10. Social Justice Society v.
Atienza o Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature
FACTS:
 Petitioners Social Justice Society et, al. filed a petition for
mandamus, seeking to compel respondent Hon. Jose Atienza,
Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance 8027.
o The ordinance reclassified certain areas in Manila from
industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under the
reclassification to cease and desist operating within 6
months from it’s date of effectivity.
o Among the businesses are the Pan-dacan Terminals of
oil companies
 The Department of Energy entered into a Memo of Agreement
with the oil companies, agreeing to scale down the Pandacan
Terminals. It was ratified by the Sagguniang Panlungsod, which
also declared that it was only effective for a period of 6 months.
o Thereafter, the period was extended and the Mayor of
Manila was also authorized to issue special business
permits to oil companies.
 In their 2007 decision, the Court held that Atienza had the
ministerial duty under the LGC to enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city, which included Ordinance
8027. They also held that the MOU was binding and had full force
and effect.
 After the 2007 decision, the oil companies (Chevron, Shell,
Petron) and the DOE filed motions for reconsideration.
o The oil companies averred that Chevron, Shell, and Petron
had previously filed a complaint against Atienza and the
City of Manila for the annulment of Ordinance 8027.
o The RTC ruled in favor of the oil companies and issued a
WPI ordering the respondents to refrain from enforcing
Ordinance 8027.
 Thereafter, Ordinance 8119 (Manila Comprehensive Land Use
Plan) was enacted and approved by Atienza.
o Chevron, Petron, and Shell again filed a complaint for the
nullification of such Ordinance.
ISSUE: W/N Ordinance 8027 violates the oil companies’ right to
property.
HELD: NO.
 Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its police power.
to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. This power flows from the
recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare
of the people is the supreme law).
o Under the LGC, LGUs like the City of Manila exercise
police power through their respective legislative bodies, in
this case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city council.
Specifically, the Sanggunian can enact ordinances for the
general welfare of the city.
 The enactment of Ordinance 8027 is a legitimate exercise of
police power.
o Requisites of Police Power: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require its exercise and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
o The ordinance was enacted to take measures to protect
the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in
case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
o The Committee on Housing found that the depot was open
to attack, and since it was situated in a densely populated
place and near Malacanang, a fire could spread to the
neighboring communities.
o The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life,
security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not
just of a particular class.
 Such Ordinance is not unfair, oppressive, or confiscatory.
o The Ordinance does not prohibit the oil companies from
operating in Manila, but only in the Pandacan area.
o The City of Manila merely regulated the businesses and
industries in the zones established.
o The oil companies aver that the closure of their depots will
result in huge losses.
 In the exercise of police power, there is a limitation
on or restriction of property interests to promote
public welfare which involves no compensable
taking. Compensation is necessary only when the
state’s power of eminent domain is exercised. In
eminent domain, property is appropriated and
applied to some public purpose. Property
 condemned under the exercise of police power, on
the other hand, is noxious or intended for a noxious
or forbidden purpose and, consequently, is not
compensable. The restriction imposed to protect
lives, public health and safety from danger is
not a taking. It is merely the prohibition or
abatement of a noxious use which interferes
with paramount rights of the public.
 The Ordinance is not partial and discriminatory.
o Requisites of a Valid Classification: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing
conditions only and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class.
o The law may treat and regulate one class differently from
another class provided there are real and substantial
differences to distinguish one class from another.
o Unlike the oil depot, the surrounding community is not a
terrorist target.
 The Court held that the oil companies are fighting for their right to
property. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally
protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the
right to property The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable,
property is not. When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power
clashes with a few individuals’ right to property, the former should
prevail.
11. Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC
FACTS:
 Petitioners posted 2 tarpaulins within a on the front walls of the
San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod.
o The first tarp said “IBASURA RH Law”, referring to RA
10354 or the Reproductive Health Law.
o The second tarp is the subject of the present case. It
contained tha heading “Conscience Vote” and lists
candidates for the 2013 elections as either anti or pro RH
(Team Buhay, Team Patay).
 Respondent Atty. Mavil Majarucon, the Election Office of
Bacolod, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials to
petitioner Rev. Bishop Vicente Navarra, the reason being the
tarp was oversized. COMELEC Res. 9615 provides that it should
be 2’3’’. It was 6’10’’.
 COMELEC Law Department issued a letter to petitioners to order
the removal of the tarpaulin, otherwise it will file an election
offense against them.
 Petitioners initiated the present case with concern about their
exercise of free speech.
