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AUGUSTO MANGAHAS v. HON. JUDGE PAREDES (G.R. No.

157866, February 14, 2007)

Facts:

Avelino Banaag filed an ejectment complaint before the MeTC Caloocan against Mangahas alleging that Mangahas constructed
houses on the property lot without his knowledge and consent and that even after several demands, they refused to vacate the
same.

Mangahas, on their answer, claimed that they have resided in the subject lot with knowledge and conformity of the true owner
Pinagkamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation (PIADECO), as evidenced by a Certificate of Occupancy signed in their favor.

Mangahas filed a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground that the subject property is part of the Tala
Estate and that RTC QC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the MeTC of QC and Caloocan prohibiting the eviction and
demolition of all occupants of the Tala Estate. They argued that the injunction issued by RTC QC is enforceable in Caloocan
because both cities are situated within the NCR.

MeTC Caloocan denied the Manifestation and held that the injunction issued by the RTC QC has binding effect only within the
territorial boundaries of the said court and since Caloocan City is not within the territorial area of the same, the injunction it issued
is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

MeTC Caloocan: ruled in favor of Banaag and held that the TCT in his name is an indefeasible proof of his ownership of the lot and
his inherent right to possess the same.

RTC: affirmed in toto the decision of MeTC.

CA: affirmed the ruling of RTC.

The decision of CA became final and executory on Dec. 13, 2002.

Dec. 11, 2000 – Banaag filed with RTC a motion for execution pending appeal. (GRANTED)

Sept. 27, 2001 – issued a Writ of Execution.

Mangahas filed a Motion to Suspend Execution. (DENIED)

Issue:

Whether the issuance of Writ of Execution is proper. - YES

Held:

SC DENIED the petition.

SC held that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is ministerial duty of the presiding judge to issue a writ of execution
except in certain cases, as when subsequent events would render execution of judgment unjust. Mangahas did not allege nor
proffer evidence that this case falls within the exception. Hence, there is no reason to vacate the writ of execution issued by the
RTC.

The issue involving the binding effect of the injunction issued by RTC of QC became the law of the case between the parties.
Under this legal principle, whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the parties in the
same case continues to be the law of the case, so long as the facts on which the decision was predicated continue. The doctrine
holds that once an appellate court has declared the law in a case that declaration continues to hold even in subsequent appeal.
The reason lies in the fact that public policy dictates that litigations must be terminated at some definite time and that the
prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.

Mangahas is therefore barred from assailing the ruling that the injunction issued by RTC of QC has no binding effect to the court of
Caloocan as this issue had already been passed upon with finality. Issues should be laid to rest at some point; otherwise, there
would be no end to litigation.
CAGAYAN DE ORO COLISEUM, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, MABANAG, JR. and KING (G.R. No. 129713, December
15, 1999)

Facts:

Cagayan De Oro Coliseum, Inc., a domestic corporation, obtained from Santiago Maceren a loan in the amount of P149,253.73
secured by a promissory note and mortgage over all the assets and properties, including a parcel of land situated in CDO
Poblacion.

The loan, together with the promissory note and mortgage, were later assigned by Maceren to the Commercial Credit Corporation
of Cagayan de Oro.

Coliseum failed to pay the loan when it became due, hence, Commercial Credit commenced foreclosure proceedings on the subject
parcel of land.

5 stockholders of Coliseum instituted before the CFI Misamis Oriental, a petition for injunction against Commercial Credit enjoining
the public sale of the corporate property and alleging that the loan was contracted by Diego Imperio, the President of the
Corporation, without the authority from the stockholders; and that the creditor, Santiago Maceren, was corporate treasurer and a
member of the Board of Directors of corporation at the time the loan was obtained.

Eventually, the parties entered into a compromise agreement which became the basis of a judgment rendered by CFI Misamis
Oriental, whereby the 5 stockholders ratified the loan of the corporation to Commercial Credit; the corporation bound itself to pay
the loan in equal monthly installments of P11,000 and in case of failure to pay any of the installments shall render the judgment
immediately executory.

Commercial Credit filed with now RTC Cagayan De Oro City, an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a Writ of Execution on the
ground of the failure of Coliseum to pay several installments on its loan. Branch Clerk of Court issued a Writ of Execution the
following day. The deputy sheriff filed a notice of levy on Coliseum’s title with the Register of Deeds of CDO.

Coliseum filed a MR of the Order of Execution alleging that the issuance of the order of execution ex parte violated their right to
due process; and that a hearing should have been conducted on the said motion. (DENIED)

Coliseum filed with the CA an action for annulment of judgment on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation discovered only in
1983. (DENIED)

Issue:

Whether the execution proceedings and the auction sale were null and void for failure to comply with the levy and notice
requirements of the Rules of Court. – YES.

Held:

SC GRANTED THE PETITION.

Execution under Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court is a remedy afforded by law for the enforcement of a judgment, its object
being to obtain satisfaction of the judgment on which the writ is issued. It issues by order of the court a quo, on motion of the
judgment oblige, upon finality of a judgment or order sought to be enforced, and is directed to an officer authorizing and requiring
him to execute the judgment of the court.

If the judgment is for money, the sheriff or other authorized officer must execute the same pursuant to the provisions of Section
15 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, viz:

Sec. 15. Execution of money judgments. - - The officer must enforce an execution of a money judgment by levying on all the
property, real and personal of every name and nature whatsoever, and which may be disposed of for value, of the judgment
debtor not exempt from execution, or on a sufficient amount of such property, if there be sufficient, and selling the same, and
paying to the judgment creditor, or his attorney, so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the judgment. Any excess in the proceeds
over the judgment and accruing costs must be delivered to the judgment debtor, unless otherwise directed by the judgment or
order of the court. When there is more property of the judgment and accruing costs, within the view of the officer, he must levy
only on such part of the property as is amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs.

Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal property, may
be levied on in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment.[48]

In executing a money judgment against the property of the judgment debtor, the sheriff shall levy on all property belonging to
the judgment debtor as is amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs, and sell the same paying to the judgment creditor so
much of the proceeds as will satisfy the amount of the judgment debt and costs. Any excess in the proceeds shall be delivered to
the judgment debtor unless otherwise directed by the judgment or order of the court. [49]
Levy means the essential act or acts by which an officer sets apart or appropriates a part or the whole of the property of the
judgment debtor for purposes of the prospective execution sale.[50] The object of a levy is to take property into the custody of the
law, and thereby renders it liable to the lien of the execution, and put it out of the power of the judgment debtor to divert it to any
other use or purpose.[51] A valid levy on execution places the property subject of execution under the jurisdiction and authority of
the court.[52] It also creates a lien in favor of the judgment creditor over the right, title and interest of the judgment debtor in such
property at the time of the levy, subject to liens and encumbrances then existing.[53]

The second paragraph of Section 15, Rule 39 as aforequoted provides that a levy is effected in the same manner as the levy
under a writ of attachment. Rule 57 on Attachment provides:

Sec. 7. Attachment of real and personal property; recording thereof. - - Properties shall be attached by the officer executing the
order in the following manner:

(a) Real property, or growing crops thereon, standing upon the records of the registrar of deeds of the province in the name of the
party against whom attachment is issued, or not appearing at all upon such records, by filing with the registrar of deeds a copy of
the order, together with a description of the property attached, and a notice that it is attached, and by leaving a copy of such
order, description, and notice with the occupant of the property, if any there be. Where the property has been brought under the
operation of the Land Registration Act, the notice shall contain a reference to the number of the certificate of title and the volume
and page in the registration book where the certificate is registered. The registrar must index attachments filed under this
paragraph in the names of both of the applicant and the adverse party.

To effect a levy upon a realty, the sheriff is required to do two specific things: (1) file with the register of deeds a copy of the
order of attachment or execution, together with the description of the attached property and notice of attachment or execution; and
(2) leave with the occupant of the property copy of the same order, description and notice.[55] These are prerequisites to a valid levy,
non-compliance with any of which is fatal.[56]

In the instant case, the execution sale of the subject property was made pursuant to the order of execution and writ of execution.
The execution order and the corresponding writ of execution were not filed with the Register of Deeds before the auction sale. The
order was filed and inscribed on petitioners title only exactly 1 year and 10 months after the execution sale.

