, as
claimed by the petitioner. Thus:

The evidence submitted by the appellee is sufficient to warrant registration of the subject lands in its name.
Appellee’s witness Engr. Mariano Flotildes, who conducted an actual area verification of the subject lots, ably
proved that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot No. 3068 is 12.6 meters and the elevation of its highest
portion is 15 meters. As to the other lot, it was found [out] that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot No.
3077 is also 12.6 meters and the elevation of its highest portion is 15 meters. Said elevations are higher than
the reglementary elevation of 12.5 meters as provided for under paragraph 11, Section 41 of R.A. No. 4850, as
amended.

In opposing the instant application for registration, appellant relies merely on the Topographic Map dated
March 2, 1966, prepared by Commodore Pathfinder, which allegedly shows that the subject parcels of land are
so situated in the submerge[d] [lake water] of Laguna Lake. The said data was gathered through aerial
photography over the area of Taguig conducted on March 2, 1966. However, nobody testified on the due
execution and authenticity of the said document. As regards the testimony of the witness for LLDA, Engr.
Ramon Magalonga, that the subject parcels of land are below the 12.5 meter elevation, the same can be
considered inaccurate aside from being hearsay considering his admission that his findings were based merely
on the evaluation conducted by DPWH and FF Cruz. x x x.24 (Citations omitted)

The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was able to present certifications issued by the DENR,
attesting that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, which
was not disputed by the petitioner. The CA further ruled that the respondent was able to prove, through the
testimonies of its witnesses, that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of the subject properties prior to June 12, 1945.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue

The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision dated May
16, 2007, which granted the application for registration filed by the respondent.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The petitioner maintains that the lower courts erred in granting the respondent’s application for registration
since the subject properties do not form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The
petitioner insists that the elevations of the subject properties are below the reglementary level of 12.50 m and,
pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, are considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake.

That the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m is a finding of fact by
the lower courts, which this Court, generally may not disregard. It is a long-standing policy of this Court that the
findings of facts of the RTC which were adopted and affirmed by the CA are generally deemed conclusive and
binding. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts unless there
are substantial reasons for doing so.25

That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, however, does not necessarily mean that
they already form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is still incumbent upon the
respondent to prove, with well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are indeed part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. While deference is due to the lower courts’ finding that
the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m and, hence, no longer part
of the bed of Laguna Lake pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, the Court nevertheless finds that the
respondent failed to substantiate its entitlement to registration of title to the subject properties.

"Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to
have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State,
remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable."26

The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject properties under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 152927, which provides that:

Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxxx

Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public land
acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as amended by
P.D. No. 1073.28 Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently
establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.29

The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the respondent presented two certifications 30 issued by
Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain "under Project No. 27-B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on January 3, 1968."

However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject
properties are alienable and disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 31 the Court
clarified that, in addition to the certification issued by the proper government agency that a parcel of land is
alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable. They must present
a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal
custodian of the records. Thus:

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application
for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In
addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the
certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.32 (Emphasis ours)

In Republic v. Roche,33 the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N. Properties, viz:

Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this
connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per
verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable or
disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical description of the land
which bears no information regarding the land’s classification. She did not bother to establish the status of the
land by any certification from the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied
with all requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. 34 (Citations omitted and emphasis
ours)

The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in support of its application for registration are
thus not sufficient to prove that the subject properties are indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as
alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the respondent to present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy.
Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the application for registration in spite of the failure of the
respondent to prove by well-nigh incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are alienable and
disposable.

Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was promulgated on
June 26, 2008, must be applied prospectively, asserting that decisions of this Court form part of the law of the
land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. The respondent points
out that its application for registration of title to the subject properties was filed and was granted by the RTC
prior to the Court’s promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N. Properties. Accordingly, that it failed to present a copy of
the original classification covering the subject properties approved by the DENR Secretary and certified by the
legal custodian thereof as a true copy, the respondent claims, would not warrant the denial of its application for
registration.

The Court does not agree.

Notwithstanding that the respondent’s application for registration was filed and granted by RTC prior to the
Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the pronouncements in that case may be applied to the present case; it is
not antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of laws pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is elementary
that the interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that law from the date it was originally passed,
since this Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted
law carried into effect.35 "Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law, but consists
merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one."36

Verily, the ruling in T.A.N. Properties was applied by the Court in subsequent cases notwithstanding that the
applications for registration were filed and granted by the lower courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N.
Properties.

In Republic v. Medida,37 the application for registration of the subject properties therein was filed on October
22, 2004 and was granted by the trial court on June 21, 2006. Similarly, in Republic v. Jaralve, 38 the application
for registration of the subject property therein was filed on October 22, 1996 and was granted by the trial court
on November 15, 2002. In the foregoing cases, notwithstanding that the applications for registration were filed
and granted by the trial courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties, this Court applied the
pronouncements in T.A.N. Properties and denied the applications for registration on the ground, inter alia, that
the applicants therein failed to present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy.

Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to present sufficient
evidence to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject
properties since 1943, the respondent presented the testimony of Cerquena. Cerquena testified that the
subject properties were originally owned by Jaime who supposedly possessed and cultivated the same since
1943; that sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the subject properties to Salvador and Mijares who, in turn, sold the
same to the respondent in 1989.

The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of the possession and occupation of the
subject properties by the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute the well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the subject properties required by Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529. Indeed, other than the testimony of Cerquena, the respondent failed to present any other
evidence to prove the character of the possession and occupation by it and its predecessors-in-interest of the
subject properties.

For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership
must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land subject of the application. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general
statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise
over his own property.39

Although Cerquena testified that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest cultivated the subject
properties, by planting different crops thereon, his testimony is bereft of any specificity as to the nature of such
cultivation as to warrant the conclusion that they have been indeed in possession and occupation of the
subject properties in the manner required by law. There was no showing as to the number of crops that are
planted in the subject properties or to the volume of the produce harvested from the crops supposedly planted
thereon.

Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have indeed
planted crops on the subject properties, it does not necessarily follow that the subject properties have been
possessed and occupied by them in the manner contemplated by law. The supposed planting of crops in the
subject properties may only have amounted to mere casual cultivation, which is not the possession and
occupation required by law.

"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of
ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from
the state. The possession of public land, however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers
title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate
against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years."40

Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by the respondent were
only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired the subject properties as
early as 1989, and that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property since
1943, it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. "While tax declarations
are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership." 41 That the subject
properties were declared for taxation purposes only in 2002 gives rise to the presumption that the respondent
claimed ownership or possession of the subject properties starting that year. Likewise, no improvement or
plantings were declared or noted in the said tax declarations. This fact belies the claim that the respondent and
its predecessors-in-interest, contrary to Cerquena's testimony, have been in possession and occupation of the
subject properties in the manner required by law.

Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain and that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same since June 12, 1945, or earlier, the respondent's application for
registration should be denied.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90503, which affirmed the Decision
dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land Registration Case No. N-
11465 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for Registration of Remman Enterprises, Inc. in
Land Registration Case No. N-11465 is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179155               April 2, 2014

NICOMEDES J. LOZADA, Petitioner,
vs.
EULALIA BRACEWELL, EDDIE BRACEWELL, ESTELLITA BRACEWELL, JAMES BRACEWELL, JOHN
BRACEWELL, EDWIN BRACEWELL, ERIC BRACEWELL, and HEIRS OF GEORGE
BRACEWELL, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision2 dated May 23, 2007 and the
Resolution3 dated August 14, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81075, which affirmed the
Decision4 dated July 31, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pifias City, Branch 275 in Civil Case
No. LP 98-0025, directing the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to set aside Decree of Registration No. N-
217036 (Decree No. N-217036) and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-78 in the name of petitioner
Nicomedes J. Lozada (petitioner), and ordering the latter to cause the amendment of Plan PSU-129514 as well
as segregate therefrom Lot 5 of Plan PSU-180598.

The Facts

On December 10, 1976, petitioner filed an application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of
land covered by Plan PSU-129514, which was granted on February 23, 1989 by the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 134, acting as a land registration court. 5 Consequently, on July 10, 1997, the LRA issued Decree No.
N-217036 in the name of petitioner, who later obtained OCT No. 0-78 covering the said parcel of land.6

On February 6, 1998, within a year from the issuance of the aforementioned decree, James Bracewell, Jr.
(Bracewell) filed a petition for review of a decree of registration under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1529,7 otherwise known as the "Property Registration Decree," before the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch
275 (Las Piñas City-RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. LP 98-0025, 8 claiming that a portion of Plan PSU-
129514, consisting of 3,097 square meters identified as Lot 5 of Plan PSU-180598 (subject lot) – of which he is
the absolute owner and possessor – is fraudulently included in Decree No. N-217036.9 He allegedly filed on
September 19, 1963 an application for registration and confirmation of the subject lot, as well as of Lots 1, 2, 3,
and 4 of Plan PSU-180598, situated in Las Piñas City, which was granted by the RTC of Makati City, Branch
58, on May 3, 1989.10 He further averred that petitioner deliberately concealed the fact that he (Bracewell) is
one of the adjoining owners, and left him totally ignorant of the registration proceedings involving the lots
covered by Plan PSU-129514.11 Instead of impleading him, petitioner listed Bracewell’s grandmother, Maria
Cailles, as an adjoining owner, although she had already died by that time.12

In his answer13 to the foregoing allegations, petitioner called Bracewell a mere interloper with respect to the
subject lot, which the Bureau of Lands had long declared to be part and parcel of Plan PSU-129514. 14 He
argued that his Plan PSU-129514 was approved way back in 1951 whereas Bracewell’s Plan PSU-180598
was surveyed only in 1960, and stated that the latter plan, in fact, contained a footnote that a portion known as
Lot 5, i.e., the subject lot, is a portion of the parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-129514.15

The overlapping was confirmed by LRA Director Felino M. Cortez in his 2nd Supplementary Report dated
August 5, 1996, which was submitted to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134. 16 The report, which contains a
recommendation that petitioner be ordered to cause the amendment of Plan PSU-129514 in view of
Bracewell’s claims, reads as follows:

COMES NOW the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and to the Honorable Court respectfully submits this
report:

1. LRA records show that a decision was rendered by the Honorable Court on February 23, 1989,
confirming the title of the herein applicant [petitioner] over the parcel of land covered by plan PSU-
129514;

2. Upon updating of plotting on our Municipal Index Sheet, thru its tie line, it was found to overlap with
plan PSU-180598, Lot 5, applied in LRC Record No. N-24916, which was referred to the Lands
Management Services, El Bldg., Quezon City, for verification and/or correction in our letter dated
January 12, 1996 x x x;

3. In reply, the Regional Technical Director, thru the Chief, Surveys Division, in his letter dated 20 June
1996, x x x, informed this Authority that after [re-verification] and research of the plan, they found out
 that Lot 5, PSU-180598 applied in LRC Record No. N-24916 is a portion of plan PSU-129514, applied
in the instant case;

4. Our records further show that the petition for registration of title to real property pertaining to Lot 5,
PSU-180598 filed by the petitioner James Bracewell, Jr. under Land Reg. Case No. N-4329, LRC
Record No. N-24916 has been granted by the Honorable Court per his decision dated May 3, 1989.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court for its information with the
recommendation that the applicant [herein petitioner] in the instant case be ordered to cause for the
amendment of plan PSU-129514, subject of registration, by segregating therefrom the portion of Lot 5, PSU-
180598 also decided in Land Reg. Case No. N-4328. The approved amended plan and the corresponding
certified technical descriptions shall forthwith be submitted to the Honorable Court for its approval to enable us
to comply with the decision of the Court dated May 3, 1989 in the instant case.17 (Emphases supplied)

The Las Piñas City-RTC Ruling

Finding that petitioner obtained Decree No. N-217036 and OCT No. 0-78 in bad faith, the Las Piñas City-RTC
rendered a Decision18 on July 31, 2003 in favor of Bracewell, who had died during the pendency of the case
and was substituted by Eulalia Bracewell and his heirs (respondents). Accordingly, it directed the LRA to set
aside Decree No. N-217036 and OCT No. 0-78, and ordered petitioner (a) to cause the amendment of Plan
PSU-129514 and to segregate therefrom the subject lot, and (b) to pay respondents the sum of ₱100,000.00
as attorney's fees, as well as the cost of suit.19

The Las Piñas City-RTC faulted petitioner for deliberately preventing respondents from participating and
objecting to his application for registration when the documentary evidence showed that, as early as 1962,
Bracewell had been paying taxes for the subject lot; and that he (Bracewell) was recognized as the owner
thereof in the records of the Bureau of Lands way back in 1965, as well as in the City Assessor's Office.20

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated his case on appeal21 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 81075,
arguing mainly that the Las Piñas City-RTC had no jurisdiction over a petition for review of a decree of
registration under Section 32 of PD 1529, which should be filed in the same branch of the court that rendered
the decision and ordered the issuance of the decree. 22 He likewise raised (a) the failure of Bracewell to submit
to conciliation proceedings,23 as well as (b) the commission of forum shopping, considering that the decision
granting Bracewell’s application for registration over Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Plan PSU-180598 was still
pending resolution before the Court at the time he filed Civil Case No. LP 98-0025.24

The CA Ruling

In a Decision25 dated May 23, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the assailed judgment of the RTC, finding that
respondents were able to substantiate their claim of actual fraud in the procurement of Decree No. N-217036,
which is the only ground that may be invoked in a petition for review of a decree of registration under Section
32 of PD 1529. It held that, since the petition for review was filed within one (1) year from the issuance of the
questioned decree, and considering that the subject lot is located in Las Piñas City, the RTC of said city had
jurisdiction over the case.26 It further declared that: (a) there was no need to submit the case a quo for
conciliation proceedings because the LRA, which is an instrumentality of the government, had been impleaded;
(b) no forum shopping was committed because the petition for review of the decree of registration before the
Las Piñas City-RTC and the application for land registration then pending before the Court involved different
parties and issues; and (c) the award of attorney’s fees was well within the sound discretion of the RTC.27

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration28 having been denied,29 he now comes before the Court via the instant
petition for review, challenging primarily the jurisdiction of the Las Piñas City-RTC which set aside and nullified
the judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 that had not yet become final and was still within
its exclusive control and discretion because the one (1) year period within which the decree of registration
issued by the LRA could be reviewed has not yet elapsed.30

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue raised for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the Las Piñas City-RTC has jurisdiction over
the petition for review of Decree No. N-217036, which was issued as a result of the judgment rendered by the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 134.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition must fail.

Under Act No. 49631 (Act 496), or the "Land Registration Act," as amended, 32 – which was the law in force at
the time of the commencement by both parties of their respective registration proceedings – jurisdiction over all
applications for registration of title was conferred upon the Courts of First Instance (CFIs, now RTCs) of the
respective provinces in which the land sought to be registered is situated.33

The land registration laws were updated and codified under PD 1529, which took effect on January 23,
1979,34 and under Section 1735 thereof, jurisdiction over an application for land registration is still vested on the
CFI (now, RTC) of the province or city where the land is situated.36

Worth noting is the explanation proffered by respondents in their comment to the instant petition that when
petitioner filed his land registration case in December 1976, jurisdiction over applications for registration of
property situated in Las Piñas City was vested in the RTC of Makati City in view of the fact that there were no
RTC branches yet in the Las Piñas City at that time. 37 Bracewell’s own application over Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of
Plan PSU-180598, all situated in Las Piñas City, was thus granted by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58.38

Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,39 otherwise known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980," was enacted and took effect on August 14, 1981,40 authorizing the creation of RTCs in different judicial
regions, including the RTC of Las Piñas City as part of the National Capital Judicial Region. 41 As pointed out by
the court a quo in its Decision dated July 31, 2003, the RTC of Las Piñas City was established "in or about
1994."42 Understandably, in February 1998, Bracewell sought the review of Decree No. N-217036 before the
Las Piñas City-RTC, considering that the lot subject of this case is situated in Las Piñas City.

Petitioner maintains that the petition for review should have been filed with the RTC of Makati City, Branch
134, which rendered the assailed decision and ordered the issuance of Decree No. N-217036, citing the 1964
case of Amando Joson, et al. v. Busuego43 (Joson) among others. In said case, Spouses Amando Joson and
Victoria Balmeo (Sps. Joson) filed a petition to set aside the decree of registration issued in favor of Teodora
Busuego (Busuego) on the ground that the latter misrepresented herself to be the sole owner of the lot when in
truth, the Sps. Joson were owners of one-half thereof, having purchased the same from Busuego’s
mother.44 The court a quo therein dismissed the petition for the reason that since its jurisdiction as a cadastral
court was special and limited, it had no authority to pass upon the issues raised. Disagreeing, the Court held
that, as long as the final decree has not been issued and the period of one (1) year within which it may be
reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering
the decree, which court after hearing, may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the land to
another.45

To be clear, the only issue in Joson was which court should take cognizance of the nullification of the decree,
i.e., the cadastral court that had issued the decree, or the competent CFI in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction.46 It should be pointed out, however, that with the passage of PD 1529, the distinction between the
general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it as a cadastral court was
eliminated. RTCs now have the power to hear and determine all questions, even contentious and substantial
ones, arising from applications for original registration of titles to lands and petitions filed after such
registration.47 Accordingly, and considering further that the matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure
and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction, 48 petitioner cannot now rely on the Joson
pronouncement to advance its theory.

Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the review of a decree of registration falls within the jurisdiction of and,
hence, should be filed in the "proper Court of First Instance," viz.:

Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value.1âwphi1 The decree of registration
shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of
any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First
Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after
the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the
court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be
prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree,
it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall
become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his
remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Since the LRA’s issuance of a decree of registration only proceeds from the land registration court’s directive,
a petition taken under Section 32 of PD 1529 is effectively a review of the land registration court’s ruling. As
such, case law instructs that for "as long as a final decree has not been entered by the [LRA] and the period of
one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the
decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering it."49

While it is indeed undisputed that it was the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 which rendered the decision
directing the LRA to issue Decree No. N-217036, and should, applying the general rule as above-stated, be the
same court before which a petition for the review of Decree No. N-217036 is filed, the Court must consider the
circumstantial milieu in this case that, in the interest of orderly procedure, warrants the filing of the said petition
before the Las Piñas City-RTC.

Particularly, the Court refers to the fact that the application for original registration in this case was only filed
before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 because, during that time, i.e., December 1976, Las Piñas City had
no RTC. Barring this situation, the aforesaid application should not have been filed before the RTC of Makati
City, Branch 134 pursuant to the rules on venue prevailing at that time. Under Section 2, Rule 4 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, the proper venue for real actions, such as an
application for original registration, lies with the CFI of the province where the property is situated, viz.:

Sec. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance.— (a) Real actions. — Actions affecting title to, or for recovery of
possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be
commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies.

As the land subject of this case is undeniably situated in Las Piñas City, the application for its original
registration should have been filed before the Las Piñas City-RTC were it not for the fact that the said court
had yet to be created at the time the application was filed. Be that as it may, and considering further that the
complication at hand is actually one of venue and not of jurisdiction (given that RTCs do retain jurisdiction over
review of registration decree cases pursuant to Section 32 of PD 1529), the Court, cognizant of the peculiarity
of the situation, holds that the Las Piñas City-RTC has the authority over the petition for the review of Decree
No. N-217036 filed in this case. Indeed, the filing of the petition for review before the Las Piñas City-RTC was
only but a rectificatory implementation of the rules of procedure then-existing, which was temporarily set back
only because of past exigencies. In light of the circumstances now prevailing, the Court perceives no
compelling reason to deviate from applying the rightful procedure. After all, venue is only a matter of
procedure50 and, hence, should succumb to the greater interests of the orderly administration of justice.51

Anent the other ancillary issues raised by petitioner on forum shopping, submission to conciliation proceedings,
and award of attorney's fees, suffice it to say that the same have been adequately discussed by the appellate
court and, hence, need no further elucidation.

Finally, on the matter of petitioner's objections against the trial judge's "unusual interest" in the case, the Court
concurs with the CA in saying that such tirades are not helpful to his cause. Besides, as pointed out in the
Decision dated July 31, 2003 of the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 275, petitioner already had his chance to
disqualify the trial judge from further hearing the case, but the appellate court dismissed his petition in CA G.R.
SP No. 74187 for lack of merit.52

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 23, 2007 and the Resolution dated August 14,
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81075 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170757               November 28, 2011

PACIFICO M. VALIAO, for himself and in behalf of his co-heirs LODOVICO, RICARDO, BIENVENIDO, all
Surnamed VALIAO and NEMESIO M. GRANDEA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MACARIO ZAFRA, and MANUEL YUSAY, Respondents,

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside
the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 54811, which reversed the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, in Land
Registration Case No. 03, granting petitioners' application for registration of title over a parcel of land located in
Ilog, Negros Occidental.

The factual milieu of this case is as follows:

On August 11, 1987, petitioners4 Pacifico, Lodovico, Ricardo, Bienvenido, all surnamed Valiao, and Nemesio
Grandea filed with the RTC of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental an application for registration of a parcel of land
with an area of 504,535 square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros
Occidental.

On June 20, 1988, private oppositors Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay filed their Motion to Dismiss the
application on the following grounds: (1) the land applied for has not been declared alienable and disposable;
(2) res judicata has set in to bar the application for registration; and (3) the application has no factual or legal
basis.

On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the application for registration on the following grounds, among others: that neither the
applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the muniment/s of
title and/or the tax declaration/s and tax payments/receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the
application, do/es not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land
applied for or of their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of
owner, since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain
belonging to the Republic, which is not subject to private appropriation; and that the present action is barred by
a previous final judgment in a cadastral case prosecuted between the same parties and involving the same
parcel of land.

On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to Dismiss. Trial thereafter ensued.

In support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject property in
1947, upon the death of their uncle Basilio Millarez (Basilio), who purchased the land from a certain Fermin
Payogao, pursuant to a Deed of Sale5 dated May 19, 1916 entirely handwritten in Spanish language. Basilio
possessed the land in question from May 19, 1916 until his death in 1947. Basilio's possession was open,
continuous, peaceful, adverse, notorious, uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death,
the applicants as co-heirs possessed the said land until 1966, when oppositor Zafra unlawfully and violently
dispossessed them of their property, which compelled them to file complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified
Theft against Zafra. In support of their claim of possession over the subject property, petitioners submitted in
evidence Tax Declaration No. 95626 dated September 29, 1976 under the names of the heirs of Basilio
Millarez.

The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995, granted petitioners' application for registration of the
subject property, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby orders and decrees registration of Lot No. 2372
subject of the present proceedings and the registration of title thereto, in favor of the applicants, who are
declared the true and lawful owners of said Lot No. 2372, except applicant Lodovico Valiao, who sold his right
to Macario Zafra.

