TACTICALFACTORSIN THE SPANISH CONQUEST

OF THE AZTECS
DOUGLASA. DANIEL
WesternWashingtonUniversity

A perspectivelargely unexaminedin past workson the Spanish Conquestof Mexico has

been the details of the tactical systems of the respectivesides, and how these systems
workedon the battlefieldto producethe Spanish victory.This article examinesthe Con-
quest in termsof tactics,applyinga military-historicalperspectiveto ethnohistoricaltexts
and data gleanedfrom modernworks.It is shownthat Spanishinfantrytactics and horse
cavalrywerecriticalfactors in the Spanishvictory.[Aztecs, ethnohistory,Mexico,Spanish
Conquest,war]

Introduction the Spanishvictoryin the Conquestcan be found

in the tacticsof the two sides.In this interpretation
Most interpretationsof the Spanish Conquestof the Spanish were able to win on the battlefield
the Aztecs attributethe Spanishvictoryto psycho- largely becauseof two facts: 1) the way in which
social factors-the Aztecs had a differentconcep- the Spanish used their infantryformations(close
tion of warfare, or they were paralyzedby the orderformationwith tightlydrilledbodiesof men)
Quetzalcoatl myth--or to technological factors, gave thema decisiveadvantageoverAztec infantry
such as the supposedsuperiorityof firearmsand formations,and 2) Spanishcavalrywas capableof
steel swords, or to combinationsof the two. As disruptingand routinglargebodiesof Aztec troops,
Soustelleput it, at least on the open battlefield.The analysisem-
phasizesthe essentialvalue of disciplineand inte-
TheSpaniards andthe Mexicans werenotreallyfighting gration of effort in combat among the Spanish
thesamekindof war.Onthematerialplane,theyfought forces.
withdifferentweapons:on thesocialandmoral,theyhad
totallydifferentconceptsof war(1970:215).
Synopsis of the ConquestEvents
Davies (1973: 251) cites, amongother factors,the
Aztec conceptionof war as "half a process gov- The expeditionof Cortes arrivedat San Juan de
ernedby ritualand magic"as a reasonfor the Az- Ulua, near present-dayVeracruz,in April 1519,
tec's defeat. Anotherpurportedreasonfor Spanish after skirtingthe coast of Yucatan.The expedition
battlesuperiorityhas beenthe supposedAztec "ob- consistedof 508 soldiers, 100 sailors,and sixteen
session"with takinglive prisonersfor latersacrifice horses(Diaz 1956: 42). At San Juan de Ulua the
(Davies 1973: 251; Soustelle 1970: 210), which Spanishmade contactwith both representatives of
handicappedthe Aztec soldierbefore the Spanish Moctezumaand the local Totonacpeople. Cortes
conquistador,who had no such compunction. induced the Totonacsto ally themselvesto him,
An issue unexaminedin detail in most Con- thus establishinga securebase on the coast. Leav-
quest literatureis that of the tacticalconceptsand ing a portionof his force as a colony,Cortesleft
practicesof both the Aztecs and the Spanish.This for Mexicoon August 16, 1519.
article examinesthe SpanishConquestin termsof On August 20th the Spanishcrossedthe fron-
its tactical background,applyinga military-histori- tier of Tlaxcala,a realmindependentof the Aztecs.
cal perspectiveto ethnohistoricalsources. These Cortesintendedto makethem allies, as he had the
sources,includingBernalDiaz' The discoveryand Totonacs.The Tlaxcalans,however,were initially
conquestof Mexico (1956) and de Sahagun'sGen- hostile,and a seriesof pitchedbattleswere fought
eral history of the things of New Spain (1975, before they made peace and enteredinto an alli-
1979), are largelyfromthe colonialperiodand the ance with the Spanish.
Spanishpoint of view, but are reasonablywell-at- Having establisheda forwardbase in Tlax-
tested and trustworthy.In addition,informationis cala, the SpanishcontinuedtowardMexico,accom-
also drawn from modernstudies, especiallyHas- panied by several thousandTlaxcalantroops. In
sig's Aztec warfare(1988). Significantreasonsfor Cholulathe Spanishmassacreda largeforcewhich
187

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188 ANTHROPOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
they supposedwas aboutto ambushthem. Moving
on, the Spanisharrivedin Tenochtitlanon Novem-
ber 8. Duringthis marchthe Spanishmanagedto
avoid direct conflictwith the Aztecs, playing (by
accident or design) on the uncertainty of
Moctezuma. Moctezuma's policy was, in fact,
markedby vacillationand confusion,despite the
fact, as evidencedby later opposition,that manyof
Moctezuma'scommandersurgedimmediateaction
against the Spanish (Davies 1973: 242-243; Diaz
1956: 240).'
Very soon after their arrivalin Tenochtitlan
the Spanish staged a coup d'etat, seizing
Moctezumaand punishingAztec commanderswho
had opposedthem. However,subsequentSpanish
actions further antagonizedthe nobility and the
priests,and the Spanishpositionremainedprecari-
ous. At this momenta secondSpanishexpedition,
sent by the Governorof Cuba,an enemyof Cortes,
arrivedon the coast. Cortes took the majorityof
his troopsto the coast to deal with this expedition,
leaving a small garrisonin Mexico. The garrison
commander,Pedrode Alvarado,massacredthe cel-
ebrantsof a religiousfestival,sparkinga rebellion.
Cortes returnedto Mexico and rejoinedthe be-
siegedSpanish.After some days of indecisivecom-
bat the Spanishdecidedto withdraw.In the retreat
the Spanish sufferedheavy casualties, losing the
major portion of their force. However,they de-
featedthe Aztecs in open battleat Otumbaon July
14, 1520, and escapedto Tlaxcala.
Having receivedreinforcementsand supplies,
the Spanishagain advancedon Mexico. Receiving
the allegianceof a breakawayfactionof the city of
Texcoco,the Spanishsubjugatedthe cities border-
ing the lakes of the Valley of Mexicoand besieged
the Aztecs in Tenochtitlan.After a 90-day siege
the city fell on August 13, 1521.
Tactical Organizationof the Spanish
The immediatequestionis how the two sidesin this
conflictused their forces and how that use led to
victoryfor the Spanishand defeat for the Aztecs.
Spanish tactics of this period were an out-
growthof theirexperiencesin boththe Reconquista
and the Italian campaigns,and the whole trendof
the late MiddleAges in reassertingthe superiority
of infantryformationsovercavalry.By the late fif-
teenthcenturythe heavyknighthad beendisplaced
on the Europeanbattlefieldby the commonfoot-
soldier.The pike was the preeminentweapon,sup-
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ported by swordsmen,muskets,and artillery.An
importantresult of these developmentswas the
reintroductionof precisionmovementof units to
the Europeanbattlefield.
For the Spanish,the provinggroundfor their
new tacticswas Italy, wherethey foughta seriesof
protractedwars with the Frenchat the turn of the
sixteenthcentury.The essentialevolutionof Span-
ish tactics in this theater was the developmentof
the general Gonzalo Fernandezde Cordoba,who
integratedthe elementsof Europeanarms into a
functional,mutually-dependent system.
Thesecretof DonGonzalo's successwashisevolution of
newinfantrytacticsandhis organization of the infantry
into manageable, units:pikemento resist
self-sufficient
the initialcavalrychargeof a battle;arquebusiers to
guardthe flanksandenfiladetheattackers; andinfantry
armedwithjavelinsandtheRoman-Spanish shortsword,
and protectedby roundshields,to movethroughthe
pikemento the attack.TheGreatCaptaindiedin 1515,
buthis tacticsandhis principleof theindependent,self-
infantryunitsurvived
sufficient (Hills1970:53).
This tactical system revolvedaround a unit
knownas a tercio,roughlycorresponding to a regi-
ment in modernparlance(Hills 1970: 53). When
standardizedin 1534 the tercioconsistedof twelve
companiesof 250 men each, six of pike, four of
swordsmen,and two of arquebusiers(p. 53). "In
column of route they marched;pikemen-swords-
men-pikemen,with the arquebusiersguardingthe
flanksand the vanguard"(pp. 53-54).
The key to this system was mutual support
among the different companies. If one unit/
weapon-typefailed, all might be lost. To insure
against this, a well-drilledand disciplinedorder
had to be maintained(Ropp 1959: 16; Jones 1987:
190-191).Individualunits wererelentlesslytrained
to work together.This disciplineenableda com-
manderto move and use his units efficiently,as
well as keepthem togetherin the face of an enemy
attack.
The formal organizationof the tercio, how-
ever, was not set until after Conquest.In the first
years of the sixteenthcenturythe organizationof
Spanisharmieswas flexible.
There[was]nosuchthingas a typical16thCenturybat-
tle formation.Each battle was a separatetactical prob-
lem. It was a game in which not only the numbersbut
the values of the pieces variedwith each situation(Ropp
1959: 19).
The variabilityof unit and unit size was adaptive
 TACTICALFACTORS
in the sense that a commandercouldadjustthe or-
ganization of his commandto the needs of the
moment.
This flexibilityservedthe Spanishwell in the
Conquest.The Spanishorganizedand reorganized
their force accordingto their needs-at Tabasco,
against the expeditionof Narvaez, in the flight
from Mexico, and elsewhere (Diaz 1956: 47-50,
285-286, 313). Gomara(1965: 239) indicatesthat
in Tlaxcala Cortes organizedhis troopsinto nine
companiesof sixty men each beforebeginningtheir
return to Mexico. Diaz (1956: 395-396) records
that duringthe siege of Tenochtitlanthe force was
reformedinto nine companiesof about fifty men
each, groupedin turn into three "divisions,"each
of three companies.This handlingof troopswas in
keepingwith Spanishpracticeof the period.
On the otherhand,the role of Spanishcavalry
in the Conquestvaried from contemporaryEuro-
pean usage. As noted above, the ascendancyof
heavycavalryin Europehad endedin the late Mid-
dle Ages with the re-inventionof effectiveinfantry
formations.In fact, cavalryhad faded to a largely
supporting role (Ropp 1959: 17). Nicolo
Machiavelli,in his Art of war, publishedin 1521,
gives an ideal for the makeupof an army of the
period.Cavalrytotalledno morethan 300 in a reg-
imentof 6000 (Machiavelli1965:61, 82), and had
moreto do with the pursuitof a routedenemythan
involvementin the main battle.
In Mexico the absenceof infantryunits orga-
nizationallyand technologicallycapable of stand-
ing againstcavalryallowedmountedtroopsa brief
renaissance.The comparativelysmall force of cav-
alry availableto Corteswas a key ingredientin the
Spanishforce, which often achievedstartlingsuc-
cess against native forces. At Cintla in Tabasco,
early in the expedition,thirteenhorsemenrouteda
huge enemy force engagedwith the infantry(Diaz
1956: 58-59). At Otumba the woundedand ex-
haustedcavalryrepeatedlybrokethroughthe over-
whelmingnumbersof Aztecs troopsuntil they re-
treated(pp. 319-320). Duringthe campaignCortes
continuallyreorganizedhis cavalry,as he did his
infantry, to meet the needs of the moment. At
Otumbahe dividedhis cavalryinto squadsof five
(Diaz 1956: 319); while preparingto return to
MexicofromTlaxcalahe organizedhis cavalryinto
four "squadrons"of ten horses each (Gomara
1965: 239). Cavalrywas the "armof decision"in
the Conquest.2
The variousindigenousallies of the Spanish,
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189
particularlythose of Tlaxcalaand Texcoco(in the
last phases of the campaign), roundedout the
Spanish force. These troopswere essentialto the
Spanisheffort in that they helpedredressthe im-
balance in numbersbetweenthe Spanishand the
Aztecs. Evenso, in manybattlesthe Aztecs greatly
outnumberedthe Spanish and their allies (Diaz
1956: 318-320). However,withoutthe extra num-
bers affordedby indigenoustroops,the Spanishin
severalactions in the early campaignsin Tabasco
and Tlaxcala seem to have been more easily en-
veloped, restrictingtheir mobilityand sometimes
putting them in precariouspositions (pp. 58-59,
126-127).
These three parts of the Spanish
force-infantry, cavalry,and allies---canbe said to
form a whole tactical entity, performingdifferent
tasks and supportingone another.The integration
between strictly Spanish units and their allies
would necessarilyhave been more tenuous than
that betweeninfantryand cavalry,since the inter-
nal orderand disciplineof each was maintainedin
differentways. But the operational"fit" was, by
the evidenceof the ethnohistories,
sufficientfor the
coordinationof action.
Tactical Organizationof the Aztecs
The tactical formationscustomarilyused by the
Aztecs were basedon a differentmeansof recruit-
ment than that of the Spanish.The Spanishwere
all volunteers,"gentleman-adventurers," who had
signedon for a sharein the Conquest.The Aztecs,
on the otherhand,employedwhat wouldbe called
a "levy,"essentiallyconscription.Everyable-bod-
ied man was liable for militaryservice.Education
for youngmenof commonerstatuswas largelythat
of the soldier (Soustelle 1970: 42). Each calpulli
(ward)had at least one telpochcalli,staffedby ex-
periencedwarriorswho served as instructors(p.
169). In this way the Aztecs possesseda highly
centralizedand universalsystemof conscriptionto
fill their manpowerneeds.
The militaryforcesof the Aztecsand theiral-
lies wereorganizedinto a seriesof units.All troops
in Tenochtitlanwere levied on the basis of their
membershipin their calpulli and fought as a
calpulli unit (Hassig 1988:56-57). In turn,the va-
riouscalpulli unitsweregroupedinto four"corps,"
corresponding to the fourquartersof the city, each
of which was commandedby one of the four
councilorsof the emperor (Soustelle 1970: 44).
190 ANTHROPOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
Troopsfrom other cities would fight in their own
units.
Eachtownmarchedunderits ownbannerwithits own
leader,andif it waslargeenoughto havemorethanone
calpolli,it wouldhaveone over-allleader,or tlahtoani,
and subordinate leadersfor eachof the severalcalpolli
units.Thesecalpolliunitswereoftendispersedamong
andincorporated intothelargerarmiesof a majorcam-
paign,but theyapparently werenotdivided.Theywere
thebasiccommand, andtacticalunits,andvio-
logistical,
latingtheirintegritywouldhavecausedtoomanysupply
andcontrolproblems (Hassig1988:55-56).
In other words,tributarytroopswere not used in
piecemealreplacementsfor Aztec units.
The mass of troops in the Aztec units were
commoners.Davies (1988: 163-164) suggests that
the highest positionswere generally reservedfor
the nobility. However,lower "officer"ranks were
typicallyheld by commonerspromotedfor merit.
The calpulli forces were organizedinto units
of 400 men, sub-dividedinto "squads,"although
the exact size of these sub-unitsis unclear(Hassig
1988: 56). The "companies"of 400 were, in turn,
organized into "divisions"of 8000, called xi-
quipeles (Diaz 1956: 440; Hassig 1988: 56), al-
thoughHassig suggeststhat this divisionwas more
an ideal than a unit regularly used, and often
towns and wards contributedless than a full xi-
quipelli to the levy.
In additionto these troops,the Aztecs had va-
rious elite units at their command.Groupedinto
soldier fraternitiessuch as the Eagle and Jaguar
Knights,these troopsfought as separatecorpsand
suppliedleadersto the regularunits (Davis 1973:
190;Hassig 1988:45). These elite soldierssupplied
the Aztec forceswith the skill and daringto be em-
ulated by the levies (Sahagun 1975: 91-93) and
also acted as shock troops(Hassig 1988: 100).
How Aztec units were orderedfor battle is
largelya matterof conjecture.Sahagun(1979: 52)
does recordthat the Aztecs were carefulin order-
ing their "ranks"for battle, and stiff punishment
was handedout to those who brokeor confusedthe
lines. However,this orderingappearsto have little
resembledthe Europeansystemof close-orderdrill.
The typical employmentof these units on the bat-
tlefieldis clear. When battle was joined,there was
an initial release of missile weapons,followedby
combat between macquauitl-armedtroops (Sous-
telle 1970: 210; Hassig 1988: 98-99). Davies sug-
gests that Aztec tactics were little more than vari-
ous kinds of ambush, but Hassig indicates that
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they also used flankattacksand encirclement(Da-
vies 1973: 188;Hassig 1988:101). Hassigalso sug-
gests that the Aztecs employeda comparatively
open battle formation,in order to give individual
soldiers room to employ their macquauitl with
maximumefficiency.
Thisopenformation is typicallyemployedwhenfighting
infantryof a similarnatureto one'sown,whereasa more
denselypackedclosedformation is employed
whenwith-
standinga cavalrycharge.Sincetherewerenohorses[in
pre-Hispanic battles],thewayAztecsweapons wereused
fosteredan openformation (Hassig1988:102).
Hassig proposesthat the wide spacings (approxi-
mately six feet) betweensoldiersin these forma-
tions were perhapsfilledby spearmen(p. 102). An
Aztec armyengagingan enemyprobablyextended
into a line
onlydeepenoughto preventthe breakthrough of enemy
elements.Oncethearmyhadclosedwiththe enemyand
formeda broadfront,skirmishing occurredby unitsas
wholes,butgiventhe weaponsemployed, actualcombat
was inevitablyan individualaffair.If the unit'sfront
broke,a routwaslikely(p. 101).
Hassig also pointsout that the Aztecs usuallyat-
temptedto surrounda foe and attack from all di-
rectionsat once.
Discussion
It seems apparentfrom the ethnohistoricalrecords
that the use of open formationsby Aztec units,
along with their inability to cope tactically with
Spanish cavalry, were the two critical battlefield
factorsof Aztec tacticalpracticewhichcontributed
to the Spanishvictory.In essence the Spanishin-
fantry,with theirclose-orderformationsand sword
and shield-armedtroops,were able to survivethe
initialcontactand penetrateAztec units,or at least
to standtheirground.Meanwhile,the Spanishcav-
alry was typically engaged in breaking up the
Aztecs' formationsand causing them to retreat.
This superiorcombat system was the reason the
Spanishwere able to win in tactical terms.
These two factorscan be seen in most of the
battles of the Conquest.The battle of Otumbaon
July 14, 1520, is one example.Havingjust escaped
from Mexico,the Spanish,alongwith survivingal-
lies, were met near the village of Otumba by a
large Mexicanforce. Cortes,in a letter to Charles
V, indicates that the Spanish were disposed in
"squadrons,"deployed in a square, during their
 TACTICALFACTORS 191

retreat: tion in the middle of the enemy throughoutthe

battle and were hard-pressed(p. 319). As noted
I concentratedmypeoplethere,andfromthosewhowere above, Sahagun (1975: 79) seems to indicatethat
still capableof actionmadesquadrons, placingthemin the Spanishclosedranksbeforecontactwas made,
frontandbehindandon the sideswiththe woundedin
themiddle;andI distributed thehorsemen likewise(Cor- whichagreeswith Diaz' statement(1956:319) that
tes 1971:140). the Spanish paused to receive instructionsand
orders.
A passage in Sahagunseems to indicate that the From this evidencethe battle can be said to
cavalry flankedthe main formation,with the re- have had four phases. First, the Spanishand the
mainingbaggageand non-combatants in the center Aztecs movedinto contact.Second,the Aztec for-
(Sahagun 1975: 77). It is probablethat the Span- mations were engaged and "fixed,"or forced to
ish "closed ranks"at the approachof the Aztec
presentvulnerableflanksand rear,by the Spanish
forces (p. 79).
infantryand allies. Third,the Spanishcavalryre-
Diaz describesthe battle vividly, mentioning
peatedly charged through the Aztec formations,
that whenthe Aztecs triedto surroundthe Spanish
disruptingtheir ranks. Fourth, the Aztecs broke
forces, the Spanishcavalry "keepingin partiesof and were pursuedby the Spanishand their allies.
five, broke through [Aztec] ranks. . ." (Diaz 1956: Accordingto Diaz, the infantrykept movingfor-
319). The Spanish infantry"movedall mixed up ward,engagingthe Aztecs at close quarters,while
with them foot to foot" (p. 319). Meanwhile,the the cavalrychargedagain and again, particularly
cavalry"spearedthem as they chose,chargingand targetingAztec leaders(1956: 319-320).3
returning.. ." (p. 319). Duringthe fightingCortes
This patternof infantryformationscoordinat-
gave instructionsto the infantryto direct their at-
tacks against the Aztec leaders.Finally,their for- ing their actions with the enemy-unit-"busting"
mationsbrokenand their chief commandersdead, cavalry was repeated,with variations,in most of
the Aztecs fled, with the Spanishcavalryand in- the battles of the Conquest.In the brief war with
Tlaxcala the Spanish appear to have been very
fantryin pursuit(p. 320).
hard pressed times, the pointthat the infantry
at to
Sahagun's informantsrecordedtheir view of
the battle as follows: could not move becauseof the mass of Tlaxcalan
troopsall aroundthem,and they had to rely on the
Alsoat thisverytimethe Mexicanscamearrivingthat cavalryto breakthe enemy(Diaz 1956: 130-131).
they mightintercept[theSpanish].. . . Andwhenthe At the battle of Cintlain Tabasco,the cavalryand
Spaniards lookedtowardthem,theyawaitedtheirfoes;
infantrycaught the Tabascanforces in what was
thereforethey checkedthemselves so that they might
contendagainstthem.Theyindeedpondered howthey essentiallya pincermovement(p. 76). In the fight-
wouldbe able to succeedagainstthem.Andwhenthis ing that attended the siege of Tenochtitlan,the
happened,[the Mexicans]fell uponthem,they threw Spanishand their allies spent much time and en-
themselves uponthemso thatall speedilywouldbe en- ergy levelinghousesand filling gaps in the cause-
closedwithinthem.Thentherewas repeatedspearing, to gain accessto the city and give the cavalry
strikingdownof the men.ThereindeeddiedMexicans ways
[and]Tlatilulcans. . . . Therewereonlya few whoes- room to maneuver(Diaz 1956:417, 422-423).
capedtheirhands,whodid not die. Andthosewhore- Duringthe campaignthe integrationof the in-
mainedat a distance. . . did not die. And whenthe allies of the Spanish with the Spanish
Spaniards hadslainthem,whentheirire abated,there- digenous
upontheywent.All whoboreburdensupontheirbacks units appearsto have been sometimesproblematic.
wentto be the last (Sahagun1975:79-80). As noted above, the Tlaxcalansand other allies
helpedredressthe numericaloddsfacingthe Span-
Several points in these narrativesare worth ish. A majoraspectof this functionmay have been
noting. First is the suggestionin Sahagun (p. 79) to absorbthe bulkof attritionallosses.The Spanish
that the Aztecs were of such numbersthat they employedtheir allies in a numberof positionsand
completelysurroundedthe Spanish.Also notableis roles, both as advanceand rear guard(Diaz 1956:
the way in which the Spanish used their cav- 353, 396), as guidesand baggage-carriers (pp. 317,
alry-in "parties of five"-to disrupt the Aztec 347), and laborers(pp. 337, 340), as well as com-
ranks(Diaz 1956:319). In addition,Diaz seemsto batants. However,Diaz (pp. 396, 400, 424, 431)
indicate a close coordinationbetweenthe cavalry also indicatesthat the allies sometimesobstructed
and the infantry.Finally, it seems clear that the operations,particularlyduringthe siege of Tenoch-
Spanishinfantryat Otumbawere in close forma- titlan, and special precautionshad to be taken to

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192 ANTHROPOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
avoid this. The difficultyappearsto have been the
sheernumbersof the allies and a tendencyon their
part to jam narrowor restrictedspaces (pp. 400,
431)'.
Concernfor the integrityof their formationsis
voiced by the Spanish in their narrativesof the
Conquest,particularlyby Diaz.
Whenwe reachedthe levelgroundwithour horsemen Triste this particularlyappearsto have been the
andartillery. . . we did not darebreakourformation, case. The
for anysoldierwholeft the ranksto followsomeof the
Indiancaptainsandswordsmen wasat oncewounded
and
rangreatdanger.. . . Wedarednotto chargethem...
lest theyshouldbreakup ourformation....
... [T]heycame on so fearlesslythat they sur-
roundedus on twosides,andhadevenhalfdefeatedus
andcut us off,whenit pleasedourLordJesusChristto
giveus strengthto turnandcloseourranks. . andad-
vancingshoulderto shoulder,we drovethemoff (Diaz
1956:126,423-424).
The Aztecs, for their part, although disci-
plinedand orderedin their own units, had neither
the effectiveclose-orderformationsof the Spanish
nor any consistentmethodof preventingthe Span-
ish cavalryfrom operatingat will, at least on the
open battlefield.This was less true in roughterrain
or within cities, wherehorseswere less useful and
more vulnerable.Hassig (1988: 241) points out
that the Aztecs developeda numberof defensive
ploys, such as pits, which they used against the
Spanish cavalry. But these were often of limited
utility: "Most of the innovative tactics were
static. . . . [T]he Spaniards had to be drawn into
an appropriatepositionor maneuver"(p. 241). The
Aztecs never evolved tactics to enable them to
stand up to the Spanishcavalryin open battle.'
Becauseof this failurecavalrymust be consid-
ered the "armof decision"in the Conquest.How-
ever, because of their small numbersduring the
campaigns,and the varied terrain in which the
fightingtook place, cavalryalone would not have
been sufficientto defeat the Aztecs. Spanishinfan-
try and allies, by their ability to engage Aztec
forcesat close quarters,to pin their units downfor
the cavalryto chargeand disrupt,and to operatein
areaswherecavalrywere ineffective,were essential
ingredientsin Spanishforce.
While engaging the Tlaxcalans,the Spanish
found them to be brave but poorlyled and badly
deployed (Diaz 1956: 131). Cortes (1971: 142)
made much the same observationaboutthe Aztecs
in one battle in one of his letters to Charles V:
"[T]heywereso manythat they got in each other's
way, and couldneitherfight nor run."The greatest
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Aztec successesagainstthe Spanishappearto have
been duringengagementswithinconstrictedareas,
such as the fightingwhich precededthe Spanish
flightfromTenochtitlanand the retreatitself along
the causewayon Noche Triste.Limitedspaceobvi-
ously preventedthe Spanish from deploying in
their customaryformationsand kept the cavalry
from operating with impunity. During Noche
Spanishquite literallyhad run for their
lives:
whatcouldwe do beyondwhatwe accomplished? which
wasto chargeandgivesomesword-thrusts to thosewho
triedto lay handson us, andto marchandget on ahead
so as to get off the causeway(Diaz1956:315).
But it was on the openbattlefieldthat the fate
of the Aztec nationwas decided,both at Otumba,
wherethe Spanishsurvivedthe Aztec'sgreatestat-
tempt to crush them, and later in the battles that
sealed off Tenochtitlanand allowedthe Spanishto
lay siege to the capitaland strangleit into submis-
sion. The Conquestcan be viewedas a classiccase
of a warwon throughsuperiortactics.The Spanish
infantryformationwas a moreeffectiveway of em-
ploying foot-soldiersthan the Aztec system, and
theircavalrywas a tacticalchallengelargelyunan-
swered. While the Aztecs and the Spanish were
fightingthe same kind of war, a fundamentaldif-
ference between them was the mannerin which
they organizedand used their respectiveforces,
and that differencewas critical.
Conclusion
At the beginningof this article it was noted that
most interpretationsof the SpanishConquesthave
attributed the Spanish victory to conceptualor
technologicalfactors.A difficultywith these inter-
pretationsmay be that they tend to obviateexami-
nationof importantfunctionalreasons-actions on
the battlefield-and producethe false impression
that the SpanishConquestwas inevitableand could
not havebeenstoppedby the Aztecs. In this article
a tactical/militaryhistoricalperspectivehas been
appliedto ethnohistoricalrecordsof the Conquest
in an attemptto understandthese "on-the-ground"
factors. The applicationof such a perspectiveto
ethnohistoricalworks has potentiallygreat utility
in explicatingactionsand eventswhichmay other-
wise be obscureand difficult.
Battleis a specialsortof sociopoliticalinterac-
 TACTICALFACTORS 193

tion. Warfareis not randomviolencebut a calcu- on the Aztecs, and politicalcontroland strategy,
lated political act employingdefinabletechniques. must be includedin an explanation.As an example
Successin battle is mediatedthroughthe tactical/ of the last, Hassighas outlinedanothercriticalrea-
organizationalconceptsand usages of either side. son for the Spanishvictory-their abilityon a stra-
Whenthe combatantscome fromtwo widelydiffer- tegic level to take "advantageof existingcleavages
ent cultures,the need for a close examinationof withinthe [Aztec] systemto split the empire,turn
those conceptsand usages is acute. Moreover,any its memberson the Aztecs, and rend it asunder"
war is won or lost because of a complexof rea-
(1988: 267). Such a perspectivecomplementsthe
sons-psychological, organizational,and technical.
Therefore,the inclusionof detailed discussionof analysis here. Strategy and tactics are linked but
tactical organizationand practice is a necessary functionallydistinct aspects of any militarycam-
Forvictorycombatantsmust havesuccessin
complimentto otherexplanationsof the Conquest.5 paign.
A more thorough-goingexaminationof the both spheres.The Spanishhad to stripthe Aztecs
ethnohistokicalrecords would reveal more about of their subjectgroups,but withouttacticalsuccess
the tactics of the Conquest.In addition,many per- their diplomatic victories would have been
tinentissues,such as logistics,the effectsof disease meaningless.

NOTES
AcknowledgmentsThis article is based on graduate research
and a paper presentedat the 1988 NorthwestAnthropological
Conferencein Spokane WA. I would like to thank Dr. Rick
Wilk for his initial inspirationand encouragementin early re-
search and paperson this topic. I also would like to acknowl-
edge the help and encouragementof the late Dr. HerbertTay-
lor, whosecommentsand suggestionson subsequentdraftswere
invaluable.
1The attitude of the Aztecs toward the Spanish, as re-
corded in the ethnohistorictexts, particularlySahagun,is one
of initial confusionand fear, then growingfamiliarity,closely
followedby opposition.In Sahagun the Spanishare presented
as greedyand perfidious,for example,attackingwithoutwarn-
ing the participantsin the Feast of Uitzilopochtli,whereupon
the Aztecs are- depicted as rising in righteous indignation
against them (Sahagun 1975: 55-57). The Sahagun narrative
of the Conquestends with the Spanish trying to extort more
gold fromthe survivingAztec leadership(p. 126). Terrorof the
Spanish seems to have faded very quickly for the Aztecs and
seems to have played little or no role in subsequentbattles.
'Much has been made by some (for example, Prescott
1964: 152, 237, 306) of the terrorthe appearanceof the horse,
an animal unknownin Pre-ColumbianMexico, engenderedin
the Aztecs. This belief has some basis in fact. Diaz (1956: 59)
records that the Tabascans "thought that the horse and its
riderwas all one animal, for they had neverseen horsesup to
this time" and that the Tlaxcalansafter their first battles with
the Spanishwere afraidof their animals (p. 131). However,it
is apparentthat this feeling did not last long after they discov-
ered that horseswere mortalcreaturesthat could die and were
vulnerable in certain types of terrain. Certainly by Noche
Triste the Aztecs were capableof killinglarge numbersof hor-
ses (and their riders)given the right set of circumstances.The
utility and success of horse cavalryfor the Spanishlay not in
psychological or supernatural terror, but in their heavy
"shock"-value,or ability to breakand disruptenemy units, on
the open battlefield.
8BrianFagan (1984: 274) believes that the targeting of
the Aztec leaders by the Spanishwas the fundamentalreason
for the Spanish victory at Otumba, in that the death of the
leaderscaused the commonsoldiersto lose heart. This is true
only in the sense, as Hassig (1988: 96) points out, that the
leaderswere standardbearerson whomtheir men guidedtheir
formations,and that, with their loss, the unit wouldbe in dan-
ger of losing its directionand cohesion.Such a dangerwould
obviously be mitigated by the assumptionof command by
subordinateleaders. More importantwas the ability of the
Spanish to maintainthe integrityof their formationsand to
disrupt the Aztec units while killing large numbersof enemy
troops.
'This inability was not for lack of understandingof the
tactical necessities,but stemmed from the fact that for the
Aztecs to change the organizationof their armieswould have
entailed
considerabletime, since it would involveretrainingpro-
fessional warriors.Closed formationswere not adopted,
apparently because while they may have cured the
problemsof a massed cavalry attack, they would also
have created a better target for Spanish gunners....
Instead,the responseswere largelytechnological(Hassig
1988: 238).
However,it is apparentfrom the recordsthat, either through
circumstancesor inspiredleadership,the Aztecs on occasion
were able to stop the Spanish cavalry charge. For example,
Diaz (1956: 379-380) writesthat at Xochimilcoa combination
of massedAztec troopsarmedwith improvisedpikes standing
on restrictedground(at a bridgeand perhapswith their backs
to the lake), managedto halt the cavalryattack and actually
drag Cortesfrom his horse.In this case Cortesand the cavalry
were rescuedby Spanishinfantryand Indianallies. However,
Hassig's point holds true-the Aztecs on the whole failed to
respondwith appropriateorganizationaladaptationsto cope
with cavalry(1988: 238).
At the same time the final stratagemwhich defeated the
Aztecs was the siege, ratherthan open battle. The siege as a
military operationwas well known in Pre-ConquestMexico
(Hassig 1988: 108) and necessarilyinvolveddifferenttactics
than combaton the battlefield.However,the ninety-daysiege
whichendedin the fall of Tenochtitlanwouldhavebeen impos-
sible for the Spanishwithouttheir open-battlevictoriesand a
continuedcoordinationof all their arms in closing the circle
tight about Tenochtitlan.Once the siege began, the Spanish
adaptedtheir units and their movementsto an unrelentingad-
vance up the causewaysinto the city, supportedby a naval

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194 ANTHROPOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY

presenceon the lakes in the form of armed brigantines.This
new order of Spanish forces was merely a variationof their
usual tactical functions.
'It is beyondthe scope of this article to examinethe suffi-
ciency of these "orthodox"interpretations.However, certain
assumptionsabout the Aztecs and their way of war, and the
ways in which they respondedto the Spanish invasion, have
been criticizedor are susceptibleto criticism.For example,the
suppositionthat the Aztec conceptionof warfare was funda-
mentallydifferentfrom the Europeanis no longer defensible.
BarryIsaacs (1983a) has demonstratedfrom the ethnohistori-
cal record that Mexican warfare on the eve of the Spanish
Conquestwas similaror identicalto "state-levelwarfareelse-
where...," with the same heavy casualties, destructionof
propertyand lands,and politicalobjectives.The captureof en-
emy warriorsfor sacrifice,in Isaacs'view, fades to a secondary
pursuitof peasantsoldierseagerto advancein rank;the overall
aims and methodsof warfarewere set by the elite, who had a
differentagenda (1983a). Even the special case of the "Flow-
ery War" (xochiyaoyotl), which has usually been interpreted
as wholly religiousin motivationand content (Soustelle 1970:
101), in fact had very real strategic and attritionalpurposes
(Isaacs 1983b). Similarcriticismcan be leveledagainstthe as-
sumptionof the superiorityof Spanishweapons,or the effects
of the Quetzalcoatlmyth on the Aztecs (see, for example,Has-
sig 1988: 237-238, 242).

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