G.R. No.
L-630 November 15, 1947 should not be, granted, is a question involving different considerations now
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and
appellee.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for
respondent-appellee.
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.
MORAN, C.J.:
Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena
Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted
by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was
denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien,
he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case
to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of
a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the
register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not
an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land.
It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there
being a motion to withdraw the appeal which should have been granted
outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down by this Court in
another case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a constitutional
question if its judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is,
we believe, a confusion of ideas in this reasoning. It cannot be denied that
the constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to decide this case
upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to be made to rest upon other
grounds if we have to render any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our
judgment simply because we have to avoid a constitutional question. We
cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal only because
we wish to evade the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be, or
to be stated.
According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary
upon this Court to grant a withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been
presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal was filed in this case, not
only had the briefs been presented, but the case had already been voted and
the majority decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal stated
no reason whatsoever, and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While
the motion was pending in this Court, came the new circular of the
Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to accept for
registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-
appellee was naturally one of the registers of deeds to obey the new circular,
as against his own stand in this case which had been maintained by the trial
court and firmly defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant
the withdrawal, the result would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A.
Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the decision
or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while this case was pending
before this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the
withdrawal of his appeal and why the Solicitor General readily agrees to
that withdrawal is now immaterial. What is material and indeed very
important, is whether or not we should allow interference with the regular
and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions, and
whether or not after having held long deliberations and after having reached
a clear and positive conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we
may still allow our conviction to be silenced, and the constitutional mandate
to be ignored or misconceived, with all the harmful consequences that
might be brought upon the national patrimony. For it is but natural that the
new circular be taken full advantage of by many, with the circumstance that
perhaps the constitutional question may never come up again before this
court, because both vendors and vendees will have no interest but to uphold
the validity of their transactions, and very unlikely will the register of deeds
venture to disobey the orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for this
court to voice its conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result
that our indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the
Constitution.
All these circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this
Court for a number of days and the legal result of the last vote was a denial
of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus confronted, at this stage
of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question becomes
unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that question.
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:
Article XIII. — Conservation and utilization of natural resources.
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of
the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens
of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time
of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession,
or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of
the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except
as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water "power" in
which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the
grant.
The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its
language, embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose
being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation
and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this
provision, with reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention of
only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it means that all lands of the
public domain are classified into said three groups, namely, agricultural,
timber and mineral. And this classification finds corroboration in the
circumstance that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that was
the basic classification existing in the public laws and judicial decisions in
the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural lands" under said
classification had then acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to
the members of the Constitutional Convention who were mostly members
of the legal profession.
As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil.,
175, 182), this Court said that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as
defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be
found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those
public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for timber
lands." This definition has been followed in long line of decisions of this
Court. (See Montano vs.Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibañez de
Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of
Lands, 39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560;
Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with respect
to residential lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral nor
timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In Ibañez
de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of
cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and planted with all
kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or
forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the
classification of agricultural land, not because it is actually used
for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally
agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances;
besides, the Act of Congress contains only three classification, and
makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban
lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.
In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land
is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also
its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. But whatever the
test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was adopted,
lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence
into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and that the term "public agricultural
lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or
mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be presumed,
therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in
mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification
and its technical meaning then prevailing.
 Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are
obviously technical; and where such words have been in use prior
to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its framers
and the people who ratified it have used such expressions in
accordance with their technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p.
683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law. ed., 648;
Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.)
It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms
employed therein shall be given the meaning which had been put
upon them, and which they possessed, at the time of the framing
and adoption of the instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed,
technical meaning in legal and constitutional history, it will be
presumed to have been employed in that sense in a written
Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303;
L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.)
Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have
been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been
adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a
particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction
requires that the words used in such statute should be construed
according to the sense in which they have been so previously used,
although the sense may vary from strict literal meaning of the
words. (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.)
Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of
Article XIII of the Constitution must be construed as including residential
lands, and this is in conformity with a legislative interpretation given after
the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that "where the
Legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such
a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so
revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the
Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly revised the Public Land
Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60
thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to
associations or corporations controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent
to a solemn declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural
lands, for, under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or
disposable public lands" which are the same "public agriculture lands"
under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential,
commercial, industrial and for other purposes. This simply means that the
term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning.
Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces
all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is
particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies
"public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into
lands that are stricly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for
agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or
lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or
disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino citizens,
is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands
under said statute and under the Constitution.
It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under
section 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874, aliens could acquire public
agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes, but after the
Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right
of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out,
undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And, again, prior
to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of
the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could
be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to
aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for
the purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is
undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and this again is
another legislative construction that the term "public agricultural land"
includes land for residence purposes.
Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation
given by the Executive Department of the Government. Way back in 1939,
Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in answer to a query as to "whether
or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now
XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential,
commercial, and industrial lands for purposes of their disposition," rendered
the following short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion:
 Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies
lands of the public domain in the Philippines into agricultural,
timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since
the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the
Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of
the Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' and, therefore,
acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme
Court of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular
Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase 'agricultural public
lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are
neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been
followed by our Supreme Court in many subsequent case. . . .
Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the
public domain must have to be included in one or more of these
classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of necessity,
therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.
Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining
whether lands are agricultural or not, the character of the land is
the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524; Lorch vs. Missoula Brick
and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of
the land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary
farming methods which determines whether it is agricultural or not
(State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).
Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen
why a piece of land, which may be sold to a person if he is to
devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends to use
it as a site for his home.
This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of
Justice who later became the Chief Justice of this Court, but also because it
was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late President Quezon who
actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision under
consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.)
And the opinion of the Quezon administration was reiterated by the
Secretary of Justice under the Osmeña administration, and it was firmly
maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations.
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government —
judicial, legislative and executive — have always maintained that lands of
the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and
that agricultural lands include residential lots.
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with
the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with
respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino
citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in
the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens
themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is
partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it
reads as follows:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through
which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly
be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if,
after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private
agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above
indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the policy of nationalization
contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for
they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed
that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the
very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the subject matter of
both sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural
land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential
lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to "agricultural land
under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase
repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute,
unless a different intention appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction,
p. 758.) The only difference between "agricultural land" under section 5, is
that the former is public and the latter private. But such difference refers to
ownership and not to the class of land. The lands are the same in both
sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what is
important is the nature or class of the property regardless of whether it is
owned by the State or by its citizens.
Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the
Hon. Teofilo Sison, then Secretary of Justice, to the effect that residential
lands of the public domain may be considered as agricultural lands, whereas
residential lands of private ownership cannot be so considered. No reason
whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid
reason can be adduced for such a discriminatory view, particularly having
in mind that the purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation
of the national patrimony, and private residential lands are as much an
integral part of the national patrimony as the residential lands of the public
domain. Specially is this so where, as indicated above, the prohibition as to
the alienable of public residential lots would become superflous if the same
prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the
prohibition as to private residential lands will eventually become more
important, for time will come when, in view of the constant disposition of
public lands in favor of private individuals, almost all, if not all, the
residential lands of the public domain shall have become private residential
lands.