Upon the finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of registration and Certificate of Title be issued
in the name of the applicants, Heirs of Basilio Millarez, namely: Pacifico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, Bienvenido
Valiao and Nemesio Grandea, subject to the rights of private oppositors, Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay
over said lot whose fishpond permits are declared VALID and will expire on December 31, 2003.
Aggrieved by the Decision, the private oppositors and the Republic, through Assistant Prosecutor Josue A.
Gatin, filed an appeal with the CA, which reversed the trial court's findings in its Decision dated June 23, 2005.
The CA ruled that the classification of lands of the public domain is an exclusive prerogative of the executive
department of the government and in the absence of such classification, the lands remain as unclassified until
it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. Further, there exists a prior cadastral case involving
the same parties herein and the same Lot No. 2372, which ruled that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the Republic.
The CA held that such judgment constitutes res judicata that bars a subsequent action for land registration. It
also ruled that the subject property is part of the inalienable land of the public domain and petitioners failed to
prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, We REVERSE the
Decision dated December 15, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, DENY the application for registration of title
filed by petitioners-appellees, DECLARE as moot and academic any and all claims of private oppositors-
appellants over Lot No. 2372, and DECLARE the subject parcel of land to be inalienable and indisposable land
belonging to the public domain.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated November 17,
2005. Hence, the present petition with the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT LOT NO. 2372 OF THE ILOG CADASTRE IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE CLAIM OF PRESCRIPTION BY THE APPLICANT WILL LIE ON LOT NO.
2372.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CAD. CASE NO. 23,
ENTITLED LODOVICO VALIAO, ET, AL., VS. MACARIO ZAFRA, ET, AL., AC G.R. NO. CV-68873,
CONSTITUTES RES JUDICATA AS FAR AS THIS APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS
CONCERNED.

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED POSSESSION OF THE APPLICANTS THROUGH THEIR

PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THEIR CLAIM FOR
PRESCRIPTION.9

Petitioners claim that Lot No. 2372 is an alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. The possession
of applicants' predecessors-in interest since 1916 until 1966 had been open, continuous and uninterrupted;
thus, converting the said land into a private land. The subject lot had already become private in character in
view of the length of time the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had possessed the subject lot,
which entitles them to the confirmation of their title. Petitioners further claim that prior dismissal in a cadastral
proceeding does not constitute res judicata in a subsequent application for registration of a parcel of land.

In its Comment, the OSG submits that the issues to be resolved in the present petition, i.e., whether Lot No.
2372 is alienable and disposable land of the public domain and whether petitioners have the right to have the
said property registered in their name through prescription of time are questions of fact, which were already
passed upon by the CA and no longer reviewable by the Court, since findings of fact of the CA, when
supported by sufficient evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties. The OSG further claims that
petitioners failed to prove that the subject lot is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain and that petitioners' application for land registration is already barred by a prior decision in a cadastral
case. Lastly, the OSG asserts that petitioners did not present sufficient evidence to prove that their possession
over the subject lot applied for had been open, peaceful, exclusive, continuous and adverse.

Anent the propriety of filing a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the principle is well-
established that this Court is not a trier of facts and that only questions of law may be raised. The resolution of
factual issues is the function of the lower courts whose findings on these matters are received with respect and
are, as a rule, binding on this Court. This rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions. One of these is when
the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court. 10 Due to the divergence of the findings
of the CA and the RTC, the Court will now re-examine the facts and evidence adduced before the lower courts.

Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree
provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly-authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

From the foregoing, petitioners need to prove that: (1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of
ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.11 These the petitioners must prove by no less than clear, positive and
convincing evidence.12

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have
been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain
part of the inalienable public domain.13 Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or
disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the
public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and
be registered as a title.14 The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of
the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.15

There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the
land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable.16

No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in question has been classified as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that
the subject property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still
inalienable public domain.17 Verily, the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until
the land subject thereof is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.1âwphi1

With respect to the existence of a prior cadastral case, it appears that on July 11, 1966, the petitioners filed in
Cadastral Case No. 23 of the then CFI of Negros Occidental a petition to reopen the proceedings relative to
three lots, one of which is Lot No. 2372. The lower court, in its Order 18 dated October 20, 1980, held that Lot
No. 2372 belongs to the Republic. It found that after the subject lot was declared public land, it was found to be
inside the communal forest. On appeal, the CA, in its Decision 19 dated August 7, 1984, found no reversible
error and affirmed the decision of the cadastral court. Thereafter, a petition elevating the case to this Court was
dismissed for lack of merit.20 In the present case, the CA, in its Decision dated June 23, 2005, ruled that such
judgment constitutes res judicata that will bar a subsequent action for land registration on the same land.

In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court held that a judicial declaration that a parcel of land is
public, does not preclude even the same applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title
to the same land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 22 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public lands remain alienable and disposable. In the case at bar,
not only did the petitioners fail to prove that the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of
the public domain, they failed to demonstrate that they by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by the law.

It is settled that the applicant must present proof of specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and
cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of
possession.23 Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would actually exercise over his own property.24
The testimonies of Nemesio and Pacifico as to their own and their predecessors-in-interest's possession and
ownership over the subject lot fail to convince Us. Petitioners claim that Basilio was in possession of the land
way back in 1916. Yet no tax declaration covering the subject property, during the period Basilio allegedly
occupied the subject property, i.e., 1916 to 1947, was presented in evidence. Other than the bare allegations
of Nemesio and Pacifico that Basilio allegedly introduced improvements on the subject property, there is
nothing in the records which would substantiate petitioners' claim that Basilio was in possession of Lot No.
2372 since June 12, 1945 or earlier, the period of possession required by law. Hence, petitioners' assertion
that Basilio possessed the property in question from 1916 to 1947 is, at best, conjectural and self-serving.

As regards petitioners' possession of the land in question from 1947 to 1966, petitioners could only support the
same with a tax declaration dated September 29, 1976. At best, petitioners can only prove possession since
said date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.25 Petitioners
failed to explain why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in-interest have possessed the subject
properties in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1976 that they started to
declare the same for purposes of taxation. Moreover, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence
of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The disputed property
may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration, or of their
predecessors-in-interest, but it does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of
ownership.26

Evidently, since the petitioners failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part of the
disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for confirmation and registration of the subject
property under PD 1529 should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54811, which reversed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, in Land Registration
Case No. 03, is AFFIRMED. The application for registration of title filed by the petitioners Pacifico Valiao,
Lodovico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea, over Lot No. 2372, with a total
area of 504,535 square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental,
is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166748               April 24, 2009

LAUREANO V. HERMOSO, as represented by his Attorney-in-Fact FLORIDA L. UMANDAP, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF ANTONIO FRANCIA and PETRA FRANCIA, NAMELY: BENJAMIN
P. FRANCIA, CECILIA FRANCIA, AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR., FRANCISCO F. VILLARICA, DANILO F.
VILLARICA, RODRIGO F. VILLARICA, MELCHOR F. VILLARICA, JESUS F. VILLARICA, BENILDA F.
VILLARICA and ERNESTO F. VILLARICA, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision1 dated October 15, 2004 and the Resolution2 dated January 19, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 77546.

The case involves parcels of land located at Malhacan, Meycauyan, Bulacan, identified as Lot No. 3257 owned
by Petra Francia and Lot 3415 owned by Antonio Francia. The lots comprises an area of 2.5 and 1.5850
hectares, respectively, and forms part of a larger parcel of land with an area of 32.1324 hectares co-owned by
Amos, Jr., Benjamin, Cecilia, Petra, Antonio and Rufo, all surnamed Francia.3

Since 1978, petitioner and Miguel Banag (Banag) have been occupying and cultivating Lot Nos. 3257 and
3415 as tenants thereof. They filed a petition for coverage of the said lots under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
27.4 On July 4, 1995, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued an order granting the petition, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing facts and jurisprudence considered, Order is hereby issued:

1. PLACING the subject two (2) parcels of land being tenanted by petitioners Laureano Hermoso and
Miguel Banag situated at Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, owned by Amos Francia, et al. under the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27; and

2. DIRECTING the DAR personnel concerned to process the issuance of emancipation patents in favor
of said Laureano Hermoso and Miguel Banag after a parcellary mapping have been undertaken by the
Bureau of Lands over the subject landholdings.

SO ORDERED.5

Respondents filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and reinvestigation. On December 9, 1995, the DAR
affirmed with modification the earlier order, and disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, ORDER is hereby issued AFFIRMING the first dispositive portion of
the Order, dated July 4, 1995, issued in the instant case, but MODIFYING the second dispositive portion of the
same now to read, as follows:

1. PLACING the subject two (2) parcels of land being tenanted by petitioners Laureano Hermoso and
Miguel Banag situated at Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, owned by Amos Francia, et al. under the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27; and

2. DIRECTING the DAR personnel concerned to hold in abeyance the processing of the emancipation
patent of Miguel Banag until the issue of tenancy relationship in DARAB Cases Nos. 424-Bul’92 and
425-Bul’92 is finally resolved and disposed.

No further motion of any and/or the same nature shall be entertained.

SO ORDERED.6

In a separate development, petitioner and Banag filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) consolidated Cases Nos. 424-BUL-92 and 425-BUL-92. The cases delved on whether both
petitioner and Banag are tenants of respondents in the subject landholding. On June 3, 1996, the DARAB
rendered a Decision7 upholding the tenancy relationship of petitioner and Banag with the respondents.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. A petition for review on certiorari was
filed before the CA. However, the petition was denied on technical grounds in a Resolution 8 dated October 9,
1996. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the same was likewise denied in a Resolution 9 dated
December 27, 1996. The case was eventually elevated to this Court in G.R. No. 127668. On March 12, 1997,
the Court denied the petition for lack of verification, 10 and subsequently, also denied the motion for
reconsideration in a Resolution11 dated July 14, 1997.

Earlier, on January 20, 1997, Banag filed before the DAR, an urgent ex-parte motion for the issuance of an
emancipation patent. On March 13, 1997, the DAR granted the motion. 12 On March 21, 1997, respondents filed
a motion for reconsideration. They claimed that the lands involved have been approved for conversion to urban
purposes in an Order13 dated June 5, 1973 issued by the DAR Secretary. The conversion order stated that the
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 does not cover the subject parcels of
land.14 On March 10, 1998, the DAR issued an Order 15 affirming the March 13, 1997 order granting the motion
for issuance of emancipation patent in favor of Banag. On March 30, 1998, respondents filed a notice of appeal
and correspondingly filed their appeal memorandum.16 On April 21, 2003, the Office of the President through
the Deputy Executive Secretary rendered a Decision 17 denying respondents’ appeal. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the questioned Order
dated 10 March 1998 of the DAR Secretary AFFIRMED in toto.

Parties are required to INFORM this Office, within five (5) days from notice, of the dates of their receipt of this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.18

Respondents then filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. They maintained
that P.D. No. 27 does not cover the subject parcels of land pursuant to the June 5, 1973 Order of the DAR
Secretary reclassifying the lands and declaring the same as suited for residential, commercial, industrial or
other urban purposes. Furthermore, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) reclassified the
lands as early as October 14, 1978.

On October 15, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed Decision,19 the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed decision of the Office of the
President is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new decision is hereby rendered dismissing the Petition
for Coverage under P.D. No. 27 filed by respondents [now herein petitioner].

SO ORDERED.20

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. On January 19, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed
Resolution21 denying the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the instant petition.

The sole issue in this petition is whether Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415 are covered by P.D. No. 27.

Petitioner avers that the final and executory decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127668 affirming that he is a
tenant of the landholding in question entitles him to avail of the right granted under PD 27. In other words,
because of the finality of the decision declaring him a tenant of the landholding in question, in effect, the
subject lots are considered as agricultural lands and are thus covered by P.D. No. 27. Parenthetically, we take
judicial notice of the decision of the Court in G.R. No. 127668, in which the tenancy relationship between
petitioner and respondents was upheld. That decision is already final and executory.

Respondents, for their part, claim that the lands were already declared suited for residential, commercial,
industrial or other urban purposes in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844 as early
as 1973. Hence, they are no longer subject to P.D. No. 27.

We resolve to deny the petition.

Section 3, Article XII22 of the Constitution mandates that alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands.

The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types, i.e., primary classification and secondary
classification. The primary classification comprises agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks. These are lands specifically mentioned in Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution. The same provision
of the Constitution, however, also states that agricultural lands of the public domain may further be classified
by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This further classification of agricultural lands is
referred to as secondary classification.23
Under existing laws, Congress has granted authority to a number of government agencies to effect the
secondary classification of agricultural lands to residential, commercial or industrial or other urban uses.

Thus, Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, which took
effect on June 15, 1988, explicitly provides:

Section 65. Conversion of Lands.— After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land
will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon
application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing
laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the
beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.

On the other hand, Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
199124 states:

SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands. —

(a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public
hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner
of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically
feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2)
where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial
purposes, as determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be
limited to the following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the
ordinance:

(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen percent (15%);

(2) For component cities and first to the third class municipalities, ten percent (10%); and

(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided, further, That agricultural
lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six
hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law", shall not be affected by the said reclassification and the conversion of such lands into
other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act.

(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon recommendation of the National
Economic and Development Authority, authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in excess of
the limits set in the next preceding paragraph.

(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing laws, continue to prepare their
respective comprehensive land use plans enacted through zoning ordinances which shall be the
primary and dominant bases for the future use of land resources: Provided, That the requirements for
food production, human settlements, and industrial expansion shall be taken into consideration in the
preparation of such plans.

(d) Where the approval by a national agency is required for reclassification, such approval shall not be
unreasonably withheld. Failure to act on a proper and complete application for reclassification within
three (3) months from receipt of the same shall be deemed as approval thereof.

(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying in any manner the
provisions of R.A. No. 6657.

But even long before these two trail-blazing legislative enactments, there was already R.A. No. 3844 or the
Agricultural Land Reform Code, which was approved on August 8, 1963, Section 36 of which reads:

SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.—Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or

future surrender, of the land, agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will personally cultivate the
landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school
site or other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to
disturbance compensation equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights
 under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural
lessor, is not more that five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance compensation the lessee
may be entitled to an advanced notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings
are filed against him: Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for
three years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the dispossession of
the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand
possession of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said
dispossessions;

(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and conditions of the
contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or force
majeure;

(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other than what had
been previously agreed upon;

(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under paragraph 3 of
Section twenty-nine;

(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially damaged or
destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;

(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-
payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of
a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to
pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or

(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of
Section twenty-seven.

The petitioner in the instant case claims that he is entitled to the issuance of an emancipation patent under
P.D. No. 27. The said decree promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, on October 21, 1972, is
entitled, "DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL
TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE
INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISMS THEREFOR". However, the law specifically applied "to tenant-farmers of
private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of share tenancy or lease tenancy,
whether classified as landed estate or not."

For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come within the coverage of P.D. No. 27, it is necessary to
determine whether the land is agricultural. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 6657 defines agricultural land, as follows:

(c) Agricultural Land refers to the land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.

and Section 3(b) specifies agricultural activity as:

(b) Agriculture, Agriculture Enterprise or Agricultural Activity means cultivation of the soil, planting of
crops, growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities
and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons
whether natural or juridical.

On the basis of these definitions, the subject parcels of land cannot be considered as within the ambit of P.D.
No. 27. This considering that the subject lots were reclassified by the DAR Secretary as suited for residential,
commercial, industrial or other urban purposes way before petitioner filed a petition for emancipation under
P.D. No. 27. The pertinent portions of the June 5, 1973 Order25 read:

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 3844, as amended, the said requests of the petitioners were
referred to the National Planning Commission as well as to the Agrarian Reform Team Leader, Valenzuela,
Bulacan for proper investigation.

The National Planning Commission in compliance therewith after due investigation and physical survey of the
subject areas, favorably recommended the suitability of the same to residential, commercial, industrial or other
urban purposes.

Similarly, the Agrarian Reform Team in Valenzuela, Bulacan after due investigation thereof found the parcels
of land subject hereof highly suitable for conversion into urban purposes in view of his findings and verification
of the location, facilities necessary for urban development and also, the low agricultural income thereof
(unirrigated), of the said land. The Team Leader concerned in his recommendation submitted to this Office
made mentioned (sic) that in his declaration of the suitability of the subject properties for urban purposes, he
believes that the conformity of the tenants consisting of eleven (11) tenants are no longer needed so long as
the petitioners are willing to pay the disturbance compensation as provided for by law. The petitioners
manifested to the Team Leader concerned their willingness to pay each and every tenant the disturbance
compensation according to law. To show further their sincerity to comply with the provisions of the law on
disturbance compensation, and to show that their (petitioners) purpose of the instant request is not to evade
the provisions of Decree 27, they stated in their letter-request that they will not eject any tenants therefrom, nor
dispossessed (sic) them of their landholdings until after they are fully and justly paid the disturbance
compensation according to law.

The subject parcels of land are not included in the land transfer operation according to the team’s report.

It maybe mentioned in this connection, that from the report of the National Planning Commission submitted to
this Office, it appears that the subject properties are strategically located in the urban center of the town of
Meycauayan wherein there are already existing developed and occupied residential subdivisions and even low
cost housing projects subsidized by funds from government financial institution. Likewise, there are also
industrial establishments in its vicinity according to the National Planning Commission’s report.

In view of the foregoing, and considering the parcels of land subject hereof to be suited for residential,
commercial, industrial or other urban purposes as found and recommended by the National Planning
Commission and the Agrarian Reform Team concerned, and considering further that the said parcels of land
by reason of their location and the existence of developed and occupied residential subdivisions and industrial
establishments in the immediate vicinity maybe considered as one of the possible areas to be reserved for
urban development as contemplated in the Letter of Instruction No. 46 of the President, and considering finally,
that the right of the agricultural tenants therein will be fully compensated and there will be no ejectment of
tenants until after full payment thereof, as manifested by the petitioners, the instant requests of the petitioners
should be, as hereby it is, given due course and the parcels of land subject thereof are hereby declared suited
for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes in accordance with the provisions of Republic
Act 3844, as amended.

It is understood however, that no agricultural tenants and/or lessees shall be ejected from or dispossessed of
their landholdings by virtue of this Order not until after they are duly and justly paid the disturbance
compensation according to law, the amount of which maybe determined and fixed by the proper court in the
absence of any mutual agreement thereto by and between the agricultural lessees and the owner-petitioners.

SO ORDERED.26

The main contention of petitioner for the approval of the emancipation patent in his favor under P.D. No. 27 is
the fact that respondents were not able to realize the actual conversion of the land into residential purposes.
To bolster his claim, petitioner relies on Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, viz.:

SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. — Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or
future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding
or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful
non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-
four, except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor, is not more than five hectares, in which
case instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advanced notice of at least one
agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further, That should the
landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within
one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant
shall have the right to demand possession of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him
because of said dispossessions.

xxxx27

However, the provision of R.A. No. 3844 had already been amended by R.A. No. 6389, as early as September
10, 1971. Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, now reads:

SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. — Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or
future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National Planning
Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes: Provided, That
the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of the
gross harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar years;

xxxx28

Under R.A. No. 6389, the condition imposed on the landowner to implement the conversion of the agricultural
land to non-agricultural purposes within a certain period was deleted. With the enactment of the amendatory
law, the condition imposed on the landowner to implement the conversion of the agricultural land to a non-
agricultural purpose within a certain period was deleted. 29 The remedy left available to the tenant is to claim
disturbance compensation.

In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform 30 , the Court held that lands not devoted to agricultural
activity and those that were previously converted to non-agricultural uses are outside the coverage of the
CARL, viz.:

We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the
CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land."
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those
lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands."

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any
language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to
be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the
areas in question continued to be developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This
can readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members even instituted an action to restrain petitioners from
continuing with such development. The enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision may
have delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact that these lands are still residential lands
and outside the ambit of the CARL. 31

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
October 15, 2004 and the Resolution dated January 19, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
77546 are hereby affirmed. The case is remanded to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Bulacan for
the proper computation of the disturbance compensation of petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151312 August 30, 2006

HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES PEDRO S. PALANCA AND SOTERRANEA RAFOLS VDA. DE PALANCA
namely: IMELDA R. PALANCA, MAMERTA R. PALANCA, OFELIA P. MIGUEL, ESTEFANIA P. PE,
CANDELARIA P. PUNZALAN, NICOLAS R. PALANCA, CONSTANTINO R. PALANCA, EDMUNDO
PALANCA, LEOCADIA R. PALANCA and OLIVERIO R. PALANCA, represented by their attorney-in-fact,
OFELIA P. MIGUEL, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by the Lands Management Bureau), REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PALAWAN (Office of the Executive Judge) and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
PALAWAN, Respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal
of the decision 1 dated July 16, 2001, and the resolution 2 dated December 21, 2001, of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 62081 entitled "Republic of the Philippines (Represented by the Lands Management
Bureau) v. Court of First Instance (CFI) of Palawan (now Regional Trial Court), Seventh Judicial District,
Branch II presided over by Former District Judge, Jose P. Rodriguez, et al."

The antecedent facts 3 are as follows:

On July 19, 1973, the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca, (petitioners herein), filed an application to bring the pieces of
land they allegedly owned under the operation of the Land Registration Act. These are: a two hundred thirty-
nine thousand nine hundred eighty (239,980) square meter parcel of land situated in Barrio Panlaitan,
Municipality of Busuanga, Province of Palawan, as shown on plan Psu-04-000074, and a one hundred
seventy-six thousand five hundred eighty-eight (176,588) square meter land in Barrio of Panlaitan (Island of
Capari), Municipality of New Busuanga, Province of Palawan, as shown on plan Psu-04-000073. They
acquired said realties by inheritance from the late Pedro S. Palanca, who had occupied and possessed said
land openly and continuously in the concept of an owner since 1934, or 39 years before the filing of said
application, and planted on said lands about 1,200 coconut trees on each land, declared the same for taxation
purposes and paid the taxes thereof. The first parcel of land is presently occupied by Lopez, Libarra, an
encargado of herein (petitioners), while the second is occupied by (petitioner) Candelaria Punzalan. In Civil
Case No. 573 entitled "Heirs of Pedro Palanca, Plaintiffs, vs. Alfonso Guillamac, Defendant," for "Recovery of
Possession of a Parcel of Land" the Court of First Instance of Palawan rendered a decision on March 4, 1970,
declaring (petitioners), the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca, as the rightful possessors of the land at Talampulan
Island, Bario of Panlaitan, Municipality of Busuanga, Province of Palawan, covered by Psu-04-000074,
including the two (2) hectare portion occupied and claimed by Alfonso Guillamac.

It also appears that the jurisdictional requirements as to notices, as prescribed by Section 31, Act No. 496,
namely publication in the Official Gazette, were complied with.

During the initial hearing of the case, verbal oppositions to the application were made by the Provincial Fiscal
of Palawan purportedly for and in behalf of the Bureau of Forest Development, the Bureau of Lands, and the
Department of Agrarian Reform, some inhabitants of the subject properties and a businessman by the name of
Alfonso Guillamac. The Provincial Fiscal stated that the lands subject of the application had no clearance from
the Bureau of Forestry and that portions thereof may still be part of the timberland block and/or public forest
under the administration of the Bureau of Forestry and had not been certified as being alienable and
disposable by the Bureau of Lands. He therefore requested that the resolution on the application be stayed
pending the examination and issuance of the required clearance by the Bureau of Forest Development. 4 After
the lapse of three years from the date of the initial hearing, however, no valid and formal opposition was filed
by any of the oppositors in the form and manner required by law. 5 Neither did the Provincial Fiscal present
witnesses from the relevant government bureaus and agencies to support his contention that the subject lands
had not yet been cleared for public disposition.