RULING IN OTHER DIGEST
12. 1 UTAK v. COMELEC
FACTS:
 RA 9006 or the Fair Elections Act was passed, providing for
common poster areas for candidates.
 COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9615, which provided the
implementing rules and regulations for RA 9006.
o SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. -
During the campaign period, it is unlawful:
xxxx
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or
propaganda material outside of authorized common poster
areas, in public places, or in private properties without the
consent of the owner thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f)
include any of the following:
xxxx
5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains,
taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether
motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such
as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers, train
stations, and the like.
 The petitioner, 1-United Transport Koalisyon, in a letter sought
clarification of the IRR. It explained that the prohibition stated
impedes the right to free speech of the private owners of PUVs
and transport terminals. They requested that respondent
reconsider the provision’s implementation.
 The COMELEC issued Resolution 13-0214 which denied
petitioner’s request.
 Petitioner maintains that Sections 7(g) items 5&g violate the right
to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals; that
the prohibition curtails their ideas of who should be voted by the
public.
ISSUE: W/N Resolution 9165 violates the right to free speech of PUV
and transport terminal owners.
HELD: YES.
 The Court held that the subject resolution is a prior restraint
on speech.
o Free speech may be identified with the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without
prior restraint or censorship and subsequent punishment.
o Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions
on the press or other forms of expression in advance of
actual publication or dissemination.
o Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from
government censorship of publications, whatever the form
of censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by
the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the
government. Any system of prior restraints of expression
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against
its validity
 The subject provisions infringe on the fundamental right of
the people to free speech.
o As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and
transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited
from expressing their preferences under the pain of
indictment for an election offense and the revocation of
their franchise or permit to operate.
o According to jurisprudence, freedom of speech and of the
press enjoys a preferred status in our hierarchy of rights.
 The rationale is that the preservation of other rights
depends on how well we protect our freedom of
speech and of the press. It has been our constant
holding that this preferred freedom calls all the
more for utmost respect when what may be
curtailed is the dissemination of information to
make more meaningful the equally vital right of
suffrage.
 The resolution is not a content-neutral regulation repugnant
to the free speech clause.
o A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely
concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that
merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-
defined standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it
restricts the right to free speech, provided that the following
requisites concur:
 first, the government regulation is within the
constitutional power of the Government; second, it
furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; third, the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and fourth, the incidental restriction on freedom of
expression is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
o The provisions merely control the place wherein the
campaign materials may be posted. It does not satisfy all
requisites.
 There is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right of the owners
of PUVs and transport terminals to free speech to further the
governmental interest.
 The provisions are not justified under the captive-audience
doctrine.
o The captive-audience doctrine states that when a
listener cannot, as a practical matter, escape from intrusive
speech, the speech can be restricted. The "captive-
audience" doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right
not to be exposed to an unwanted message in
circumstances in which the communication cannot be
avoided.
o A government regulation based on the captive-audience
doctrine may not be justified if the supposed "captive
audience" may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive
speech.
o The commuters are not forced or compelled to read the
election campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport
terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to receive
the messages contained in the posted election campaign
materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find
the same unbearably intrusive.
 Provisions also violate the equal protection clause.
o Equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in
other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give
undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against
others.
 o The classification is constitutionally impermissible because
it is not based on substantial distinction and not germane
to the purpose of the law.
o The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made
available for use by the public is likewise not substantial
justification to set them apart from private vehicles and
other properties. Superficial differences do not make for a
valid classification (they are both still seen by the public).
 The freedom to advertise one's political candidacy is clearly a
significant part of our freedom of expression. A restriction on this
freedom without rhyme or reason is a violation of the most
valuable feature of the democratic way of life.
WHO ARE SUBJECT TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS?
13. People v. Marti
FACTS:
 Appellant Andre Marti and his common-law wife Shirley Reyes
went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in
the Pistang Pilipino Complex, with them 4 gift wrapped packages.
Anita Reyes went with them.
o Marti told Anita that he was sending the packages to a
Walter Fierz, a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
o Anita asked if she could examine the packages but Marti
refused, assuring her that they contained books, cigars,
and gloves.
o Before delivering the packages to the Bureau of Customs,
Anita’s husband Job Reyes opened them for final
inspection.
o The boxes emitted a peculiar odor. Inside the bundles
were dried leaves. He took several grams thereof.
o Job then wrote a letter to the NBI requesting a lab exam for
the samples he got. He brought the letter and the boxes to
the NBI and was interviewed by the Chief of the Narcotics
Section.
o Job and NBI agents went to his office to retrieve the
remaining boxes. Inside, they found dried marijuana
leaves.
