Verbs and ‘Times’ 4.1. The fact that verbs have censes indicates that con- siderations involving the concept of time are relevant to their use. These considerations are not limited merely to the obvious discrimination between past, present, and fu- ture; there is another, a more subtle dependence on that concept: the use of a verb may also suggest the particular way in which thae verb presupposes and involves the notion of time, In a number of recent publications some attention has been paid to these finer aspects, perhaps for the first time systematically. Distinctions have been made among verbs suggesting processes, states, dispositions, occurrences, tasks, achievements, and so an. Obviously these differences can- not be explained in terms of time alone: other factors, like the presence or absence of an object, conditions, intended states of affairs, also enter the picture. Nevertheless one 1 With only minor changes this chaptor reproduces an article of the came title which appeared in The Philorophical Review, LXVI (a9s7). 143-160. [97]LINGUISTICS IN PHILOSOPHY feels that the time elemeat remains erucial; at leas itis m= pportanc enough to warrane separate treatment, Indeed, oT intend to show, if we focus oar atteation primarily upon the time sekemata presupposed by various verbs? we are able t throw lighe on some of the absourties which sill remain in these matters. These time schemata will appear as jimporcant constituents of the concepts that prompt us to use those terms the way we consistenely do. There area few such schemzta of very wide application. ‘Once they Fave been discovered in some typical examples, they may be used ss models of comparison in exploring and ig the hchavior of any verb whatever. In indicating these schemata, [do not clair that they rep- resent all posible ways in whieh verbs can be used correccly ‘with respect to time determination nor that a verb exhibi- ing a use faily covered by one schema cannot have diver- gent uses, which in eurn may be deseribed in terms of the fother schemata, As a matter of fact, precisely those verbs thar eall for two or more time schemata will provide the most interesing instances of conceptaal divergence in this, respect—an ambiguity which, if undetected, might lead to confusion. Thus my intention is not to give ules about hhow to use certain cerms but tosuggest a way of describing the nse of thorecemis. I shall present some “objects of com ‘parison which are meant to throw light on the facs of cur language by way not only of similarities, but also of dis similarities . .. a measuring rod; not as a preconceived idea to which realty must correspond.” * 42. Our first task therefore will be to locate and to de~ scribe the most common time schemata implied by the we 2 an aware of my duty wm explin what exactly T meen by tine schon inthis cout Tia doy te one” #1, Wisrgeatein, Piloopbia! Imeizations, T,130-15. 981‘VERBS AND TIMES: ‘of English verbs, To do this I need some clear-cut examples ‘which, at Teast in their dominant use, show forth these schemata in pare form, At this stage, I shall try to avoid ambiguous terms and ignore stetched and borderline uss, stare wich the well-known differeace between verbs that possess continuous tenses and verbs that do not. The ques- What are you doing? night be answered by: Tam running (or writing, working, and so on) but not by. Tam knowing (0: loving, recognizing, and so on).* (On the other hand, the sppropriate question and answer Do yom know Yes, Ido ave no counterpacts like Do you rune Yes, Ido ‘This difference suggests that rumiing, writing, and the ee are proceses going on in time, hat iy roughly, that they consis of successive phases following one another in time. Indeed, the man who is running lis up his right leg ‘one moment, drops ithe nex, then ifts hs other leg, drops it, and so on. But although ie can be true of a sabject that fe knows something at a given moment or for a certain yeriod, knowing and its kin are not processes going on in “The presesce or absence of an objec is icelevare here. I amt ‘usbing& carts a correc setence, while Iam loving you remains Unless a very diferent meaning of roming i invslved, which stall discus te, (991LINGUISTICS IN PHILOSOPHY. time. [t may be the ease that Tenovr geography now, bat this does not mean chat a process of knowing geography i feing on xt present costing of phases suceding one Firs let us focus our attention on the group of verbs that ‘admit continuous censes, There is « marked cleevage within the group itself. If ic is cue vac somecne is sunning or pushing a cart now, then even if he stops in the next moment itwille stil true that he did run or did push a care. On the ther hand, even if itis troe that someone ie drawing a circle or is running a mile now, if he stops in the next mo- rent it may aot be tue that he did draw a circle or did rin amiles In other words if someone stops running mile, be did not run a mile; if one stops drawing a circle, he did ot draw a circle, But the man who stops running did run, and he who stops pushing the cart did push it Rusning a nile and drawing a circle have to be Gnisked, while ie docs not mike sease to talk of finishing running’ or pushing a cart. Thus we see thar while ruaning ot pushing a care has po set terminal point, running 2 mile and draving a circle co have a “climax,” which has to be reached if the action is to be what i is elaimed to be, Accordingly, the question For how long did he push the car? isa significant one, while How long die eke to push the cat? sounds oda. On she other bind “For a clear formulation of this extion se 8, Brombenger’s “Am Appeoin 0 phn tae). Dae (ed) cea Philosophy, second see, pp 7-105. Bromberger correcty pos ‘ove an error I commited in giv thi eitefion ia the Ong PIPE (9p. 74-75) {109‘VERBS AND TIMES ow long did it take to draw the circle? is the appropriate question, and For how long did he draw the eire fs somewhat queer. And, of course, the corresponding an- sowers will be He was pushing it for half an hour and Tc ook him ewenry seconds to draw the circle He did itn ewenty seconds and not vice versa, Pushing a cart may go on for a time, Durie does not rake any definite time; the activity of draw- ing may also go on for atime, bur it takes a certain time to draw a drele, A very interesting consequence follows, If ic true that someone has been running for half an hous, chen it must bbe true that he has been running for every period within ‘hae half hour. But even if i is true that a runner has run a mie in four minotes, ie cannot be true that he has run mile in any period which is a real part of that time, although it remains true that he was running, or that he was engaged in running a mile, dusing any substretch of those four min- tutes, Sinilarly, incase I weote a leter in an hout, T did not swnite it, say, in the fist quarter of thst hour. Tt appears, then, that running and its kind go on in time in a hemoge- neous way; any part of the process is ofthe seme narure as the whole. Nor so with manning a mile or writing a letter, they also go om in time, but they proceed roward a terminus which is logically necessary to theis being what dhey are on)‘Somehow this climax casts its shadow backward, giving new color co all cae went before, Thus we have arrived at the time schemata of two im- portant species of verb. Let us call the fre type, that of ronning, puobing a cart, and so forth, “activity terms.” and the second type, that of rumning a mile, drawing a circle and t0 forth, “aceomplshmens terms.” 1 The desetiption of these first wo categories also illustrices what I mean by exhibiting the “time schemata” of verbs, ‘When one turns tothe other genus, that is, ro the verbs lacking continuovs tenses, one discovers a specific difference there roo. Ar we mid shove, verbs like knowing and recog: nizing do not indicate processes going on in tim, yet they muy be predicated of a subject for a given time with truth ot fabity. Now some of these verbs cin be predicated oaly for single moments of time (steiely speaking), while others ean be predicated for shorter or longer periods of time. One reiches the hilleop, wins the race, spots or zecogaizes some thing, and so on a definite moment. On the other hand, ‘ore can know or believe something, love ot dominate some. body, for a short or long period. "The form of persinent ‘questions and answers proves the point neity: At what time did you reach the top? At noon sharp. At what momeae did you spot the plane? At 10:53 AM. bur "In ce absence of “pure” serminology 1 am forced to be com ent with thew anys (and the other wat be given), which aes ‘connote aspecss beyond tine stractare (eg, chat of success), we {do not forget that our pone of view i nied to time schemata Ihave, we shall nt be surpesed when, for expla, getting es ‘brid tums out to be an accomplshinane tom and dying 30 [102]‘VERBS AND TIMES: For how long did you love her? For three year How long did you believe in the stork? Till L was and not the other way around.