On the other hand, petitioners submitted the plan and technical description of the land, a survey certificate
approved by the Bureau of Lands and also tax declarations showing that they have consistently paid the realty
taxes accruing on the property. Petitioners likewise presented six witnesses in support of their application,
namely Constantino Palanca, Ofelia Palanca-Miguel, Lopez Libarra, Alejandro Cabajar, Alfonso Lucero and
Augustin Timbancaya.

Both Constantino Palanca and Ofelia Palanca-Miguel testified that: (1) they were heirs of one Pedro S.
Palanca; (2) they, together with their other siblings, were applicants for the registration of two parcels of land
located in Barrio Panlaitan, Busuanga, Palawan; (3) their father, Pedro S. Palanca, acquired ownership over
the subject properties by continuous, public and notorious possession; (4) their father built a house on each
parcel of land and planted coconut trees; (5) since their father’s death, they have continued their possession
over the lands in the concept of owners and adverse to all claimants; and (6) the properties have been
declared for taxation purposes and the corresponding taxes religiously paid for over forty (40) years. 6

Lopez Libarra and Alejandro Cabajar testified that they knew the late Pedro S. Palanca and worked for the
latter as an overseer and a "capataz" respectively in the cultivation of the subject properties. Cabajar, in
particular, claimed that he helped clear the lands sometime in the mid-1920s, planted upon such lands coconut
trees which are now bearing fruit, and continued working with Pedro S. Palanca until the latter’s death in 1943.
He subsequently went to work for the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca whom he confirms now own and manage the
properties. 7

For his part, Libarra testified that he had been the overseer of the two coconut plantations of the late Pedro S.
Palanca since 1934. He identified the location of the properties, averring that one plantation is in Talampulan,
Panlaitan Island and the other in Talampetan, Capari Island. He further testified that at the time he was
employed in 1934, there were already improvements in the form of coconut trees planted in the areas, a
number of which were already bearing fruits. His duties included overseeing and cleaning the plantations,
making copra and replanting the area when necessary. He also claimed he worked with Pedro S. Palanca until
the latter’s death in 1943 and continues to work for the latter’s heirs up to the present. 8

Also presented were Alfonso Lucero and Augustin Timbancaya, who testified thus:

Alfonso Lucero testified that he is a Forester in the Bureau of Forest Development, formerly the Bureau of
Forestry. He was once assigned as the Chief of Land Classification Party No. 55 in Palawan. Presently, he is a
member of the Composite Land Classification Team No. 32 in the province with station at Puerto Princessa
City. He has been employed with the Bureau of Forest Development for about 30 years, starting as a Forest
Guard in 1947. As chief of Land Classification Party No. 55, he covered the territory from Puerto Princesa City
northward up to Busuanga, where the land in question is located. His duty was to supervise the team that
conducted the limitation, segregation and deviation of agricultural lands within the area. He served in this
capacity for twelve (12) years until December 1975. As such, he issued certifications after due classification by
his office, of alienable and disposable land for administration by the Bureau of Lands and eventual disposition
to interested parties. He had been in Busuanga, Palawan a number of times and is familiar with the lands in
question, one of which is in Talampetan, Capari Island and the other in Talampulan, Panlaitan Island. He is
aware that the lands in question are claimed and administered by the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca. The
improvements on the land are at least 40 years old in his estimation. He recalls having issued a certification of
release of this property for disposition to private parties, but could not remember the exact date when he did
so. He identified Exhibits "JJ" and "KK" to be certifications to the effect that Talampulan in Panlaitan Island and
Talampetan, a portion of Capari Island, both in Busuanga (formerly Coron), Palawan, are fully cultivated and
mainly planted to coconuts before World War II by herein applicants, the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca. He is fully
convinced that the lands in question have already been released before the war for agricultural purposes in
favor of Pedro S. Palanca, applicants’ predecessor-in-interest. Releases of agricultural lands which are done in
bulk at present was not in vogue before the last war, for releases at that time were made on a case-to-case
basis. Under the pre-war system, an application for a piece of land was individually referred to the then Bureau
of Forestry which in turn conducted a classification of the area as to its availability, whether it be for sale,
homestead, etc. On the basis of the Bureau of Forestry investigation, a certification was then issued as to its
availability for the purpose for which the application was made. The certification was made on the basis of such
application, and was called the isolated case release or the case-to-case basis. This procedure was followed in
the case of herein applicants and there seemed to be no reason to doubt that the area was in fact released to
herein applicants. Therefore, the area is no longer under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.

Alfonso Lucero also testified that as Chief of Land Classification Party No. 55, he was the one directly in
charge of classification and release of lands of public domain for agricultural purposes. His office is directly
under the bureau chief in Manila, although for administrative purposes he is carried with the district forestry
office in Puerto Princesa City. The certifications he issue carry much weight in land classification and releases
in the province unless revoked by the Manila Office.

Augustin O. Timbancaya testified that he is a licensed geodetic engineer, formerly called a land surveyor. His
services were engaged by applicant Ofelia P. Miguel, the representative of the other applicants, to conduct and
prepare a land plan for two parcels of land subject of the application. He went personally to the lands in
question. He executed Exhibit "U", the Plan of Land covered by PSU-04-000073, containing an area of one
hundred seventy-six thousand, five hundred eighty-eight (176,588) square meters situated at Talampetan,
Capari Island, Busuanga, Palawan, approved by the Director of Lands on June 25, 1973. He also identified
Exhibit "V", the Plan of Land under PSU-04-000074, containing an area of two hundred thirty-nine thousand,
nine hundred eighty (239, 980) square meters located at Talampulan, Panlaitan Island, Busuanga, Palawan,
which was also approved by the Director of Lands on June 25, 1973. Both lands are in barrio Panlaitan,
Busuanga (formerly Coron), Palawan, and have an aggregate total area of four hundred sixteen thousand five
hundred sixty-eight (416,568) square meters. All these surveys were properly monumented. He personally
prepared the technical description for both lots. He also prepared the Geodetic Engineer’s Certificates and had
the same notarized by Atty. Remigio Raton, the first on January 24, 1972 and the second on March 14, 1972.
He believes that both parcels of land have been released for agricultural purposes because if it were
otherwise, the survey plans he executed would not have been approved by the Director of Lands. In other
words, the approval of the Land Plans by the Director of the Bureau of Lands indicates that the lands in
question have been previously released for alienation and disposition. Both parcels of land have been fully
developed and the coconuts planted thereon are about 50 years old. He has no doubt that these lands were
released for agricultural purposes long ago. 9

After trial, the CFI of Palawan issued a decision on December 15, 1977 declaring petitioners as the owners in
fee simple of the two parcels of land in question. Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4295 was
issued in the name of petitioners. Subsequently, out of OCT No. 4295, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-
7095, T-7096, T-10396, T-10397, T-10398, T-10399, T-10418, and T-10884 were issued.

On December 6, 2000, or after almost twenty-three years, respondent Republic of the Philippines filed with the
CA a petition 10 for annulment of judgment, cancellation of the decree of registration and title, and reversion.
Respondent sought to annul the December 15, 1977 decision of the CFI, arguing that the decision was null
and void because the two lands in question were unclassified public forest land and, as such, were not capable
of private appropriation. In support of this proposition, respondent presented Land Classification Map No. 839,
Project 2-A dated December 9, 1929 showing that the subject properties were unclassified lands as of that
date as well as a certification dated November 24, 2000 issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office stating that "the islands of Talampulan and Capar(i) Island located in the municipality of
Busuanga, Palawan are within the unclassified public forest." Respondent likewise drew attention to Executive
Proclamation No. 219 issued on July 2, 1967 which classified the Province of Palawan as a National Game
Refuge and Bird Sanctuary and the small islands off Palawan as national reserves closed to exploitation and
settlement under the administration of the Parks and Wildlife Office, subject only to existing private rights. 11 In
view of the fact that the properties were never classified as alienable and disposable, respondent argued that
the CFI did not have jurisdiction to make a disposition of the same.

In addition, respondent asserted that the participants in the proceedings committed perfidious acts amounting
to extrinsic fraud which is one of the grounds for the annulment of a judgment. Respondent maintained that a
culture of collusion existed between and among the petitioners, the Provincial Fiscal and the ranking officer of
the District Forestry Office, Alfonso Lucero, such that the State was deprived of the opportunity to fairly present
its case to the court.

On July 16, 2001, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Court of First Instance of Palawan,
Branch II, dated December 15, 1977, in Land Registration Case No. N-21, LRC Record No. N-44308 is hereby
declared NULL and VOID. Accordingly, Decree No. N-172081 and the corresponding Original Certificate of
Title No. 4295 issued in the name of the Heirs of Pedro S. Palanca, as well as the subsequent Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-7095, T-7096, T-10396, T-10397, T-10398, T-10399, T-10410 and T-10884 and all
subsequent TCTs issued thereafter are also declared NULL and VOID. Private respondents Heirs of Pedro S.
Palanca are DIRECTED to surrender said transfer certificates of title to public respondent Register of Deeds of
Palawan; and the latter is also DIRECTED to cause the cancellation thereof.

SO ORDERED. 12

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in a resolution 13 dated December 21,
2001. Hence, this petition.

Petitioners contend that the CA disregarded settled jurisprudence and applicable land laws when it ruled that
the subject properties covered by their application for registration were forest lands and that, consequently, the
land registration court did not have jurisdiction to award the same to them. They opine that it is not necessary
for them to prove that the government had expressly given a grant of the subject properties to Pedro S.
Palanca, their predecessor-in-interest, separate of the legislative grant given to them purportedly under
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act). Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be
formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the
cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands 14 and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands. 15 They likewise
argue that the CA erred in relying upon Executive Proclamation No. 219 and upon Land Classification Map No.
839, Project 2-A to nullify petitioners’ mother title. According to petitioners, the reversal of the CFI’s decision
violated the principle of res judicata as well as the rule on incontrovertibility of land titles under Act No. 496.

Respondent, on the other hand, denies the allegations of the petition in its comment 16 dated August 6, 2002
and contends that (a) the claim that the subject parcels of land are public agricultural lands by virtue of a
legislative grant is unfounded and baseless; (b) the land registration court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, was
devoid of jurisdictional competence to order titling of a portion of forest land; (c) the CA is correct in declaring
that there must be a prior release of the subject lands for agricultural purposes; (d) the rules on res
judicata and the incontestability of Torrens titles do not find proper applications in the exercise of the power of
reversion by the State; and (e) estoppel and laches will not operate against the State. Respondent also
reiterates its contention that collusion existed between the parties in the proceedings below which prevented a
fair submission of the controversy, to the damage and prejudice of the Republic.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that an action for reversion filed by the State to recover property
registered in favor of any party which is part of the public forest or of a forest reservation never prescribes.
Verily, non-disposable public lands registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State
at any time 17 and the defense of res judicata would not apply as courts have no jurisdiction to dispose of such
lands of the public domain. 18 That being said, it must likewise be kept in mind that in an action to annul a
judgment, the burden of proving the judgment’s nullity rests upon the petitioner. The petitioner has to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that the judgment being challenged is fatally defective. 19

Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court finds that respondent met the required burden of
proof. Consequently, the CA did not err in granting respondent’s petition to annul the decision of the land
registration court. This petition for review, therefore, lacks merit.

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act upon which petitioners anchor their claim states:

Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming
to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx

(b) Those who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.

The above provision clearly requires the concurrence of two things: (1) that the land sought to be registered is
public agricultural land, and (2) that the applicant seeking registration must have possessed and occupied the
same for at least thirty years prior to the filing of the application. That the petitioners, through Pedro S.
Palanca, have been in possession of the properties since 1934 is not disputed. What is in doubt is the
compliance with the first requisite.

To reiterate, the validity of the CFI decision was impugned on the basis of the court’s lack of jurisdiction. If the
properties were alienable public lands, then the CFI, acting as a land registration court, had jurisdiction over
them and could validly confirm petitioners’ imperfect title. Otherwise, if the properties were indeed public
forests, then the CA was correct in declaring that the land registration court never acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case and, as a result, its decision decreeing the registration of the properties in favor of
petitioners would be null and void.

The reason for this is the fact that public forests are inalienable public lands. The possession of public forests
on the part of the claimant, however long, cannot convert the same into private property. 20 Possession in such
an event, even if spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen into ownership. 21 It bears stressing that
unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply. 22

In the present case, Land Classification Map No. 839, Project 2-A 23 indicated that the Talampulan and Capari
Islands on which the properties were located were unclassified public lands as of December 9, 1929. It was by
virtue of Executive Proclamation No. 219 issued on July 2, 1967 that these islands were subsequently
classified as national reserves. Based on these, it becomes evident that the subject properties have never
been released for public disposition. Obviously, from the time that petitioners and their predecessor-in-interest
were occupying the properties in 1934 until the time that an application for registration was filed in 1973, these
properties remained as inalienable public lands.

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public forests,
the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as
mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to
disposition. 24 When the property is still unclassified, whatever possession applicants may have had, and
however long, still cannot ripen into private ownership. 25 This is because, pursuant to Constitutional precepts,
all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in such lands and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 26 Thus, the Court has
emphasized the need to show in registration proceedings that the government, through a positive act, has
declassified inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. 27

Petitioners’ reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands 28 and Ankron v. Government 29 is misplaced. These

cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the
Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief
Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber
and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or
were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.

As petitioners themselves admit, registration of the properties is sought under Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Sections 6 and 7 of the Act provide as follows:

Section 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from
time to time classify the lands of the public domain into —

(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Timber, and

(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of
their administration and disposition.

Section 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time
declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.

Based on the foregoing, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable,
mineral or forest lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the government. Clearly, the
courts no longer have the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the
public domain. 30

To the Court’s mind, petitioners have failed to present incontrovertible proof that the lands they claimed had
previously been classified as alienable. The bare allegation of Alfonso Lucero that a certification had been
issued releasing the properties for agricultural purposes is not sufficient to prove this fact. The best evidence
would be the document itself which, however, was not produced in this case. It was error for the land
registration court to have taken Mr. Lucero’s testimony at face value, absent any other evidence to conclusively
prove that the land had been released for public disposition.

Furthermore, it must be pointed out that petitioners’ contention that the State has the burden to prove that the
land which it avers to be of public domain is really of such nature applies only in instances where the applicant
has been in possession of the property since time immemorial. When referring to this type of possession, it
means possession of which no person living has seen the beginning and the existence of which such person
has learned from the latter’s elders. 31 Immemorial possession justifies the presumption that the land had never
been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. 32 The
possession of petitioners in this case does not fall under the above-named exception as their possession, by
their own admission, only commenced sometime in 1934.

To reiterate, where there is a showing that lots sought to be registered are part of the public domain, the
applicant for land registration under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 must secure a certification from
the government that the lands claimed to have been possessed by the applicant as owner for more than 30
years are alienable and disposable. 33 Petitioners’ failure to do so in this case, when taken with the evidence
adduced by respondent showing that the lands in question indeed remain part of the public domain and form
part of the national reserves, confirms that the CFI never acquired jurisdiction to order the registration of such
lands in favor of petitioners, and certainly justifies their reversion to the State.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167707              October 8, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE

REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR
LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE
TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their behalf
and in behalf of all those similarly situated, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775              October 8, 2008

DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY
SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI,
PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO, AKLAN, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles
over their occupied lands.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which
granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the
survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus,
and nullification of Proclamation No. 10645">[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying
Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.

The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm crystalline
waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants 4 who
live in the bone-shaped island’s three barangays.5

On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National
Reservation Survey of Boracay

Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.7

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18018 declaring Boracay
Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine
reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved
the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory
relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised
doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through
their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax
purposes and paid realty taxes on them.10

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place
Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of
private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect
titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The
OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass
of lands classified as "public forest," which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,11 as amended.

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was
misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since
Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot
ripen into ownership.

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1) respondents-
claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were
planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less
twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared
the land they were occupying for tax purposes.12

The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801
posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the
trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.13

The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30,
Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of
Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo,
Aklan.15 The titles were issued on

August 7, 1933.16

RTC and CA Dispositions

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No.
3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in
Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands
surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not
in itself constitute a title to the land.

SO ORDERED.17

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that
neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or
could not be the subject of disposition. 18 The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands. 19 The trial
court cited Sections 8720 and 5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands
in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.22

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.23 The Republic then appealed to the CA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal
filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.24

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they occupied
since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25 Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land
(protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable
and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the
centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest
land protection purposes.

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay, 27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other landowners29 in
Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation
No. 1064.30 They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over portions of Boracay.
They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have
also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts
on their lots.31

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural
land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act. 32 Thus, their possession in the
concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their
occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No.
705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to
reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive
government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally involve the
same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.33

Issues

G.R. No. 167707

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal
obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay
Island.34

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

I.AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER
THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30
YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE
THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD
705?

II.HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE

OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC
6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE
TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED
RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED
BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO
SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.

V.CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE

THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF
PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?35 (Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and
petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.
The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as
amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.

Our Ruling

Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive

to reclassify lands of the public domain

Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title,
namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902 36 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No.
2874 and CA No. 141;37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation
No. 106439 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and executive acts.

But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the public
domain.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber. 40 Meanwhile, the
1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by
law,41 giving the government great leeway for classification. 42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935
Constitution classification with one addition: national parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be
alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and
administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 45 The
doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.46

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.47 Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain. 48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if
lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state,
is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of
public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of
obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.49

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,
ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. 50 The
Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."51

The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish
Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.52

The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law 53 partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the
Indies. It established possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land,
under certain conditions which were set forth in said decree. 54 Under Section 393 of the Maura Law,
an informacion posesoria or possessory information title,55 when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is
converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which
must be actual, public, and adverse, 56 from the date of its inscription. 57 However, possessory information title
had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the
lands would revert to the State.58

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal concessions which
took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant;
(3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion
posesoria or possessory information title.59>

The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule was embodied in
the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into
three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands. 61 The act provided for, among
others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold
system).62 It also provided the definition by exclusion of "agricultural public lands." 63 Interpreting the meaning of
"agricultural lands" under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64

x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands
acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration
Act. The act established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and
imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.66

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the first Public
Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and administrative
confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of
the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain. 67 Under
the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the
next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.68

On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public
Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and
Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of
title, possession and occupation en concepto dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was
required.69

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this
day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition
of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands, 70 and privately owned lands which reverted
to the State.71

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation of
lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was
superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,72 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,73 which now provides
for possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.74

The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land
registration proceedings.76 Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration
of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976.
Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands77 shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property
Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property. 78 It governs
registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.79

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of
State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes.81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to
those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."82

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.83 To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. 84 There must still be a
positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of
an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. 85 The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of
years is alienable and disposable.86

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification
was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable
and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that
lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.87

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it, agricultural
lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron
v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).89 These
cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in
these old cases that "in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural
lands until the contrary is shown."90

Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the effect of
converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land registration courts
would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or
agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.

Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify
lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make
corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon
the preponderance of the evidence.91 This was the Court’s ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S.
Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo
Azcuna, viz.:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an act of the
Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands
and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.

xxxx

Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced. These cases
were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine
Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or
President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and
agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were
vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.93

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a
presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts have a right to presume,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary
is shown."94

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of the
public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch
of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.

If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have
automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral land,
alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be
utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.

The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought under the
provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation
of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of
imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their
predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land
remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.

In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in the end,
dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts
could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:

In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the
particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of
land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the
other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of
the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and
"mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be
forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it
contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists
some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today,
and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-
versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as
agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that
particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other purposes.  We believe,
however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine
Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land
involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of
proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in
each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to
decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said
classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by
reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private
interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural,
forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of
the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside
and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry, supra)95 (Emphasis ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of each case,
except those that have already became private lands. 96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in
Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to
classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. 96-a Since then, courts no longer
had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain.97

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933, 98 did not present a
justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of the property’s land classification. Simply put,
there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming
were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for
judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no
longer authorized to determine the property’s land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act
No. 926.

We note that the RTC decision 99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of
Manila,100 which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify
lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular
Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,102 and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine
Islands.103

Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The pertinent issue
in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and if
so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited
by the 1935 Constitution104 from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the issue is
whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural.

Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior
to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have already stated, those
cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classify
lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.

Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the
land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island
for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 106 ipso facto converted the island into private
ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.

A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of Appeals.107 Collado, citing the
separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources,107-a ruled:

"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the
terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for
the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and
sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to
public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the government’s title to public land
sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term
"public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are
thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government
and the friar lands."

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act
No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands
are alienable and disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD
No. 705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority110 certify that Boracay
Island is an unclassified land of the public domain.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public
forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain which  has
not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for
forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay
Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to
its effectivity.

The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of
touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to
pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists,
Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.

Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the island; 111 that
the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064
will destroy the island’s tourism industry, do not negate its character as public forest.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution 112 classifying lands of the public domain
into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not necessarily refer to large tracts of
wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes. 113 The discussion in Heirs of
Amunategui v. Director of Forestry114 is particularly instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually
be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to
be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other
trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive
of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)

There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a
classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on
the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. 116 At any rate, the Court is tasked
to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest
cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been
automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.

Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants
argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone.
Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural land.
There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in
Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands" 117 and "areas declared as alienable and disposable" 118 does not by itself
classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands
and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All forested  areas in public
lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that the island can be
classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the
Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Development’s authority to declare areas in the island as
alienable and disposable when it provides:

Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as
alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable
or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation
No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of Boracay
Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine
reserve to be administered by the PTA – to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in
the development of the areas’ tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine
environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological
purposes. It does not address the areas’ alienability.119

More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands,
coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in
Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding
areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation
of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the
other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have been,
and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.

It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and
opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is only the
President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the
lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.121

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted
to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of
public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President.
Courts have no authority to do so.122 Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until released
and rendered open to disposition.123

Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of
agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line
of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest
land protection purposes.

Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional,
about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within
her authority to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.

Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants
further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since
Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land
without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:

SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation
No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.
No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this
Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have
determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive from later
converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain
despite PD No. 705.

In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,124 the Court stated that
unclassified lands are public forests.

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public
forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the
classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to
disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the land had never been
previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian
law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice126 on this point:

Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word
"reclassification." Where there has been no previous classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the
mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for purposes
of determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest
reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no "reclassification of
forest lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).

Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of forest lands to
agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to
those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the Revised Forestry Code, which have
not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the provisions
of the Revised Forestry Code.127

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141.
Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites
for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945;
and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.128

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of
Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and,
applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.

Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No.
926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable and
disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes that
the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the
law itself.129 Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long,
cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.130

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064,
with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first
element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12,
1945.

We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private claimants
complied with the requisite period of possession.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of possession.
We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of
recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and
occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.

Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the island for a
long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their
continued possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a
vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently
occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws
applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial
confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and
considerable investment in the island.

One Last Note

The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of Boracay Island, making it
a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of years,
thousands of people have called the island their home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants’
plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang
batas at ito ang dapat umiral.