It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of
private ownership" were used and later changed into "no agricultural land of
private ownership," and lastly into "no private agricultural land" and from
these changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced in the
second and final drafts was intended to limit the meaning of the word "land"
to land actually used for agricultural purposes. The implication is not
accurate. The wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose
than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no land" of the
first draft, unqualified by the word "agricultural," may be mistaken to
include timber and mineral lands, and since under section 1, this kind of
lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the same would be
superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to be drafted in harmony
with section 1 to which it is supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as
under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, and the only
lands that may become private are agricultural lands, the words "no land of
private ownership" of the first draft can have no other meaning than "private
agricultural land." And thus the change in the final draft is merely one of
words in order to make its subject matter more specific with a view to
avoiding the possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the
first draft.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including
residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that
"aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses
for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that
"they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building
homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and
vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of
other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly
agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the
conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII
of the Constitution and which was embodied in the report of the Committee
on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources
of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other
natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation.
They should, therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority
of that nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino
Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee on
Agricultural Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech
delivered in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands, said:
"The exclusion of aliens from the privilege of acquiring public agricultural
lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws
of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines
for the Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the same tenor was the speech
of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete nationalization of our
lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given
birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and
natural resources are immovables and as such can be compared to the vital
organs of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant
death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely nationalize these
two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come
when we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will
be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to have if a
part of our country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?"
(Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego says that since the opening days of the
Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and dominating objectives was
the conservation and nationalization of the natural resources of the country.
(2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified
by the members of the Constitutional Convention who are now members of
this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and Mr.
Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the
Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small jitney for hire, it is
certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a pieace
of land.
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented
by an act of the National Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was
approved. We are referring again to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to
the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120
and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of
reciprocity. Said section reads as follows:
SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the
provisions of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such
land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to
persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may
acquire lands of the public domain under this Act; to corporations
organized in the Philippine Islands authorized therefor by their
charters, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine
Legislature, to citizens of countries the laws of which grant to
citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold,
lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or permanent
improvements thereon, or any interest therein, as to their own
citizens, only in the manner and to the extent specified in such
laws, and while the same are in force but not thereafter.
SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the
provisions of the former Public Land Act or of any other Act,
ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law
formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public
lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public
domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or
conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or associations who
may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; to corporate
bodies organized in the Philippine Islands whose charters may
authorize them to do so, and, upon express authorization by the
Philippine Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of
which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to
acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land or
pemanent improvements thereon or any interest therein, as to their
own citizens, and only in the manner and to the extent specified in
such laws, and while the same are in force, but not
thereafter: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be
applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary
succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts,
nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or
residence purposes, while used for such purposes: Provided,
further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and
improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding
section being transferred by judicial decree to persons,corporations
or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under
the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or
associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or
improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of
five years, under the penalty of such property reverting to the
Government in the contrary case." (Public Land Act, No. 2874.)
It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to
all private lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there
being practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of the
means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in
these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred
to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature,
to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease,
encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted
the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came
the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed, sections 122
and 123 of which read as follows:
SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the
provisions of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such
land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to
persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may
acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to
 corporations organized in the Philippines authorized thereof by
their charters.
SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the
provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal
decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the
Philippines with regard to public lands terrenos baldios y
realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or
presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any
other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be
encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons,
corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public
domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the
Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: Provided,
however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the
conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly
acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided,
further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and
improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding
section being transferred by judicial decree to persons,
corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the
same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations,
or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or
improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of
five years; otherwise, such property shall revert to the
Government.
These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of
Act No. 2874, the only difference being that in the new provisions, the right
to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely stricken out. This,
undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of
Article XIII of the Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of
private agricultural lands to aliens, grants them no right of reciprocity. This
legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for prominent members
of the National Assembly who approved the new Act had been members of
the Constitutional Convention.
It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections
122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, there being no proof that the
same had been acquired by one of the means provided in said provisions.
We are not, however, diciding the instant case under the provisions of the
Public Land Act, which have to refer to land that had been formerly of the
public domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We are
deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution
which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it
prohibits the transfer to alien of any private agricultural land including
residential land whatever its origin might have been.
And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No.
133 which allows mortgage of "private real property" of any kind in favor
of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens
to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the
mortgage. This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that
are strictly agricultural and private lands that are residental or commercial.
The prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor of
aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a legislative interpretation
of the constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that
private residential lands may be sold to aliens under the Constitution, no
legislative measure would have been found necessary to authorize mortgage
which would have been deemed also permissible under the Constitution.
But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress that such sale is forbidden by
the Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted the legislative
measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the constitutional
prohibition.
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice.
We are construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be.
Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely
into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their homes.
But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to
compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied,
however, that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from
the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the
Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a
lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they
desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes,
Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not
acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands, and,
accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.
G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIÑA
AND FLOR DE VEGA, respondents.
Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land
which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from
a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the
Public Land Act (CA 141)?
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on
the following ratiocination:
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to
nullify the decision of the appellate court which affirmed the judgment of
the court a quo in granting the application of respondent spouses for
registration over the lots in question.
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-
D, as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo
City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the
purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title
of the two (2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo
City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino
citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through
naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented
their respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision confirming
private respondents' title to the lots in question, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court
hereby approves the said application and confirms the title
and possession of herein applicants over Lots 347 and
348, Ap-04-003755 in the names of spouses Mario B.
Lapiña and Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens
by birth but now Canadian citizens by naturalization and
residing at 14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo City and/or
201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9,
Canada.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding
decree of registration be issued. In the certificate of title
to be issued, there shall be annotated an easement of .265
meters road right-of-way.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)
In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants
were still Filipino citizens when they bought the land in
controversy from its former owner. For this reason, the
prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by
aliens could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the
rightful owners of the subject realty considering also that
they had paid for it quite a large sum of money. Their
purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to
confirm their title over the land, for, as has been passed
upon, they had been the owners of the same since 1978. It
ought to be pointed out that registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not
established as a means for the acquisition of title to
private land. It is intended merely to confirm and register
the title which one may already have (Municipality of
Victorias vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31189, March
31, 1987). With particular reference to the main issue at
bar, the High Court has ruled that title and ownership over
lands within the meaning and for the purposes of the
 constitutional prohibition dates back to the time of their
purchase, not later. The fact that the applicants-appellees
are not Filipino citizens now cannot be taken against them
for they were not disqualified from acquiring the land in
question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R. No. L-29442,
November 11, 1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's
approval, hence this present recourse, which was belatedly filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been
filed out of time had it not been for the constitutional issue presented
therein.
At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired
proprietary rights over the subject properties before they acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their
favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are
presumed to be public lands under the principle that lands of whatever
classification belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before
the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the jurisdical
sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. Petitioner
further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the
applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned
land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land,
depending on the evidence.
