G.R. No.

175723, February 4, 2014

THE CITY OF MANILA ETC., ET AL. v. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO ETC., ET AL

PERALTA, J.:

NATURE:

This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the Resolutions1 dated April 6, 2006 and November 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:

Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable
period from January to December 2002 against the private respondents.In addition to the taxes
purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue
Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes. private respondents were
constrained to pay the P 19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.

On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed before the RTC of Pasay City the complaint denominated
as one for “Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously–Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition
with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction

The RTC granted private respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 but the RTC denied. Petitioners then filed a special civil
action for certiorari with the CA but the CA dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari holding that it
has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private
respondents’ complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows
that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should,
likewise, be filed with the CTA.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the CA denied it in its Resolution hence, this petition

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory
order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
HELD:

The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by
the RTC in a local tax case. In order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate
jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring
exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law
intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such
appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as
partial, not total.

Consistent with the above pronouncement, the Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. [118 Phil. 1022 (1963)] that “if a case may be appealed to a particular court or
judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.” This principle was affirmed in De
Jesus v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992) where the Court stated that “a court may
issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by
appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.

BRGY. CAPTAIN BEDA TORRECAMPO, Petitioner, v. METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWAGE

SYSTEM, Respondents.

The Facts

Torrecampo's constituents approached him to report that personnel and heavy equipment from the
DPWH entered a portion of their Barangay to implement the C-5 Road Extension Project over Lot Nos.
42-A-4, 42-A-6 and 42-A-4. Torrecampo Alleged that if the MWSS and the DPWH are allowed to continue
and complete the C-5 Road Extension Project, 3 aqueducts of the MWSS supplying water to 8 million
Metro Manila residents will be put at great risk. He Insisted that the RIPADA area is a better alternative
to subject lots. Torrecampo thus filed the present petition.

This Court required respondents to comment. A status quo order was issued. The hearing regarding the
urgent application for ex-parte temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction was set
on 6 July 2009.

Atty. Villamor, Jr. contended that grave injustice and irreparable injury to would result should the
petition be denied, the constitutional right to health would be violated, and that the petition was filed
directly with the SC because lower courts are prohibited from issuing restraining orders and injunctions
against government infrastructure projects pursuant to R.A 8975.
Asst. Solicitor General Panga, for respondent DPWH, asserts that petitioner's case does not fall under an
exception and thus should have followed the principle of hierarchy of courts.

Atty. Agra for respondent MWSS finds as premature the filing of the petition for injunction as there is
yet no road expansion project to be implemented, the project has yet to pass prior review by the MWSS;
under the premises, there is yet no justiciable controversy.

The Court then required all parties to submit their memoranda, further, the status quo order was lifted
since no grave injustice or irreparable injury would arise.

On 12 March 2009, MWSS issued Board Resolution No. 2009-052 and allowed DPWH to use the 60
Meter Right-of-Way for preliminary studies in the implementation of the C-5 Road Extension Project.
DPWH entered the said properties of the MWSS on 30 June 2009.

ISSUE: Whether respondents should be enjoined from commencing with and implementing the C-5 Road
Extension Project

HELD: The petition must fail.

Torrecampo seeks judicial review of a question of Executive policy, a matter outside this Court's
jurisdiction. Here, the issue is dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. Thus,
Torrecampo wants this Court to determine whether the Tandang Sora area is a better alternative to the
RIPADA area for the C-5 Road Extension Project. Such determination belongs to the Executive branch
and cannot be touched upon by this Court.

The exception to this rule applies when there is grave abuse of discretion. In this case, however, the
DPWH still has to conduct the proper study to determine whether a road can be safely constructed on
land beneath which runs the aqueducts. Without such study, the MWSS, which owns the land, cannot
decide whether to allow the DPWH to construct the road. Absent such DPWH study and MWSS decision,
no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction can be alleged against or attributed to
respondents warranting the exercise of this Court's extraordinary certiorari power.
MIRASOL VS CA [351 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 128448; 1 Feb 2001]

Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the
Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols
signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of
PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's sugar and to apply the
proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.