 The NBI agents arrested Marti while he was claiming his mail at
the Central Post Office. The leaves also tested positive for
marijuana.Thereafter, an information was filed against him for
violating RA 6425.
ISSUE: W/N Marti’s constitutional rights were violated.
HELD: NO.
 Marti contends that the evidence was obtained in violation of his
rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication, and therefore should be inadmissible.
o The evidence was discovered by a private person, acting
in a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of State authorities.
o The act of a private individual in violation of Marti’s
constitutional rights cannot be invoked against the State.
 The NBI did not make an illegal search and seizure of the
evidence.
o Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job
Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who
made search/inspection of the packages. Said
inspection was reasonable and a standard operating
procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary
measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of
Customs
o The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert
the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a
warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is
in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is
open, where no trespass has been committed in aid
thereof, is not search.
 The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches
and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against
the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed.
 If the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of
a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the
case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the
right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked
for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is
involved.
14. Serrano v. National Labor Relations Commission
FACTS:
 Petitioner Ruben Serranos was hired by respondent Isetann
Department Store as a security checker to apprehend shoplifters
and prevent pilferage of merchandise. He eventually became the
head of the Security Checkers Section.
 In a cost-cutting measure, Isetann phased out its entire security
section and engaged the service of an independent security
agency. Serranos was sent a memo, terminating his employment.
 Serranos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal layoff, unfair
labor practice, underpayment of wages, and nonpayment of salary
and overtime pay.
 The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Serranos.
o He ruled that Isetann failed to establish that it phased out
the security section to minimize losses and that it failed to
accord due process to Serranos.
 Isetann appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC reversed the decision
of the Labor Arbiter. It held that the phase-out was a legitimate
business decision.
ISSUE: W/N Isetann violated Serrano’s right to due process.
HELD: NO.
 Under the Labor Code, the employer may terminate employment
due to “installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of
operations of the establishment or undertaking.”
 The Court held that the phase-out was a legitimate business
decision. This factual finding of the NLRC, an admin agency, must
be accorded with respect and finality since nothing on record
detracts from it.
 Art 283 of the Labor Code also provides that to terminate
employment, there must be “a written notice on the workers and
the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month
before the intended date thereof.”
o Isetann gave the Serranos the notice and terminated his
services on the same day. He was denied his right to be
given written notice before the termination.
 The Court held that the violation of the notice requirement is
not a denial of due process.
o The Due Process Clause of the Costi is a limitation on
governmental powers. It does not apply to the exercise of
private power, such as the termination of employment
under the Labor Code.
o Notice and hearing are required under the Due Process
Clause before the power of organized society are brought
to bear upon the individual. This is obviously not the case
of termination of employment. The purpose of the 1 month
notice before an employee is laid off to give him time to
prepare for the loss of the job and not to afford him an
opportunity to be heard on any charge against him.
 The lack of notice only made the termination ineffectual.
o Not all notice requirements are requirements of due
process. Some are simply part of a procedure to be
followed before a right granted to a party can be exercised.
o Isetann’s failure to comply with the notice requirement
does not constitute a denial of due process but a mere
failure to observe a procedure for the termination of
employment. Under the Labor Code, only the absence of a
just cause for termination can make the dismissal illegal.
15. BPI v. Casa Montessori International
FACTS:
 CASA Montessori International opened an account with BPI,
wiith CASA’s President Ma. Carina Lebron as one of its
signatories.
 In 1991, CASA discovered that 9 of its checks had been encashed
by one Sonny Santos, totaling in the amount of P782,000.00.
Santos was a fictitious name of Leonardo Yabut who was an
external auditor of CASA.
 The PNP Crime Lab examined the checks and concluded that the
signature thereon was not Lebron’s.
o CASA then filed a Complaint for Collection with Damages
against BPI, praying that BPI be ordered to reinstate the
stolen amount.
o The RTC ruled in CASA’s favor.
o The CA modified the RTC decision, taking into account
CASA’s negligence that resulted in the forgery.
DUAL CITIZENSHIP AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
16. Maquiling v. COMELEC
FACTS:
 Private respondent Rommel Arnado is a natural-born Fil. Citizen.
However, he was naturalized as a US citizen.
 He applied for repatriation under RA 9225 before the Consulate
Gen. of the PH in San Francisco and also took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Rep. of the PH. On the same day, an Order of
 Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was
issued.
 Respondent Linog Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a
petition to disqualify Arnado and to cancel his COC for mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the 2010 elections.