All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster
from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this
mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not
necessarily mean lack of right to possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can take
steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for
original registration of title, such as by homestead 131 or sales patent,132 subject to the conditions imposed by
law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or
to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill 133 now pending
in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the island to
private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the classification of
the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does
not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress
and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress.

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival. Their promotion and protection are not just
fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of our
environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968
in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:134

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with
respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the
pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without
justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common
knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or
ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are
emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to
function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion
results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property – crops, livestock,
houses, and highways – not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be
written down in a lumberman’s decalogue.135

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R.
CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135385               December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO,
LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE
SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG,
DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU
RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING,
DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY,
BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU
MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES
D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON,
ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL,
LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO
ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ,
RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B.
GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY
MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE
SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G.
SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR
TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG
AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING,
SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING
MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M.
MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M.
LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father
TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M.
EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-
PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules).

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. 1 In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the
government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their
Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be
dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor
General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional
on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition
be granted in part.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the
IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and
members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They
join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to
Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and
that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious
disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation
for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached
Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the
Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective
memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the
ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section
2, Article XII of the Constitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn,
defines ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public
lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community
property of the indigenous peoples;

"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;

"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their
ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and
utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25
years; and

"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and
conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds,
mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."2

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and
"ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate
the rights of private landowners.3

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and
making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands
on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.4

These provisions are:

"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral
lands;

"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an
ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and
Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area
terminates;

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall
be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and
 settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be
resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;

"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes
involving indigenous peoples; and

"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
the indigenous peoples."5

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They
contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive departments under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6

Petitioners pray for the following:

"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;

"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to
cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;

"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease
and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371;
and

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371.
Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of
Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with
the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground
that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which
he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA.
Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of
Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule
56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, and Panganiban.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion

Footnotes

1 
Rollo, p. 114.

2 
Petition, Rollo, pp. 16-23.

3 
Id. at 23-25.

4 
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."

5 
Rollo, pp. 25-27.

6 
Id. at 27-28.

7 
Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing held on April 13, 1999, pp. 5-6.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO, J.:

PRECIS

A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche entitled "On the Uses and
Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard Posner1 wrote:2

"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most 'past-dependent,' of
the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient practices, ancient texts,
archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority, gerontocracy, and interpretation conceived of as a method of
recovering history. It is suspicious of innovation, discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and
brashness of youth. These ingrained attitudes are obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law in a more
pragmatic direction. But, by the same token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms with history."

When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced radical concepts into the
Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership
of land and other natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without
considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by
discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only
to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral
land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people.

This Opinion discusses the following:

I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.

A. The Laws of the Indies

B. Valenton v. Murciano

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

D. The Philippine Constitutions

II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).

A. Indigenous Peoples

1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

2. Their Concept of Land

III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.

A. Legislative History

IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.

A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and do not
constitute part of the land of the public domain.

1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired

2. The concept of native title

(a) Cariño v. Insular Government

(b) Indian Title to land

(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique

3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land

B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law

C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine enshrined in Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands

2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the ancestral domains
does not deprive the State of ownership over the natural resources, control and supervision in
their development and exploitation.

(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of
Section 7(a) of the law on ownership of ancestral domains and is ultra vires.

(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7 (b) of the IPRA is allowed
under Paragraph 3, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Consitution.

(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the IPRA may be
harmonized with Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International Indigenous Movement.

DISCUSSION

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM.

A. The Laws of the Indies

The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of dominium.3 This was the
foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian Doctrine"
or jura regalia is a Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the country
through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies, i.e., more specifically, Law
14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of the Spanish Crown
with respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner:

"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore
ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and
patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us as
they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and
governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which are
peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their probable
increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them
in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and
unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.

We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts designate at such time as
shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations,
and estates shall exhibit to them and to the court officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds
thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just
prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us to be disposed of at our will." 4

The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently, all lands became the
exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took charge of distributing
the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, both military and civilian. 5 Private land titles
could only be acquired from the government either by purchase or by the various modes of land grant from the
Crown.6

The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of 1893.7 The Spanish
Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The
law sought to register and tax lands pursuant to the Royal Decree of 1880. The Royal Decree of 1894, or the
"Maura Law," was partly an amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of the Indies, as already
amended by previous orders and decrees.8 This was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines.
It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the state.

Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the government of the United
States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands. In 1903, the United
States colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land
Act.

B. Valenton v. Murciano

In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v. Murciano.9

Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time occupation or
paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of the subject land in 1860. Defendant's
predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand, purchased the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in 1892.
The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that they had lost all rights to the land by not objecting
to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting that their 30-year adverse possession, as
an extraordinary period of prescription in the Partidas and the Civil Code, had given them title to the land as
against everyone, including the State; and that the State, not owning the land, could not validly transmit it.

The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those special laws which from
earliest time have regulated the disposition of the public lands in the colonies." 10 The question posed by the
Court was: "Did these special laws recognize any right of prescription as against the State as to these lands;
and if so, to what extent was it recognized?"

Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the disposition of land in the
Philippines. However, it was understood that in the absence of any special law to govern a specific colony, the
Laws of the Indies would be followed. Indeed, in the Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it was decreed that until
regulations on the subject could be prepared, the authorities of the Philippine Islands should follow strictly the
Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and the Royal Cedula of 1754.11

Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, the court
interpreted it as follows:

"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands belong to the Crown
which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him. This statement
excludes the idea that there might be lands not so granted, that did not belong to the king. It excludes
the idea that the king was not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because some private person had
been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law all the occupants of the public lands
are required to produce before the authorities named, and within a time to be fixed by them, their title papers.
And those who had good title or showed prescription were to be protected in their holdings. It is apparent that it
was not the intention of the law that mere possession for a length of time should make the possessors the
owners of the land possessed by them without any action on the part of the authorities."12

The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings
who preceded him, belonged to the Crown. 13 For those lands granted by the king, the decree provided for a
system of assignment of such lands. It also ordered that all possessors of agricultural land should exhibit their
title deed, otherwise, the land would be restored to the Crown.14

The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered the Crown's principal
subdelegate to issue a general order directing the publication of the Crown's instructions:

"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the promulgation and
publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not x x x cultivated or tenanted, may x x x
appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue of which said lands are occupied. x x x.
Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties interested that in case of their failure to present their
title deeds within the term designated, without a just and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and
evicted from their lands, and they will be granted to others."15

On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands "wrongfully occupied" by private
individuals in the Philippine Islands. Valenton construed these regulations together with contemporaneous
legislative and executive interpretations of the law, and concluded that plaintiffs' case fared no better under the
1880 decree and other laws which followed it, than it did under the earlier ones. Thus as a general doctrine,
the Court stated:

"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a
sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did that the State remained the
absolute owner."16

In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in these Islands by
which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these lands by prescription, without any action by the
State."17 Valenton had no rights other than those which accrued to mere possession. Murciano, on the other
hand, was deemed to be the owner of the land by virtue of the grant by the provincial secretary. In effect,
Valenton upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of public land.

As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the Spanish Government from
earliest times, requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain title deeds therefor from the State, has
been continued by the American Government in Act No. 926."18

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the the Philippine Bill of
1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for
the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It
also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of
town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation
of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption
that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; 19 and that the government's title
to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United
States.20 The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the
government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, 21 and excluded the patrimonial
property of the government and the friar lands.22

Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land Act. This new law was passed
under the Jones Law. It was more comprehensive in scope but limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to
Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. 23 After the
passage of the 1935 Constitution, Act 2874 was amended in 1936 by Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present Public Land Law and it is essentially the same as Act 2874.
The main difference between the two relates to the transitory provisions on the rights of American citizens and
corporations during the Commonwealth period at par with Filipino citizens and corporations.24

Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system under Act 496, or the
Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all public and private
lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system. The law is said to be almost a verbatim copy of the
Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898,25 which, in turn, followed the principles and procedure of the
Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned it after the Merchant Shipping
Acts in South Australia. The Torrens system requires that the government issue an official certificate of title
attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens
and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves. 26 The certificate of title is indefeasible
and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of said certificate. This
system highly facilitates land conveyance and negotiation.27

D. The Philippine Constitutions

The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and dominating objectives of
the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the
country.28 There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state
ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. 29 State ownership of natural
resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state's power to control their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization.30 The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well
knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards,
however, they were not certain whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts,
the Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.31

Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and Utilization of Natural
Resources," reads as follows:

"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at
the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources,
with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease
for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of
the grant."

The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the "National Economy
and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:

"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement
lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or
lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall
be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."

The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on "National Economy and
Patrimony," to wit:

"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use
may be the measure and limit of the grant.

x x x."
Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated therein, whether
on public or private land, belong to the State. It is this concept of State ownership that petitioners claim is
being violated by the IPRA.

II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.

Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous
Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples,
Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is simply
known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs)
as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and possession of their
ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The
ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin
to native title.

Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:

- the right to develop lands and natural resources;

- the right to stay in the territories;

- the right in case of displacement;

- the right to safe and clean air and water;

- the right to claim parts of reservations;

- the right to resolve conflict;32

- the right to ancestral lands which include

a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to
customary laws and traditions of the community concerned;

b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of transfer, if the
transfer is to a non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if
the transfer is for an unconscionable consideration.33

Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-governance and
empowerment,34 social justice and human rights, 35 the right to preserve and protect their culture, traditions,
institutions and community intellectual rights, and the right to develop their own sciences and technologies.36

To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).
The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of the President and is composed of seven (7)
Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from each of the ethnographic areas- Region I and the Cordilleras;
Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the
Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao. 37 The
NCIP took over the functions of the Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern
Cultural Communities created by former President Corazon Aquino which were merged under a revitalized
structure.38

Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and practices. When still
unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is granted quasi-judicial powers. 39 The NCIP's
decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by a petition for review.

Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to, unauthorized and/or
unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall be punished in accordance with customary laws or
imprisoned from 9 months to 12 years and/or fined from ₱100,000.00 to ₱500,000.00 and obliged to pay
damages.40

A. Indigenous Peoples

The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) or
the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the 1987 Constitution while that of "IPs" is the
contemporary international language in the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 41 and the
United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.42

ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:

"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples- refer to a group of people or homogeneous
societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized
community on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time
immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs,
traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social and cultural
inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the
majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of
their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the
time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries, who
retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been
displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains."

Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or homogeneous

societies who have continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and
defined territory. These groups of people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories
under claim of ownership since time immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions
and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of
colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the Filipino majority.
ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or
colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who may
have been displaced from their traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral
domains.

1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon, Mindanao, Mindoro,
Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu group of islands. They are composed of 110 tribes and are
as follows:

1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian or Itneg, Ifugao, Kalinga,
Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte and Pangasinan; Ibanag of Isabela,
Cagayan; Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya; Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of
Cagayan; Ivatan of Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.

2. In Region III- Aetas.

3. In Region IV- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal, Quezon; Alangan or
Mangyan, Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental and Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan
of Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon, Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.

4. In Region V- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan, Isarog, and Kabihug of
Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines Sur; Itom of Albay, Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the
Pullon of Masbate and Camarines Sur.

5. In Region VI- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the Magahat of Negros Occidental;
the Corolano and Sulod.

6. In Region VII- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.

7. In Region IX- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur; the Kalibugan
of Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and Yakat.

8. Region X- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the Banwaon, Bukidnon,
Matigsalog, Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin Island; the Higa-unon of Agusan del
Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis Occidental; the Tigwahanon of Agusan del Sur, Misamis
Oriental and and Misamis Occidental, the Manobo of the Agusan provinces, and the Umayamnon of
Agusan and Bukidnon.

9. In Region XI- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of the Dibabaon, Mansaka
of Davao del Norte; B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli and Talaingod of Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of
Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of the Surigao provinces and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South
 Cotabato; the Mangguangon of Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog of Davao del Norte and Del
Sur; Tagakaolo, Tasaday and Ubo of South Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao del sur and South
Cotabato.

10. In Region XII- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan/Samal, and Iranon.43

How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to as early as 25,000 to 30,000
B.C.

Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely by the Negritos,
Indonesians and Malays.44 The strains from these groups eventually gave rise to common cultural features
which became the dominant influence in ethnic reformulation in the archipelago. Influences from the Chinese
and Indian civilizations in the third or fourth millenium B.C. augmented these ethnic strains. Chinese economic
and socio-cultural influences came by way of Chinese porcelain, silk and traders. Indian influence found their
way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial society.45

The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering became supplementary
activities as reliance on them was reduced by fishing and the cultivation of the soil.46 From the hinterland,
coastal, and riverine communities, our ancestors evolved an essentially homogeneous culture, a basically
common way of life where nature was a primary factor. Community life throughout the archipelago was
influenced by, and responded to, common ecology. The generally benign tropical climate and the largely
uniform flora and fauna favored similarities, not differences.47 Life was essentially subsistence but not harsh.48

The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form. They had languages that
traced their origin to the Austronesian parent-stock and used them not only as media of daily communication
but also as vehicles for the expression of their literary moods.49 They fashioned concepts and beliefs about the
world that they could not see, but which they sensed to be part of their lives. 50 They had their own religion and
religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality of the soul and life after death. Their rituals were based on
beliefs in a ranking deity whom they called Bathalang Maykapal, and a host of other deities, in the
environmental spirits and in soul spirits. The early Filipinos adored the sun, the moon, the animals and birds,
for they seemed to consider the objects of Nature as something to be respected. They venerated almost any
object that was close to their daily life, indicating the importance of the relationship between man and the
object of nature.51

The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from the Malay word "balangay,"
meaning, a boat, which transported them to these shores. 52 The barangay was basically a family-based
community and consisted of thirty to one hundred families. Each barangay was different and ruled by a
chieftain called a "dato." It was the chieftain's duty to rule and govern his subjects and promote their welfare
and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he exercised all the functions of government. He was the
executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme commander in time of war.53

Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down orally from generation to
generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of the barangay. They were preserved in songs and
chants and in the memory of the elder persons in the community. 54 The written laws were those that the
chieftain and his elders promulgated from time to time as the necessity arose. 55 The oldest known written body
of laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel at about 1250 A.D. Other old codes are the Muslim Code
of Luwaran and the Principal Code of Sulu. 56 Whether customary or written, the laws dealt with various
subjects, such as inheritance, divorce, usury, loans, partnership, crime and punishment, property rights, family
relations and adoption. Whenever disputes arose, these were decided peacefully through a court composed by
the chieftain as "judge" and the barangay elders as "jury." Conflicts arising between subjects of different
barangays were resolved by arbitration in which a board composed of elders from neutral barangays acted as
arbiters.57

Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private property in land. The chiefs
merely administered the lands in the name of the barangay. The social order was an extension of the family
with chiefs embodying the higher unity of the community. Each individual, therefore, participated in the
community ownership of the soil and the instruments of production as a member of the barangay. 58 This
ancient communalism was practiced in accordance with the concept of mutual sharing of resources so that no
individual, regardless of status, was without sustenance. Ownership of land was non-existent or
unimportant and the right of usufruct was what regulated the development of lands. 59 Marine resources
and fishing grounds were likewise free to all. Coastal communities depended for their economic welfare on the
kind of fishing sharing concept similar to those in land communities. 60 Recognized leaders, such as the
chieftains and elders, by virtue of their positions of importance, enjoyed some economic privileges and
benefits. But their rights, related to either land and sea, were subject to their responsibility to protect the
communities from danger and to provide them with the leadership and means of survival.61
Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in Maguindanao. The Sultanate
of Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction over territorial areas represented today by Tawi-tawi, Sulu,
Palawan, Basilan and Zamboanga. Four ethnic groups were within this jurisdiction: Sama, Tausug, Yakan and
Subanon.62 The Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato toward Maranao territory, now Lanao del
Norte and Lanao del Sur.63

The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still held in common but
was private in use. This is clearly indicated in the Muslim Code of Luwaran. The Code contains a provision on
the lease of cultivated lands. It, however, has no provision for the acquisition, transfer, cession or sale of
land.64

The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive economies where most
production was geared to the use of the producers and to the fulfillment of kinship obligations. They were not
economies geared to exchange and profit.65 Moreover, the family basis of barangay membership as well as of
leadership and governance worked to splinter the population of the islands into numerous small and separate
communities.66

When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found the Filipinos living in
barangay settlements scattered along water routes and river banks. One of the first tasks imposed on the
missionaries and the encomenderos was to collect all scattered Filipinos together in a reduccion.67 As early as
1551, the Spanish government assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude towards the natives. 68 The Spaniards
regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity to civilize these less fortunate people living in the
obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "moral and material advantages" of community life and the
"protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws."69

The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and convent would be
constructed. All the new Christian converts were required to construct their houses around the church and the
unbaptized were invited to do the same.70 With the reduccion, the Spaniards attempted to "tame" the reluctant
Filipinos through Christian indoctrination using the convento/casa real/plaza complex as focal point.
The reduccion, to the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to make the Filipinos law-abiding citizens of the
Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make them ultimately adopt Hispanic culture and civilization.71

All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well as all lands not
assigned to them and the pueblos, were now declared to be crown lands or realengas, belonging to the
Spanish king. It was from the realengas that land grants were made to non-Filipinos.72

The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the concept of public
domain were the most immediate fundamental results of Spanish colonial theory and law. 73 The
concept that the Spanish king was the owner of everything of value in the Indies or colonies was
imposed on the natives, and the natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to land.74

Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and religious, classified the Filipinos
according to their religious practices and beliefs, and divided them into three types . First were the Indios, the
Christianized Filipinos, who generally came from the lowland populations. Second, were the Moros or the
Muslim communities, and third, were the infieles or the indigenous communities.75

The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by the Spaniards and was
allowed certain status although below the Spaniards. The Moros and infieles were regarded as the lowest
classes.76

The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were driven from Manila and the
Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to the hinterlands. The Spaniards did not pursue them into the deep
interior. The upland societies were naturally outside the immediate concern of Spanish interest, and the cliffs
and forests of the hinterlands were difficult and inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect, relative
security.77 Thus, the infieles, which were peripheral to colonial administration, were not only able to preserve
their own culture but also thwarted the Christianization process, separating themselves from the newly evolved
Christian community.78 Their own political, economic and social systems were kept constantly alive and vibrant.

The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally mutual feeling of suspicion,
fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one hand and the non-Christians on the other. Colonialism
tended to divide and rule an otherwise culturally and historically related populace through a colonial system
that exploited both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos.79

President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, addressed the
existence of the infieles:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course
followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal
government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce
civilized customs."80

Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the path of civilization, the
American government chose "to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity and with the
national conscience."81

The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and the non-Christian Filipinos.

The term "non-Christian" referred not to religious belief, but to a geographical area, and more directly, "to
natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from
settled communities."82

Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903, they passed Act No. 253
creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT). Under the Department of the Interior, the BNCT's
primary task was to conduct ethnographic research among unhispanized Filipinos, including those in Muslim
Mindanao, with a "special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their
advancement in civilization and prosperity." The BNCT was modeled after the bureau dealing with
American Indians. The agency took a keen anthropological interest in Philippine cultural minorities and
produced a wealth of valuable materials about them.83

The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. The raging issue then
was the conservation of the national patrimony for the Filipinos.

In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a more rapid and complete
manner the economic, social, moral and political advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos or national cultural
minorities and to render real, complete, and permanent the integration of all said national cultural minorities
into the body politic, creating the Commission on National Integration charged with said functions." The law
called for a policy of integration of indigenous peoples into the Philippine mainstream and for this purpose
created the Commission on National Integration (CNI).84 The CNI was given, more or less, the same task as
the BNCT during the American regime. The post-independence policy of integration was like the colonial
policy of assimilation understood in the context of a guardian-ward relationship.85

The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the Spaniards and Americans,
government attempts at integration met with fierce resistance. Since World War II, a tidal wave of
Christian settlers from the lowlands of Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands and wide open spaces
in Mindanao.86 Knowledge by the settlers of the Public Land Acts and the Torrens system resulted in
the titling of several ancestral lands in the settlers' names. With government initiative and
participation, this titling displaced several indigenous peoples from their lands. Worse, these peoples
were also displaced by projects undertaken by the national government in the name of national development.87

It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision:

"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural communities in the
formulation and implementation of State policies."88

For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the "cultural minorities" were
addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and they were referred to as "cultural
communities." More importantly this time, their "uncivilized" culture was given some recognition and their
"customs, traditions, beliefs and interests" were to be considered by the State in the formulation and
implementation of State policies. President Marcos abolished the CNI and transferred its functions to
the Presidential Adviser on National Minorities (PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to integrate the
ethnic groups that sought full integration into the larger community, and at the same time "protect the rights of
those who wish to preserve their original lifeways beside the larger community." 89 In short, while still
adopting the integration policy, the decree recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way
of life.90

In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as the Ancestral Lands Decree. The

decree provided for the issuance of land occupancy certificates to members of the national cultural
communities who were given up to 1984 to register their claims.91 In 1979, the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems was created under E.O. No. 561 which provided a mechanism for the
expeditious resolution of land problems involving small settlers, landowners, and tribal Filipinos.92
Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some 100,000 Kalingas and Bontoks of
the Cordillera region were displaced by the Chico River dam project of the National Power Corporation (NPC).
The Manobos of Bukidnon saw their land bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar Industries Company (BUSCO). In
Agusan del Sur, the National Development Company was authorized by law in 1979 to take approximately
40,550 hectares of land that later became the NDC-Guthrie plantation in Agusan del Sur. Most of the land was
possessed by the Agusan natives.93 Timber concessions, water projects, plantations, mining, and cattle
ranching and other projects of the national government led not only to the eviction of the indigenous peoples
from their land but also to the reduction and destruction of their natural environment.94

The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one of
preservation. Invoking her powers under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino created the Office of
Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural
Communities all under the Office of the President.95

The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right of tribal Filipinos to
preserve their way of life.96 This Constitution goes further than the 1973 Constitution by expressly
guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By
recognizing their right to their ancestral lands and domains, the State has effectively upheld their right
to live in a culture distinctly their own.

2. Their Concept of Land

Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino mainstream. They are non-
Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly upland areas. They have a system of self-government
not dependent upon the laws of the central administration of the Republic of the Philippines. They follow ways
of life and customs that are perceived as different from those of the rest of the population. 97 The kind of
response the indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial threat worked well to their advantage by making it
difficult for Western concepts and religion to erode their customs and traditions. The "infieles societies" which
had become peripheral to colonial administration, represented, from a cultural perspective, a much older base
of archipelagic culture. The political systems were still structured on the patriarchal and kinship oriented
arrangement of power and authority. The economic activities were governed by the concepts of an ancient
communalism and mutual help. The social structure which emphasized division of labor and distinction of
functions, not status, was maintained. The cultural styles and forms of life portraying the varieties of social
courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant.98

Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no traditional concept of
permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots, ownership of land more accurately applies to the
tribal right to use the land or to territorial control. The people are the secondary owners or stewards of the land
and that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership, and the land reverts to the
beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary owners. Under the concept of "trusteeship," the right to
possess the land does not only belong to the present generation but the future ones as well.99

Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except the gods and spirits,
and that those who work the land are its mere stewards. 100 Customary law has a strong preference for
communal ownership, which could either be ownership by a group of individuals or families who are related
by blood or by marriage, 101 or ownership by residents of the same locality who may not be related by blood or
marriage. The system of communal ownership under customary laws draws its meaning from the subsistence
and highly collectivized mode of economic production. The Kalingas, for instance, who are engaged in team
occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products, and swidden farming found it natural that forest areas,
swidden farms, orchards, pasture and burial grounds should be communally-owned. 102 For the Kalingas,
everybody has a common right to a common economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations to the land
are shared in common.

Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also sanctions individual
ownership. The residential lots and terrace rice farms are governed by a limited system of individual
ownership. It is limited because while the individual owner has the right to use and dispose of the property, he
does not possess all the rights of an exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil Code. 103 Under Kalinga
customary law, the alienation of individually-owned land is strongly discouraged except in marriage and
succession and except to meet sudden financial needs due to sickness, death in the family, or loss of
crops.104 Moreover, and to be alienated should first be offered to a clan-member before any village-member
can purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a non-member of the ili.105

Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The concept of
individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our national
land laws and governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands. Communal
ownership is looked upon as inferior, if not inexistent.106
III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.

A. The Legislative History of the IPRA

It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that the Tenth Congress
of the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed and approved R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act (IPRA) of 1997. The law was a consolidation of two Bills- Senate Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125.

Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was a consolidation of four
proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural Communities, Environment and Natural
Resources, Ways and Means, as well as Finance. It adopted almost en toto the comprehensive version of
Senate Bill Nos. 1476 and 1486 which was a result of six regional consultations and one national
consultation with indigenous peoples nationwide.108 At the Second Regular Session of the Tenth
Congress, Senator Flavier, in his sponsorship speech, gave a background on the situation of indigenous
peoples in the Philippines, to wit:

"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long suffered from the dominance
and neglect of government controlled by the majority. Massive migration of their Christian brothers to their
homeland shrunk their territory and many of the tribal Filipinos were pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting the
intrusion, dispossessed of their ancestral land and with the massive exploitation of their natural resources by
the elite among the migrant population, they became marginalized. And the government has been an
indispensable party to this insidious conspiracy against the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs). It
organized and supported the resettlement of people to their ancestral land, which was massive during the
Commonwealth and early years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine first introduced
to our system by Spain through the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government
passed laws to legitimize the wholesale landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or grant of lands to migrant
homesteaders within the traditional areas of the ICCs."109

Senator Flavier further declared:

"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and cared for the land long before
any central government was established. Their ancestors had territories over which they ruled themselves and
related with other tribes. These territories- the land- include people, their dwelling, the mountains, the water,
the air, plants, forest and the animals. This is their environment in its totality. Their existence as indigenous
peoples is manifested in their own lives through political, economic, socio-cultural and spiritual practices. The
IPs culture is the living and irrefutable proof to this.

Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to it; and depending on it.
Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as distinct peoples."110

To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a bill based on two
postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the principle of parens patriae.

According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian Doctrine reinstated in
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution," our "decisional laws" and jurisprudence passed by the State
have "made exception to the doctrine." This exception was first laid down in the case of Cariño v. Insular
Government where:

"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of the cultural communities
as one of private ownership, which, in legal concept, is termed "native title." This ruling has not been
overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in subsequent cases."111

Following Cariño, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D. 705, P.D. 410, P.D. 1529,
R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao). These laws, explicitly or
implicitly, and liberally or restrictively, recognized "native title" or "private right" and the existence of ancestral
lands and domains. Despite the passage of these laws, however, Senator Flavier continued:

"x x x the executive department of government since the American occupation has not implemented the policy.
In fact, it was more honored in its breach than in its observance, its wanton disregard shown during the period
unto the Commonwealth and the early years of the Philippine Republic when government organized and
supported massive resettlement of the people to the land of the ICCs."

Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess their ancestral land. The
bill was prepared also under the principle of parens patriae inherent in the supreme power of the State and
deeply embedded in Philippine legal tradition. This principle mandates that persons suffering from serious
disadvantage or handicap, which places them in a position of actual inequality in their relation or transaction
with others, are entitled to the protection of the State.

Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21) Senators voting in favor and
none against, with no abstention.112

House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee on Cultural Communities. It
was originally authored and subsequently presented and defended on the floor by Rep. Gregorio Andolana of
North Cotabato.113

Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:

"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar implications that would promote,
recognize the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and
development.

Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to assure and ascertain that these
rights shall be well-preserved and the cultural traditions as well as the indigenous laws that remained long
before this Republic was established shall be preserved and promoted. There is a need, Mr. Speaker, to look
into these matters seriously and early approval of the substitute bill shall bring into reality the aspirations, the
hope and the dreams of more than 12 million Filipinos that they be considered in the mainstream of the
Philippine society as we fashion for the year 2000." 114

Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as mandated in the
Constitution. He also emphasized that the rights of IPs to their land was enunciated in Cariño v. Insular
Government which recognized the fact that they had vested rights prior to the establishment of the Spanish
and American regimes.115

After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding amendments, was approved
on Second Reading with no objections.

IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTION.

A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of Indigenous Peoples and Do Not
Constitute Part of the Land of the Public Domain.

The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral
lands. Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral domains. These are defined in Section 3 [a] and [b] of
the Indigenous Peoples Right Act, viz:

"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure
or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary
dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure
their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential,
agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting
grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which
may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or
shifting cultivators;

b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by
individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously,
to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a
consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests,
swidden farms and tree lots."

Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or
possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time
immemorial, continuously until the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by
force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings with
government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland waters,
coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential,
agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial
grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources. They also include lands
which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for
their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic
and/or shifting cultivators.116

Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except that
these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by
the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not limited
to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.117

The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the procedures embodied in
Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of 1993, signed by then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Angel Alcala. 118 DAO No. 2 allowed the delineation of ancestral
domains by special task forces and ensured the issuance of Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims (CALC's)
and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.

The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power conferred by the IPRA on
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).119 The guiding principle in identification and
delineation is self-delineation.120 This means that the ICCs/IPs have a decisive role in determining the
boundaries of their domains and in all the activities pertinent thereto.121

The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth in Sections 51 and 52 of
the IPRA. The identification, delineation and certification of ancestral lands is in Section 53 of said law.

Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and upon finding by the NCIP
that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the
name of the community concerned.122 The allocation of lands within the ancestral domain to any individual
or indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in accordance
with customs and traditions.123 With respect to ancestral lands outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP
issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT).124

CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the Register of Deeds in the
place where the property is situated.125

(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired

The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1)
by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act
and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.

(2) The Concept of Native Title

Native title is defined as:

"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory
reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and
are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest."126

Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private
ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are
indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs
to their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized and
respected.127 Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories
identified and delineated.128

Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native title, however, is a
right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA
categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public land.
Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public
lands and are private.

(a) Cariño v. Insular Government129

The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cariño v. Insular
Government.130 Cariño firmly established a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal
grant from the State.

In 1903, Don Mateo Cariño, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration court 146 hectares of land in
Baguio Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that this land had been possessed and occupied by his
ancestors since time immemorial; that his grandfather built fences around the property for the holding of cattle
and that his father cultivated some parts of the land. Cariño inherited the land in accordance with Igorot
custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under the Spanish land laws, but no document issued from the
Spanish Crown.131 In 1901, Cariño obtained a possessory title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage
Law.132 The North American colonial government, however, ignored his possessory title and built a public road
on the land prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his property in the land registration court. While his petition
was pending, a U.S. military reservation133 was proclaimed over his land and, shortly thereafter, a military
detachment was detailed on the property with orders to keep cattle and trespassers, including Cariño, off the
land.134

In 1904, the land registration court granted Cariño's application for absolute ownership to the land. Both the
Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government appealed to the C.F.I. of Benguet which
reversed the land registration court and dismissed Cariño's application. The Philippine Supreme
Court135 affirmed the C.F.I. by applying the Valenton ruling. Cariño took the case to the U.S. Supreme
Court.136 On one hand, the Philippine government invoked the Regalian doctrine and contended that Cariño
failed to comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, which required registration of land
claims within a limited period of time. Cariño, on the other, asserted that he was the absolute owner of the
land jure gentium, and that the land never formed part of the public domain.

In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S. Supreme Court held:

"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from
the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled to
the treatment accorded to those in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also, that in legal
theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain
asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the United
States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of
strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the
subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide."137

The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice was with the new
colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be decided under U.S. law.

The Cariño decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's concept of "due process" as well
as the pronounced policy "to do justice to the natives."138 It was based on the strong mandate extended to the
Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that "No law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection
of the laws." The court declared:

"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United States. Whatever
consideration may have been shown to the North American Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in
America was to occupy land. It is obvious that, however stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines
was different. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount necessities, our first
object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their country for
private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter 1369, section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691), all the
property and rights acquired there by the United States are to be administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants
thereof.' It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to what
was unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own. The same statute made
a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those
safeguards to all. It provides that 'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.'
In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from section 12, it is hard to believe that the United States
was ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it
meant by "property" only that which had become such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the
inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by
long association,- of the profoundest factors in human thought,- regarded as their own."139

The Court went further:

"Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps,
be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been
held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the
same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly in a case like
this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt."140

The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as testimony or memory went,
and (2) under a claim of private ownership. Land held by this title is presumed to "never have been public
land."

Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees upheld in the 1904 decision
of Valenton v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court found no proof that the Spanish decrees did not honor
native title. On the contrary, the decrees discussed in Valenton appeared to recognize that the natives owned
some land, irrespective of any royal grant. The Regalian doctrine declared in the preamble of
the Recopilacion was all "theory and discourse" and it was observed that titles were admitted to exist beyond
the powers of the Crown, viz:

"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof that it
was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older decrees
and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives
were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not
assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will. For
instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary
conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it commands viceroys and others, when it seems
proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa
prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin
of all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles
were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their
books." (Emphasis supplied).141

The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway over unconquered
territories. The wording of the Spanish laws were not framed in a manner as to convey to the natives that
failure to register what to them has always been their own would mean loss of such land. The registration
requirement was "not to confer title, but simply to establish it;" it was "not calculated to convey to the mind of
an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it."

By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of Valenton. It was frank enough,
however, to admit the possibility that the applicant might have been deprived of his land under Spanish law
because of the inherent ambiguity of the decrees and concomitantly, the various interpretations which may be
given them. But precisely because of the ambiguity and of the strong "due process mandate" of the
Constitution, the court validated this kind of title. 142 This title was sufficient, even without government
administrative action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens certificate. Justice Holmes explained:

"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem not without
difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on that account to notice the possible effect
of the change of sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to be
observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of the opinion that law and justice require that the
applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of
those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of
Spain."143

Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cariño and ordered the registration of the 148 hectares in Baguio
Municipality in his name.144

Examining Cariño closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the title it upheld as "native
title." It simply said:

"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his argument,
characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or military government of the
Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted to
anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish
Laws, and which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the
technical position of Spain it does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and was
a mere trespasser when the present government seized his land. The argument to that effect seems to amount
to a denial of native titles through an important part of the Island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies
which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power to enforce."145

This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the entire length of
the Cariño decision. It is observed that the widespread use of the term "native title" may be traced to Professor
Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting Professor at the University of the Philippines College of Law from the Yale
University Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch published an article in the Philippine Law Journal entitled Native
Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law.146 This article was made after Professor Lynch visited over thirty
tribal communities throughout the country and studied the origin and development of Philippine land
laws.147 He discussed Cariño extensively and used the term "native title" to refer to Cariño's title as discussed
and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in said case.

(b) Indian Title

In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native title" as defined by Justice
Holmes in Cariño "is conceptually similar to "aboriginal title" of the American Indians. 148 This is not surprising,
according to Prof. Lynch, considering that during the American regime, government policy towards ICCs/IPs
was consistently made in reference to native Americans. 149 This was clearly demonstrated in the case of Rubi
v. Provincial Board of Mindoro.150

In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the provincial governor to remove
the Mangyans from their domains and place them in a permanent reservation in Sitio Tigbao, Lake Naujan.
Any Mangyan who refused to comply was to be imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans, including one who was
imprisoned for trying to escape from the reservation, filed for habeas corpus claiming deprivation of liberty
under the Board Resolution. This Court denied the petition on the ground of police power. It upheld
government policy promoting the idea that a permanent settlement was the only successful method for
educating the Mangyans, introducing civilized customs, improving their health and morals, and protecting the
public forests in which they roamed.151 Speaking through Justice Malcolm, the court said:

"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United
States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippine Islands in its dealings
with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the
United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived
by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.

From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of
pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be
described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship
shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States.152

x x x.

As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But
even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that
Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these reservations, without any
previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been made to remain
on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn from
the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and
executive branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to
upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as many forceful reasons exist for the
segregation of the Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the
United States."153

Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An Indian reservation is a part
of the public domain set apart by proper authority for the use and occupation of a tribe or tribes of Indians. 154 It
may be set apart by an act of Congress, by treaty, or by executive order, but it cannot be established by
custom and prescription.155

Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It also covers the "aboriginal
right of possession or occupancy."156 The aboriginal right of possession depends on the actual occupancy
of the lands in question by the tribe or nation as their ancestral home, in the sense that such lands constitute
definable territory occupied exclusively by the particular tribe or nation. 157 It is a right which exists apart from
any treaty, statute, or other governmental action, although in numerous instances treaties have been
negotiated with Indian tribes, recognizing their aboriginal possession and delimiting their occupancy rights or
settling and adjusting their boundaries.158

American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights to land they have held and
occupied before the "discovery" of the Americas by the Europeans. The earliest definitive statement by
the U.S. Supreme Court on the nature of aboriginal title was made in 1823 in Johnson & Graham's
Lessee v. M'Intosh.159
In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made by the chiefs of two (2)
Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize this conveyance, the plaintiffs being private
persons. The only conveyance that was recognized was that made by the Indians to the government of the
European discoverer. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out that the potentates of the old
world believed that they had made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new world by bestowing
civilization and Christianity upon them; but in addition, said the court, they found it necessary, in order to avoid
conflicting settlements and consequent war, to establish the principle that discovery gives title to the
government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, the discovery was made, against all other
European governments, which title might be consummated by possession. 160 The exclusion of all other
Europeans gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives and
establishing settlements upon it. As regards the natives, the court further stated that:

"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be regulated by
themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose between them.

In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely
disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful
occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use
it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were
necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased,
was denied by the fundamental principle that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.

While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants, they asserted the
ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate
dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives. These grants have been
understood by all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy." 161

Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive right to acquire Indian land
and extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discoverer- whether to England, France, Spain or Holland- did this right
belong and not to any other nation or private person. The mere acquisition of the right nonetheless did not
extinguish Indian claims to land. Rather, until the discoverer, by purchase or conquest, exercised its right, the
concerned Indians were recognized as the "rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to
retain possession of it." Grants made by the discoverer to her subjects of lands occupied by the Indians were
held to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. Once the discoverer
purchased the land from the Indians or conquered them, it was only then that the discoverer gained an
absolute title unrestricted by Indian rights.

The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not convey a title paramount to
the title of the United States itself to other parties, saying:

"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of possession has never
been questioned. The claim of government extends to the complete ultimate title, charged with this
right of possession, and to the exclusive power of acquiring that right."162

It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves the universal
recognition of this principle.163

The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their native lands without having to
invalidate conveyances made by the government to many U.S. citizens.164

Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.165 In this case, the State of Georgia enacted a
law requiring all white persons residing within the Cherokee nation to obtain a license or permit from the
Governor of Georgia; and any violation of the law was deemed a high misdemeanor. The plaintiffs, who were
white missionaries, did not obtain said license and were thus charged with a violation of the Act.

The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the treaties established
between the United States and the Cherokee nation as well as the Acts of Congress regulating intercourse
with them. It characterized the relationship between the United States government and the Indians as:

"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign potentate for the supply
of their essential wants, and for their protection from lawless and injurious intrusions into their country. That
power was naturally termed their protector. They had been arranged under the protection of Great Britain; but
the extinguishment of the British power in their neighborhood, and the establishment of that of the United
States in its place, led naturally to the declaration, on the part of the Cherokees, that they were under the
protection of the United States, and of no other power. They assumed the relation with the United States which
had before subsisted with Great Britain.
This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful, not that of
individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the laws of a master."166

It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct territorial boundaries and
recognize their right of occupancy over all the lands within their domains. Thus:

"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate trade and intercourse with
the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that
protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is still in force, manifestly
consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries,
within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries,
which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.

x x x.

"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities,
retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time
immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from
intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region
claimed: and this was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the
Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct from others." x x x.167

The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately
described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to
enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of
Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by our Constitution and laws,
vested in the government of the United States."168

The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the discoverer as against all other
European governments. Designated as the naked fee,169 this title was to be consummated by possession and
was subject to the Indian title of occupancy. The discoverer acknowledged the Indians' legal and just claim to
retain possession of the land, the Indians being the original inhabitants of the land. The discoverer nonetheless
asserted the exclusive right to acquire the Indians' land- either by purchase, "defensive" conquest, or cession-
and in so doing, extinguish the Indian title. Only the discoverer could extinguish Indian title because it alone
asserted ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, while the different nations of Europe respected the rights of the
natives as occupants, they all asserted the ultimate dominion and title to be in themselves.170

As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee title to the lands occupied
by the Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign- first the discovering
European nation and later the original 13 States and the United States- a right of occupancy in the
Indian tribes was nevertheless recognized. The Federal Government continued the policy of respecting the
Indian right of occupancy, sometimes called Indian title, which it accorded the protection of complete
ownership.171 But this aboriginal Indian interest simply constitutes "permission" from the whites to occupy the
land, and means mere possession not specifically recognized as ownership by Congress. 172 It is clear that this
right of occupancy based upon aboriginal possession is not a property right. 173 It is vulnerable to affirmative
action by the federal government who, as sovereign, possessed exclusive power to extinguish the right of
occupancy at will.174 Thus, aboriginal title is not the same as legal title. Aboriginal title rests on actual,
exclusive and continuous use and occupancy for a long time. 175 It entails that land owned by Indian title must
be used within the tribe, subject to its laws and customs, and cannot be sold to another sovereign government
nor to any citizen.176 Such title as Indians have to possess and occupy land is in the tribe, and not in the
individual Indian; the right of individual Indians to share in the tribal property usually depends upon tribal
membership, the property of the tribe generally being held in communal ownership.177

As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is ordinarily used to designate such
lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws. 178 Indian land which has been abandoned is
deemed to fall into the public domain.179 On the other hand, an Indian reservation is a part of the public domain
set apart for the use and occupation of a tribe of Indians. 180 Once set apart by proper authority, the reservation
ceases to be public land, and until the Indian title is extinguished, no one but Congress can initiate any
preferential right on, or restrict the nation's power to dispose of, them.181

The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral land claims of indigenous
Americans.182 And two things are clear. First, aboriginal title is recognized. Second, indigenous property
systems are also recognized. From a legal point of view, certain benefits can be drawn from a comparison of
Philippine IPs to native Americans.183 Despite the similarities between native title and aboriginal title, however,
there are at present some misgivings on whether jurisprudence on American Indians may be cited
authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S. recognizes the possessory rights of the Indians over their land; title
to the land, however, is deemed to have passed to the U.S. as successor of the discoverer. The aboriginal title
of ownership is not specifically recognized as ownership by action authorized by Congress. 184 The protection of
aboriginal title merely guards against encroachment by persons other than the Federal
Government.185 Although there are criticisms against the refusal to recognize the native Americans' ownership
of these lands,186 the power of the State to extinguish these titles has remained firmly entrenched.187

Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty over the ancestral domains and
ancestral lands.188 The IPRA, however, is still in its infancy and any similarities between its application in the
Philippines vis-à-vis American Jurisprudence on aboriginal title will depend on the peculiar facts of each case.

(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique

In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cariño and enshrined in the IPRA grants ownership,
albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title presumes that the land is private and was never
public. Cariño is the only case that specifically and categorically recognizes native title. The long line of
cases citing Cariño did not touch on native title and the private character of ancestral domains and
lands. Cariño was cited by the succeeding cases to support the concept of acquisitive prescription
under the Public Land Act which is a different matter altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land sought
to be registered must be public agricultural land. When the conditions specified in Section 48 [b] of the
Public Land Act are complied with, the possessor of the land is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law,
a right to a grant of the land. 189 The land ceases to be part of the public domain,190 ipso jure,191 and is converted
to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the prescribed statutory period.

It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands192 that the court declared that the rule that all lands
that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public domain has an
exception. This exception would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of
his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial. It is this kind of possession that would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even
before the Spanish conquest.193 Oh Cho, however, was decided under the provisions of the Public Land Act
and Cariño was cited to support the applicant's claim of acquisitive prescription under the said Act.

All these years, Cariño had been quoted out of context simply to justify long, continuous, open and adverse
possession in the concept of owner of public agricultural land. It is this long, continuous, open and adverse
possession in the concept of owner of thirty years both for ordinary citizens 194 and members of the national
cultural minorities195 that converts the land from public into private and entitles the registrant to a torrens
certificate of title.

(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates that the Land is Private.

The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is further strengthened by the
option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes of
registration under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts
ancestral land into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary
implication is that ancestral land is private. It, however, has to be first converted to public agricultural
land simply for registration purposes. To wit:

"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land
Registration Act 496- Individual members of cultural communities, with respect to their individually-owned
ancestral lands who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous
possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time immemorial or for a period of not
less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the approval of this Act and uncontested by the members of
the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their ancestral lands under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.

For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character and actually used
for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a slope of eighteen
percent (18%) or more, are hereby classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.

The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years from the approval of this
Act."196

ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their individually-owned ancestral
lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands only, not domains, and such lands must be individually, not
communally, owned.

Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of
owner since time immemorial197 or for a period of not less than 30 years, which claims are uncontested by the
members of the same ICCs/IPs, may be registered under C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act,
or Act 496, the Land Registration Act. For purposes of registration, the individually-owned ancestral lands are
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, provided, they are agricultural in
character and are actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture and tree farming purposes. These lands
shall be classified as public agricultural lands regardless of whether they have a slope of 18% or more.

The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance with the requirements of the
Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act. C.A. 141, the Public Land Act, deals specifically with lands of
the public domain.198 Its provisions apply to those lands "declared open to disposition or concession" x x x
"which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public purposes, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in
any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act
or any other valid law x x x or which having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so." 199 Act 496,
the Land Registration Act, allows registration only of private lands and public agricultural lands. Since
ancestral domains and lands are private, if the ICC/IP wants to avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act
496, the IPRA itself converts his ancestral land, regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen
per cent (18%) or over,200 from private to public agricultural land for proper disposition.

The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act has nonetheless a limited
period. This option must be exercised within twenty (20) years from October 29, 1997, the date of approval of
the IPRA.

Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are
private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony of the
1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or timber,
(c) mineral lands, and (d) national parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions ancestral lands and
ancestral domains but it does not classify them under any of the said four categories. To classify them as
public lands under any one of the four classes will render the entire IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the
IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major
problem of the ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms of sheer survival of
the ICCs/IPs.201

The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to
their ancestral lands" and that "Congress provide for the applicability of customary laws x x x in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain." 202 It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs
distinct rights of ownership over their ancestral domains and lands that breathes life into this
constitutional mandate.