As found by the trial court:
The evidence thus presented established that applicants,
by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, had been
in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the two adjacent
parcels of land applied for registration of title under a
bona-fide claim of ownership long before June 12, 1945.
Such being the case, it is conclusively presumed that all
the conditions essential to the confirmation of their title
over the two adjacent parcels of land are sought to be
registered have been complied with thereby entitling them
to the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title
pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree. (Rollo, p. 26)
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:
The land sought to be registered has been declared to be
within the alienable and disposable zone established by
the Bureau of Forest Development (Exhibit "P"). The
investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Natural
Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed realty
had been occupied by the applicants "whose house of
strong materials stands thereon"; that it had been declared
for taxation purposes in the name of applicants-spouses
since 1979; that they acquired the same by means of a
public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Tuluyan" duly executed by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo
Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits "I" and "J"); and that
applicants and their predecessors in interest had been in
possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the
filing of the application for registration. But what is of
great significance in the instant case is the circumstance
that at the time the applicants purchased the subject lot in
1978, both of them were Filipino citizens such that when
they filed their application for registration in 1987,
ownership over the land in dispute had already passed to
them. (Rollo, p., 27)
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession and
argues:
17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was
declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent
spouses only since 1979. However, tax declarations or
reality tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership. (citing cases)
 18. Then again, the appellate court found that "applicants
(respondents) and their predecessors-in-interest had been
in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to
the filing of the application for registration." This is not,
however, the same as saying that respondents have been
in possession "since June 12, 1945." (PD No. 1073,
amending Sec. 48 [b], CA NO. 141; sec. also Sec. 14, PD
No. 1529). So there is a void in respondents' possession.
They fall short of the required possession since June 12,
1945 or prior thereto. And, even if they needed only to
prove thirty (30) years possession prior to the filing of
their application (on February 5, 1987), they would still
be short of the required possession if the starting point is
1979 when, according to the Court of Appeals, the land
was declared for taxation purposes in their name. (Rollo,
pp. 14-15)
The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner,
any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a
parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his
predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession
thereof for thirty (30) years or more. This is not, however, what the law
provides.
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141)
reads:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by wars
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis
supplied)
As amended by PD 1073:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c),
Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended
in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant himself or
thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945.
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the law employs the
terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-
interest". Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in
possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period
and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with
by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession. In
the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not
only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not
deny this except that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in
possession of the land sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore
short of the required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of
land were acquired by private respondents through their predecessors-in-
interest, who, in turn, have been in open and continued possession thereof
since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-
in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to
confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA
875 [1982]) deserves scant consideration. There, it was held that before the
issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense
the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has
already been abandoned in the 1986 case of Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in Director of
Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court, through
then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa, declared that:
(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for the
period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby
the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso
jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction,
ceases to be public land and becomes private property. . . .
Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
. . . Secondly, under the provisions of
Republic Act
No. 1942, which the respondent Court
held to be inapplicable to the
petitioner's case, with the latter's proven
occupation and cultivation for more
than 30 years since 1914, by himself
and by his predecessors-in-interest, title
over the land has vested on petitioner so
as to segregate the land from the mass
of public land. Thereafter, it is no
longer disposable under the Public Land
Act as by free patent . . .
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when
the conditions as specified in the
foregoing provision are complied with,
the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to
a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being
issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be
of the public domain and beyond the
authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of. The application for
confirmation is mere formality, the lack
of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be
evidenced by the patent and the Torrens
title to be issued upon the strength of
said patent.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical
inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration prescribed by the
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State
than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that
the possessor(s) ". . . shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title ..." No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would,
in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited
to ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the
required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a
title already vested. The proceedings would not originally
convert the land from public to private land, but only
confirm such a conversion already affected by operation
of law from the moment the required period of possession
became complete. As was so well put in Cariño, ". .
.(There are indications that registration was expected
from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
 proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply
to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not
by earlier law. (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open,
continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public
land ipso jure converts the same to private property (Director of Lands v.
IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]). This
means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as
to segregate the land from the mass of public and (National Power
Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]).
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land
is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated,
must be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the
Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When
the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National Power Corporation
v. CA, supra). As such, the land ceases to be a part of the public domain
and goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the
acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149
SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. As
could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were able
to establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest.
Evidence was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid
taxes on the subject land and introduced improvements thereon (Exhibits
"F" to "F9"). A certified true copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta
Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the
subject parcels of land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her
father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit
"G"). Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in
evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, to
prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable and disposable zone
of the government and that no forestry interest was affected (CA GR No.
28953, Records, p. 33).
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for
registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly, the
ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis.
We disagree.
In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were
natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of their supposed acquisition of the
property. But this is where the similarity ends. The applicants
in Buyco sought to register a large tract of land under the provisions of the
Land Registration Act, and in the alternative, under the provisions of the
Public Land Act. The land registration court decided in favor of the
applicants and was affirmed by the appellate court on appeal. The Director
of Lands brought the matter before us on review and we reversed.
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the
private respondents do not rely on fee simple ownership
based on a Spanish grant or possessory information title
under Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the private
respondents did not present any proof that they or their
predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old Spanish
grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal grant (b) the
"concession especial" or especial grant; (c) the
"composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d)
the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the
"informacion posesoria" or possessory information title,
which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title
(Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]).
The primary basis of their claim is possession, by
themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since time
immemorial.
If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have
been in possession since time immemorial, the rulings of
both courts could be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh
Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]):
 . . . All lands that were not acquired
from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain. An exception to the rule
would be any land that should have
been in the possession of an occupant
and of his predecessors in interest since
time immemorial, for such possession
would justify the presumption that the
land had never been part of the public
domain or that if had been a private
property even before the Spanish
conquest (Cariño v. Insular
Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212
U.S. 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The
applicant does not come under the
exception, for the earliest possession of
the lot by his first predecessor in
interest began in 1880.
. . . alienable public land held by a
possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30 years
under the Public Land Act, as amended)
is converted to private property by the
mere lapse or completion of said
period, ipso jure. (Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, supra)
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant
must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and
(b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be
either since time immemorial, as ruled in both Cariño and
Susi, or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
As to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos v.
Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 37 [1989]), adopted the rule
enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per then Associate
Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an applicant for
registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must
secure a certification from the Government that the lands
which he claims to have possessed as owner for more than
thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is the
burden of the applicant to prove its positive averments.
In the instant case, private respondents offered no
evidence at all to prove that the property subject of the
application is an alienable and disposable land. On the
contrary, the entire property . . . was pasture land (and
therefore inalienable under the then 1973 Constitution).
. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to
establish their imperfect title to the property in question.
Their allegation of possession since time immemorial, . .
., is patently baseless. . . . When referring to possession,
specifically "immemorial possession," it means
possession of which no man living has seen the
beginning, and the existence of which he has learned from
his elders (Susi v. Razon, supra). Such possession was
never present in the case of private respondents. . . .
. . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the
finding that the private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than
eighty (80) years, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove
that (their predecessor-in-interest) had possessed the
property allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853
and made the subject of both his last will and testament
and the project of partition of his estate among his heirs
— in such manner as to remove the same from the public
domain under the Cariño and Susi doctrines. Thus, (when
the predecessor-in-interest) died on 31 May 1937, he
transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the said
property, to his heirs. This being the case, his possession
 cannot be tacked to that of the private respondents for the
latter's benefit pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their
application . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that the private respondents became
American citizens before such filing, it goes without
saying that they had acquired no vested right, consisting
of an imperfect title, over the property before they lost
their Philippine citizenship. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely
because they were American citizens at the time of their application
therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove possession of their
predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in such a
manner that the property has been segregated from public domain; such that
at the time of their application, as American citizens, they have acquired no
vested rights over the parcel of land.
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born
Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue
thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the
possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held
by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition,
private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the
contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapiñas mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that
the Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the contested
parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the
Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this
Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has
lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of
private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to
Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of
this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private
land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang
Pambansa may provide.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the
relevant provision of which provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal
capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws
may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum
area of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban
land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by
him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one
of them may avail of the privilege herein granted;
Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total
area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands
for residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a
transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for
residential purposes which, when added to those already
owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas
herein authorized.
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law
has been passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs
the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen
who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they
applied for registration of the properties in question, said properties as
discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could be no
legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what
the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no
longer form part of the public domain. They are already private in character
since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of
ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of
1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by
him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were
natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or
acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether
private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they
purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is
that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for
registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the
Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the
requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest
over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must perforce
be approved.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185,
must also be complied with by private respondents. Specifically, it refers to
Section 6, which provides:
Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in
other laws for the registration of titles to lands, no private
land shall be transferred under this Act, unless the
transferee shall submit to the register of deeds of the
province or city where the property is located a sworn
statement showing the date and place of his birth; the
names and addresses of his parents, of his spouse and
children, if any; the area, the location and the mode of
acquisition of his landholdings in the Philippines, if any;
his intention to reside permanently in the Philippines; the
date he lost his Philippine citizenship and the country of
which he is presently a citizen; and such other
information as may be required under Section 8 of this
Act.
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not
apply in the instant case since said requirements are primarily directed to
the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be submitted.
Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the
requirements must likewise be submitted before the land registration court
prior to the approval of an application for registration of title. An
application for registration of title before a land registration court should not
be confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of
deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving
the application for registration has become final that a decree of registration
is issued. And that is the time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185,
before the register of deeds should be complied with by the applicants. This
decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the register
of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior
to the issuance of the decree of registration, the register of deeds has no
participation in the approval of the application for registration of title as the
decree of registration is yet to be issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 91189 November 27, 1992
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
SAMUEL BUYCO and EDGAR BUYCO, represented by their
attorney-in-fact, RIEVEN H. BUYCO and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In its Decision of 5 February 1985, 1 Branch 82 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) at Odiongan, Romblon granted the application of the private
respondents, who are American citizens, to bring within the operation of the
Land Registration Act a parcel of land with an area of 3,194,788 square
meters (319.4788 hectares) which spreads across the barangays of
Canduyong, Anahao and Ferrol in the municipality of Odiongan, Province
of Romblon, and to confirm their title thereto.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals; he alleged therein
that the trial court erred (a) in not declaring the private respondents barred
by the Constitution from applying for registration because they are
American citizens and are thus disqualified from acquiring lands in the
Philippines, (b) in holding that private respondents had established
proprietary rights over the land even before acquiring American citizenship
through naturalization, and (c) independently of the issue of alienage, in not
dismissing the application for registration on the basis of the private
respondents failure to overthrow, by conclusive or well-nigh
incontrovertible proof, the presumption that the land applied for is public
land belonging to the State. 2
In its Decision of 21 November 1989 in CA-G.R. CV No. 05824, 3 public
respondent dismissed the appeal "for lack of merit." 4
Petitioner consequently filed this petition on 11 January 1990 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. Reiterating the issues he raised before the respondent
Court, he seeks a review and reversal of the latter's decision. 5
In the Resolution of 11 July 1990, this Court gave due course to the petition
after the filing by the private respondents of their Comment to the same and
by the petitioner of his reply thereto.6 On 17 April 1991, the parties were
required to file their respective Memoranda. 7
The records disclose the following material operative facts and procedural
antecedents:
A certain Charles Hankins, an American who was married to Laura Crescini
and who resided in Canduyong, Odiongan, Romblon, died on 31 May 1937
leaving a will (Exhibit "N"). He was survived by his widow; his son
Alexander and William; and his grandchildren Ismael Samuel and Edgar, all
surnamed Buyco, who are the legitimate issues of his deceased daughter
Lilia and her husband Marcelino Buyco. The will was submitted for probate
before the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Romblon. Charles Hankins' son Alexander was appointed administrator of
the estate in Special Proceedings No. 796.
Laura Crescini died on 22 December 1941.
It appears that in a Project of Partition dated 25 June 1947 (Exhibit "O") and
submitted to the probate court in the aforesaid Special Proceedings No. 796,
one of the properties of Charles Hankins described as "a parcel of
pastureland, riceland and coconut land containing an area of about 250
hectares, 21 ares and 63 untares . . . assessed at for P6,950.00 as per Tax
Declaration No. 15853," was partitioned among his heirs as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
TO LAURA C. HANKINS, . . .
(a) 157 acres . . . comprised in what is
known as Carabao Pastureland and
Milk-Cow Pasture. (This land is a
portion of the land described in tax
declaration N0. 15853 . . .)
xxx xxx xxx
 TO ALEXANDER HANKINS, . . .
(a) 80 acres of land (pasture) which is a
portion of the land described in Tax
declaration No. 15853 . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
TO LILIA HANKINS, . . .
(a) 100 acres of pastureland situated in
the barrio of Canduyong and which is a
portion of the entire parcel described in
tax declaration No. 15853 . . . .
(b) 25 acres of pasture land situated in
the barrio of Canduyong and which is a
portion of the entire parcel described in
tax declaration No. 15853.
xxx xxx xxx
TO WILLIAM B. HANKINS, . . .
(a) 100 acres of pastureland situated in
the barrio of Canduyong and which is a
portion of the entire parcel described in
tax declaration No. 15853 . . . .
(b) 25 acres of pasture land situated in
barrio Anajao and which is a portion of
the entire parcel described in tax
declaration No. 15853 . . . . 8
The total area so adjudicated is 487 acres, or 197.086 hectares (1 hectare =
2.471 acres)
On 30 July 1948, Laura's share in the estate of her husband Charles was
partitioned among her children. Alexander and William, and her
grandchildren, Ismael, Samuel and Edgar who were represented by their
father Marcelino Buyco (Exhibit "P"). Thereafter, on the same date,
William sold his hereditary shares in the estate of his parents to Marcelino
Buyco (Exhibit "R").
On 20 August 1962, Marcelino Buyco donated to his children the property
acquired from William together with other properties (Exhibit "S").
On 8 September 1970, the Buyco brothers partitioned among themselves the
properties acquired by inheritance from their grandparents and by donation
from their father (Exhibit "T"). However, Ismael waived his right to his
share therein in favor of Samuel, one of the private respondents in this case.