Since the order was not filed with the Register of Deeds prior to the execution sale, it follows that the levy was not effected
and the execution sale of February 13, 1987 proceeded without a levy. A lawful levy on execution is indispensable to a valid sale on
execution. In other words, a sale, unless preceded by a valid levy, is void, and the purchaser acquires no title to the property
sold. Without a proper levy, the property is not placed under the authority of the court. The court does not acquire jurisdiction over
the property subject of execution, hence, it could not transmit title thereto at the time of the sale. Where in the instant case no
jurisdiction was acquired over the subject property, the execution sale was void and of no legal effect.
FRANCISCO LU v. JUDGE ORLANDO ANA F. SIAPNO (A.M. MTJ-99-1199, July 6, 2000)

Facts:

Francisco Lu filed an administrative complaint for gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, abdication of official function
and gross misconduct against Judge Siapno of the MTC Urdaneta, Pangasinan. He alleged that:

Judge Siapno rendered judgment for an ejectment case against Francisco; which decision was allegedly received by his
counsel on September 13, 1995 and a Notice of Appeal was filed on the same day. On September 11, 1995, Branch Clerk
of Court issued a Writ of Execution, which was implemented by Sheriff Lopez, who forcibly ejected Francisco from the
premises.

Judge Siapno also granted plaintiff’s counsel ex-parte motion to withdraw deposit and motion for special demolition
allegedly without notice and hearing. On the same day, Sheriff Lopez immediately implemented the order of demolition by
serving a copy of the said order upon Francisco’s wife and proceeded with the demolition of the structure, building and
other improvements on the land in question. The order of demolition was allegedly received Francisco’s counsel 7 days
after the demolition.

Judge Siapno included in the dispositive portion of the decision the directive that, “in accordance with the Rules, let the
Writ of Execution be issued”

Issue:

Whether Judge Siapno is guilty of the charges filed against him. – YES

Held:

Judge Siapno is held GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW when he rendered judgment providing, in the dispositive portion,
for its immediate execution.

Basic is the rule that a judge may not order execution of judgment in the decision itself. Section 21 of the Rules on Summary
Procedure likewise provides that the decision of the regional trial court is immediately executory. Even if immediately executory,
there must first be a motion to that effect and a hearing called for that purpose. In an ejectment case, the adverse party is entitled
to notice before execution can be ordered. In disregarding the rules and settled jurisprudence, respondent Judge showed gross
ignorance, albeit without any malice or corrupt motive. The lack of malicious intent, however, cannot completely free respondent
Judge from liability. When the law is elementary, so elementary not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

As regards the writ of demolition, the Clerk of Court and the Sheriff must be held responsible. The issuance of the writ of execution
and its subsequent implementation without motion and hearing and at the time the copy of the judgment has not yet been
received by defendant's counsel, was precipitate and against all sense of fair play. Lu's counsel received the MTC-decision on
September 13, 1995 and filed a notice of appeal on the same day. However, the writ of execution was issued by Clerk of Court
Corpuz on September 11, 1995 and was implemented by Sheriff Lopez on said date. Clearly, there was a violation of the rules of
procedure. Even in the Rule on Summary Procedure, a judgment must first be given to the losing party before it can be executed.

Sheriff Lopez removed the personal belongings of Lu without giving the latter five (5) days notice to remove the same or to obtain
remedies somewhere. Under the Rules of Court, the immediate enforcement of a writ of execution in ejectment cases is carried out
by giving the defendant notice of such writ, and making a demand that defendant comply therewith within a reasonable period,
normally from three (3) to five (5) days, and it is only after such period that the sheriff enforces the writ by the bodily removal of
the defendant and his personal belongings. And if demolition is involved, there must first be a hearing on motion and due notice
for the issuance of a special order under Section 14, Rule 39.
BACHRACH CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (G.R. No. 128349,
September 25, 1998)

Facts:

Bachrach Corporation entered into 2 lease contracts with the Philippine Government covering two areas located at the Manila Port
Area for a term of 99 years each. Pres. Corazon Aquino issued E.O. 321 transferring the management and administration of the
entire port area to PPA. PPA issued a memorandum increasing the rental rates by about 1,500%. Bachrach refused to pay the
substantial increase rates demanded by PPA.

PPA filed with MeTC Manila an unlawful detainer case against Bachrach for non-payment of rent.

MeTC ruled in favor of PPA and rendered a decision ordering the eviction of Bachrach from the leased premises.

RTC affirmed the decision in toto of MeTC.

CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

Bachrach filed an MR to CA, but it was put on hold pending submission of a compromise agreement.

When the parties failed to submit to a compromise agreement, CA denied the MR of Bachrach.

May 20, 1995 - CA decision in the ejectment suit became final and executory.

Meanwhile, on March 28, 1995, Bachrach filed an action for specific performance against PPA before the RTC Manila for refusing to
honor a compromise agreement said to have been perfected between Bachrach and PPA.

June 8, 1995 – PPA filed a motion for a writ of execution/garnishment in the ejectment case.

June 9, 1995 – Bachrach filed in the specific performance case for the issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin MeTC from issuing the writ of execution/garnishment. (GRANTED, RTC)

CA: ruled in favor of PPA and rendered the decision of RTC to be null and void.

Issue:

Whether the issuance of writ of preliminary of injunction by RTC was an improper interference with the judgment in the unlawful
detainer case. – NO.

Held:

SC GRANTED THE PETITION.

It could be argued that, instead of filing a separate action for specific performance, Bachrach should just have presented the
alleged compromise agreement in the unlawful detainer case. Unfortunately, the refusal of PPA to honor the agreement after its
alleged perfection effectively prevented Bachrach from seeking the coercive power of the court to enforce the compromise in the
unlawful detainer case. The situation virtually left Bachrach with but the remedy of independently initiating the specific
performance case in a court of competent jurisdiction.

In its challenged decision, the Court of Appeals, on its part, has said that respondent PPAs prayer for the issuance of a writ of
execution and garnishment is but the necessary and legal consequence of its affirmance of the lower courts decision in the
unlawful detainer case which has by then become final and executory.

The rule indeed is, and has almost invariably been, that after a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the
court to order its execution. No court, perforce, should interfere by injunction or otherwise to restrain such execution.

The rule, however, concededly admits of exceptions; hence, when facts and circumstances later transpire that would render
execution inequitable or unjust, the interested party may ask a competent court to stay its execution or prevent its enforcement.
So, also, a change in the situation of the parties can warrant an injunctive relief.

Evidently, in issuing its orders of 13 July 1995 and 29 August 1995 assailed by PPA in the latters petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the Court of Appeals, the trial court in the case at bar would want to preserve status quo pending its disposition
of the specific performance case and to prevent the case from being mooted by an early implementation of the ejectment writ. In
holding differently and ascribing to the trial court grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
appellate court, in our considered view, has committed reversible error.
MARIA BALUYUT, ET AL., v. RODOLFO GUIAO, ET AL., (G.R. No. 136294, September 28, 1999)

Facts:

Baluyut, et al., filed before the RTC Guagua, Pampanga a complaint for declaration of nullity of donation executed by Rosario De
Guiao in favor of Rodolfo, et al,.

RTC: ruled in favor of Baluyut.

CA: reversed the decision of RTC.

The record of the case was then returned to the court of origin together with the entry of judgment which had become final and
executory.

Rodolfo et al., filed a motion with the RTC for the issuance of a Writ of Possession. (GRANTED) A writ of possession was thereafter
issued.

Baluyut filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Possession alleging that the dismissal of the complaint did not give rise to the right to
take possession of the property involved. The only portion that may be executed from the said decision would be the cost of suit.
(DENIED)

RTC: held that in ruling that there is a valid donation in favor of Rodolfo et al., the CA impliedly ruled that they have the right to
possess the land.

Issue:
Whether the writ of possession was validly issued. – YES

Held:

SC DENIED THE PETITION

As discussed above, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court erred in denying the notice of appeal on the premise that
the Supreme Court has allowed an exception to the rule that only final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal when in the
afore-cited case of Paulino vs. Court of Appeals, it ruled that when in the opinion of the defeated party, the order of execution
varies the terms of the judgment and does not conform to the essence thereof, he may appeal the order.

However, a perusal of the records will show that the instant case does not fall under the above-stated exception. In this case, the
writ of possession clearly does not vary the terms of the judgment which affirmed the validity of the donation as well as the
subsequent sale. As the appellate court correctly observed, by virtue of a valid donation in favor of respondents Rodolfo Guiao and
Trinidad Mandal, ownership over the subject property had been transferred to the latter. In the same vein, by virtue of the valid
sale made by the afore-named respondents in favor of respondent spouses Nicolas Tubil and Iluminada Canlas, the latter became
the owners of the same. One of the attributes of ownership is possession; it follows, that respondent spouses, being the owners of
the subject property, are entitled to possession of the same.

Clearly, therefore, the writ of possession issued by the trial court does not vary the terms of the judgment attributing ownership of
the subject property to respondent spouses. On the contrary, said writ of possession conforms to the essence of the judgment of
ownership.

Judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto; and, where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land
should be considered included in the decision, it appearing that the defeated partys claim to the possession thereof is based on his
claim of ownership.[10] Furthermore, adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of possession if the defeated party has
not shown any right to possess the land independently of his claim of ownership which was rejected. In such a case, a writ of
execution would be required if the defeated party does not surrender the possession of the property. [11] Here, there is no
allegation, much less proof, that petitioners have any right to possess the land independent of their claim of ownership.

This is in conformity with Section 47 (c), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:

Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxx.
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been adjudged, or which was actually
and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (Italics supplied)
JANE ABALOS, et al., v. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION (G.R. No. 140374, November 27, 2002)

Facts:

Abalos et al., filed a case for illegal dismissal against Philex after Philex undertook a retrenchment program that resulted in the
termination of the petitioners after a manpower audit was conducted by said corporation.

The case was submitted for arbitration through a submission agreement through NCMB, CAR, Baguio City.

Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision ordering Philiex to reinstate the employee.

CA: denied the petition of Philex.

SC (petition for review on certiorari): denied

April 27, 1998 – Entry of judgment was made.

Philex filed a manifestation and motion for leave to offer separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, before the Voluntary Arbitrator
alleging that the former employees’ positions no longer existed and that there arose strained relations between the parties that
effectively barred reinstatement. (GRANTED)

CA: affirmed the decision of Voluntary Arbitrator.

Issue:
Whether an order that has become final and executory can be modified or altered. – YES

Held:

SC DENIED THE PETITION OF ABALOS, ET AL.,

A basic tenet in our rules of procedure is that an award that is final and executory cannot be amended or modified
anymore. Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it
or by the highest court of the land. However, this rule is subject to exceptions as stated in the case of David vs. CA, 316 SCRA 710
(1999), cited by respondent:

One exception is that where facts and/or events transpire after a decision has become executory, which facts and/or
events present a supervening cause or reason which renders the final and executory decision no longer enforceable.
Under the law, the court may modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever
circumstances transpire rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying
or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory.

In David, we held also that where an execution order [which] has been issued is still pending, all proceedings on the execution are
still proceedings in the suit. As such, modification of the execution of such judgment is allowed.

In Torres vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 330 SCRA 311 (2000), this Court ruled that:
Execution is the final stage of litigation, the end of the suit. It cannot be frustrated except for serious reasons demanded
by justice and equity. In this jurisdiction, the rule is that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it is the
ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment. A writ of execution may however be
refused on equitable grounds as when there was a change in the situation of the parties that would make execution
inequitable or when certain circumstances, which transpired after judgment became final, rendered execution of judgment
unjust. The fact that the decision has become final does not preclude a modification or an alteration thereof because even
with the finality of judgment, when its execution becomes impossible or unjust, it may be modified or altered to
harmonize the same with justice and the facts (emphasis supplied).

In Deltaventures Resources Inc. vs. Cabato, 327 SCRA 521 (2000), we held that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. The power of a voluntary arbitrator to issue a writ of
execution carries with it the power to inquire into the correctness of its execution and to consider whatever
supervening events transpire during execution. Therefore, we are in agreement with the appellate court that a voluntary
arbitrator has jurisdiction to amend the mode of executing an award if and when the case merits such amendment.
BANGKOK BANK PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED v. THELMA U. LEE (G.R. No. 159806, January 20, 2006)

Facts:

Bangkok Bank extended a credit line to Midas Corporation in the amount of $2M. Midas refused to pay its outstanding obligation.
Bangkok filed a complaint for sum of money with an Urgent issuance for Writ of Preliminary Attachment before the RTC of Makati.

Bangkok filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment. (DENIED)

Bangkok filed MR praying for partial judgment. (GRANTED)

RTC amended the dispositive portion of the partial decision where it granted the motion for execution pending appeal ordering the
immediate execution of the partial decision.

CA: upheld the decision of RTC BUT ruled that a partial decision cannot be subject of execution until after judgment is rendered on
the entire case. Hence, the portion ordering the immediate execution of the partial decision was annulled and set aside.

RTC: issued a decision upholding the validity of the writ of preliminary attachment and dismissing Midas claim of damages for lack
of evidence.

Bangkok filed a Motion for execution pending appeal. (GRANTED)

A writ of execution of the partial decision as amended and of the decision on the remaining issues was promptly issued.

CA granted the petition of Midas and held that the order of RTC failed to state good reasons to justify immediate execution.

Issue:

Whether the writ of execution should be issued as a matter of right. - NO

Held:

SC AFFIRMED the decision of CA.

When the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution, judgment had already been rendered on the remaining factual issues
such that a partial judgment had become a complete judgment. Thus, a writ of execution could already issue.

However, since appeal had been duly perfected, though not yet finally resolved, execution was NOT a matter of right, BUT of
discretion PROVIDED good reasons therefor existed. The compelling grounds for the issuance must be stated in a special oreder
after due hearing.

Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:


SEC. 2. Discretionary execution.
(a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal. On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record
or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion,
order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.

After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.

Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing. (Underscoring
ours.)

In the case at bar, the assailed order of RTC failed to state good reasons for the issuance of the writ. The assailed order, which
granted the motion for execution pending appeal, fell short of the requirements of Section 2 of Rule 39. Where the order is not in
conformity with the Rules, the same is null and void. CA is correct in declaring the order of RTC as null and void.
JESUS T. DAVID v. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 115821, October 13, 1999)

Facts:

RTC of Manila, Branch 27, with Judge Diaz, issued a writ of attachment over the real properties of private respondents. However,
Judge Diaz issued an Order amending said decision on the period of computation of the legal interest.

Afable (respondent) appealed to the CA and to SC, but both affirmed the decision of RTC.

Entries of judgment were made and the record of the case was remanded to RTC, presided by Judge Cruz, for the final execution.

David filed a motion of writ of execution. (GRANTED)

David filed a motion praying that Judge Cruz issue an order directing the sheriff to prepare and execute a certificate of sale in favor
of David and contending that compound interest, allowed by Article 2212 of the Civil Code, should apply in this case.

Judge Cruz DENIED the motion and held that in accordance with CB Circular No. 416, amending the Usury Law and raising the
legal rate of interest from 6% to 12% and as construed in Reformina vs. Tomol, legal interest should apply.

Issue:

Whether Judge Cruz abused his discretion when he modified the decision and amended its dispositive portion. – NO.

Held:

SC DENIED the PETITION filed by David.

The rule that once a judgment had become final and executory, it is ministerial duty of the courts to order its execution is not
absolute. It admits of certain exceptions. One exception is where facts and/or events transpire after a decision has become
executory, which facts and/or events present a supervening cause or reason which renders the final and executory decision of the
court no longer enforceable.

Under the law, the court may modify or alter the judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances
transpire rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such
modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory.

In the present case, after the case was remanded to the lower court, David filed a motion for the issuance of an Alias Writ of
Execution. The motion was finally resolved on July 5, 1993. When Central Bank Circular No. 416 took effect on July 29, 1974, the
suit was still pending. Hence, when respondent Judge Cruz ordered the computation of legal interest for the execution of the
amended order, he correctly took judicial notice of the Courts pronouncement in Reformina vs. Tomol.

The passage of the Central Bank Circular No. 416 was a supervening event which happened after the decision had become
executory. Had Judge Cruz failed to order the assailed amendment, the result would have been iniquitous. Hence, no error can be
ascribed to Judge Cruz.
GENEROSO SALIGUMBA v. MONICA PALANOG (G.R. No. 143365, December 4, 2008)

Facts:

Monica Palanog filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages against Spouses Saligumba before the RTC of Aklan praying
that they be declared the true and rightful owner of the land in question.

RTC: ruled in favor of Palanog and declared them to be the lawful owners of the subject land and ordering the Saligumbas to
vacate the premises and restore possession to Palanog.

A motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the said decision was filed but the RTC ruled that since more than 5 years had
lapsed after the date of its finality, the decision could no longer be executed by mere motion.

Monica Palanog filed a complaint seeking to revive and enforce the RTC decision which she claimed has not been barred by the
statute of limitations.

RTC: GRANTED the motion to revive judgment.

Issue:

Whether action for revival of judgment is proper in the case at bar. – YES

Held:

SC DENIED the petition filed Saligumba.

The instant case is an action for revival of judgment and the judgment sought to be revived in this case is the decision in the
action for quieting of title with damages in Civil Case No. 2570. This is not one for annulment of judgment.

An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a previous judgment which has
become dormant after the passage of five years without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended to
re-open any issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtors case nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment. An
action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action, different and distinct from either the recovery of property case or
the reconstitution case, wherein the cause of action is the decision itself and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment
sought to be enforced is rendered. Revival of judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to be revived, either by
motion or by independent action, is already final and executory.

The RTC-Branch 3 Decision dated 7 August 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570 had been rendered final and executory by the lapse of time
with no motion for reconsideration nor appeal having been filed. While it may be true that the judgment in Civil Case No. 2570 may
be revived and its execution may be had, the issue now before us is whether or not execution of judgment can be issued against
petitioners who claim that they are not bound by the RTC-Branch 3 Decision dated 7 August 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570.

Civil Case No. 2570 is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an action involving real property. It is an action that
survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 as the claim is not extinguished by the death of a party.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD. V. TOYOTA BEL-AIR, INC. (G.R. No. 137884, March 28, 2008)

Facts:

Toyota entered into a Contract of Lease over a 3,700 sqm lot and building owned by Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. in
Makati City for a period of 5 years. Upon expiration of the lease, Toyota remained in possession of the property. Despite repeated
demands, Toyota refused to vacate the property. Thus, Insular filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Toyota in MeTC.

MeTC ruled in favor of Insular Life and ordered Toyota to “pay reasonable compensation at the rate of P 585,640.00 a month until
possession of the subject premises is surrendered”

Insular filed a Motion for Execution. Toyota, meanwhile, filed a Notice of Appeal.

Subsequently, Insular filed a Notice of Partial Appeal of the decision insofar as the issue of monthly compensation was concerned.
Both parties, however, later filed separate motions to withdraw their respective appeals. (GRANTED)

MeTC also issued a Writ of Execution.

Deputy Sheriff of the MeTC executed the writ by levying on Toyota’s personal and real properties and garnishing its bank accounts.

Toyota filed a Petition for Certiorari alleging that MeTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the Writ of Execution since the writ
amended the dispositive portion of the decision it sought to execute by giving retroactive effect to the payment of reasonbale
compensation of P 585,640.00 by the inclusion of the phrase from April 15, 1997.

RTC issued a TRO enjoining the auction sale of Toyota’s levied properties.

Insular filed with MeTC a Motion to Clarify Decision praying that the court issue an order clarifying the dispositive portion of the
decision.

MeTC issued an Order, clarifying the dispositive portion “to pay reasonable compensation in the amount of P585,640.00 as of April
15, 1997 until possession of the subject premises is surrendered to Insular.”

RTC: held that MeTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing Writ of Execution by giving retroactive effect to the reasonable
compensation judgment by inserting the date April 15, 1997 which was not provided in the dispositive portion of the MeTc
decision.

Issues:

Whether the amendment made by MeTC on its dispositive portion of decision is proper. - YES
Whether the Writ of Execution is valid. - YES

Held:

SC GRANTED THE PETITION and held that the writ of execution issued by MeTC as valid.

While the general rule is that the portion of a decision that becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decreed in
the dispositive part thereof, there are recognized exceptions to this rule: (a).where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of
the opinion may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgment, because the dispositive part of a decision must find
support from the decisions ratio decidendi; and (b).where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue is found in
the body of the decision.

Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the Court finds that the exception to the general rule applies to the instant case.
The RTC should have referred to the body of the decision for purposes of construing the reasonable compensation judgment,
because the dispositive part of a decision must find support from the decisions ratio decidendi. Findings of the court are to be
considered in the interpretation of the dispositive portion of the judgment.

Indeed, to grasp and delve into the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted to - the
decision must be considered in its entirety.[46] The Court may resort to the pleadings of the parties, its findings of fact and
conclusions of law as expressed in the body of the decision to clarify any ambiguities caused by any inadvertent omission or
mistake in the dispositive portion thereof.

The Court cannot help but call the RTCs attention to the prejudice it has wittingly or unwittingly caused Insular Life by voiding the
entire writ of execution when what was assailed was simply the inclusion of the phrase from April 15, 1997 in the reasonable
compensation judgment of the MeTC. The order for Toyota to vacate the lease properties and return possession thereof to Insular
Life, and pay attorney's fees and litigation expenses was not assailed and should have been enforced.