* Before going any further lr us call the firs family (chat of reaching the top) “achievement terms;” and the second (hae of Joving) “state terms.” Then we can say that achievements occur ata single moment, while states last For 1 period of time, 445. Our conclusion sbout achievements is reinforced by 2 curioas fesuze pointed out by Gilbere Ryle (following ‘Asstote), namely that “I aa say" have see it’ soon a8 Tean say ‘Tee ic!” Asa mater of face the point ean be rade stonger sil: in eases af pure achievement terms the proscne tense is almost exclusively used as historic preset ‘0 8 indicating immediate furore: ‘Now he finds the treasure (or wins the race, and so on) is not wed to report the actual Gnding or winning, while the seemingly paradoxical Now he has found it Ac this moment he his woa the race “The fact that we often say things like in know it only for + moment the vse of for indians mt a periods though very shorts to be understood * Dilenmasp. tos. He quotes Ariscore’s Net. teq8b. As we shall rer, thie oriclar example i» be ideadiog [103LINGUISTICS IN PHILOSOPEY Ie took him three hours to reach the summit He found ie in five minutes rmight rempe + novice to confose achievements (which be- long to the second genus) with accomplishments (which belong to the first). A lite reflection is Sufficient to expose the falhey. When Isay that it took me an hour to write a letter (which is an secomplishment), Timply thae the writ ing of the lener went on during that hour. This is not the ‘ase with achievements, Even if one says that it took him three hours t> reach the summit, one does not mean thie the “resching” of the summit went on during those hones” Obviously it took three hours of climbing to reach the top. Pucin another way: if I write a eter ia an hour, then Tea sy Tam writing a letter a any time daring that hour; bt if itakes three hours vo reach the top. I cannot say Tam reaching the tp at any momert ofthat period, ‘As to states, the lack of continuots tenses (eg I ant nowing, loving, and so forth) is exough to disinguish ‘them from activities and accomplishments, and the form of time determination (Honolong. . . ?For such and sucha ‘eriod) should be sufficient to keep them from being con- fused with achievements Sill, I thine ie mighe be usefl to mention, by way of gression, 2 surprising feature about states which is not striely eonnecred with considerations of tine ‘Whea I say that I could run if my legs were nce tied, 1 For those who lke odds: 18 108 the bataion Reenty min ser to eros the border; They are crosing te border. Sach are te ‘order eaves Tent to oore a hi mage 108]VERBS AND TIMES: do not imply thae Toul runif my legs were not tied, On the other hand, there isa sense of en in which He could know the answer if he had read Kant does mean that in chat ease he would know the answer. Smilacly, in an obvious sense, to say that I could like her if she were not selfish is to say chat would like her i she ‘were not selfish, One fee's something strange in Even if Tconld like her T would nor like her. Ie appets, therefore, that in conditionals could is often in- terchangeable with would in connection with states. For the same reason, can might become redundant in indicative sentences of this kind. Hence the airy feeling about I can ‘vow, | can love, can like, and so fore, This abo explains why I san believe ie is very often used insead of I believe it. And, o anticipate, the question Do you see the rabbit? can be answered equivalently by Yr, Zcam se it or Yes, Z see it, Later on, in connection with a concrete example, T shall take up tis matter again and try to be more specific. For the present, it is enough to mention that vhile 10 be able to run is never the same thing as to sun or to be able to write a leuer is by no means the same as to write i, it scems to be the cas that, in some sense, to be able to know isto know, o be able t0 love s to love, and to be able to see is to see. ‘One might point out that some achievements also share this feature. Indeed ia some sense, to be able to recognize isto recognize and to be able to spot the plane isto spot the plane, On the other hand, to be able to starc or stop running is by no means the same thing as to start or stop running, although to start or to sop running are clearly achieve- rents according to their tine schema. Thus here the con Ue)LINGUISTICS IN PHTLOSORHY sideration of the time element is noe suficient; we have to ook for another erkeriun. If we consider thac one can sare or stop renning deliberately or carefully and also that one cean be accused of, oc held responsible for, having started or stopped sunning bur not of having spotted or recognized something, thea we realize that the above-mentioned curi- cous behavior with respect to ca is proper to verbs denoting achievements that cannot be regarded as voluntary (or in- voluntary) actions Following this lead back to states, we find indeed that one cannot know, believe, or love deliberately or carefully, and none of us ean be accused of, or held responsible foe, having “done” so either. Wemay conclude this digresion by saying thaestates and some ichievemests eaanot be qual= ified as actions at all" By way of ilustration o this section, Tadd four examples which demonstate our te sshemata from snother angle. For activites: A was running at time ¢ meins that time Instane £8 on time stretch throughout which A as run- ning, For accomplishments: 4 war drawing a circle at ¢ means thar ison tho time stretch in which A drew that excl. For achievements: A won arace between t, and t, mesns hae rhe time instant at which Al won that race is beeween ty and ts. For stares: 4 loved somebady from 1, to» means that at any instant herween ¢, nd ty A loved that person ‘This shows thatthe concept of activites calls for periods of time that are not unique or definite, Accomplishments, "They are net “done” or “performed” ae all. 3 In my reason an, end insaing deliberately and carefally 4 citeria for genuine actions fave made we of my (aot very ‘rustvorthy) recollection of j.L. Austin's lectures given a Fre vardia 195, 06]‘VERBS AND TIMES ‘on the other hand, imply the notion of unique and definite time periods. In an analogous way, while achievements in- vvolve unique and definite time instants states involve time instants in an indefinite and sonunique sense. ‘This division hat an air of completeness about it. Perhaps it i more then a mere presumption to think that all verbs cea be analyzed in terms of these four schewata, 44 Hhaving thos formed and polished our conceptual toxls, inthe following sections I shall ny to show how they cen be vsed in pratice. Here, of course, it would be foolish to claim any completeness: all T ean do's to make some 2e- rmatks on a few verbs or groups of veris end hope that the reader, if he deems it worth while, wil be able to proceed to other verbs in which he isinterested, Thereisa very large numberof verbsthat fall completely, ‘ora least in their domsinane use, within one of these cate- gore? A litle reflection shows that running, walking, Swimming, pashing or polling something, and the like are alnost unambiguous esses of activity. Painting @ picture, ‘making chair, bulding a honse, writing or reading a novel, delivering 2 rermon, gring or atendig a clas, playing 4 game of ches, and so forth, as also growing up, recovering from ilies, getting ready for something, and 50 on, are clearly accomplishments, Recognizing, realizing, spotting and identifying something, losing or finding an object, reaching the summit, winning the race, crosing the border, sarting, topping, and resuming something, being born, and even dying fall squarely into the class of achieverents Hving, posessing, desing, or wanting something, liking, disliking, loving, hating, roiing, or dominating somebody © For che se of mylinic spicy Tall, in what follows, be sosqewhe eat with respect tothe “ose verso mension” of Fvbs hon‘something, and, of course, knowing or believing things are manifestly staves. Tn connection with the lase group, an obvious idea ‘emerges. From the paint of view of time schemats, being married, being present or absent, healthy oil, and so on also behave like states. But then we can take one more step and realize tha this true of all qualities, Indeed, something is hard, het, or yellow for a time, yet to be yellow, for in- stance, doss not meen that a process of yellowing i going ‘on. Similarly, akhough hardening ie a proces: (activity ot accomplishment), being hard is ¢ state, Now perhaps ve understand why desiring, knowing, loving, aed so on—the so-celled immanent operations of traditional philosophy— ‘can be and have been looked upon as qualities. hibits (in 2 broader sense inclading occupations, disp>- sitions, abilities, and so forth) are also states in our sen. ‘Compare the ewo questions: Are you smoking? and Do yeu omoke? The firs one asks ebout an activity, the second, a state. This difference explains why a chess player can sy at all times that he phys chess and why a worker for the General Hlectrie Company can say, while sunbathing on the beach, that he works for General Electric. Ir is not only activities chat are “habit-forming” in this sense, Writers are people who write books or articles, and ‘writing a book is an accomplishment; dogeatchers are men ‘who catch dogs, and eatchiag a dog is aa achievement. Now the carious ching is that while cabdrivers—that is, people of whom one can always sey thas they drive a cab— sometimes are actually driving a cab, rulers—zhat i, people ‘of whom one can alsvays say that they rule a countey—are never actually ruling « country, that is, they are never en- gaged in a specie activity of ruling « country comparable to the specific activity of driving a cab. A cabdriver might [08]‘VERBS AND TIMES say that he was driving his eab all morning, bu the king of Cambodia can hardly say that he was ruling Cambodia all morning. Tne obvious explanation is cat while diving cab iss fairly uniform ching, as are also smoking, painting, and writing, the actions which a ruler as suchis supposed to perform are manifold and quite dsparace in sature2* Is he “aling” only while hes addressing the assembly and sur- veying troops, or also while he is eating lobster at a state dinner? We feel that some of his ations are more appropti- are than others to his state 26a rule, bat we also feel that ‘none of ther in particular ean be eilled “ruling.” OF course, 4 painter ako performs diverte actions which are more oF less related to his profession (eg. watching the sunset ot ‘buying canvas); xevertheless there is one acsivity, actually painting, which is “the” activity of a painter. Adopting Ryle’s terminology, I shall cal che states of smokers, painters, dogeatchers, and the like specif tates, and the states of rules, servants, educators (and grocers, ‘who not only are never actully “yrocing” bur also do aot “groce": the verb grace does not happen to exist) generic ‘This much it has seemed necesary to say about states, that puzzling category in which the rok of verb melts into that of predicate, and actions fade into qualities nd rela- tions, 45. As.we see, the distinction between the activity sense and the state sense of to smoke, t9 paint, and che like is igenersl distinction, not peculiar to the concept of smoking ‘or painting alone. Many activities (and sore accomplish- ments and achievements) have 2 “derived” stare sense. Ae pointed outky Ryle in The Concept of Mind, pp a 148 ibid, pn. [109]LINGUISTICS IN PHILOSOPHY ‘There is, however, a group of verbs with conceprual diver- _gonces of their own. With respect to many of these verbs, it is hardly possible to esablish the category to which they “originally” belong. ‘The group of verbs I have in mind ‘comprises philosophically notorious specimenslike to think, 10 know, t0 uaderstand, on the one hand, and to see, 0 hear, and their kindsed on the other." In gecent years a number of excellent publicazions have succeeded in poiating out chat the alleged epistemological problems sorzouncing this fam- ily look far les fomnidable when we become aware of the mistakes of extegory thet are embedded in their very for- ‘molation; one cen hardly state che problem so Tong as one refuses to talk incorrect English, I ventare to claim that our categories, based upon time schemata, not only do justice o these recent diicovesies but, beyond that, can be employed in exposing and eliminating ccerain mistakes and oversimplificitions which are ape to dliscredit the whole method. Let us begin with thinking, Te is clear that it is used in two basic senses. Thinking func- tions differently in He is thinking about Jones and in He thinks that Jones isa rascal “The first “thinking” is a process, the second a stare. The first sentence can be used to describe what one is doing, the second cannot. This tecomes obvious when we consider shat while We dull se chat although Inowing reine quite typical stato thi pone fe eaever another los (U0)‘VERBS AND TIMES He thinks that Jones isa rascal night be sad truthfully of someone who is sound asleep He is thinking abovt Jones cannot, Te shows that ing about something is a process that goes on in time, an activity one can carry on deliber- ately or carefully, bur thisis by no means rue of thinking that something is the cas. If it struc that he was thinking about Jones for Falf an hour, thea it must be crue that he was thinking atone Jones during all pars of that peried. Boe cven if eis true chat he thought that Jones was a rascal for ayear, that does nor necesrily mean thar he was thinking about Jones the rascal, for any minute ofthat rime. ‘The last face shous tha thinking that is not related t0 shimbing about the way smoking in is habit sense is related to smoking in its activity sense. Thinking tbat is rather like ruling, thats, i's based upon actions of various kinds, Con- sider the behavior of che farmer who thinks that its going to rain, We may say, then, that sbinking ehavis a genesic sate. On the other hand, the stae ofa “thinker” isa specific sate: he is a man who is very often engaged in thinking out ponderous maces." Ir iseasy to see thar belcving that is also a genetic state. Asa mater of face, be believes that can be exchanged for Fe thinks that in mos cases. Believing in, though different in meaning, belongs to the same category; one can beliere in the right cause even while asleep. Krein is clarlya stare in its deminant wes (knowing shat, knowing how, knowing something [somebody]. Fur- 47 Tam in doe sbowt shining of someting Ter wi not aay eg Te seems t» me, though, eh very ofen fe as an aches ‘Rent see: Reery tite see thet pieire ti of som tinyLINGUISTICS IN PHILOSOPHY thermore, since I am knowing dots not exist in English, Ienowing tema ra be 4 genesic este, Far example, the faet that [know that Harvard is in Cambridge is behind «host of my actions thac range from addressing lers wo boarting ‘buss. Yer none of these actions in particular ean be quali- fied as knowing. Dovbts might arise, however, from uses like And then sudenly Ines! and Nowe knors it witch sound like achievements. Indeed, this insight sense of lesowing fis more or ls into chat category. Yet ie would bea mibtde to think cha this kind of knowing is reted to te state sense in the way that catching dogs related to the specife state of dogeatchers. A litle reflection shows ‘thac they are related rather as getting married (achieve- seat) isto being martied (generic sate). This is best shown in an example. Suppose someone i trying to lve 4 problem in mathematies. Suddenly he eres out “Now 1 know ie!” After ten miautes he explains the solution tome. ‘Obyiously he sil knows it, which means chat no ashes of ‘understanding aze necessary for hin eo explain i. Indeed, so long ashe krows it (ina sate sense), ii logically im- posible hate will “nowt (In an achievement sense) ‘Now I kame it indicates tha: he di not know iebefore. One is tempeed hezeo say that “moving” means to sare lencnring. This ta dangerone competion; makes ue chink that just as to sure rumning legins the accvty of runsing, tosart knowing begins the activity of knowing. Of couse, the fact that to start (or to op) knowing doesnot make ‘sense demonstrates that “knowing” isnot the beginning of an. activity but the beginning of a tate. In general is impor- at 10 ditingush achievements that stare activities from schiovements this inate a xe. “The same distinctions hold for understamling. is achieve mest sense, however, is perhaps more comaon than that of fun)VERBS AND TIMES nowwing; we have just now mentioned “fashes” of under sanding. But these flasher of understanding are also achieve ments initiating the genetic state of understanding. 4.6. We mast keep in mind all these subtleties ss we pro- eed tothe arduous tak of analyzing the eoncepr of seeing from the point of view of temporal structure, In Tbe Con- cept of Mind ™ and abo in Dilemmas ® Ryle quite consis ‘couly maintains chat secing isnot a proces nor 4 state but ‘kind of achievement or success, in many respects similar to winning a race or finding something. More recently F. N. Sibley has pointed out cha in a numberof is significant ‘uss, seeing fonctions quite differently from achievement ‘terme, precisely from the point of riew of temporal seme~ ‘ure. He concludes tha since seeing is ne, at least not al~ ‘ways, an achievemene, i© may turn out w be an activity afer al. ‘There is no question that stcing can be an achievemest in ‘our sense. Uses like At tae moment 1 sew him, together With the above-mentioned pesbilty of saying I bave seen it as s00n a8 one is able to sty I see it, show that mach. T shall refer to this “sporcing” sense of seeing (which is some- what analogous to the insighe sense of knowing, or rather understanding) as “seeing.” Now, [think “seeing” isnot the only sense of seings How long did you see the killer? (Oh, Lam quite tll, T saw him alle time he was in the courtroom. I was watching him. suggests another possibility. Maps. Chap 2 "Sebi Senstisai and Sésing” Mind, LXIV 0958)s 485 478. On p 472 he’s indaced to ay things ike "one must trough (ebae Yonge of sane be selng i.” (31LINGUISTICS IN PETLOSOPRY Do you still see the plane? points in the sume direction. Furthermore, I sported him crossing the sreet spotted him runsing ccan only be understood in the sense of spotted him while he (or 1) was crossing the street I spotted him while he (or 1) was runsing. On the other band, Law him crossing the street Law him running may also be taken to meen T saw him cots the areet Isiw him run, ‘Spot refuses this move: * Ispotted him cress the street sported him run. ur time schemata exphin this difference. Sporting (an achievement) connotes a anique and indivisible time instant. Now manning or crossing the street aze processes going on in time (the later also tikes time) and as such cannot be bbroken dowa into indivisible time instants. their very notion indicates a time steeech, Thus there is a Iogical difficuley in spotting somebody ran or eross the street. One can spot somebody while he is running, or on the street, but while and om here indicate states, and states can be brokea down {nto time inseats, Then iis clear chat seing in T aw him while he was running (or erosing the sereee) tu‘VERBS AND TIMES ray mean merely “Seeing,” but sesing in 1 saw him ran (or cross the street) must have a sense chat admits @ period of time: + process Bor seeing cannot be a proces. What are you doing? can never, in good Eaglish, be answered by 7 am seeing - « Thus notwithsanding the fact that one might see something for a long period, it does not mean that he “is seeing” chat thing for any period, yer it remains rrue that he sees it at all moments during that period. In addition, deliberately or carefully fail wo deseribe or misieserbe see ing, asno one canbe accused of or held eespoasible for hav ing seen something, though one can be accused of or held resporsible for having looked at or watched something. ‘Thus seeing is not an action which is “done” or “per~ formed” at all. Finally the curious equivalence of I see i and I can see it ot even I saw bir all the time and I could see bias all the time ako confirms our claim thar seeing is not a proces but a state or achievement. Being able to see can hardly be conceived of as a proces. 