STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION
“If there are ten lawyers in a room
discussing one and the same law, you can
expect eleven different constructions and
interpretations.”
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, DEFINED

•Statutory construction is the act or process of

discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of
the authors of the law with respect to its application to a
given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful,
among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is
not explicitly provided in the law.
•One who interprets makes use of intrinsic aids or those
found in the statute itself, while one who constructs
makes use of extrinsic aids or those found outside of the
written language of the law.
•When the words and phrases of a statute are not
obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of
the legislature should be determined from the language
employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words,
there is no room or construction.

•In other words, when the language of the law is plain, it

is not necessary, and it is not permissible, to resort to
extrinsic aids.
When the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left
with no alternative but to apply the same according to its
clear language.
 THE MOST BASIC RULES TO REMEMBER

APPLY THE LAW INTERPRET THE LAW CONSTRUCT THE LAW

When the law speaks in clear and
categorical language
When there is ambiguity in the
language of the statute, ascertain
legislative intent by making use of
intrinsic aids, or those found in the
law itself.
When the intent of the legislature
cannot be ascertained by merely
making use of intrinsic aids, the
court should resort to extrinsic
aids, or those found outside the
language of the law
 THREE (3) CARDINAL RULES WHEN THE WORDINGS OF THE
CONSTITUTION ARE SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION
FIRST: VERBA LEGIS

•Whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed.

SECOND: RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA

•In case of ambiguity, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the
intent of its framers.

THIRD: UT MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT

•The Constitution should be interpreted as a whole, but if the plain meaning of the word is not found
to be clear, resort to other aids is available.
AIDS IN INTERPRETATION
AND CONSTRUCTION
AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
INTRINSIC AIDS
• Elements found in the law itself

EXTRINSIC AIDS
• Facts or matters not found in the law

PRESUMPTIONS
• Based on logic or established provisions of law
 INTRINSIC AIDS

1. TITLE
That which expresses the subject matter of the law.

 Example:

“ANACT PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE LAW ON FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION

AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF” (Republic Act No. 10591)

“AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING
FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (Republic Act No. 9262)
 INTRINSIC AIDS
2. PREAMBLE
That which states the reasons or the objectives of the law.

 People vs. HON. A. PURISIMA, et al.

G.R. Nos. L-420050-66, November 20, 1978

In this case, the Supreme Court Ruled that the intent and spirit of Presidential
Decree No. 9 can be found in the preamble or “whereas” clauses, which enumerate
the facts, or events that justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions
stated therein.
 FACTS OF THE CASE:
• An Information for violation of PD No. 9 was ordered quashed by Judge Purisima because
said information failed to allege an essential element of the offense: That the carrying
outside of the accused’s residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or
on the occasion of, connected with, or related to subversion, insurrection, rebellion,
organized lawlessness or public disorder.

•On appeal, the Solicitor General raised the argument that the prohibited acts need not be
related to subversion activities and that the preamble of the statute or that expressed in the
“whereas” clauses is not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or
cure inherent defects in the statute. It was also argued that the explanatory note merely
explains the reasons for issuing the decree and this cannot prevail over the text itself.
 P.D. No. 9
“It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such
as "fanknife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except
where such articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a
livelihood and while being sued in connection therewith; and any person found guilty
thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a
Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.”
 THE RULING:
•The Court disagrees with the contention of the Solicitor General.

•Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of PD No. 9,
it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be
found among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses which enumerate the facts
or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanction stated
therein.
 P.D. No. 9
• WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, the
Philippines has been placed under a state of martial law;
• WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No. 6 dated
September 22, 1972 and General Order No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have
been promulgated by me;
• WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminally,
chaos and public disorder mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081
are committed and abetted by the use of firearms, explosives and other deadly
weapons;
• NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the
aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby
order and decree that:
 INTRINSIC AIDS

3. WORDS, PHRASES AND SENTENCES, CONTEXT

The intention of the legislature must primarily be determined from the language
of the statute and such language consists of the words, phrases and sentences
used therein.

The meaning of the law should, however, be taken from the general consideration
of the act as a whole and not from any single part, portion or section or from
isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences used.
 CASE
G.R. No. 120363, September 5, 1997

CECILLEVILLE REALTY AND SERVICE CORPORATION

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND HERMINIGILDO PASCUAL
 FACTS OF THE CASE:
•In 1976, Sotero Pascual became a tenant of Jose A. Resurreccion, the president of
petitioner Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation, in the latter’s land at Catmon,
Sta. Maria, Bulacan. When Sotero died, his wife Ana Pascual succeeded him in tenancy
by operation of law. As such tenant she had a home lot and a house on the
landholding. She was assisted in the cultivation of the land by her son, private
respondent Hermigildo Pascual, who also occupies a portion of the landholding distinct
from that occupied by his mother.

•Petitioner Cecilleville sought to eject Hermigildo from the portion occupied by his
house but the latter, insisting that he is entitled to occupancy since he is helping his
mother in the cultivation of the land, refused to vacate.
 FACTS OF THE CASE:
•Petitioner instituted an ejectment suit against Hermigildo before the MTC of Sta.
Maria, Bulacan. Finding no tenancy relationship between petitioner and Hermigildo,
the MTC ordered the latter to vacatethe land and pay attorney’s fees and the sum of
P500.00 monthly from the filing of the complaint.

•On appeal, however, the RTC reversed the MTC and ordered that the case be
remanded to the DARAB for further adjudication, as the RTC was of the opinion that
Ana Pascual was entitled to the help of her son in the cultivation and consequently, her
son cannot be simply ejected.
 FACTS OF THE CASE:
•In this petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, Cecilleville contends
that the appellate court erred in not finding that while private respondent is entitled to
work on the agricultural land of the petitioner in his capacity as member of the family
of tenant Ana Pascual, nonetheless he cannot occupy a substantial portion thereof and
utilize the same for residential purposes..
 THE RULING
As clearly provided by Section 22, paragraph 3, RA No. 1199, as
amended by RA No. 2263, only a tenant is granted the right to a home lot
and the right to construct and maintain a house thereon. Private
respondent is not entitled to a home lot. As the Court sees it, the issue lies
on the interpretation of Sec. 22, paragraph 3 of RA No. 1199, as amended
by RA No. 2263.
 THE RULING
”The tenant shall have the right to demand for a home lot suitable
for dwelling with an area of not more than 3 per cent of the area of his
landholding provided that it does not exceed one thousand square meters
and that it shall be located at a convenient and suitable place within the
land of the landholder to be designated by the latter where the tenant
shall construct his dwelling and may raise vegetables, poultry, pigs and
other animals and engage in minor industries, the products of which shall
accrue to the tenant exclusively.”
 THE RULING
The law is unambiguous and clear. Consequently, it must be applied
according to its plain and obvious meaning, according to its express terms.
Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the word, only a tenant is
granted the right to have a home lot and the right to construct or maintain
a house thereon. And here, private respondent does not dispute that he is
a mere of Ana Pascual’s immediate farm household. Under the law,
therefore, We find the private respondent not entitled to a home lot.
Neither is he entitled to construct a house of his own or to continue
maintaining the same within the very small landholding of petitioner.
 INTRINSIC AIDS
4. PUNCTUATION
• It is an aid of low degree in interpreting the language of the of a statute and can
never control against the intelligible meaning of the written word.

• However, if the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning that is reasonable

and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an additional
argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words thus punctuated.
 CASE:

U.S. vs. HART, et al.

26 PHIL. 149
G.R. No. 8848
November 21, 1913
 FACTS OF THE CASE:
•Accused-Appellants Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were charged in the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga with vagrancy under Section 1 of RA No.
519. This section enumerates certain classes of persons who are to be
considered as vagrants such as those “found loitering about saloons or
dram shops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the
country without visible means of support.”

• Accused-Appellants were prosecuted and convicted for “loitering about

saloons or dram shops or gambling houses”, which is the first part of said
Section 1.
The second part, it will be noticed, is worded as follows: “or tramping or straying
through the country without visible means of support.”
 FACTS OF THE CASE:
•It turned out, however, as shown by the evidence, that accused-appellants had
visible means of support, but the Attorney general argued that “without visible means
of support” as used in the second part, does not apply to “every person found
loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses”, but only to “tramping
or straying through the country”.

•It was contended that if “without visible means of support” is intended for the first
part, either the comma after “gambling houses” would have been omitted, or else the
comma after “country” would have been inserted.
 THE RULING
When the meaning of legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the
courts to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that
construction of the statute which will give it effect.

The construction should be based upon something more substantial than the
mere punctuation found in the printed act. If the punctuation in the statute gives it a
meaning which is reasonable and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be
used as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of the
statute as thus punctuated. But an argument based upon punctuation is not
conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary,
to give to the Act the effect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous or
incorrect punctuation marks, and inserting others where necessary.

The accused-appellants were acquitted.

 INTRINSIC AIDS
5. LEGISLATIVE DEFINITION AND INTERPRETATION
It the legislature has defined the words used in the statute and has declared the
construction to be placed thereon, such definition or construction should be
followed by the courts.
The rules are as follows:

• If a law provides that in case of doubt it should be construed or interpreted in a certain manner, the courts should
follow such instruction;

• In case of conflict between the interpretation clauses and the legislative meaning, as revealed by the statute
considered in its totality, the latter shall prevail;

• A term is used throughout the statute in the same sense in which it is first defined;

• Legislative definition of similar terms in other statutes may be resorted to except where a particular law expressly
declares that its definition therein is limited in application to the statutes in which they appear.
 EXTRINSIC AIDS
1. CONTEMPORANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES
2. POLICY
3. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE STATUTE
4. CONTEMPORANEOUS OR PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION
5. EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION
6. LEGISLATIVE CONSTRUCTION
7. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
8. CONSTRUCTION BY THE BAR AND LEGAL COMMENTATORS
 CONTEMPORANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES

(a) History of the times and conditions existing at the time the
law was enacted
(b) Previous state of the law
(c) The evils sought to be remedied or corrected by the law;
and
(d) The customs usages of the people
 POLICY
The general policy of the law or the settled policy of the
State may enlighten the interpreter of the law as to the
intention of the legislature in enacting the same.
 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE STATUTE
The history of a law may be found in:

(a) reports of the legislative committees;

(b) transcript of stenographic notes taken
(c) during a hearing;
(d) legislative investigation;
(e) legislative debates
 CONTEMPORANEOUS OR PRACTICAL
CONSTRUCTION
Those who lived at or near the time when the law was passed were more acquainted
of the conditions and the reasons why a particular law was enacted.

Their understanding and application of the law, especially if the same has been
continued and agreed to by the judicial tribunals and the legal profession, deserve to
be considered by the courts.
 EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION
(a) Congress is deemed to have been aware of the construction made by the
officers charged with the administration and enforcement of the law;
(b) The courts should respect that construction except if it is clearly
erroneous;
(c) Executive construction has more weight if it is rendered by the Chief Legal
Adviser of the government who can issue opinions to assist various
departments of the government charged with the duty to administer the
law;
(d) The opinion, however, of the Chief Legal Adviser is subservient to the
ruling of the judiciary, which is in charge of applying and interpreting laws.
 LEGISLATIVE CONSTRUCTION
Legislative construction is entitled to consideration and great
weight but it cannot control as against the court’s prerogative to
decide on what is the right or wrong interpretation.
 JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
It is presumed that the legislature was acquainted with and had in
mind the judicial construction of former statutes on the subject.

It is also presumed that the statute was enacted in the light of the
judicial construction that the prior enactment has received.

With respect to a statute adopted from another State, it is presumed

that it was adopted with the construction placed upon it by the
courts of that State.
 CONSTRUCTION BY THE BAR AND LEGAL
COMMENTATORS
It is presumed that the meaning publicly given in a statute by the members of the legal
profession is a true one and regarded as one of that should not be lightly changed.

The opinion and commentaries of text writers and legal commentators, whether they
are Filipinos or foreigners, may also be consulted as, in fact, they are oftentimes cited
or made as references in court decisions.
 USE OF EXTRINSIC AIDS

Extrinsic aids are entitled to respect, consideration and weight,

but the courts are at liberty to decide whether they are
applicable or not to the case brought to it for decision.
 PRESUMPTIONS IN AID OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
(1) Presumption of Validity
(2) Presumption of Constitutionality
(3) Presumption of Good Faith
(4) Presumption Against Injustice
(5) Presumption Against Inconsistency
(6) Presumption Against Absurdity
(7) Presumption Against Ineffectiveness
(8) Presumption Against Irrepealable Laws
 PRESUMPTIONS IN AID OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
(9) Presumption Against Implied Repeals
(10) Presumption Against Violation of Public Policy
(11) Presumption of Knowledge of Existing Laws
(12) Presumption of Acquiescence to Judicial Construction
(13) Presumption of Jurisdiction
(14) Presumption of Acting Within the Scope of Authority
(15) Presumption Against Violation of International Law
 PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY
• Every statute passed by the legislature is presumed to be valid
because in approving it, the legislature is supposed to have
considered the question of its validity.

• The question of validity of every statute is first determined by the

legislative department of the government itself, and the court
should resolve every presumption in favor of its validity.

• Statutes should not be presumed to be invalid unless it clearly

appears that they are within some of the inhibitions of the
fundamental law of the State.
 PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
• Every statute passed by the legislature is presumed to be constitutional.

• The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality.

• To doubt is to sustain. However, when the statute is really unconstitutional, the

courts are authorized to declare its invalidity.
 PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH
• In the interpretation of statutes, it is presumed that the
legislature had good motives in having considered and adopted
a particular law.

• It is presumed that the legislature acted in good faith, and that

it acted from patriotic and just motives.
 PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE
• In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
-Article 10, New Civil Code of the Philippines

• This presumption is meant to strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an

injustice, which may apparently be authorized if the law is interpreted otherwise.
 PRESUMPTION AGAINST INCONSISTENCY
• The mind of the lawmaking body is presumed to be consistent.
In case of doubt therefore, such a construction should be
adopted as will make all the provisions of the statute
consistent with one another and with the entire law.

• A word or phrase repeated in a statute will have the same

meaning all throughout the statute, unless a different intention
clearly appears.
 PRESUMPTION AGAINST ABSURDITY
• It is presumed that the legislature does not intent that
absurdity will flow from its enactment of the statute. The
courts therefore have the duty to interpret the law in such a
way as to avoid absurd results.

• Whenever possible, a legal provision must not be construed to

be a useless surplusage, and accordingly meaningless, in the
sense that it adds nothing to the law or having no effect
thereon whatsoever.
 PRESUMPTION AGAINST INEFFECTIVENESS

• It is presumed that the lawmaking body does not intend to

adopt laws which are unnecessary and ineffective.

• It is presumed that the lawmaking body intends to impart in its

enactments such a meaning as will render them operative and
effective.
 PRESUMPTION AGAINST IRREPEALABLE LAWS

• It is presumed that the lawmaking body does not intend that

its laws shall be irrepealably.

• The legislature cannot enact irrepealably laws, and the reason

is obvious—the needs of today or the situations obtaining
now will not most likely be the same in the years to come.
 PRESUMPTION AGAINST IMPLIED REPEALS
• Repeals by implication is not favored.
• There are two (2) requirements before a statute can be
considered to have repealed a prior statute by implication:

(a) That the statute touches the same subject matter; and

(b) That the latter statute is repugnant to the earlier one.

 THREE BASIC RULES ON THE MATTER OF REPEAL
• Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

*Article 7, New Civil Code of the Philippines

• When a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first
repealed shall not be thereby revived, unless expressly so provided. However, when a
law repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication only, its repeal revives the
prior law unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise.

• A general law does not repeal a special law unless it is so expressly provided, or they
are incompatible.
 PRESUMPTION AGAINST VIOLATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY

• It is presumed that the legislature designs to favor and foster

rather than to contravene that public policy which is based
upon the principles of natural justice, good morals, and the
settled wisdom of the law as applied to the ordinary affairs of
life.
PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTING LAWS

• In enacting a law, the lawmaking body is presumed to have full

knowledge of all existing laws on the subject.

• Hence, if there are two laws on the same subject enacted on

different dates, the latter law cannot be held to have
abrogated the former law, unless the repugnancy is clear,
convincing and irreconcilable.
 PRESUMPTION OF ACQUIESCENCE TO JUDICIAL
CONSTRUCTION

• When the court has construed a statute in a particular manner,

and the lawmaking body made no move to alter or amend the
said statute, it is presumed that the legislature has acquiesced
to the said construction.
 PRESUMPTION OF JURISDICTION

• A statute will not be construed in such a manner as to oust or

restrict the jurisdiction of a court, or to vest a new jurisdiction
in the said court, unless there are express words or a necessary
implication to that effect.
 PRESUMPTION OF ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF
AUTHORITY
• It is presumed that the legislature acted within the scope of its
authority.

• Hence, if a statute admits of more than one interpretation, one that

places the said statute outside of legislative competence, and the
another that places the said statute within the limits of legislative
competence, the court should adopt the latter interpretation.
 PRESUMPTION AGAINST VIOLATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
• It is presumed that s statute is in conformity with the rules and
principles of international laws or with treaties, in line with Section 2,
Article II of 1987 Constitution, which provides:

“Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.”