Edgar and Samuel Buyco became naturalized American citizens on 29
January 1972 and 12 September 1975, respectively.
On 14 October 1967, Edgar and Samuel, through their attorney-in-fact,
Rieven H. Buyco, filed before the then Court of First Instance of Romblon
an application for the registration of a parcel of land, described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot I, under surveyed for the heirs of
Lilia Hankins situated in the barrios of Canduyong,
Anahao and Ferrol, Municipality of Odiongan, province
of Romblon, Tablas Island under PSU 127238) LRC
Record No. ________: Bounded on the North by
properties of the heirs of Rita Fiedacan and Alexander
Hankins; on the Northeast, by Canduyong River and
property of Alexander Hankins; on the East, by properties
of Andres Cuasay, Escolastica Feruelo, Candido
Mendoza, Raymundo Goray, Pedro Goray, Manuel Yap,
Feliza Fedri and Silverio Mierculecio; on the Southeast,
by properties of Candido Mendoza, the Heirs of Benita
Formilleza Silverio Mierculecio, Zosimo Llorca, Lot 2,
and properties of Beatrice Hankins and Zosimo Llorca; on
the West, by properties of Maria Llorca and Miguel
Llorca; and on the Northwest, by property of Catalino
Fabio. Point "I" is S. 33 deg. 24"., 4075.50 m. from
 B.L.L.M. 1, Odiongan, Romblon. Area THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT
(3,194,788) SQUARE METERS, more or less as Exhibit
"C". 9
which they claim to own in fee simple as they acquired the same by
inheritance and donation inter vivos. However, they allege in paragraph 9 of
the application that should the Land Registration Act be inapplicable, the
benefits provided for under C.A. No. 141, as amended, be made to extend to
them since both they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession thereof since time immemorial. The application was docketed as
Land Registration Case No. N-48 LRC Record No. N-51706.
The above description is based on a survey plan prepared by private land
surveyor Santiago Español in 1950 (Exhibit "C") and subsequently
approved by the Director of Lands. While in their application, private
respondents invoked the provisions of the Land Registration Act,10 they
eventually sought for a confirmation of imperfect title pursuant to paragraph
(b), Section 48 of the Public Land Act 11, as further amended by P.D. No.
1073.
While only the herein petitioner filed an opposition thereto, the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) manifested that the portion of
the property pertaining to Samuel Buyco is covered by a mortgage in its
favor. After the jurisdictional facts had been established during the initial
hearing and a general order of default entered against all other parties, the
lower court designated the Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Odiongan
as commissioner to receive the evidence for the parties. Samuel Buyco,
William Hankins, Manuel Firmalo and Jacinta Gomez Gabay (who was 83
years old when she took the witness stand in October 1979) testified for the
applicants. The first two (2) recounted the history of the tract of land up to
the time of the abovementioned partitions and the alleged possession of the
entire area by the applicants (private respondents herein).
On 5 February 1985, the land registration court handed down a
Decision 12 the dispositive portion of which reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court hereby orders the
registration of title to the parcel of land designated as Lot
No. 1 Psu-127238 and its technical description together
with all the improvements thereon, in the name of the
herein applicants, recognizing the interest of the
Development Bank of the Philippines to be annotated on
the certificate of title to be issued as mortgagee for the
amount of P200,000.00 with respect to the share of
applicants (sic) Samuel H. Buyco.
Upon the decision become (sic) final let the
corresponding decree and certificate of title be issued
accordingly.
The favorable decision is based on the court's conclusion that:
The oral and documentary evidence indubitably show
applicants and their predecessors-in-interest — their
grandparents Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini, to their
uncle Alexander Hankins, to them thru their
administrators Gregorio Gabay and later Manuel Firmalo
— have possessed the property herein sought to be
registered in the concept of owners thereof, and such
possession has been continuous, uninterrupted, adverse,
open and public for a period of more than eighty years.
And their right over the property is duly recognized by the
adjoining owners in their individual affidavits marked as
Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-21", inclusive. Moreover, none
of the adjoining owners filed any opposition to the herein
land registration case, thereby indubitably showing their
recognition of the correctness of the boundary (sic)
between their individual lots and that of applicants land
subject of this registration.
The late Charles Hankins declared said land for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 15853 (please see
description of lot in Exh. "N") and thereafter in the name
of applicants and/or their father Marcelino Buyco since
1949 up to the present time (Exhs. "W", "W-1" to "W-
19").
Applicants have also paid the real estate taxes thereon
since 1948 up to the present time (Exhs. "X", "X-1" to
"X-194").
In 1950, the land of applicants was surveyed by Private
Surveyor Santiago Español and its exact metes and
bounds were determined with accuracy in his survey plan
PSU-127238 (Exh. "C"). This survey corrected the
impreciseness of the land area as mentioned in the several
instruments –– the will, project of partition, deed of
partition, deed of sale (Exhs. "N", "O", "P", and "R") —
under which applicants acquired the land in question. The
correctness of this survey is further shown by the fact that
none of the other heirs, like Alexander Hankins nor (sic)
the adjoining owners ever made a claim over any portion
of the lot shown in said Psu-127238.
The land in question has been primarily devoted to cattle
grazing (sic) and to the cultivation of rice and coconut and
it was (sic) the applicants and their predecessors-in-
interest have (sic) been reaping the fruits thereof.
The evidence further show (sic) that applicants can
rightfully and did validly acquire title and ownership over
the land in question because they were then Filipino
citizens, their father Marcelino Buyco being a Filipino
citizen himself (please see personal circumstances of
Marcelino Buyco in Exhs. "P" and "R") and their modes
of acquisition — by inheritance, intestate succession, and
donation inter-vivos — are all legally recognized modes
to transfer ownership to them from their predecessors-in-
interest.
Since time immemorial, applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest have exercised all the attributes
of dominion and absolute ownership over the land in
question, and have therefore established their vested
proprietary rights and registrable (sic) title over the land
in question, rights which they have acquired long before
they became citizens of the United States (Edgar Buyco
became a U.S. citizen only on January 29, 1972; while
Samuel H. Buyco, only on September 12, 1975. As a
matter of fact, applicant Samuel H. Buyco mortgaged in
favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines (Exhs.
"U", "U-1" and "U-2") the portion belonging to him in
Lot 1, Psu-127238.