47. Atthispoine, however, a serious difficuly arises. After an eye operation the ductor might say that now the patient can sce without suggesting chat he seer through the band. age, much ss he might say of a patient after an orthopedic operation that he can walk without implying that he is actually walking. Therefore—the objection might go—as the boily sate of being able to wall is not the same thing 1 walking, the bodily state of being able to see it not the same thing as seeing. Yet they are related the same way: the stare of being able to wale is necessary for the activity of walking, and the stite of being able co ste is necessiry tsiLINGUISTICS IN PHILOSOPHY for the activity of secing. Furthermore, 8 we also sug- gesed, we can say of a man who is sound asleep that he knows geography. or that he chinks that Jones is rascal or that heloves Lucy, but no one can say of somebody who is sound aleep that he ses something in any ordicary sense of seing. One might say, however, that he can see, mean- ing that he is norblind, Thus tobe abl to see is astate ke knowing but seeing is nor. ‘This reisoning confuses two senses of can. There sre people who can drink a galloa of wine in one draught sppose ne of them has performed that remarkable feat 1 minute ago. ‘Then itis quite unlikely eat he can do it again now. Should we sy then, ath moment, that he en, for rather that he eannos, drink a gallon of wine in ene draught? He canand he eannet. Let a refer tothe Bs eam (in be can) 25 cen, and to the second (in be connot) a can, Of course, be can, means that he could, if his stomach ‘were empty. When his stomach is empry he both ane and can, Thus cans involves cam, conditionally: he cany if ce- tein condliions ae fuliled, Can does noe involve any fur= ther cans: he can actually. Yet even can, drink a gallon of wine does net mean that he actually does dtink ois drinking that amazing draughe. Now the doctor’s car in Now be can see, spoken wile the patien’s eyes are ull bandaged, is a can ifthe band age were removed and if his eyes were open (everything cele, like light in the room, and so forth, remaining the sare), then he could see some things in the room that i, hhe would see some things in the room. Thus the above- ‘mentioned equivilenee holds lctweca see and an, see, that is, the lovestleel can thae does not involve any further cams conéitionaly. And this equivalence does not hold for activities: che other patient cane walk, chongh his legs are us)‘VERBS AND ‘TIMES stil tied tothe beds if he were released he could; walk, yet ie may be he would not be walking * But my adversary might contin: “You obtiowsly over- look a ghing difference. Walking is a volunary action while seeing is spontaneous one, If you are not blind, f there is some light, ard if you open Your eyes, then you cannot help seeing something: the spontancous activity of secing stats. Digestion, you agree, is a process, yet the equivalence you speak about also holds there, beeause it also a spontaneous activity. When I siy that T can diget pork, I mean ehat if Thad eaten pork, Icoulk digest pork, thats, I would be digesting pork. If Thave nc eaten pork, Tcannot digest pork. So there is a sense in which cam digert pork and i: digesting pork mean the same thing.” This objection is a shrewd one, Ie is quite trae chat no fone can be running if he is noe running, as nothing can be a catifit is not « cat. But this canis a logical modality like srmst i Alleats must be cats In this seme, of course, can be digesting is the came as di- gesting. But our cam, if you like, is a physical modality. Ie is silly to point at a pork chop and say Now I cannoe digest i bue when T have eaten ity T shall be able to digest it for a while, till have digested it, and then T shall not be sble to digest But tis by no means foolish to say 21Now itbecomes cler that, for insance, He cowl, know tbe snrucr if be bed rd Kent mesos that thn cae he would kn the mnwer, but He coull; mow. does aoe mean that in tat m7LINGUISTICS IN PHILOSOPHY Now I canner see the moon, but when the cloud ‘goes away, I shall be able x0 see it. 48. We can safely conclude then that seeing has a stare Sense too. Now, sinee there i no such process a seeing, yet there isan achievement of “seeing” (the “spotting” sense), the question arses whether “seeing” is related to seeing as catching dogs is related to the state of dogeatchers, oF rather a “Knowing” (the achievement) is related to know ing (the state). Te is quite clear thar the latter the case: [Ac that moment I saw him (spotted him) means chat T did not see him before that moment. Thus “seeing” is an achievement initiating the generic state of seeing. As will be recalled, there are scores of activities, accom= plishments, and achievements involved in the notion of ruling or knowing that something is the case, Thus the problem remains: what activities, accomplishments, and ‘chievements are connected in this way with the notion of seeing? Did I nor know that Harvard is in Cambridge, 1 could not perform a great number of actions the way { do perform them In an analogous way, if T do not see my hand, Teannot watch, scan, observe, oF scrutinize it; I can- not gaze upon it, keep it insight, focas my eyes on it, oF follow it with my eyes; I exnnot see that itis dirty, T can- not notice, or easily nd ou, tell, or describe what color i fas or what it looks lke ar present; then aso T esnnot sense) look at it and see ie a5 an inseramene of as an animal with five tentacles, and so on. ‘Of course, sone of these actions have to be performed allacthe seme time, or one after the other, while we see an sbject. When Tam writing, I see the pencil all the time, tus]‘VERBS AND TIMES ‘otherwise I could not write the way Ido write, Neverthe- less T do nor watch, observe, or scrutinize it; I might not look ae it a al, Tighe even noe notice its color. In the same way, when Tam walking up and down in my room, abyorbed in thoughts, I do not pay any’ attention to the furniture arourd me, yet Tsce it most of the times otherwise T would bounce against tables and chairs every s0 often, ‘Think of the way we see our noses or the frame of our spectacles. Notice that none of the actions I have enumerated are . mysterious in the way that seeing is eaimed to be myster- ‘ous Any good dictionary ean tell ws what we mean by ‘oaiching, scrutinizing, and so on, without even mentioring seeing On the other hand the mearing of seeing cannot be given, short of a mystery, without realizing a sate term, that i, without giving the kind of explanation T have tried to give, In much the same way, the meaning ‘of tnowing remains something ghostly tll che kind of ex- planationis given tha, for instance, we find in The Concept of Mind; or, for that mater, housekeeping would remain an abstrese activity did we not all know what sort of (by rho means abstause) actions houackeepers are supposed to perform. 14.9. Before we take leave of seeing, I shall mention ewo borderline senses, If one tells us that he ssw Carmen last, night, he meane chat he sas all four acte of Carmen. Besides, he might say thae ie took three hours to see Carmes. Perhaps fone might even answer the question What are you doing? = For example, The Concise Oxford Dicionary, 4th ety defines watching (relevant sense). esp eyes Fixed on, keep under observ tor, follow observanly. Aid fraseling:look dowely a exanine in deni. tsLINGUISTICS IN PHILOSOPHY by I am seeing Carmen on TV. Thus there is a queer s¢- ccomplishmere sense of seeing. There ie ancther etrsined usage. A “seer” sees things, and now and then he actually is seeing ghoxs or pink rats, Such strained or stretched emi- ployment should not worry us. It would be « very serious ristake if one tried to explain the stock uses of seeing on the basis of auch employmiens ‘Thus there is no one big mystery with regurd to seeing, although litte pazzles remain as to observing, caatching, and so forth. One could point out, for example, that while they are actviies, they sometimes have—and this is tre more of observing than of watching—an accomplshnet sense: i takes some time to observe the passige of Venus across the sun or to watch an ant carrying home @ dead fly. There are obvious parallels berween the concepts of seting and hearing and those of watching and listening, and c0 0m, Thus we could continue this kind of investigation, but without any specifie protlem it would become tedious and idle Asa conclusion. I think, itis not too much to say that cour categories, besides confirming established differences between processes and nonprocesses, may helpus in larly- ing the often overlooked snd embarrassing differences wathin the css of nonproceses. We have no season to fear ie is not always an achieve ment, might turn out t9 be an accivity after all, reviving thereby all the ghosts of epistemology. “What happens ‘when we perceive, and what is it that makes it happen? ‘That is the problem of perception.” A sailor on deck looking ahead remarks, “Te is pitch dark, T don’e see any thing.” After a walle, “Now I see a star.” We ask him, Boring, Langfcli, and Weld, Fousdatious of Prycbology,p- 6 [20]VERBS AND TIMES “What fas happened?” “The clouds gone.” “But what cise happened?” “Nothing else” Of course many things happened in the world and in che sailor. Bu his seeing is not one of them.** 21 wih to express my gratitude to Profesor Israel Scheer for his belpfol comments en the Sse draft of chis chapter. un