B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form
of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of ownership under
the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a specified period, and harkens to Section 44
of the Public Land Act on administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles and Section
48 (b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Thus:

"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four hectares
and who since July fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition, or who
shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be
entitled, under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such
land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.

A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not
since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this
section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent application he is not the owner of any real
property secured or disposable under the provision of the Public Land Law.203

x x x.

"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming
to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.

 (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their

predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not,
under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted
in sub-section (b) hereof."204

Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally public agricultural land but
because of adverse possession since July 4, 1955 (free patent) or at least thirty years (judicial confirmation),
the land has become private. Open, adverse, public and continuous possession is sufficient, provided, the
possessor makes proper application therefor. The possession has to be confirmed judicially or administratively
after which a torrens title is issued.

A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as entitled to all the rights of
ownership under the civil law. The Civil Code of the Philippines defines ownership in Articles 427, 428 and
429. This concept is based on Roman Law which the Spaniards introduced to the Philippines through the Civil
Code of 1889. Ownership, under Roman Law, may be exercised over things or rights. It primarily includes the
right of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned. And the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing
includes the right to receive from the thing what it produces, 205 the right to consume the thing by its use, 206 the
right to alienate, encumber, transform or even destroy the thing owned, 207 and the right to exclude from the
possession of the thing owned by any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted such thing.208

1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.

Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens title but to a Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally recognizes the indigenous concept of ownership of the
ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain. Thus:

"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that ancestral
domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The
indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but
community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It
likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights."

The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held under the
indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view that ancestral domains are the
ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is private simply because it is not part of the public
domain. But its private character ends there. The ancestral domain is owned in common by the
ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. The IPRA itself provides that areas within the ancestral domains,
whether delineated or not, are presumed to be communally held. 209 These communal rights, however, are
not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the Civil Code. 210 Co-ownership gives any co-owner
the right to demand partition of the property held in common. The Civil Code expressly provides that "no co-
owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership." Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the thing in common, insofar as his share is concerned. 211 To allow such a right over ancestral domains may be
destructive not only of customary law of the community but of the very community itself.212

Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real property, much less
corporate condominium rights. A corporation can exist only for a maximum of fifty (50) years subject to an
extension of another fifty years in any single instance. 213 Every stockholder has the right to disassociate himself
from the corporation.214 Moreover, the corporation itself may be dissolved voluntarily or involuntarily.215

Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the land but extends to all
generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future, to the domain. This is the reason why the ancestral
domain must be kept within the ICCs/IPs themselves. The domain cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed to
other persons. It belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.

Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership. The lands are communal.
These lands, however, may be transferred subject to the following limitations: (a) only to the members of the
same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with customary laws and traditions; and (c) subject to the right of redemption of
the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15 years if the land was transferred to a non-member of the ICCs/IPs.
Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domains,"216 the IPRA, by legislative fiat, introduces a new concept of
ownership. This is a concept that has long existed under customary law.217

Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as a source of
law.218 Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that custom should be applied in cases where no
codal provision is applicable.219 In other words, in the absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code,
custom, when duly proven, can define rights and liabilities.220

Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies to
ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil law.  The
indigenous concept of ownership under customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized, and
coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on land titling and land registration.221

To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title. The CADT is merely a
"formal recognition" of native title. This is clear from Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit:

"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.- The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains by virtue
of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned
shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize the title of the concerned
ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated."

The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is "belongingness" to the land, being people
of the land- by sheer force of having sprung from the land since time beyond recall, and the faithful nurture of
the land by the sweat of one's brow. This is fidelity of usufructuary relation to the land- the possession of
stewardship through perduring, intimate tillage, and the mutuality of blessings between man and land; from
man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for man.222

C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian Doctrine Enshrined in Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands

The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. Section 7
provides for the rights over ancestral domains:

"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.- The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights include:

a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains;

b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, the right to
develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage
and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future
generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural
resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of
natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection
and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an
informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government
or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair
compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to
effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment
upon these rights;"

c) Right to Stay in the Territories.- The right to stay in the territory and not to be removed therefrom. No
ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior informed consent, nor through any means other
than eminent domain. x x x;

d) Right in Case of Displacement.- In case displacement occurs as a result of natural catastrophes, the
State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas where they can have
temporary life support systems: x x x;

e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.- Right to regulate the entry of migrant settlers and
organizations into their domains;
 f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.-For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have access to
integrated systems for the management of their inland waters and air space;

g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.- The right to claim parts of the ancestral domains which have
been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and intended for common and public
welfare and service;

h) Right to Resolve Conflict.- Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with customary laws of the
area where the land is located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints be submitted to
amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice whenever necessary."

Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:

"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.- The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
lands shall be recognized and protected.

a) Right to transfer land/property.- Such right shall include the right to transfer land or property rights
to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community
concerned.

b) Right to Redemption.- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property rights by virtue of
any agreement or devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent
of the ICCs/IPs, or is transferred for an unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP
shall have the right to redeem the same within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date
of transfer."

Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their ancestral domains which covers (a)
lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d) traditional
hunting and fishing grounds, and (e) all improvements made by them at any time within the domains. The right
of ownership includes the following rights: (1) the right to develop lands and natural resources; (b) the right to
stay in the territories; (c) the right to resettlement in case of displacement; (d) the right to regulate the entry of
migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean air and water; (f) the right to claim parts of the ancestral domains as
reservations; and (g) the right to resolve conflict in accordance with customary laws.

Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the ancestral domains, Section 8 gives
the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land or property rights to members of the same ICCs/IPs or non-
members thereof. This is in keeping with the option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens title over the
ancestral lands, but not to domains.

2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral Domains Does Not
Deprive the State of Ownership Over the Natural Resources and Control and Supervision in their Development
and Exploitation.

The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural resources is declared
in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or, it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well
as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions
to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the state shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within
thirty days from its execution."223

All lands of the public domain and all natural resources- waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources- are owned by the State. The Constitution provides that in the exploration, development and
utilization of these natural resources, the State exercises full control and supervision, and may undertake the
same in four (4) modes:

1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or

2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens or qualified corporations;

3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens;

4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral
oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or
financial assistance.

As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and responsibility in the
exploration, development and utilization of these natural resources. The State may directly undertake the
exploitation and development by itself, or, it may allow participation by the private sector through co-
production,224 joint venture,225 or production-sharing agreements.226 These agreements may be for a period of
25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The State, through Congress, may allow the small-scale utilization
of natural resources by Filipino citizens. For the large-scale exploration of these resources, specifically
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the State, through the President, may enter into technical and
financial assistance agreements with foreign-owned corporations.

Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A.
7076) the three types of agreements, i.e., co-production, joint venture or production-sharing, may apply to both
large-scale227 and small-scale mining.228 "Small-scale mining" refers to "mining activities which rely heavily on
manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment."229

Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains
includes ownership, but this "ownership" is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a) as:

"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements
made by them at any time within the domains;"

The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually
occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by
them at any time within the domains." It will be noted that this enumeration does not mention bodies of water
not occupied by the ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional hunting grounds, fish in
the traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other natural resources found
within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7 (a) does not cover
"waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all other natural resources"
enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution as belonging to the State.

The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section 7(a) complies with the
Regalian doctrine.

(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the Parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of the
IPRA And is Unconstitutional.

The Rules Implementing the IPRA230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:
"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands, waters, and natural
resources and all improvements made by them at any time within the ancestral domains/ lands. These rights
shall include, but not limited to, the right over the fruits, the right to possess, the right to use, right to consume,
right to exclude and right to recover ownership, and the rights or interests over land and natural resources. The
right to recover shall be particularly applied to lands lost through fraud or any form or vitiated consent or
transferred for an unconscionable price."

Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over "lands, waters and natural
resources." The term "natural resources" is not one of those expressly mentioned in Section 7 (a) of the law.
Our Constitution and jurisprudence clearly declare that the right to claim ownership over land does not
necessarily include the right to claim ownership over the natural resources found on or under the land. 231 The
IPRA itself makes a distinction between land and natural resources. Section 7 (a) speaks of the right of
ownership only over the land within the ancestral domain. It is Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law that
speak of natural resources, and these provisions, as shall be discussed later, do not give the ICCs/IPs
the right of ownership over these resources.

The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not specifically and
categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the constitutionality of the Implementing
Rules in general.232 Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion in the implementation of the law, it is necessary to
declare that the inclusion of "natural resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes
beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.

(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA Is Allowed Under
Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.

Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7 (b) merely grants the
ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz:

"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to develop,
control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural
resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the
profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and
conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological,
environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to
an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or
private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any
damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the
government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"

The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the IPRA enumerates the following
rights:

a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied;

b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the
responsibilities for future generations;

c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization of the natural
resources found therein;

d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources for the
purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to
national and customary laws;

e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any
project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just
and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project;

f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and
encroachment upon these rights.233

Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs
are merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them for future generations, "benefit and
share" the profits from their allocation and utilization, and "negotiate the terms and conditions for their
exploration" for the purpose of "ensuring ecological and environmental protection and conservation
measures." It must be noted that the right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the natural resources
covers only their exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and environmental
protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral domain. It does not extend to the exploitation and
development of natural resources.

Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of management or
stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in the profits of their utilization or negotiate
the terms for their exploration. At the same time, however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the natural resources
within their ancestral domains are conserved for future generations and that the "utilization" of these resources
must not harm the ecology and environment pursuant to national and customary laws.234

The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to contemplate small-scale
utilization of natural resources as distinguished from large-scale. Small-scale utilization of natural
resources is expressly allowed in the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution "in
recognition of the plight of forest dwellers, gold panners, marginal fishermen and others similarly situated who
exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance and survival."235 Section 7 (b) also expressly mandates
the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these resources and ensure environmental and ecological protection
within the domains, which duties, by their very nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.

(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the IPRA Is Allowed Under
Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 57 of the IPRA provides:

"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.- The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in
the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral
domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the development and
utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more
than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs
concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision-making process, has agreed to allow such
operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and take appropriate action to
safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract."

Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of natural resources within

ancestral domains" and "gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights' therein." The terms "harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation" of any natural resources within the ancestral domains obviously refer to
large-scale utilization. It is utilization not merely for subsistence but for commercial or other extensive use
that require technology other than manual labor. 236 The law recognizes the probability of requiring a non-
member of the ICCs/IPs to participate in the development and utilization of the natural resources and thereby
allows such participation for a period of not more than 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. This may be
done on condition that a formal written agreement be entered into by the non-member and members of the
ICCs/IPs.

Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and conserve" the natural resources.
Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the development or exploitation thereof. Priority
means giving preference. Having priority rights over the natural resources does not necessarily mean
ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that there is a superior entity that owns these resources
and this entity has the power to grant preferential rights over the resources to whosoever itself chooses.

Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the said doctrine that all
natural resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the State. It incorporates by implication the
Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the provision be read in the light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Interpreting Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution 237 in relation to Section 57 of
IPRA, the State, as owner of these natural resources, may directly undertake the development and
exploitation of the natural resources by itself, or in the alternative, it may recognize the priority rights
of the ICCs/IPs as owners of the land on which the natural resources are found by entering into a co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreement with them. The State may likewise enter
into any of said agreements with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, or enter
into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
or allow such non-member to participate in its agreement with the ICCs/IPs. If the State decides to enter
into an agreement with a non-ICC/IP member, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall
ensure that the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the agreement shall be protected. The agreement shall be for a
period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.

To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral domains, the State, as owner
of these resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of and by itself, directly undertake the development and
exploitation of the natural resources; or (2) it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs by entering into
an agreement with them for such development and exploitation; or (3) it may enter into an agreement with a
non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, local or foreign; or (4) it may allow such non-member
to participate in the agreement with the ICCs/IPs.

The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains
merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the
right to the small-scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large-
scale development and exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to automatically give
priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has several options and it is within its discretion to choose which
option to pursue. Moreover, there is nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely undertake
the large-scale development of the natural resources within their domains. The ICCs/IPs must undertake such
endeavour always under State supervision or control. This indicates that the State does not lose control and
ownership over the resources even in their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law simply give due
respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants of the land where the natural resources lie, have traditionally
utilized these resources for their subsistence and survival.

Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by the following provision:

"Section 59. Certification Precondition.- All departments and other governmental agencies shall henceforth be
strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any concession, license or lease, or entering into any
production-sharing agreement. without prior certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap
with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after a field-based investigation is conducted
by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the
NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further,
That no department, government agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation may issue new
concession, license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a
CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act,
any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process."

Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation of natural resources shall
not be issued, renewed or granted by all departments and government agencies without prior certification from
the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not overlap with any ancestral domain. The NCIP
certification shall be issued only after a field-based investigation shall have been conducted and the free and
prior informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained. Non-compliance with the consultation requirement
gives the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or suspend any project granted by any department or government agency.

As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of any concession, license or
agreement over natural resources, that a certification be issued by the NCIP that the area subject of the
agreement does not lie within any ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the NCIP with power over the
other agencies of the State as to determine whether to grant or deny any concession or license or agreement.
It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/IPs have been informed of the agreement and
that their consent thereto has been obtained. Note that the certification applies to agreements over natural
resources that do not necessarily lie within the ancestral domains. For those that are found within the said
domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.

V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE INDIGENOUS

INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.

The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism stretching back to prehistoric
times. The movement received a massive impetus during the 1960's from two sources. First, the
decolonization of Asia and Africa brought into the limelight the possibility of peoples controlling their own
destinies. Second, the right of self-determination was enshrined in the UN Declaration on Human
Rights.238 The rise of the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to the attention of North American
Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New Zealand the possibility of fighting for fundamental rights and
freedoms.

In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded, 239 and during the 1980's, indigenous
affairs were on the international agenda. The people of the Philippine Cordillera were the first Asians to take
part in the international indigenous movement. It was the Cordillera People's Alliance that carried out
successful campaigns against the building of the Chico River Dam in 1981-82 and they have since become
one of the best-organized indigenous bodies in the world.240

Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene. This came as a result of
the increased publicity focused on the continuing disrespect for indigenous human rights and the destruction of
the indigenous peoples' environment, together with the national governments' inability to deal with the
situation.241 Indigenous rights came as a result of both human rights and environmental protection, and have
become a part of today's priorities for the international agenda.242

International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies, programs and specific
rules concerning IPs in some nations. The World Bank, for example, first adopted a policy on IPs as a result of
the dismal experience of projects in Latin America. 243 The World Bank now seeks to apply its current policy on
IPs to some of its projects in Asia. This policy has provided an influential model for the projects of the Asian
Development Bank.244

The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and declares as a State policy
the promotion of their rights within the framework of national unity and development. 245 The IPRA amalgamates
the Philippine category of ICCs with the international category of IPs, 246 and is heavily influenced by both the
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.247

ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries"248 and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and many other international instruments on the prevention of discrimination. 249 ILO
Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and
Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries" (ILO No. 107) passed on June 26, 1957.
Developments in international law made it appropriate to adopt new international standards on indigenous
peoples "with a view to removing the assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards," and recognizing the
aspirations of these peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic
development."250

CONCLUSION

The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and religious differences.
These differences were carried over and magnified by the Philippine government through the imposition of a
national legal order that is mostly foreign in origin or derivation. 251 Largely unpopulist, the present legal system
has resulted in the alienation of a large sector of society, specifically, the indigenous peoples. The histories
and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the evolution of Philippine culture and are vital to the
understanding of contemporary problems.252 It is through the IPRA that an attempt was made by our legislators
to understand Filipino society not in terms of myths and biases but through common experiences in the course
of history. The Philippines became a democracy a centennial ago and the decolonization process still
continues. If the evolution of the Filipino people into a democratic society is to truly proceed democratically,
i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing democratization, 253 it is this
Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws in the country and affirm their co-
existence with the land laws in our national legal system.

With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997.
G.R. No. 134209             January 24, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 which affirmed an earlier
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69 in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1.

The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as follows:

This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, more
particularly described in the amended application filed by Celestina Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with the
Regional Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner
of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the
same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have
been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no
mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in
possession thereof.

On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to the application on the
ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the
muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a
bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicant’s claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of
Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general default as against the whole world, with the
exception of the Office of the Solicitor General, and proceeded with the hearing of this registration case.

After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . . applicant rested her case. The Solicitor General, thru
the Provincial Prosecutor, interposed no objection to the admission of the exhibits. Later . . . the Provincial
Prosecutor manifest (sic) that the Government had no evidence to adduce. 3

In a decision4 dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment for herein respondent Celestina Naguiat,
adjudicating unto her the parcels of land in question and decreeing the registration thereof in her name, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates the parcels of land situated in Panan, Botolan,
Zambales, appearing on Plan AP-03-003447 containing an area of 3,131 square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03-
003446 containing an area of 15,322 containing an area of 15,387 square meters to herein applicant Celestina T.
Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Rommel Naguiat and a resident of Angeles City, Pampanga
together with all the improvements existing thereon and orders and decrees registration in her name in accordance
with Act No. 496, Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should be 141] as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1529. This
adjudication, however, is subject to the various easements/reservations provided for under pertinent laws,
presidential decrees and/or presidential letters of instructions which should be annotated/ projected on the title to be
issued. And once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be immediately issued.
(Words in bracket added)

With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, petitioner Republic went on appeal to the
CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001. As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision of May 29,
1998, affirmed that of the trial court, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the Republic’s present recourse on its basic submission that the CA’s decision "is not in accordance with
law, jurisprudence and the evidence, since respondent has not established with the required evidence her title in fee
simple or imperfect title in respect of the subject lots which would warrant their registration under … (P.D. 1529 or
Public Land Act (C.A.) 141." In particular, petitioner Republic faults the appellate court on its finding respecting the
length of respondent’s occupation of the property subject of her application for registration and for not considering
the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to
alienable and disposable property.
Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of the Government so that
they may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private
appropriation.5 As to these assets, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. 6 Given this postulate, the
principal issue to be addressed turns on the question of whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have
the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act 7 and the Constitution8 classifying lands of the public domain into
"agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks," do not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded
land or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees and underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui 9-

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. xxx. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. xxx

Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, 10 which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State – the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. 11 All lands not appearing to be
clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the State. 12 Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the
inalienable public domain. 13 Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying
lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive
Branch of the government and not the court.14 Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence,
the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the
applicant.15

In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are already alienable and disposable. Wrote the
appellate court:

The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of the public domain cannot be sustained as it is
directly against the above doctrine. Said doctrine is a reaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier
cases . . . that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for period prescribed by law
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of
judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property …. (Word in bracket and
underscoring added.)

The principal reason for the appellate court’s disposition, finding a registerable title for respondent, is her and her
predecessor-in-interest’s open, continuous and exclusive occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years.
Prescinding from its above assumption and finding, the appellate court went on to conclude, citing Director of Lands
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) 16 and Herico vs. DAR,17 among other cases, that, upon the completion of the
requisite period of possession, the lands in question cease to be public land and become private property.

Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are not, however, winning cards for the respondent,
for the simple reason that, in said cases, the disposable and alienable nature of the land sought to be registered
was established, or, at least, not put in issue. And there lies the difference.

Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official
proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof. 18 Aside from tax receipts, respondent submitted in evidence
the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which, needless to state, provided no information respecting
the classification of the property. As the Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome
the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. 19

It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has been a notorious practice resorted
to in land registration cases.20 For this reason, the Court has made it a point to stress, when appropriate, that
declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable
lands need an express and positive act from the government. 21

The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessor-in-interest have been in
open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is now of little moment. For,
unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title. 22

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondent’s application for
original registration of title in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales,
Branch 69, is DENIED.

No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 107751 June 1, 1995

LETICIA P. LIGON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CELIA LIPANA-REYES, Presiding Judge, Branch 81, Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Iglesia ni Kristo and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the order of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 82, granting the motion of respondent of Iglesia ni Kristo to direct petitioner to
surrender the owner's duplicate of the certificates of title in her possession.

On 19 October 1990 respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint 1 for specific performance with damages against the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP)
docketed as Civil Case No. Q90-6937. Respondent INK alleged in its complaint that by virtue of an Absolute
Deed of Sale dated 20 April 1989 IDP sold to it two (2) parcels of land located at Tandang Sora, Barrio Culiat,
Quezon City, both of which IDP is the registered owner. The parties stipulated in the deed of sale that the IDP
shall undertake to evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the property within forty-five (45) days from the
execution of the contract.

IDP failed to fulfill this obligation. Hence INK prayed that the trial court order IDP to comply with its obligation of
clearing the subject lots of illegal occupants and to pay damages to INK.

IDP alleged in its answer that it was INK which violated the contract by delaying the payment of the purchase
price and prayed that the contract of sale be rescinded and revoked.

On 15 June 1991 INK filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the ground that there was actually no
genuine issue as to any material fact.

On 12 September 1991 the trial court rendered partial judgment, and on 7 October 1991 an amended partial
judgment granting the reliefs prayed for by INK except the prayer for damages which was to be resolved later.

On 22 January 1992 INK filed a motion in the same case praying that petitioner Leticia Ligon, who was in
possession of the certificates of title over the properties as mortgagee of IDP, be directed to surrender the
certificates to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in its
name. INK alleged that the document could not be registered because of the refusal and/or failure of petitioner
to deliver the certificates of title despite repeated requests.

On 31 January 1992 petitioner Ligon filed an opposition to the motion on the ground that the IDP was not
served copy of the motion, and the ownership of the INK over the property was still in issue since rescission
was sought by the IDP as a counterclaim. She prayed that the motion be denied, but should it be granted, the
Register of Deeds be directed after registration to deliver the owner's duplicate copies of the new certificates of
title to her.

On 15 February 1992 petitioner filed a Supplemental Opposition questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court
because the motion involved the registrability of the document of sale, and she was not made a party to the
main case.

On 2 March 1992 the trial court granted the motion of INK and ordered petitioner to surrender to INK the
owner's copy of RT-26521 (170567) and RT-26520 (176616) in open court for the registration of the Absolute
Deed of Sale in the latter's name and the annotation of the mortgage executed in favor of petitioner on the new
transfer certificates of title to be issued to INK.2

On 6 April 1992, on motion of petitioner Ligon, the trial court reconsidered its order by directing her to deliver
the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. 3

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking the annulment of the two (2) orders.
However, on 28 October 1992 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the orders of the trial
court.

Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the trial court erred: (a) in ruling that it had jurisdiction over petitioner;
(b) in upholding the orders of the trial court even as they violated the rule prohibiting splitting of a single cause
of action and forum-shopping; (c) in holding that INK is the owner of the property and entitled to registration of
its ownership; and, (d) in holding that INK has a superior right to the possession of the owner's copies of the
certificates of title.
Upon prior leave, the IDP intervened alleging that prior to the issuance by the trial court of the order of 2 March
1992, its legal Board of Trustees filed a motion for intervention informing said court that the sale of the
properties was not executed by it but was made possible by a fake Board of Trustees, hence, the sale is void.
The trial court denied the motion since jurisdiction over the incident properly belonged to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Conformably therewith, IDP brought the matter before the SEC which later
declared that the sale of the properties was void. Thus, IDP banks on this favorable decision in similarly
seeking the nullification of the questioned orders of the trial court.

Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds unless
the owner's duplicate certificate is presented together with such instrument, except in some cases or upon
order of the court for cause shown. In case the person in possession of the duplicate certificates refuses or
fails to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds so that a voluntary document may be registered and a
new certificate issued, Sec. 107, Chapter 10, of P.D. No. 1529 clearly states:

Sec. 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. — Where it is necessary to issue a new

certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the title of the registered
owner against his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason of
the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the party
in interest may file a petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds.
The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate
certificate to surrender the same and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon
such surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process
of the court, or if for any reason the outstanding owner's duplicate certificate cannot be
delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance of a new
certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new, certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a
memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate.

Before the enactment of P.D. No. 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, the former law,
Act No. 496 otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, and all jurisprudence interpreting the former law
had established that summary reliefs such as an action to compel the surrender of owner's duplicate certificate
of title to the Register of Deeds could only be filed with and granted by the Regional Trial Court sitting as a land
registration court if there was unanimity among the parties or there was no adverse claim or serious objection
on the part of any party in interest, otherwise, if the case became contentious and controversial it should be
threshed out in an ordinary action or in the case where the incident properly belonged.4

Under Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, it is now provided that "Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts)
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of titles to lands, including
improvements and interest therein and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to
hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions." The above provision has
eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited
jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding
multiplicity of suits the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial
courts the authority to act not only on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after
original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions.5

The principal action filed by INK in Civil Case No. Q-90-6937 before the trial court was for specific performance
with damages based on a document of sale. Such action was well within the exclusive jurisdictions of the
Regional Trial Court.6 When IDP, the defendant in the trial court, did not question the genuineness and validity
of said deed of sale and its obligations thereunder, the summary judgment issued by the court granting the
reliefs sought by INK was also an exercise of its general jurisdiction.

Hence, when INK filed a motion for the issuance of an order from the same court to compel the holder of the
duplicate certificates of title to surrender the same to the Register of Deeds for the registration of the deed of
sale subject of the principal action, the motion was a necessary incident to the main case. When the sale of the
property was upheld by the court in its judgment and the defendant was directed to comply with its terms and
conditions, the right of INK to have the same registered with the Register of Deeds could not be disregarded.
To assert and enjoy its right, INK should be allowed to seek the aid of the court to direct the surrender of the
certificates of title. Since Regional Trial Courts are courts of general jurisdiction, they may therefore take
cognizance of this case pursuant to such jurisdiction. 7 Even while Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529 speaks of a petition
which can be filed by one who wants to compel another to surrender the certificates of title to the Register of
Deeds, this does not preclude a party to a pending case to include as incident therein the relief stated under
Sec. 107, especially if the subject certificates of title to be surrendered are intimately connected with the
subject matter of the principal action.8 This principle is based on expediency and in accordance with the policy
against multiplicity of suits.
The records of the case show that the subsisting mortgage lien of petitioner appears in the certificates of title
Nos. 26520 and 26521. Hence, the order of the trial court directing the surrender of the certificates to the
Register of Deeds in order that the deed of sale in favor of INK can be registered, cannot in any way prejudice
her rights and interests as a mortgagee of the lots. Any lien annotated on the previous certificates of title which
subsists should be incorporated in or carried over to the new transfer certificates of title. This is true even in the
case of a real estate mortgage because pursuant to Art. 2126 of the Civil Code it directly and immediately
subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the
obligation for whose security it was constituted. It is inseparable from the property mortgaged as it is a right in
rem — a lien on the property whoever its owner may be. It subsists notwithstanding a change in ownership; in
short, the personality of the owner is disregarded. Thus, all subsequent purchasers must respect the mortgage
whether the transfer to them be with or without the consent of the mortgagee, for such mortgage until
discharged follows the property.9 It is clear therefore that the surrender by petitioner of the certificates of title to
the Register of Deeds as ordered by the trial court will not create any substantial injustice to her. To grant the
petition and compel INK to file a new action in order to obtain the same reliefs it asked in the motion before the
trial court is to encourage litigations where no substantial rights are prejudiced. This end should be avoided.
Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of
justice. The rules are intended to insure the orderly conduct of litigations because of the higher objective they
seek, which is, to protect the parties' substantive rights. 10

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 October 1992 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 103727 December 18, 1996

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y ESTEBAN, represented by its HEIR-
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR, ENGRACIO F. SAN PEDRO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division) AURELIO OCAMPO, DOMINADOR D. BUHAIN, TERESA C.
DELA CRUZ, respondents-appellees.

G.R. No. 106496 December 18, 1996

ENGRACIO SAN PEDRO, CANDIDO GENER, ROSA PANTALEON, VICENTE PANTALEON, ELEUTERIO
PANTALEON, TRINIDAD SAN PEDRO, RODRIGO SAN PEDRO, RICARDO NICOLAS, FELISA NICOLAS,
and LEONA SAN PEDRO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division) and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p

The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject of controversy in these two
consolidated cases. The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim
to the ownership of, against third persons and the Government itself, a total land area of approximately
173,000 hectares or "214,047 quiniones," 1 on the basis of a Spanish title, entitled "Titulo de Propriedad
Numero 4136" dated April 25, 1894. The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the
provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as Quezon City,
Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of Manila, thus affecting in general lands extending from
Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan Bay in the north and
Tayabas Bay in the south.2

Considering the vastness of the land claim, innumerable disputes cropped up and land swindles and rackets
proliferated resulting in tedious litigation in various trial courts, in the appellate court and in the Supreme
Court, 3 in connection therewith.

We have had the impression that our decisions in Director of Forestry, et al. v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183
[1968]; Antonio, et al. v. Barroga, et al., 23 SCRA 357 [1968]; Carabot, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 145
SCRA 368 [1986]; Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 186 SCRA 88 [1990]; Widows and Orphans
Association, Inc. (WIDORA) v. Court of Appeals, et al., 212 SCRA 360 [1992]; NAPOCOR v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 144 SCRA 318 [1986]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al., 135 SCRA 156 [1985]; and Director
of lands v. Tesalona, 236 SCRA 336 [1994] 4 terminated the controversy as to ownership of lands covered by
Spanish Land Titles, for it is the rule that, once this Court, as the highest Tribunal of the land, has spoken,
there the matter must rest:

It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must end, Hence,
after the procedures and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review
set by law have been exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter
is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement
with the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be
expected; but, it is not their will, but the Court's, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public policy
demands that at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositions
thereon accorded absolute finality. 5 [Cited cases omitted]

It is, therefore, to the best interest of the people and the Government that we render judgment herein
writing finis to these controversies by laying to rest the issue of validity of the basis of the estate's claim of
ownership over this vast expanse of real property.

The following facts are pertinent in the resolution of these long drawn-out cases:

G.R. NO. 103727

G.R No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a complaint 6 for recovery of possession and/or damages
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. This was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 104, Quezon City in its decision 7 dated July 7, 1989, the dispositive
portion 8 of which reads:
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the complaint against the defendants
Aurelio Ocampo, Dominador Buhain and Teresa dela Cruz and ordering plaintiff to pay each of
the herein defendants, the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as and for attorney's
fees, and to pay the costs of suit.

The said complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or reconveyance with damages and with a
prayer for preliminary injunction was filed on August 15, 1988 by Engracio San Pedro as heir-judicial
administrator of the "Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban" against Jose G. De Ocampo,
Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Rey Antonio Noguera, Teresa C. dela Cruz, Gaudencio R Soliven, Diomedes
Millan, Carmen Rayasco, Dominador D. Buhain, Mario D. Buhain, Jose D. Buhain, Arestedes S. Cauntay,
Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu (El Mavic Investment & Development Corporation), Capitol Hills Realty
Corporation and Jose F. Castro. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-447 in Branch 104,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

In the complaint, it was alleged, among others: (1) that Engracio San Pedro discovered that the aforenamed
defendants were able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles to portions of the subject
estate, particularly Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1386, 8982, 951975-951977, 313624, 279067, 1412,
353054, 372592, 149120, 86404, 17874-17875, all emanating from Original Certificate of Title No. 614 9 and
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 255544 and 264124, both derivatives of Original Certificate of Title No. 333;
(2) that the aforesaid defendants were able to acquire exclusive ownership and possession of certain portions
of the subject estate in their names through deceit, fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation; (3) that Original
Certificates of Title Nos. 614 and 333 had been cancelled by and through a final and executory decision dated
March 21, 1988 in relation to letter recommendations by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest Development
and the Office of the Solicitor General and also in relation to Central Bank Circulars dated April 7, 1971, April
23, 1971, September 12, 1972 and June 10, 1980; and (4) that the issue of the existence, validity and
genuineness of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 25, 1894 which covers the subject estate had been
resolved in favor of the petitioner estate in a decision dated April 25, 1978 by the defunct Court of First
Instance, Branch 1 of Baliwag, Bulacan pertaining to a case docketed as Special Proceeding No. 312-B. 10

Summons were served on only five of the aforementioned defendants, namely, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO,
Inc., Teresita G. dela Cruz, Dominador Buhain and Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu. 11

On February 7, 1989, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the complaint against Mareco, Inc. for improper
service of summons and against Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu for lack of cause of action considering
that the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 86404 is El Mavic Investment and
Development Co., Inc., not Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu. 12

Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.

On July 7, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint based on the following grounds:
(a) Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz are already the registered owners of the parcels of land covered by
Torrens titles which cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad No. 4136, covering the
subject estate; and (b) the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan entitled "In the Matter of the
Intestate Estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban" specifically stated in its dispositive portion that
all lands which have already been legally and validly titled under the Torrens System by private persons shall
be excluded from the coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136. 13

The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied, 14 and so, the petitioner estate interposed an appeal with
the Court of Appeals. On January 20, 1992, the appeal was dismissed 15 for being unmeritorious and the lower
court's decision was affirmed with costs against the petitioner estate. The appellate court ratiocinated:

(1) neither the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof was presented in the
proceeding below;

(2) the illegible copy of the Titulo presented in court was not registered under the Torrens
system hence, it cannot be used as evidence of land ownership;

(3) the CFI decision invoked by petitioner estate in its favor expressly excluded from the Titulo
titled lands of private individuals;

(4) the Titulo is inferior to that of the registered titles of Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz as
correctly ruled by the lower court;

(5) there is no evidence showing that OCT No. 614 from which titles of Ocampo, Buhain and
Dela Cruz originated was already cancelled, hence, the lower court did not err in not declaring
the same as null and
void. 16
Not having obtained a favorable judgment on appeal, the petitioner estate, on March 16, 1992, filed the present
petition 17 docketed as G.R. No. 103727.

G.R. NO. 106496

G.R. No. 106496, a petition for review on certiorari, began as a

petition 18 for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban which
eventually resulted to an Order 19 dated November 17, 1978 declaring inter alia, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
as null and void and of no legal force and effect.

The dispositive portion 20 of the said Order reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court so orders that:

1) The Decision dated April 25, 1978 is reconsidered and set aside.

2) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and of no legal force and effect and
that therefore no rights could be derived therefrom.

3) All orders approving the sales, conveyances, donations or any other transactions involving
the lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are declared invalidated, void and of no
force and effect.

4) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the inventory of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.

5) The heirs, agents, privies or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the late Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban are enjoined from representing or exercising any acts of possession or
ownership or from disposing in any manner portions of all the lands covered by Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 and to immediately vacate the same.

6) Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as co-administrators submit in Court within twenty
days their final accounting and inventory of all real and personal properties of the estate which
had come into their possession or knowledge under oath.

7) This case is hereby re-opened, to allow movants-intervenors to continue with the

presentation of their evidence in order to rest their case.

The consideration and approval of the administrator's final accounting and inventory of the
presentation of movants-intervenors' evidence as well as the consideration of all other incidents
are hereby set on December 22, 1978 at 8:30 a.m.

The aforementioned petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro
y Esteban was filed on December 29, 1971 with the defunct Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial
District, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan. The petition docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 312-B was initiated by Engracio
San Pedro and Justino Z. Benito who sought to be appointed as administrator and co-administrator,
respectively.

On February 29, 1972, after the jurisdictional facts were established, evidence for the petitioners was received
by the lower court without any opposition. 21

On March 2, 1972, then Presiding Judge Juan F. Echiverri issued an Order appointing Engracio San Pedro as
Administrator of the subject estate. 22

On March 11, 1972, the Court issued letters of administration in favor of Engracio San Pedro upon posting of a
bond in the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). 23

On February 7, 1974, Administrator Engracio San Pedro was ordered to furnish copies of the letters of
administration and other pertinent orders approving certain dispositions of the properties of the estate to the
following entities:

(a) The Commanding General

Philippine Constabulary
Camp Crame, Quezon City
 (b) The Solicitor General
Manila

(c) The Government Corporate Counsel

A. Mabini St., Manila

(d) The City Mayors of Quezon City & Caloocan

(e) The Governors of Rizal, Quezon and Bulacan

(f) The City Treasurers of Quezon City and Caloocan

(g) The Provincial Treasurers of Quezon, Bulacan and Rizal

(h) The PHHC, Diliman, Quezon City

(i) The PAHRRA Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City

(j) The Municipal Treasurers of the various municipalities in which properties of the estate are
located; and

(k) Office of Civil Relations, Camp Crame, Quezon City and Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City. 24

The above Order was issued so as to protect the general public from any confusion brought about by various
persons who had been misrepresenting themselves as having been legally authorized to act for the subject
estate and to sell its properties by virtue thereof.

On August 30, 1976, a Motion for Intervention and an Opposition to the Petition was filed by the Republic of
the Philippines alleging, inter alia:

4. That under Presidential Decree No. 892, dated February 16, 1976, Spanish titles like the
TITULO is absolutely inadmissible and ineffective as proof of ownership in court proceedings,
except where the holder thereof applies for land registration under Act 496, which is not true in
the proceedings at bar;

5. That no less than the Supreme Court had declared TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NO. 4136 as
invalid;

6. That, moreover, the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and/or his supposed heirs have
lost whatever rights of ownership they might have had to the so-called Estate on the ground of
inaction, laches and/or prescription;

7. That, accordingly, there is no estate or property to be administered for purposes of inventory,

settlement or distribution in accordance with law, and all the inventories so far submitted, insofar
as they embraced lands within the TITULO, are deemed ineffective and cannot be legally
considered; and

8. That the Republic of the Philippines has a legal interest in the land subject matter of the
petition considering that, except such portions thereof had been (sic) already the subject of valid
adjudication or disposition in accordance with law, the same belong in State ownership.25

On February 15, 1977, the Republic filed a Motion to Suspend

Proceedings. 26

On February 16, 1977, the Republic's Opposition to the Petition for Letters of Administration was dismissed by
means of the following Order issued by Judge Benigno Puno:

WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction to determine the legal issues raised, the Court hereby
DISMISSES the "Opposition" dated August 30, 1976, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General;
likewise, for lack of merit, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated February 15, 1977, filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General is DENIED.

The administrator Engracio San Pedro and the Co-administrator Justino Z. Benito are ordered
to furnish the office of the Solicitor General all copies of inventories already filed in Court within
ten (10) days from notice hereof. 27
On March 9, 1977, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the
Republic. 28

On April 25, 1978, the lower court then presided over by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, rendered a 52-page
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) Declaring the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of
the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, issued on April 29, 1984, in the name of the deceased Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, covering a total area of approximately 214,047 quiniones or
173,000 hectares, situated in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, Quezon City and
Caloocan City;

(b) Declaring Engracio San Pedro, Candido Gener, Santiago Gener, Rosa Pantaleon, Vicente
Pantaleon, Eleuterio Pantaleon, Trinidad San Pedro, Rodrigo San Pedro, Ricardo Nicolas, and
Teresa Nicolas, as the true and lawful heirs of the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban
and entitled to inherit the intestate estate left by the said deceased, consisting of the above-
mentioned tract of private land covered and described by said above-mentioned Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, excluding therefrom: (a) all lands
which have already been legally and validly titled under the Torrens System, by private persons,
or the Republic of the Philippines, or any of its instrumentalities or agencies; (b) all lands
declared by the government as reservations for public use and purposes; (c) all lands belonging
to the public domain; and, (d) all portions thereof which had been sold, quitclaimed and/or
previously excluded by the Administrator and duly approved by a final order of the Court, except
those which may hereafter be set aside, after due consideration on a case to case basis, of
various motions to set aside the said Court order which approved the said sales, quit-claims,
and/or exclusions;

(c) The designation of Atty. Justino Z. Benito as co- administrator, is hereby revoked to take
effect immediately, to obviate any confusion in the administration of the Estate, and to fix the
responsibilities of administration to the co-heir Administrator, Engracio San Pedro, whose
appointment as such is hereby confirmed. The said co-administrator Justino Z. Benito is hereby
ordered to render his final accounting of his co-administration of the Estate, within thirty (30)
days from receipt of copy hereof;

(d) The Co-Heir-Administrator, Engracio San Pedro is hereby ordered to amass, collate,
consolidate and take possession of all the net estate of the deceased Don Marino San Pedro y
Esteban, as well as all other sets and credits lawfully belonging to the estate and/or to take
appropriate legal action to recover the same in the proper Courts of Justice, government offices
or any appropriate forum; and to pay all taxes or charges due from the estate to the
Government, and all indebtedness of the estate, and thereafter, to submit a project of partition
of the estate among the lawful heirs as herein recognized and declared.

It is, however, strongly recommended to His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos that, to
avoid the concentration of too much land to a few persons and in line with the projected urban
land reform program of the government, corollary to the agricultural land reform program of the
New Society, the above intestate estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban should
be expropriated or purchased by negotiated sale by the government to be used in its human
settlements and low cost housing projects.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED. 29

On May 17, 1978, the Republic moved for a reconsideration of the above decision. 30

On June 5, 1978, administrator Engracio San Pedro filed a Manifestation and Petition for the Inhibition of the
then newly appointed Presiding Judge Oscar Fernandez. On July 12, 1978, after the Republic filed its Reply to
the Petition for Inhibition, Judge Fernandez denied the said petition. 31

After hearings were conducted on the Republic's Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Fernandez issued the
aforestated Order 32 dated November 17, 1978 which, in essence, set aside Judge Bagasao's decision dated
April 25, 1978 by declaring Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect,
thus, excluding all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 from the inventory of the estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
The petitioners-heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban appealed to the Court of Appeals and alleged
that the lower court did not act with impartiality when it granted the Republic's motion for reconsideration which
was merely pro forma, thereby overturning a prior declaration by the same court of the existence, genuineness
and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro. 33

On March 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the petitioners-heirs.34 In affirming the
assailed Order dated November 17, 1978, the appellate court focused its discussion solely on the issue of
whether or not the lower court erred in declaring Titulo de Priopriedad No. 4136 null and void. The appellate
court ruled that the petitioners-heirs failed to controvert the Republic's claim that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
is invalid on the following bases; (a) non-production of the original of the subject title; (b) inadmissibility of the
photostat copies of the said title; and (c) non-registration of the subject Spanish title under Act No. 496 (Land
Registration Act) as required by Presidential Decree No. 892 (Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System
of Registration and of the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings).

The petitioners-heirs moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision by invoking certain cases
wherein the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 had been allegedly recognized. The Court of Appeals
refused to be swayed and denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 35

Hence, the herein petition, 36 docketed as G. R. No. 106496, was filed on September 18, 1992.

After the parties filed their respective pleadings in G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496, this Court resolved to
consolidate both cases on September 15,
1994. 3 7

While these cases were pending before us, several parties filed separate motions for intervention which we
denied on different occasions for lack of merit.

In G.R No. 103727, the grounds relied upon for the grant of the petition are as follows:

I. That petitioner-appellant as plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-88-447, RTC, Branch 104 was denied
due process of law due to gross negligence of lawyer, which respondent court grossly failed to
take cognizance of.

II. That the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction in not remanding the case for trial and in affirming the lower court's null and void
judgment.38

In G.R No. 106496, the petitioners-heirs present the following assignment of errors, to wit:

First. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed order which resolved a question of
title or ownership over which the lower court as an intestate court has no jurisdiction and over
the vigorous and repeated objections of the petitioners. 39

Second. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the order of Judge Fernandez setting
aside the order and decision of Judge Puno and Bagasao; Judge Fernandez thereby acted as
an appellate court reviewing, revising, amending or setting aside the order and decision of
Judges of equal rank. 40

Third. Respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to uphold the order of Judge Fernandez
who without jurisdiction, set aside the order of Judge Puno and the decision of Judge Bagasao,
both of which were already final. 41

Fourth. Respondent Court of Appeals was unmindful of the fact that Judge Fernandez was
appointed by President Marcos to reverse Judge Bagasao, regardless of the evidence, thereby
unmindful that petitioners were denied the cold neutrality of an impartial tribunal.42

Fifth. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the evidence presented before
Judges Echiverri, Puno and Bagasao and merely adopted the order of Judge Fernandez who
never received a single piece of evidence, notwithstanding the 1906 Guide title over Hacienda
Angono in Binangonan, Rizal, the boundary owner stated therein being Don Mariano San Pedro
y Esteban, and the November 1991 en banc decision of the Supreme Court upholding the
Guido title. 43

Of paramount importance over and above the central issue of the probative value of the petitioners' Spanish
title in these cases is the propriety of the lower court's resolution of the question of ownership of the subject
San Pedro estate in the special proceedings case. Thus, before we address ourselves to the issue of whether
or not petitioners' Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is null and void and of no legal force and effect, it is best that
we first determine whether or not the lower court, acting as a probate court, in the petition for letters of
administration, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in settling the issue of
ownership of the San Pedro estate covered by Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.

Petitioners-heirs, in G.R No. 106496, on the one hand, contend that the lower court, then CFI, Bulacan, Branch
IV, had no jurisdiction as an "intestate court" 44 to resolve the question of title or ownership raised by the public
respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General in the intestate proceedings
of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. 45

The public respondent, on the other hand, invoking its sovereign capacity as parens patriae, argues that
petitioners' contention is misplaced considering that when the Republic questioned the existence of the estate
of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the lower court became duty-bound to rule on the genuineness and validity
of Titulo de Propriedad 4136 which purportedly covers the said estate, otherwise, the lower court in the
intestate proceedings would be mistakenly dealing with properties that are proven to be part of the State's
patrimony or improperly included as belonging to the estate of the deceased. 46

A probate court's jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what shares are due
them as regards the estate of a deceased person. Neither is it confined to the issue of the validity of wills. We
held in the case of Maniñgat v. Castillo, 4 7 that "the main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate
the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the process of administration." Thus, its function
necessarily includes the examination of the properties, rights and credits of the deceased so as to rule on
whether or not the inventory of the estate properly included them for purposes of distribution of the net assets
of the estate of the deceased to the lawful heirs.

In the case of Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, 48 we stated, thus:

. . . questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to estate of the deceased maybe
passed upon in the Probate Court, with the consent of all the parties, without prejudice to third
persons . . .

Parenthetically, questions of title pertaining to the determination prima facie of whether certain properties
ought to be included or excluded from the inventory and accounting of the estate subject of a petition for letters
of administration, as in the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, maybe
resolved by the probate court. In this light, we echo our pronouncement in the case of Garcia v. Garcia  49 that:

. . . The court which acquired jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the
filing of the corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties,
and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the
administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law
requires the administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance with this duty, the court has
also inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be
included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the properties
of a deceased person duly call the court's attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or
credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the court's duty to hear the observations,
with power to determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if the properties
referred to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and
ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said properties. 50 [Emphasis Supplied]

In view of these disquisitions of this Court, we hold that the lower court did not commit any reversible error
when it issued the Order dated November 17, 1978 which set aside Judge Bagasao's decision dated April 25,
1978 and declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void, consequently excluding all lands covered
by the said title from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.

A corollary issue sought to be ventilated by the petitioners-heirs as regards the assailed Order of November
17, 1978 is the impropriety of Judge Fernandez' act of granting the motion for reconsideration filed by the
public respondent Republic since, Judge Fernandez did not personally hear the intestate case. Petitioners thus
dubbed him as a "reviewing judge." By setting aside the Decision dated April 25, 1978 of his predecessors in
CFI, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan, namely, Judge Benigno Puno and Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, respectively,
Judge Fernandez, acting as a "reviewing judge," proceeded without authority and/or jurisdiction.51

There is no question that, barring any serious doubts as to whether the decision arrived at is fair and just, a
newly appointed judge who did not try the case can decide the same as long as the record and the evidence
are all available to him and that the same were taken into consideration and thoroughly studied. The "reviewing
judge" argument of the petitioners-heirs has no leg to stand on considering that "the fact that the judge who
penned the decision did not hear a certain case in its entirety is not a compelling reason to jettison his findings
and conclusion inasmuch as the full record was available to him for his perusal." 52 In the case at bar, it is
evident that the 41-page Order dated November 17, 1978 of Judge Fernandez bespeaks of a knowledgeable
and analytical discussion of the rationale for reconsidering and setting aside Judge Bagasao's Decision dated
April 25, 1978.

Considering the definiteness of our holding in regard to the correctness of Judge Fernandez' disposition of the
case, i.e., the issuance by the lower court of the assailed Order of November 17, 1978, we now focus on the
core issue of whether or not the lower court in G.R No. 106496 committed reversible error in excluding from
the inventory of the estate of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban all lands covered by Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 primarily on the ground that the said title is null and void and of no legal force and effect.
Juxtaposed with this is the issue of whether or not the appellate court, in both cases, G.R. Nos. 103727 and
106496, erred in not recognizing Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as evidence to prove ownership by the Late
Mariano San Pedro of the lands covered thereby.

It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on February 16, 1976, the system of
registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should
cause their lands covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act 53 within six (6) months
from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until August 16, 1976. 54 Otherwise, non-compliance therewith
will result in a re-classification of their lands. 55 Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable
evidence of land ownership. 56

Section 1 of the said Decree provides:

Sec. 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is discontinued, and all
lands recorded under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered
as unregistered lands.

All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No.
496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of
this decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any
registration proceedings under the Torrens system.

Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law
may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act.
3344.

The Whereas clauses of the aforesaid Decree specify the underlying policies for its passage, to wit:

WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other forms of conveyances of large tracts of public
and private lands to unsuspecting and unwary buyers appear to have been perpetrated by
unscrupulous persons claiming ownership under Spanish titles or grants of dubious origin;

WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have often resulted in conflicting claims and litigations
between legitimate title holders, bona fide occupants or applicants of public lands, on the one
hand, and the holders of, or person claiming rights under the said Spanish titles or grants, on
the other, thus creating confusion and instability in property ownership and threatening the
peace and order renditions in the areas affected;

WHEREAS, statistics in the Land Registration Commission show that recording in the system of
registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is practically nil and that this system has become
obsolete;

WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the operation of the
Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership unless
accompanied by proof of actual possession;

WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to discontinue the System of registration under the
Spanish Mortgage Law and the use of Spanish titles as evidence in registration proceedings
under the Torrens system;

In the case of Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, et al., 57 we took cognizance of this Decree and
thus held that caution and care must be exercised in the acceptance and admission of Spanish titles taking into
account the numerous fake titles that have been discovered after their supposed reconstitution subsequent to
World War II.

In both cases, petitioners-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad 4136 was brought
under the operation of P.D. 892 despite their allegation that they did so on August 13, 1976. 58 Time and again
we have held that a mere allegation is not evidence and the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving
it. 59 Proof of compliance with P.D. 892 should be the Certificate of Title covering the land registered.

In the petition for letters of administration, it was a glaring error on the part of Judge Bagasao who rendered
the reconsidered Decision dated April 25, 1978 to have declared the existence, genuineness and authenticity
of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban despite the
effectivity of P.D. No. 892. Judge Fernandez, in setting aside Judge Bagasao's decision, emphasized that
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under P.D. 892, is inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of private
ownership in the special proceedings case. He made the following observations as regards the Titulo, to wit:

The Solicitor General, articulating on the dire consequences of recognizing the

nebulous titulo as an evidence of ownership underscored the fact that during the pendency of
this case, smart speculators and wise alecks had inveigled innocent parties into buying portions
of the so-called estate with considerations running into millions of pesos.

Some, under the guise of being benign heroes even feigned donations to charitable and
religious organizations, including veterans' organizations as smoke screen to the gargantuan
fraud they have committed and to hood wink further other gullible and unsuspecting victims. 60

In the same light, it does not escape this Court's onomatopoeic observation that the then heir-judicial
administrator Engracio San Pedro who filed the complaint for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with
damages in G.R No. 103727 on August 15, 1988 invoked Judge Bagasao's Decision of April 25, 1978 in
support of the Titulo's validity notwithstanding the fact that, by then, the said Decision had already been set
aside by Judge Fernandez' Order of November 17, 1978. We are in accord with the appellate courts' holding in
G.R No. 103727 insofar as it concludes that since the Titulo was not registered under Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered titles of the private respondents
Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.

This Court can only surmise that the reason for the non-registration of the Titulo under the Torrens system is
the lack of the necessary documents to be presented in order to comply with the provisions of P.D. 892. We do
not discount the possibility that the Spanish title in question is not genuine, especially since its genuineness
and due execution have not been proven. In both cases, the petitioners heirs were not able to present the
original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof. In the special proceedings case, the
petitioners-heirs failed to produce the Titulo despite a subpoena duces tecum (Exh. "Q-RP") to produce it as
requested by the Republic from the then administrators of the subject intestate estate, Engracio San Pedro and
Justino Benito, and the other interested parties. As an alternative to prove their claim of the subject intestate
estate, the petitioners referred to a document known as "hypoteca" (the Spanish term is 'hipoteca') allegedly
appended to the Titulo. However, the said hypoteca was neither properly identified nor presented as evidence.
Likewise, in the action for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages, the petitioners-heirs did
not submit the Titulo as part of their evidence. Instead, only an alleged illegible copy of the Titulo was
presented. (Exhs. "C-9" to "C-19").

The Best Evidence Rule as provided under Rule 130, section 2 of the Rules of Court is stated in unequivocal
terms. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule read:

Sec. 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. — There can be no evidence of a writing

the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the
following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;

(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

xxx xxx xxx

Sections 3 and 4 of the same Rule further read:

Sec 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed — When the original writing has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or
destruction or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents
in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses.

Sec. 5. Secondary evidence when original is in adverse party's custody. — If the writing be in
the custody of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such
notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the writing, the contents
 thereof may be proved as in the case of its loss. But the notice to produce it is not necessary
where the writing is itself a notice, or where it has been wrongfully obtained or withheld by the
adverse party.

Thus, the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in its nature, such as
photocopies, as long as the original evidence can be had. In the absence of a clear showing that the
original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, the photocopy submitted, in
lieu thereof, must be disregarded, being unworthy of any probative value and being an inadmissible
piece of evidence. 61

Hence, we conclude that petitioners-heirs failed to establish by competent proof the existence and due
execution of the Titulo. Their explanation as to why the original copy of the Titulo could not be produced was
not satisfactory. The alleged contents thereof which should have resolved the issue as to the exact extent of
the subject intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro were not distinctly proved. In the case of Ong Ching
Po v. Court of Appeals, 62 we pointed out that:

Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed.
But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the
former existence of the document. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence; execution;
loss; contents. This order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. 63

In upholding the genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, Judge Bagasao, in his
decision, relied on: (1) the testimony of the NBI expert, Mr. Segundo Tabayoyong, pertaining to a report dated
January 28, 1963 denominated as "Questioned Documents Report No. 230-163"; (2) a photostat copy of the
original of the Titulo duly certified by the then Clerk of Court of the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila;
and (3) the hipoteca Registered in the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on December 4, 1894.

Judge Fernandez, in his November 1978 Order which set aside Judge Bagasao's April 1978 decision correctly
clarified that the NBI report aforementioned was limited to the genuineness of the two signatures of Alejandro
Garcia and Mariano Lopez Delgado appearing on the last page of the Titulo, not the Titulo itself. When asked
by the counsel of the petitioners-heirs to admit the existence and due execution of the Titulo, the handling
Solicitor testified:

x x x           x x x          x x x

ATTY. BRINGAS:

With the testimony of this witness, I would like to call the distinguished counsel
for the government whether he admits that there is actually a titulo propiedad
4136.

COURT:

Would you comment on that Solicitor Agcaoili?

ATTY. AGCAOILI:

We are precisely impugning the titulo and I think the question of counsel is
already answered by witness. The parties have not yet established the due
existence of the titulo.

ATTY. BRINGAS:

We are constrained to ask this matter in order to be candid about the question.
The witness is a witness for the government, so with the testimony of this witness
for the government to the effect that there is actually in existence titulo propiedad
4136; we are asking the question candidly to the government counsel whether he
is prepared to state that there is really in existence such titulo propiedad 4136.

ATTY. AGCAOILI:

We are now stating before this court that there was such a document examined
by the NBI insofar as the signatures of Alejandro Garcia and Manuel Lopez
Delgado are concerned and they are found to be authentic. 64
The following significant findings of Judge Fernandez further lend credence to our pronouncement that the
Titulo is of dubious validity:

. . . the NBI in its Questioned Document Report No. 448-977 dated September 2, 1977 (Exhibit
"O-RP") concluded that the document contained material alterations as follows:

a) On line 15 of "p, 1, Title" and on line 5 of "p. 2, Title," the word "Pinagcamaligan" was written
after "Pulo;"

b) On line 16, "p. 1, Title," "un" was converted to "mil;"

c) On Line 18, "p. 1, Title," "mil" was written at the end of "tres" in "tres mil;"

d) On line 19 of "p. 1, Title," a semblance of "mil" was written after "setentay tres;"

e) On line 6, "p. 2, Title," "un" was formed to a semblance of "uni;" and

f) On line 8, "p. 2, Title," "un" was formed to "mil."

The plain and evident purpose was definitely to enlarge the area of the titulo. According to Mr.
Tabayoyong of the NBI, there are still "pieces of black ashes around the rings of the portions
which are indications of burnings". The burnings were made on the very portions where there
were previous erasures, alterations and intercalations. Understandably, the burnings were done
to erase traces of the criminal act. 65

In the case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et a1. 66 Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, in
reinstating the trial court's judgment therein, sustained the finding that:

. . . The photostatic copy (in lieu of the lost original) of the Spanish title in the name of Mariano
San Pedro shows obvious alterations and intercalations in an attempt to vastly increase the
area and change the location of the land described in the original title . . .

Anent the inadmissibility as evidence of the photostat copy of the Titulo, we sustain the lower court's analysis,
as affirmed by the appellate court, viz:

To begin with, the original of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136 was never presented in Court. Upon
request of the Government, a subpoena duces tecum (Exhibit "Q-RP") was issued to the two
administrators, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as well as to other interested parties to
produce the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. But no one produced the titulo. What the
parties did was to pass the buck to one another.

Without any plausible explanation at all on as to why the original could not be produced, the
Court cannot take cognizance of any secondary evidence.

It was explained that the titulo after changing hands, finally fell into the hands of a certain Moon
Park of Korea but who later disappeared and that his present whereabouts could not be known.

Strangely enough, despite the significance of the titulo, no serious efforts on the part of the
claimants-heirs were exerted to retrieve this document of vital importance despite the Court
order to produce it in order to determine its authenticity.

It would not be enough to simply say that Moon Park's whereabouts are unknown or that there
are not enough funds to locate him. The only logical conclusion would be that the original would
be adverse if
produced. 67

As regards the hipoteca which allegedly defines the metes and bounds of the subject intestate estate, the
petitioners-heirs have not established the conditions required by law for their admissibility as secondary
evidence to prove that there exists a document designated as Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. Hence, the same
acquires no probative value. 68

At this juncture, our decision dated June 28, 1968 in Director of Forestry, et al. v. Hon. Emmanuel
M. Muñoz, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, et al.  69 is enlightening. In said case,
private respondent, Pinaycamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc., (PIADECO), claimed to be the
owner of some 72,000 hectares of land located in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del
Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. To prove its ownership Piadeco
relied on Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 28, 1894. Scholarly opining that the Titulo is of doubtful
validity, 70 Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, speaking for the Court, stated that:

But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing intertwine of two undisputed facts. First.
The Title embraces land "located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, and Quezon
City." Second. The title was signed only by the provincial officials of Bulacan, and inscribed only
in the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The situation, indeed, cries desperately for a plausible
answer.

To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that private ownership of land
must be proved not only through the genuineness of title but also with a clear identity of the land
claimed. (Oligan v. Mejia, 17 Phil. 494, 496; Villa Abrille v. Banuelos, 20 Phil. 1, 8, citing Sison
v. Ramos, 13 Phil. 54 and Belen v. Belen, 13 Phil. 202; Licad v. Bacani, 51 Phil. 51, 54-56;
Lasam v. Director, 65 Phil. 367, 371. This Court ruled in a case involving a Spanish title
acquired by purchase that the land must be concretely measured per hectare or per quinon, not
in mass (cuerpos ciertos), (Valdez v. Director, 62 Phil. 362, 373, 375). The fact that the Royal
Decree of August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a basis for classifying lands strongly suggests
that the land applied for must be measured per hectare.

Here, no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title. In Piadeco's "Rejoinder to
Opposition" dated April 28, 1964 filed in Civil Case 3035-M, it specified that area covered by
its Titulo de Propiedad as 74,000 hectares (Rollo in L-24796, p. 36). In its "Opposition" of May
13, 1964 in the same case, it described the land as containing 72,000 hectares (Id., p. 48).
Which is which? This but accentuates the nebulous identity of Piadeco's land, Piadeco's
ownership thereof then equally suffers from vagueness, fatal at least in these proceedings.

Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original owner appearing on the
title, acquired his rights over the property by prescription under Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal
Decree of June 25, 1880, (Rollo of L-24796, p. 184) the basic decree that authorized
adjustment of lands. By this decree, applications for adjustment — showing the location,
boundaries and area of land applied for — were to be filed with the Direccion General de
Administration Civil, which then ordered the classification and survey of the land with the
assistance of the interested party or his legal representative (Ponce, op. cit., p. 22).

The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing applications for adjustment at
one year from the date of publication of the decree in the Gaceta de Manila on September 10,
1880, extended for another year by the Royal Order of July 15, 1881 (Ibid.). If Don Mariano
sought adjustment within the time prescribed, as he should have, then, seriously to be
considered here are the Royal Orders of November 25, 1880 and of October 26, 1881, which
limited adjustment to 1,000 hectares of arids lands, 500 hectares of land with trees and 100
hectares of irrigable lands (See: Government v. Avila, 46 Phil. 146, 154; Bayot v. Director of
Lands, 98 Phil. 935, 941. Article 15 of the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889 limited the area
that may be acquired by purchase to 2,500 hectares, with allowable error up to 5%. Ponce, op
cit., p. 19). And, at the risk of repetition, it should be stated again that Piadeco's Titulo is held
out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000 hectares of land.

But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of February 13, 1894),
published in the Gaceta de Manila on April 17, 1894 (Ibid., p. 26; Venture, op. cit., p. 28). That
decree required a second petition for adjustment within six months from publication, for those
who had not yet secured their titles at the time of the publication of the law (Ibid.). Said law also
abolished the provincial boards for the adjustment of lands established by Royal Decree of
December 26, 1884, and confirmed by Royal Decree of August 31, 1888, which boards were
directed to deliver to their successors, the provincial boards established by Decree on Municipal
Organization issued on May 19, 1893, all records and documents which they may hold in their
possession (Ramirez v. Director of Land, supra, at p. 124).

Doubt on Piadeco's title here supervenes when we come to consider that title was either dated
April 29 or April 25, 1894, twelve or eight days after the publication of the Maura Law.

Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at how Piadeco exactly acquired its rights
under the Titulo. The original owner appearing thereon was Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
From Piadeco's explanation — not its evidence (Rollo of L-24796, pp. 179-188) we cull the
following: On December 3, 1894, Don Mariano mortgaged the land under pacto de retro,
redeemable within 10 years, for P8,000.00 to one Don Ignacio Conrado. This transaction was
said to have been registered or inscribed on December 4, 1894. Don Mariano Ignacio died, his
daughter, Maria Socorro Conrado, his only heir, adjudicated the land to herself. At about the
same time, Piadeco was organized. Its certificate of registration was issued by the Securities
 and Exchange Commission on June 27, 1932. Later, Maria Socorro, heir of Don Ignacio,
became a shareholder of Piadeco when she conveyed the land to Piadeco's treasurer and an
incorporator, Trinidad B. Estrada, in consideration of a certain amount of Piadeco shares.
Thereafter, Trinidad B. Estrada assigned the land to Piadeco. Then came to the scene a certain
Fabian Castillo, appearing as sole heir of Don Mariano, the original owner of the land. Castillo
also executed an affidavit of adjudication to himself over the same land, and then sold the same
to Piadeco. Consideration therefor was paid partially by Piadeco, pending the registration of the
land under Act 496.

The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of the consideration to Fabian Castillo
made to depend on the registration of the land under the Torrens system, if Piadeco was sure of
the validity of Titulo de Propiedad 4136? This, and other factors herein pointed out, cast great
clouds of doubt that hang most conspicuously over Piadeco's title.

Moreover, in the case of Widows & Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 71 we categorically

enunciated that the alleged Spanish title, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, had become bereft of any probative
value as evidence of land ownership by virtue of P.D. 892 as contained in our Resolution dated February 6,
1985 in a related case entitled Benito and WIDORA v. Ortigas docketed as G.R No. 69343. On March 29,
1985, an entry of final judgment was made respecting G.R. No. 69343.

Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the prior declarations by this Court relating to the issue of
the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 preclude us from adjudicating otherwise. In the Muñoz case, we
had cast doubt on the Titulo's validity. In the WIDORA case, the Titulo's nullification was definitive. In both
cases, the Republic and the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban were on opposite ends before this bench.
In the case en banc of Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 72 the Court explained the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment, viz:

. . . conclusiveness of judgment — states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former
suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in
privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such
parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either
the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper
authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a
particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that
the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former
judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if
that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of
Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required by merely identity of
issues.

The issue, whether Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is valid or not, must now be laid to rest. The Titulo
cannot be relied upon by the petitioners-heirs or their privies as evidence of ownership. In the petition
for letters of administration the inventory submitted before the probate court consisted solely of lands
covered by the Titulo. Hence, there can be no "net estate" to speak of after the Titulo's exclusion from
the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro.

In G.R No. 103727, the Titulo cannot be superior to the Torrens Titles of private respondents Buhain, Ocampo
and Dela Cruz, namely TCT No. 372592 (Exh. "2", Buhain), TCT No. 8982 (Exh. "2" — De Ocampo) and TCT
No. 269707 (Exh. "2" — Dela Cruz). 73 Under the Torrens system of registration, the titles of private
respondents became indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final decree. 74 More importantly, TCT
Nos. 372592, 8982, 269707, having been issued under the Torrens system, enjoy the conclusive presumption
of validity. 75 As a last hurrah to champion their claim to the vast estate covered by the subject Spanish title, the
petitioners-heirs imputed fraud and bad faith which they failed to prove on the part of the private respondents
as regards their Torrens titles and accused their own counsel of gross negligence for having failed to call the
proper witnesses from the Bureau of Forestry to substantiate the petitioners-heirs' claim that OCT No. 614
from which private respondents were derived is null and void. It is an elementary legal principle that the
negligence of counsel binds the client. 76 The records show that the petitioners-heirs were not at all prejudiced
by the non-presentation of evidence to prove that OCT No. 614 is a nullity considering that their ownership
itself of the lands being claimed was not duly proved. In the case of Villa Rhecar Bus v. Dela Cruz, et al., 77 we
held:

It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his responsibilities to his client. This
negligence ultimately resulted in a judgment adverse to the client. Be that as it may, such
mistake binds the client, the herein petitioner. As a general rule, a client is bound by the
mistakes of his counsel. (Que v. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 13 [1980] Only when the
 application of the general rule would result in serious injustice should an exception thereto be
called for. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue prejudice against the
petitioner has been satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is only an unsupported claim that
the petitioner bad been prejudiced by the negligence of its counsel, without an explanation to
that effect.

Sans preponderance of evidence in support of the contention that the petitioners-heirs were denied due
process on account of the negligence of their counsel, the writ of certiorari is unavailing.

It bears repeating that the heirs or successors-in-interest of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are not without
recourse. Presidential Decree No. 892, quoted hereinabove, grants all holders of Spanish Titles the right to
apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six
(6) months from the effectivity of the Decree. Thereafter, however, any Spanish Title, if utilized as evidence of
possession, cannot be used as evidence of ownership in any land registration proceedings under the Torrens
system.

All instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under
Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act 3344.

In view hereof, this is as good a time as any, to remind the Solicitor General to be more vigilant in handling
land registration cases and intestate proceedings involving portions of the subject estate. It is not too late in the
day for the Office of the Solicitor General to contest the Torrens titles of those who have acquired ownership of
such portions of land that rightfully belong to the State.

In fine, the release of the matured Land Bank Capital Bonds issued in favor of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban
on August 13, 1968 sought by one Catalino San Pedro, alleged heir, legal holder and owner of Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 is a matter not ripe for adjudication in these cases. Firstly, Catalino San Pedro is not a
party in any of the two cases before us for review, hence, this Court in a Resolution dated May 10,
1993, 78 denied Catalino's motion for leave to reopen and/or new trial. And, secondly, the aforementioned
bonds were not included in the inventory of the subject estate submitted by then administrators, Engracio San
Pedro and Justino Benito before the probate court.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petitions in G.R Nos. 103727 and 106496 are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Consequently, in G.R No. 103727, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 20, 1992 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

In G.R No. 106496, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and, therefore, no rights could be
derived therefrom;

(2) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the inventory of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban;

(3) The petition for letters of administration, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 312-B, should
be, as it is, hereby closed and terminated.

(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are hereby disallowed to exercise any act of possession or
ownership or to otherwise, dispose of in any manner the whole or any portion of the estate
covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136; and they are hereby ordered to immediately vacate
the same, if they or any of them are in possession thereof.

This judgment is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.