 Balua contends that Arnado was not a resident of Kauswagan and
that he is a foreigner, presenting a certification issued by the
Bureau of Immigration indicating the nationality of Arnado as
"USA-American."
 Furthermore, Balua presented a computer-generated travel record
which indicated that Arnadp has been using his US Passport in
entering and departing the PH.
 After Arnado failed to answere Balua’s petition, Balue moved to
declare him default.
 It was only after Arnado was declared the winner of the 2010
elections that he filed his answer to Balua’s petition. The
documents he submitted were:
 Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines
 Joint-Affidavit of his neighbors attesting that Arnado is a long-time
resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and
continuously residing in his family’s ancestral house there
 Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan
stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that
Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to
the Philippines in 2009
 Certification from the Municipal Local Gov’t Operations Office
stating that Arnado’s father was Mayor of Kauswagan
 Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan
certifying that Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan
since 2009
 COMELEC 1st Division treated the petition as one for
disqualification.
 It ruled that Balua failed to present any evidence that Arnado is a
resident of the US. However, they could not conclude that Arnado
failed to meet the 1-year requirement of residency.
 It disagreed that Arnado is a PH citizen since he has been
consistently using his US Passport after renouncing his US
Citizenship, negating his Affidavit of Renunciation.
 Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication
that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship
and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable
him to run for office.
 1st Division ruled in favor of Balua. Arnado was disqualified
and was prevented from assuming his position.
 Herein Petitioner Casan Maquiling, another mayoral candidate,
garnered the 2nd highest number of votes for the 2010 elections.
 He filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that while
COMELEC correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession
under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not
applicable in this case.
 He claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the
nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate
candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes,
should be proclaimed as the winner.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Arnado using his US Passport affects his qualification to
run for public office.
2. W/N the rule on succession in the Local Gov’t Code is
applicable to the case.
HELD:
1. YES.
 By renouncing his foreign citizenship, Arnado was deemed solely
a Fil citizen. However, this legal presumption does not operate
permanently and is open to attack when the citizen performs
positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign
citizenship.
 Using a foreign passport is an act which repudiates the oath of
renunciation for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of
another country to be qualified to run for public office.
 The act of using his US Passport does not divest Arnado of his
Filipino citizenship. However, by representing himself as an
American citizen he voluntarily and effectively reverted to his
status as a dual citizen.
 Thus, when Arnado filed his COC he was a dual citizen.
2. NO.
 The electorate’s awareness of Arnado’s disqualification is not
needed for the disqualification to attach to him. The existence of a
disqualifying circumstance (use of US Passport) was enough to
make him ineligible.
 The 2nd placer in votes is actually the first placer among the
qualified candidates.
 Arnado’s COC is void from the beginning since he was barred
from even becoming a candidate since he was a dual citizen.
 Votes in his favor should not have even been counted.
17. Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
 Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was
found abandoned as a newborn in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo
by a certain Edgardo Militar. Parental care and custody over
petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano
Militar and Emiliano's wife. The relatives then reported and
registered the child as a founding with the Civil Registrar of Iloilo.
The child was then named Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
Militar.
 Grace was adopted by celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan
Roces). The trial court granted their petition and ordered that
petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe".
 It was only in 2005 that Susan Roces found out that their lawyer
failed to secure a new Certificate of Live Birth with Poe’s new
name as well as the name of the adoptive parents. Roces then
submitted an affidavit and in 2006, a Certificate of Live Birth in the
name of Mary Grace Poe was released by the Civil Registry of
Iloilo.
 considered dual citizens. Poe then registered as voter in August
 At the age of 18, Poe was registered as a voter of San Juan.
Initially, the petitioner was enrolled and pursued a degree in
Development Studies at the University of the Philippines but she
chose to pursue her studies abroad and left for the United States
of America (U.S.) in 1988.
 Poe graduated in 1991 from Boston
College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her
Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies. In 1988, she was
issued a Philippine passport.
 On 27 July 1991, Poe married Teodoro Llamanzares and flew to
the US right after the wedding. In 2001, Poe became a
naturalized American Citizen and she obtained a US Passport
that same year.
 In April 2004, Poe came back to the Philippines in order to support
her father’s candidacy. Poe returned to the US in July 2004 with
her two daughters.
 Poe returned in December 2004 after knowing her father’s
deteriorating condition. The latter died and Poe stayed until
February 2005 to take care of the funeral arrangements. Poe
wanted to be with her grieving mother that is why she and her
husband decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines sometime first quarter of 2005. They prepared for
resettlement including notification of their children’s schools,
coordination with property movers and inquiry with Philippine
authorities as to how they can bring their pet dog.
 According to Poe, as early as 2004, she already quit her job in the
US. Poe came home to the PH on May 24, 2005 and
immediately secured a TIN while her husband stayed in the US.
They stayed with her mother until she and husband was able to
purchase a condominium in San Juan sometime February 2006.
On February 14, 2006, Poe went back to the US to set up the
other family belongings. She commuted back in March 2006.
In early 2006, Poe and husband acquired a property in Corinthian
Hills in Quezon City where they built their family home.
 On July 7, 2006, Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 9225. On July 10,
2006, she filed a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship
together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her
three children. The Bureau of Immigration acted in favor of the
petition on July 18, 2006. She and her children were then
2006 and secured a Philippine passport thereafter.
 On October 6, 2010, she was appointed as Chairperson of the
MTRCB. Before assuming her post, she executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation of Allegiance to the US before a notary public
in Pasig City on October 20, 2010. The following day, she
submitted the Affidavit to the Bureau of Immigration and took her
oath as a chairperson of MTRCB. Poe from them on, she
stopped using her American passport.
 On July 12, 2011, Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of
Renunciation of Nationality of the US before the Vice Consul of
the US Embassy in Manila. On December 9, 2011, the US Vice
Consul issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the US
effective October 21, 2010.
 On October 2, 2012, Poe filed with COMELEC her Certificate
of Candidacy for Senator saying that she was resident of the
Philippines for a period of 6 years and 6 months before May 13,
2013. She was then proclaimed a Senator on May 16, 2013.
 On October 15, 2015, Poe filed her COC for the Presidency for
the May 2016 elections. She declared that she is a natural born
and her residence in the Philippine up to the day before election
would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.
 There were some petitions filed against Poe because there are
some issues about her that made her have this case in running for
president. Petitions were filed against Poe by Estrella
Elamparo, Francisco S. Tatad, Antonio P. Contreras and
Amado D. Valdez.
 They alleged that (1) she committed material misrepresentation in
her COC when she stated that she is a resident of the Philippines
for at least 10 years 11 months up to the day before May 9, 2016
Elections, (2) she is not natural born considering that Poe is a
foundling and (3) Grace Poe’s candidacy should be denied,
rejected or cancelled for committing material misrepresentations in
her Certificate of Candidacy.
ISSUES:
W/N PET is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
W/N PET satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.
W/N COMELEC can cancel PET’s COC.
HELD:
YES.
 There is a very high probability that Grace Poe’s parents are
Filipinos. Grace Poe's physical features are typical of Filipinos.
As a matter of fact, she was abandoned as an infant in a
municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99%
chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino. That high
probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible
under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To
assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually
impossible, as the norm.
 decide upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a
 By votes of 7-5, the Supreme Court pronounced and said that
foundlings are as a natural-born citizens. This is based on the
finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention manifests that the framers intended foundlings to be
covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitution’s
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect
to foundlings, the Supreme Court felt the need to examine or test
the intent of the framers.

 That foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born
citizenship is supported by treaties and the general principles
of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to
some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to
presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the
foundling is found.
YES.
 Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled
with animus revertendi in acquiring a new domicile.

 Grace Poe’s domicile had been timely changed as of May 24,
2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when her application under RA
9225 was approved by the BI.
 COMELEC’s reliance on cases which decree that an alien’s stay
in the country cannot be counted unless she acquires a
permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is
without merit. Such cases are different from the circumstances in
this case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming and
somehow an accurate evidence of her actual stay and intent to
abandon permanently her domicile in the US.
 Coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the
Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe
returned on May 24, 2005, it was for good.
NO.
 The COMELEC cannot cancel, deny or reject her Cerftificate of
Candidacy on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her
citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds
for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to
candidate is suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due course or cancel
her candidacy on ground of false representations regarding her
qualifications.
 In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe was
pronounced qualified as a candidate for the presidency. Hence,
there cannot be any false representations in her COC regarding
her citizenship and residency.
18. Caballero v. COMELEC
FACTS:
 the May 2013 elections. Another rival candidate (Casan
19. Arnado v. COMELEC
FACTS:
• Rommel Arnado was a natural-born Filipino. Later, however,
he became an American citizen.
• On July 10, 2008, he re-acquired his Filipino citizenship by
executing an oath of allegiance to the Philippines.
• On April 3, 2009, he executed an affidavit renouncing his
American citizenship.
• On November 30, 2009, he filed a certificate of candidacy
(COC) for mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May
10, 2010 elections.
• A rival candidate (Linog Balua) then filed a disqualification
case against Arnado on the ground that Arnado used his US
passport after renouncing his US citizenship in April 2009. It
was argued that such act of using a US passport constitutes
dual allegiance and that is a ground for disqualification under
the Local Government Code. In short, it was argued that
Arnado remained a US citizen.
• In his defense, Arnado argued that he is qualified to run for
public office because he complied with the requirements of
Republic Act No. 9225 which provides that a former Filipino
citizen may run for elective public office if (1) they meet the
qualifications for the elective office they desire, and (2) make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships – which must be done before the filing of the
COC.
• Arnado explained that his use of his US passport after April
2009 was because of the fact that he did not know yet that he
had been issued already a Philippine passport; that when he
received said Philippine passport, he used it since then; that at
any rate, Arnado, on November 30, 2009, again executed an
Affirmation of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance before a
notary public.
• Balua however presented proof that Arnado again used his US
passport in January 2010 and in March 2010.
• Eventually, the Commission on Elections disqualified Arnado,
who won the 2010 elections, and declared another rival
candidate as the rightful mayor. This was affirmed by the
Supreme Court (G.R. No. 195649).
• Later, on October 1, 2012, Arnado filed his COC for mayor for
Maquiling) filed a petition to disqualify Arnado based on the
ruling in G.R. No. 195649. While the case was pending,
Arnado won the 2013 elections as he even acquired 84% of
the votes cast for mayor in Kauswagan.
• Later however, the COMELEC disqualified Arnado from
running in the May 2013 Elections and his declaration as
Mayor of Kauswagan was voided. Arnado sued the COMELEC
as he argued that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion. He averred that he was able to comply with the
requirements of RA 9225; and that his disqualification only
disenfranchised 84% of the Kauswagan voters.
ISSUE: W/N Arnado should be disqualified.
HELD:
• Firstly, the fact that he obtained a landslide victory does not
override the requirements set by law. The fact that he
garnered 84% of the total votes cast in Kauswagan cannot
override the constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications. Election victory cannot be
used as a magic formula to bypass election eligibility
requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining
to elections will become toothless.
• The COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion
when it disqualified Arnado. Arnado failed to comply with the
requirements of RA 9225. Although he did swear allegiance to
the Philippines and renounced his US citizenship prior to filing
his COC in November 2009, such acts were deemed recanted
or withdrawn when he again used his US passport.
• In fact, Arnado did not controvert the allegations that he used
his US passport in January 2010 and March 2010. As such, he
remained a US citizen and is therefore disqualified to run for
public office.
• What Arnado could have done, for the purposes of running in
the 2013 elections, was to renounce again (for the third time)
his US citizenship. But he never did that hence he was
rightfully disqualified in the 2013 elections too.
• Note also that assuming that Arnado never used his US
passport in January 2010 and March 2010, he is still
disqualified.
• Arnado averred that his use of his US passport prior to
November 2009 was cured when he again made a second
 renunciation of his US citizenship on November 30, 2009.
However, the Affidavit of Renunciation he offered in court
during trial was a mere photocopy of the original. Under the
Best Evidence Rule (Section 3, Rule 130, Revised Rules of
Court), the original must be presented unless the same is lost.
In this case, the original was never alleged to have been lost.
Further, the said Affidavit was being used belatedly by Arnado.
In fact, it was never formally offered. Under Section 34, Rule
132 of the Revised Rules of Court, “The court shall consider
no evidence which has not been formally offered.”
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
Similarities And Differences
20. Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation
FACTS:
 PPI and Fertiphil are both engaged in the importation and
distribution of fertilizers, pesticides, and agricultural chemicals.
 In 1985, the Pres. Marcos issued LOI 1465 which provided for the
imposition of a capital recovery component on the domestic sale
of all grades of fertilizers in the PH.
o CRC of not less that P10 per bag
o Shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to make
PPI viable
 Fertiphil paid P10 per bag of fertilizer it sold in the PH to the
Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority. The FPA remitted the amount
to the Far East Bank and Trust Company, the depository bank
of PPI.
 After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, FPA stopped the imposition of
the CRC.
o Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it
paid, but PPI refused.
o Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages
against FPA and PPI. It questioned the constitutionality of
LOI 1465 and alleged that it solely favored PPI, which used
the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer
industry.
o The FPA countered that the LOI was a valid exercise of
police power of the State to ensure the stability of the
fertilizer industry.
 The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Fertiphil, invalidating the
levy for violating the basic principle that taxes can only be levied
for public purpose.
 The CA affirmed the RTC ruling, holding that even if the LOI was
issued under the state’s police power, it is still unconstitutional
because it did not promote public welfare.
ISSUE: W/N LOI 1465 is constitutional.
HELD: NO.
 PPI claimed that LOI 1465 was a valid exercise of either police
power or the power of taxation. Fertiphil counters that the LOI is
unconstitutional because it was enacted to give benefit to a private
company since it was imposed to pay the corporate debt of PPI.
 Police power and the power of taxation are distinct and have
different tests for validity.
o Police power is the power of the State to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order
to promote the general welfare. Its main purpose is the
regulation of a behavior or conduct.
o Power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for
public purpose. Its main purpose is revenue generation.
 The SC agrees with the RTC that the LOI was an exercise of the
State’s taxation power. It primary purpose was revenue
generation. It held that P10 was too excessive to serve a mere
regulatory purpose.
 The SC held that the LOI was unconstitutional because it was
not for a public purpose and was imposed to give undue
benefit to PPI.
o The power to tax exists for the general welfare; hence,
implicit in its power is the limitation that it should be used
only for a public purpose. It would be a robbery for the
State to tax its citizens and use the funds generated for a
private purpose.
o “Public purpose” is an elastic concept that can be
hammered to fit modern standards. It does not only pertain
to those purposes which are traditionally viewed as
essentially government functions, but also includes those
purposes designed to promote social justice.
 LOI 1465 expressly provided that the levy be imposed to benefit
PPI, a private company. The text of the LOI was plain that the levy
was to raise capital for PPI.
 The LOI provided that the tax was conditional and dependent
upon PPI becoming financially viable. This This suggests that the
 levy was actually imposed to benefit PPI. It did not fix the
maximum amount and the payment was made indefinite.
 The tax was also remitted directly to the Far East Bank and Trust
Comp, PPI’s depository bank. PPI benefitted from the LOI.
 The levy was also used to pay PPI’s corporate debts, as revealed
by a Letter of Understanding signed by then Prime Minister Cesar
Virata.
 The LOI was still unconstitutional even if enacted under the
police power; it did not promote public interest.
o It failed to comply with the test of lawful subjects and
lawful means: (1) the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of particular class, requires its
exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.
 The doctrine of operative fact is inapplicable.
o PPI invoked the doctrine of operative fact, which is
applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will
impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the
invalid law. It contended that Fertiphil cannot ask for a
refund.
o NO. PPI did not raise the applicability of the doctrine of
operative fact with the RTC and the CA.
o The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It
produces no rights, imposes no duties and affords no
protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal
contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been passed.
Being void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All
levies paid should be refunded in accordance with the
general principle against unjust enrichment.
21. Gerochi v. Dept. of Energy
FACTS:
 Petitioners Romeo Gerochi, Katulong ng Bayan (KB) and
Environmentalist Consumers Network, Inc. (ECN) pray that
Sec. 34 of RA 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001
(EPIRA)) imposing the Universal Charge, and Rule 18 of its IRR,
be declared unconstitutional.
o The also pray for a refund of the Universal Charge.
 EPIRA took effect on June 26, 2001. Respondent National Power
Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) filed
with the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition to avail
from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary
Electrification. The NPC filed another petition with ERC, praying
that their proposed share be P0.0025 per kilowatt-hour for
watershed rehabilitation.
o The ERC approved the amount P0.0168/kWh as NPC’s
share.
o NPC filed a motion for reconsideration asking the ERC to
set aside its previous decision. ERC did, and authorized
the NPC to draw up 70M for its watershed rehabilitation
project.
o Based on the ERC decision, respondent Panay Electric
Company (PECO) charged petitioners with the Universal
Charge in their respective electric bills.
 Petitioner contended that since the power to tax is a legislative
function, its delegation to any executive or administrative agency
like the ERC is unconstitutional.
 Respondents held that the Universal Charge was not a tax
because unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income for
public purposes, it was levied for a specific regulatory purpose,
which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric power
industry. They also contended that it does not possess the
essential characteristics of a tax, that its imposition would redound
to the benefit of the electric power industry and not to the public.
ISSUE: W/N the Universal Charge is an exercise of the State’s power
of taxation.
HELD: NO.
 The power to tax is based on the principle that taxes are the
lifeblood of the government, and their prompt and certain
availability is an imperious need. It emanates from necessity;
without taxes, the government cannot fulfill its mandate of
promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people.
 Police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare
by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is
the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most demanding of
the three fundamental powers of the State.
o salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is
the supreme law)
o sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property
as not to injure the property of others)
o parens patriae
 If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is
merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the
 primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does
not make the imposition a tax.
 It is a well-established doctrine that the taxing power may be used
as an implement of police power.
o The Universal charge is an exercise of the State’s police
power, as provided by its purposes enumerated in its
Decalaraiton of Policy. It is to ensure the viability of the
country’s electric power industry.
o It is not a tax.
Police Power
22. US v. Toribio
FACTS:
 Luis Toribio allegedly slaughtered a carabao for human
consumption without a permit from the municipal treasure of the
municipality where it was slaughtered, violating Act 1147 (an act
regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter or large cattle).
o Sec 30: No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for
food at the municipal slaughterhouse except upon permit
secured from the municipal treasure.
 The animal was slaughtered in Carmen, Bohol where there was
no municipal slaughterhouse. Toribio contends that since Act 1147
do not prohibit the slaughter of large cattle without a permit under
such circumstances.
o Toribio claims that the provisions must be construed as to
limit the prohibition of slaughter in a municipal
slaughterhouse, and that since Carmen does not have
such slaughterhouse the prohibition is inapplicable.
ISSUE: W/N Act 1147 is constitutional.
HELD: YES.
 The SC held that the prohibition refers (1) to the slaughter of large
cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) expressly and
specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal
slaughterhouse without such permit
 Act 1147 primarily seeks to protect the large cattle of the PH
against theft and to make it easy to recover or return such cattle to
their owners if they are lost, strayed, or stolen.
o The Act is designed to make it difficult except for the
rightful owner of the cattle to retain them in his possession
or to dispose them to others.
 If Toribio’s construction is applied, the purpose of the Act will be of
no use since thieves would simply avoid killing the cattle they stole
in municipal slaughterhouses.
o Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two
or more constructions, that construction should be adopted
which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of
the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute
was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which
would tend to render abortive other provisions of the
statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought
to attain by its enactment.
 It also appeared that Toribio did in fact apply for a permit, but
it was denied to him because the animal was unfot for
agricultural work or for draft purposes. Toribio’s counsel
contends that such prohibition is unconstitutional since it is
in violation of the PH Bill which provides that “no law shall be
enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.”
o The SC ruled that the law in question "is not a taking of the
property for public use, within the meaning of the
constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the
power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such
particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with
or injurious to the rights of the public. All property is
acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not
be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly
impair the public rights and interest of the community."
 In Com. v. Alger, the exercise of the right of eminent domain
was distinguished from the police powers of the State.
o Eminent domain - the right of a government to take and
appropriate private property to public use, whenever the
public exigency requires it; which can be done only on
condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor.
o Police power - the power vested in the legislature by the
constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant
to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good
and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of
the same.
 The restrain placed on the slaughter of carabaos fit for agricultural
work and draft purposes is not an appropriation of property
 interests to a "public use," and is not, therefore, within the 
principle of the exercise by the State of the right of eminent
domain.
o It is fact a mere restriction or limitation upon a private
use, which the legislature deemed to be detrimental to the
public welfare.
 Also, several years prior to the enactment of the said law, an
epidemic struck the Philippine islands which threatened the
survival of carabaos in the country. In some provinces seventy,
eighty and even one hundred percent of their local carabaos
perished due to the said epidemic. This drove the prices of
carabaos up to four or five-fold, as a consequence carabao theft
became rampant due to the luxurious prices of these work
animals. Moreover, this greatly affected the food production of the
country which prompted the government to import rice from its
neighboring countries.
 As these work animals are vested with public interest for they are
of fundamental use for the production of crops, the government
was prompted to pass a law that would protect these work
animals. The purpose of the law is to stabilize the number of
carabaos in the country as well as to redistribute them throughout
the entire archipelago. It was also the same reason why large
cattle fit for farm work was prohibited to be slaughtered for human
consumption.
 Obviously, the provisions of the statute under consideration were
imposed strictly for the promotion of general welfare and public
interest. These reasons satisfy the requisites for the valid exercise
of police power.

23. US v. Pompeya
FACTS:
 Silvestre Pompeya was charged with violating EO No. 1 based
on Sec. 40 of the Municipal Code by failing to render service
while on patrol duty.
o The failure, refusal, or neglect of any such able-bodied
man to render promptly the service thus required shall be
punishable…
 Pompeya contended that the EO was unconstitutional because it
is in contravention to the Organic Act of the PH, which guarantees
the liberty of citizens.
ISSUE: W/N the subject law is unconstitutional.
HELD: