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POLICE POWERS
1. White Light Corporation et. al. vs. City of Manila
FACTS: On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law
Ordinance 7774 entitled “An Ordinance” prohibiting short
time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension
houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels
who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said
Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of White Light
Corporation. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the
personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the
Constitution.
The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid
exercise of police power. Under the Local Government
Code, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments, including tourist
guides and transports. The Cour of Appeals ruled in favor
of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7774 is valid.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the said ordinance is
null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty.
It also violates the due process clause which serves as a
guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or
seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Not all
who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are
really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists
who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up.
Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said
ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group
of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be
adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or
public welfare.
2. MMDA vs Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising
December 16, 2009
Facts: Respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising
entered into a contract for advertising with the Metro Rail
Transit Corp. and thereafter installed commercial
billboards, signages and other advertising media in
different parts of the MRT 3 premises. Sometime in 2001
MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle said billboards
and signages pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009
wherein the MMDA prohibits the posting, installation, and
display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters,
streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center-island,
posts, trees, parks and open spaces. Trackworks refused
the said request and then MMDA proceeded to dismantle
the billboards and similar forms of advertisement.
Trackworsk filed a civil case before the Pasig RTC, a
temporary restraining order was issued against MMDA. The
MMDA filed a petition with the Court of Appeals but denied
said petition and affirmed the order of the RTC. Petition
was then filed with the SC which denied the same and
eventually this resolution after a petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the power under its
mandate to cause the dismantling of respondents’
advertisement materials.
Held: The Court ruled that MMDA had no power on its own
to dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards and other
advertising materials installed on the MRT3 structure by
Trackworks. The MMDA’s powers were limited to the
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a
system and administration. Nothing in Republic Act 7924
granted MMDA police power let alone legislative power.
Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards,
signages and other advertising media in the MRT 3 from
MRTC’s authority under the BLT agreement to develop
commercial premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain
advertising income is no longer debatable. Under the BLT
agreement, MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the
expiration of which MRTC would transfer ownership of the
MRT3 to the Government. Considering that MRTC
remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time
material to this case, and until this date, MRTC’s entering
into the contract for advertising services with Trackworks
was a valid exercise of ownership. MMDA also may not
invoke that it is implementing the Buliding Code rules and
regulations because the power to enforce this lies with the
DPWH and not in the MMDA. The DPWH hass not
delegated the MMDA to implement such Code. Petition is
denied.
Abundio Bacatan
3. Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. vs. CA,
G.R. No. 100152
March 31, 2000
Facts: Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied for a
business permit to operate in Iligan City. After hearing the
sides of local optometrists, Mayor Camilo Cabili of Iligan
granted the permit but he attached various special
conditions which basically made Acebedo dependent upon
prescriptions or limitations to be issued by local
optometrists. Acebedo basically is not allowed to practice
optometry within the city (but may sell glasses only).
Acebedo however acquiesced to the said conditions and
operated under the permit. Later, Acebedo was charged
for violating the said conditions and was subsequently
suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then
assailed the validity of the attached conditions. The local
optometrists argued that Acebedo is estopped in assailing
the said conditions because it acquiesced to the same and
that the imposition of the special conditions is a valid
exercise of police power; that such conditions were
entered upon by the city in its proprietary function hence
the permit is actually a contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not the special conditions attached by
the mayor is a valid exercise of police power.
HELD: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to
operate its business and not to practice optometry (the
latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of
Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor is ultra
vires hence cannot be given any legal application therefore
estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of
police power. Though the mayor can definitely impose
conditions in the granting of permits, he must base such
conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions
are ultra vires. Lastly, the granting of the license is not a
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contract, it is a special privilege – estoppel does not apply.
EMINENT DOMAIN
4. Association of Small Landowners in the Phils. vs.
Sec of the DAR, 175 SCRA 343
Facts: In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant
who blocked and challenged Hercules for his life on his
way to Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. The
two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversary to
the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even
stronger to resume their struggle. This happened several
times to Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally, as they
continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus
was the son of Gaea and could never die as long as any
part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus
forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air,
beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to
death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without
whose invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus
weakened and died.
The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing
tale. But they also tell of the elemental forces of life and
death, of men and women who, like Antaeus need the
sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive.
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the
acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious
resource among our people. But it is more than a slogan.
Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry
dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the
dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in
the sun. Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935
mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-
being and economic security of all the people," especially
the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed
this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate
the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition
of private property and equitably diffuse property
ownership and profits." Significantly, there was also the
specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian
reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from
the bondage of the soil."
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides
echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and
separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights,
containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions
for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in
the following words for the adoption by the State of an
agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian
reform program founded on the right of farmers and
regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof.
To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such
priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress
may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the
payment of just compensation. In determining retention
limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners.
The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary
land-sharing.
A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO
228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-
hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants.
Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified
farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that
President Aquino usurped the legislature’s power. A
petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victoria’s Mill
Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229.
Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund
withinitial fund of P50Billion. A petition by owners of land
which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer. A petition invoking the right of
retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not
exceeding seven hectares.
Issue:Whether the Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc exempted from agrarian reform program .
Held: The Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The
Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and
cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares.
They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7
hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land
to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have
shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want
to be exempted from agrarian reform program because
they claim to belong to a different class.
Pearlle Joyce Calampinay
5. Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC
Facts:
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this
Court assailing the constitutional validity of Resolution No.
2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections
("Comelec") and its corresponding Comelec directive dated
22 March 1995, through a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition. Petitioner PPI is a non-stock, non-profit
organization of newspaper and magazine publishers.
Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772
directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not
less than one-half page for the common use of political
parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be
allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all
candidates to enable them to make known their
qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their
platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be
used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election
information.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is
unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as
unconstitutional.
To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-
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space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half page),
amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public
use or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the intended
frequency of such compulsory "donation:" only once during
the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12
May 1995? or everyday or once a week? or as often as
Comelec may direct during the same period? The extent of
the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a
case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon
the use of private property
It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are
unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to
Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness
or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the
heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested,
let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted
the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or
by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship
between that power and the enforcement and
administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown;
it is not casually to be assumed.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course,
authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of
"just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently
the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space"
is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent
Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is
read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority
to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print
space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or
perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print
space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to
suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and
magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print
space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in
Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772
does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for
compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of
factual context here present, to provide free print space for
Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Christine Lily Angely Chin
6. G.R. No. 124795 December 10, 2008
FORFOM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS
Facts: Petitioner Forfom Development Corporation
(Forfom) is a domestic corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines, while respondent
Philippine National Railways (PNR) is a government
corporation engaged in proprietary functions. Forfom is the
registered owner of several parcels of land in San Vicente,
San Pedro, Laguna. President Ferdinand E. Marcos
approved the Presidential Commuter Service Project, more
commonly known as the Carmona Project of the President.
Resolution No. 751 of the PNR Board of Directors,
authorized its General Manager to implement the project.
During the construction of said commuter line, several
properties owned by private individuals/corporations were
traversed as right-of-way. Among the properties through
which the commuter line passed was a 100,128 square-
meter portion owned by Forfom.
On 24 August 1990, Forfom filed a complaint for Recovery
of Posssession of Real Property and/or Damages. PNR
explained that former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
approved what was known to be the Carmona Project a
5.1 kilometer railroad extension line from San Pedro,
Laguna to San Jose, Carmona, Cavite to serve the
squatters' resettlement area in said localities. Dr. Felix
Limcaoco, was not paid because he failed to present the
corresponding titles to his properties
Issue: Whether or not the properties of Forfom were taken
by PNR without due process of law and without just
compensation.
Held: Section 9, Article III states that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation. The
fundamental power of eminent domain is exercised by the
Legislature. It may be delegated by Congress to the local
governments, other public entities and public utilities. In
the case at bar, PNR, under its charter, has the power of
expropriation.
A number of circumstances must be present in the taking
of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the
expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the
entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should
be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the
property must be devoted to a public purpose or otherwise
informally, appropriately or injuriously affected; and (5) the
utilization of the property for public use must be in such a
way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property.
PNR's entry into the property of Forfom was with the
approval of then President Marcos and with the
authorization of the PNR's Board of Directors. The property
of Forfom measuring around eleven hectares was devoted
to public use - railroad tracks, facilities and appurtenances
for use of the Carmona Commuter Service. Forfom's
inaction for almost eighteen (18) years to question the
absence of expropriation proceedings and its discussions
with PNR, has waived its right and is estopped from
assailing the takeover of its land on the ground that there
was no case for expropriation that was commenced by
PNR. The recovery of possession of the property by the
landowner can no longer be allowed on the grounds of
estoppel and, more importantly, of public policy which
imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue
its services to the public.
The PNR's occupation of Forfom's property for almost
eighteen (18) years entitles the latter to payment of
interest at the legal rate of six (6%) percent on the value
of the land at the time of taking until full payment is made
by the PNR. However, since Forfom no longer appealed the
deletion by both lower courts of said prayer for exemplary
damages, the same cannot be granted.
Jeyan Chin
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7. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
the PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY
(PEZA) vs SPOUSES AGUSTIN and IMELDA CANCIO
G.R. No. 170147. January 30, 2009.
Facts: On May 19, 2001, petitioner offered to purchase
respondents’ lot at P52,294,000 for the whole property.
The letter containing the offer further instructed
respondents to consider and accept however, instead of
accepting, respondents filed an unlawful detainer case
against Maitland in the Municipal Trial Court of Lapu Lapu
City.
Thereafter, petitioner commenced expropriation
proceedings for respondents’ property with the Regional
Trial Court. Accordingly, it sought a writ of possession for
the property for which it was willing to deposit 10% of the
offered amount.
Respondents, however, filed a motion to require petitioner
to comply with RA 8974 which requires that, upon the
filing of the complaint for expropriation, the implementing
agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property an
amount equivalent to 100% of the current zonal valuation
thereof for purposes of the issuance of a writ of
possession. Petitioner should make the required payment
under the law because RA 8974, which took effect before
the commencement of the expropriation case, applied to
all actions of such nature regardless of whether the
government agency was already in possession or not.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8974 is applicable in this case or
not.
Held: RA 8974 governs this case. RA 8974 readily reveals
that it applies to instances when the national government
expropriates property for national government
infrastructure projects. Undeniably, the economic zone is a
national government project – a matter undisputed by both
parties. Also, the complaint for expropriation was filed only
on August 27, 2001 or almost one year after the law was
approved on November 7, 2000. Thus, there is no doubt
about its applicability to this case.
There was also confusion regarding the nature of the
amount to be paid for the issuance of a writ of possession.
In Capitol Steel Corporation v. PHIVIDEC Industrial
Authority, we clarified that the payment of the provisional
value as a condition for the issuance of a writ of
possession is different from the payment of just
compensation for the expropriated property. While the
provisional value is based on the current relevant zonal
valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair
market value of the property.
There is no need yet to determine with reasonable
certainty the final amount of just compensation in resolving
the issue of a writ of possession. In fact, it is the
ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the writ. No
hearing is required and the court cannot exercise its
discretion in order to arrive at the amount of the
provisional value of the property to be expropriated as the
legislature has already fixed the amount under the
aforementioned provision of the law. It is only after the
trial court ascertains the provisional amount to be paid that
just compensation will be determined.
8. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Raymunda
Martinez
G.R. No. 169008 (August 14, 2007)
Facts:
After compulsory acquisition by the Department of
Agrarian Reform, on November 16, 1993, of respondent
Martinez's 62.5369-hectare land in Barangay Agpudlos, San
Andres, Romblon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, or
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL),
petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines offered
P1,955,485.60 as just compensation, for which respondent
rejected. Thus, the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, through its Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator conducted summary administrative
proceedings for the preliminary determination of just
compensation in accordance with Section 16 (d) of the
CARL. On September 4, 2002, PARAD Virgilio M. Sorita,
rendered judgment ordering the LBP to pay landowner-
protestant RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ for her property covered
with the total amount of TWELVE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY NINE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY TWO
and 50/100 Pesos (Php12,179,492.50). A petition for the
fixing of just compensation was then filed by LBP's counsel
before the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) of the Regional
Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon. Meanwhile, respondent,
still asserting the finality of PARAD Sorita's decision, filed
before the Office of the PARAD a motion for the issuance
of a writ of execution, which was eventually granted on
November 11, 2003. The PARAD denied LBP's motion for
reconsideration and ordered the issuance of a writ of
execution on February 23, 2004. LBP, on March 12, 2004,
moved to quash the said February 23, 2004 PARAD
resolution. On April 6, 2004, even as the motion to quash
was yet unresolved, LBP instituted a petition for certiorari
before the CA. The CA, on September 28, 2004 dismissed
the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the PARAD, gravely abused its
discretion when it issued a writ of execution despite the
pendency of LBP's petition for fixing of just compensation
with the SAC?
Held: In this case, petitioner moved to quash the PARAD
resolutions and at the same time petitioned for their
annulment via certiorari under Rule 65. In both
proceedings, the parties are identical and the reliefs prayed
for are the same. In the two actions, petitioner also has a
singular stance: the PARAD resolutions should not be
executed in view of the pendency of the petition for fixing
of just compensation with the SAC. Thus a situation is
created where the two fora could come up with conflicting
decisions. This is precisely the evil sought to be avoided by
the rule against forum-shopping. We find petitioner not
entitled to the grant of a writ of certiorari by the appellate
court because the Office of the PARAD did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it undertook to execute the
September 4, 2002 decision. Rule XIII, Section 11 of the
DARAB Rules of Procedure. · In Philippine Veterans Bank v.
Court of Appeals and in Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, we explained the
consequence of the said rule to the effect that the
adjudicator's decision on land valuation attains finality after
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the lapse of the 15-day period. Considering therefore that,
in this case, LBP's petition with the SAC for the fixing of
just compensation was filed 26 days after its receipt of the
PARAD's decision, or eleven days beyond the reglementary
period, the latter had already attained finality. The PARAD
could very well issue the writ of execution.
“An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Special
Agrarian Courts by filing a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
notice of the decision; otherwise, the decision shall
become final.
9. HON. VICENTE P. EUSEBIO, LORNA A.
BERNARDO, VICTOR ENDRIGA, and the CITY OF
PASIG, Petitioners, v. JOVITO M. LUIS, LIDINILA
LUIS SANTOS, ANGELITA CAGALINGAN, ROMEO M.
LUIS, and VIRGINIA LUIS-BELLESTEROS,
Respondents.
G.R. NO. 162474 October 13, 2009
Facts:
Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land
taken by Pasig City to be used as a municipal road in 1980.
On 1993, a resolution authorizing payments for said land
was passed. However, respondents were not agreeable
with the assessed value and went on to negotiate the
same. On 1994, a letter was addressed to the mayor
calling his attention as a property in the same area had
been paid for by petitioners at the price of P2,000.00 per
square meter when said property was expropriated in the
year 1994 also for conversion into a public road.
Counsel for respondents sent a demand letter on 1996 to
Mayor Eusebio, demanding the amount of P5,000.00 per
square meter, or a total of P7,930,000.00, as just
compensation for respondents property.
Respondents filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and/or
Damages praying that the property be returned to them
with payment of reasonable rental for sixteen years of use
at P500.00 per square meter, or P793,000.00, with legal
interest of 12% per annum from date of filing of the
complaint until full payment, or in the event that said
property can no longer be returned, that petitioners be
ordered to pay just compensation in the amount of
P7,930,000.00 and rental for sixteen years of use at
P500.00 per square meter, or P793,000.00, both with legal
interest of 12% per annum from the date of filing of the
complaint until full payment.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondents
which was affirmed by the CA upon appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents are entitled to regain
possession of their property taken by the city government
in the 1980s and, in the event that said property can no
longer be returned, how should just compensation to
respondents be determined.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that failure to question the taking of the
property for a long period of time, respondents are also
estopped from recovering possession of their land, but are
entitled to just compensation as addressed in Forfom
Development Corporation v. Philippine National Railways.
With regard to the time as to when just compensation
should be fixed, it is settled jurisprudence that where
property was taken without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings, and its owner files an action for recovery of
possession thereof before the commencement of
expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at
the time of taking that is controlling.
10. NPC vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay
G.R. No. 165828. August 24, 2011
FACTS:
On November 21, 1997, the respondents as the owners of
land with an area of 221,573 square meters situated in
Ditucalan, Iligan City, sued NPC and alleged that they had
belatedly discovered that one of the underground tunnels
of NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus River for
the operation of the Hydroelectric Project in Agus V, Agus
VI and Agus VII traversed their land; that their discovery
had occurred in 1995 after Atty. Saidali C. Gandamra,
President of the Federation of Arabic Madaris School, had
rejected their offer to sell the land because of the danger
the underground tunnel might pose to the proposed Arabic
Language Training Center and Muslims Skills Development
Center; that such rejection had been followed by the
withdrawal by Global Asia Management and Resource
Corporation from developing the land into a housing
project for the same reason; that Al-Amanah Islamic
Investment Bank of the Philippines had also refused to
accept their land as collateral because of the presence of
the underground tunnel; that the underground tunnel had
been constructed without their knowledge and consent;
that the presence of the tunnel deprived them of the
agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of
their land; and that their land had also become an unsafe
place for habitation because of the loud sound of the water
rushing through the tunnel and the constant shaking of the
ground, forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer
grounds. After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs
(Heirs of Macabangkit), which CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the Heirs of Macabangkits right to claim just
compensation had prescribed under section 3 of Republic
Act No. 6395 or under Article 620 and Article 646 of the
Civil Code.
HELD:
The court upheld the liability of NPC for payment of just
compensation. The action to recover just compensation
from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the
action for damages. The former, also known as inverse
condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of
property taken in fact by the governmental defendant,
even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent
domain has been attempted by the taking agency. Just
compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is
not the takers gain, but the owner's loss. The word just is
used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation in
order to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered
for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full,
and ample. On the other hand, the latter action seeks to
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vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be
actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or
exemplary. When a right is exercised in a manner not
conformable with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
like provisions on human relations in the Civil Code, and
the exercise results to the damage of another, a legal
wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held responsible.
11. ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO, MARIO P.
OUANO, LETICIA OUANO ARNAIZ, and CIELO
OUANO MARTINEZ
- versus -
THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, THE MACTAN-
CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, and
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF CEBU
G.R. No. 168770
Facts:
in 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAA's
predecessor agency pursued a program to expand the
Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Through its team of
negotiators. NAC met and negotiated with the owner of the
properties situated around the airport, which included Lot
Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942,
and 947 of the Banilad Estate. As the landowners would
later claim, the government negotiating team, assured
them that they could re-purchase their respective lands
should the Lahug Airport expansion project do not push
through or once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations
transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport.
Some of the landowners accepted the assurance and
executed deeds of sale with a right to re-purchase. Others,
however, refused to sell because the purchase price
offered was viewed as way below market, forcing the hand
of the Republic, represented by the then CAA, as successor
agency of the NAC, to file a complaint for the expropriation
of Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A,
942, and 947. On December 29, 1961, the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Cebu rendered judgment for the
Republic: a. Declaring the expropriation justified in and in
lawful exercise of the right to eminent domain. When
Lahug Airport completely ceased operations prompted the
former lot owners to formally demand from the
government that they be allowed to exercise their
promised right to re-purchase.
Issue:
Wether or not the former owners of lots acquired for the
expansion of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City has the right
to re-purchase or secure reconveyance of their respective
properties.
Held:
The Ouano petition is deemed meritorious. The MCIAA
and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the
lots subject of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case
No. r-1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by
the government. The Lahug Airport had been closed and
abandoned. A significant portion of it had, in fact, been
purchased by a private corporation for development as a
commercial complex. it has been preponderantly
established by evidence that the NAC, through its team of
negotiators, had given assurance to the affected
landowners that they would be entitled to re-purchase
their respective lots in the event they are no longer used
for airport purposes.
DUE PROCESS
12. LUMIQUED v. EXEVEA
G.R. No. 117565, November 18, 1997
Facts: Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director
(DAR)- Cordillera Autonomous Region. Regional DAR-CAR
Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio
filed three complaints. First was charging Lumiqued with
malversation through falsification of official documents due
to unreasonable gas expenses. With the benefit of falsified
receipts, Lumiqued claimed and used this for
reimbursement. In the second complaint, Lumiqued was
accused of violation of Commission on Audit rules and
regulation, due to the unliquidated cash advances he made
which he purportedly defrauded the government “by
deliberately concealing his unliquidated cash advances
through falsification of accounting entries in order not to
reflect on ‘Cash advances of other officials’ under code of
accounting rules.” On the third complaint, Lumiqued was
charged of oppression and harassment due to the issue
that he unjustly removed Zamudio from work. The
complaints were referred to DOJ under acting Justice
Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro, and Regional State
Prosecutor Apolinario Exevea. Committee hearings were
conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not
assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he
moved for its resetting to enable him to employ the
services of counsel. The committee granted the motion,
but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date
he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case
submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee
recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon
adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52
dismissing Lumiqued.
Lumiqued appealed averring that his right to due process
was violated as well as his right to security of tenure.
Issue: Does the due process clause encompass the right to
be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?
Held: These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The
right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver
is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right
afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial
investigation. 23 It is not an absolute right and may, thus,
be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with
more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at
bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal
proceedings to have competent and independent counsel
of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of
any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation
conducted by the committee created by Department Order
No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be
held administratively liable under the law for the
complaints filed against him. As such, the hearing
conducted by the investigating committee was not part of
a criminal prosecution. This was even made more
pronounced when, after finding Lumiqued administratively
liable, it hinted at the filing of a criminal case for
7
malversation through falsification of public documents in its
report and recommendation. While investigations
conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin
to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under
existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or
may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature
of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to
represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to
furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In
administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. The Supreme
Court also emphasized that the constitutional provision on
due process safeguards life, liberty and property. Public
office is a public trust. It is not a property guaranteed of
due process. But when the dispute concerns one’s
constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public
office is deemed analogous to property in a limited sense;
hence, the right to due process could rightfully be invoked.
Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute
especially when it was proven, as in this case, that the
public officer (Lumiqued) did not live up to the
Constitutional precept i.e., that all public officers and
employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency.
Audreylyn Gonzales
13. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v HON. RALPH
LANTION
G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000.
FACTS:
On June 18, 1999 the DOJ received from DFA of the United
States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for
various crimes in violation of US tax and election laws. In
compliance with PD No. 1069 “Prescribing the procedure
for extradition of persons who have committed crimes in a
foreign country” and the established “Extradition treaty
between the Philippines and USA,” the department
proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to
conduct technical evaluation and assessment.
Pending the extradition documents by the Philippine
government, Jimenez requested for the copy of the official
extradition request, however, the Secretary of Justice
denied the request as it alleges such information is
confidential and that it is premature to provide such as the
process is not a preliminary investigation but mere
evaluation.
On January 18, 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Court dismissed
the petition at bar and ordered the petitioner to furnish
private respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period
within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
On February 3, 2000, the petitioner timely filed an Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is entitled to two basic
due process rights of notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings
RULING:
The Court held that private respondent is bereft of the
right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process.
The private respondent buttresses his position by likening
an extradition proceeding to a criminal proceeding and the
evaluation stage to a preliminary investigation. The Court
is not persuaded. An extradition proceeding is sui generis.
It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation
all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not
involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an
accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the
court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a
rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be
invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose
extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation.
As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character
and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is
not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process
safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the
former.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED. The Decision in the case at bar promulgated on
January18, 2000 is REVERSED. The assailed Order issued
by the public respondent judge on August 9, 1999 is SET
ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this
Court on August 17, 1999 is made PERMANENT.
14. GOVERNMENT of the USA vs. HON. PURGANAN
GR. NO. 148571 Sept. 24 2002
FACTS: Secretary Lantion was to give Mr. Jimenez copies
of the request for extradition, its supporting papers, and to
grant the latter a reasonable period to file a comment and
supporting evidence. But on motion for reconsideration by
the Secretary of Justice, the decision was reversed. It did
however, hold that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right
to notice and hearing. On May 18, 2001, the Government
of the USA filed the Petition for Extradition with the RTC,
praying that an order for his “immediate arrest” be issued
right away in order to prevent Jimenez’s flight. Before the
RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before the
same an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,” praying
that his application be set for hearing. After the hearing,
Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum therein stating
that he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000
should a warrant be issued. The court ordered the issuance
of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary
liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was
granted provisional liberty. The US Government filed a
petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
to set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in
cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as
there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.
ISSUE: Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process.
RULING: No. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights
to due process and to fundamental fairness. A subsequent
opportunity to be heard is enough. Thus, there can be no
violation of due process. Mr. Jimenez would have the full
opportunity to be heard when the extradition court hears
8
the Petition for Extradition. He would also enjoy, during the
hearings, the full chance to be heard and fundamental
fairness. Also worth of note is that, before the US
government requested the extradition of Mr. Jimenez,
proceedings had already been conducted. Having had the
opportunity in the requesting state, instead of taking it, he
ran away.
Ro Ann Marie Gumban
15. G.R No. 190529 April 29, 2010
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC
vs
COMELEC
FACTS:
The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) files a
petition for review and a motion for reconsideration to
nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No.
8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI
and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009. These
resolutions delisted PGBI from the roster of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions under the party-list system.
According to Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941, known
as Party-List System Act, COMELEC, upon verified
complaint of any interested party, may remove or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition if: (1) it fails to participate in the last two
preceding elections or (2)fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system
in the two preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered. For May 2010 Elections, the
COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 8679 deleting
several party-list groups or organizations from the list of
registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions.
Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it
was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast
in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.
PGBI filed its opposition to Resolution No. 8679 and
likewise, sought for accreditation as a party-list
organization. One of the arguments cited is that the
Supreme Court's ruling in G.R. No. 177548 –
MINERO(Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association)
vs COMELEC cannot apply in the instant controversy. One
of the reasons is because the factual milieu of the cited
case is removed from PGBI's. Additionally, the requirement
of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court's ruling in
G.R. No. 179271 – BANAT (Barangay Association for
Advancement and National Transparency) vs
COMELEC.COMELEC denied the motion and in response,
pointed out that the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as
MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not
participate at all in the 2004 elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PGBI’s right to due process was violated.
HELD:
No. PGBIs right to due process was not violated for PGBI
was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a
reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of
due process is simply the opportunity to be heard; as
applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the
opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A
formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is
frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x.
The court finds it obvious under the attendant
circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process. In
any case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no
longer any cause for complaint on due process grounds.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
16. TELEBAP VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998
FACTS
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of
radio and television broadcasting companies. They are
suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The
other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates radio and
television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines
under a franchise granted by Congress. They challenge the
validity of Section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and
television broadcast companies to provide free air time to
the COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and
other political purposes. Petitioner claims that it suffered
losses running to several million pesos in providing
COMELEC Time and they raised the following issues (1)
that it takes property with-out due process of law and
without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and
television broad-cast companies the equal protection of the
laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media
of communication or information during the period of
election. Petitioners complain that the provision singles out
radio and televi-sion stations to provide free air time. They
contend that there was a different treatment with news-
papers and magazines for they are not similarly required
for the print space.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of equal protection
clause in this case.
HELD:
The argument will not bear analysis. It rests on the fallacy
that broadcast media are entitled to the same treatment
under the free speech guarantee of the Constitution as the
print media. There are important differences in the
characteristics of the two media, however, which justify
their dif-ferential treatment for free speech purposes.
Because of the physical limitations of the broadcast
spectrum, the government must, of necessity, allocate
broadcast frequencies to those wishing to use them. There
is no similar justification for government allocation and
regulation of the print media. The reason for this is that, as
already noted, the government spends public funds for the
allocation and regulation of the broadcast industry, which it
does not do in the case of the print media. To require the
radio and television broadcast industry to provide free air
9
time for the COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for what the
industry gets. The broadcast media have also established a
uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos. On
the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere.
The television set is also becoming universal. Their
message may be simultaneously received by a national or
regional audience of listeners including the indif-ferent or
unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio
or television set. The impact of the vibrant speech is
forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work,
the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate,
analyze, and reject the utterance.
Petitioners' assertion therefore that assailed provision
denies them the equal protection of the law has no basis.
17. G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000
The People of the Philippines, plaintiff
vs.
Romeo Jalosjos, accused-appellant
Facts:
Jalosjos was reelected as a member of the Congress when
his conviction for heinous crime of statutory rape on two
counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending
appeal. He filed a motion to allow him to fully discharge of
his duty and attend session of the Congress. Jalosjos
argued that his conviction should not bar him from
performing his duty and deprived the electorate of their
“sovereign will”.
Issues:
Whether or not Jalosjos’s conviction which barred him from
performing his duty as a member of the Congress violated
the “sovereign will” of the electorate.
Held:
No right of the electorate was violated. The Congress can
still function even with the absence of some of its
members. Being elected for a public office is not an
absolute right but a privilege, holding a public office does
not give priority over other right or interest, including the
police power of the state.
18. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission
G.R. No. 192935. December 7, 2010
FACTS: On July 30, 2010, President Aquino signed
Executive Order No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010. It was established is a mere ad hoc
body formed under the Office of the President. The
primary task of the Philippine Truth Commission was to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by
third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman.
PTC has all the powers of an investigative body but it is not
a quasi-judicial body. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists
as to warrant the filing of information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional
and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They
argued that: (a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers;
(b) That provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of
the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No.
1; (c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and
statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-
judicial powers and (d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal
protection clause.
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued
that: 1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of
Congress because the President’s executive power and
power of control necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations; 2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the
power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is
no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds; 3] The
Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the
functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a
fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body; 4] The
Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection
clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the
equal protection clause.
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Executive
Order No. 1 violated the equal protection clause. The
Supreme Court finds difficulty in upholding the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause
enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
1987 Constitution. Equal protection requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the
equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of
a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s
duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be
valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class. The
classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members
of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as it violated
of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration only. The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that
is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated
10
constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification. The PTC
must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC
must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
unconstitutional insofar as it violated the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
Jerelyn Ligaray
19. COMELEC vs. Conrado Cruz, et.al., November 20,
2009
Facts:
On October 29, 2007 Synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, some of the then
incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City
filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief to
challenge the constitutionality of Section 2 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 9164 (entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending
RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991):
Sec. 2. Term of Office. The term of office of all barangay
and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of
this Act shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than
three (3) consecutive terms in the same position: Provided,
however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from
the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official was elected.
This are there arguments:
1. The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied
prospectively and not retroactively.
2. Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No.
9164 would be a violation of the equal protection of the
law.
3. Barangay officials have always been apolitical.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 2 of R.A No. 9164 is constitutional.
Ruling:
The assailed law is valid and constitutional. RA No. 9164 is
an amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the Local Government
Code of 1991 or LGC) and is not a penal law; hence, it
cannot be considered an ex post facto law. The three-term
limit, according to the COMELEC, has been specifically
provided in RA No. 7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated
the three-term limitation. It further asserts that laws which
are not penal in character may be applied retroactively
when expressly so provided and when it does not impair
vested rights. As there is no vested right to public office,
much less to an elective post, there can be no valid
objection to the alleged retroactive application of RA No.
9164.
20-A. JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO v. DOJ
G.R. No. 199082
September 18, 2012
FACTS: The Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order
creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-
Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections
electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of
officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial report,
the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the
results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the
provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao
were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team
recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected to preliminary
investigation for electoral sabotage.
After the preliminary investigation, the
COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution ordering that
information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed
against GMA, et al. while that the charges against Jose
Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the
validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of
Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates
the equal protection clause?
