ae nc eee ene nes ee eee en eee ee lation and on the basis of factual knowledge. His claim is, I think, that the epistemological views of the Cyrenaics dictated a kind of hedonism which precluded rational choice and rational justification of one’s ac- tions.5 This text merits attention, since it is the only evidence that may refer explicitly to the philosophical relation between the epistemology and the ethics of the Cyrenaic school. PHere. 1251 [Philodemus] [On Choices and Atoidances] Col. #,, . and they claim that in truth no (judgement) takes precedence over any other, being persuaded that the great pathos of the soul occurs as a result of pain and that thus we accomplish our choices and avoidances by observing both (sc, bodily and mental pain). It is not possible that the joys arise in us in the same way and all together, in accordance with some expectation . . . Col. nt... and some people® denied that it is possible to know anything. And, further, they added that if nothing is present on account of which one should make an immediate choice, then one should not choose immediately. Some other people, having selected the path? of the soul as the maral ends and as not in need of additional judgement based on further criteria, granted to everybody an authority, which was not accountable, to take pleasure in whatever they cared to name and to do whatever contributed to it. And yet others held the doctrine that what our school calls grief or joy are totally empty notions because of the manifest indeterminacy of things . 3 THE ANONYMOUS THEA US COMMENTATOR Another Greek source is the commentary on Plato’s Tieaciefus, the only ancient commentary on that dialogue to survive to our days (Berlin papyrus 9782). Its author remains anonymous. He is probably a Middle Platonist, and his floruit may be anywhere between the first century BC and the second century Ap.’ The seventy-five columns of the papyrus cover a relatively short part of the dialogue, from its opening at 142a to the application. of the theory of perpetual flux to sense-perception at 1534. The epistemological position of the Cyrenaics is mentioned in connection with Theaetetus’ attempt to answer the question what is § On the content and interpretation of PHerc. 1251 cols, rm, see Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan 1995, especially pp. 19-23, 81~2, 87-9, 115-28. § This column mentions three different groups of thinkers, of which the second and the third groups are probably Cyrenaic sects. 7 Om the author and date of this text, see Diels and Schubart 1905; Tarrant 1943; Mansfeld 1991; and the recent edition of the cammentary by Bastianini and Sedicy 1995.148 Appendix knowledge by defining knowledge as sense-perception The anonymous author comments on the Protagorean thesis that as things appear to one, so they are for one, and on the Heraclitean doctrine of flux brought in support of the epistemological relativism of Protagoras (62.1ff): in a universe of perpetual flux, nothing has a stable identity, for neither the perceiving subject or faculty nor the perceived object exist in themselves, but only in so far as they are perceived (64. 1-7); so, things are for me such as they affect me and they are for you such as they affect you (64.8-11) and, according to this hypothesis, man is the judge and measure of the affections or conditions which he experiences (64.1216). Subsequently, the author attempts to clarify the application of the theory to the case of the perception of the wind by different people (152b). He stresses that, according to the Protagorean- Heraclitean theory, different perceivers are affected differently by the same wind, in the same place, at the same time (64.21~65.13). The proponents of the theory conclude that the wind causing these path is neither cold nor not cold, but that in reality it does not have such properties; for if'a thing does have an intrinsic property, then it cannot produce different path? in different perccivers in the same conditions and at the same time (65.14~25). The author's suggestion is that the Cyrenaic position, that only the pathé are apprehensible but the external objects are inapprehensible, is based on comparable grounds (cf. hothen: 65.29): we cannot tell whether the fire has the property of burning, because if it did, then all things that came into contact with it would be affected in the same way, i.e. they would burn. ‘The surviving commentary on the Theaeictus does not cover the part of the dialogue which contains the theory of the ‘subtler’ philosophers (156aff.). However, the claim of its author that there is a close philo- sophical relation between the Protagorean—Heraclitean doctrine in Pla- to's Theaetetus and the epistemological views of the Cyrenaics prefigures modern interpretations tending to identify these two doctrines. Anonymous commentator on Plato’s Theaeletus p.152b- col. 65.2939 Whence the Cyrenaics claim that the pati alone are apprehensible but the external objects inapprehensible, for, they say, I apprehend that I am being burnt, but it is non-evident whether the fire is such as to burn, If it were such, all things would be burnt by it.