President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to
purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree
directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government. Believing that
the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an accounting
of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make
unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due and
demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way of dacion en
pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged
properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.

Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if properly
liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under
P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of
sugar pertained to the National Government.

On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against
PNB.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to
the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial
Court.

(2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.

(3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.

Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power
of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional
Trial Courts.

The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide
whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny
the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must
stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions
involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in
"any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words
used in the rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In all actions assailing the validity of a statute,
treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.

Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for violating the due
process clause and the prohibition against the taking of private property without just compensation.
Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial review.

Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there must be
before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before
the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have
standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest
opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL –
ARROYO

G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days
after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under
Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution
prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up
the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief
Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two
declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.

The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the
Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its
occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the
Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not
written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure
its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as
stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which
the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process,
there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once
the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may
resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII,
which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the
vacancy.

ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement.

HELD:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme
Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall
not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall
be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in
division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have
ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have
ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power
of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within
the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive
Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume
that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended
Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a
similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

CLAUDIA S. YAP, Petitioner, v. THENAMARIS SHIPS MANAGEMENT and INTERMARE MARITIME

AGENCIES, INC.,Respondents.

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner was employed as an electrician of the vessel, M/T SEASCOUT by Intermare Maritime
Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture Shipping Limited.The contract was for 12 months.On 23
August 2001,Yapboarded M/T SEASCOUT and commenced his job as electrician. However, on or about
08 November 2001, the vessel was sold.

Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along with the scrapping bonus.However,
he insisted that he was entitled to the payment of the unexpired portion of his contract since he was
illegally dismissed from employment.He alleged that he opted for immediate transfer but none was
made.
Respondents contended that Yap was not illegally dismissed.They further alleged that Yaps contract was
validly terminated due to the sale of the vessel and no arrangement was made for Yaps transfer to
Thenamaris other vessels.

Thus, Yap brought the issue before the Labor Arbiter (LA) which ruled that petitioner was illegally
dismissed; that respondents acted in bad faith when they assured petitioner of re-embarkation but he
was not able to board; and that petitioner was entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
contract for a period of nine months (US$12,870.00), P100,000 for moral damages, and P50,000 for
exemplary damages with 10% of the same for Attys fees.

Respondents sought recourse from the NLRC which modified the award of salaries from that
corresponding to nine months to only three months (US$4,290.00) pursuant to Section 10 R.A. No. 8042.

Respondents and petitioner both filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

NLRC affirmed the finding of Illegal Dismissal and Bad Faith on the part of respondent. However, the
NLRC reversed its earlier Decision, holding that "there can be no choice to grant only 3 months salary for
every year of the unexpired term because there is no full year of unexpired term which this can be
applied."

Respondents filed an MR, which the NLRC denied. Undaunted, respondents filed a petition
forcertiorariunder Rule 65 before the CA.

The CA affirmed the findings and ruling of the LA and the NLRC. However, the CA ruled that the NLRC
erred in sustaining the LAs interpretation of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. The CA relied on the clause "or
for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" provided in the 5th paragraph
of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.

Both parties filed their respective MRs which the CA denied. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:

[1] Whether Section 10 of R.A. 8042, to the extent that it affords an illegally dismissed migrant worker
the lesser benefit of "salaries for [the] unexpired portion of his employment contract for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term,whichever is less" is constitutional;

[2] Assuming that it is, whether the CA gravely erred in granting petitioner only three (3) months
backwages when his unexpired term of 9 months is far short of the "every year of the unexpired term"
threshold.

HELD: The petition is impressed with merit.

We have previously declared that the clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less" is unconstitutional for being violative of the rights of (OFWs) to equal protection.
Moreover, the subject clause does not state any definitive governmental purpose, hence, it also violates
petitioner's right to substantive due process.

Generally, an unconstitutional act is not a law. An exception to this is the doctrine of operative fact
applied when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law. This case should not be included in the exception. It was not the fault of
petitioner that he lost his job due to an act of illegal dismissal committed by respondents.