From the foregoing evidence it has been satisfactorily
established that the applicants have acquired an imperfect
and incomplete title over the parcel of land subject of this
registration proceedings in their own right as citizens of
the Philippines so as to entitle them to a confirmation and
registration of said lot in their names. Consequently
Section II, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution does not
apply to this case, neither (sic) does this case fall under
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 713. 13
More specifically, the conclusion regarding possession is based on the
testimonies of Manuel Firmalo, William Hankins and Jacinta Gomez Gabay
which, as summarized by the court, are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Witness Manuel Firmalo testified that from 1970 to 1978
he was the administrator, of the property of applicants;
that the said property is located in the Barrios of Anahao,
Canduyong, and Tubigon (now forming part of the
municipality of Ferrol) and the same is shown in the
survey may marked as Exh. "C" (Psu-127238); that said
lot is separated from the adjacent properties by concrete
monuments, big tress and some barb (sic) wire fence (sic);
that previous to his administration thereof, the same
property was administered by his father-in-law, Gregorio
Gabay; . . . that during his administration, a large part of
the land was devoted to cattle grazing and a little portion,
to coconut (sic) which are now fruit bearing; that when he
took over the administration of the ranch, there was a total
of 120 heads of cattle and at the time of termination of his
administration there were 300 heads; that from time to
time, some cattle in the ranch were sold by him and he
rendered an accounting to the applicants, the owners of
the ranch; that he employed cowhands to help him ran
(sic) the ranch of applicants and the salaries of said
cowhands were paid out of the funds of applicant Samuel
Buyco from the sale of the cattle; that the proceeds of the
coconuts harvested, the money was (sic) deposited with
the bank and a portion was used for the payment of the
real estate taxes on the land; that during his administration
no third person ever claimed ownership over applicants
land; that he was the one who procured the execution of
the affidavits of adjoining owners (Exhs. "V", "V-1" to
"V-21") which were used to support the real estate
mortgage with the DBP over said land; that from the
proceeds of the sale of the copra harvested from the land
of applicants,. he paid the real estate taxes thereon
specifically the taxes covered by Exhs. "X-83" to "X-
144"; . . . that his administration over said land was
adverse, open continuous and public.
William Hankins, then 72 years old and resident (sic) of
Odiongan, Romblon, testified . . .; that ever since he was
still a small kid, he know (sic) that the big tract of land
subject of their partition was already owned by his father
(Charles Hankins); that the possession of his father was in
the concept of owner, continuous, adverse, public, and
open, up to his (Charles Hankins) death; that after
receiving his hereditary share from the estates of his
father and mother, he sold his said shares to Marcelino
Buyco, father of applicants by executing a Deed of Sale
(Exh. "R") dated July 30, 1948; that during the lifetime of
Charles Hankins; the big tract of land was devoted
primarily to cattle grazing and to coconut and rice; that
after he sold his hereditary share of (sic) Marcelino
Buyco, the latter took possession of his said portion; that
after Marcelino Buyco died, the property of Marcelino
Buyco (including his share (sic) hereditary share sold
under Ex. (sic) "R") was transmitted to his children,
namely: Edgar H. Buyco, Ismael Buyco and Samuel H.
Buyco (Samuel and Edgar Buyco, the (sic) applicants
herein); that he known that at present the owners in
possession of the property subject of this registration
proceedings are applicants Samuel Buyco and Edgar
Buyco; that the said land is devoted to cattle grazing and
planted with coconuts and rice.
xxx xxx xxx
Jacinta Gomez Gabay, 83 years (as of October, 1979) . . .
testified that she knew the spouses Charles Hankins and
Laura Crescini because since the time she can remember,
she stayed with said spouses up to the (sic) their death
(sic); that having stayed with the Hankins couple, she
knew of their properties because she lived with them in
Canduyong where the property was situated; that the
property is a big tract of land; . . . that when she was
living with the Hankins spouses, said spouses already
owned and were in possession of this big tract of land,
and this land was fenced off with barbed wires, and that
said big tract of land has been used for grazing purposes
since she reached the age of reason up to the present time;
that during all the time that she has been with said
Hankins spouses, nobody ever claimed any portion
thereof; that this property extended from barrio
Canduyong up to barrio Anahao; that after Charles
Hankins died, his property was divided among his
children Alexander Hankins, William Hankins and Lilia
Hankins and the latter's share was received by her
children named Ismael, Samuel and Edgar all surnamed
Buyco; that before Charles Hankins' estate was
partitioned it was placed under the administration of
Alexander Hankins (one of the heirs); that after the
partition, the portion (sic) that went to the Buyco children
(as heirs of Lilia Hankins) were administered by her
husband Gregorio Gabay; that her husband's
administration over said property started 3 or 4 years after
 the war which (sic) lasted 25 years or until Gregorio
Gabay died; that his son-in-law Manuel Firmalo took over
the administration of applicants' property; that the land
she was referring to is utilized as a pasture land and it has
been a pasture since the time it was it was owned by
spouses Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini up to the
present time; that Edgar, Samuel and Ismael, all surnamed
Buyco have been receiving the fruits of the portion that
went to Lilia Hankins; that Charles Hankins' possession of
that big tract of land was in the concept of owner,
continuous, adverse, open and public; that a portion of
this big tract of land went to Edgar H. Buyco, Samuel H.
Buyco and Ismael H. Buyco as the heirs of Lilia Hankins;
that the possession of the said heirs of the late Lilia
Hankins over the portion that went to them was in the
concept of owner, continuous, adverse, open and public
up to the present time; that as far as she can remember the
Hankins family possessed said property for more than
eighty (80) years. 14
The land registration court also summarized the testimony of private
respondent Samuel H. Buyco as to possession in this wise:
Applicant Samuel H. Buyco testified that he was 51 years
of age, . . .; that prior to the death of his grandfather
Charles Hankins, that big parcel of pastureland was about
500 to 550 hectares, the boundaries of which were marked
off by concrete monuments, some big trees, some big
stones until it was partitioned in 1948, and to fix the
actual boundaries, the land was surveyed by private
surveyor Español (Exh. "D"); that during the lifetime of
their grandfather Charles Hankins this big land was
primarily used as a ranch and it was fenced off by barb
(sic) wires to prevent the cattle from getting out; that after
the death of his grandfather Charles Hankins, the property
was administered by his uncle Alexander Hankins, and
such administration was terminated when there was a
partition in 1948 in accordance with the will of his
grandfather; that during the administration of the property
by Alexander Hankins, this property was used as a cattle
ranch, even during the Japanese time; that after receiving
their share form the partition of the estate, they initially
planted rice and coconut and later on they reverted to
cattle ranch operation (sic); that after he and his brother
Edgar became the possessor (sic) of said land, they were
the one (sic) who have been harvesting the fruits of the
land; that they did not personally managed (sic) the land
but hired in 1949 the services of Mr. Gregorio Gabay to
administer the estate for them until 1970 when the latter
died, and Manuel Firmalo was hired to take over the
administration until 1977 when applicant took over active
management of the property because he obtained a loan of
P200,000.00 from the Development Bank of the
Philippines; . . . that the land was declared in their name
(sic) for taxation purposes by their administrator Gregorio
Gabay in 1949 (Exhs. "W", "W-1" to "W-19", inclusive)
and that the taxes thereon were paid out of their own
money since 1948 up to the present (Exhs. "X", "X-1" to
"X-194", inclusive); that applicants' possession in the
concept of owner over the property sought to be
registered has been open, continuous, uninterrupted,
adverse and
public. 15
As earlier adverted to petitioner's appeal from the said decision was
dismissed by the public respondent for lack of merit. As to the private
respondents' title to the land subject of the application, public respondent
makes the following findings:
Undisputably, applicant-appellees anchored their title to
the land in question by means of hereditary succession as
well as donation from their own father, Marcelino Buyco,
who purchased the entire hereditary share of William
Hankins (Exhs. "R"). Subsequently, applicants-appellees
and their brother, Ismael, partitioned their hereditary
share from their grandparents, the spouses Hankins,
including the property donated by their father, Marcelino
Buyco, in an instrument dated September 8, 1970 (Exh.