Ruling: Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in violation of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution because its sole
purpose is the investigation and prosecution of certain
persons and incidents. They insist that the Joint Panel was
created to target only the Arroyo Administration as well as
public officials linked to the Arroyo Administration.
While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among
those subjected to preliminary investigation, not all
respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were
public officers who were investigated upon in connection
with their acts in the performance of their official duties.
Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation
by the Joint Committee.
The equal protection guarantee exists to
prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
Recognizing the existence of real differences among men,
it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires
that all persons under like circumstances and conditions
shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.
SEACHES AND SEIZURE
20. Lim vs Felix
G.R. Nos. 94054-57, February 19, 1991
Facts:
At the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic
Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of
Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his
security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes,
Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and
killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security
escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the
assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot
11
wound. For the crime of multiple murder and frustrated
murder, the accused were Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana
Lim of Masbate, Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T.
Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim
and Mayor Antonio Kho. The RTC of Masbate concluded
that a probable cause has been established for the
issuance of warrants of arrest. In the same Order, the
court ordered the arrest of the petitioners plus bail for
provisional liberty.
The entire records of the case were transmitted to the
Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Respondent Acting Fiscal
Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the case. A
petition to transfer the venue of the Regional Trial Court of
Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of Makati was filed by
petitioners and granted by the SC.
On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued warrants of
arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.
Issue:
Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest
without bail by simply relying on the prosecution’s
certification and recommendation that a probable cause
exists
Held:
No. The Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987
Constitution which requires “x x x probable cause to be
personally determined by the Judge x x x”, not by any
other officer or person. If a Judge relies solely on the
certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the
records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has
not personally determined probable cause. The
determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The
constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The
Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion. The records of
the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal
Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal
were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no
basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal
determination regarding the existence of a probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the
Constitution. He could not possibly have known what
transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification.
Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners’
motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground
that the mere certification and recommendation of the
respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient
for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
21. ALAIN MANALILI vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997
Facts: At about 2:10 o’clock in the afternoon of April 11,
1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance
along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City. They then chanced
upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared
high on drugs. The male person was observed to have
reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner.
When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the
latter approached him and introduced themselves as police
officers. The policemen then asked the male person what
he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to
resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he
could see what said male person had in his hands. The
latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu
to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and
examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana
residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana
contents. Then the accused was arrested.
Issue: Whether a search and seizure could be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest.
Held: Yes. In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is
that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously
secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and
seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this
guarantee. This right, however, is not absolute. The recent
case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized
exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and
seizure, viz.: "(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2)
search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4)
customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves
of their right against unreasonable search and seizure." In
People vs. Encinada, the Court further explained that in
these cases, the search and seizure may be made only
with probable cause as the essential requirement. Stop-
and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception
to the general rule against a search without a warrant. In
Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that there
were many instances where a search and seizure could be
effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest,
one of which was stop-and-frisk. To require the police
officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a
search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much
too late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it
was reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious
individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to
maintain the status quo while obtaining more information,
rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime
to occur. Herein, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions
observed during their surveillance that Manalili had red
eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan
City Cemetery, which according to police information was a
popular hangout of drug addicts.
22. PEOPLE v. EDISON SUCRO
G.R. No. 93239 March 18, 1991
FACTS
On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the
INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi,
Jr to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro,
because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was
selling marijuana.
As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio
Positioned himself under the house of a certain Arlie
Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of
Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter,
Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking
something which turned out later to be marijuana from the
compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then
return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer,
12
Aldie Borromeo. Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and
reported the activity going on. P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat.
Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments. At about
6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report
that a third buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante,
was transacting with appellant.
At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the
area and while the police officers were at the Youth Hostel
at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to
intercept Macabante and appellant. P/Lt. Seraspi and his
team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini
and Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center.
Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the
ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana.
When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he
bought the same from appellant (Edison Sucro) in front of
the chapel. The police team then was able to overtake and
arrest appellant at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans
Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of
marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another
teabag from Macabante,
ISSUE
Whether or not the arrest of the accused without warrant
is lawful and whether or not the evidence of such arrest is
admissible.
HELD
As the Solicitor General has pointed out:
There are several instances when a warrantless search and
seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded
by an arrest provided the same is effected on the basis of
probable cause (e.g. stop and search without warrant at
checkpoints). Between warrantless searches and seizures
at checkpoints and in the case at bar the latter is more
reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was
effected on the basis of probable cause. Under the
circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed
probable cause for the arresting officers, to arrest
appellant who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize
the contraband.
That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid
warrant is not an absolute rule (Manipon, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 [1986]). Among the
exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful
arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant. (People v. Castiller, G.R.
No. 87783, August 6, 1990).
Stephen Rodriguez
23. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, accused-
appellant.
G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000
Facts: This is an automatic review for the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch
27 sentencing Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz to death penalty for
violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
SPO3 Marcelo Tipay testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of
September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an unnamed
informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation,
allegedly owned by appellant. The prohibited plants were
allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector
Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva
Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his operatives to
verify the report. Inspector Parungao gave them specific
instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the
cultivator of same."
At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said
police team, accompanied by their informer, left for the
site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being
grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest
barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place
pinpointed by their informant. The police found appellant
alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around
the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven
(7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows,
approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut.PO2 Balut
asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and,
according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were
his. The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which
weighed 2.194 kilograms. The police took photos of
appellant standing beside the cannabis plants. Appellant
was then arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090
kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for
analysis. Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime
Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic
examination of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs
containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for
marijuana.
Issue: Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants
in the present case lawful?
Ruling: The Constitution lays down the general rule that a
search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a
judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is
deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the
occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed
tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree
and should be excluded. Such evidence shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding. In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut
testified that they first located the marijuana plants before
appellant was arrested without a warrant. Hence, there
was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search
of appellant's premises. Note further that the police team
was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search
for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence
in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is
not searching for evidence against the accused, but
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Clearly,
their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent.
We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon
arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the
area" before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the
seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent"
and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana
plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye
and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be
13
made to apply.
For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be
present: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in
the pursuit of their official duties;(b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right
to be where they are; and (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere
seizure of evidence without further search. Valdez is
ACQUITTED.
Pearl Diamond Sillador
24. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHUA HO SAN
@ TSAY HO SAN
G.R. No. 128222. June 17, 1999
FACTS: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of
firearms and other contraband, Chief of Police Jim Lagasca
Cid of Bacnotan Police Station, La Union began patrolling
the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring
the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio
call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan
Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting for police
assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had
spotted. According to Almoite, the vessel looked different
from the boats ordinarily used by fisher folk of the area
and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six
of his men led by SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded
immediately to Tammocalao beach and there conferred
with Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried
a lone male passenger, who was later identified as Chua
Ho San. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger
alighted, carrying a multicolored strawbag, and walked
towards the road. Upon seeing the police officers, the man
changed direction and broke into a run. Badua held Chua’s
right arm to prevent him from fleeing. They then
introduced themselves as police officers; however, Chua
did not understand what they’re saying. CID then resorted
to "sign language;" he motioned with his hands for Chua to
open the bag. Chua apparently understood and acceded to
the request. The said bag was found to contain several
transparent plastics containing yellowish crystalline
substances, which was later identified to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Chua was then
brought to Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided
with an interpreter to inform him of his constitutional
rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and
seizure conducted by the Police Officers constitute a valid
exemption from the warrant requirement.
HELD: The Court held in the negative. The Court explains
that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's
body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by
virtue of a valid search warrant issued in accordance with
the Rules. However, warrantless searches may be
permitted in the following cases, to wit:(1)search of
moving vehicles, (2)seizure in plain view, (3)customs
searches, (4)waiver or consent searches, (5)stop and frisk
situations (Terry search), and (6)search incidental to a
lawful arrest. It is required in cases of in flagrante delicto
that the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of
such facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or
constitutive of probable cause. Probable cause means a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant
a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged. In the case at bar,
there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or
demonstrative of CHUA's participation in ongoing criminal
enterprise that could have spurred police officers from
conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA was not identified
as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact
that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no
resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not
automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating
an offense. With these, the Court held that there was no
probable cause to justify a search incidental to a lawful
arrest. The Court likewise did not appreciate the contention
of the Prosecution that there was a waiver or consented
search. If CHUA could not understand what was orally
articulated to him, how could he understand the police's
"sign language?" More importantly, it cannot logically be
inferred from his alleged cognizance of the "sign language"
that he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived
his right against such an intrusive search. Finally, being a
forbidden fruit, the subject regulated substance was held
to be inadmissible in evidence. Hence, the accused was
acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient to establish
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
25. PEOPLE vs TANGLIBEN
G.R. No. L-63630, April 6, 1990
Facts: Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were
conducting surveillance at the San Fernando Victory Liner
Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel
Tangliben, carrying a traveling bag who acted suspiciously.
They confronted him, inspected his bag, and there they
found marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken to
the Police Headquarters for further investigations. The Trial
Court found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the
RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Issue:
Whether or not the search is unlawful
Ruling: The court ruled that the search was lawful.
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a
search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus,
Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:
Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense, without a search warrant.
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying
marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls
squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was
incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid.
In the case of People v. Claudia, 160 SCRA 646, Appellant
Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat.
Daniel did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the
latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless
search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful.
(Nolasco V. Paño, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no
infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
14
In People v. Amininudin, the PC officers had earlier
received a tip from an informer that accused-appellant.
was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was
carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they waited for him
one evening, approached him as he descended from the
gangplank, detained him and inspected the bag he was
carrying. Said bag contained marijuana leaves. The Court
held that the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence
since it was seized illegally. The records show, however,
that there were certain facts, not sing in the case before
us, which led the Court to declare the seizure as invalid. As
stated therein:
The present case presented no such urgency From the
conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that
they had at react two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant of arrest and search Aminnudin who
was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was
known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival
was certain. And from the information they had received,
they could have persuaded a judge that there was
probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a
warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to
comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored
altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of
the arresting team, had determined on his own authority
that a "search warrant was not necessary."
In contrast, the instant case presented urgency. Although
the trial court's decision did not mention it, the transcript
of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer
who pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying
marijuana. (TSN, pp. 52-53) Faced with such on-the-spot
information, the police officers had to act quickly. There
was not enough time to secure a search warrant. We
cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin to the case
at bar. To require search warrants during on-the-spot
apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of
firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband
goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if
not impossible to contain the crimes with which these
persons are associated.
26. People of the Philippines vs. Leila Johnson Y.
Reyes
G.R. No. 138881 December 18, 2000 Second
Division
I. Facts:
Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker of the NAIA
departure area. When Ramirez frisked Leila Johnson, a
departing passenger bound for the United States, she felt
something hard on the latter’s abdominal area. Upon
inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two
panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a
result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the
explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior,
SPO4 Reynaldo Embile who directed her to take accused-
appellant to the nearest women’s room for inspection
accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Inside the womens
room, Johnson brought out three plastic packs, later
identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
with a total weight of 580.2 grams. Johnson claimed that
the shabu confiscated from her is inadmissible as evidence
because she was forced to affix her signature on the
plastic bags while she was detained at the 1st RASO office,
without the assistance of counsel and without having been
informed of her constitutional rights.
II. Issue:
Whether or not the shabu confiscated is inadmissible as
evidence.
III. Ruling:
No, the shabu is not inadmissible as evidence. What is
involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto
pursuant to a valid search made on her person. The
constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she
was never placed under custodial investigation but was
validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions
of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Travellers are often notified through airport public address
systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they
are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures. The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride
having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless
search, they are admissible in evidence against Johnson.
Johnson’s subsequent arrest, although likewise without
warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the
discovery and recovery of shabu in her person in flagrante
delicto.
Anent Johnson’s allegation that her signature on the shabu
packs had been obtained while she was in the custody of
the airport authorities without the assistance of counsel,
the Solicitor General correctly points out that nowhere in
the records is it indicated that Johnson was required to
affix her signature to the packs.
27. G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-
appellant.
Facts:
Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the
Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a
tourist. At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May
1989, Captain Alen Vasco ordered his men to set up a
temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay,
Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles
coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a
checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent
reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs.
Moreover, information was received by the Commanding
Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited
drugs. At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus
where accused was riding was stopped. During the
inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist.
Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the
officer asked for accused's passport and other identification
15
papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer
required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging
on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch
bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered,
the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to
open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects
turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Issue:
Whether or not the search and arrest of the accused was
illegal for it is made without a valid search warrant.
Held:
A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace
officer or a private person when in his presence the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. The receipt of
information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the
suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport,
taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to
reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide
something illegal from the authorities. From these
circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the
warrantless search that was made on the personal effects
of the accused.
28. G.R. No. 83988 | September 29, 1989
RICARDO C. VALMONTE vs. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA
FACTS:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters,
AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations
within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for
the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region. As part of its
duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and
Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) aver that: (1)
because of the installation of said checkpoints, the
residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and
of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and
whimsical disposition of the military manning the
checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are
being subjected to regular searches and check-ups,
especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a
search warrant and/or court order; (2) the said
checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to
make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or
court order in violation of the Constitution; and, (3)
instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed,
had been harassed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conduct of military and police
checkpoints violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures
RULING:
No. Military and police checkpoints do not violate the right
of the people against unreasonable search and seizures.
The Court held that not all searches and seizures are
prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden.
A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each
case. Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside
the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or
flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its
existence and promote public welfare and an individual's
right against a warrantless search which is however
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is
susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same
manner that all governmental power is susceptible of
abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted
within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an
orderly society and a peaceful community.
29. People of the Philippines vs De Gracia
G.R. Nos. 102009-10, July 06, 1994
Facts:
The incidents took place at the height of the coup d'etat
staged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements
headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-
Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the
Government. At that time, various government
establishments and military camps in Metro Manila were
being bombarded by the rightist group with their "tora-
tora" planes.
In the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren
Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region
Defense Command was conducting a surveillance of the
Eurocar Sales Office, together with his team, pursuant to
an intelligence report received by the division that said
establishment was being occupied by the elements of the
RAM-SFP as a communication command post. The
surveillance team was later attacked by a group of five
men.
As a consequence , at around 6:30 in the morning of
December 5,1989, a searching team raided the Eurocar
Sales Office. The team was able to find and confiscate six
cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4
dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov"
bombs inside one of the rooms. De Gracia was the only
person then present in the room; as a result of the raid, he
was arrested along with two others. . No search warrant
was secured by the raiding team because, according to
them, at that time there was so much disorder considering
that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by
the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within
the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that
the courts were consequently closed.
Issue:
16
Whether or not the military operatives made a valid search
and seizure during the height of the December 1989 coup
d’etat.
Held:
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the
Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant
at that time. The raid was actually precipitated by
intelligence reports that said office was being used as
headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a
surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the
surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming
from the Eurocar building. There was general chaos and
disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense
firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby
Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces.
The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed
and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were
deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered
opinion that the instant case falls under one of the
exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search.
In the first place, the military operatives, taking into
account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable
ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There
was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to
warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then
prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for
and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial
judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when
the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such
urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant
could lawfully be dispensed with.
30. Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs
Board, et al
November 3, 2008
Facts:
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner
Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party,
seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from
enforcing paragraphs (c),(d) and (f) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165
which provides that random drug testing will be conducted
on Students of secondary and tertiary schools and also to
officers and employees of public and private offices
persons, while mandatory drug testing to All persons
charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal
offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of
not less than six (6) years and one (1) day on the ground
that they are constitutionally infirm, for the persons
constitutional right against unreasonable searches is
breached by said provisions.
Issue:
Whether or not paragraph (c) and (d) and (f) of Sec. 36 of
RA 9165 violates the persons constitutional right against
unreasonable searches.
Held:
Sec. 36 (c) and (d) of RA 9165 is Constitutional but Sec.
36(f) is unconstitutional. Using US Jurisprudence, the Court
ruled in favor of the constitutionality of Sec 36(c) applying
the following reasonable deduction: (1) schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights
than an adult, and are subject to the custody and
supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3)
schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard
the health and well-being of their students and may adopt
such measures as may reasonably be necessary to
discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to
impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair,
just, and non-discriminatory. It is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and
regulations and policies. Just as in the case of secondary
and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random
drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 (d) of RA 9165 for officers
and employees of public and private offices is justifiable.
The Court notes in this regard that petitioner Social Justice
Society, other than saying that subjecting almost
everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is
unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual
right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the right to be
left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right
to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or
from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as
to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities.
Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and
regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions
specifically directed towards preventing a situation that
would unduly embarrass the employees or place them
under a humiliating experience. While every officer and
employee in a private establishment is under the law
deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible
subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in
advance for drug testing. The intrusion into the employees
privacy is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly
against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is
relatively minimal. Like their counterparts in the private
sector, government officials and employees also labor
under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by
the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all
enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public
service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness
for private employees, the more reason that it should pass
the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command,
are required to be accountable at all times to the people
and to serve them with utmost responsibility and
efficiency. In the case of persons charged with a crime
before the prosecutors office, a mandatory drug testing
can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of
randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to
their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They
are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of
being haled before the prosecutors office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case,
do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone
waive their right to privacy.
Joselito Toledo
17
31. POLLO VS CONSTANTINO-DAVID
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a letter-complaint addressed to respondent
CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David marked
"Confidential" was sent through a courier service. Acting
upon the letter-complaint, Chairperson David immediately
formed a team of four personnel with background in
information technology (IT), and issued a memo directing
them to conduct an investigation and specifically "to back
up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan
Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions. The backing-up of all
files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal
Services Division was witnessed by several employees,
together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely
monitored said activity. The contents of the diskettes were
examined by the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs. It was found
that most of the files in the On the basis of this finding,
Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order requiring
the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit
his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from
notice.
Petitioner then denied that he is the person referred to in
the anonymous letter-complaint which had no attachments
to it, because he is not a lawyer. He accused CSC officials
of conducting a fishing expedition when they unlawfully
copied and printed personal files in his computer, and
subsequently asking him to submit his comment which
violated his right against self-incrimination. He averted that
he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done
while he was on leave, that the files in his computer were
his personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends
and some associates and that he is not authorizing their
sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would
violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection
against self-incrimination and warrantless search and
seizure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s claim to avail the right to
privacy over his computer and electronic files as a
government employee is valid.
HELD:
No. The Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual
expectation of privacy either in his office or government-
issued computer which contained his personal files. On the
contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance
office of the CSC; he normally would have visitors in his
office like friends, associates and even unknown people,
whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him
seemed a trivial request. The search of petitioner’s
computer files was conducted in connection with
investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an
anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson
David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV. A search by a
government employer of an employee’s office is justified at
inception when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee
is guilty of work-related misconduct. Therefore petitioner’s
right to privacy is not violated in the case at bar and his
claim to avail such right is not supported by sufficient
grounds.
WRIT OF AMPARO
32. G.R. No. 180906
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
THEPHILIPPINES vs. RAYMOND MANALO
Facts: On February 14, 2006 past afternoon, Raymond
Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military
men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they
were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months
of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August
13, 2007. Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition
for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining
Order to stop the military officers and agents from
depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic
rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The
Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus
motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition.
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the
privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA ordered the
Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the
AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official
and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’
custody, confirm the present places of official assignment
of two military officials involved, and produce all medical
reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under
military custody. The Secretary of National Defense and
the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to
reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is
necessary for the right to security of a person may be
invoked.
Held: In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court
ruled that there is a continuing violation of the Manalos
right to security. The Writ of Amparo is the most potent
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty,
and security has been violated or is threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials
or employees and by private individuals or entities.
Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been
under concealment and protection by private citizens
because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The
circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention,
torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that
there is an apparent threat that they will again be
abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These
constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life,
actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the
Court explained. The right to security of person is a
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security.
Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees
that, as a general rule, one’s body cannot be searched or
invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted
in the context of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion
of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical
disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of
physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates.
Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime
18
against persons because they are an affront to the bodily
integrity or security of a person.
33. Robert Reyes vs. Sec. Raul Gonzales, December
3, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila
Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007. On
December 1, 2007, upon the request of the DILG,
respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold
Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering to include in the
Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others in
the interest of national security and public safety. RTC
issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against
petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause.
Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power to
issue a Hold Departure Order and has no legal basis since
Rebellion case has already been dismissed but the HDO
has not been lifted.
Petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco Chavez manifested that
every time petitioner would leave and return to the
country, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and
interrogate him for several minutes because of the existing
HDO. The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the
ground that respondents violated petitioner’s constitutional
right to travel. The CA dismissed the petition and denied
the privilege of the writ of amparo. The motion for
reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s right to liberty has been
violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of the
subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of
the writ of amparo.
HELD: Petition is denied. The rights that fall within the
protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of
the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2)
right to liberty; and (3) right to security. In Secretary of
National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., the court made a
categorical pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its
present form is confined to these two instances of
“extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,” or to
threats thereof.
The restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a
consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed
against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to
establish that his right to travel was impaired in the
manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious
violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which
there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
The direct recourse to this Court is inappropriate,
considering the provision of Section 22 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo which provides, that when a criminal action
has commenced no separate petition for the writ shall be
filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by
motion in the criminal case.
33-A. In the matter of the petition for the Writ of
Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of NORIEL
H.RODRIGUEZ, vs.GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, et
al
Facts:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti
Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant
organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as
an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya,
making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances.
Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured
repeatedly when he refused to confess to his membership
in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo and and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data
with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and
Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The
petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et al. The
writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as
party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case
during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility can
be used in amparo and habeas data cases.
Held:
The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to
determine whether respondents are accountable for and
have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in
order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to
protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court
from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in
amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and
accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely
applied in amparo cases in order to identify those
accountable individuals that have the power to effectively
implement whatever processes an amparo court would
issue. In such application, the amparo court does not
impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the
superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect
the rights of the aggrieved party. Such identification of the
responsible and accountable superiors may well be a
preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of
course, is still subject to further investigation by the
appropriate government agency.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
34. Marynette Gamboa vs. Marlou C. Chan et. al.,
July 24, 2012
Facts: On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275
(A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to
Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the
Country”, forming the Zeñarosa Commission to investigate
the existence of private army groups (PAGs) with a view to
eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and
permanently in the future.
Gamboa alleged that without the benefit of data
verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information
gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby
causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of
19
individuals maintaining PAGs.
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening
news program the portion of the Report naming Gamboa
as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a
PAG.21 Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG
also appeared on print media.
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her
reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a
Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of
habeas data against respondents in their capacities as
officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.25 In her Petition, she
prayed for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the
unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b)
withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP
officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to her honor;
(d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding
unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining
respondents from making baseless reports.
Issues:
Whether or Not her right to privacy was violated and,
Whether or not the writ of habeas data is the proper
remedy for the violation of her rights.
Ruling: The Constitution explicitly mandates the
dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not
recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also
provides for the establishment of one police force that is
national in scope and civilian in character.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state
interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged
intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when
the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information
against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore,
the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of
protection established in existing law and jurisprudence,
this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these
investigating entities that information-sharing must
observe strict confidentiality. That it was leaked to third
parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting
reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to
establish that respondents were responsible for this
unintended disclosure.
In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to
address the purported damage to her reputation, making a
resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas
data unnecessary and improper.
Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove
through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of
individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters
susceptible to harassment and to increased police
surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently
explained that the investigations conducted against her
were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption
of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION
35. Felipe Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, August 26,
1999
Facts: The evidence shows that, at around 8:40 in the
evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique
Ike Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station DWTI
in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the
Entertainment City following reports that it was showing
nude dancers. After the three had seated themselves at a
table and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on
stage and began to perform a strip act. As she removed
her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took
a picture. At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin,
with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena
and demanded to know why he took a picture. Jalbuena
replied: Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job. Sioco
pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned the latter
that he would kill him.
This angered Lingan. The two then had a heated
exchange. Finally, Lingan said: Masyado kang abusado,
alisin mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo.
petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of his pistol
above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood
flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner
Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored
him. Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: Kita
mo yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan ang
naghamon. He said to Sgt. Aonuevo: Ilagay mo diyan sa
blotter, sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si Ike
Lingan ang naghamon. He then poked his gun at the right
temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the
blotter. Jalbuena could not affix his signature. His right
hand was trembling and he simply wrote his name in print.
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner
Navarro to his office, while a policeman took Lingan to the
Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager of DWTI,
Boy Casaada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been
taken to the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died
from his injuries.Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena
was able to record on tape the exchange between
petitioner and the deceased.
Issue: Whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No.
4200, which prohibits wire tapping
Held: SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not
being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,
or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described: It shall
also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not
in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence,
to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc
record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any
communication or spoken word secured either before or
after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited
by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or
persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either
verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof,
whether complete or partial, to any other person:
Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof
as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of
offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be
20
covered by this prohibition.
SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of
the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or
recording of private communications. Since the exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its
tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A
voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a
witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation;
(2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded;
and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the
persons such are claimed to belong. In the instant case,
Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice
recording;that the tape played in court was the one he
recorded;]and that the speakers on the tape were
petitioner Navarro and Lingan.A sufficient foundation was
thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by
the prosecution.
Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena
established: (1) that there was a heated exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in
the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena;
and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving
petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the
worst of it.
Pearlle Joyce Calampinay
36. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
In August, 1929, the Supreme Court rendered a decision in
Government of the Phil. Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose,
declaring that two parcels of land bordering on Laguna de
Bay and identified as Lots 1 and 2 form an integral part of
the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan belonging to the
Colegio de San Jose. Ten years later, the Colegio de San
Jose sold the said two lots, together with an adjoining
unregistered land, to the Government. The three parcels of
land acquired by the Government became known as the
Tunasan Homesite. The Rural Progress Administration
(RPA), which was charged with the administration and
disposition of the homesite, caused the subdivision thereof
into small lots for the purpose of selling them to bona fide
occupants. In December, 1940, Lot 17, Block 78 of the
Tunasan Homesite, which was part of Lot 2, and containing
an area of 5,158 square meters, was sold by the RPA to
Apolonio Diaz. In May, 1948, Lot 19 of the same homesite,
which was also a part of Lot 2, with an area of 1,170
square meters, was acquired by Apolonio Diaz, although
his son Pastor Diaz was made to appear as the vendee. In
January, 1955, the heirs of Apolonio Diaz transferred their
rights to both Lots 17 and 19 to Marta Ygonia, wife of
Arcadio Ramirez (said spouses being the parents of herein
petitioner), who paid the balance of the purchase price for
the lots. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources approved the deeds of transfer of rights
executed by the heirs of Apolonio Diaz, and in July, 1958,
the Land Tenure Administration executed a deed of sale in
favor of Marta Ygonia over Lots 17 and 19. An original
application for registration was filed by spouses Marta
Ygonia and Arcadio Ramirez (docketed as LRC Case No. B-
46) with the then Court of First Instance of Laguna in May,
1957. It had for its subject matter a parcel of land on the
eastern side of Lot 17, with an area of 11,055 square
meters (later increased to 11,311 sq. meters), which was
claimed by the applicants as an accretion to their land
gradually formed by alluvial deposits. The Director of Lands
opposed the application on the grounds that the applicants
did not possess sufficient title to the land sought to be
registered, and that the land in question is a part of the
public domain.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Hon. Court of Appeals
committed grave error in the interpretation and application
of the doctrine of res judicata, more particularly on the
issue of public domain.
Ruling:
After careful deliberation and consultation, we find
ourselves in agreement with petitioners contention. Seen
from the perspective offered by the aforequoted ruling, it is
evident that one of the elements of res judicata is lacking
in the case at bar. Respondent Court declared that identity
of causes of action between Case No. B-46 and Case No.
B-526 exist since they both sought registration of the land
formed by alluvial deposits, but failed to recognize that the
basis for claiming such registration was different in each
case. In Case No. B-46, applicants-spouses Arcadio
Ramirez and Marta Ygonia (herein petitioners parents)
claimed that their possession of the land, tacked to that of
their predecessors Apolonio Diaz, et al. (allegedly from
1943 onwards), was sufficient to vest title in them by
acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, in LRC Case
No. B-526, petitioner claimed that the duration of
possession by his parents (commencing allegedly in 1958),
combined with his own possession (counted from 1988
when he purchased the accretion from his parents) gave
him sufficient title thereto by acquisitive prescription.
As to the parties pleas before the respondent Court for the
issuance of an order to cause the taking of a verification
survey to determine whether they are referring to the
same parcel of land or to two different properties, suffice it
to say that the disposition of this case is not a bar to such
a survey.
Christine Lily Angely Chin
37. G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996
CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ALFREDO MARTIN
Facts: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private
respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine,
and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and
cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents
consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin
and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled
21
checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs.
The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence
in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from
the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against
her husband.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence obtained can be held
inadmissible as it violated his right of privacy of
communication.
Held: The intimacies between husband and wife do not
justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication
between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage,
save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one
to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to
the other.
38. Waterous Drug Corporation
vs
NLRC
G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997
Facts:
Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by
Waterous Drug Corp.
YSP Inc., a supplier of medicine, sold to Waterous, thru
Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit.
However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that
the price per bottle is P320.00. Verification was made to
YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found
that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced.
YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes)
confirmed that the difference represents refund of jack-up
price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice,
which was paid to Ms. Catolico. Said check was sent in an
envelope addressed to Catolico.
Catolico denied receiving the same. However, Saldana, the
clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. confirmed that she saw an
open envelope with a check amounting P640 payable to
Catolico.
Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico
for acts of dishonesty.
NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents
(check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of
the constitutional right invoked by complainants. In the
light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from
interference by government and cannot be extended to
acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it
within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
Issue: Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence
Held: Yes. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private
individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims,
that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults.
On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an
invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient
evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from
employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes
provided by the Labor Code for the termination of
Employment.
39. Marquez v Desierto
G.R. No. 135882. June 27, 2001
FACTS:
Sometime in May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an
Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto dated April
29, 1998, to produce several bank documents for purposes
of inspection in camera relative to various accounts
maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas
Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager. The
accounts to be inspected are Account Nos. 011-37270,
240-020718, 245-30317-3 and 245-30318-1, involved in a
case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding
and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et. al.
The lower court rendered a decision in favor for the
Ombudsman.
Marquez prayed that the previous decisions be set aside
and the issuance of TRO and/or preliminary injunction to
the order of the Ombudsman and court decisions. ISSUE:
Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in
camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as
an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A.
No.1405). HELD: No. SC ruled that before an in camera
inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case
before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the
account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to
the subject matter of the pending case before the court of
competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the
account holder must be notified to be present during the
inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account
identified in the pending case.
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending case before any
court of competent authority. What is existing is an
investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In short,
what the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to
fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado
Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there
was no pending case in court which would warrant the
opening of the bank account for inspection.
40. BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES,
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA,
CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA
REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA,
TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL
COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE
22
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998
Facts:
President Fidel V. Ramos issued AO No. 308 entitled
“ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM”. Petitioner assailed
its constitutionality on the grounds that the administrative
order issued by the executive is deemed to be a law and
not a mere administrative order thus it is a usurpation of
legislative power of the congress to make laws, and it
impermissibly intrudes the citizen’s constitutional right of
privacy.
Issue:
Whether or not AO No. 308 violates a person’s right to
privacy.
Ruling:
The essence of privacy is the right to be let alone.
Administrative Order No. 308 violates the constitutional
right to privacy because its scope is too broad and vague
that will put people’s right to privacy in clear and present
danger if implemented. The A.O. 308 also lacks of proper
safeguards for protecting the information that will be
gathered from people through biometrics and other means.
Thus, A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual’s
liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track
down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and circumvent
the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for
“fishing expeditions” by government authorities and evade
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
41. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp vs. COMELEC
January 28, 2000
FACTS:
COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a
restraining order to stop ABS CBN or any other groups, its
agents or representatives from conducting exit surveys.
The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon
"information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN has
prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV
coverage of the elections and to make an exit survey of
the vote during the elections for national officials
particularly for President and Vice President, results of
which shall be broadcasted immediately.” The electoral
body believed that such project might conflict with the
official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count
of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It
also noted that it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN
to undertake the exit survey. Two days before the
elections on May 11, 1998, the Court issued the Temporary
Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner ABS-CBN. The
Comelec was directed to cease and desist, until further
orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the
restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact,
the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by
media without any difficulty or problem.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not ABS-CBN, in holding of exit polls and the
nationwide reporting of their results validly exercises
freedoms of speech and of the press.
HELD:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It, cited the
following: First, by the very nature of a survey, the
interviewees or participants are selected at random, so
that the results will as much as possible be representative
or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the
community or group polled. Second, the survey result is
not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec
count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group
as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for,
based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals.
Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the
integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are
separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding
and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot
undermine those of the elections, since the former is only
part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be
indicative of the other.
Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be
prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress
incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without
transgressing the fundamental rights of our people.
42. SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED
and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION
-versus-
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 147571
Facts:
Social Weather Stations (SWS) is an institution conducting
surveys in various fields. Kamahalan Publishing
Corporation., on the other hand, publishes the Manila
Standard which is a newspaper of general circulation and
features items of information including election surveys.
Both SWS and Kamahalan are contesting the validity and
enforcement of R.A. 9006 (Fair Election Act), especially
section 5.4 which provides the surveys affecting national
candidated shall not be published 15 days before an
election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be
publishes 7 dyas before the election. SWS wanted to
conduct an election survey throughout the period of the
elections both at the national and local levels and release
to the media the results of such survey as well as publish
them directly. Kamahalan, for its part, intends to publish
election survey results up to the last day of the elections
on May 14, 2001.
Issue:
Whether or not the restriction on the publication of election
survey constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of
freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to
justify such restraint.
Held:
Yes, Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006 constitutes an
unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech,
expression, and the press. The power of the COMELEC
over media franchises is limited to ensuring equal
opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply, as well as
to fix reasonable rates of charge for the use of media
facilities for public information and forms among
23
candidates. here, the prohibition of speech is direct,
absolute, and substantial. Nor does this section pass the
O'brient test for content related regulation because (1) it
supresses one type of expression while allowing other
types such as editorials, etc.: (2) the restriction is greater
than what is needed to protect government interest
because the interest can be protected by narrower
restrictions such as subsequent punishment punishment.
Justice Kapunan's dissenting opinion basically says that the
test of clear and present danger is inappropriate to use in
order to test the validity of this section. Instead, he
purports to engage in a form of balancing by weighing the
circumstances to determine whether public interest is
served by the regulation of the free enjoyment of the
rights. However, he failed to show why, on the balance,
the other considerations should outweigh the value of
freedom of expression.
43. Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial of in
the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder cases against the
former President Joseph E. Estrada.
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001
Facts: The Kapisanan ng mga Broadkaster ng Pilipinas
(KBP), sent a letter requesting the court to allow live media
coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other
criminal cases filed against former President Joseph
Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order to assure the
public of full transparency in the proceedings of an
unprecedented case in our history. The petitioners invoked
that in involves a matter of public concern and interest, or
a matter over which the entire citizenry has the right to
know, be informed and made aware of. Moreover, the live
radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also
serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired
transparency in the administration of justice in order to
disabuse the minds of the supporters of the past regime of
any and all unfounded notions, or ill-received attempts on
the part of the present dispensation, to railroad the instant
criminal cases against the former President Estrada.
However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 23,
1991, in a case for libel filed by then President Corazon C.
Aquino read that the Court resolved to prohibit live radio
and television coverage of court proceedings in view of
protecting the parties’ right to due process, to prevent
distraction of the participants in the proceedings and to
avoid miscarriage of justice.
Issue: Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
the press and right to information of public concern be
given more weight than the fundamental rights of the
accused.
Held: An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a
right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where
his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public
trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would
not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not
compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public
trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies
that the court doors must be open to those who wish to
come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with
decorum and observe the trial process. In the
constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough
facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe
the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness
negligible and not too large as to distract the trial
participants from their proper functions, who shall then be
totally free to report what they have observed during the
proceedings. The courts recognize the constitutionally
embodied freedom of the press and the right to public
information. It also approves of media's exalted power to
provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of
conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting
the public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless,
within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still
the paramount right of the accused to due process which
must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its
constitutional proportions. Television can work profound
changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on. There
will be conscious and unconscious effect that such
coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the
decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise
be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or
innocence to yield to it. Due process guarantees the
accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is
proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual
settings nor made an object of public's attention and
where the conclusions reached are induced not by any
outside force or influence but only by evidence and
argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and
calm ambiance is demanded. It may be difficult to quantify
the influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on
them directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it
does so in so many ways and in varying degrees. With the
possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also
the very life of an accused, a verdict that would come only
after the presentation of credible evidence testified to by
unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure,
whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of
histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret
veritable facts free from improper influence,8 and decreed
by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by
running emotions or passions.
44. NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC. v
HON. CEASAR G. DY
G.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411, April 2, 2009.
FACTS:
Petitioners Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc.
(Newsounds) and Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc.
(CBS) operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan
(DZNC) and Star FM DWIT Cauayan in Cauayan Citry,
Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation
in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela. The HLURB and
OMPDC affirmed and certified that the commercial
structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning
regulations, noting as well that the location is classified as
a “commercial area”.
The radio station was able to fully operate smoothly
thereafter. However in 2002, petitioners’ renewal of
mayor’s permit was denied on the ground that they have
not submitted conversion papers showing that the
24
agricultural land was converted to commercial land.
Petitioners asked the court to compel the issuance of
mayor’s permit but the same was denied. In the meantime,
DAR Region II office issued to petitioners a formal
recognition of conversion of the property from agricultural
to commercial.
In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal
of mayor’s permit, attaching the DAR Order. Respondent
Felicisimo Meer, denied the same, claiming that it was void
on the grounds that they did not have record of the DAR
Order. The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and
respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia closed the
radio station. Due to the provision of Omnibus Election
Code which prohibits the closure of radio station during the
pendency of election period, COMELEC issued an order
allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17,
2004, but was barred again by respondent Mayor Cesar Dy
on the grounds that the radio station had no permit.
Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run again until
June 10, 2004 after elections. Petitioners filed the case to
the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayor’s permit but
both courts denied the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners’ constitutional right of freedom
of expression was violated
RULING:
In the case at bar, the absence of any evidence other than
bare assertions that the 1996 to 2001 certifications were
incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that
respondents are estopped from asserting that the previous
recognition of the property as commercial was wrong.
It is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all
to even require petitioners to secure “approved land
conversion papers from the DAR showing that the property
was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial
land.” Respondents closure of petitioner’s radio stations is
clearly tainted with ill motives. Petitioners have been
aggressive in exposing the widespread election
irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored
respondent Dy and his political dynasty. Such statement
manifests and confirms that respondent’s denial of the
renewal applications on the ground that property is
commercial and merely a pretext, and their real agenda is
to remove petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the
latter’s voice. This is a blatant violation of constitutional
right to press freedom.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED.
Joshua John Granada
45. HECTOR C. VILLANUEVA vs. PHILIPPINE DAILY
INQUIRER, INC., et. al.
G.R. No. 164437
FACTS: Petitioner was a mayoralty candidates in Bais,
Negros Oriental during the 1992 elections. Two months
prior the elections, Ricardo Nolan, petitioned for the
disqualification of petitioner before the COMELEC. Nolan’s
petition however, was denied. Two days prior the
elections, respondent Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing
Corporation published a story that COMELEC had
disqualified petitioner. A day prior the elections,
respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. also came out
with a similar story. Subsequent the articles, when the
results of the elections came out, petitioner lost. Under the
belief that said articles led to his defeat, petitioner sued
respondents PDI and Manila Bulletin, alleging that the
articles were maliciously timed to defeat him. He sued for
actual damages worth P270,000, moral damages worth
P10,000,000, an unspecified amount of exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees of P300,000. Respondents
disclaimed liability, asserting that they acted without
malice, stressing that the stories were privileged in nature.
ISSUES: Whether or not respondents, being members of
the press, abused the freedom of the press.
RULING: The Court did not consider that the respondents
had abused the freedom of the press. Newspapers should
be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to
courageously and effectively perform their important role
in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press
reporters and editors usually have to race with their
deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable
care, they should not be held to account, to a point of
suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the
choice of words. For liability to arise without offending the
freedom of the press, the test to meet is whether or not
the constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct, unless
it be proven that the statement was made with ‘actual
malice,’ or with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not. Absent proof that
they were obtained from a press conference or release,
respondents were not impelled by malice. Still, the news
items were derogatory and injurious to petitioner’s
reputation and candidacy. The Court simply faulted
respondents for failing to verify the truth of the news tips
they published and held them respondents liable for
negligence. Petitioner was awarded damages, as amended.
46. G.R. No. 180291 July 27, 2010
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as
PRESIDENT and GENERAL MANAGER of the GSIS,
Petitioners,
vs.
DINNAH VILLAVIZA, ELIZABETH DUQUE,
ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ, RODEL RUBIO, ROWENA
THERESE B. GRACIA, PILAR LAYCO, and ANTONIO
JOSE LEGARDA, Respondents.
Facts:
PGM Garcia, as President and General Manager of the
GSIS, filed separate formal charges against respondents
and eventually found them guilty for Grave Misconduct
and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service and meting out the penalty of one (1) year
suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant
thereto. The charges contained that respondent, wearing
red shirt together with some employees, marched to or
appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the
Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest
and support for Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco,
the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises.
25
On appeal, CSC found that the acts of respondents in
going to the GSIS-IU office wearing red shirts to witness a
public hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or
mass action prescribed above. CSC added that their
actuations can be deemed an exercise of their
constitutional right to freedom of expression. The CA found
no cogent reason to deviate therefrom.
Issue:
Whether or not an unruly mass gathering of employees to
protest the prohibition against the appearance of their
leader as counsel in the administrative case, falls within
the constitutional purview of the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of expression.
Held:
Yes. As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316
which serves to regulate the political rights of those in the
government service, the concerted activity or mass action
prescribed must be coupled with the intent of effecting
work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their
demands of force concession. Wearing similarly colored
shirts, attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office,
bringing with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists,
some even badmouthing the guards and PGM Garcia, are
acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work
stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of
realizing their demands of force concession.
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much
right as any person in the land to voice out their protests
against what they believe to be a violation of their rights
and interests. Not all collective activity or mass undertaking
of government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we
would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in the
government service of their constitutional right to freedom
of expression. Civil Service does not deprive them of their
freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by
joining the government service, the members thereof have
renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can
be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.
Thus, respondents freedom of speech and of expression
remains intact, and CSCs Resolution No. 02-1316 defining
what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action has
only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured against
that definition, respondents actuations did not amount to a
prohibited concerted activity or mass action.
John Paul Hervas
47. SORIANO VS MTRCB
G.R. No. 164785 March 15, 2010
FACTS:
Eliseo F. Soriano, a television evangelist, hosted the Ang
Dating Daan aired nationwide daily from 10:00 p.m. to
midnight over public television. The program carried a
general patronage rating from the Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). Soriano regu-
larly engaged in verbal sparring on air with the host of
Iglesia ni Cristo’s Ang Tamang Daan, hurling accusations
and counter-accusations with respect to their opposing
religious beliefs and practices. It appears that in his
program Ang Tamang Daan’s Michael M. Sandoval attacked
So-riano for alleged inconsistencies in his Bible teachings.
Michael compared spliced recordings of Soriano’s
statements, matched with subtitles of his utterances, to
demonstrate those inconsisten-cies. On August 10, 2004,
in an apparent reaction to what he perceived as a
malicious attack against him by the rival television
program, Soriano accused Michael of prostituting himself
with his fab-ricated presentations. Michael and seven other
ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo lodged a complaint against
Soriano before the MTRCB. Acting swiftly, the latter
preventively suspended the airing of Soriano’s Ang Dating
Daan television program for 20 days, pursuant to its
powers under Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree 1986 and
its related rules. Soriano challenged the validity of that pre-
ventive suspension before this Court in G.R. 164785. After
hearing the main case or on September 27, 2004, the
MTRCB found Soriano guilty as charged and imposed on
him a penalty of three months suspension from appearing
on the Ang Dating Daan program. Soriano thus filed a
second petition in G.R. 165636 to question that decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of freedom of speech
in this case.
HELD:
Soriano’s Bible ministry has been on television continuously
for 27 years since 1983 with no prior record of use of foul
language. For a 15-second outburst of its head at his
bitterest critics, it seems not fair for the Court to close
down this Bible ministry to its large followers altogether for
a full quarter of a year. It is obscenity on television that
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech does not
protect. As the Courts decision points out, the test of
obscenity is whether the average person, applying
contemporary standards, would find the speech, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest. A quarter-of-a-year
suspension would probably be justified when a general
patronage program intentionally sneaks in snippets of
lewd, prurient materials to attract an audi-ence to the
program. This has not been the case here.
The Court concedes that Soriano’s short outburst was not
in the category of the obscene. Soriano actually exercised
some restraints in the sense that he did not use the
vernacular word for the female sexual organ when
referring to it, which word even the published opinions of
the Court avoided despite its adult readers. The word puta
or prostitute describes a bad trade but it is not a bad word.
The world needs a word to describe it. The Court claims
that, since Ang Dating Daan carried a general patronage
rating, Sorianos speech no doubt caused harm to the
children who watched the show. This statement is much
too sweeping. There is no question that Soriano attacked
Michael, using figure of speech, at past 10:00 in the
evening, not at 2:00 in the afternoon. The average Filipino
child would have been long in bed by the time Ang Dating
Daan appeared on the television screen.
It is a direct, unconditional, and total abridgment of the
freedom of speech, to which a re-ligious organization is
entitled, for a whole quarter of a year. Since this case is
about protecting children, the more appropriate penalty, if
Soriano’s speech during the program mentioned was
indecent and had offended them, is to raise his programs
26
restriction classification. The MTRCB classify programs to
protect vulnerable audiences.
48. G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc.,
petitioners
vs.
Anti-Terrorism Council, et al, respondent
Facts:
Six petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of
the Republic Act No. 9372 otherwise known as Human
Security Act of 2007. The petitioners raise that the law
suffers vagueness and overbreadth. There is vagueness
when the law lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two aspects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcements unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle. There is overbreadth when the law is
too sweeping that it restricts even those rights that are
protected. The petitioners assail that the definition of the
crime of terrorism under the said law was vague and
broad.
Issues:
Whether or not the RA 9372 suffers vagueness or
overbreadth that should be grounds for a facial invalidation
or challenge.
Held:
No penal laws should be subject to a facial challenge. A
facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free
speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional
litigation are rightly accepted. The petitioners invoked that
the law penalizes speech, contending the element of
“unlawful demand” in the definition of terrorism must be
necessarily be transmitted through some form of
expression protected by free speech clause. The court held
that the notion of the petitioners is entirely inaccurate, as it
focused on just one element of the crime. Almost every
commission of a crime entails consideration of every word community or society.
in the elements and mincing of the words of the offender. The Court further reiterated that the power to regulate is
vested to the government through police power. The
49. Bayan, Karapatan, et.al. vs. Ermita, et.al., permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and
G.R. No. 169838.April 25, 2006 present danger to public order, public safety, public
FACTS: The Petitioners alleged the constitutionality of convenience, public morals or public health and that is the
Batas Pambansa No. 880. They alleged that their rights as recognized exception to the exercise of right even under
organizations and individuals were violated when the the Universal Declaration on Civil and Political Rights.
rallies, marches and protests that they have participated The SC ruled that BP No. 880 is only a restriction that
were violently dispersed, by policemen implementing BP simply regulates the time, place and manner of the
No. 880. assemblies. The law provides a precise and sufficient
The Petitioners come in three groups: First is Bayan, et al standard - the clear and present danger test and that the
in GR No. 169838, second is Jess del Prado, et al in GR No. reference to "imminent and grave danger of substantive
169849 and third is Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al in GR evil substantially means the same thing and is not
No. 169881. The Petitioners seek to stop violent dispersals inconsistent standard. A fair and impartial reading of BP
of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy. They No. 880 readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
contended that: 1) BP No. 880 is a violation of the assemblies that would use public places that the reference
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because
Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which assemblies have to be for lawful causes otherwise they
Philippines is a signatory; 2) That the provisions of BP No. would not be peaceable and entitled to protection.
880 are not mere regulations but prohibitions as it is
allegedly a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble
and petition for redress of grievances; 3)That BP No. 880
requires permit before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and
present danger and that it is not content-neutral as it does
not apply to mass actions in support of the government; 4)
That two standards stated in the law, the clear and present
danger and imminent and grave danger were inconsistent.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP No. 880 is constitutional.
RULING: No. The Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of BP. 880. The Supreme Court ruled that
the right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances are
fundamental rights of the people guaranteed by the
constitution but it is a settled principle growing out of the
nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that
it shall not injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
50. IBP vs. Hon. Lito Atienza, February 24, 2010
having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the Facts:
27
In June 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) filed an application for a rally permit with the
office of Manila Mayor Jose “Lito” Atienza. The
IBP sought their rally to be staged at the Mendiola
Bridge. Atienza granted the permit but indicated
thereon that IBP is only allowed to stage their rally
at the Plaza Miranda, a freedom park.
IBP President Jose Anselmo Cadiz received the
rally permit on the day before the scheduled rally.
Cadiz immediately went to the Court of Appeals to
assail the permit because what Atienza did was
only a partial grant which was alleged to be a
violation of the constitutional right to freedom of
expression and a grave abuse of discretion on the
part of Atienza.
Meanwhile, IBP pushed through with the rally not
at Plaza Miranda but at the Mendiola Bridge.
Subsequently, the Manila Police District (MPD)
filed a criminal case against Cadiz for allegedly
violating the Public Assembly Act or specifically,
for staging a rally in a place different from what
was indicated in the rally permit.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Atienza.
The CA ruled that what Atienza did was within his
power; that freedom of expression is not absolute.
Cadiz appealed before the Supreme Court. Cadiz
also prayed for the suspension of the criminal case
against him on the ground that the certiorari case he
filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the
criminal case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the certiorari case Cadiz filed
against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the
criminal case filed against him (Cadiz).
2. Whether or not it is within Mayor Jose Atienza’s
power to modify the rally permit without consulting
with the IBP.
HELD:
1. No. It is improper for Cadiz to raise the issue of
prejudicial question at this stage and in this
certiorari case. Under the Rules of Court, a
prejudicial question is a ground to suspend the
criminal proceeding. However, Cadiz must first file
a petition to suspend the criminal proceeding in the
said criminal case. The determination of the
pendency of a prejudicial question should be made
at the first instance in the criminal action, and not
before the Supreme Court in an appeal from the
civil action.
2. No. In modifying a rally permit or in granting a
rally permit which contains a time and place
different from that applied for, the mayor must first
consult with the applicant at the earliest
opportunity. This is in order to give the applicant
some time to determine if such change is favorable
to him or adverse (and if adverse, he can seek
judicial remedies) – Section 6 of the Public
Assembly Act.
It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or
modification that the clear and present danger test
be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of
the view that there is such an imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil, the applicant must be
heard on the matter. In this case, Atienza did not
consult with the IBP. Atienza capriciously and
whimsically changed the venue without any reason
therefor. Such is a grave abuse of discretion and a
violation of the freedom of expression.
Ryce Magalit
51. Estrada v. Escritor
492 SCRA 1
June 22, 2006
Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in
the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living
with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for
more than twenty five years and had a son with him
as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before
she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still
legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of
said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to
remain employed therein for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal
arrangement is permitted by her religion—the
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the
Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a
‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the
approval of their congregation. Such a declaration
is effective when legal impediments render it
impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize
respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
RULING: The State could not penalize respondent
for she is exercising her right to freedom of
religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically
28
articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most
inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s
interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be
merely abstract or symbolic in order to be
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise
claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced
any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage
or bigamy charges against respondent or her
partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to
the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between
public and secular morality and religious morality
should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our
Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of
religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise
Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state
interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has
proved a compelling state interest, it has to further
demonstrate that the state has used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is
not infringed any more than necessary to achieve
the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes
an exemption to the law based on her right to
freedom of religion.
Daphne Jade Panes
52. Soriano vs. Laguardia
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m.,
petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating
Daan, which then aired on UNTV 37, made
obscene remarks against Iglesia ni Cristo(INC).
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but
almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged
by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private
respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo,
against petitioner in connection with the above
broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who
felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was
then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV
program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue:
Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the
televised “Ang Dating Daan” program a part of the
religious discourse and within the protection of
Section 5, Art.III of the 1987 Constitution?
Held:
No. The SC ruled that “Soriano’s statement can be
treated as obscene, at least with respect to the
average child,” and thus his utterances cannot be
considered as protected speech. Citing decisions
from the US Supreme Court, the High Court said
that the analysis should be “context based” and
found the utterances to be obscene after considering
the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the
time of the show, and the “G” rating of the show,
which are all factors that made the utterances
susceptible to children viewers. The Court
emphasized on how the uttered words could be
easily understood by a child literally rather than in
the context that they were used.” The SC also said
“that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but
rather a “form of permissible administrative
sanction or subsequent punishment.” In affirming
the power of the MTRCB to issue an order of
suspension, the majority said that “it is a sanction
that the MTRCB may validly impose under its
charter without running afoul of the free speech
clause.” visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court said
that the suspension “is not a prior restraint on the
right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of
Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to
him by MTRCB,” rather, it was a sanction for “the
indecent contents of his utterances in a “G” rated
TV program.”
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case,
therefore, and considering the adverse effect of
petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental
rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his
duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly
suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan
for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be
properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was
an undue curtailment of his right to free speech
either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent
punishment. Aside from the reasons given above, a
requirement that indecent language be avoided has
its primary effect on the form, rather than the
content, of serious communication. There are few,
29
if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use
of less offensive language.
Jed Paracha
53. Austria v. NLRC
G.R. No. 124382 August 16, 1999
Facts: The Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is a
religious corporation under Philippine law. The
petitioner was a pastor of the SDA for 28 years
from 1963 until 1991, when his services were
terminated. On various occasions from August up
to October, 1991, petitioner received several
communication from Mr. Eufronio Ibesate, the
treasurer of the Negros Mission asking him to
admit accountability and responsibility for the
church tithes and offerings collected by his wife,
Mrs. Thelma Austria, in his district which
amounted to P15,078.10, and to remit the same to
the Negros Mission. The petitioner answered
saying that he should not be made accountable
since it was Pastor Buhat and Ibesate who
authorized his wife to collect the tithes and
offerings since he was very ill to be able to do the
collecting.
A fact-finding committee was created to
investigate. The petitioner received a letter of
dismissal citing:
Misappropriation of denominational funds;Willful
breach of trust; Serious misconduct; Gross and
habitual neglect of duties; Commission of an
offense against the person of employer's duly
authorized representative as grounds for the
termination of his services.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter
for illegal dismissal, and sued the SDA for
reinstatement and back wages plus damages.
Decision was rendered in favor of petitioner. SDA
appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in
favor of respondent.
Issue:1. Whether or not the termination of the
services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair,
and, as such, involves the separation of church and
state. 2. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC
has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint
filed by petitioner against the SDA.
Held: 1. No. The matter at hand relates to the
church and its religious ministers but what is
involved here is the relationship of the church as an
employer and the minister as an employee, which is
purely secular because it has no relationship with
the practice of faith, worship or doctrines. The
grounds invoked for petitioner’s dismissal are all
based on Art. 282 of Labor Code. 2. Yes. SDA was
exercising its management prerogative (not
religious prerogative) to fire an employee which it
believes is unfit for the job. It would have been a
different case if Austria was expelled or
excommunicated from the SDA.
Evonnie Parreño
54. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC v.
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 153888 July 9, 2003
FACTS
On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the
Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the
Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and
designating respondent OMA to oversee its
implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has
the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and
perform other related regulatory activities.
On May 8, 2002, a news article entitled "OMA Warns
NGOs Issuing Illegal 'Halal' Certification" was
published in the Manila Bulletin, a newspaper of
general circulation. In said article, OMA warned
Muslim consumers to buy only products with its
official halal certification since those without said
certification had not been subjected to careful
analysis and therefore could contain pork or its
derivatives. Respondent OMA also sent letters to food
manufacturers asking them to secure the halal
certification only from OMA lest they violate EO 46
and RA 4109.As a result, petitioner lost revenues
after food manufacturers stopped securing
certifications from it.
Hence, this petition for prohibition.
Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the
30
constitutional provision on the separation of Church
and State. It is unconstitutional for the government to
formulate policies and guidelines on the halal
certification scheme because said scheme is a
function only religious organizations, entity or
scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the
Muslims. According to petitioner, a food product
becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic
religious ritual and prayer. Thus, only practicing
Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food.
A government agency like herein respondent OMA
cannot therefore perform a religious function like
certifying qualified food products as halal.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was a violation in Section 10,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall
be passed.
HELD
We grant the petition.
OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order
No. 697 (EO 697) "to ensure the integration of
Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino
society with due regard to their beliefs, customs,
traditions, and institutions." OMA deals with the
societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the
Muslim community as a"national cultural
community" and not as a religious group. Thus,
bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the
Church and State, the latter must make sure that
OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters
lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the
"free exercise of religion" provision found in Article
III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by
the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court
has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well
aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good."
Stephen Rodriguez
55. Brother MARIANO MIKE Z.
VELARDE, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL
JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.
G.R. No. 159357. April 28, 2004
Facts: This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 12, 2003
Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 49).
The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a
Petition for Declaratory Relief filed before the
RTC-Manila by herein Respondent Social Justice
Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner Mariano
Mike Z. Velarde, together with His Eminence,
Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao
Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother
Eliseo F. Soriano as co-respondents. The Petition
prayed for the resolution of the question whether or
not the act of a religious leader like any of herein
respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a
candidate for elective office or in urging or
requiring the members of his flock to vote for a
specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit
of the constitutional provisions.
Issue: May religious leaders like herein petitioner,
Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from
endorsing candidates for public office?
Ruling: The basic question posed in the SJS
Petition -- WHETHER ENDORSEMENTS OF
CANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL -- undoubtedly deserves
serious consideration. As stated earlier, the Court
deems this constitutional issue to be of paramount
interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it concerns the
governance of our country and its people. Thus,
despite the obvious procedural transgressions by
both SJS and the trial court, this Court still called
for Oral Argument, so as not to leave any doubt
that there might be room to entertain and dispose of
the SJS Petition on the merits.
Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to
convince the Court that there are enough factual
and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. On
the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General
has sided with petitioner insofar as there are no
facts supporting the SJS Petition and the assailed
Decision.
We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state
directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for its
claim. During the Oral Argument, counsel for SJS
candidly admitted that there were no factual
allegations in its Petition for Declaratory
Relief. Neither were there factual findings in the
assailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the
trial court to answer a hypothetical question. In
effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion, the
rendition of which was beyond the courts
constitutional mandate and jurisdiction.
31
Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear
violation of the Constitution, because it made no
findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is
void and deemed legally inexistent. Consequently,
there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm,
reverse or even just modify.
Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court
to take up, on the merits, the paramount question
involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-
honored rule that the constitutionality of a statute
[or act] will be passed upon only if, and to the
extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in
a justiciable controversy and is essential to the
protection of the rights of the parties concerned.
Pearl Diamond Sillador
56. DOMINADOR L. TARUC vs. BISHOP
PORFIRIO B. DE LA CRUZ
G.R. No. 144801. March 10, 2005
FACTS: The petitioners are lay members of the
Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro,
Surigao City. Petitioners led by Taruc clamored for
the transfer of parish priest Rustom Florano for the
reason that the family of Fr. Floranos wife
belonged to a political party opposed to petitioner
Tarucs. However, Bishop De la Cruz found this
reason too flimsy so he denied their request. Things
worsened when Taruc conducted an open mass for
the town Fiesta celebrated by Fr. Ambong who was
not a member of the clergy of the diocese of
Surigao. Petitioners were then
expelled/excommunicated from the PIC for the
reason of (1) disobedience to duly constituted
authority, (2) inciting dissension resulting in
division of the Parish of Our Mother of Perpetual
Help and (3) threatening to forcible occupy the
Parish Church causing anxiety among the General
Membership.
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with
preliminary injunction against Bishop De la Cruz
and impleaded Fr. Florano and a certain Delfin
Bordas for conspiring with the Bishop. They said
that their rights to due process were violated
because they were not heard before the order of
expulsion was made
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction
to hear a case involving the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a
religious institution.
HELD: Section 5, Article III or the Bill of Rights of
the 1987 Constitution specifically provides that:
No law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
The case at bar is purely ecclesiastical matters
which is considered to be outside the providence of
the court due to the form of government where the
complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical
authority is insisted upon. Hence, the civil courts
must not allow themselves to intrude unduly in
matters of an ecclesiastical nature. Civil Courts will
not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious
organization except for the protection of civil or
property rights. Those rights may be the subject of
litigation in a civil court, and the courts have
jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the
title, use, or possession of church property. Those
who unite to an ecclesiastical body do so with
implied consent to submit to the Church
government and they are bound to submit to it.
The power to exclude membership from the church
of those considered unworthy lies solely to the
Church thus it is outside the province of the civil
court. The expulsion of membership of the
petitioners was legally made. They have not
violated the due process of law because they were
given opportunity to be heard when they were also
warned of the consequences of their actions.
Silva Yugin
57. CHAVEZ, vs. PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG)
G.R. No. 130716. December 9, 1998
FACTS: Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer,
citizen and former government official who initiated the
prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who
committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury
and the systematic subjugation of the countrys
economy, alleges that what impelled him to bring this
32
action were several news reports bannered in a number
of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These
news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of
billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various
coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported
execution of a compromise, between the government
(through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split
or share these assets.
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to
information and the correlative duty of the state to
disclose publicly all its transactions involving the
national interest, demands that respondents make public
any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to
PCGGs task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten
wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged
billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of
paramount public interest, since it has a debilitating
effect on the countrys economy that would be greatly
prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a
compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They
claim, though, that petitioners action is premature,
because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG
to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And
even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to
make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and
conditions of the Agreements have not become effective
and binding.
Issue: Whether or not recovery of the Marcoses alleged
ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and
imbued with public interest.
Ruling: The Court ruled in affirmative.
Executive Order No. 1, , created the PCGG which was
primarily tasked to assist the President in the recovery
of vast government resources allegedly amassed by
former President Marcos. Under Executive Order No. 2,
all persons and entities who had knowledge or
possession of ill-gotten assets and properties were
warned.On May 7, 1986, another directive (EO No. 14)
was issued giving additional powers to the PCGG
which, taking into account the overriding considerations
of national interest and national survival. With such
pronouncements of our government, whose authority
emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the
recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth is a
matter of public concern and imbued with public
interest. We may also add that ill-gotten wealth, by its
very nature, assumes a public character. Based on the
aforementioned Executive Orders, ill-gotten wealth
refers to assets and properties purportedly acquired,
directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives and close associates through
or as a result of their improper or illegal use of
government funds or properties; or their having taken
undue advantage of their public office; or their use of
powers, influences or relationships, resulting in their
unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and
prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines. Clearly, the assets and properties referred to
supposedly originated from the government itself. To all
intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the
people. As such, upon reconveyance they will be
returned to the public treasury, subject only to the
satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may
be adjudged by competent courts. Another declared
overriding consideration for the expeditious recovery of
ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used for national
economic recovery.
Also, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as
well as other government representatives, to disclose
sufficient public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such
information, though, must pertain to definite
propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-
agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common
assertions are still in the process of being formulated or
are in the exploratory stage. There is a need, of course,
to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of
information in general, as discussed earlier -- such as on
matters involving national security, diplomatic or
foreign relations, intelligence and other classified
information.
Lenicia Soldevilla
58. Francisco I. Chavez vs. Public Estates
Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002 En Banc
I. Facts:
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084
tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore
and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve,
acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands.” PD No. 1085 transferred to PEA the "lands
reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the
Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP for brevity).
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint
Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with
AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the
Freedom Islands. PEA and AMARI entered into the
JVA through negotiation without public bidding.
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President
33
Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the
Senate and denounced the JVA as the
"grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate
Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises, and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. On
April 27, 1998, Frank I. Chavez, as a taxpayer,
filed a petition and prayed that PEA publicly
disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA,
invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7,
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of
the people to information on matters of public
concern. AMARI argues there must first be a
consummated contract before petitioner can invoke
the right.
II. Issue:
Whether or not the constitutional right to
information includes official information on on-
going negotiations before a final agreement.
III. Ruling:
Yes, the constitutional right to information includes
official information on on-going negotiations
before a final agreement. Contrary to AMARI's
contention, a consummated contract is not a
requirement for the exercise of the right to
information. Otherwise, the people can never
exercise the right if no contract is consummated,
and if one is consummated, it may be too late for
the public to expose its defects. The right to
information covers three categories of information
which are "matters of public concern," namely: (1)
official records; (2) documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions and
decisions; and (3) government research data used in
formulating policies. The constitutional right to
information includes official information on on-
going negotiations before a final contract. The
information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not
cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and
similar matters affecting national security and
public order. Congress has also prescribed other
limitations on the right to information in several
legislations.
Krianne Solis
59. G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner, vs. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE
ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
respondents.
Facts:
On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before
respondent Committees and testified on matters
concerning the National Broadband Project (the
"NBN Project"), a project awarded by the
Department of Transportation and Communications
("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC")
Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200
Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN
Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President
Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe. However,
when probed further on President Arroyo and
petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN
Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
"executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner
refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b)
whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear
before respondent Committees upon orders of the
President invoking executive privilege. Respondent
Committees found petitioner’s explanations
unsatisfactory.
Issue:
Whether or not the questions sought by the SBRC
to be answered falls under executive privilege.
Held:
The communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege.
The Court articulated in these cases that "there are
certain types of information which the government
may withhold from the public," that there is a
34
"governmental privilege against public disclosure
with respect to state secrets regarding military,
diplomatic and other national security matters"; and
that "the right to information does not extend to
matters recognized as ‘privileged information’
under the separation of powers, by which the Court
meant Presidential conversations, correspondences,
and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings."
In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding
executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific
questions, did not in any way curb the public’s
right to information or diminish the importance of
public accountability and transparency. First, the
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-
delegable power” of the President. Second, the
communications are “received” by a close advisor
of the President. Under the “operational proximity”
test. Third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of
the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
Anne Pauleen Sombrea
60. G.R. No. 189546 | September 21, 2010
CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT IN
GOVERNANCE vs COMELEC
FACTS:
On May 26, 2009 petitioner Center for People
Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG), a non-
government organization, wrote respondent
COMELEC, requesting a copy of the source code
of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS)
programs, the Board of Canvassers
Consolidation/Canvassing System (BOC CCS)
programs for the municipal, provincial, national,
and congressional canvass, the COMELEC server
programs, and the source code of the in-house
COMELEC programs called the Data Capturing
System (DCS) utilities.
On June 24, 2009 the COMELEC granted the
request for the source code of the PCOS and the
CCS, but denied that for the DCS, since the DCS
was a system used in processing the Lists of Voters
which is not part of the voting, counting and
canvassing systems contemplated by R.A. 9369.
According to COMELEC, if the source code for the
DCS were to be divulged, unscrupulous individuals
might change the program and pass off an illicit
one that could benefit certain candidates or parties.
Rejecting COMELEC’s excuse, on October 5, 2009
CenPEG filed the present petition for mandamus,
seeking to compel COMELEC to immediately
make its source codes available to CenPEG and
other interested parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC violated the
constitutional right to information
HELD:
Yes. The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A.
9369 is clear in that once an AES technology is
selected for implementation, the Commission shall
promptly make the source code of that technology
available and open to any interested political party
or groups which may conduct their own review
thereof. The COMELEC has offered no reason not
to comply with this requirement of the law. Indeed,
its only excuse for not disclosing the source code
was that it was not yet available when CenPEG
asked for it and, subsequently, that the review had
to be done, apparently for security reason, under a
controlled environment. The elections had passed
and that reason is already stale.
The Court GRANTS the petition for mandamus and
directs the COMELEC to make the source codes
for the AES technologies it selected for
implementation pursuant to R.A. 9369 immediately
available to CenPEG and all other interested
political parties or groups for independent review.
Genevieve Tersol
61. In Re: Edillon
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
Facts:
Marcial Edillon is a duly licenced practicing lawyer
in the Philippines. In 1975, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Board Board of Governors
recommended the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the
provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the
35
IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP,
payment of membership fee and suspension for
failure to pay the same.
The respondent argues that the said provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in
the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-
condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in
good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to
pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of
the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the
rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by
the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes,
the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the
IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and
effect.
Issue:
Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillon
to pay his membership fee to the IBP.
Held:
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of
any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the
Bar examinations. Bar integration does not compel
the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated
Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues.
The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program — the lawyers. Assuming that
the questioned provision does in a sense compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
power of the State.
Robespierre Tersol
62. MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO
129 SCRA 359
Facts:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student
Council of respondent University. They sought and
were granted by the school authorities a permit to
hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on
August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along
with other students, they held a general assembly at
the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science
basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in
such permit, not in the basketball court as therein
stated but at the second floor lobby. At such
gathering they manifested in vehement and
vigorous language their opposition to the proposed
merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the
Institute of Agriculture. The same day, they
marched toward the Life Science Building and
continued their rally. It was outside the area
covered by their permit. They continued their
demonstration, giving utterance to language
severely critical of the University authorities and
using megaphones in the process. There was, as a
result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also,
the non-academic employees, within hearing
distance, stopped their work because of the noise
created. The demonstration also went beyond the
period allowed. They were asked to explain on the
same day why they should not be held liable for
holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9,
1982, they were informed that they were under
preventive suspension for their failure to explain
the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity
thereof was challenged by petitioners both before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal against private
respondents and before the Ministry of Education,
Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento found
petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly
which was characterized by the violation of the
permit granted resulting in the disturbance of
classes and oral defamation. The penalty was
suspension for one academic year. Hence this
petition. Issue:
Whether or not the Student’s Councils
constitutional right to form association has been
violated.
Held:
Yes, with the activity taking place in the school
premises and during the daytime, no clear and
present danger of public disorder is discernible.
36
This is without prejudice to the taking of
disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others."
The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech
are guaranteed students of educational institutions.
Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters
affecting their welfare or involving public interest
is not to be subjected to previous restraint or
subsequent punishment unless there be a showing
of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil
that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary,
the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the
content of the placards displayed or utterances
made. The peaceable character of an assembly
could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder
under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that
may be aired being susceptible to correction
through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to
be held in school premises, permit must be sought
from its school authorities, who are devoid of the
power to deny such request arbitrarily or
unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may
be conditions as to the time and place of the
assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage
of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if,
however, there be violations of its terms, the
penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to
the offense.
Joselito Toledo
63. UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY
UNION VS LAGUESMA
FACTS:
On March 20, 1995 the United Union of Pepsi
Cola, who is the Petitioner of this case filed a
petition for certification election on behalf of the
route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines,
Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-
arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment, on the ground that the route
managers are managerial employees and, therefore,
ineligible for union membership under the first
sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, citing the
ineligibility of managerial employees to join any
labor organization right of supervisory employees.
Managerial employees are not eligible to join,
assist or form any Labor organization. Supervisory
employees shall not be eligible for membership in a
labor organization of the rank-and-file employees
but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own. Petitioner brought this
suit challenging the validity of the order, dismissed.
Hence, this petition. Pushing through for resolution
its contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of
the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial
employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join
unions, which is in contrast of Art. III, Section 8 of
the Constitution which provides that the right of the
people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
be abridged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation of the right of
the Union consisting of supervisors to form an
association.
HELD:
The Court ruled that the right of the people whether
employed by the State or Private establishments to
form associations, unions, or societies for purposes
not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Nor is the
guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, Section
8 infringed by a ban against managerial employees
forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III,
Section 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise
should be for purposes “not contrary to law.” In the
case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for
prohibiting managerial employees from forming or
joining Labor organizations. Petition therefore must
be denied. Their right to association has not been
violated.
Charrie Ursua
64. GR No. 132088, 28 June 2000
Acosta vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: Petitioners are teachers from different public
school in Metro Manila. On various dates in
September and October 1990, petitioner did not
report for work and instead, participated in mass
37
actions by public school teachers at the Liwasang
Bonifacio for the purpose of petitioning the
government for redress of their grievances.
Petitioners were administratively charged with such
offenses as grave misconduct, gross neglect of
duty, gross violation of civil service law, rules and
regulations and reasonable office regulations,
refusal to perform official duty, gross
insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and absence without official
leave. Petitioners failed to answer these charges.
Following the investigations conducted by the
DECS Investigating committees, Secretary Cariño
found petitioners guilty as charged and ordered
their immediate dismissal from the service.
Petitioners appealed and the CSC modified the said
orders of Secretary Cariño to six months
suspension without pay. Petitioners appealed the
orders of Secretary Cario to the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB) and later to the CSC.
Following the denial of their motion for
reconsideration, petitioners questioned the matter
before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
denied their petition.
Issue: Whether Petitioner’s participation in the
mass actions was an exercise of their constitutional
rights to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances
Held: Petitioners' contentions are without merit.
The character and legality of the mass actions
which they participated in have been passed upon
by this Court as early as 1990 in Manila Public
School Teachers' Association (MPSTA) v. Laguio,
Jr. wherein we ruled that "these 'mass actions' were
to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted
a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or
absence from, work which it was the teachers'
sworn duty to perform, undertaken for essentially
economic reasons." The ability to strike is not
essential to the right of association. In the absence
of statute, public employees do not have the right to
engage in concerted work stoppages for any
purpose. Further, herein petitioners, are being
penalized not because they exercised their right of
peaceable assembly and petition for redress of
grievances but because of their successive
unauthorized and unilateral absences which
produced adverse effects upon their students for
whose education they are responsible. As aptly
stated by the Solicitor General, “It is not the
exercise by the petitioners of their constitutional
right to peaceably assemble that was punished, but
the manner in which they exercised such right
which resulted in the temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service and classes in various
public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there
are efficient and non-disruptive avenues, other than
the mass actions in question, whereby petitioners
could petition the government for redress of
grievances.”
It bears stressing that suspension of public services,
however temporary, will inevitably derail services
to the public, which is one of the reasons why the
right to strike is denied government employees. It
may be conceded that the petitioners had valid
grievances and noble intentions in staging the
“mass actions,” but that will not justify their
absences to the prejudice of innocent school
children. Their righteous indignation does not
legalize an illegal work stoppage.
In the case at bar, petitioners initially assailed the
alleged non-observance of due process by the
DECS Investigating Committees only upon appeal
to the MSPB. Significantly, however, it has been
our consistent ruling that an appeal is curative of
any supposed denial of due process.[ Thus, after
full ventilation of their case before the MSPB and
CSC, and later on before the Court of Appeals,
petitioners cannot now allege denial of due process
to justify their claim for back wages.
Sealtiel I. Abayon
65. Pacific Wide Realty and Dev’t. Corp. vs.
Puerto Azul Land, Inc., November 25, 2009
FACTS: Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) is the
owner and developer of the Puerto Azul Complex
situated in Ternate, Cavite. Its business involves the
development of Puerto Azul into a satellite city
with residential areas, resort, tourism and retail
commercial centers with recreational areas. In order
to finance its operations, it obtained loans from
various banks. PALI and its accommodation
mortgagors, i.e., Ternate Development Corporation
(TDC), Ternate Utilities, Inc. (TUI), and Mrs.
Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez, secured the loans. In the
beginning, PALIs business did very well. However,
it started encountering problems when the
Philippine Stock Exchange rejected the listing of its
38
shares in its initial public offering which sent a bad
signal to the real estate market. This resulted in
potential investors and real estate buyers shying
away from the business venture. The situation was
aggravated by the 1997 Asian financial crisis and
the decline of the real estate market.
Consequently, PALI was unable to keep up with
the payment of its obligations, both current and
those that were about to fall due. One of its
creditors, the Export and Industry Bank (EIB), later
substituted by Pacific Wide Realty and
Development Corporation (PWRDC), filed
foreclosure proceedings on PALIs mortgaged
properties. Thrust to a corner, PALI filed a petition
for suspension of payments and rehabilitation,
accompanied by a proposed rehabilitation plan and
three (3) nominees for the appointment of a
rehabilitation receiver. EIB and the other creditors
of PALI filed their respective comments/opposition
to the report/recommendations of the rehabilitation
receiver. On November 2, 2005, EIB, together with
another creditor of PALI, Tranche I (SPV-MC),
Inc., filed an urgent motion to disqualify the
appointed rehabilitation receiver. The RTC denied
the motion in an Order dated December 9, 2005.
ISSUE: Whether the terms of the rehabilitation plan
are unreasonable and in violation of the non-
impairment clause
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
There is no merit in PWRDCs contention that there
is a violation of the impairment clause. Section 10,
Article III of the Constitution mandates that no law
impairing the obligations of contract shall be
passed. This case does not involve a law or an
executive issuance declaring the modification of
the contract among debtor PALI, its creditors and
its accommodation mortgagors. Thus, the non-
impairment clause may not be invoked.
Furthermore, as held in Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr. even assuming that the same may be
invoked, the non-impairment clause must yield to
the police power of the State. Property rights and
contractual rights are not absolute. The
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the State for the common good of the
general public.
 Successful rehabilitation of a distressed
corporation will benefit its debtors, creditors,
employees, and the economy in general. The court
may approve a rehabilitation plan even over the
opposition of creditors holding a majority of the
total liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the
rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the
opposition of the creditors is manifestly
unreasonable. The rehabilitation plan, once
approved, is binding upon the debtor and all
persons who may be affected by it, including the
creditors, whether or not such persons have
participated in the proceedings or have opposed the
plan or whether or not their claims have been
scheduled.
Dave Adricula
66. Hon. Heherson Alvarez vs PICOP Resource,
Inc.
Facts:
PICOP filed with the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) an application to
have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43
converted into an IFMA. In the middle of the
processing of PICOP’s application, however,
PICOP refused to attend further meetings with the
DENR. Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR
Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez. PICOP seeks the
issuance of a privileged writ of mandamus to
compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute and
deliver an IFMA to PICOP, as well as to issue the
corresponding IFMA assignment number on the
area covered by the IFMA, formerly TLA No. 43,
as amended; b) to issue the necessary permit
allowing petitioner to act and harvest timber from
the said area of TLA No. 43, sufficient to meet the
raw material requirements of petitioner’s pulp and
paper mills in accordance with the warranty and
agreement of July 29, 1969 between the
government and PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest;
and c) to honor and respect the Government
Warranties and contractual obligations to PICOP
strictly in accordance with the warranty and
agreement dated July 29, 1969 between the
government and PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest.
The Respondent Secretary Alvarez is likewise
ordered to pay petitioner the sum of P10 million a
month beginning May 2002 until the conversion of
TLA No. 43, as amended, to IFMA is formally
effected and the harvesting from the said area is
39
granted.
Issue:
Whether or not the 1969 Document is a contract
recognized under the non -impairment clause by
which the government may be bound (for the
issuance of the IFMA).
Held:
The court ruled that a timber license is not a
contract within the purview of the non-impairment
clause is edifying. We declared: Needless to say, all
licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protected by the due process clause
of the Constitution. Since timber licenses are not
contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
"SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked. The
approval of the Sanggunian concerned is required
by law, not because the local government has
control over such project, but because the local
government has the duty to protect its constituents
and their stake in the implementation of the project.
Facts: PICOP filed with the DENR an application
to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No.
43 converted into an IFMA. PICOP initially sought
to comply with the requirement under Sections 26
and 27 of the Local Government Code to procure
prior approval of the Sanggunians concerned.
Abundio Bacatan
67. Diaz vs. Secretary of Finance (2011)
G.R. No. 193007 July 19, 2011
Facts:
Petitioners Renato V. Diaz and Aurora Ma. F.
Timbol (petitioners) filed this petition for
declaratory relief assailing the validity of the
impending imposition of value-added tax (VAT) by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on the
collections of toll way operators. Court treated the
case as one of prohibition. Petitioners hold the view
that Congress did not, when it enacted the NIRC,
intend to include toll fees within the meaning of
"sale of services" that are subject to VAT; that a
toll fee is a "user's tax," not a sale of services; that
to impose VAT on toll fees would amount to a tax
on public service; and that, since VAT was never
factored into the formula for computing toll fees, its
imposition would violate the non-impairment
clause of the constitution. The government avers
that the NIRC imposes VAT on all kinds of
services of franchise grantees, including toll way
operations; that the Court should seek the meaning
and intent of the law from the words used in the
statute; and that the imposition of VAT on toll way
operations has been the subject as early as 2003 of
several BIR rulings and circulars. The government
also argues that petitioners have no right to invoke
the non-impairment of contracts clause since they
clearly have no personal interest in existing toll
operating agreements (TOAs) between the
government and toll way operators. At any rate, the
non-impairment clause cannot limit the State's
sovereign taxing power which is generally read into
contracts.
Issue:
May toll fees collected by toll way operators be
subjected to VAT (Are toll way operations a
franchise and/or a service that is subject to VAT)?
Ruling:
The toll way operator is no different from the
service providers under Section108 who allow
others to use their properties or facilities for a fee.
Toll way operators are franchise grantees and they
do not belong to exceptions that Section 119 spares
from the payment of VAT. The word "franchise"
broadly covers government grants of a special right
to do an act or series of acts of public concern. Toll
way operators are, owing to the nature and object
of their business, "franchise grantees." The
construction, operation, and maintenance of toll
facilities on public improvements are activities of
public consequence that necessarily require a
special grant of authority from the state. A tax is
imposed under the taxing power of the government
principally for the purpose of raising revenues to
fund public expenditures. Toll fees, on the other
hand, are collected by private toll way operators as
reimbursement for the costs and expenses incurred
in the construction, maintenance and operation of
the toll ways, as well as to assure them a reasonable
margin of income. Although toll feesare charged
for the use of public facilities, therefore, they are
not government exactions that can be properly
40
treated as a tax. Taxes may be imposed only by the
government under its sovereign authority; toll fees
may be demanded by either the government or
private individuals or entities, as an attribute of
ownership.
Arex June Baligala
68. RE: Request of the National Committee on
Legal Aid to Exempt Clients from Paying Filing,
Docket and other Fees, August 28, 2009
Facts: On September 23, 2008 the Misamis
Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) promulgated Resolution No. 24,
series of 2008. The resolution requested the IBPs
National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) to ask
for the exemption from the payment of filing,
docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid
offices in the various IBP chapters. Resolution No.
24, series of 2008
At the outset, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the
IBP for its effort to help improve the administration
of justice, particularly, the access to justice by the
poor. Its Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 in fact
echoes one of the noteworthy recommendations
during the Forum on Increasing Access to Justice
spearheaded by the Court last year. In promulgating
Resolution No. 24, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of
the IBP has effectively performed its duty to
participate in the development of the legal system
by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and
in the administration of justice.
The means and merit tests appear to be reasonable
determinants of eligibility for coverage under the
legal aid program of the IBP. Nonetheless, they
may be improved to ensure that any exemption
from the payment of legal fees that may be granted
to clients of the NCLA and the legal aid offices of
the various IBP chapters will really further the right
of access to justice by the poor. This will guarantee
that the exemption will neither be abused nor
trivialized. Towards this end, the following shall be
observed by the NCLA and the legal aid offices in
IBP chapters nationwide in accepting clients and
handling cases for the said clients.
Issue: Whether the Constitution guarantees the
rights of the poor to free access to the courts and to
adequate legal assistance.
Held: Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there is a
right, there must be a remedy. The remedy must not
only be effective and efficient, but also readily
accessible. For a remedy that is inaccessible is no
remedy at all.
The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor
to free access to the courts and to adequate legal
assistance. The legal aid service rendered by the
NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters
nationwide addresses only the right to adequate
legal assistance. Recipients of the service of the
NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters may
enjoy free access to courts by exempting them from
the payment of fees assessed in connection with the
filing of a complaint or action in court. With these
twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article
III of Constitution is advanced and access to justice
is increased by bridging a significant gap and
removing a major roadblock.
The Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines is hereby Commended for
helping increase the access to justice by the poor.
The request of the Misamis Oriental Chapter for the
exemption from the payment of filing, docket and
other fees of the clients of the legal aid offices of
the various IBP chapters is Granted. The Rule on
the Exemption From the Payment of Legal Fees of
the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid
(NCLA) and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local
Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) (which shall be assigned the docket number
A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC [IRR] provided in this
resolution is hereby Approved. In this connection,
the Clerk of Court is Directed to cause the
publication of the said rule in a newspaper of
general circulation within five days from the
promulgation of this resolution.
Pearlle Joyce Calampinay
69. People vs. Galit
Facts:
Before Us for mandatory review is the death
sentence imposed upon the accused Francisco Galit
by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, in
Crim. Case No. CCC-VII-2589 of said court.
The record shows that in the morning of August
23, 1977, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow, was
41
found dead in the bedroom of her house located at
Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a result of
seven (7) wounds inflicted upon different parts of
her body by a blunt instrument.  More than two
weeks thereafter, police authorities of Montalban
picked up the herein accused, Francisco Galit, an
ordinary construction worker (pion) living in
Marikina, Rizal, on suspicion of the murder. On the
following day, however, September 8, 1977, the
case was referred to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for further investigation in
view of the alleged limited facilities of the
Montalban police station. Accordingly, the herein
accused was brought to the NBI where he was
investigated by a team headed by NBI Agent
Carlos Flores. He had been detained and
interrogated almost continuously for five days, to
no avail. He consistently maintained his innocence.
There was no evidence to link him to the crime.
Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A
confession was absolutely necessary. So the
investigating officers began to maul him and to
torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on
his innocence. His will have to be broken. A
confession must be obtained. So they continued to
maltreat and beat him. They covered his face with a
rag and pushed his face into toilet bowl full of
human waste. The prisoner could not take it
anymore. His body could no longer endure the pain
inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer.
He admitted what the investigating officers wanted
him to admit and he signed the confession they
prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for
pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting
it to be a reenactment. The following day,
September 9, 1977, Francisco Galit voluntarily
executed a Salaysay admitting participation in the
commission of the crime. He implicated Juling
Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his companions in the
crime.  As a result, he was charged with the crime
of Robbery with Homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused was informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel,
and that any statement he might make could be
used against him.
Held:
The Revised Penal Code punishes the maltreatment
of prisoners as follows:
ART. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. — The
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period
to prision correccional in its minimum period, in
addition to his liability for the physical injuries or
damage caused, shall be imposed upon any public
officer or employee who shall over do himself in
the correction or handling of a prisoner or detention
prisoner under his charge, by the imposition of
punishments in a cruel and humiliating manner.
If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a
confession, or to obtain some information from the
prisoner, the offender shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum period, temporary
special disqualification and a fine not exceeding
500 pesos, in addition to his liability for the
physical injuries or damage caused.
There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered
from the accused, no state witnesses, and not even
fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime.
The only evidence against the accused is his alleged
confession. It behoves Us therefore to give it a close
scrutiny. The alleged confession and the pictures of
the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as
evidence because they were obtained in a manner
contrary to law.vTrial courts are cautioned to look
carefully into the circumstances surrounding the
taking of any confession, especially where the
prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving
one. Where there is any doubt as to its voluntariness,
the same must be rejected in toto.
Christine Lily Angely Chin
70. G.R. No. 132154 June 29, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs
PACITO ORDOO and APOLONIO MEDINA
Facts: On 5 August 1994 the decomposing body of
a 15 year old girl named Shirley Victore was found
among the bushes near a bridge in Barangay
Poblacion, Santol, La Union who three (3) days
before was reported missing. According to a post-
mortem examination conducted by Dr. Arturo
Llavore, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, the
victim was raped and strangled to death.
Unidentified sources pointed to Pacito Ordoo and
Apolonio Medina as the authors of the crime.
However, for lack of evidence then directly linking
them to the crime, they were allowed to go home.
On 10 August 1994 the accused Pacito Ordoo and
42
Apolonio Medina returned to the police station one
after another and acknowledged that they had
indeed committed the crime. Acting on their
admission, the police immediately conducted an
investigation and put their confessions in writing.
The investigators however could not at once get the
services of a lawyer to assist the two (2) accused in
the course of the investigation because there were
no practicing lawyers in the Municipality of Santol,
a remote town of the Province of La Union. The
investigation was conducted with the Parish Priest,
the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police and other
police officers of Santol, La Union, in attendance to
listen to and witness the giving of the voluntary
statements of the two (2) suspects who admitted
their participation in the crime.
Issue: whether or not their confession is
inadmissible due to the lack of counsel to assist
them during custodial investigation
Held: Under the Constitution and the rules laid
down pursuant to law and jurisprudence, a
confession to be admissible in evidence must
satisfy four (4) fundamental requirements: (a) the
confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession
must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (c) the confession must be
express; and, (d) the confession must be in writing.
Among all these requirements none is accorded the
greatest respect than an accused's right to counsel
to adequately protect him in his ignorance and
shield him from the otherwise condemning nature
of a custodial investigation. The person being
interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid
the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced
admissions or confessions from the lips of the
person undergoing interrogation for the
commission of the offense. Hence, if there is no
counsel at the start of the custodial investigation
any statement elicited from the accused is
inadmissible in evidence against him. This
exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption
that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar
atmosphere and runs through menacing police
interrogation procedures where the potentiality for
compulsion, physical and psychological, is
forcefully apparent.
Jeyan Chin
71. People
vs
Lugod
GR No. 136253. February 21, 2001.
Facts: On September 15, 1997 at around 7 PM,
Helen Ramos, the victim’s mother, was asleep in
her house together with her husband and their
children, Nemrod, Neres and Nairube. At around
12:30 a.m., they noticed that Nairube was gone.
The backdoor of their house was left open where a
pair of slippers that did not belong to the family
was found. In the morning, the police began their
search for Nairube wherein a panty belonging to
the victim was found, as well as a black colored
shirt belonging to the accused , Lugod. Witnesses
testified that both slippers and shirt were worn by
Lugod. Lugod was then brought to the police
station where he was temporarily incarcerated.
Although he admitted to SPO2 Gallardo that he
raped and killed Nairube, Lugod refused to make a
statement regarding the same.
On September 19, 1997, the Vice Mayor visited the
accused in his cell. In the course of his conversation
with Lugod, Lugod allegedly confessed to the
commission of the offense. He was charged for
rape with homicide.
Issue: Whether or not Lugod’s confession can be
used against him.
Held: At the time of the arrest, records reveal that
the accused was not informed of his right to remain
silent and his rights to counsel. There was also no
evidence that he intended to waive these rights.
This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which
cannot be disregarded or ignored no matter how
brutal the crime is.
The records do not support the confession allegedly
made by the accused to the Mayor and Vice Mayor.
The records show that the Mayor of Cavinti did not
appear in trial. Moreover, the testimony of the Vice
Mayor with respect to the alleged confession made
by the accused is not conclusive.
The accused merely responded to the questions that
the Vice Mayor propounded to him. He did not
state in certain and categorical terms that he raped
and killed Nairube. Amidst such a highly coercive
atmosphere, accused- appellant’s claim that he was
43
beaten up and maltreated by the police officers
raises a very serious doubt as to the voluntariness
of his alleged confession.
Frank Cuevas
72. People v Taboga
G.R. Nos. 144086-87. February 6, 2002
FACTS:
Francisca Tubon, a widowed septuagenarian, was
robbed, stabbed and burned beyond recognition
when her house built of strong materials was set on
fire.
Edralin Taboga was charged with Robbery with
Homicide.
On April 1, 1998, in the Municipality of Magsingal,
Province of Ilocos Sur, the accused Taboga entered
the house of Tubon and killed her. Then after he
take/steal three finger rings, one necklace with
pendant and one vial of perfume and four gantas of
rice belonging to Tubon. He also set the house on
fire.
Taboga was arrested. He was brought to the police
station for further investigation.
Taboga confessed to SPO1 Panod but he did not
sign the confession upod advice of his lawyer.
The following day, April 2, 1998, Mr. Mario
Contaoi, a radio announcer of DZNS, went to the
Magsingal Municipal Police Station to interview
the suspect, Edralin Taboga. Again, Taboga
admitted killing the deceased and setting her and
her house on fire.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the admission of Taboga to the
radio announcer is admissible as evidence.
HELD:
YES, There is nothing in the record to show that
the radio announcer colluded with the police
authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against
accused-appellant. Neither is there anything on
record which even remotely suggests that the radio
announcer was instructed by the police to extract
information from him on the details of the crimes.
Indeed, the reporter even asked permission from
the officer-in-charge to interview accused-
appellant. Nor was the information obtained under
duress. In fact, accused-appellant was very much
aware of what was going on. He was informed at
the outset by the radio announcer that he was a
reporter who will be interviewing him to get his
side of the incident
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabugao,
Ilocos Sur, Branch 24, in Criminal Case Nos. 1818-
K, is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Edralin
Taboga is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Homicide and is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is ordered to
pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P50,000.00
as exemplary damages, in addition to the amounts
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P115,960.00 as
actual damages, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Lovely De la Torre
73. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUANITO BALOLOY,
accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 14740 April 12, 2002
Facts:
Juanito Baloloy was convicted by the trial court of rape
with homicide and imposed on him the penalty of death
for having raped and killed an eleven-year old Genelyn
Camacho.
The facts of the case show that on August 3, 1996,
Genelyn was asked by her father Jose to borrow some
rice from their neighbor Wilfredo Balogbog whose
house was about 200 meters away. She left their house
but never returned. Jose looked went to Wilfredo’s
house to look for his daughter but was informed that she
already left with one ganta of rice with her. Together,
they looked for Genelyn but was not able to find her.
When Jose got home, his neighbors Ernesto Derio and
Juanito Baloloy arrived and told him that Juanito saw
the dead body of Genelyn at the waterfalls. They went
to the waterfalls and informed Barangay Captain Ceniza
who ordered the members of the Bantay Bayan to
retrieve the body and reported the incident to the police
station.
44
The next day, a black rope was found at the spot where
Genelyn’s body was found. Brgy. Captain Ceniza, who
at that time was at the wake of the victim, asked the
people present as to who owns the rope. Juanito claimed
ownership of the same, hence, he and Brgy. Captain
Ceniza had a private talk where he confessed having
committed the crime. He was brought to the police
headquarters.
On the same day, they went to Presiding Judge
Celestino V. Dicon’s office to swear to their affidavits
before him. Brgy Captain Ceniza pointed to Juanito as
the culprit in her affidavit. Judge Dicon turned to
Juanito and asked him whether the charge against him
was true. Juanito responded that he was demonized, and
he spontaneously narrated that after he struck Genelyn’s
head with a stone, he dropped her body into the
precipice.
The following day, a complaint was filed against him.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting as
evidence against the accused the alleged confession of
the latter to Brgy. Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon
Ruling:
Jurisprudence provides that the constitutional provision
on custodial investigation does not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning
by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the
crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions
made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before
he is placed under investigation.
In the case at bar, the accused, after admitting
ownership of the black rope, voluntarily narrated to
Ceniza that he raped Genelyn and thereafter threw her
body into the ravine. This narration was a spontaneous
answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinary
manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed
under custody for investigation in connection with the
commission of the offense.
However, as for Judge Dicon’s questioning, Juanito’s
rights were violated when he was propounded with
incriminating questions without informing him of his
constitutional rights. It is settled that at the moment the
accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by, the
police officers, the custodial investigation is deemed to
have started. Thus, his extrajudicial confession before
Judge Dicon made without a counsel is inadmissible in
evidence, however, it could be treated as a verbal
admission of the accused, which could be established
through the testimonies of the persons who heard it or
who conducted the investigation of the accused.
Donna Fernandez
74. NARCISO vs. STA. ROMANA-CRUZ
G.R. No. 134504. March 17, 2000
FACTS:
After a preliminary investigation on the death of
Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso, wife of Joselito
Narciso, Asst. City Prosecutor Myrna Dimaranan
Vidal of Quezon City recommended and thereafter
filed the information for parricide against Joselito
Narciso. Narciso thereafter asked for a review of
the prosecutor’s resolution before the Department
of Justice (DOJ) which was however denied. He
moved for reconsideration, which was still denied
by the DOJ. The Motion was granted and the case
was set for reinvestigation by another prosecutor.
Accused filed an Urgent Ex-Parte to Allow
Accused Joselito Narciso to Post Bail. On
November 3, 1992 private complainant moved for
the postponement of the trials set on November 9,
16 and 23 and the subsequent hearings thereon
pending the resolution of their Urgent Motion to
Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail. On
November 9, 1992, the court issued the first
assailed order stating therein to wit: On November
16, 1992, the court cancelled the hearing upon
motion of the public prosecutor because no
prosecution witness was available. In the hearing of
November 23, 1992, the private prosecutor again
moved for postponement because of the pendency
of his Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused to
Post Bail. On the same date, the court issued the
second assailed order which reads:"Not obtaining
any resolution on her Motion To Lift Order
Allowing Accused to Post Bail, private
complainant filed this petition before the CA."
As earlier mentioned, the Court of Appeals granted
private respondents Petition for Certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused was lawfully granted
with his right to bail.
Ruling:
As to the validity of the grant of bail, Section 13,
Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons,
except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114
of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides: "No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall
be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the
45
criminal prosecution." Although petitioner was
charged with parricide which is punishable with
reclusion perpetua, he argued before the CA that he
was entitled to bail because the evidence of his guilt
was not strong. He contended that the prosecutor's
conformity to his Motion for Bail was tantamount to a
finding that the prosecution evidence against him was
not strong. The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that
there was no basis for such finding, since no hearing
had been conducted on the application for bail
summary or otherwise. The appellate court found that
only ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the
Motion by the accused and the Order granting bail, a
lapse of time that could not be deemed sufficient for
the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence.
We agree with the CA. Additionally, the courts grant
or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which
should be formulated the judge's own conclusion on
whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate
the guilt of the accused. The summary thereof is
considered an aspect of procedural due process for
both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will
invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for
bail.
Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago
was laced with grave abuse of discretion and the
Court of Appeals was correct in reversing him.
Zarian Lyn Gasapo
75. Miriam Defensor-Santiago
-versus-
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman;
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special
Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA
G.R. Nos. 99289-90
Facts:
Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with
violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. An order
of arrest was issued against her with bail for her
release fixed at P15,000.00. She filed an "Urgent
Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail
Bond". The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
authorizing the Santiago to post cash bond which
the later filed in the amount of P15,000.00. Her
arraignment was set, but she asked for the
cancellation of her bail bond and that she be
allowed provisional release on recognizance. The
Sandiganbayan deferred the arraignment.
Meanwhile, it issued a hold departure order against
Santiago by reason of the announcement she made,
which was widely publicized in both print and
broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the
U.S. to accept a fellowship at Harvard University.
She directly filed a "Motion to Restrain the
Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure
Order with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction"
with the SC. She argued that the Sandiganbayan
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold
departure order considering that it had not acquired
jurisdiction over her person as she has neither been
arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered. The
hold departure order was also issued sua sponte
without notice and hearing. She likewise argued
that the hold departure order violates her right to
due process, right to travel and freedom of speech.
Issues:
Whether or not Miriam Defensor-Santiago's right to
travel been impaired?
Held: By posting bail, an accused holds himself
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of
the court, thus, he may legally be prohibited from
leaving the country during the pendency of the
case. Since under the obligations assumed by
petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of
the court, she may legally be prohibited from
leaving the country during the pendency of the
case. Parties with pending cases should apply for
permission to leave the country from the very same
courts which, in the first instance, are in the best
position to pass upon such applications and to
impose the appropriate conditions therefor since
they are conversant with the facts of the cases and
the ramifications or implications thereof.
Lizanne Gaurana
76. AGULLO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 132926, July 20, 2001
Facts: Elvira Agullo, the disbursing officer of the
Ministry of Public Works and Highways, Region 8,
46
Palo Leyte was charged of the crime of
malversation of public funds thus paid, collected
and received by her in her official capacity, and by
reason of which she is accountable thereof, taking
advantage of her official position, for her own
personal use and benefit she had in her possession
in the amount of (P26,404.26), belonging to the
government of the Republic of the Philippines. On
arraignment, Agullo, assisted by her counsel de
officio, Anonio Manzanoo, pleaded not guilty.
When this case was called for pre-trial, the accused
personally and through her counsel Atty. Antonio
Manzano of the CLAO readily entered into
stipulations insofar as her official position in
government as well as the fact of audit of her
accounts are concerned. In a letter[7] dated 25
August 1986, addressed to the Resident Auditor of
the MPWH, petitioner complied with the directive
by explaining that the cash shortage was, in effect,
due to a fortuitous event where the amount could
have been stolen/taken by somebody on the day she
suffered a stroke on 22 October 1985. With
petitioners admission of the fact of cash shortage,
the prosecution then rested its case. During trial,
the defense offered to present the testimony of
witness Austero for the purpose of proving the said
amount was withheld from the salary and other
compensation of petitioner Agullo. At the witness
stand, petitioner Agullo unrelentingly maintained
her innocence and vehemently denied the
accusation against her. Striking down the defense
as incredible and without basis, the Sandiganbayan
rendered its assailed decision, convicting petitioner
Agullo of the crime of malversation of public
funds.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan
disregarded or overlooked certain evidence of
substance which violates the petitioner’s
constitutional right to be presumed innocent until
proven otherwise.
Held: The pieces of evidence presented against
petitioner in this case do not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and may not be deemed sufficient to
support a conviction. Aside from the
aforementioned documents, the prosecution opted
not to present a single witness to buttress its bid for
conviction and relied merely on the prima facie
evidence of conversion or presumption of
malversation. To put it differently, the presumption
under the law is not conclusive but disputable by
satisfactory evidence to the effect that the accused
did not utilize the public funds or property for his
personal use, gain or benefit. if the accused is able
to present adequate evidence that can nullify any
likelihood that he had put the funds or property to
personal use, then that presumption would be at an
end and the prima facie case is effectively negated.
This Court has repeatedly said that when the
absence of funds is not due to the personal use
thereof by the accused, the presumption is
completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is
never deemed to have existed at all. Worth noting
is that the Sandiganbayan, in its impugned decision,
admitted that conversion or the placing of
malversed government funds to personal uses has,
indeed, not been proven in the case at bar. the
Sandiganbayan undoubtedly disregarded or
overlooked certain evidence of substance which, to
a large extent, bear considerable weight in the
adjudication of petitioners guilt or the affirmation
of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent
until proven otherwise. Notably, the
Sandiganbayan, in convicting petitioner, obviously
relied more on the flaws and deficiencies in the
evidence presented by the defense, not on the
strength and merit of the prosecutions evidence.
This course of action is impermissible for the
evidence of the prosecution clearly cannot sustain a
conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The
constitutional presumption of innocence is not an
empty platitude meant only to embellish the Bill of
Rights.Its purpose is to balance the scales in what
would otherwise be an uneven contest between the
lone individual pitted against the People of the
Philippines and all the resources at their command.
Audreylyn Gonzales
77. PEOPLE v BATO
G.R. No. 113804, January 16, 1998.
FACTS:
This postulate is applied by this Court in reversing
the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding Sergio
and Abraham Bato guilty of murder and sentencing
them to reclusion perpetua.
The trial court ruled that the prosecution witness,
Ernesto, Jr., positively identified the accused who
invited him and his father for a drink. He witnessed
how they tied the hands of Ernesto Sr. before they
47
took him away. That the police blotter failed to
state the names of the assailants did not negate
appellant’s participation in the slaying. Further, the
entry was based on the information relayed not by
the witness himself but by the barangay chairman,
who had not witnessed the incident. The trial court
further appreciated the aggravating circumstance of
treachery. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling
of the trial court.
Appellants raised the defense of denial. They
maintained that their identification as the alleged
perpetrators of Ernestos murder is merely an
afterthought, necessitated by a death of strong
evidence on the part of the prosecution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is circumstantial evidence as
to evoke moral certainty that appellants is guilty.
RULING: The Supreme Court pored over the entire
records of both lower courts and concluded, after
careful deliberation, that the appellant is entitled to
an acquittal. The circumstantial evidence adduced
by the prosecution fails to evoke moral certainty
that appellants are guilty.
It has been held that a judgment of conviction
based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld
only if the circumstances proven constitute an
unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that the defendants are guilty, to the
exclusion of any other conclusion. The
circumstances proved must be concordant with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty and, at the same time, inconsistent
with any hypothesis other than that of guilt.
In the instant case, the totality of the prosecution
evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain
leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the
accused. In acquitting the herein appellant, this
Court is not decreeing that he did not participate in
the killing. It is merely ruling that the state failed to
present sufficient evidence to overturn the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the
assailed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant ABRAHAM BATO is
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
Joshua John Granada
78. PEOPLE VS. DE GUZMAN
G.R. NO. 186498
FACTS: Accused-appellant Ronaldo De Guzman
was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs by a lower court,
and such decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Appellant argued that the technical
provisions required by RA No. 9165 was not
complied with by the police officers, namely: that
the seized items were not marked immediately after
the arrest; that the police officers failed to make an
inventory of the seized items in his presence or in
the presence of his counsel; and that no
photographs were taken of the seized items.
Appellant also claimed that the unbroken chain of
custody of the evidence was not established.
Appellant contended that the failure of the police
officers to enter the buy-bust operation in the police
blotter before the said operation, the lack of
coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency, and the failure to observe the requirements
of R.A. No. 9165 effectively overturned the
presumption of regularity of the police officers in
the performance of their duties. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the degree of proof has
been met.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the trial
court correctly determined that the buy-bust
transaction took place. The buyer, SPO1 Llanillo,
and seller, appellant De Guzman, were both
identified. The purported sale of the illegal drugs
that took place were clearly demonstrated.
Therefore the prosecution positively established the
first and third elements of the crime. Nonetheless,
the prosecution failed to establish the integrity of
the corpus delicti. In a prosecution for violation of
the RA 9165, the existence of the dangerous drug is
an essential condition for conviction as the
dangerous drug is the very heart of the crime. The
requirement of the chain of custody ensures that
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence
would be removed. The failure to follow the
procedure mandated under R.A. No. 9165 and its
IRR (Implementing Rules and Regulations) must
be explained satisfactorily as courts cannot presume
what these grounds are or that they even exist. In
the case at bar, it was said that SPO3 Yadao
marked the seized items, and only when he saw the
items at the police station for the first time.
48
Moreover, there was no physical inventory made
nor photographs of the seized items taken. Neither
was there any mention that media or DOJ
representatives, nor any elected official, were
present during the inventory. The prosecution never
explained the reasons for these lapses. The failure
to observe the proper procedure negates the
operation of the presumption of regularity accorded
to police officers. Despite the general rule that the
testimonies of apprehending police officers are
accorded full faith due to the presumption that they
have performed their duties regularly, when the
performance of their duties is tainted with failure to
comply with the procedure and guidelines
prescribed, the presumption is effectively
destroyed. Thus, even if the defence’s evidence is
weak, the prosecution’s whole case still falls.
Appellant was acquitted.
Ro Ann Marie Gumban
79. G.R. No. L-32888 August 12, 1983
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
ELOY MAGSI ET AL
FACTS
Soon after appellant was apprehended on August
20, 1970, his arraignment was scheduled before the
Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union.
The case was actually set and rescheduled for six
(6) times, first of which was on August 1, 1970. On
that date, despite appointment by the court of Atty.
Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused,
hearing was re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion
of Atty. Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it
because of accused desire to be represented by a de
parte counsel. Prior to the next hearing, Atty.
Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio counsel
and it was favorably acted on by the court on
September 7, 1970. At the second hearing on
September 8, 1970, for failure of the de officio and
de parte counsels to appear, despite a second call of
the case, the hearing was re-set for the next day and
the court appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de
officio counsel for the accused. On the third
hearing date, neither the de parte nor the de officio
counsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera was
reappointed that day as de officio counsel for
arraignment purposes only. The accused del
Rosario entered a plea of guilty but qualified it with
the allegation that he committed the crime out of
fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the other co
accused. Appellant was found guilty of murder and
made to suffer the death penalty.
ISSUE:
Whether the court had been remiss in its duties to
the accused, who was convicted on an improvident
plea of guilty.
HELD:
Of the six hearing dates held relative to the case,
accused at two instances entered a qualified plea of
guilty. De officio counsel Atty, Rivera and accused
were hardly afforded by the Court any opportunity
to discuss the case together, and the qualified plea
of guilty resulted from the Court's proddings rather
than from accused's spontaneous volition. The
Court knew that accused's prior plea of guilty was
qualified by alleged duress employed on him by the
other accused. It behooved the Court to allow the
accused an opportunity to present evidence on the
alleged duress, as well as discover for itself the
reasons for accused's change of mind regarding his
plea. But more importantly, the Court could have
complied, as it failed to do so the first time, with its
bounden duty to apprise and advise the accused of
the seriousness of the charges, the meaning of the
qualifying and modifying circumstances, and
gravity of the penalty that may be imposed on him
despite the plea of guilty, as well as received
prosecution's evidence on the alleged aggravating
circumstances attendant to the commission of the
offense charged. But these considerations
notwithstanding, sans any evidence whatsoever
from the prosecution nor from the defense, after
Atty. Cariaso's manifestation, and its trite queries
addressed to the accused whether he confirmed the
same or not, the Court proceeded to decide the
case. The Court has consistently enjoined strict and
substantial adherence to its rulings in cases where
defendants are charged with capital offenses. Mere
pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel, who
fails to genuinely protect the interests of the
accused, resetting of hearing by the court for
alleged reception of evidence when in fact none
was conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to
the accused whether he understands the charges and
49
the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient
compliance with the Court's injunctions. The
conduct of the trial court clearly established the fact
that it had been remiss in its duties to the accused,
who was convicted on an improvident plea of
guilty.
John Paul Hervas
80. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS
ROLANDO RIVERA
G.R. No. 139180. July 31, 2001
FACTS
On March 1997 in Santiago, Lubao, Pampanga
Rolando Rivera raped his 13 year old daughter,
Erlanie. Rolando pleaded not guilty. Prosecution
presented Erlanie as its witness like-wise her aunt,
Marietta Pagtalunan, and Dr. Demetria Barin, who
conducted the physical exami-nation. The court
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape as charged sentenced to suffer
the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection and
is also ordered to indemnify the offended party for
compensatory and moral damages. Rolando
appealed and con-tends that he was denied of due
process because the trial judge disallowed his
lawyer from cross-examining Erlanie concerning
the latter’s sworn statements on the ground of
irrelevance and im-materiality; the trial court
denied the motion made by accused-appellants
counsel to postpone the cross-examination because
of which the said counsel consequently waived the
cross-examination of Dr. Barin; the judge
propounded numerous questions to accused-
appellant during his cross-examination by the
prosecutor; and the decision was promulgated just
one day after accused-ap-pellant submitted his
memorandum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of Rolando’s
right to be heard.
HELD:
Procedural due process simply means that a person
must be heard before he is condemned. The due
process requirement is a part of person’s basic rights,
not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or
performed perfunctorily. With both the evidence and
the law applicable to this case, the Supreme Court
hold that Rolando has been accorded his right to due
process.
After private complainant testified on direct-
examination, counsel for accused attempted to cross-
examine her on matters relevant to the complaint for
Acts of Lasciviousness which was objected to by
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Arturo G. Santos on the
ground that private complainant did not testify on that
matter but limited her testimony on the rape case
only. Counsel for the accused argued that although
that is correct nonetheless because [of] the sworn
statement executed by pri-vate complainant identified
by said witness in her direct examination and marked
as Exhibit C for the prosecution, he is at liberty to
cross-examine the witness on all matters stated in her
sworn statement including that portion touching on
the acts of lasciviousness subject matter of another
case before another court.
The Court sustained the objection. Section 6, Rule
132, Revised Rules on Evidence pro-vides that the
witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party
as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or
connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and
freedom to test his accu-racy and truthfulness and
freedom from interest or bias or the reverse, and to
elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.
The witness testified only on the rape case. She did
not testify anything about acts of las-civiousness
committed upon her person. She may not therefore be
questioned on this matter be-cause it is not connected
with her direct testimony nor has any bearing upon
the issue. To allow adverse party to cross-examine the
witness on the acts of lasciviousness which is pending
trial in another court and which the witness did not
testify is improper.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed with the
modification.
Cristy Marie Ituriaga
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
Second Division
81. G.R. No. 138335, May 20, 2014
People of the Philippines, appellee,
vs.
Oscar Alcanzado, appellant
Facts:
The Regional Trial Court of Makati found
accused Oscar Alcansado guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder. This petition for
50
a review on certiorari assailing the said
decision was filed. A careful examination of
the records reveals that the assailed decision
will have to be set aside and the records
remanded back to the RTC for reception of
evidence for the defense. The RTC
committed a serious error in promulgating a
decision after denying the demurer to
evidence filed by the appellant upon prior
leave of court, without first giving appellant
the opportunity to present his evidence.
Issues:
Whether or not there is a violation of the
constitutional right of the accused to be heard
on his defense.
Held:
The court held that the appellant has not been
accorded due process and his right to be heard
was violated. The Supreme Court ruled that
contrary to the RTC’s assertion in its decision
that the demurer to evidence was denied, the
records of the case do not reveal that there
was any prior order denying appellant’s
demurer to evidence before rendition of the
assailed judgment. Due to the procedural
unfairness and complete miscarriage of
justice in the handling of the proceedings in
the trial court.
Roxanne Jordan
82. People vs. Rodrigo Bayya,
G.R. No. 127845. March 10, 2000
FACTS: In 1994, Rosie Bayya claimed in her
testimony in court that when she was still 12 years
old, her father, Lodrigo Bayya, forced her at the
point of a knife to have sexual intercourse with
him. He repeated the bestial act in their house about
twice a week afterwards, and then later used her
four (4) times a month, the last she remembered
being on July 5, 1995.
During the trial, the accused-appellant admitted
having carnal knowledge of his daughter twice but
theorized that he was "out of his mind" when he
committed the incestuous rape. Having admitted
the authorship of the offense charged, the appellant
does not dispute the trial courts finding of guilt. In
view of the facts established, the trial court
rendered judgment of conviction, sentencing
appellant to suffer the ultimate penalty of death.
Upon appeal, Lodrigo Bayya questioned the
penalty imposed under R.A. 7659, considering that
the Information filed against him was silent about
the applicability of the same. He alleged denial of
his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a transgression of
appellant's right to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him, in view of the fact
of information is silent about the applicability of
R.A. No. 7659.
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled affirmed
the conviction of rape with the modification that
accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
The Supreme Court claimed that a careful perusal
of the Information indicting the appellant reveals a
crucial omission in its averments of the minority of
the victim. The objectives of the defendant's right
to be informed are: (1) to furnish the accused with
such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make the defense; (2) to avail himself
of his conviction or acquittal for protection against
further prosecution for the same cause; and (3) to
inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may
decide whether they were sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had.
The Court claimed that the information does not
allege the minority of the victim although the same
was proven during trial as borne by the records. It
matters not how conclusive and convincing
evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be
convicted of any offense not charged in the
Complaint or Information on which he was tried or
therein necessarily included.
The Information charges nothing more than simple
rape as absent are the special qualifying
circumstances of relationship and minority which
had the capacity of increasing the penalty by
degrees.
51
Jerelyn Ligaray
83. People vs. Malansing, 378 SCRA 685
Facts:
This is an automatic review for the joint decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City
convicting appellants of two counts of murder and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death for
each count. Appellants are brothers. Joey
Manlansing denied participation in the killing, but
he admitted boxing Jorja in the face to prevent her
from shouting, while Mario was assaulting her
husband. Mario Mallansing claimed he alone was
responsible for the deaths. In open court, Mario
affirmed his confession and insisted that his brother
had nothing to do with the deaths
He claimed that Joey woke up only after he killed
Magin and that Joey tried to unsuccessfully stop
him from attacking Jorja. He said he killed the
couple out of anger after Jorja told him that he was
going to be ejected as a tenant. Mario said Joey
knew nothing of his motive.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating
the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength and taking advantage of night-time.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that none of the
aggravating circumstances were alleged in the
informations nor in the amended informations with
specificity as a qualifying circumstance elevating
either killing to murder. Thus, conformably with
Gario Alba, the offenses committed by appellants
only constitute two counts of homicide and not
murder. Since the penalty for homicide under 249
of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal, it
is incorrect to sentence both appellants to death. In
evaluating the circumstances that qualified the
crimes to murder, the trial court considered, aside
from evident premeditation, treachery, nighttime,
and use of a
deadly weapon, the aggravating circumstances of
abuse of superior strength and dwelling The
Supreme Court note that abuse of superior strength
and dwelling were not alleged in the informations.
In accordance then with Section 8 of Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, abuse of
superior strength and dwelling may not be
appreciated to convict the brothers. Further, should
there be a finding of treachery, then abuse of
superior strength is absorbed by the former. We are
thus left to review only the allegation that the
aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, treachery, and nocturnity were
present in the commission of the crimes.
At the outset, we shall discount nocturnity as an
aggravating circumstance, since in this case, the
darkness of the night was not purposely sought by
the offenders to facilitate the commission of the
crime nor to ensure its execution with impunity.
Ryce Magalit
84. People v. Alvarado
379 SCRA 475
Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
Branch 52, finding accused-appellant Armando
Alvarado guilty of rape of his 14-year old daughter
Arlene and sentencing him to suffer the death
penalty. Accused-appellant argues that
complainant’s testimony should not have been
given credence. He contends that, although Dr.
Villarosa found that complainant had sexual
intercourse recently, it could not have been with
accused-appellant since the examining physician
testified that complainant might have had sexual
intercourse either a week or a month before her
examination on September 19, 1997, and
complainant had sexual relationships with different
men in August 1997. He contends that the trial
court should have given greater weight to his
defense as the same purportedly conformed to the
findings of the expert witness.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in
convicting the accused of the crime charged.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled disagree with the
petitioner's contention. It is a time-honored rule that
the assessment of the trial court with regard to the
credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost
52
respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial
judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate
judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants
in the course of their testimonies. The only
exception is if there is a showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some
fact or circumstance of weight and substance that
would have affected the case. In this case, the
Supreme Court find no compelling reason to depart
from this rule. Indeed, complainant proved herself
to be a credible witness. Her narration of how she
was sexually assaulted by her own father remained,
as also noted by the trial court, plain, candid,
straightforward, and unflawed by serious
contradictions in spite of the lengthy and tedious
cross-examination by the defense counsel. It is also
noteworthy that, in the course of her testimony,
Arlene’s eyes overflowed with tears, which only
revealed the depths of the shame and suffering she
endured as a consequence of the violation of her
virtue and personhood, and the truthfulness of her
charge. She was not impelled by any bad motive to
testify falsely against accused-appellant, as shown
by the admissions by the latter and his mother that
they did not know of any reason why Arlene filed
the rape charge against him. The reasons offered by
accused-appellant that Arlene had many boyfriends
and that he would always scold her for attending
dances and entertaining suitors are flimsy. In fact,
when the trial judge asked her if her accusation
against her father was true considering that the
death penalty could be imposed on him, Arlene
unhesitatingly answered in the affirmative.
Daphne Jade Panes
85. Teves vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros
Oriental, and his wife Teresita Z. Teves seeks to
annul and set aside the decision of the
Sandiganbayan convicting them of violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law for possessing
direct pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit
and Recreation Center in Valencia. Upon their
arraignment on 12 May 1997, the petitioners
pleaded “not guilty.” On 23 February 1998, the
petitioners filed their Comment/Objections to the
evidence offered by the prosecution and moved for
leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. On 29
July 1998, the Sandiganbayan admitted Exhibits
“A” to “S” of the prosecution’s evidence but
rejected Exhibits “T,” “U,” and “V.” It also denied
petitioners’ demurrer to evidence, as well as their
motion for reconsideration On 16 July 2002, the
Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision. The
petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan
committed serious and palpable errors in convicting
them. In the first place, the charge was for alleged
unlawful intervention of Mayor Teves in his
official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license
in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.
But they were convicted of having a direct financial
or pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit and
Recreation Center prohibited under Section 89(2)
of the LGC of 1991, which is essentially different
from the offense with which they were charged.
Thus, the petitioners insist that their constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them was transgressed because
they were never apprised at any stage of the
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan that they were
being charged with, and arraigned and tried for,
violation of the LGC of 1991. The variance
doctrine invoked by the respondent is but a rule of
procedural law that should not prevail over their
constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of
the nature and cause of accusation against them.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan violated the
petitioners'constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that petitioners can be
convicted of second mode of violation of Section
3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of
a prohibited interest considering that it was not
charged in the information. When there is a
variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information and that proved, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included
in the offense charged, or of the offense charged
which is included in the offense proved. It is clear
that the essential ingredients of the offense proved
constitute or form part of those constituting the
53
offense charged. Put differently, the first and
second elements of the offense charged, as alleged
in the information, constitute the offense proved.
Hence, the offense proved is necessarily included
in the offense charged, or the offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved. The
variance doctrine thus finds application to this case,
thereby warranting the conviction of petitioner
Edgar Teves for the offense proved.
Jed Paracha
86. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. ANIANO
DESIERTO
G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001
Facts: From the beginning of his term, however,
petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems
that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His
sharp descent from power started on October 4,
2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson,
a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
On October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings
involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other
forms of corruption were made against Estrada
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On
November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the
House of representatives and, on December 7,
impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate
during which more serious allegations of graft and
corruption against Estrada were made and were
only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11
senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in
suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As
a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an
uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out
and Senate President Pimentel resigned after
casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew
their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at
EDSA Shrine. At noon of April 14, 2001, Arroyo
took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd
at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his
family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his
fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for
WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further
proceedings in cases filed against him not until his
term as president ends. He also prayed for
judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office.
Issue: Whether or Not the prosecution of Estrada
should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
Held: No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair
trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since
our justice system does not use the jury system, the
judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened
individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere
publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not
present enough evidence to show that the publicity
given the trial has influenced the judge so as to
render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the
Court said that the cases against Estrada were still
undergoing preliminary investigation, so the
publicity of the case would really have no
permanent effect on the judge and that the
prosecutor should be more concerned with justice
and less with prosecution.
Evonnie Parreño
87. RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND
TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE
MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST
MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY
AMPATUAN, ET AL.,
A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC June 14, 2011
FACTS
On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32
journalists and media practitioners were killed while
on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindana Touted
as the worst election-related violence and the most
brutal killing of journalists in recent history, the tragic
incident which came to be known as the
Maguindanao Massacre spawned charges for 57
counts of murder and an additional charge of
rebellion against 197 accused Datu Andal Ampatuan,
Jr.
On November 19, 2010, the National Union of
54
Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc.,
relatives of the victims, individual journalists from
various media entities, and members of the academ
filed a petition before this Court praying that live
television and radio coverage of the trial in these
criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g.,
still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the
courtroom to assist the working journalists, and
reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the
broadcast coverage and the use of devices.
Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao
Massacre cases has attracted intense media coverage
due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of
the accused, and the number of media personnel
killed. They inform that reporters are being frisked
and searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular
devices upon entry, and that under strict orders of the
trial court against live broadcast coverage, the number
of media practitioners allowed inside the courtroom
has been limited to one reporter for each media
institution.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was a violation on the exercise
of the freedom of the press.
HELD
The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm ─ [a]
trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious
importance to all concerned and should not be treated
as a means of entertainment so treat it deprives the
court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs
from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which
our judicial proceedings are formulated. The
observation that massive intrusion of representatives
of the news media into the trial itself can so alter and
destroy the constitutionally necessary atmosphere and
decorum stands.
The Court concluded in Aquino:
Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's
right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly
administration of justice, and considering further that
the freedom of the press and the right of the people to
information may be served and satisfied by less
distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live
radio and television coverage of court proceedings
shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings
for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to
shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the
parties and their counsel taken prior to the
commencement of official proceedings. No video
shots or photographs shall be permitted during the
trial proper.
Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to
due process, to prevent the distraction of the
participants in the proceedings and in the last
analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court
resolved to PROHlBIT live radio and television
coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of court
hearings for news purposes shall be limited and
restricted as above indicated.
Stephen Rodriguez
88. JONATHAN D. CARIAGA, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and DAVAO
LIGHT and POWER CO., respondents.
G.R. No. 143561. June 6, 2001
Facts: This is a petition for review
on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the RTC of Davao City, Branch
11, which convicted petitioner Jonathan
Cariaga of the crime of Qualified Theft. Luis
Miguel Aboitiz, Systems Analyst of the
Davao Light & Power Company, Inc.
(DLPC), initiated a covert operation. Aboitiz
sought the assistance of Sgt. Fermin Villasis,
Chief, Theft & Robbery Section, San Pedro
Patrol Station and also hired one Florencio
Siton, as his undercover agent under the
pseudonym Canuto Duran. Canuto Duran
struck an acquaintance with one Ricardo
Cariaga, a private electrician, at the Miguel
Store, situated in front of the DLPC office.
Canuto purchased small electrical wires
which, according to Ricardo, came from his
cousin, Jonathan Cariaga, nicknamed Totoy.
Ricardo introduced Canuto to Jonathan who
was then assigned driver of DLPC Service
Truck S-143. Sitons undercover work came to
an abrupt end on February 1, 1989 when
members of Sgt. Villasis team apprehended
Canuto and turned him over, including the
electrical wires that he previously purchased
from Jonathan through Ricardo, to the San
Pedro Patrol Station.  The prosecution was
unable to present Ricardo as its witness as the
subpoena could not be personally served upon
him as according to his wife, Antonieta
Cariaga, he was in Sultan Kudarat and the
date of his return to Davao City was not
certain. Petitioner argues that the sworn
statement of Ricardo Cariaga who was not
presented in court is inadmissible. The
prosecution presented in evidence, Ricardo
55
Cariagas sworn statement which was attached
as Annex 8-A to DLPCs position paper in the
labor case filed by Jonathan Cariaga against
the latter for illegal dismissal. The trial court
admitted the same in evidence despite the
timely objection of the defense counsel; and
the Court of Appeals upheld the admission
thereof citing as basis, Section 47, Rule 130
of the Rules on Evidence and Section 1(f),
Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the
fundamental right of the accused to meet the
witnesses against him face to face.
Ruling: “In Toledo, Jr. vs. People, this Court
emphasized that the preconditions set forth in Section
47, Rule 130 for the admission of testimony given by
a witness out of court must be strictly complied with
and that there is more reason to adopt such a strict
rule in the case of Section 1(f) of Rule 115, for apart
from being a rule of evidence with additional specific
requisites to those prescribed by Section 47, more
importantly, said provision is an implementing
translation of the constitutional right of an accused
person to meet the witnesses (against him) face to
face. In Tan vs. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that
unable to testify or for that matter unavailability, does
not cover the case of witnesses who were subpoenaed
but did not appear. It may refer to inability
proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to
death, as when the witness is old and has lost the
power of speech. It does not refer to tampering of
witnesses.” The threshold question then is the
admissibility of the sworn statement of Ricardo
Cariaga which was attached to DLPCs position paper
in the labor case filed by Jonathan Cariaga against it
for illegal dismissal. The records reveal that witness
Ricardo Cariaga was subpoenaed only once and did
not appear to testify in the criminal case against
petitioner. Concededly, this witness was not deceased
or out of the Philippines. In fact, the private
prosecutor informed the court that he is in Sultan
Kudarat and previously, his wife informed the sheriff
that he was in Sultan Kudarat which is in Cotabato, a
mere four hours drive from Davao City. Against this
backdrop, can this witness be categorized as one that
cannot be found despite due diligence, unavailable or
unable to testify. We are inclined to rule in the
negative and reverse the Court of Appeals on this
point. It must be emphasized that this rule is strictly
complied with in criminal cases, hence, mere sending
of subpoena and failure to appear is not sufficient to
prove inability to testify. The Court must exercise its
coercive power to arrest. In the instant case, no efforts
were exerted to have the witness arrested which is a
remedy available to a party-litigant in instances
where witnesses who are duly subpoenaed fail to
appear. On this score alone, the sworn statement of
Ricardo Cariaga should not have been admitted as
evidence for the prosecution, and we shall no longer
delve into the other aspects of this rule. DECISION is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Pearl Diamond Sillador
89. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
WILLIAM ONG y LI and CHING DE MING @
ROBERT TIU
G.R. No. 137348. June 21, 2004
FACTS: Based on prosecution through the
testimony of SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales, in the
afternoon of July 23, 1998, a confidential informant
(CI) of the Special Operations Division (SOD),
PNP Narcotics Group, reported to Chief Inspector
Albert Ignatius Ferro about the alleged illicit drug
activities of accused William Ong and Ching De
Ming @ Robert Tiu. As per order of Chief
Inspector Ferro, a team of eight decided to conduct
a buy-bust operation. Once, CI confirmed the
meeting time and venue with the drug dealer, and
exchanges of gift-wrapped packages rendered of
one (1) sealed plastic bag with a white crystalline
substance by the accused Ong and boodle money
placed in a “W. Brown” plastic bag by SPO1
Gonzales, thereafter, the latter arrested Ong while
the CI and the back-up agents arrested co-accused
De Ming.The two (2) accused were brought to the
police office where the corresponding booking
sheets and arrest report were prepared. The plastic
bag containing the illegal drug substance, was
referred to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory for examination, positive for
methyl amphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
regulated drug. However, appellants denied the
story of the prosecution and maintained innocence
to the crimes charged. On November 18, 1998 the
trial court convicted appellants as charged and
imposed on them the penalty of death. It likewise
ordered each of them to pay a fine of P1 million
pesos. However, the case was on automatic review.
Appellants insist on their innocence. They claim
that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional right of
56
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against them was violated.
HELD: Yes. Rule 116, Section 1 (a) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
provides: SECTION 1. Arraignment and plea; how
made.-
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court
where the complaint or information was filed or
assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in
open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the
accused with a copy of the complaint or
information, reading the same in the language or
dialect known to him, and asking him whether he
pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may
call at the trial witnesses other than those named in
the complaint or information.
The arraignment of appellants violates the above
rule. Appellants are Chinese nationals. Their
Certificate of Arraignment states that they were
informed of the accusations against them. It does
not, however, indicate whether the Information was
read in the language or dialect known to them.
Moreover, after arraignment and in the course of
the trial, the lower court had to secure the services
of a certain Richard Ng Lee as Chinese interpreter.
What leaps from the records of the case is the
inability of appellants to fully or sufficiently
comprehend any other language than Chinese and
any of its dialect. Despite this inability, however,
the appellants were arraigned on an Information
written in the English language. The Court
emphasized that the requirement that the
information should be read in a language or dialect
known to the accused is mandatory. It must be
strictly complied with as it is intended to protect the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The constitutional protection is part of due process.
Failure to observe the rules necessarily nullifies the
arraignment. Therefore, the appellants were
acquitted of the crime charged.
Silva Yugin
90. PEOPLE vs.BOHOL.
G.R. No. 171729, July 28, 2008
Facts: On August 2, 2002, between 9:30 p.m. to
10:00 p.m. of the same day, there was a buy-bust
operation against Bohol,headed by the informant,
PO2 Estrada Consequently, the police officers
brought Bohol to the police station and the
confiscated four plastic sachets of white crystalline
substance were subjected to laboratory
examination. The specimens were confirmed to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly
known as shabu.
Upon arraignment, Bohol entered a plea of "not
guilty" to both charges. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
On March 7, 2003, the trial court rendered the
assailed Decision, the
Issue: Whether Bohol’s arrest and the search on his
person were illegal.
Ruling: The arrest of Bohol is legal. The
Constitution proscribes unreasonable arrests and
provides in the Bill of Rights that no arrest, search
and seizure can be made without a valid warrant
issued by competent judicial authority. However, it
is a settled exception to the rule that an arrest made
after an entrapment operation does not require a
warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered
reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Section 5(a)
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
states:Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.–
A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
In the present case, the arresting officers were
justified in arresting Bohol as he had just
committed a crime when he sold the shabu to PO2
Estrada. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted to
be a valid means of arresting violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Law.
Considering the legality of Bohol’s warrantless
arrest, the subsequent warrantless search that
resulted in the seizure of the shabu found in his
person is likewise valid. In a legitimate warrantless
arrest, the arresting police officers are authorized to
search and seize from the offender (1) any
dangerous weapons and (2) the things which may
be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions.
This Court has ruled that the following instances
constitute valid warrantless searches and seizures:
(1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a
57
moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in plain
view; (5) search when the accused himself waives
his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and
emergency circumstances.
Lenicia Soldevilla
91. People vs. Alicia A. Chua
G.R. No. 128280 April 4, 2001 First Division
I. Facts:
In September 1992, Harmony Electronics Company
in Taiwan asked Alicia A. Chua to call up Zenon
To-ong and Domingo Tercenio and tell them that
they were needed in Taiwan. Chua contacted To-
ong and told him the message. In October 1992,
To-ong and Tercenio went to the office of Chua
and the latter told them that she could send them to
Taiwan upon payment of a placement fee of Php.
15,000.00 each. She also asked them to secure NBI
clearances and medical certificates. On October 29,
1992, Tercenio, together with Lonito Baluis, went
back to the office of Chua and submitted the
requirements. They paid Php.15,000.00 each for
which they were issued a receipt. Chua assured
Tercenio and Lonito Baluis that they would be able
to leave for Taiwan soon. Three months passed, but
they were not deployed. After a few more months,
Tercenio could not anymore locate Chua. Chua
used the same modus operandi on the other private
complainants. The complainants inquired from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA
for brevity) about Chua’s activities. The POEA
issued a certification that Chua was not licensed to
recruit persons/workers for overseas employment.
As a result, the trial court found Chua guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment
committed in large scale and eight (8) counts of
estafa. Chua appealed and claimed that she was
denied her constitutional right to compulsory
process.
II. Issue:
Whether or not Chua was denied of her
constitutional right to compulsory process.
III. Ruling:
No, Chua was not denied of her constitutional right
to compulsory process.
The 1973 and 1987 constitutions expanded the right
to compulsory process which now includes the
right to secure the production of evidence in one’s
behalf. U.S. vs. Ramirez laid down the requisites
for compelling the attendance of witnesses, as
follows: (a) that the evidence is really material; (b)
that he is not guilty of neglect in previously
obtaining the production of such evidence; (c) that
the evidence will be available at the time desired;
and (d) that no similar evidence could be obtained.
In the case at bar, the trial court correctly denied
Chua’s motion for the production of the records
which were the basis in issuing the POEA
certification dated February 3, 1994, as the same
would not in any way alter the undisputed fact that
Chua was not issued a license until then.
Krianne Solis
92. G.R. No. 109775 November 14, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE
ENCARNACION MALIMIT alias
"MANOLO", accused-appellant.
Facts:
Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged
with and convicted of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide. Appellant
questions the credibility of prosecution
witnesses Florencio Rondon and Edilberto
Batin by pointing out their alleged delay in
revealing what they knew about the incident.
Appellant derided the non-presentation by the
prosecution of the police blotter which could
prove if appellant was indeed implicated right
away by Batin to the crime. Even assuming
arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified
the appellant only on September 15, 1991, or
after the lapse of five months from
commission of the crime, this fact alone does
58
not render their testimony less credible. The
non-disclosure by the witness to the police
officers of appellant's identity immediately
after the occurrence of the crime is not
entirely against human experience. appellant
asseverates that the admission as evidence of
Malaki's wallet together with its contents,
viz., (1) Malaki's residence certificate; (2) his
identification card; and (3) bunch of keys,
violates his right against self-incrimination.
Likewise, appellant sought for their exclusion
because during the custodial investigation,
wherein he pointed to the investigating
policemen the place where he hid Malaki's
wallet, he was not informed of his
constitutional rights.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of the right
of the accused to be informed.
Held:
These are the so-called "Miranda rights" so
oftenly disregarded by our men in uniform.
However, infractions thereof render
inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession
or admission made during custodial
investigation. The admissibility of other
evidence, provided they are relevant to the
issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or
rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken
in the course of custodial investigation.
Concededly, appellant was not informed of
his right to remain silent and to have his own
counsel by the investigating policemen during
the custodial investigation. Neither did he
execute a written waiver of these rights in
accordance with the constitutional
prescriptions. Nevertheless, these
constitutional short-cuts do not affect the
admissibility of Malaki's wallet, identification
card, residence certificate and keys for the
purpose of establishing other facts relevant to
the crime. Thus, the wallet is admissible to
establish the fact that it was the very wallet
taken from Malaki on the night of the
robbery. The identification card, residence
certificate and keys found inside the wallet,
on the other hand, are admissible to prove
that the wallet really belongs to Malaki.
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that
these pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the
same will not detract from appellant's
culpability considering the existence of other
evidence and circumstances establishing
appellant's identity and guilt as perpetrator of
the crime charged.
Anne Pauleen Sombrea
93. G.R. 125687 | December 9, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs DELFIN
RONDERO
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
ART III SECTION 3. (2) Any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
FACTS:
Delfin Rondero was seen by the victim’s father,
Maximo Doria, pumping the artesian well with an
ice pick clenched in his mouth and was washing his
bloodied hands. The 9 year old victim, Mylene
Doria, was later found dead and half naked with
lacerations in her vagina but no sperm. Rondero
was convicted of homicide. For his conviction,
several circumstantial pieces of evidence were
submitted including strands of his hair for
comparison with the strands of hair found in the
victim’s right hand at the scene of the crime as well
as blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken
from his house. Rondero avers that the acquisition
of his hair strands was without his express written
consent and without the presence of his counsel,
which, he contends is a violation of his
constitutional right, specifically those under
Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence gathered can be
admitted as evidence
HELD:
Yes. Under the above-quoted provisions, what is
actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from the
accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body
in evidence when it may be material. For instance,
59
substance emitted from the body of the accused
may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts
of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the
mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence
against him. Consequently, although Rovero insists
that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and
submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the
hair samples may be admitted in evidence against
him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial
compulsion or any evidence communicative in
nature acquired from the accused under duress.
On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and
short pants taken from the accused are inadmissible
in evidence. They were taken without the proper
search warrant from the police officers. Accused-
appellant’s wife testified that the police officers,
after arresting her husband in their house, took the
garments from the clothesline without proper
authority. This was never rebutted by the
prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule
known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” evidence
illegally obtained by the state should not be used to
gain other evidences because the illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
Simply put, accused-appellant’s garments, having
been seized in violation of his constitutional right
against illegal searches and seizure, are
inadmissible in court as evidence.
Genevieve Tersol
94. Marcelo vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 109242, January 26, 1999
Facts:
In1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati
Central Post Office, disclosed to his chief, Projecto
Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the
pilferageof mail matter in the post office. For this
reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the National Bureau
of Investigation in apprehending the group responsible
for mailpilferage in the Makati Post Office. NBI agents
were then dispatched to Legaspi Village following a
report that the group would stage a theft of mail matter
on that day.
Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero were arrested and were
brought by the NBI agents to their headquarters. The
motorcycle of Romero and Marcelo and the bag of
unsorted mail found in their possession were also
brought in. The unsorted mail seized from Marcelo and
Romero consisted of 622 letters. The names of the
addressees were listed. They were subsequently notified
by the Bureau of Posts to claim their letters. Many of
them, after proper identification, were able to claim
their letters. Some letters contained money.
Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix
their signatures on the envelopes of the letters. They did
so in the presence of the members of the NBI
Administrative and Investigative Staff and the people
transacting business with the NBI at that time.
According to Director Ranin, they required the accused
to do this in order to identify the letters as the very same
letters confiscated from them.
They were charged with infidelity in the custody of
documents. The case was later withdrawn and another
information for qualified theft was filed before the
Sandiganbayan. In 1993, the Sandiganbayan found all
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals of the crime of qualified theft.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in admitting as evidence
of petitioners guilt the letters signed by the accused
during custodial investigation without the assistance of
counsel, in utter disregard of his constitutional right.
Held:
The purpose for securing the signature of Marcelo, et.
al. on the envelopes was to authenticate the envelopes as
the ones seized from him and Ronnie Romero. This
purpose and their signatures on the envelope, when
coupled with the testimony of prosecution witnesses that
the envelopes seized from Marcelo were those given to
him and Romero, undoubtedly help establish the guilt of
Marcelo. Since these signatures are actually evidence of
admission obtained from Marcelo and his co-accused
under circumstances contemplated in Art. III. §§12(1)
and 17 of the Constitution, they should be excluded. For
indeed, Marcelo and his co-accused signed following
their arrest. Hence, they were at the time under custodial
investigation, defined as questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in a significant way. Under the Constitution, among the
rights of a person under custodial investigation is the
right to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice and if the person cannot
afford the services of
counsel, that he must be provided with one. However,
the letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence.
The letters were validly seized from Marcelo and
Romero as an incident of a valid arrest. A ruling that
Marcelo's admission that the letters in question were
those seized from him and his companion on 17
February 1989 is inadmissible in evidence does not
extend to the exclusion from evidence of the letters
themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being the
fruits of a crime validly seized during a lawful arrest.
That these letters were the ones found in the possession
of Marcelo and his companion and seized from them
was shown by the testimonies of Vela and Tumagan.
60
Indeed, Marcelo and his co-accused were not convicted
solely on the basis of the signatures found on the letters
but on other evidence, notably the testimonies of NBI
agents and other prosecution witnesses.
Robespierre Tersol
95. BENGZON VS SENATE BLUE RIBBON
COMMITEE
203 SCRA 767
Facts:
Senator Enrile asks the Senate to look into the
matter of the alleged acquisition of the Lopa Group
of the properties of Kokoy Romualdez which is a
subject of sequestration by the PCGG. Senator
Enrile citing probable violations of Republic Act
No. 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Section 5.
On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter
was referred by the Senate to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon
Committee). Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee started its investigation on the matter.
Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by
the Committee to appear before it and testify on
"what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six
(36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez."
At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa
declined to testify on the ground that his testimony
may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil
Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to
testify involing his constitutional right to due
process, and averring that the publicity generated
by respondents Committee's inquiry could
adversely affect his rights as well as those of the
other petitioners who are his co-defendants in Civil
Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon,
suspended its inquiry and directed the petitioners to
file their memorandum on the constitutional issues
raised, after which, it issued a resolution dated 5
June 1989 rejecting the petitioner's plea to be
excused from testifying, and the Committee voted
to pursue and continue its investigation of the
matter. Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee is poised to subpoena them and required
their attendance and testimony in proceedings
before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction
and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant
disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their
grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury,
and that there is no appeal nor any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, the petitioners filed the present petition for
prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraning
order and/or injunctive relief.
Issue:
Whether or not the the petitioners constitutional
right against self incrimination would be violated if
they are required to attend the Senate Inquiry
Held:
No, The right against self-incrimination is
construed as the right to remain completely silent
and may be availed of by the accused in a criminal
case, but it may be invoked by other witnesses only
as questions are asked of them, Moreover, this right
of the accused is extended to respondents in
administrative investigations but only if they
partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or
analogous to a criminal proceeding. At the case at
bar, since petitioners is not an accused and the case
is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to take
the witness stand and testify, and that they can
invoke their right against self-incrimination only
when a question which tends to elicit an answer
that will incriminate them is propounded to them.
Clearly then, it is not the character of the suit
involved but the nature of the proceedings that
controls. The privilege has consistenly been held to
extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to
all cases in which punishment is sought to be
visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.
Joselito Toledo
96. PEOPLE VS GALLARDE
FACTS:
The accused, Gallarde was charged with the crime
of rape with homicide. The trial court convicted
him of murder only. The trial court rejected the
photographs taken of the accused immediately after
the incident on the ground that the same were taken
when the accused was already under the mercy of
the police. During the arraignment Gallarde, with
the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty. Trial of the case immediately ensued as the
defense waived the holding of the pretrial
conference. The Regional Trial Court of Tayug,
61
Pangasinan, Branch 51, rendered a decision
convicting Gallarde of the crime of murder only,
not of the complex crime of rape with homicide
because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge,
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the late
Editha Talan, the victim in the negotiated sum of
P70, 000.00. His motion for reconsideration,
having been denied by the trial court in its
Resolution of 28 February 1998, Gallarde appealed
to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation of the right of
the accused to be informed of the nature of the
offense he was charged.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled to sustain Gallarde’s
contention that the trial court erred in convicting
him of murder in information charging him of rape
with homicide. A reading of the accusatory portion
of the information shows that there was no
allegation of any qualifying circumstance.
Although it is true that the term “homicide” as used
in special complex crime of rape with homicide is
to be understood in its generic sense, and includes
murder and slight physical injuries committed by
reason or on the occasion of rape it is settled in this
jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged
and the evidence fails to support the charge as to
one of the component offense, the accused can be
convicted of the other. In rape with homicide, in
order to be convicted of murder in case the
evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the
qualifying circumstance must be sufficiently
alleged and proved. Otherwise, it would be a denial
of the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature of the offense with which he is charged. The
rules on evidence and precedents sustain the
conviction of an accused through circumstantial
evidence, as long as the following requisites are
present: (1) there must be more than one
circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on
proven facts; and (3) the combination of all
circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt
of the guilt of the accused. The importance of
circumstantial evidence is more apparent in the
prosecution of cases of rape with homicide. It is
well settled that the absence of spermatozoa in or
around the vagina does not negate the commission
of rape. There is in fact a doubt on the commission
of rape as it was based on the fact that there is at all
no convincing proof that the laceration of the
vagina and the rupture of the hymen of EDITHA
were caused in the course of coitus or by a male
organ.
Charrie Ursua
97. G. R. Nos. 148948 & 148951-60. February
17, 2003
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner,
vs. HON LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Imus,
Cavite, respondent.
Facts: Petitioner Commission on Elections seeks
the nullification of the orders of 16 March 2001and
9 May 2001 of respondent Judge Lucenito N. Tagle
of the Regional Trial Court. That on May 11, 1998
elections, Florentino A. Bautista ran for the
position of mayor in the Municipality of Kawit,
Cavite. On 8 July 1998, he filed with the
COMELEC a complaint against then incumbent
mayor Atty. Federico Poblete, Bienvenido Pobre,
Reynaldo Aguinaldo, Arturo Ganibe, Leonardo
Llave, Diosdado del Rosario, Manuel Ubod,
Angelito Peregrino, Mario Espiritu, Salvador Olaes
and Pedro Paterno, Jr., for violation of Section 261
(a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The
complaint was supported by the separate affidavits
of forty-four (44) witnesses attesting to the vote-
buying activities of the respondents. On 25
February 1999, the COMELEC en banc issued a
resolution directing the filing of the necessary
information against the respondents. Before the
trial commenced, or on 2 December 1999, a
complaint was filed by Innocencio Rodelas and
Gerardo Macapagal with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor in Imus, Cavite, for violation
of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code
against the witnesses in the criminal case for vote-
buying. On 10 April 2000, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor resolved to file separate
informations for vote-selling in the various
branches of the RTC in Imus, Cavite, against the
respondents. On 23 June 2000, the respondents
appealed, the the COMELEC en banc denied the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The COMELEC en
banc, upon the recommendation of its Law
62
Department, declared null and void the resolution
of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. It held
that the respondents therein are exempt from
criminal prosecution pursuant to the fourth
paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as The Electoral Reforms Law of
1987, which grants immunity from criminal
prosecution persons who voluntarily give
information and willingly testify against those
liable for vote-buying or vote-selling. It further
directed the Law Department to file the necessary
motions to dismiss the criminal cases filed against
the said respondents. The Law Department filed a
motion to dismiss. This Court referred the petition
to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and
required it to manifest whether it is adopting the
petition. In a Manifestation and Motion filed with
this Court, the OSG stated that it repleads the
submissions contained in the petition and adopts
the petition as its own.
Issue: Whether the rights of the accused have
violated.
Held: The petition is meritorious. In this case, when
the COMELEC nullified the resolution of the
Provincial Prosecutor in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, which
was the basis of the information for vote-selling, it,
in effect, withdrew the deputation granted to the
prosecutor. Such withdrawal of the deputation was
clearly in order, considering the circumstances
obtaining in these cases where those who
voluntarily executed affidavits attesting to the vote-
buying incident and became witnesses against the
vote-buyers now stand as accused for the same acts
they had earlier denounced. The contention is
without basis. A reading of the motion to dismiss
Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-
00 shows that a certified true copy of COMELEC
Minute Resolution No. 00-2453 was attached
thereto and was made an integral part thereof. The
attached resolution indicated that the accused in the
cases sought to be dismissed had voluntarily given
information and were willing to testify against the
vote-buyers, and are therefore utilized as witnesses
in the pending case for vote-buyers docketed as
Criminal Case No. 7034-99. The respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion when he
denied the motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos.
7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00 despite
COMELECs determination that the accused therein
are exempt from criminal prosecution for vote-
selling pursuant to the provision in the fourth
paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646.
Wherefore, the petition is granted.
Sealtiel I. Abayon
98. People vs. Echegaray, February 7, 1997
FACTS: The Supreme Court rendered a decision in
the instant case affirming the conviction of the
accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-
year old daughter.  The crime having been
committed sometime in April, 1994, during which
time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly
known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in
effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out
the supreme penalty of death. The accused-
appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's
grandmother that precipitated the filing of the
alleged false accusation of rape against the
accused.  This was dismissed.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged
the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and
retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty
Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of
the Philippines. A supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf
of accused-appellant. In sum, the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main
issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating
to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged
incompetence of accused-appellant's former
counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1)
absolutely abolished the death penalty.
HELD: The opposition to the death penalty
uniformly took the form of a constitutional question
of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel,
unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in
violation of the constitutional proscription against
cruel and unusual punishments.
Harden- "The penalty complained of is neither
cruel, unjust nor excessive.  In Ex-parte Kemmler,
136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court
said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve
torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of
death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word
as used in the constitution.  It implies there
63
something inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life.
Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that
there is really nothing therein which expressly
declares the abolition of the death penalty.  The
provision merely says that the death penalty shall
not be imposed unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter
provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua.  The language, while
rather awkward, is still plain enough Nothing is
more defining of the true content of Article III,
Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution than the
form in which the legislature took the initiative in
re-imposing the death penalty.
It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659
cites that there has been an "alarming upsurge of
such crimes", for the same was never intended by
said law to be the yardstick to determine the
existence of compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes.  Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states
is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice,
public order and rule of law, and the need to
rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for
heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose
the death penalty for said crimes."
Dave Adricula
99. People of the Philippines vs Mercado
November 29, 2000
Facts:
Twelve-year-old Florencio Villareal testified that at
around 9 oclock in the evening of February 9, 1994,
he and Richard Buama were picked up by accused-
appellant Elpidio Mercado near Mercados house in
Sto. Tomas, Bukid, Pasig, Metro Manila. Mercado
arrived in a car, together with Eric Ona. Mercado
suspected Florencio Villareal and Richard Buama
of being the ones who had broken into his store and
stolen money. Florencios friend, Rex Bugayong,
was able to run from Mercado. Florencio and
Richard were pushed into Mercados car. Florencio
said Mercado poked a gun at Richard. Mercado
drove the car to Tanay, Rizal.
Upon reaching Tanay at around 11 oclock in the
evening Mercado took the three of them (Florencio,
Richard, and Eric) to an apartment. Florencio was
led inside the apartment while Richard was held
outside by Mercado. When Florencio looked
through the window, he saw Mercado slap and box
Richard. Then he was brought inside. Mercado later
went upstairs. According to Florencio, Richard
asked if they could leave the place as he held his
stomach in pain, but Florencio replied that the door
was padlocked. Mercado thereafter ordered Richard
to take off all his clothes and lie face down on the
kitchen floor. Mercado asked his aide Jeff to get a
rope. Jeff brought a piece of rattan rope and tied
Richards hands, while Mercado tied Richards feet.
This happened at about 11:30 in the evening.
Mercado also ordered Jeff to get rags with which to
blindfold and gag Richard and then asked Acebron
to get a bolo or a big knife. After getting a bolo,
Acebron and Jeff put Richard into the luggage
compartment of Mercado's car. They then drove
away, leaving behind Florencio and Eric in the
apartment. After two hours, Mercado and Acebron
came back. Florencio saw Acebron washing the
bloodstains off the bolo. He asked Mercado where
Richard was, to which Mercado replied, "Wala na.
Pinatahimik ko na." The trial court found both
accused guilty and sentenced them to death.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No.7659 violates the
constitutional ban against infliction of cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment.
Held:
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the
death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited case of
Harden v. Director of Prisons, this Court held that
punishments are cruel when they involve torture or
a lingering death; but the punishment of death is
not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used
in the constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life. It is an exercise of the
state's power to "secure society against the
threatened and actual evil". Procedural and
substantial safeguards to insure its correct
application are established.
Abundio Bacatan
64
100. EDUARDO CUISON, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS , respondent
G.R. No. 128540 April 15, 1998
Facts:
On February 7, 1989, respondent Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch
39) rendered a Joint Decision in Criminal Cases
Nos. L-3553 and L-3554.
Judgment was rendered finding accused Eduardo
Cuison guilty of the crime of double homicide,
beyond reasonable doubt and therefore sentences
him to suffer imprisonment from 6 years and 1 day
of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and 1 day
of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each
offense, with the accessories provided by law and
to pay the costs. Accused is also ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the amount
of P30,000.00 and the heirs of Rulo Castro also the
amount of P30,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said
decision was affirmed with the modification that
the civil indemnity was increased to P50,000.00.
The accused elevated the decision on a petition for
review docketed as G.R. Nos. 108985-86 but the
Supreme Court denied the said petition on
December 1, 1993.
The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court
of Pangasinan (Br. 39) for promulgation of the
decision. However, respondent Judge promulgated
on April 4, 1995 the decision of the Court of
Appeals only with respect to the modified civil
liability of the accused but did not commit the
accused to jail to commence service of his
sentence.
Asst. City Prosecutor Abraham L. Ramos II
reported the matter to the Solicitor General and
requested that a motion for clarification be filed
with this Court to clarify the decision
Issue:
Whether or Not to pursue the promulgation will
violate the accused's constitutional right against
jeopardy.
Ruling:
As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil
action for the recovery of indemnity. Hence, a
decision in such case disposes of both the criminal
as well as the civil liabilities of an accused. Here,
trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the
case, but not the criminal.
As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA
Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the
promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was
also void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial
judge rendered a substantially incomplete
promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his
mistake in his April 12, 1996 Order. We emphasize
that grave abuse of discretion rendered the
aforementioned act of the trial court void. 28 Since
the criminal cases have not yet been terminated, the
first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double
jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense.
Arex June Baligala
101. Almario v. Court of Appeals, 355 SCRA 1
Facts: The informations were filed on October 22, 1992.
After petitioner’s arraignment on March 18, 1992, pre-trial
was held, which was terminated on October 21, 1994.
Thereafter, the cases were scheduled for continuous trial in
December 1994, and in January and February 1995, but the
hearings were cancelled because the Presiding Judge of the
court was elevated to this Court and no trial judge was
immediately appointed/detailed thereto. The hearing set for
June 21, 1995, was postponed for lack of proof of notice to
all the accused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17,
1995, upon request of private prosecutor, and without
objection on the part of petitioner’s counsel, postponed to
July 24, 1995. However, for lack of proof of service of
notice upon petitioner’s three co-accused, the hearing set
for July 24, 1995, was likewise cancelled and the cases
were reset for trial on September 8 and 25, 1995.
On September 8, 1995, private complainant failed to
appear despite due notice. Hence, upon motion of
petitioner’s counsel, respondent court issued the following
order: When this case was called for hearing, private
complainant is not in Court despite notice. Atty. Alabastro,
counsel for accused Roberto Almario, moved that the case
against the latter be dismissed for failure to prosecute and
considering that accused is entitled to a speedy trial.
Upon motion of the private prosecutor and despite the
opposition of petitioner, respondent court in its Order dated
October 25, 1995, reconsidered the Order of September 8,
1995. The pertinent portion of said order reads as follows:
In Hipolito vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 108478-79,
Feb. 21, 1993) the Supreme Court held that the right of the
accused to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when the
proceedings is attended by vexations, capricious and
oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause
or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to
(e) lapse without the party having his case tried. At least
this right is relative, taking into (the) account the
65
circumstances of each case.
There has been no vexations, capricious and oppressive
delays, or unjustified postponements of the trial, or a long
time is allowed to (e) lapse without the party having his
case tried which would constitute, according to the above
case, violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial.
After arraignment of the accused, the pre-trial was set and
the same was ordered terminated on October 25, 1994. On
June 21, 1995, the case was set for initial presentation of
evidence of the proof of service of the notices to the
accused and their respective counsels. On July 17, 1995,
counsel for the accused did not interpose objection to
private prosecutor’s motion to postpone due to absence of
witnesses. On July 24, 1995, the trial could not proceed as,
being a joint trial of three criminal cases, the three other
accused were not present. There were only three settings
from the date of termination of the pre-trial for the
prosecution to present evidence and the same were
postponed with valid reasons.
The dismissal in the Order dated September 8, 1995, did
not result in the acquittal of the accused since the right of
the accused to speedy trial has not been violated, and its
dismissal having been made upon the motion of the
accused there is no double jeopardy.
Issue: Whether petitioner invoke the right against double
jeopardy.
Held: It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the
constitutional right against double jeopardy when that
order was reconsidered seasonably. For as petitioner’s
right to speedy trial was not transgressed, this exception to
the fifth element of double jeopardy – that the defendant
was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused – was not met. The trial court’s initial order of
dismissal was upon motion of petitioner’s counsel, hence
made with the express consent of petitioner. That being the
case, despite the reconsideration of said order, double
jeopardy did not attach. As this Court had occasion to rule
in People vs. Tampal, (244 SCRA 202) reiterated in People
vs. Leviste, where we overturned an order of dismissal by
the trial court predicated on the right to speedy trial –
It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held
that the dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to
prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar
further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It
must be stressed, however, that these dismissals were
predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial.
These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench
considering that the right of the private respondents to
speedy trial has not been violated by the State. For this
reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right
against double jeopardy.
Pearlle Joyce Calampinay
102. Manantan vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela
filed an information charging petitioner Manantan
with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide,
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of September 1982,
in the municipality of Santiago, province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the
driver and person-in-charge of an automobile
bearing Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and
unlawfully drove and operated the same while
along the DaangMaharlika at Barangay Malvar, in
said municipality, in a negligent, careless and
imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic
laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking
the necessary precaution to prevent accident to
person and damage to property, causing by such
negligence, carelessness and imprudence said
automobile driven and operated by him to
sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing plate No. 918-
7F driven by Charles Codamon, thereby causing
the said automobile to turn down resulting to the
death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said
automobile.
Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the
trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence
without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal
from the civil aspect of the judgment in Criminal
Case No. 066, the appellate court found petitioner
Manantancivilly liable and ordered him to
indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas
and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 representing loss of
support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and moral
damages of P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00
for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas.
Issue:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in finding that
petitioners acquittal did not extinguish his civil
liability.
Ruling:
The lower courts decision in Criminal Case No.
066 supports the conclusion of the appellate court
that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt;
hence, petitioners civil liability was not
extinguished by his discharge. We note the trial
courts declaration that did not discount the
possibility that the accused was really negligent.
However, it found that a hypothesis inconsistent
66
with the negligence of the accused presented itself
before the Court and since said hypothesis is
consistent with the recordthe Courts mind cannot
rest on a verdict of conviction.
The foregoing clearly shows that petitioners
acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his
guilt had not been established with moral certainty.
Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability
for the same act or omission lies.The foregoing
were the applicable provisions of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure at the time private respondents
appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066
to the court a quo in 1989. Being in the nature of a
curative statute, the amendment applies
retroactively and affects pending actions as in this
case.
Christine Lily Angely Chin
103. G.R. No. 136258. October 10, 2001
The People of the Philippines
vs
Carlos Feliciano
Facts: From being the subject of moral
condemnation, the Kiss of Judas appears to attain a
different dimension in criminal procedure. That the
State should agree to become a party to setting up a
premium on "treachery," and that it should reward
conduct from which an honorable man would
ordinarily recoil with aversion, paradoxically
illustrates the perceived necessity of such kind of
an arrangement in criminal procedure. Pending
resolution by the trial court on the motion, Carlos
Feliciano and Rodel de la Cruz were arraigned on
08 February 1996. The two accused entered a plea
of not guilty. On 18 June 1996, the court a quo
granted the motion of the prosecution and the name
of Rodel de la Cruz, an accused turned state
witness, was forthwith stricken off from the
Information. When the trial concluded, the
Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, found for
the prosecution and pronounced accused Carlos
Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced
him to suffer the extreme penalty of death.
Issue: whether or not the discharging of the accused
as state witness tantamounts to violation of his right
against double jeopardy.
Held: It is widely accepted that the discharge of an
accused to become a state witness has the same
effect as an acquittal. The impropriety of the
discharge would not have any effect on the
competency and quality of the testimony, nor
would it have the consequence of withdrawing his
immunity from prosecution. A discharge, if granted
at the stage where jeopardy has already attached, is
equivalent to an acquittal, such that further
prosecution would be tantamount to the state
reneging on its part of the agreement and
unconstitutionally placing the state witness in
double jeopardy. The rule, of course, is not always
irreversible. In an instance where the discharged
accused fails to fulfill his part of the bargain and
refuses to testify against his co-accused, the benefit
of his discharge can be withdrawn and he can again
be prosecuted for the same offense.
Despite an obvious attempt to downgrade his own
participation in the crime, state witness de la Cruz,
nevertheless, did not renege from his agreement to
give a good account of the crime, enough to indeed
substantiate the conviction of his co-accused, now
appellant Carlos Feliciano, by the trial court. On
significant points, the damaging testimony of de la
Cruz against appellant was corroborated by Ruben
Barte and Ramon Yael.
Jeyan Chin
104. Merciales
vs.
Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124171. March 18, 2002.
Facts: The public prosecutor filed a motion for the
discharge of the accused Nuada so that he could be
a state witness but the prosecution contended that it
was not required to present evidence to warrant the
discharge of Nuada because he was already under
the Witness Protection Program. But this motion
was denied for failure of prosecutor to present
evidence. Prosecution then filed petition for
certiorari before the SC questioning such denial.
67
The private respondents then filed a motion to set
the case for hearing based on their constitutional
right to speedy trial which was granted. The
prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration,
instead of presenting further evidence. The hearing
was postponed and was set for another schedule.
On the date of hearing, the prosecution again filed
for MR and invoked its pending petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court but the
respondents objected to reset the hearing again. The
judge called for recess to allow the prosecution to
present the NBI agent would be presented to prove
the extrajudicial confession of the accused Nuada.
However, after recess the public prosecutor
declined to present the NBI agent and manifested
that it would not present any further evidence. The
defense then moved to that the cases be deemed
submitted for decision and asked leave of court to
file a demurrer of evidence. In the decision of RTC,
It dismissed the charge of rape with homicide based
on demurrer to evidence filed by private
respondents/accused.
Issue: Whether or not there be an acquittal by
demurrer to evidence.
Held: The RTC judge was ordered to complete
presentation of all available witnesses for the
prosecution. There was grave abuse of discretion
by the trial court. The court required the public
prosecutor to present evidence to justify Nuada’s
discharge as state witness but insisted there was no
need to do so because Nuada was already under the
Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. The trial
court directed the public prosecutor the NBI agent
who took Nuada’s extrajudicial confession but the
prosecutor declared that he was resting his case
knowing that the evidence he previously presented
was not sufficient to convict the accused. And due
to that, a demurrer to evidence was filed by the
accused and was granted by the trial court. It was
then clear that the public prosecutor was guilty of
serious nonfeasance. When grave abuse of
discretion is present, an order granting a demurrer
to evidence becomes null and void.
Frank Cuevas
105. Potot v People
GR No. 143547
FACTS:
Joey S. Potot, petitioner, was charged with
homicide in Criminal Case No. 2739 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Catarman,
Northern Samar. The information against him, filed
on December 12, 1999, alleges:
That on or about the 2nd day of November, 1999,
at about 3:00 oclock in the early morning in the
public cemetery of the Municipality of Mondragon,
Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a knife locally
called dipang, with deliberate intent to kill and
without justifiable cause, did then and there
wifully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab RODOLFO DAPULAG @ PILI with the
use of said weapon which the accused had provided
himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon
said Rodolfo Dapulag @ Pili a mortal wound which
caused the death of said victim.
On February 3, 2000, petitioner, through counsel,
filed a manifestation with motion informing the
trial court that he is not appealing from the
Decision and praying that a commitment order be
issued so he could immediately serve his sentence.
Attached to the motion is petitioner's letter to the
court stating that he does not intend to appeal from
its Decision.
However, on February 11, 2000, the private
complainant, Rosalie Dapulag (wife of the victim),
filed through counsel, a motion for
reconsideration/retrial praying that the Decision be
set aside and that the case be heard again because
there were irregularities committed before and
during the trial which caused miscarriage of justice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment has become final that
the accused right against double
jeopardy will be violated upon re-trial of the same
case.
HELD:
YES. The February 1, 2000 order Decision had
become final.
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the
following requisites must be present: (1) a valid
complaint or information; (2) the court has
jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has
68
pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
These requisites have been established. Records
show that petitioner was charged with homicide in
Criminal Case No. 2739 under a valid information
before the trial court which has jurisdiction over it.
He was arraigned and pleaded guilty to the charge.
On the basis of his plea, petitioner was convicted
and meted the corresponding penalty. As petitioner
has been placed in jeopardy for the crime of
homicide, he cannot be prosecuted anew for the
same offense, or any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the first
offense charged.
Lovely De la Torre
106. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
appellee, vs. CLARENCE ASTUDILLO,
CRISANTO ASTUDILLO, alias ANTENG or
ENTENG, HILARIO ASTUDILLO, alias
BODA, appellant.
G.R. No. 141518. April 29, 2003
Facts:
On November 21, 1995, the accused-appellant was
arraigned and the accused pleaded not guilty. On
March 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was
convicted of murder qualified by abuse of superior
strength. The accused-appellant appealed and, upon
review of the case, the Court of Appeal revised the
decision, modified, and replaced the qualifying
circumstance into treachery, thus increasing the
accused-appellant’s civil liability. Hence this
appeal by accused-appellant on the grounds that the
actions of the Court of Appeals violated his right
against double jeopardy.
Issues:
Whether or not the modification of the charge from
murder qualified by abuse of superior strength to 100 . Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, March 23, 1984 Fern
murder qualified by treachery violates the
accused’s right against double jeopardy
Ruling:
When the accused himself files or consents to the
filing of a motion for reconsideration or
modification, double jeopardy cannot be invoked
because the accused waived his right not to be
placed therein by filing such motion. His motion
gives the court an opportunity to rectify its errors or
to reevaluate its assessment of facts and
conclusions of law and make them conformable
with the statute applicable to the case in the new
judgment it has to render. The raison detre is to
afford the court a chance to correct its own
mistakes and to avoid unnecessary appeals from
being taken. In effect, a motion for reconsideration
or modification filed by or with consent of the
accused renders the entire evidence open for the
review of the trial court without, however,
conducting further proceedings, such as the taking
of additional proof. Let it be known that appellate
courts are triers of law, and not triers of facts.
69
Zarian Lyn Gasapo
108. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES -versus-
HON. SIMEON FERRER
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14
Facts:
Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge
that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of
1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the
information of subversion against the following: 1.)
Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)aggravated by
circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers,
subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford
impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being
members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating
people to unite and overthrow the Philippine
Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances
of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court
is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers
of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by
pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of
safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption
of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP
regardless of voluntariness. The Anti Subversive Act of
1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw
the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership
therein, and for other purposes. It defined the
Communist Party being although a political party is in
fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the
Government, not only by force and violence but also by
deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares
that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security
of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation
with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is
punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a
designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be
made prior to filing of information in court. Section
6provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence.
Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts
penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows
the renunciation of membership to the CCP through
writing under oath. Section 9 declares the
constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise
under freedom if thought, assembly and association.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post
facto law.
(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of
expression.
Held:
The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion
Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act.
It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the
substitution of judicial determination to a legislative
determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured
as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be
present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the
statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct.
(A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto
law.)In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the
CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of
the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to
other organizations having the same purpose and their
successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not
person. Membership to this organizations, to be
unlawful, it must be shown that membership was
acquired with the intent to further the goals of the
organization by overt acts. This is the element of
membership
with knowledge that is punishable. This is the required
proof of a member’s direct participation. Section 4
prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The
members of the subversive organizations before the
passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape
liability by renouncing membership in accordance with
Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis
mutandis or that the necessary changes having been
made. The declaration of that the CPP is an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government
should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only
a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The existence of
Substantive Evil justifies the limitation to the exercise
of “Freedom of Expression and Association" in this
matter. Before the enactment of the statute and
statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the
Congress were done. The court further stresses that
whatever interest in freedom of speech and association
is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP
are weak considering national security and preservation
of democracy. The court set basic guidelines to be
observed in the prosecution under RA1700.
Lizanne Gaurana
109. ALEJANDRO KATIGBAK and MERCEDES K.
KATIGBAK, plaintiffs-appellants,  vs.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, EPIFANIO
VILLEGAS, ARTURO XAVIER, PONCIANO
FERNANDO, ROSENDO DOMINGO and
LEONARDO LUCENA, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19328 December 22, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,  vs. ALEJANDRO KATIGBAK and
MERCEDES K. KATIGBAK defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-19329 December 22, 1989
Facts: This issue involved the constitutionality of
R.A. 1379 “An Act Declaring Forfeiture in favor of
70
the State of the any Property found to have been
unlawfully acquired by any public officer or
employee. The civil cases were instituted by the
spouses Alejandro and Mercedes Katigbak. In their
complaint they praye: that the solicitor general be
enjoined from filing a complaint against them for
forfeiture of property under the said act; the said
statute be declared unconstitutional in so far as it
authorizes forfeiture of properties acquired before
its approval; properties acquired by Alejandro
when he was out of the government service be
excluded from forfeiture proceedings; and the NBI
officers and the investigating prosecutor be
sentenced to pay damages. The second action
commenced by petition filed by the Republic of the
Philippines against Alejandro Katigbak, his wife,
Mercedes Katigbak, and his son, Benedicto,
seeking the forfeiture in favor of the State of the
properties of Alejandro allegedly gotten by him
illegally, in accordance with RA 1379. Said
properties were allegedly acquired while Katigbak
was holding various positions in the government,
the last being that of an examiner of the Bureau of
Customs; and title to some of the properties were
supposedly recorded in the names of his wife
and/or son. The cases were jointly tried.
Issue: Whether or not RA 1379 unconstitutional for
being an expost-facto law, because it imposes the
penalty of forfeiture on a public officer or
employee acquiring properties allegedly in
violation of said R.A. No. 1379 at a time when that
law had not yet been enacted.
Held: The forfeiture of property provided for in
Republic Act No. 1379 being in the nature of a
penalty; and it being axiomatic that a law is ex-post
facto which inter alia "makes criminal an act done
before the passage of the law and which was innocent
when done, and punishes such an act," or, "assuming
to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect
imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful," it follows
that penalty of forfeiture prescribed by R.A. No. 1379
cannot be applied to acquisitions made prior to its
passage without running afoul of the Constitutional
provision condemning ex post facto laws or bills of
attainder. In the case, The trial court declared certain
of their acquisitions in 1953, 1954 and 1955 to be
illegal under R.A. No. 1379 although made prior to
the enactment of the law, and imposed a liean
thereon. Such a disposition is, quite obviously,
constitutionally permissible. R.A. No. 1379 is not
penal in nature, its objective not being the
enforcement of a penal liability but the recovery of
property held under an implied trust. With respect to
things acquired through delicts, prescription does not
run in favor of the offender. As to the issue of
whether or not the Prosecuting Fiscal, Leonardo
Lucena, should be made answerable for damages
because the filing of the forfeiture proceedings, Civil
Case No. 31080, resulted from a preliminary
investigation which was allegedly conducted by
Fiscal Lucena in an arbitrary and highhanded manner,
suffice it to state that the trial court found no proof of
any intention to persecute or other ill motive
underlying the institution of Civil Case No. 31080.
The trial court further found that during the
preliminary investigation by Fiscal Lucena on
September 13, 19, 24, 25 and 26, 1956, Alejandro
Katigbak was assisted by reputable and competent
counsel, Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez and Atty.
Antonio Carag. The mere fact that the preliminary
investigation was terminated against the objection of
Katigbak's counsel, does not necessarily signify that
he was denied the right to such an investigation. What
is more, the Trial Court's factual conclusion that no
malice or bad faith attended the acts of public
respondents complained of, and consequently no
award of damages is proper, cannot under established
rule be reviewed by this Court absent any showing of
the existence of some recognized exception thereto.
Audreylyn Gonzales
110. WRIGHT v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 113213, August 15, 1994.
FACTS:
To suppress crimes, Australia and the Government
of the Philippines entered into a Treaty of
Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. It was
ratified in accordance with the provisions of
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in
a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September
10, 1990. The Treaty adopts a "non-list, double
criminality approach" which provides for broader
coverage of extraditable offenses between the two
countries and embraces crimes punishable by
imprisonment for at least 1 year. It also allows
extradition for crimes committed prior to the
treaty's date of effectivity, provided that these
crimes were in the statute books of the requesting
State at the time of their commission.
Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to
extradite “persons wanted for prosecution of the
71
imposition or enforcement of a sentence in the
Requesting State for an extraditable offense." A
request for extradition requires, if the person is
accused of an offense, the furnishing by the
requesting State of either a warrant for the arrest or
a copy of the warrant of arrest of the person, or,
where appropriate, a copy of the relevant charge
against the person sought to be extradited.
On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D.
Hidalgo of the DFA indorsed to the DOJ
Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February 19,
1993 from the Government of Australia to the DOJ
through Attorney General Michael Duffy seeking
to indict Paul Joseph Wright, an Australian Citizen.
In accordance to Section 5 of PD No. 1069
(September 10, 1990), an extradition proceedings
was initiated on April 6, 1993 before the RTC of
Makati. On June 14, 1993 RTC granted the petition
for extradition requested by the Government of
Australian concluding that the extradition could be
granted irrespective of when the offense was
committed. The extradition proceeding resulted in
an order of his deportation. The decision was
sustained and motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
Whether or not such retroactive application is in
violation of the Constitution for being an ex post
facto law
HELD:
The Supreme Court cited the case of Calder v. Bull
where it concluded that the concept of ex post facto
laws in our Constitution was limited only to penal
and criminal statutes which affect the substantial
rights of the accused. As concluded by the Court of
Appeals, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal
legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. This
being so, there is absolutely no merit in petitioner’s
contention that the ruling of the lower court
sustaining the Treaty’s retroactive application with
respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty’s
coming into force and effect, violates the
Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto
laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation
nor a criminal procedural statute. "It merely
provides for the extradition of persons wanted for
prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense
or crime was already committed or consummated at
the time the treaty was ratified." WHEREFORE,
instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Joshua John Granada
111. PANFILO M. LACSON vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, et. al.
G.R. NO. 128096
FACTS: Petitioner Lacson was involved in a
criminal case that started when eleven persons
suspected to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng
Gang were killed by the Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Petitioner was
one of the heads of said group. In a media expose,
it was said that what happened was a rub-out and
not a shoot-out. Among other issues, petitioner
argues that Republic Act 8249, enacted as his case
was pending, had a retroactive effect; that it was
tailored-suit to match petitioner’s case, making the
same an ex-post facto law that would affect his
right to procedural due process. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 8249 is an ex post
facto law that may affect the petitioner’s right to
due process.
RULING: Petitioner’s contention is incorrect. R.A.
8249 does not have the qualities of an ex-post facto
law. Generally, an ex post facto law exerts a
retroactive effect on penal laws. However, R.A.
8249 is not a penal law. As the Court defines,
‘Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which
prohibit certain acts and establish penalties thereof;
or those that defines crimes, treat of their nature,
and provide for their punishment’. Republic Act
8249 is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is
not penal in character and thus is not considered to
be an ex post facto law. Therefore, the argument of
the petitioner that the law in question has
retroactive effect and may affect his right to due
process is wrong.
72
Ro Ann Marie Gumban
112. G.R. No. 207264 October 22, 2013
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN
FACTS:
The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari
with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction resolution of the Commission on
Election ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of
Candidacy of petitioner for the position of the
Representative of the lone district of Marinduque. On
October 31.2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the
Comelec an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or
to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Regina
Ongsiako Reyes, the petitioner, on the ground that it
contained material representations. On March 27, 2013,
the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of
the petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8, 2013. On
May 14, 2013, COMELEC en banc denied her MR.
However, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner
of the May 13, 2013 Elections. On June 5, 2013,
COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final
and Executory. On the same day, petitioner took her
oath of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives. She has yet to assume
office at that time, as her term officially starts at noon of
June 30, 2013.According to petitioner, the COMELEC
was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly
proclaimed 20 because pursuant to Section 17, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the
exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications” of the Members of the House of
Representatives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ongsiako is ineligible to run for office
on the ground of citizenship.
HELD:
For respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and
become eligible for public office the law requires that
she must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take
the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before the Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate
in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.
In the case at bar, there s no showing that respondent
complied with the aforesaid requirements. Early on in
the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner's
lack of proof regarding her American citizenship,
contending that it is petitioner's burden to present a case.
She, however, specifically denied that she has become
either a permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the
USA.
Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered
evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013,
however, establishing the fact that respondent is a
holder of an American passport which she continues to
use until June 30 2012 petitioner was able to
substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to
respondent to present substantial evidence to prove
otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do,
leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent
falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish
that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by
becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and
thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship, she remains to be an American
citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold
any elective public office in the Philippines."
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance
as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner contends that,
since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with
her appointment as Provincial Administrator of
Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status
as a natural-born Filipino citizen. said oath of allegiance
cannot be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A.
No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as
prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01,
otherwise known as the Rules Governing Philippine
Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum
Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules) and
Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by
the Bureau of Immigration. Thus, petitioner s oath of
office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered
as the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No.
9225.
John Paul Hervas
113. JAPZON VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 180088 January 19, 2009
FACTS
Manuel Japzon and Jaime Ty were candidates for the
Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on
14 May 2007. On 15 June 2007, Japzon filed before the
COMELEC a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Ty’s
Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material
misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty
was a former natural-born Filipino, migrated to the
United States and became a citizen thereof. Ty had been
residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed
his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he
falsely represented therein that he was a resident of
Barangay 6, Poblacion, Gen-eral Macarthur, Eastern
73
Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a
permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country.
While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his
Phil-ippine citizenship, he never actually resided in said
place for a period of one year immediately preceding the
date of election as required under the Local Government
Code of 1991. In his an-swer, Ty admitted that he was a
natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and
subse-quently became a naturalized American citizen.
Ty claimed that he had reacquired his Philippine
citizenship and renounced his American citizenship, and
he had been a resident of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior
to the 14 May 2007elections. Therefore, Ty sought the
dismissal of Japzons petition.
Pending the submission by the parties of their respective
position papers, the elections were already held. Ty
acquired the highest number of votes and was declared
Mayor. Following the submission of the Position Papers
of both parties, COMELEC First Division rendered its
Resolu-tion dated 31 July 2007 in favor of Ty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ty was able to meet the citizenship
required for a public office.
HELD:
There is no dispute that Ty was a natural-born Filipino.
He was born and raised in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. However, he left
to work in the USA and eventually became an American
citizen. Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship by tak-
ing his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before the Philippine Consulate Gen-eral in
USA, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act
No. 9225. At this point, Ty still held dual citizenship,
American and Philippine. It was only on 2007 that Ty
renounced his Amer-ican citizenship before a notary
public and became a pure Philippine citizen again.
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs
the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may
reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship despite
acquiring a foreign citizen-ship, and provides for his
rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close
scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at
all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born
Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic
Act No. 9225 imposes no residency require-ment for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor
does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship on the current
residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. RA
9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This
is only logical and consistent with the general intent of
the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-
born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both
Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish
residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign
country of which he is also a citizen.
Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural
born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for
public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and ex-isting laws; and (2) make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.Yes he is eligible for public office.
The fact that he had dual citizenship did not disqualify
him from running for public office.
Cristy Marie Ituriaga
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
Second Division
114. G.R. No. 195649, July 2, 2013
CASAN MACODE MACQUILING,
PETITIONER, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y
CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA.
RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the
propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a US
passport. Arnado was naturalized US citizen but he
renounced such citizenship and took Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
July 10, 2008. Arnado filed his certificate of
candidacy on November 30, 2009 to run for
Municipal Mayor of Kausawagan, Lanao del Norte
for the May 10, 2010 election.
Issues:
Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship tantamount to
undoing a renunciation earlier made.
Held:
The court held that Arnado is not qualified to run
for public office because of his continued use of his
American Passport he continually and voluntarily
represented himself as an American. Arnado’s
citizenship is dual, he is a Filipino by birth and an
American through naturalization. Dual citizens are
not qualified to run as provided by Section 40 of
the Local Government Code.
74
Roxanne Jordan
115. Bengzon III v. HRET
357 SCRA 545. May 7, 2001
FACTS: Teodoro C. Cruz was a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of
Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the
US Marine Corps and without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance
to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for under CA No. 63.
The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this
case, in view of the constitutional requirement that “no
person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship
through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing
for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons
Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or
Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the
United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the
1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who
was then running for reelection.
Antonio Bengson III filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become
a member of the House of Representatives since he is
not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for
quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz, a natural-born Filipino
who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Filipino
citizens who have lost their citizenship may however
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A.
No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: 1) by
naturalization, 2) by repatriation, and 3) by direct act of
Congress.
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those
who lost their citizenship due to:
1.)desertion of the armed forces; 2) services in the
armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; 3)
service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time, 4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;
and 5) political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as
a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he
was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
The Supreme Court reiterated that R.A. No. 2630
provides under Section 1. Any person who had lost his
Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the
United States, or after separation from the Armed
Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil
Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in
the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain
a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with
the afore cited provision, Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a
status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation
allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Jerelyn Ligaray
116. Tabasa vs CA, August 29, 2006
FACTS: When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A.
Tabasa acquired American citizenship when his
father became a naturalized citizen of the US. In
1995, he arrived in the Philippines and was
admitted as "balikbayan"; thereafter, he was
arrested and detained by the agent of BIR. The
Consul General of the US embassy of Manila filed
a request with the BID that his passport has been
revoked and that Tabasa had a standing warrant for
several federal charges against him.Petitioner
alleged that he acquired Filipino citizenship by
repatriation in accordance with the RA No. 8171,
and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he
cannot be deported or detained by the BID.
ISSUE: Whether or not he has validly reacquired
75
Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and
therefore, is not an undocumented alien subject to
deportation.
RULING: No. Petitioner is not qualified to avail
himself of repatriation under RA 8171. The only
person entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 is
either a Filipino woman who lost her Philippine
citizenship by marriage to an alien, or a natural-
born Filipino, including his minor children who lost
Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity. Petitioner was already 35 years
old when he filed for repatriation. The act cannot
be applied in his case because he is no longer a
minor at the time of his repatriation in 1996. The
privilege under RA 8171 only belongs to children
who are of minor age at the time of filing of the
petition for repatriation.
Ryce Magalit
117. Loida Nicolas - Lewis v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 162759
August 4, 2006
Facts: Petitioners, who reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, sought
registration and certification as “overseas absentee
voters” however they were advised by the
Philippine Embassy in the US that as per a
COMELEC letter to DFA dated September 23,
2003, they have no right yet to vote in such
elections owing to their lack of the one-year
residence requirement prescribed by Sec. 1, Art. IV
of the Constitution.
When petitioner Nicolas-Lewis
clarified on said requirement, the COMELEC
replied its position that the OAVL was not enacted
for the petitioners and that they are considered
regular voters who have to meet the requirements
of residency under the Constitution. Consequently,
petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in
said elections.
On May 20, 2004, the OSG filed a
Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment) stating that
“all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual
citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage,
may do so,” observing, however, that the
conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the
petition moot and academic.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners and
others who might have meanwhile retained and/or
reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A.
9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
Ruling: As may be noted, there is no
provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 -
requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and
physically stay in the Philippines first before they
can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary,
R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals
are most likely non-residents, grants under its
Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that
granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It
cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in
essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all
overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency
requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under
ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
The Court rules and so holds that
those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003, may exercise the right to vote under the
system of absentee voting in Republic Act No.
9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
Daphne Jade Panes
118. Valles vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 137000, Aug. 9, 2000
FACTS: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May
16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an
Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen,
she left Australia and came to settle in the
76
Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and
has since then participated in the electoral process
not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In
the May 1998 elections, she ran for governor but
Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as
candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or
a Filipino
HELD: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres
to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a
child follows the nationality or citizenship of the
parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as
opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which
determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of
place of birth. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a
year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect
and at that time, what served as the Constitution of
the Philippines were the principal organic acts by
which the United States governed the country.
These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and
the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916,
also known as the Jones Law. Under both organic
acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided
therein including their children are deemed to be
Philippine citizens. Private respondents father,
Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in
Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law,
Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine
citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the
laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s
daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the
Philippines. The signing into law of the 1935
Philippine Constitution has established the
principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx So also,
the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers
citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent,
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen,
having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of
her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her
losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia
follows the principle of jus soli, then at most,
private respondent can also claim Australian
citizenship resulting to her possession of dual
citizenship.
Jed Paracha
119. Tecson vs. COMELEC,
GR No. 161434 March 3, 2004
Facts: On December 31, 2003 Ronald Allan Kelly
Poe a.k.a Fernando Poe Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate
of candidacy for the position of Presidency in the
Republic of the Philippines. Victorino Fornier
initiated a petition before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to
cancel his certificate of candidacy due to the reason
that FPJ is not a natural born Filipino because his
parents were foreigners. On January 23, 2004 the
COMELEC dismissed Fornier’s action for lack of
merit. Three days later, he filed his motion for
consideration but was denied on February 6, 2004
by the COMELEC. On his part, respondent,
presented twenty-two documentary pieces of
evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a
certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that
there appeared to be no available information
regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of
births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification
issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives
Division of the National Archives that no available
information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of
birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of
Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo
Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No.
20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of
Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of
Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage
contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley,
and h) a certification issued by the City Civil
Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating
that the records of birth in the said office during the
period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally
destroyed during World War II.
77
Issue: Whether or not Ronald Allan Kelly Poe is a
natural born Filipino or not.
Held: Yes. It is proven that FPJ is a natural Filipino
due to the fact that his father, Allan F. Poe, is also a
Filipino Citizen. FPJ’s grandfather, Lorenzo Poe,
has claimed his citizenship under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 which declared that those who resided
in the Philippines are already considered Filipino
Citizens which has been extended to FPJ’s father.
Since FPJ was born under the 1935 constitution
which states that a child whether legitimate or not
shall be considered Filipino citizens as long as their
fathers are. Documentary evidence adduced by
petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal
grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes,
the father of Allan F. Poe. Allan F. Poe, showed
that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol
father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espanol mother,
Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an
uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the
alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of
their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the
same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be
twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino
citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years
old, unmarried, and an American citizen.
Evonnie Parreño
120. BALGAMELO CABILING MA, ET. AL V.
COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ,
JR., ET. AL
G.R. No. 183133 July 26, 2010
FACTS
Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr.,
Valeriano Cabiling Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Arceli Ma,
Nicolas Ma, and Isidro Ma are the children of Felix
Ma, a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a
Filipina.
They were all raised in the Philippines and have
resided in this country for almost sixty (60) years;
they spent their whole lives, studied and received
their primary and secondary education in the country.
During their age of minority, they secured from the
Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of
Registration (ACRs) and immediately upon reaching
the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine
citizenship in accordance with Section 1(4), Article
IV, of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that
those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship are citizens of the Philippines.
Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine
citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the
necessary documents registered in the civil registry as
required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
625 (An Act Providing the Manner in which the
Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be
Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino
Citizen).
On 16 February 2004, the Bureau of Immigration
received the Complaint-Affidavit of a certain Mat G.
Catral, alleging that Felix Ma and his seven (7)
children are undesirable and overstaying aliens.
ISSUE
Whether or not children born under 1935 constitution
of a Filipino mother and an alien father, who executed
an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and
took their oath of allegiance to the government upon
reaching the age of majority, but who failed to
immediately file the documents of election with the
nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals
subject to deportation.
HELD
We are guided by this evolvement from election of
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority under the 1935 Philippine Constitution to
dispensing with the election requirement under the
1973 Philippine Constitution to express classification
of these children as natural-born citizens under the
1987 Constitution towards the conclusion that the
omission of the 1941 statutory requirement of
registration of the documents of election should not
result in the obliteration of the right to Philippine
citizenship.
Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis
of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine
citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship
in form and substance. The failure to register the
election in the civil registry should not defeat the
election and resultingly negate the permanent fact that
they have a Filipino mother. The lacking
requirements may still be complied with subject to the
imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if
any. The documents they submitted supporting their
allegations that they have already registered with the
78
civil registry, although belatedly, should be examined
for validation purposes by the appropriate agency, in
this case, the Bureau of Immigration. Other
requirements embodied in the administrative orders
and other issuances of the Bureau of Immigration and
the Department of Justice shall be complied with
within a reasonable time.
Stephen Rodriguez
121. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
AZUCENA SAAVEDRA
BATUGAS, respondent.
G.R. No. 183110. October 7, 2013
Facts: On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition
for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del
Sur. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to
allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in
some known lucrative trade. Finding the grounds relied
upon by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC
denied said Motion.  Neither the OSG nor the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor appeared on the day of the
hearing. Hence, Azucena’s counsel moved that the
evidence be presented ex-parte, which the RTC granted.
Accordingly, the RTC designated its Clerk of Court as
Commissioner to receive Azucena’s evidence. During
the November 5, 2004 ex-parte hearing, no
representative from the OSG appeared despite due
notice. Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on
September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents, Azucena has
never departed the Philippines since birth. Azucena can
speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her
primary, secondary, and tertiary education were taken in
Philippine schools. Azucena married Santiago Batuigas
(Santiago), a natural-born Filipino citizen. They have
five children. All of them studied in Philippine public
and private schools and are all professionals.Azucena
and her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the
retail business of and later on in milling/distributing
rice, corn, and copra.
The RTC found that Azucena has amply supported the
allegations in her Petition.The OSG then appealed the
RTC judgment to the CA, contending that Azucena
failed to comply with the income requirement under CA
473. The OSG further asserted that the ex-parte
proceeding before the commissioner is not a "public
hearing" as ex-parte hearings are usually done in
chambers, without the public in attendance. Azucena
countered that although she is a teacher by profession,
she had to quit to help in the retail business of her
husband, and they were able to send all their children to
school. Azucena denied that the hearing for her Petition
was not made public, as the hearing before the Clerk of
Court was conducted in the court’s session hall. Thus,
the instant Petition wherein the OSG recapitulates the
same arguments it raised before the CA, i.e., the alleged
failure of Azucena to meet the income and public
hearing requirements of CA 473.
Issue: Whether or not Azucena does not have the
qualification required in no. 4 of Section 2 of
CA 473 as she does not have any lucrative
income, and that the proceeding in the lower
court was not in the nature of a public hearing.
Ruling: The Court held that the OSG had the
opportunity to contest the qualifications of
Azucena during the initial hearing scheduled on
May 18, 2004. However, the OSG or the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor failed to appear in
said hearing, prompting the lower court to order
ex parte presentation of evidence before the
Clerk of Court on November 5, 2004. The OSG
was also notified of the ex parte proceeding, but
despite notice, again failed to appear. The OSG
had raised this same issue at the CA and was
denied for the reasons stated in its Decision. We
find no reason to disturb the findings of the CA
on this issue. Neither should this issue further
delay the grant of Philippine citizenship to a
woman who was born and lived all her life, in
the Philippines, and devoted all her life to the
care of her Filipino family. She has more than
demonstrated, under judicial scrutiny, her being
a qualified Philippine citizen. On the second
issue, we also affirm the findings of the CA that
since the government who has an interest in,
and the only one who can contest, the
citizenship of a person, was duly notified
through the OSG and the Provincial
Prosecutor’s office, the proceedings have
complied with the public hearing requirement
under CA 473. No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473
provides as qualification to become a Philippine
citizen: He must own real estate in the
Philippines worth not less than five thousand
pesos, Philippine currency, or must have known
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation.
Azucena is a teacher by profession and has
actually exercised her profession before she had
to quit her teaching job to assume her family
duties and take on her role as joint provider,
together with her husband, in order to support
her family. Together, husband and wife were
able to raise all their five children, provided
them with education, and have all become
professionals and responsible citizens of this
country. Certainly, this is proof enough of both
79
husband and wife’s lucrative trade. Azucena
herself is a professional and can resume
teaching at anytime. Her profession never
leaves her, and this is more than sufficient
guarantee that she will not be a charge to the
only country she has known since birth. Petition
is DENIED. Petition for Naturalization, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
Pearl Diamond Sillador
122. MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES vs.
COMELEC, et al
G.R. NO. 221697 221698-700
FACTS: Grace Poe (Poe) was found abandoned by
Edgardo Militar in a church in Jaro Iloilo sometime
in 1968. The relatives of Edgardo then reported and
registered the child as a founding with the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo. The child was then named Mary
Grace Militar. In 1974, the child was adopted by
Fernando Poe, Jr and Susan Roces. Necessary
annotations were placed in the child’s foundling
certificate but it was only in 2005 that Susan Roces
discovered that their lawyer failed to secure a new
Certificate of Live Birth indicating Poe’s new name
as well as the name of the adoptive parents. Roces
then submitted an affidavit and in 2006, a
Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace
Poe was released by the Civil Registry of Iloilo.
At the age of 18, Poe was registered as a voter of
San Juan. In 1988, she was issued a Philippine
passport. However, in 1991, Poe married Teodoro
Llamanzares and flew to the US right after the
wedding. She then gave birth to her eldest child in
the US. In 2001, Poe became a naturalized
American Citizen and she obtained a US Passport
that same year. In April 2004, Poe came back to the
Philippines in order to support her father’s
candidacy. It was at this time that she gave birth to
her youngest daughter. In July 2004, she then
returned to the US with her two daughters. Poe
returned in December 2004 after learning of her
father’s deteriorating condition. The latter died and
Poe stayed until February 2005 to take care of the
funeral arrangements. Poe stated that she wanted to
be with her grieving mother hence, she and her
husband decided to move and reside permanently in
the Philippines sometime first quarter of 2005.
They prepared for resettlement including
notification of their children’s schools,
coordination with property movers and inquiry with
Philippine authorities as to how they can bring their
pet dog. According to Poe, as early as 2004, she
already quit her job in the US. Poe came home on
May 24, 2005 and immediately secured a TIN
while her husband stayed in the US. She and her
family stayed with her mother until she and
husband was able to purchase a condominium in
San Juan sometime February 2006. On February
14, 2006, Poe returned to the US to dispose the
other family belongings. She travelled back in
March 2006. In early 2006, Poe and husband
acquired a property in Corinthian Hills in Quezon
City where they built their family home.
On July 7, 2006, Poe took her Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A.
9225. On July 10, 2006, she filed a sworn petition
to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with
petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her
three children. The Bureau of Immigration acted in
favor of the petition on July 18, 2006. She and her
children were then considered dual citizens. Poe
then registered as voter in August 2006 and secured
a Philippine passport thereafter. On October 6,
2010, she was appointed as Chairperson of the
MTRCB. Before assuming her post, she executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
US before a notary public in Pasig City on October
20, 2010. The following day, she submitted the
Affidavit to the Bureau of Immigration and took
her oath as MTRCB Chairperson. According to
Poe, she stopped using her American passport from
then on.
On July 12, 2011, Poe executed an
Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of
the US before the Vice Consul of the US Embassy
in Manila. On December 9, 2011, the US Vice
Consul issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality
of the US effective October 21, 2010. On October
2, 2012, Poe filed with COMELEC her Certificate
of Candidacy for Senator stating that she was a
resident of the Philippines for a period of 6 years
and 6 months before May 13, 2013. She was then
proclaimed a Senator on May 16, 2013.
On October 15, 2015, Poe filed her COC for the
Presidency for the May 2016 elections. She
declared that she is a natural born and her residence
in the Philippine up to the day before
election would be10 years and 11 months counted
from May 24, 2005. Several petitions were filed
against Poe alleging that (1) she committed
material misrepresentation in her COC when she
80
stated that she is a resident of the Philippines for at
least 10 years 11 months up to the day before May
9, 2016 Elections, (2) she is not natural born
considering that Poe is a foundling. It was argued
that international law does not confer natural born
status and Filipino citizenship to foundlings hence,
she is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship under R.A.9225 as she is not a
natural citizen to begin with.
Assuming that Poe was a natural born citizen, she
lost it when she became a US Citizen.
COMELEC ruled against the petitioner resolving
that she is not a natural born citizen and that she
failed to complete the 10 year residency
requirement. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Mary Grace Poe, as a
foundling, is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines.
2. Whether Poe’s repatriation resulted to
reacquisition of natural born citizenship.
HELD: On the first issue, the Supreme Court held
that foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens.
While the 1935 Constitution is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language that
would exclude them either. Because of silence and
ambiguity in the enumeration, there is a need to
examine the intent of the framers. The amendment
to the Constitution proposed by constitutionalist
Rafols to include foundlings as natural born
citizens was not carried out, not because there was
any objection to the notion that persons of
unknown parentage are not citizens, but only
because their number was not enough to merit
specific mention. There was no intent or language
that would permit discrimination against
foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions
guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the
laws. Likewise, domestic laws on adoption support
the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These
laws do not provide that adoption confers
citizenship upon the adoptee, rather, the adoptee
must be Filipino in the first place to be adopted.
Recent legislation all expressly refers to “Filipino
children” and includes foundlings as among
Filipino children who may be adopted.
The argument that the process to determine that the
child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a
foundling certificate are acts to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship is without merit. Hence, the
argument that as a foundling, Poe underwent a
process in order to acquire or perfect her Philippine
citizenship is untenable. “Having to perform an
act” means that the act must be personally done by
the citizen. In this case, the determination of
foundling status was done by authorities, not by
Poe. Second, the object of the process is to
determine the whereabouts of the parents, not the
citizenship of the child and lastly, the process is not
analogous to naturalization proceedings.
Under international law, foundlings are citizens.
Generally accepted principles of international law
which include international customs form part of
the laws of the land. The common thread of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the
International Convent on Civil and Political Rights
obligates the Philippines to grant nationality from
birth and to ensure that no child is stateless. The
principles stated in the:
1. Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Relation to the Conflict of Nationality laws (that a
foundling is presumed to have the nationality of the
country of birth)
2. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
(foundling is presumed born of citizens of the
country where he is found) bind the Philippines
although we are not signatory to these
conventions. Although we are not a signatory to the
Hague Convention, we are a signatory to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
which affirms Article14 of the Hague Convention.
Likewise, the Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness affirms Article 15 of the UDHR. By
analogy, although the Philippines have not signed
the International Convention for the Protection of
Persons from Enforced Disappearance, we (the
Supreme Court) ruled that the proscription against
enforced disappearance was nonetheless binding as
a generally accepted principle of international law.
Poe’s evidence shows that at least 60 countries in
Asia, North and South America and Europe have
passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its
citizens. 166 out of 189 countries accept that
foundlings are recognized as citizens. Hence, there
is a generally accepted principle of international
law to presume foundlings as having been born and
a national of the country in which it is found.
Hence, as a foundling, Poe is a natural born
81
Filipino citizen.
On the second issue, the COMELEC arrogantly
disregarded jurisprudence on the matter of
repatriation which states that repatriation results in
the recovery of the original nationality. A natural
born citizen before he lost his Philippine nationality
will be restored to his former status as natural born
Filipino after repatriation (Benson v. HRET,
Pareno v. Commission on Audit etc). In passing
R.A. 9225, Congress saw it fit to decree that natural
born citizenship may be reacquired even if it has
been lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree
with the Congress’ determination. Neither is
repatriation an act to ‘acquire or perfect’ one’s
citizenship. In the case of Bengson, the Court
pointed out that there are only two types of citizens
under the 1987 Constitution: natural born and
naturalized. There is no third category for
repatriated citizens. The COMELEC cannot reverse
a judicial precedent.
Hence, COMELEC’s decision is wrapped with
grave abuse of discretion.
Pearl Diamond Sillador
122-A. MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES
vs. COMELEC, et al
G.R. NO. 221697 221698-700
J. Carpio – Dissenting Opinion
PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS: A presidential
candidate who is deemed a natural born citizen by
less than a majority and deemed not a natural-born
Filipino citizen by five Justices and with no opinion
from three Justices is now allowed to run for
President of the Philippines. He notes that the
ruling of the majority will lead to absurd results by
allowing a presidential candidate with uncertain
citizenship status to be potentially elected. The
majority wants to resolve the citizenship status only
after the election, and if the petitioner wins.
Poe failed to prove that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and a resident of the Philippines for
the last ten years hence, she is not eligible to run as
President of the Republic of the Philippines.
ON CITIZENSHIP: The 1935 Constitution, which
is applicable in Poe’s case, allows only two
methods of acquiring Philippine citizenship:
1. By blood relation to the father or mother who
must be a Filipino citizen
2. By naturalization according to law
The Philippines adheres to the jus sanguinis
principle or the “law of the blood” to determine
citizenship at birth. An individual acquires Filipino
citizenship at birth solely by virtue of biological
descent from a Filipino mother or father. This view
is made evident by the suppression from the
Constitution of the jus soli principle.
Poe contends that as a foundling, she is deemed
included in par. 3 and 4 of Article IV of the 1935
constitution (Par 3 - Those whose father are
citizens of the Philippines and Par 4 - those whose
mother are citizens of the Philippines, and upon
reaching the age of majority, elects Philippine
citizenship). Poe is gravely mistaken as the framers
of the 1935 Constitution voted to categorically
reject the proposal to include foundlings as Citizens
of the Philippines. The delegates actually voted to
reject Rafol’s amendment to consider children of
unknown parentage as Filipino citizens. Three
delegates even voiced out their objections to this
amendment and stated that the Congress should
instead provide an enabling law for foundlings to
be considered as Filipino citizens. Poe argues that
the reason why the provision on foundlings was not
included in the 1935 Constitution was because
there is already a clear principle existing in
domestic and international law on foundlings.
Carpio comments that there is no such domestic
law as well as international law existing during the
proceedings of the 1935 Constitutional Convention
explicitly governing citizenship of foundlings and
thus there could not have been any redundancy to
speak of. The Spanish Civil Code which has a
provision on foundlings ceased to have any effect
in our land upon the cession by Spain of the
Philippines to the US. Likewise, only the 1930
82
Hague Convention relating to the Conflict of
Nationality law, which articulated the presumption
on the place of birth of foundlings, was in existence
during the deliberations of the 1935 Constitution.
This Convention does not guarantee a nationality to
a foundling at birth and there is no prevailing
customary international law at the time, as there is
still none today, conferring automatically a
nationality to foundlings at birth. While the framers
of the 1935 Constitution discussed the matter of
foundlings, they not only rejected the proposal to
include a provision relating to them (foundlings)
but also clearly manifested that foundlings could
not be citizens of the Philippines at birth like
children of Filipino fathers. The framers
intended to exclude foundling from the definition
of natural born Filipino citizens by expressly
rejecting Rafol’s proposal. Clearly, it was the intent
of the framers of the 1935 Constitution to refer to
natural-born citizens as only those who were
Filipino citizens by the mere fact of being born to
fathers who were Filipino citizens – nothing more
nothing less. As a matter of course, those whose
parents are neither Filipino citizens or are both
unknown, as the case of foundlings, cannot be
considered natural born Filipino citizens.
FOUNDLINGS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
It is a fundamental principle that every independent
state has the right and prerogative to determine who
its citizens are. This principle is applied in the
Philippines as early as 1912 in the case of Roa. The
1930 Hague Convention explicitly recognizes this
principle. Hence, it is the municipal law, both
constitutional and statutory, which determines and
regulates the conditions on acquiring citizenship.
There is no customary international law presuming
a foundling as a citizen of the country where the
foundling is found. Poe anchors her claims on the
Convention of the Rights of the Child, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), the 1930 Hague
Convention, and the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness (CRS).
1. Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC)
was ratified by the Philippines only on August 21,
1990. This convention binds the Philippines only
on the day of ratification. Since Poe was born in
1968, her citizenship at birth cannot be affected in
any way by the Convention. Moreover, the CRC
does not guarantee a child a nationality at birth
much less a natural citizenship at birth as
understood under the Philippine constitution, but
merely the right to acquire a nationality in
accordance with a domestic law.
2. ICCPR – the ICCPR entered into force on 23
March 1976. The ICCPR does not obligate states to
automatically grant a nationality to children at
birth. The covenant does not guarantee a foundling
a nationality at birth.
3. UDHR – The UDHR (Art. 15 on the right to a
nationality) is merely a declaration. It does not
obligate states to automatically confer nationality to
a foundling.
4. 1930 Hague Convention – the Philippines is not
a signatory to this convention, hence, Philippines is
not bound by it. Poe claims that this convention is
evidence of “generally accepted principles of
international law.” Note that Article 14 of this
convention states that foundlings shall have the
nationality of the country OF birth”. It does not say
that a foundling shall have the nationality AT birth.
There is nothing in this article that guarantees the
nationality of a foundling at birth, much less natural
born citizenship at birth as understood under the
Philippine constitution. Moreover, Article 15 of the
convention acknowledges the fact that acquisition
of nationality by reason of birth in a state’s territory
is not automatic. It actually states that municipal
law determines the conditions governing the
acquisition of nationality.
5. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness –
the Philippines is not a signatory to this convention.
The convention does not bind the Philippines.
Likewise, Art. 2 of the CRS which states that
“foundling found in the territory of a contracting
state, shall in the absence of proof to the contrary,
to have been born within that territory of parents
possessing the nationality of that state” binds only
contracting states, of which, the Philippines is not.
In sum there is no international treaty to which the
Philippines is a contracting party, which provides
expressly or impliedly that a foundling is deemed a
natural born citizen of the country
in which the founding is found. On the issue of
customary international law, one of its elements
(widespread and consistent practice of states) was
not duly proven by Poe. She failed to show that
Article 2 of the CRS is an established, widespread
83
and consistent practice of a majority of sovereign
states. On the other hand, international law writers
generally accept that the CRS does not constitute
customary international law precisely because of
the small number of states that have ratified the
convention. Since the first element of customary
international law is missing, the second element
(opinion juris) is lacking as well. There is no
general international law, whether customary
international law or generally accepted principle of
international law, obligating the Philippines, or any
state, to automatically confer citizenship to
foundlings at birth. There are only two general
principles of international law applicable to
foundlings;
1. First, that a foundling is deemed domiciled in the
country where the foundling is found (they have a
domicile at birth, not a nationality at birth)
2. A founding is deemed born in the country where
the foundling is found.
These two general principles have nothing to do
with conferment of nationality.
Assuming that there was in the 1935 and thereafter,
a customary international law conferring nationality
to foundlings at birth, still foundlings could not be
considered as natural born Filipino citizens as such
would conflict with the concept of jus sanguinis
under the 1935 Constitution. In case of conflict
between customary international law and the
Constitution, the Constitution prevails. Moreover,
there is a difference between citizenship at birth
because of jus soli and citizenship at birth because
of jus sanguisinis. The former may be granted to
foundlings under the constitution but the
citizenship granted is not of a natural-born
citizenship but that of naturalized citizenship. Only
those citizens at birth because of jus sanguisinis,
which required blood relation to a parent are
natural citizens under the 1935, 1973 and 1987
constitution.
On burden of proof: Any person who claims to be a
citizen of the Philippines has the burden of proving
his or her Philippine citizenship. A person who
claims to be qualified to run for the position of
President, because he or she, is a natural born
citizen, has the burden of proving that he/she is
indeed a natural born citizen. Any doubt should be
resolved against him/her. In this case, there is no
dispute that petitioner is a foundling with unknown
biological parents. Hence, her certificate of live
birth does not show on its face that she is a natural
born Filipino citizen. This shifted the burden of
evidence to the petitioner that she is eligible to run
and she could have used evidence such as DNA.
Summary: Petitioner is not a natural born citizen
because:
1. No Philippine law automatically confers
Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth
2. The 1935 constitution clearly excluded
foundlings from being considered natural born
citizens
3. There is no legal presumption in favor of
Philippine citizenship, whether natural or
naturalized.
4. There is no treaty, customary international law or
general principle of international law granting
automatically Philippine citizenship to a foundling
at birth.
5. Assuming that there is a customary law
presuming that foundling is a citizen of the country
where it is found, such presumption cannot prevail
over the Philippine constitution which adopts the
jus sanguinis principle
6. Petitioner failed to discharge her burden to prove
that she is a natural born Filipino citizen
7. Foundling has to perform an act, that is, prove
his/her status as a foundling to acquire a Philippine
citizenship. This being so, a foundling can only be
deemed a naturalized Filipino citizen because
he/she has to perform an act to acquire Philippine
citizenship.
Not being a natural born citizen, petitioner is a
nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy
for President can motu propio be cancelled by the
COMELEC. There is no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the COMELEC.
Silva Yugin
122-B. GR. No. 221697 - Poe-Llamanzares v.
Commission on Elections and Estrella C.
Elamparo,
GR. Nos. 221698-700 - Poe-Llamanzares v.
Commission on Elections,et.al.
Dissenting Opinion
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Considering the conclusion Associate Justice Del
Castillo that have reached relative to petitioner's
material misrepresentation regarding her period of
84
residence in the Philippines, and considering
further that based even only thereon, her 2015 CoC
should be cancelled and denied due course,
Associate Justice deem it wise and prudent to
withhold passing judgment at this time regarding
petitioner's citizenship. All, any judgment at this
time upon this issue might directly impact on GR.
No. 221538 (Rizalito Y. David v. Senate Electoral
Tribunal), which is a Quo Warranto case seeking
the removal of petitioner as a Senator of the
Philippines wherein her natural-born citizenship
status is directly assailed.
Furthermore, he believed that the resolution of the
issue on petitioner's citizenship must be carefully
studied. Any hasty or ill-considered ruling on this
issue could open the floodgates to abuse by certain
groups and individuals looking only after their own
interest to the prejudice and undoing of our
motherland. Non-Filipinos might use the ruling to
advance their vested interests by simply posing as
foundlings so that they would be presumed or
cloaked with natural-born citizenship. They could
use this as an avenue to obtain Filipino citizenship
or natural-born status which they could not
ordinarily gain through ordinary naturalization
proceedings.
Further he said that it is not improbable, that
petitioner was born to Filipino parents; yet the fact
remains that their identities are unknown. In short,
petitioner's citizenship is uncertain. While it defies
human nature to resist the natural impulse to claim
one's own child, the sad reality is that there are still
many parents who abandon their child, depriving
said child not only of parental love and care, but
also identity and pedigree. Every opportunity
should thus be given to the innocent child to trace
his/her parentage and determine compliance with
the Constitution. As the Court has declared in Moy
Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration:
whenever the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
vthe ruling therein as to the person's citizenship is
generally not considered as res judicata. Thus, it
may be threshed out again and again as the
occasion demands.
Finally he concluded that, it is imperative for the
Court to carefully tread on the issue of citizenship
for the issue of citizenship impacts not solely on
petitioner but also on those similarly situated like
her; it also involves the sovereignty and security of
our country. We must not lose sight of.the fact that
the citizens of the country are the living soul and
spirit of. the nation, and the very reason and
justification for its existence and its preservation.
Our rights, prerogatives and privileges as Filipino
citizens are the bedrock of our Constitution.
Lenicia Soldevilla
122-C. Separate Dissenting Opinion of Assoc.
Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares vs.
COMELEC, et. al.
G.R. Nos. 221697-700 March 8, 2016 En Banc
Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro
(A.J. De Castro for brevity) claimed that Mary
Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares’ (Grace Poe
for brevity) representation that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen, hence, eligible to run for president,
is false. Under the Constitution, natural-born
Filipino citizenship is based on blood relationship
to a Filipino father or mother following the “jus
sanguinis” principle. Grace Poe, being a foundling,
does not come within the purview of the
constitutionally ordained principle. Likewise,
Grace Poe cannot find succor in the provisions of
the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws and
the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness in claiming natural-born Filipino
citizenship primarily due to the following reasons:
1.) the Philippines has not ratified said International
Conventions, 2.) they espouse a presumption of
fiction of law which is disputable and not based on
the physical biological ties to a Filipino parent, 3.)
said conventions are not self-executing as the
Contracting State is granted the discretion to
determine by enacting a domestic or national law
the conditions and manner by which citizenship is
to be granted, and 4.) the citizenship, if acquired by
virtue of such conventions will be akin to a
citizenship falling under Section 1 (4), Article IV of
the 1987 Constitution, recognizing citizenship by
naturalization in accordance with law by a special
act of Congress. In addition, under the said
international conventions, citizenship is not
automatically conferred but will entail an
85
affirmative action of the State, by a national law or
legislative enactment, so that the nature of
citizenship, if ever acquired pursuant thereto, is
citizenship by naturalization. Section 2 of Article
IV of the 1987 Constitution defines “natural-born
citizens” to cover “those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform an
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship”. A foundling, on the other hand, is one
who must first go through legal process to obtain an
official or formal declaration proclaiming him/her
to be a foundling in order to be granted certain
rights reserved to Filipino citizens. This being the
case, a foundling does not meet the above-
mentioned definition of the natural-born citizen
who is such “from birth”. This will somehow
prevent opening the floodgates to the danger
foreseen by Justice del Castillo that non-Filipinos
may misuse a favourable ruling on foundlings to
the detriment of national interest and security.
Furthermore, A.J. De Castro claimed that the
argument of the Solicitor General in favour of
Grace Poe in citing the ratio of children born in the
Philippines of Filipino parents to children born in
the Philippines of foreign parents during specific
periods is false. Statistics have never been used to
prove paternity or filiation. With more reason, it
should not be used to determine natural-born
citizenship as a qualification to hold public office,
which is of paramount importance to national
interest. Natural-born citizenship, as a qualification
for public office, must be an established fact in
view of the jus sanguinis principle enshrined in the
Constitution, which should not be subjected to
uncertainty nor be based in statistical probabilities.
Krianne Solis
122-D. SET Case No. 001-15
RIZALITO Y. DAVID, petitioner v. MARY
GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, respondent.
SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
Facts:
Grace Poe was found abandoned on September 3,
1968, by a certain Edgardo Militar in front of the
Parish Church in Jaro, Iloilo. In 1974, the spouses
Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa L. Sonora filed before
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan,
Rizal a petition to adopt Grace Poe and on May 13,
1974, the MTC approved the spouses Poe’ s
petition for adoption. On July 27, 1991, Grace Poe
married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a
Filipino-American citizen. July 29, 1991, Grace
Poe went to live with her husband in the U.S. On
October 18, 2001, Grace Poe became an American
citizen through naturalization. On May 24, 2005,
Grace Poe returned to the Philippines with the
intent to resettle in the country for good. On July
10, 2006, Grace Poe filed with the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) a sworn Petition to reacquire
Philippine citizenship under the provisions of the
Republic Act No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act of 2003. On July 7, 2006,
she took her Oath of Allegiance under the Act. In
its July 18, 2006 Order, the BI approved Grace
Poe’ s petitions for the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship and for the derivative citizenship of her
children. On December 9, 2011, the U.S. Vice
Consul issued a “ Certificate of Loss of
Nationality” certifying that as of October 21, 2010,
Grace Poe had lost her U.S. citizenship when she
took her oath of office as MTRCB Chairperson. On
October 2, 2012, Grace Poe filed her certificate of
candidacy (CoC) for Senator in the May 13, 2013
elections.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is a natural- born
Filipino because she is a foundling.
Held:
The respondent admitted her status as a foundling,
thus, lifting the petitioner’ s burden of proving his
claim that she is a foundling. The Constitution
requires – with no exceptions or qualifications –
that Filipino senators must be natural-born
Philippine citizens. Article VII, Section 3 of the
1987 Constitution provides a clear, absolute
command, couched in the strongest language
possible, that is, through a negative phraseology – “
No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines.” The amendment of
the respondent’ s birth certificate to attest to her
Philippine citizenship, however, ignores the
evidentiary reality that at the time her birth
certificate was amended, NO BASIS existed to
86
recognize the respondent as a natural-born
Philippine citizen. Other government documents
only relied on the respondent’ s birth certificates
for information on her citizenship and, hence,
cannot have any higher probative value than these
birth certificates.
Citizendhip under the 1935 Constitution, as a
foundling, the respondent’ s parentage is unknown.
This is an undisputed point. And because the
identities of the respondent’ s parents are unknown,
their citizenship cannot as well be determined.
Thus, the respondent could not have acquired
Philippine citizenship through paragraph (3) of
Section 1 which requires that the respondent’ s
birth father be a Philippine citizen so she herself
can be a Philippine citizen. Neither could the
respondent have acquired her Philippine citizenship
through her mother under paragraph (4) since her
birth mother’ s identity is also unknown.
122- E. Assoc. Justice Del Castillo- Dissenting Opinion
Genevieve Tersol
122-F. Poe-Llamanzares vs COMELEC
GR. No. 221697, GR. Nos. 221698-700
Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe Dissenting
Opinion
Justice Bernabe claimed that there was no grave
abuse of discretion in the COMELEC’s ruling that
petitioner (Grace Poe) had made a false material
representation in her 2015 Certificate of Candidacy
( CoC) when she declared that she was a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines.
Natural-born citizens, as defined in the
Constitution, are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire of perfect their citizenship.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis. Here, the child follows
the nationality or the citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth. Blood
relation to a Filipino parent is therefore necessary
to show that one is a Filipino citizen by birth under
this principle.
In the case at bar, there was no evidence
whatsoever that would show blood relation to a
Filipino parent. While the petitioner initially did
not bear the burden of proving that she made false
material representation on her 2015 CoC, that
burden shifted to her when she admitted her status
as a foundling.
Without any proof of blood relation to a Filipino
parent, and without any mention in the constitution
that foundlings are considered or are presumed to
be Filipino citizens by birth, the COMELEC’s
ruling that a petitioner was not a natural-born
citizen cannot be taken as patently unreasonable
and grossly baseless so as to amount to grave abuse
of discretion.
122- G. Assoc. Justice Leonen- Separate Concurring Te
Opinion
87
Joselito Toledo
122- H. POE VS COMELEC
Justice Jardeleza Concurring Opinion
FACTS:
The Philippine Constitution requires that a person
aspiring for Presidency must be a natural-born
Filipino, citizen of the Philippines for at least Ten
Years immediately preceding the election. The
question is whether the petitioner as a foundling
and former resident of the United States satisfies
these requirements. First consideration is the issue
if the jurisdiction raised by the parties. A petitioner not have established domicile in the Philippines
Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares contends that in the prior to a waiver of his non-resident status.
absence of any material misrepresentation in her However the amendments introducing the
certificate of Candidacy, the public respondent, reintegration provisions, a balikbayan is no longer
COMELEC had no jurisdiction to rule on her precluded from developing intent to stay
respondent eligibility. She posits that the permanently in the Philippines. Therefore Poe, who
COMELEC can only rule on whether she intended entered the Philippines after the effectivity of RA
to deceive the electorate when she indicated that 9174 had the ability to establish a lawful domicile
she a natural-born and that she has been a resident in the Philippines even prior to her reacquisition of
for 10 years and 11 months. For the petitioner, Filipino Citizen.
absent such intent, all other attacks on her
citizenship and residency are premature since her
qualifications can only be challenged through the
post-election remedy of a petition for quo-warranto.
On the other hand, COMELEC argues that since
citizenship and residency are material
representations in the COC affecting the
qualifications for the office of the President, it 122- I. Assoc. Justice Caguioa- Concurring Opinion
necessarily had to Constitution rule on whether
Poe’s statements were true.
ISSUE:
Whether or not balikbayan may establish domicile
in the Philippines even prior to reacquisition of his
citizenship.
HELD:
As for Justice Jardeleza’s concurring opinion, is
beyond question that issues affecting the
citizenship and residence of Poe are within the
purview of Section 78 which the issue of
Citizenship by RA 9174 to RA 6768 differentiate
the present case from Coquil which was decided
prior to the enactment of RA 9174. The Court
concluded that a Visa-Free balikbayan visitor could