Also, we cannot subscribe to respondents postulation that the tanker allowance of US$130.00 should
not be included in the computation of the lump-sum salary. First, fair play, justice, and due process
dictate that this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal, pass upon this question. Second, the
allowance was encapsulated in the basic salary clause.
Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No. 171101,
November 22, 2011

VELASCO, JR., J.:

I. THE FACTS

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition
filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock
Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are
operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court
declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to
the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want
to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to
them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs
will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing
their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with
respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to
remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its
earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and
UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary
to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but
also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and
effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and
consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be
applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution
approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the
Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed
to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also
given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA
6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not
the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no
longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011
decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless
that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the
issue of constitutionality.]
Gonzales vs. Narvasa G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000

Facts: Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality
of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.

The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study and recommend proposed
amendments and/or revisions to the Constitution, and the manner of implementing them.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case

Held: In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer.

A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury
as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be addressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not
shown that he has sustained or in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of
the PCCR and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Neither does he claim
that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected
to any penalties or burdens as a result of the issues raised.

In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue
when it is established that public funds have disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the
Constitution. Thus, payer’s action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its
taxing or spending power. In the creation of PCCR, it is apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of
its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of EO 43 as amended by
EO 70. The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. The funds
used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the
Chief Executive’s power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. As to the
creation of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants, the petitioner has not
alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayer’s interest
in this particular issue.
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this
Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on
October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss
the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this
effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI
of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint
or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by
at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis.

HELD:

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI,
Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by
former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices
of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the
second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against
the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that
judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere
specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to
clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions."
From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political
questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus
beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained.
On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions
which are not truly political in nature.

Chavez v JBC

Facts:

The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme Court
Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure.

Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent
and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body
representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC).

In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as
ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme
Court, and a representative of the private sector.” In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment
of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as
one of the ex officio members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7)
members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress
began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each
having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the
legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a
unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to the JBC.
The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was
adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the
Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a
unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress
in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house
of representation, defeating the principle of balance.

The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be members
of the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2)
members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are
undeniably presidential appointees

Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not just
for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention
for rectification of legal blunders.

Issue:

Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are
members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

Held:

No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the functions of
the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution that in the phrase, “a representative of Congress,” the use of the singular letter “a”
preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It
is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may
designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms,
so provided.

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or
is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to
be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a
word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning
may be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes
apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its
generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be
allowed to sit in the JBC

Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is
no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if
the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is
undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided
into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the
JBC for that matter.

With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be admitted from the Congress and
House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional
Commission, held that “Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one
body. While it is true that there are still differences between the two houses and that an inter-play
between the two houses is necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by
the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because no liaison
between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the
Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the
term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of
government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary.
Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than
one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would “negate the principle of
equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.”

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members
only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes
against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal
voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any
circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must
conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional
doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to
sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of
the government and the people who run it.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts,
actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar
Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute
itself so that only one ( 1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in
accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is immediately
executory.

JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO

Facts: Pursuant to the government’s plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao City, the Republic of the
Philippines filed an expropriation case against the owners of the properties affected by the project. The
expropriation case was presided by Judge Renato A. Fuentes. The government won the expropriation
case. DPWH still owed the defendants-lot owners. The lower court granted Tessie Amadeo’s motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution against the DPWH to satisfy her unpaid claim. On May 3, 1994,
respondent Sheriff Paralisan issued a Notice of Levy, addressed to the Regional Director of the DPWH,
Davao City, describing the properties subject of the levy as ‘All scrap iron/junks found in the premises of
the Department of Public Works and Highways depot at Panacan, Davao City. The auction sale pushed
through and Alex Bacquial emerged as the highest bidder. Meanwhile, Alex Bacquial, together with
respondent Sheriff Paralisan, attempted to withdraw the auctioned properties on May 19, 1994. They
were, however, prevented from doing so by the custodian of the subject DPWH properties, a certain
Engr. Ramon Alejo, who claimed that his office was totally unaware of the auction sale, and informed
the sheriff that many of the properties within the holding area of the depot were still serviceable and
were due for repair and rehabilitation.