"T"). In this partition, the share of Ismael H. Buyco went
to applicant-appellee Samuel H. Buyco (Exh. "T-1").
 From the records extant in this case, it is Our considered
view that from almost (sic) time immemorial or a period
of eighty (80) years, applicant-appellees through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, continuous,
and peaceful possession of the property in question so that
the inescapable conclusion is that all along it is private
land and had been segregated from the dominion (sic) of
the State. Thus, We sustain the conclusion reached by the
court a quo that the latter (applicants-appellees) thru their
predecessors-in-interest have acquired title by acquisitive
prescription over the same. . . . 16
As to the issue of the private respondents citizenship, public respondent
held that:
. . . it is beyond per adventure (sic) of doubt that
applicants-appellees were still Filipinos when they
acquired their title thereto. From the death of their
grandfather Charles Hankins on May 31, 1937,
applicants-appellees right of succession was already
vested. Moreover, as early as the year 1962, their father
Marcelino Buyco transferred his title thereto by
donation inter-vivos so that on September 8, 1970, when
the Buyco brothers partitioned the property in question,
among themselves, they could validly register the same as
they already possess the necessary qualifications to have
their title perfected under the Torrens system of
registration. 17
The petition is meritorious.
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduce, the private respondents do
not rely on fee simple ownership base on a Spanish grant or possessory
information title under Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the private
respondents did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-
interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo
real" or royal; (b) the "concession especial" or special grant; (c)
the "composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de
compra" or title of purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or
possessory information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or
gratuitous title.18 The primary basis of their claim is possession, by
themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial. The
land registration court and the public respondent are of the opinion, and so
held, that the private respondents had this in their favor. Thus, both courts
declared that the land applied for had been segregated from the public
domain and had become private land.
If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in
possession since time immemorial, the rulings of both courts could be
upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands; 19
. . . All lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain. An exception to the rule would be any
land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain even before the Spanish conquest. (Cariño
vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. ed.,
594.)20 The applicant does not come under the exception,
for the earliest possession of the lot by his first
predecessor in interest began in 1880.
This exception was reiterated in Susi vs. Razon, 21 where the first possessor
was in possession was in possession for an undetermined period of time
prior to 1880. We stated therein:
. . . In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et de jure established, in paragraph (b)
of section 45 of Act No. 2874, 22 amending Act No. 926,
that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government were complied with, for he has been in
actual and physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain
openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July
26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land
under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. . . . If by
 a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in
question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to
be of the public domain and had become private property,
at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the
control of the Director of Lands.
Although this additional pronouncement was rippled by the ruling Manila
Electric Co. vs. Castro-Bartolome 23, to the effect that land would cease to
be public only upon the issuance of a certificate of title to any Filipino
citizen claiming it under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, 24 and that a
piece of land over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed
remains public, this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice, now
Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, in Director of Lands vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 25 reiterated the Cariño and Susi doctrine, thus:
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view,
and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralcomust be
reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding
precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of
cases already referred to, 26 is that alienable public land
held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessor-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years
under The Public Land Act, as amended) is covered to
private property by the mere lapse or completion of said
period, ipso jure.
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a)
the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept
abovestated, must be either since time immemorial, as ruled in
both Cariño and Susi, or for the period prescribe in the Public Land Act. As
to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos vs. Court of
Appeals, 27 adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per then
Associate Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., now a distinguished member of
this Court, that an applicant for registration under Section 48 of the Public
Land Act must secure a certification from the Government that the lands
which he claims to have possessed as owner for more than thirty (30) years
are alienable and disposable. It is the burden of the applicant to prove its
positive averments.
In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove
that the property subject of the application is an alienable and disposable
parcel of land of the public domain. On the contrary, based on their own
evidence, the entire property which is alleged to have originally belonged to
Charles Hankins was pasture land. According to witness Jacinta Gomez
Gabay, this land has been pasture land, utilized for grazing purposes, since
the time it was "owned" by the spouses Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini
up to the present time (i.e., up to the date she testified). In Director of Lands
vs. Rivas, 28 this Court ruled:
Grazing lands and timber lands are not alienable under
section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution and
sections 8, 10 and 11 of Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution. Section 10 distinguishes strictly agricultural
lands (disposable) from grazing lands (inalienable).
The instant application was filed, heard and decided under the regime of the
1973 Constitution.
As to the second matter to be proved, the applicant must present evidence of
an imperfect title such as those derived from the old Spanish grants. He may
also show that he has been in continuous, open and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership and for the period prescribed under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. 29 Simply put, a person who seeks the
registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of possession by himself
and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and
convincing evidence; he should not rely on the weakness of the evidence of
the
oppositors. 30 This rule is certainly not new. In the 1913 case of Maloles
vs. Director of Lands, 31 this Court already held that in order that a
petitioner may be entitled to have a parcel of land registered under the
Torrens system, he has to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee
simple, of the said land; moreover, it is the duty of the court, even in the
absence of any oppositor, to require the petitioner to show, by a
preponderance of the evidence and by positive and absolute proof, so far as
it is possible, that he is the owner in fee simple of the land in question.
In Santiago vs. de los Santos, 32 this rule was to find anchorage in policy
considerations based no less on one of the fundamental objectives of the
Constitution, namely the conservation and utilization of our natural
resources. We held in the said case that there would be a failure to abide by
its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to
private ownership of real estate. This Court then set the quantum of
evidence needed to be established by the applicant, to wit: well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence.
In the instant case, private respondents evidence miserably failed to
establish their imperfect title to the property in question. Their allegation of
possession since time immemorial, which was conceded by the land
registration court and the public respondent, is patently baseless. There is an
evident failure to comprehend the meaning and import of the
term immemorial. As defined, immemorial simply means beyond the reach
of memory, 33 beyond human memory, or time out of mind. 34 When
referring to possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means
possession of which no man living has seen the beginning, and the existence
of which he has learned form his elders. 35 Such possession was never
present in the case of the private respondents. The trial court and the public
respondent based the finding of the more than eighty (80) years of
possession by the private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest on
the sole testimony of Mrs. Gabay who was eighty-three (83) years old when
she testified in October of 1979. Thus, she must have been born in 1896. If
the asserted possession lasted for a period of more than eighty (80) years at
the time she testified the same must have commenced sometime in 1899, or
at the time that she was barely three (3) years old. It is quite impossible that
she could fully grasp, before coming to the age of reason, the concept of
possession of such a big tract of land and testify on the same some eight (8)
decades later. In short, therefore, she cannot be relied upon to prove the
possession by Charles Hankins of the said property from 1899.
Charles Hankins was an American citizen. There is no evidence to show the
date of his birth, his arrival in the Philippines — particularly in Odiongan,
Romblon — or his acquisition of the big tract of land; neither is there any
evidence to prove the manner of his acquisition thereof. Thus, there does
not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the private respondents
and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than eighty
(80) years, much less since time immemorial. In Oh Cho vs. Director of
Lands, 36 possession which began in 1880 was not considered as possession
"since time immemorial."
There is as well, no evidence on record to show that Charles Hankins
cultivated, had control over or used the whole or even a greater portion of
the big tract of land for grazing purposes. None of the witnesses testified as
to the number of heads of cattle which were bought by Charles into the
land. There is likewise no competent proof that he declared the land in his
name for taxation purposes or that he had paid the taxes thereon. Although
his will (Exhibit "N") made mention of Tax Declaration No. 15853, neither
the said declaration nor any tax receipt was presented in evidence. Because
of such non-production, it cannot be determined when Charles initially
declared his alleged land for taxation purpose and what exactly were its
natural boundaries, if any. It is clear that the non-production of this tax
declaration accounted for the obvious inability of the witnesses to testify
with certainty as to the extent of the area of the property. As correctly
observed by the petitioner, none of the private respondents' witnesses could
give the court a definite idea thereon. Thus, Samuel Buyco declared:
I really don't know the exact area, but it is between 500 to
550 hectares. 37
while William Hankins admitted:
I cannot exactly tell because that is a very big estate. 38
On the other hand, witness Jacinta Gomez Gabay averred:
I could not exactly tell but I have heard that it was a big
tract of land because we were staying there. 39
In any event, even if Charles had indeed declared the property for taxation
purposes and actually paid taxes, such facts are still insufficient to justify
possession thereof, much less a claim of ownership thereon. This Court has
repeatedly held that the declaration of ownership for purposes of assessment
on the payment of the tax is not sufficient to prove ownership. 40
To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that Charles
Hankins had possessed the property — allegedly covered by Tax
Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of both his last will and
testament and the project of partition of his estate among his heirs — in
such a manner as to remove the same from the public domain under the
Cariño and Susi doctrines. Thus, when he died on 31 May 1937, he
transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the said property, to his
heirs. This being the case, his possession cannot be tacked to that of the
private respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their application. It
would have been entirely different if the possession of Charles was open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious and under a bona fide claim of ownership
as provided under Section 48 of the Public Land Act. Even if he were an
American citizen at that time, he would have had the same civil rights as
Filipino citizens pursuant to the original ordinance appended to the 1935
Constitution. the pertinent portion of said ordinance reads:
(17) Citizens and corporations of the United States shall
enjoy in the Commonwealth of the Philippines all the civil
rights of the citizens and corporations, respectively,
thereof.
The import of said paragraph (17) was confirmed and reinforced the
originally by Section 44 of Act No. 2874 and Section 127 of C.A. No. 141
(The Public Land Act of 1936); the latter provided that:
Sec. 127. During the existence and continuance of the
Commonwealth and before the Republic of the
Philippines is established, citizens and corporations of the
United States shall enjoy the same rights granted to
citizens and corporations of the Philippines under this
Act.
This right, however, vanished with the advent of the Philippine Republic on
4 July 1946. 41
Verily, private respondents had to rely exclusively on their own possession.
under the applicable law at the time, it was incumbent upon them to prove
that they had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural land of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. 42
By their own evidence, private respondents admitted that they were never in
actual possession of the property prior to the filing of their application.
During the pendency of Special Proceedings No. 796, the estate of Charles
Hankins appeared to have been administered by his son Alexander. This
administration was terminated in 1948 upon the execution of the Project of
Partition. Private respondents and their brother Ismael did not take
possession of the share which pertained to their mother, Lilia; instead; they
allegedly hired Gregorio Gabay to administer the same. There is, however,
no competent evidence to show the extent of such administration.
Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that Gregorio had the property declared
for taxation purposes, the correct area and boundaries of the same have not
been proven. As evidenced by the Project of Partition, the share of Lilia was
only 125 acres or 50.59 hectares, which is clearly not the portion applied
for. The area applied for consists of 319.4788 hectares of land based on a
survey plan prepared by private land surveyor Español on the basis of a
survey conducted in 1950. Obviously, therefore, the plan was not prepared
to determine Lilia's share alone for, as admitted by the private respondents
themselves, this plan includes William Hankins' share which was sold to
Marcelino Buyco, private respondents father, and the other properties which
the latter donated to the private respondents and Ismael Buyco on 20
August 1962 (Exhibit "S"). However, there is no competent evidence as to
the respective boundaries and areas of the properties constituting the said
share of William Hankins; neither are there reliable descriptions of the other
alleged properties belonging to Marcelino Buyco. Be that as it may, when
the survey was conducted by Español, private respondents and their brother
Ismael did not immediately acquire the portion originating from William
Hankins and the other alleged properties of Marcelino Buyco; hence, there
was no valid basis for the inclusion of said properties in the survey. And
even if both William's share and Marcelino Buyco's properties were
included there would still be nothing to support the application for the entire
319,4788 hectares considering that as per the Project of Partition, the share
pertaining to William consisted only of 50.59 hectares. There was,
moreover, no evidence to show the extent of the alleged "other properties"
of Marcelino Buyco. Given such circumstances, it would be reasonable to
presume that what was surveyed in 1950 was the entire pasture land alleged
to form part of the estate of Charles Hankins, covered by Tax Declaration the Regional Trial Court of Romblon in Land Registration Case No. N-48,
No. 15853, and which necessarily included the share of Alexander Hankins. LRC Record No. N-51706 is REVERSED.
Significantly, per Exhibit "O" the latter's share is specified as part of the
property covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853. The inclusion then of Costs against the private respondents.
Alexander's share in the survey and the plan may provide the clue to this
unusual increase in the area covered by the survey plan.
SO ORDERED.

Nevertheless, even if We are to assume for argument's sake that there was
nothing irregular in the inclusion in the survey plan of the share of William
Hankins and the other properties of Marcelino Buyco, the fact remains that
the "ownership" thereof could have been acquired by the private
respondents and Ismael Buyco only on 20 August 1962 upon the execution
of the deed of donation in their favor. To be thus benefited by the
possession of William or Marcelino for purposes of Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, there should be proof that said predecessors had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
thereof. Unfortunately, no such proof was offered.

It is palpably obvious then that at the time Land Registration Case No. N-48
was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon on 14 October 1976,
private respondents did not have in their favor an imperfect title over that
which they claimed to have inherited, by representation, from the estate of
Charles Hankins. With greater force does this conclusion likewise apply
with respect to the properties donated to them in 1962 by their father
Marcelino Buyco. This is because they were not able to prove open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30)
years immediately preceding the filing of the application, 43 or from 12 June
1945. 44

Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before

such filing, it goes without saying that they had acquired no vested right,
consisting of an imperfect title over to property before they lost their
Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of the

public respondent of 21 November 1989 in CA-G.R. CV No. 05824 is
hereby SET ASIDE and the Decision of 5 February 1985 of Branch 82 of