OUTLINE MCLE LECTURE

TRIAL TECHNIQUES ON EXECUTION OF FINAL JUDGMENTS

By: Atty. Hilarion B. Buban

1. FINALITY OF JUDGMENT FOR PURPOSES OF EXECUTION

2. WHEN EXECUTION SHALL ISSUE

3. HOW A JUDGMENT IS EXECUTED

● Recent Jurisprudence (discretionary execution)- GSIS vs. PGAI, G.R. No.187021, November 20,
2013

A. Good reasons to allow execution pending appeal and the nature of the exemption under Section 39 of
RA 8291.

The execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that only a final
judgment may be executed.80 In order to grant the same pursuant to Section 2,81 Rule 39 of the Rules,
the following requisites must concur: (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to
the adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and (c) the good
reason must be stated in a special order.

Good reasons call for the attendance of compelling circumstances warranting immediate execution for
fear that favorable judgment may yield to an empty victory. In this regard, the Rules do not categorically
and strictly define what constitutes "good reason," and hence, its presence or absence must be
determined in view of the peculiar circumstances of each case. As a guide, jurisprudence dictates that
the "good reason" yardstick imports a superior circumstance that will outweigh injury or damage to the
adverse party.83 Corollarily, the requirement of "good reason" does not necessarily entail unassailable
and flawless basis but at the very least, an invocation thereof must be premised on solid footing.

In the case at bar, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, granted PGAI’s motion for execution pending appeal on
the ground that the impending sanctions against it by foreign underwriters/reinsurers constitute good
reasons therefor. It must, however, be observed that PGAI has not proffered any evidence to substantiate
its claim, as it merely presented bare allegations thereon. It is hornbook doctrine that mere allegations
do not constitute proof. As held in Real v. Belo, "it is basic in the rule of evidence that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. In short, mere allegations are not evidence."
Hence, without any sufficient basis to support the existence of its alleged "good reasons," it cannot be
said that the second requisite to allow an execution pending appeal exists. To reiterate, the requirement
of "good reasons" must be premised on solid footing so as to ensure that the "superior circumstance"
which would impel immediate execution is not merely contrived or based on speculation. This, however,
PGAI failed to demonstrate in the present case. In fine, the Court therefore holds that the CA’s
affirmance of the RTC’s February 14, 2002 Order authorizing execution pending appeal, as well as the
February 19, 2002 issuances related thereto, was improper.

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 ● Recent Jurisprudence (execution as a matter of right)- ANAMA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.
No.187021, January 25, 2012

Elementary is the rule that every motion must contain the mandatory requirements of notice and
hearing and that there must be proof of service thereof. The Court has consistently held that a motion
that fails to comply with the above requirements is considered a worthless piece of paper which should
not be acted upon. The rule, however, is not absolute. There are motions that can be acted upon by the
court ex parte if these would not cause prejudice to the other party. They are not strictly covered by the
rigid requirement of the rules on notice and hearing of motions.

The motion for execution of the Spouses Co is such kind of motion. It cannot be denied that the
judgment sought to be executed in this case had already become final and executory. As such, the
Spouses Co have every right to the issuance of a writ of execution and the RTC has the ministerial duty to
enforce the same. This right on the part of the Spouses Co and duty on the part of the RTC are based on
Section 1 and Section 2 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides, as follows:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. – Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on
motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the
period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in
the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the
judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with
notice to the adverse party.

Xxxxx

As can be gleaned therefrom, under Paragraph 1 of Section 1 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure, the Spouses Co can have their motion for execution executed as a matter of right
without the needed notice and hearing requirement to petitioner. This is in contrast to the provision of
Paragraph 2 of Section 1 and Section 2 where there must be notice to the adverse party. In the case of
Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. v. Virginia D. Vda. De Hernandez, it was written:

It is evident that Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court does not prescribe that a copy
of the motion for the execution of a final and executory judgment be served on the defeated party, like
litigated motions such as a motion to dismiss (Section 3, Rule 16), or motion for new trial (Section 2, Rule
37), or a motion for execution of judgment pending appeal (Section 2, Rule 39), in all of which instances
a written notice thereof is required to be served by the movant on the adverse party in order to afford
the latter an opportunity to resist the application.

Based on the quoted decision, it is clear that the mandatory requirement of notice and hearing involving
litigated motions do not apply to a motion for writ execution of a judgment that has already become
final and executory because no appeal was perfected within the prescribed period. This is because the

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execution of such final decision is precisely no longer a litigated matter. Execution of such judgment is a
matter of right.

● Recent Jurisprudence (execution by motion beyond 5 years)- RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING

CORPORATION vs. SERRA, GR No. 203241, July 10, 2013

"x x x.

The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within five
years from the date of its entry or by an action after the lapse of five years and before prescription sets
in. This Court, however, allows exceptions when execution may be made by motion even after the lapse
of five years. These exceptions have one common denominator: the delay is caused or occasioned by
actions of the judgment obligor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage. In Camacho v. Court of
Appeals,13 we held that where the delays were occasioned by the judgment debtor’s own initiatives and
for her advantage as well as beyond the judgment creditor’s control, the five-year period allowed for
enforcement of the judgment by motion is deemed to have been effectively interrupted or suspended.

In the present case, there is no dispute that RCBC seeks to enforce the decision which became final and
executory on 15 April 1994. This decision orders Serra to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in
favor of RCBC. However, to evade his obligation to RCBC, Serra transferred the property to his mother
Ablao, who then transferred it to Liok. Serra’s action prompted RCBC to file the Annulment case. Clearly,
the delay in the execution of the decision was caused by Serra for his own advantage.

Thus, the pendency of the Annulment case effectively suspended the five-year period to enforce
through a motion the decision in the Specific Performance case. Since the decision in the Annulment
case attained finality on 3 March 2009 and RCBC’s motion for execution was filed on 25 August 2011,
RCBC’s motion is deemed filed within the five-year period for enforcement of a decision through a
motion.

4. PROCEEDINGS WHERE PROPERTY IS CLAIMED BY THIRD PERSONS

● Recent Jurisprudence - MAGDALENA T. VILLASI V. FILOMENA GARCIA, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS

HEIRS, NAMELY, ERMELINDA H. GARCIA, ET AL.,G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014.

The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right of possession.
Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the
property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first
unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession thereon. In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya (260
Phil. 401 [1990]) we declared that for a third-party claim or a terceria to prosper, the claimant must first
sufficiently establish his right on the property:

“[A] third person whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the obligation of the judgment
debtor may invoke the supervisory power of he court which authorized such execution. Upon due
application by the third person and after summary hearing, the court may command that the property
be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful owner or possessor. What said court can

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do in these instances, however, is limited to a determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or
wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed
taken hold of property not belonging to the judgment debtor. The court does not and cannot pass upon
the question of title to the property, with any character of finality. It can treat of the matter only insofar
as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. It can require the sheriff to restore
the property to the claimant’s possession if warranted by the evidence. However, if the claimant’s proofs
do not persuade the court of the validity of his title or right of possession thereto, the claim will be
denied.”

5. EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT FOR SPECIFIC ACTS – recent jurisprudence