On the basis of letters from Congressman Manuel M. Garcia of the Second District of Davao City and
Engineer Ramon A. Alejo, the Court Administrator, Supreme Court directed Judge Renato A. Fuentes and
Sheriff Norberto Paralisan to comment on the report recommending the filing of an administrative case
against the sheriff and other persons responsible for the anomalous implementation of the writ of
execution. The Department of Public Works and Highways, through the Solicitor General, filed an
administrative complaint against Sheriff Norberto Paralisan for conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service.

The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended that Judge Renato A. Fuentes be charged
before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e) and likewise be
administratively charged before the Supreme Court with acts unbecoming of a judge.

Director Valenzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao a criminal complaint
charging Judge Rentao A. Fuentes with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e).

Fuentes filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss complaint and/or
manifestation to forward all records to the Supreme Court.

Petitioner alleged that the respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he initiated a criminal complaint against petitioner for
violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3 [e]. And he conducted an investigation of said complaint against
petitioner. Thus, he encroached on the power of the Supreme Court of administrative supervision over
all courts and its personnel.

The Solicitor General submitted that the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation because the
Supreme Court is not in possession of any record which would verify the propriety of the issuance of the
questioned order and writ. Moreover, the Court Administrator has not filed any administrative case
against petitioner judge that would pose similar issues on the present inquiry of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao.
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his
official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of
an administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court.

Held: No.

Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:

“Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from
any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases.”

Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his
office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman
must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action.

Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk.

Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the
proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No other
branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the
judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.

Petitioner’s questioned order directing the attachment of government property and issuing a writ of
execution were done in relation to his office, well within his official functions. The order may be
erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of execution
was valid under the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the judicial action only
by the Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts. “No other entity or official of the
Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not any functionary
thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision--whether final and executory or not--and
pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an
unjust judgment or order.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151434, 3 March 2004]

Facts:

On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate
of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando
Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate
of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were
foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F.
Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being
an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on
two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie
Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack
of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion
was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the
decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a
writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the
COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434
and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President
of the Philippines.

Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those
who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August
1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship
- naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus
sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs.
Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the
reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now
become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on
the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his
parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents
would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20
August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4)
The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954,
Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth
certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody
of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during
the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of
the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and
to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-
Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were
dismissed.

PEOPLE VS MATEO

G.R. No. 147678-87 July 7 2004 [Judicial Power]

FACTS:

The MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1 found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 10 counts of rape and
to indemnify the complainant for actual and moral damages. Mateo appealed to the CA. Solicitor
General assailed the factual findings of the TC and recommends an acquittal of appellant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of express
provision in the constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or death.

RULING:

Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in
which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving
offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the
more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is
imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution –

Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

“(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

“x x x x x x x x x

“(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.”

It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it
does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an
intermediate appeal or review in favour of the accused.

In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence
of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the
evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal
from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed,
the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation of
primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet,
it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual issues.
G.R. Nos. 191002, 191032, 191057, 191149, 191342, & 191420, & A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC ARTURO M. DE
CASTRO, et al., Petitioners, versus JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Respondents.

Promulgated:

March 17, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

SEPARATE OPINION

NACHURA, J.:

No amount of exigency can make this Court exercise a power where it is not proper.[1]

I am deeply impressed by the very well written ponencia of Justice Lucas P. Bersamin. However, I am
unable to concur in all of his conclusions. Instead, I vote to dismiss all the petitions because they have
utterly failed to present a justiciable controversy.

The Antecedents

In recent weeks, two potential scenarios have gripped the public mind. The first is the specter of the
failure of our first ever automated election which has evoked numerous doomsday predictions. The
second is the possibility of the appointment by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Courtafter the compulsory retirement of incumbent Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno on May
17, 2010. This has generated frenzied debates in media, in various lawyers assemblies, in the academe,
and in coffee shops. It has even spawned a number of rallies and demonstrations by civil society groups
and by self-styled constitutional experts.

It does not matter that these two situations are merely possibilities, that they are conjectural and
speculative at this moment in time. They have, nonetheless, captured the public imagination, and have
ushered an open season for unfettered discussion and for dire prognostication.

Not unexpectedly, the controversy posed by the second scenario involving concerns closest to homehas
arrived in this Court through various petitions and interventions.

The core issue is whether the sitting President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, can validly
appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court when the incumbent Chief Justice, Reynato S. Puno,
compulsorily retires on May 17, 2010, in light of two apparently conflicting provisions of the
Constitution.

Article VII, Section 15, provides a constitutional limitation on the Presidents power of appointment, viz.:

Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.[2]

On the other hand, Article VIII, Section 4(1) contains an express mandate for the President to appoint
the Members of the Supreme Court within ninety days from the occurrence of a vacancy, thus

Sec. 4(1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.[3]

in relation to Article VIII, Section 9, which states that

Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof.

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission
of the list.

The perceived conflict was resolved in administrative matter, In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998
of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch
62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively.[4] Therein, the Court was confronted
with the question of whether the appointments of the concerned RTC judges, issued within two months
before the presidential election in 1998, were valid. The Court answered that, in the given situation,
Article VII, Section 15, has primacy over Article VIII, Section 4(1), because the former was couched in
stronger negative language. Accordingly, the appointments were nullified. However, Valenzuelas
applicability to the present controversy is challenged by most of herein petitioners.

The petitions were filed following certain acts of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) related to the
constitutional procedure for the appointment of Supreme Court justices, specifically in the matter of the
appointment of Chief Justice Punos successor. On January 18, 2010, the JBC passed a Resolution which
relevantly reads:

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up
the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief
Justice Honorable Reynato S. Puno.

It will publish the opening of the position for applications or recommendations; deliberate on the list of
candidates; publish the names of candidates; accept comments on or opposition to the applications;
conduct public interviews of candidates; and prepare the shortlist of candidates.

As to the time to submit this shortlist to the proper appointing authority, in the light of the Constitution,
existing laws and jurisprudence, the JBC welcomes and will consider all views on the matter.[5]
On January 20, 2010, the JBC formally announced the opening, for application or recommendation, of
the position of Chief Justice of this Court, thus

The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announces the opening for application or recommendation, of the
position of CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, which will be vacated on 17 May 2010 upon the
retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice, HON. REYNATO S. PUNO.

Applications or recommendations for this position must be submitted not later than 4 February 2010
(Thursday) to the JBC Secretariat. x x x.[6]

In its February 8, 2010 meeting, the JBC decided to proceed with the process of announcing to the public
the names of the candidates for the position. Included in the list of applicants are: (1) Brion, Arturo D.;
(2) Carpio, Antonio T.; (3) Corona, Renato C.; (4) Carpio Morales, Conchita; (5) Leonardo-de Castro,
Teresita J.; and (6) Sandoval, Edilberto G.[7]

These developments, having already engendered near-hysterical debates, impelled a number of

petitioners to file suit. However, obviously hedging against the possibility that the cases would be
disallowed on the ground of prematurity, petitioners came to Court using different procedural vehicles.

In G.R. No. 191002, petitioner Arturo de Castro entreats the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to
compel the JBC to send the list of nominees for Chief Justice to the incumbent President when the
position becomes vacant upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010.

The Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) and John Peralta, petitioners in G.R. Nos. 191057
and 191149, respectively, plead for the same relief.

In G.R. No. 191032, Jaime Soriano seeks the issuance by the Court of a writ prohibiting the JBC from
continuing with its proceedings, particularly the screening of applicants for Chief Justice, based on the
hypothesis that the authority to appoint the Chief Justice pertains exclusively to the Supreme Court. He
posits that it is the Court that must commence its own internal proceeding to select the successor of
Chief Justice Puno.
Amador Tolentino, Jr., in G.R. No. 191342, asks this Court to enjoin and restrain the JBC from submitting
the list of nominees for judiciary positions, including that of Chief Justice, to the incumbent President
during the period covered in Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution.

In a cleverly crafted petition which he denominated an administrative matter, former Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza filed A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, imploring this Court to rule, for the guidance of the JBC,
whether the constitutional prohibition in Article VII, Section 15, applies to positions in the judiciary and
whether the incumbent President may appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon the latters
retirement.

Notably, although the petitions sport different appellations (for mandamus, or prohibition, or even as an
administrative matter), they (except the Soriano petition) share a common bottom line issue, i.e., a
definitive ruling on whether, in light of the perceived conflict between Article VII, Section 15, and Article
VIII, Section 4(1), the incumbent President can validly appoint a Chief Justice after Chief Justice Puno
retires on May 17, 2010.

Thus, the Court consolidated the petitions and required the JBC and the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) to file their respective comments.

Significantly, the JBC, in its February 25, 2010 Comment, stated:

11. The next stage of the process which will be the public interview of the candidates, and the
preparation of the shortlist of candidates have yet to be undertaken by the JBC as of this date, including
the interview of the constitutional experts, as may be needed.

Likewise, the JBC has yet to take a position on when to submit the shortlist to the proper appointing
authority, in light of Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that vacancy in the
Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90) days from the occurrence thereof, Section 15, Article VIII
of the Constitution concerning the ban on Presidential appointments two (2) months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term and Section 261(g), Article XXII of
the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines.[8]

On the other hand, the OSG, in its Comment dated February 26, 2010, took the position that the
incumbent President of the Philippines can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno when he retires
on May 17, 2010, because the prohibition in Article VII, Section 15, of the Constitution does not apply to
appointments in the Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, several motions for intervention with oppositions-in-intervention were received by the
Court.

Oppositors-Intervenors Antonio Gregorio III, Peter Irving Corvera, Walden Bello, Loretta Ann Rosales,
and National Union of Peoples Lawyers uniformly contend in their pleadings that the consolidated
petitions should be dismissed outright, because of the absence of an actual case or controversy ripe for
judicial adjudication and because of petitioners lack of legal standing to institute the cases.

Oppositor-Intervenor Mitchell John Boiser posits, among others, that the petitions for mandamus are
premature because there is yet no final list of nominees and the position of Chief Justice is not yet
vacant.

Oppositors-Intervenors Yolanda Quisumbing-Javellana, Belleza Alojado Demaisip, Teresita Gandionco-

Oledan, Ma. Verena Kasilag-Villanueva, Marilyn Sta. Romana, Leonila de Jesus, and Guinevere de Leon
contend, among others, that the incumbent President is prohibited from making appointments within
the period prescribed in Article VII, Section 15; that the next President will still have ample time to
appoint a Chief Justice when Chief Justice Puno retires on May 17, 2010 before the 90-day period for
appointment mandated in Article VIII, Section 4(1) expires; and that in the interim, the duties of the
Chief Justice can be exercised by the most senior of the incumbent Supreme Court justices.

My Position

After careful perusal of the pleadings and painstaking study of the applicable law and jurisprudence, I
earnestly believe that the consolidated petitions should be dismissed, because they do not raise an
actual case or controversy ripe for judicial determination.

As an essential ingredient for the exercise of the power of judicial review, an actual case or controversy
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible to judicial
resolution.[9] The controversy must be justiciabledefinite and concretetouching on the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right, on one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, the case must concern
a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.[10] The rationale for this
requirement is to prevent the courts through avoidance of premature adjudication from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements, and for us to be satisfied that the case does not present a
hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never
transpire.[11]
Thus, justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the
dispute; (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse; (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of
being adjudicated by judicial power; and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in
practical relief to the complainant.[12]

By these standards, the consolidated petitions do not present a justiciable controversy because of the
absence of clashing legal rights. The JBC has merely started the selection process by accepting
applications and nominations for the position of Chief Justice. This is only the initial stage of the
procedure for appointment of a Chief Justice. By the JBCs own admission, it has yet to undertake the
public interview of the applicants; it has yet to prepare the shortlist and to decide whether it needs to
interview constitutional experts.

Arturo de Castro and John Peralta justify the propriety of the filing of their respective petitions for
certiorari and mandamus by a common thread: that the JBC has deferred its decision as to whom to
submit the list of nominees.[13] They are then asking the Court to compel the JBC to submit the list to
the incumbent President.

