1 Digested Cases for Legal Ethics
PHHC v. Tiongco
G.R. No. L-18891 November 28, 1964
FACTS:
Appellants Melchor Tiongco and Melchor Escasa were registered squatters of lot
No. 23 Block No. E-156, containing an area of about 460 sq. meters. Long before
the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation declared a parcel of land embraced
in TCT 1356 of the Quezon City Register of Deeds. Appellants were already
occupying the portion and have introduced improvements thereon and had
declared the property for taxation purposes. In the census list of the corporation,
the appellants were considered as bonafide occupants of the property and during
the same period, they had applied to purchase the property from the PHHC. They
found out later, that the same had already been awarded to Asuncion Enverga, a
relative of a Congressman, in spite of the fact that she had not occupied the
property at any time, nor introduced any improvements. Immediately upon the
discovery of the award a complaint was lodged by Tiongco and Escasa with the
appellee PHHC. After a preliminary investigation of the complaint, Eugenio
Alvarado, Jr., Chief of Investigation & Research Section, PHHC Investigating
Committee, with the recommendation that they have priority rights to the
property, which was given after two investigations. The matter has been submitted
to the Executive Committee to render their judgment.
However, no action has been taken on the report. Four months after the filing of
the complaint, the PHHC instituted an action for Recovery of Possession in the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the appellant interposes the defense of
Priority of Right to Purchase and ability to pay, which was found in the investigation
made by the appellee. The case was set for hearing on February 7, 1961. The
appellants’ counsel, Atty. Bonifacio Tañega failed to notify the appellants of the
scheduled hearing. The case was heard, the plaintiff introduced evidence showing
ownership of the property. The judgment held that the plaintiff is the owner of the
land situated in Quezon City, and that the defendants without the consent and
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knowledge of the plaintiff entered and constructed their houses upon then
premises, depriving the plaintiff of the possession of the same parcel of land.
Tiongco and Escasa were ordered to remove their houses and the improvements
on them, and pay the plaintiff the sum of Php 26.00 per month from the date of
occupation, until premises in question is restored to the plaintiff, and Php. 200.00
in attorney’s fees.
Although the above judgment was received by counsel for the appellants, he never
informed the latter about the matter. Neither did he take steps to protect the
interests of his clients, by presenting a motion for reconsideration and/or filing a
petition to set aside judgment. Appellants only came to know that an adverse
decision had been promulgated when on May 12, 1961, the Deputy Sheriff of
Quezon City, served them a copy of writ of execution ordering them to vacate the
premises and to pay the amounts ordained therein. Appellants lost no time in
contacting their counsel, Atty. Tañega, and failing to do so, they engaged the
services of Atty. Ciriaco Sayson, who presented with the lower Court a Petition for
Relief from Judgment, accompanied by affidavits of merit. The Presiding Judge
cited Atty. Tañega to appear before him, because of the seriousness of the charges.
Atty. Tañega admitted to the court that he did not inform the appellants of the
hearing, as he forgot all about the same; that he received the decision but did not
also inform the appellants about it, because he forgot all about the case, explaining
that he had so many ejectment cases then, that the orders and decisions in the
case just escaped his attention.
Issue: whether or not Atty. Tañega’s conduct constitutes negligence of his duties as
a lawyer.
HELD:
 2 Digested Cases for Legal Ethics

There was something fishy and suspicious concerning the actuations of former
counsel Atty. Tañega in this case. He did not give any significance at all, to the
processes of the court, which has proven prejudicial to the rights of his clients.
There was nothing which could have prevented the appellants from attending the
trial of the case themselves, or moving for a reconsideration of the decision or
taking the necessary appeal from the judgment, if only their counsel had informed
them of the court's processes. Counsel had simply ignored the rights of his clients
by giving a lame and flimsy explanation that the court's processes just escaped his
attention. He deprived them of their day in court.

There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally notice to counsel
is notice to parties, and that such doctrine has beneficient effects upon the prompt
dispensation of justice. Its application to a given case, however, should be looked
into and adopted, according to the surrounding circumstances; otherwise, in the
court's desire to make a short cut of the proceedings, it might foster, wittingly or
unwittingly, dangerous collusions to the detriment of justice. It would then be easy
for one lawyer to sell one's rights down the river, by just alleging that he just forgot
every process of the court affecting his clients, because he was so busy. Under this
circumstance, one should not insist that a notice to such irresponsible lawyer is also
a notice to his clients.

The attention of the trial court is invited to the censurable conduct of Atty.
Bonifacio Tañega in this particular case, and to take such action as may be
warranted in the premises.

Javellana v. Lutero

Medina, L. O. IX. IX. MMX Page 2

 3 Digested Cases for Legal Ethics
GR. No. G.R. No. L-23956 July 21, 1967
FACTS:On March 1963, the Roman Archbishop in Jaro, Iloilo filed a detainer
complaint against Elpidio Javellana in the municipal court which was presided by
Judge Nicolas Lutero. The hearing was reset four times, all at the behest of Elpidio
Javellana’s lawyer who gave reasons as flimsy as a painful toe, or an unfinished
business transactions in Manila. This last postponement was granted by the
municipal court, with a warning that no further postponements shall be allowed.
When the case was called for trial on August 27, 1963, neither the defendant nor
his counsel Atty. Hautea appeared although one Atty. Romy Peña who was present
in court verbally moved for the postponement of the trial on the ground that Atty.
Hautea was in Manila attending to a business transaction. The plaintiff's counsel
objected to the motion on the ground that the defendant and his counsel were well
aware of the court's previous admonition that no further postponement of the case
would be granted, and then manifested that the witnesses and the evidence for the
plaintiff were ready for presentation on that date.
The verbal motion was denied, and plaintiff was directed to adduce his evidence.
During the hearing, a telegram arrived from Atty. Hautea asking for a
postponement of the hearing. However, the hearing still continued. The court on
the same date rendered judgment for the plaintiff and against the defendant.
About 50 days later, the defendant thru his same counsel filed a petition for relief
(from the judgment of the municipal court)with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
praying that the decision in question be set aside, that the detainer case be set for
trial on the merits, and, pending determination of the petition, that an injunction
issue restraining the enforcement of the decision. Counsel for the petitioner
averred that his absence on the date of the trial was excusable as he attended to a
very urgent business transaction in Manila; that before his departure for the latter
city, he verbally informed the respondent judge that his return to Iloilo might be
delayed and that he might not arrive on time for the trial of the case as set; that he
called at both the law office and the residence of the counsel for the private
respondent to inform him of the desired postponement and the reason therefor,
but the latter was in Bacolod at the time; that he exercised utmost diligence and
Medina, L. O. IX. IX. MMX Page 3
precaution in the sense that while in Manila he sent a telegram to the respondent
judge, asking for postponement; and that notwithstanding all the foregoing, the
municipal court nevertheless proceeded with the trial in his absence and that of his
client, allowed the private respondent to present his evidence ex parte, and
rendered a decision against the petitioner, thus depriving the latter of his day in
court. Counsel for the petitioner further asserted that his client has a good and
substantial defense, which is, that the complainant had given his client an option to
buy the premises subject-matter of the complaint below, and that a reopening of
the case would cause the private respondent no real injury.
Issue: W/N Atty. Hautea was negligent in his duties as a lawyer.
HELD:
A counsel for any party in a judicial controversy, by mandate of the canons of legal
ethics, and with due regard for the elementary standards of fair play, is duty bound
to prepare for trial with diligence and deliberate speed. This norm of conduct is no
less applicable in a detainer case, such as the one at bar, even if the issues are
essentially simple and uncomplicated. It is obvious that the counsel for the
petitioner-appellant has been remiss in this respect.
The case was set for trial six times. Thrice it was postponed at the behest of the
said counsel. The last postponement was granted on July 24, 1963 with the
unequivocal admonition by the judgment that no further postponement would be
countenanced. The case was reset for hearing on August 27, 1963, which means
that the appellant's counsel had more than a month's time to so adjust his
schedule of activities as to obviate a conflict between his business transactions and
his calendar of hearings. Came August 27, and neither he nor the appellant
appeared at the trial. His absence on the latter date was not occasioned by illness
or some other supervening occurrence which unavoidably and justifiably prevented
him from appearing in court.
 4 Digested Cases for Legal Ethics

It was the bounden duty of the said counsel, under the circumstances, to
give preferential attention to the case. As things were, he regarded the municipal
court as a mere marionette that must ever await his pleasure. This attitude on his
part is censurable as it reveals more than just a modicum of disrespect for the
judiciary and the established machinery of justice

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