De Castros and Peraltas submission tends to mislead the Court. It is clear from the narrated facts that
there is yet no list to submit. The JBC is still in the process of screening applicants for the position. Since
there is no list to be submitted, there can be no deferment of its submission. De Castro and Peralta have
not shown or even alleged that the JBC has refused or has been unlawfully neglecting[14] to submit its
list, if it is already in existence, to the incumbent President. Mandamus is proper only to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty.[15] The mandamus petition therefore has no leg to
stand on as it presents no actual case ripe for judicial determination.

PHILCONSA, for its part, contends that two applicants for the post, Justices Carpio and Carpio Morales,
manifested their interest in their nomination on the condition that the same will be submitted to the
next President. According to PHILCONSA, this fact has created a dilemma/quandary to respondent JBC
whether to exclude [from] or include [in the list] the names of said two Senior Justices.[16] It then prays
for this Court to rule on the issue.

PHILCONSA, like de Castro and Peralta, is not completely truthful. From its comment, it appears that, as
early as February 10, 2010, the JBC had already included the two justices, despite their conditional
acceptance of their nominations, in the list of applicants for the post. There is no quandary to speak of.
To justify their petitions for prohibition, Jaime Soriano and Amador Tolentino, Jr. allege that the JBC has
already started the screening process for Chief Justice.[17] Thus, they claim that the Court can now
resolve the constitutional question and issue the writ prohibiting the JBC from submitting the list of
nominees to the incumbent President.

As earlier mentioned, absent a shortlist of nominees for Chief Justice prepared by the JBC, there is yet
nothing that the Court can prohibit the JBC from submitting to the incumbent President. The JBC has not
even intimated concretely that it will perform the act sought to be prohibitedsubmitting a list to the
incumbent President. The JBC merely started the screening process. Let it be noted that a writ of
prohibition is issued to command a respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter
specified.[18] Likewise, without a shortlist, there is nothing that this Court can mandate the JBC to
submit to the President.

As to the petition filed by Estelito Mendoza, while it is captioned as an administrative matter, the same
is in the nature of a petition for declaratory relief. Mendoza pleads that this Court interpret two
apparently conflicting provisions of the ConstitutionArticle VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 4(1).
Petitioner Mendoza specifically prays for such a ruling for the guidance of the [JBC], a relief evidently in
the nature of a declaratory judgment.

Settled is the rule that petitions for declaratory relief are outside the jurisdiction of this Court.[19]
Moreover, the Court does not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest,
however intellectually challenging.[20] While Mendoza and the other petitioners espouse worthy
causes, they have presented before this Court issues which are still subject to unforeseen possibilities. In
other words, the issues they raised are hypothetical and unripe for judicial determination.

At this point, several contingent events are still about to unfold. The JBC, after it has screened the
applicants, may decide to submit the shortlist of nominees either before or after the retirement of Chief
Justice Puno. If it decides to submit the list after May 17, 2010, it may opt to transmit said list of
nominees to President Macapagal-Arroyo or to the next President. If the list is transmitted to her, the
incumbent President may either appoint or not appoint the replacement of Chief Justice Puno. We
cannot assume that the JBC will do one thing or the other. Neither can we truly predict what the
incumbent President will do if such a shortlist is transmitted to her. For us to do so would be to engage
in conjecture and to undertake a purely hypothetical exercise.

Thus, the situation calling for the application of either of the conflicting constitutional provisions will
arise only when still other contingent events occur. What if the JBC does not finish the screening process
during the subject period? What if the President does not make the appointment? Verily, these
consolidated petitions involve uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or
indeed may not occur at all, similar to the recently decided Lozano v. Nograles,[21] which this Court
dismissed through the pen of Chief Justice Puno. As no positive act has yet been committed by
respondents, the Court must not intervene. Again, to borrow the words of Chief Justice Puno in Lozano,
judicial review is effective largely because it is not available simply at the behest of a partisan faction,
but is exercised only to remedy a particular, concrete injury.

Further, the Mendoza petition cannot be likened to the administrative matter in In Re Appointments of
Hon. Valenzuela & Hon. Vallarta,[22] over which the Court assumed jurisdiction. In that case, the
President appointed judges within the constitutional ban and transmitted the appointments to the Chief
Justice. Clearly, an actual controversy ripe for judicial determination existed in that case because a
positive act had been performed by the President in violation of the Constitution. Here, as shown above,
no positive act has been performed by either the JBC or the President to warrant judicial intervention.

To repeat for emphasis, before this Court steps in to wield its awesome power of deciding cases, there
must first be an actual controversy ripe for judicial adjudication. Here, the allegations in all the petitions
are conjectural or anticipatory. No actual controversy between real litigants exists.[23] These
consolidated petitions, in other words, are a purely academic exercise. Hence, any resolution that this
Court might make would constitute an attempt at abstraction that can only lead to barren legal
dialectics and sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.[24]

Moreover, the function of the courts is to determine controversies between litigants and not to give
advisory opinions.[25] Here, petitioners are asking this Court to render an advisory opinion on what the
JBC and the President should do. To accede to it is tantamount to an incursion into the functions of the
executive department.[26] This will further inappropriately make the Court an adviser of the President.
Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, in his concurring opinion in Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio,[27]
specifically counseled against this undue portrayal by the Court of the alien role of adviser to the
President, thus

Moreover, I would assume that those of us entrusted with judicial responsibility could not be unaware
that we may be laying ourselves open to the charge of presumptuousness. Considering that the exercise
of judicial authority does not embrace the alien role of a presidential adviser, an indictment of
officiousness may be hard to repel. It is indefinitely worse if the advice thus gratuitously offered is
ignored or disregarded. The loss of judicial prestige may be incalculable. Thereafter, there may be less
than full respect for court decisions. It would impair the confidence in its ability to live up to its trust not
only on the part of immediate parties to the litigation but of the general public as well. Even if the
teaching of decided cases both here and in the Philippines is not as clear therefore, there should be, to
say the least, the utmost reluctance on the part of any court to arrogate for itself such a prerogative, the
exercise of which is fraught with possibilities of such undesirable character.
The ponencia holds that we need not await the occurrence of the vacancy by May 17, 2010 in order to
have the principal issue be ripe for judicial determination. That may very well be desirable. But still,
there must be the palpable presence of an actual controversy because, again, as discussed above, this
Court does not issue advisory opinions. The Court only adjudicates actual cases that present definite and
concrete controversies touching on the legal relations of the parties having adverse legal interests.

The ponencia also sought refuge in the American cases of Buckley v. Valeo[28] and Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases[29] to support its position that the reasonable certainty of the occurrence of
the perceived threat to a constitutional interest is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a challenge,
provided the Court has sufficient facts before it to enable it to intelligently adjudicate the issues. The
cited American cases only considered the issue of ripeness and did not confront the absence of an actual
case or controversy. Further, in Buckley, the members of the Commission were already appointed under
the statute being challenged as unconstitutional, and they were about to exercise powers under the
likewise challenged provisions of the statute. Thus, in those cases, there was the inevitability of the
operation of a challenged statute against the appellants. No such situation exists in the cases before us.

Here, the factual and legal setting is entirely different. The JBC only started the screening of the
applicants. It has not yet transmitted a list to the President, as, in fact, it still has to make the list. The
President has not yet made an appointment for there is yet no vacancy and no shortlist has yet been
transmitted to her. The constitutional provisions in question are not yet in operation; they may not even
be called into operation. It is not time for the Court to intervene.

A final note. If petitioners only want guidance from this Court, then, let it be stated that enough
guidance is already provided by the Constitution, the relevant laws, and the prevailing jurisprudence on
the matter. The Court must not be unduly burdened with petitions raising abstract, hypothetical, or
contingent questions. As fittingly phrased by Chief Justice Puno in Lozano

Given the sparseness of our resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient judicial service to our
people is severely limited. For courts to indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits and suitors
is for them to unduly overburden their dockets, and ultimately render themselves ineffective dispensers
of justice. To be sure, this is an evil that clearly confronts our judiciary today.[30]

With the above disquisition, I find no compelling need to discuss the other issues raised in the
consolidated petitions.

In light of the foregoing, I vote for the dismissal of the consolidated petitions.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice.