Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-51206 August 25, 1989

NORBERTO MASIPEQUINA and JOVENCIO ALAMPAYAN, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Paulino G. Clarin for petitioners.

CORTES, J.:

The extent to which responding peace officers may defend themselves in the face of an attack by the
person sought to be apprehended is the subject of this petition for review.

Petitioners Patrolmen Norberto Mesipequina and Jovencio Alampayan, who were members of the
Integrated National Police (INP) of San Isidro, Bohol, were charged with the crime of homicide for the
death of Leopoldo Potane. They were convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
from seven (7) years and one (1) day of prison mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Leopoldo Potane in the amount of twelve thousand pesos (P12,000.00).

On appeal, the Solicitor General joined the petitioners in their prayer for acquittal on the theory that
petitioners are exempt from liability because they had acted in self-defense when they shot and killed
Leopoldo Potane. But, just the same, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but
modified the penalty of imprisonment to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prison mayor as minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Before this Court both the petitioners and the Solicitor General reassert that petitioners should be
acquitted because they acted in lawful self-defense.

There is no dispute about the following facts, which were quoted by the Court of Appeals from the
Solicitor General's presentation.

xxx

In the afternoon of December 21, 1976, Barangay Capt. Nicolas Potane of Barrio
Abehilan San Isidro, Bohol and his father, Pedro Potane requested assistance from the
Police Sub-station Commander of San Isidro in apprehending Leopoldo Potane, son of
Pedro Potane and elder brother of Nicolas, who has begun to show signs of recurring
insanity. Since his arrival from Mindanao in 1974, Leopoldo had been acting queerly and
at times violent. On December 18, 1975, Leopoldo chased the wife of Nicolas with a bolo
and almost hacked her. He always carried a bolo, and had threatened his own wife,
daughter, brothers, and even his parents with death. Fearing for their safety, they
transferred temporarily to the Home Economics building of the barrio school and left
Leopoldo alone in the house of his father. Nicolas Potane and his immediate relatives
wanted Leopoldo to be examined and treated by the Provincial Health Officer for his
 mental ailment (pp. 19-22, 26-32. t.s.n., Nov. 15, 1976; Exhs. C, C-1 to C-5-A, Folder of
Exhibits).lâw phî1.ñèt

Patrolmen Norberto Masipequina and Jovencio Alampayan, the former armed with a 38
cal. revolver and the latter with the Thompson submachine gun, were ordered by the sub-
station commander to arrest Leopoldo. Before proceeding to the house where Leopoldo
was, the policemen passed the store of a certain Ismael Balumia where they had a
conference with Barrio Captain Nicolas Potane; his father, Pedro Potane; his mother,
Marganta Potane and others. In said store a joint affidavit (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2, Folder
of Exhibits), was prepared and signed by Nicolas Potane, Pedro Potane, Margarita
Potane, Clara Potane, Francisca Potane, and Emilia Potane, wife of Leopoldo,
authorizing the 'peace officer of the San Isidro Police Dept. 'to apprehend Leopoldo
Potane who was about to run amok.' The document further stated that if Leopoldo would
resist as he is armed with a weapon, the policemen 'have the right to shoot him but not to
kill him ... but if such does not permit, if he resist(s) arrest they have the right to resort to
any manner to prevent the fearful outcome from his running amok' and 'if he would be
killed by the police officers on account of his resistance, we, the parents, brother and
sisters, and wife would take no action if something untoward would occur. (pp. 4-8, t.s.n.,
Dec. 7, 1976).

Thereafter, the two policemen, accompanied by several persons, among whom was
Nicolas Potane, went to the house of Pedro Potane where Leopoldo was. Upon arrival
thereat, Pat. Masipequina, a childhood friend of Leopoldo, called Leopoldo and urged him
to come out. He also asked Leopoldo for a drink, but Leopoldo refused to go down the
house. Pat. Masipequina then informed Leopoldo that his father and brother had reported
that he (Leopoldo) had chased his sister-in-law with a bolo and their officer-in-charge
sent him to investigate the report. He told Leopoldo to come down so that they could talk.
Leopoldo instead told him to come up (pp. 10-11, t.s.n., Ibid). lâw phî1.ñèt

Pat. Masipequina went up the house followed by Nicolas Potane with a petromax lamp.
Patrolman Jovencio Alampayan and the rest stayed in the yard Although in the yard,
Patrolman Alampayan could see what was going on inside the house because it was a
single storey house and had an elevation of only 4 feet (p. 56, t.s.n., Dec. 6, 1976).
Nicolas stayed on the door landing while Masipequina entered the sala and was about to
sit down on a rocking chair when Leopoldo suddenly emerged from an adjacent room
and rushed at him swinging a bolo. Masipequina pushed the rocking chair towards
Leopoldo. Leopoldo hit Masipequina on the bridge of the nose (p. 23, t.s.n., Ibid). As the
latter retracted, he lost his balance and was hit on the right side of his face. At this
juncture, Masipequina drew his revolver and fired three shots. One shot misfired but the
other two hit Leopoldo on the chest. Leopoldo continued to advance towards him. He
pushed the rocking chair at Leopoldo and ran out of the house shouting for help.
Leopoldo ran after him. Pat. Masipequina jumped from the house and landed on the
ground. In the process he hit his shin on a piece of stone. Leopoldo also jumped to the
ground and continued to pursue Masipequina. As Leopoldo poised to hack Pat.
Masipequina, Pat. Alampayan fired his gun hitting Leopoldo once at the thigh (pp. 25-26,
Id., pp. 40, 71, t.s.n., Dec. 6, 1976).

xxx

[CA Decision, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 9-11].

Leopoldo Potane died some thirty (30) minutes later while being brought to the health center for
treatment.
The issue is readily apparent: whether or not, given the undisputed facts, petitioner Masipequina had
acted in lawful self-defense. (Petitioner Alampayan's conviction for the crime charged hinges on that of
Masipequina as the trial court had found that the two conspired to kill Leopoldo Potane, as alleged in the
information.).

The trial court, however, rejected the defense raised by petitioner. The following reasons, which were
cited by the trial court, were adopted and quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals:

. . . (1) the fact that the accused persisted in their attempts to arrest and/or pick up the
victim for almost two (2) hours, culminating in the tragedy at around nine o'clock that
evening; (2) the fact that the victim suffered three gunshot wounds, two of which were
over the heart and admittedly fatal, and the third on the left thigh which was not fatal but
sufficient to cripple him; (3) the fact that all three gunshot wounds bore evidence of
gunpowder signs, which is indicative and conclusive of having been inflicted at close
range; (4) the fact that the victim had a 2-inch lacerated wound on his forehead and
another lacerated wound on his right leg which have not been sufficiently explained but
are also indicative of having been inflicted by blunt instruments, like a flashlight or the
butts of a revolver or a submachine gun; and (5) the fact that the alleged injuries of
accused Masipequina could not, by any stretch of imagination, be inflicted by a bolo
allegedly wielded by the victim, since they are quite superficial in degree, located in the
most improbable places and may even have been self-inflicted to justify a subsequent
claim of self-defense.

xxx

[Rollo, p. 20.]

"The law on self-defense embodied in any penal system in the civilized world finds justification in
man's natural instinct to protect, repel, and save his person and rights from impending danger
and peril; it is based on that impulse of self-preservation born to man and part of his nature as a
human being." [People v. Boholst-Caballero, G.R. No. L-23249 November 25,1974,61 SCRA 180, 1
85.] In our jurisdiction it is found in Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal
liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided the following
circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

xxx

It is settled jurisprudence that he who invokes the exempting circumstance of self-defense must
prove it during the trial [U.S. v. Coronel, 30 Phil. 112 (1915)]. He must prove the elements
enumerated in Article 11 by clear and convincing evidence, the reason being that since he had
admitted having killed or wounded another, which is an act punishable by law, he shall be liable
thereof unless he establishes a lawful defense [People v. Boholst-Caballero, supra]. Thus, the
determination of whether or not all the three elements are present in the case.
 1. That there was unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased Leopoldo Potane is
evident from the established facts. Leopoldo Potane, who had showed signs of mental
illness and had threatened his immediate relatives with a bolo, suddenly and without
provocation attacked with a bolo Masipequina, whom he (Leopoldo Potane) has asked to
go inside the house.

2. That there was reasonable necessity of the means employed by Masipequina to

prevent or repel Leopoldo Potane's attack is also supported by the evidence.

In the leading case of U.S. v. Mojica, 42 Phil. 784 (1922), where a policeman trying to quell a disturbance
shot with his revolver and fatally wounded a man who attacked him with a knife, the Court laid down the
following rule:

A police officer, in the performance of his duty, must stand his ground and cannot,
like a private individual, take refuge in flight; his duty requires him to overcome his
opponent. The force which he may exert therefore differs somewhat from that
which may ordinarily be offered in self-defense. Bearing this in mind, we do not
think that the appellant in using his revolver against the deceased can be said to
have employed unnecessary force. The deceased attacked him with a deadly
weapon; he might, perhaps, have saved himself by running away, but this his duty
forbade. Was he to allow himself to be stabbed before using his arms? It may,
perhaps, be argued that the appellant might have used his club, but a policeman's
club is not a very effective weapon as against a drawn knife and a police officer is
not required to afford a person attacking him the opportunity for a fair and equal
struggle. (State vs. Phillips, 119 Iowa, 652; 67 L.R.A. 292; North Carolina vs.
Gosnell, 74 Fed., 734; Boykin vs. People, 22 Colo., 496; 45 Pac., 419; Adams vs.
State, 72 Ga., 85.) And if it was necessary for the appellant to use his revolver, he
could hardly, under the circumstances, be expected to take deliberate and careful
aim so as to strike a point less vulnerable than the body of his adversary. (U.S. vs.
Mack 8 Phil., 701; U.S. v. Domen 37 Phil., 57.) [Id., p. 787].

Tested by this standard, the means employed by Masipequina in repelling the attack were, under the
circumstances, both reasonable and necessary. He initially tried to defend himself by pushing the rocking
chair toward Leopoldo Potane but when that proved futile and he (Masipequina) was caught in a very
precarious position, i.e., his back was on the floor and Leopoldo Potane kept flailing at him with the bolo,
he had no other choice but to use his revolver to defend himself against the attack. Under the
circumstances, there was no opportunity for Masipequina to carefully take aim. He just discharged his
weapon at the deceased in the hope that such would save him from any further injury or death.

It must also be borne in mind that the rule is that the reasonable necessity of the means employed to
repel or prevent the attack depends upon the imminent danger of injury, not on the harm actually done to
the accused [U.S. v. Paras, 9 Phil. 367 (1907)]. Thus, that Masipequina escaped serious injuries does not
necessarily imply that the means he used to repel the attack were unreasonable and excessive. The fact
remains that the act of Leopoldo Potane of attacking Masipequina with a bolo was a very real danger to
his life that the latter had to repel the best way he can. That the gunshot wounds he inflicted on Leopoldo
Potane proved to be fatal does not make the means he employed any less reasonable under the
circumstances.

3. Then, the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of Masipequina is too plain to even doubt. He,
together with Patrolman Alampayan had been tasked by his superior to apprehend Leopoldo Potane
upon complaint of his own father and brother. Thus, petitioners herein, when they went to apprehend the
deceased, were in the performance of their official duties as peace officers. And when they reached the
house where Leopoldo Potane was hiding, Masipequina tried to coax Leopoldo Potane into coming out of
the house, but the latter would not. It was only when Leopoldo Potane asked Masipequina, who was his
childhood friend, to enter the house that he did, followed by Nicolas Potane. Masipequina was about to
take a seat, definitely a non-provocative act, when he was suddenly attacked by Leopoldo Potane with a
bolo.

As consistently argued by the Solicitor General before the Court of Appeals and this Court, all the
elements of self defense are present in the instant case:

... (a) [T]here was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim which was a real and
imminent threat to the life of Pat. Masipequina. The victim was brandishing a bolo which
he did use in fact to hit the latter; (b) The use of his revolver to repel the aggression was
a reasonable necessity. His life already exposed to danger in the face of a continuous
assault, it is likely that had he not shot the victim, he would have been killed, considering
the deranged mind of the aggressor. Moreover, after he shot the victim, he ran away to
avoid being hit farther (sic), an act obviously inconsistent with a deliberate intent to kill;
(c) Pat. Masipequina did not provoke the victim into attacking him. In fact, before he went
inside the house, he asked Leopoldo to come out to talk things over. He even asked for a
drink. It was only when the victim himself asked Pat. Masipequina to go up the house that
the latter entered the sala.

xxx

[Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Respondent People's Brief, p. 12; Rollo, p. 115].

We also hasten to add that, as in the case of People v. Boholst-Caballero, supra, we accord special
significance to the wounds inflicted on the deceased in finding that the elements of self-defense had been
established.

According to Dr. Julieta Melicor, who conducted the postmortem examination on the body of the
deceased, the trajectory of the two chest wounds indicate that the person who fired the shots was in a
lying and lower position while the deceased was then standing [TSN, September 2, 1976, pp. 5-6, 10].
This corroborates petitioner Masipequina's testimony that he had his back to the floor when he fired at the
victim who was attacking him with a bolo. The fact that the wounds bore traces of gunpowder, indicating
the proximity between the person who fired the shot and the deceased, also support Masipequina's
testimony.

After the elements of self-defense had been established to exculpate petitioners from the charge of
homicide, the next question that arises, albeit only incidentally, is whether or not Alampayan could be
separately convicted of the lesser offense of less serious or slight physical injuries for the gunshot wound
he inflicted on Leopoldo Potane's thigh.

Again, we refer to Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability:

xxx

3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first
and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present and
that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.

xxx
Thus, the elements of defense of stranger are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending be not induced by revenge,
resentment, or other evil motive.

1. In the instant case, that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Leopoldo Potane
had been adequately established, as discussed earlier with regard to the circumstance of
self-defense.

2. Then, that the means employed by Alampayan in trying to prevent Leopoldo Potane
from further attacking Masipequina with a bolo were reasonable is clearly evident, as
Alampayan only shot at Leopoldo Potane's thigh to prevent him from further pursuing
Masipequina who was trying to escape Leopoldo Potane's attack.

3. Finally, that Alampayan was not motivated by any evil motive is shown by the fact that
he, together with Masipequina, only proceeded to the place where the incident happened
to look for Leopoldo Potane because they had been ordered by their substation
commander to apprehend Leopoldo Potane who had shown signs of mental
derangement and had threatened his relatives with a bolo. In short, the two policemen
were in the performance of their official and lawful duties.

This, the performance of duties, brings to fore another circumstance that would justify
Alampayan's wounding of Leopoldo Potane, for the same Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code
exempts from liability [a]ny person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of
a right or office" [Art. 11, par. 5]. Thus, in one case, the Court acquitted the accused police
officers even if their acts constituted the crimes of discharge of firearm and lesiones
graves and menos graves, inflicted upon persons facing criminal charges who were trying to
resist arrest, because the accused officers were in the performance of their official duties [U.S. v.
Resaba, 1 Phil. 311 (1902)].

Finally, the small lacerated wounds on Leopoldo Potane's forehead and right leg, which the trial court and
the Court of Appeals found suspicious, can be explained by the fact that Leopoldo Potane dropped to the
ground after he was shot on the thigh by Alampayan. There is nothing on the record to support the
conclusion that the wounds were inflicted by a flashlight or gun butt.

In fine, this Court, on the basis of the same facts found by the Court of Appeals, has arrived at a different
conclusion. Principally, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision after concluding that one of
the elements of self-defense, i.e., reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
attack, was lacking. However, after a careful consideration of the undisputed facts and the rule on self-
defense by police officers enunciated in Mojica, this Court is convinced that said element had been
established and that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it rejected petitioners'
defense and affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED.
Petitioners Patrolmen Norberto Masipequina and Jovencio Alampayan are ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

SPO2 LOLITO T. NACNAC, G.R. No. 191913

Petitioner,
Present:

VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,

- versus - PERALTA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
March 21, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Every circumstance favoring the accused’s innocence must be

duly taken into account. The proof against the accused must survive the
test of reason. Strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the accused could be
laid the responsibility for the offense charged. If the prosecution fails to
discharge the burden, then it is not only the accused’s right to be freed;
it is, even more, the courts constitutional duty to acquit him.[1]

This treats of the Motion for Reconsideration of Our Resolution dated August 25,
2010, affirming the July 20, 2009 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 30907 entitled People of the Philippines v. SPO2 Lolito T.
Nacnac. The CA affirmed the May 23, 2007 Judgment[3] in Criminal Case No.
10750-14 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14 in Laoag City, which
convicted petitioner of homicide.
The Facts

An Information charged the accused as follows:

That on or about February 20, 2003, in Dingras, Ilocos Norte, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused SPO2 Lolito I. Nacnac,
a public officer, being then a member of the Philippine National Police,
assigned with the Dingras Police Station, Dingras, Ilocos Norte, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, shoot
one SPO1 Doddie Espejo with a gun resulting into the latters death.[4]

A reverse trial ensued upon the claim of self-defense by the accused. As

summarized by CA,[5] the shooting incident happened as follows:

The victim, SPO1 Doddie Espejo[,] had a history of violent aggression

and drunkenness. He once attacked a former superior, P/Insp. Laurel
Gayya, for no apparent reason. On the day of his death, he visited a cock
house for merriment. He was shot by accused-appellant [petitioner] on
February 20, 2003 at around 10:00 p.m. at the Dingras Police Station,
Dingras, Ilocos Norte.

On that fateful night of February 20, 2003, accused-appellant, the victim

and a number of other police officers were on duty. Their shift started at
8:00 in the morning of the same day, to end at 8:00 the next morning.
Accused-appellant, being the highest ranking officer during the shift,
was designated the officer-of-the-day. Shortly before 10:00 in the
evening, the victim, together with then SPO1 Eduardo Basilio, took the
patrol tricycle from the station grounds. When accused-appellant saw
this, he stopped the victim and his colleague from using the tricycle. The
victim told accused-appellant that he (the victim) needed it to go
to Laoag City to settle a previous disagreement with a security of a local
bar.

Accused-appellant still refused. He told the victim that he is needed at

the station and, at any rate, he should stay at the station because he was
drunk. This was not received well by the victim. He told accused-
 appellant in Ilocano: Iyot ni inam kapi (Coitus of your mother, cousin!).
The victim alighted from the tricycle. SPO1 Eduardo Basilio did the
same, went inside the office, and left the accused-appellant and the
victim alone. The victim took a few steps and drew his .45 caliber gun
which was tucked in a holster on the right side of his chest. Accused-
appellant then fired his M-16 armalite upward as a warning shot.
Undaunted, the victim still drew his gun. Accused-appellant then shot
the victim on the head, which caused the latters instantaneous death.
Accused-appellant later surrendered to the stations Chief of Police.

The RTC Ruling

The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime charged. The RTC held that the
claim of self-defense by the accused was unavailing due to the absence of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. The dispositive portion of the RTC Judgment
reads:

WHEREFORE, the accused SPO2 Lolito Nacnac is found

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. Taking into
account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the Court
hereby sentences him to an indeterminate penalty ranging from EIGHT
YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to FOURTEEN YEARS
of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of
the deceased (1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, (2) P100,000.00
as actual damages, (3) P50,000.00 as moral damages, and (4) P20,000.00
as attorneys fees. Costs against the accused.[6]

The CA Ruling

On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC. It held that the essential and
primary element of unlawful aggression was lacking. It gave credence to the
finding of the trial court that no one else saw the victim drawing his weapon and
pointing it at accused Senior Police Officer 2 (SPO2) Lolito T.
Nacnac. The fallo of the CA Decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and
the challenged Judgment dated May 23, 2007 in Criminal Case No.
10750-14 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.[7]

On August 25, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution, denying Nacnacs petition for
review for failure to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error
in the challenged decision and resolution as to warrant the exercise of this Courts
appellate jurisdiction.

On October 11, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Courts
Resolution dated August 25, 2010. On March 21, 2012, this Court granted the
Motion and reinstated the petition. Petitioner raises the following issues:

1. [Whether the CA erroneously held that] the victims drawing of his

handgun or pointing it at the petitioner is not sufficient to constitute
unlawful aggression based on existing jurisprudence.

2. [Whether the CA incorrectly appreciated the photo] showing the

victim holding his handgun in a peculiar manner despite the fact that no
expert witness was presented to testify thereto x x x.

3. [Whether petitioner] has met the second and third requisites of self-
defense x x x.[8]

Petitioner argues that he did not receive a just and fair judgment based on the
following: (1) the trial court did not resort to expert testimony and wrongly
interpreted a photograph; (2) the trial court ignored the evidence proving unlawful
aggression by the victim; (3) the trial court ignored the two gun reports and two
empty shells found at the crime scene which support the claim that petitioner fired
a warning shot; and (4) the trial court failed to appreciate petitioners act of self-
defense. Petitioner also claims that the CA gravely erred in not giving proper
weight and due consideration to the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG).

In its Comment[9] dated April 27, 2011, the OSG avers that petitioner is entitled to
an acquittal, or at the very least, not one but two mitigating circumstances.

Our Ruling
We revisit Our ruling in the instant case.

The Revised Penal Code provides the requisites for a valid self-defense claim:

ART. 11. Justifying circumstances.The following do not incur any

criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided

that the following circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.

Unlawful Aggression

Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense. We explained,

Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this
justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other
elements are present.[10] It would presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected
attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person not a mere threatening
or intimidating attitude but most importantly, at the time the defensive action was
taken against the aggressor. x x x There is aggression in contemplation of the law
only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life. The peril
sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not just speculative. [11]

As We held:

Even the cocking of a rifle without aiming the firearm at any particular
target is not sufficient to conclude that ones life was in imminent danger.
Hence, a threat, even if made with a weapon, or the belief that a person
was about to be attacked, is not sufficient. It is necessary that the intent
be ostensibly revealed by an act of aggression or by some external acts
showing the commencement of actual and material unlawful
aggression.[12]
The following exchange showing actual and material unlawful aggression
transpired during the examination of petitioner:[13]

Atty. Lazo: At any rate, when you again prevented them from getting the
tricycle telling them again that they should not get the tricycle,
what happened next?

Accused: When police officer Basilio alighted from the tricycle SPO1
Espejo also alighted sir.

Q What did Doddie Espejo do when he alighted from the tricycle?

A I saw him hold his firearm tucked on his right waist. (witness
demonstrating by placing his right hand at his right sideways).
And he was left handed, sir.

Q And what happened next?

A When I saw him holding his firearm that was the time I fired a
warning shot, sir.

Q And when you fired [a] warning shot, what happened next?

A He drew his firearm, sir.

Q When he drew his firearm, what did you do?

A When he drew his firearm I shot him [on] his head once, sir.

xxxx
Atty. Cajigal:

Q By the way, what kind of firearm did the victim draw from his waist?
A Cal. 45, sir.
Q What firearm did you use in defending yourself?

A M-16 armalite, sir.

xxxx
 Q Alright, you mean to tell the Honorable Court then that at the time that
you pointed or squeezed the trigger of your gun the cal. 45 was
already pointed at you?
A Yes, sir.

Q Did you ever observe if he squeezed the trigger but the gun [was]
already pointed at you?

A He just pointed his firearm at me, sir.

Q Who first pointed his firearm, the victim pointed his firearm at you
before you pointed your firearm at him?

A The victim, sir.

Q In short, it was the victim whose gun was first pointed at you?
A Yes, sir.

Q And that was the time when you raised your armalite and also pointed
the same at him is that right?

A Yes, that was the time that I shot him, sir. (Emphasis supplied.)

According to the trial court, petitioners claim that the victim pointed his gun at
petitioner was a mere afterthought. It ruled that petitioners sworn statement and
direct testimony as well as the testimonies of SPO1 Eduardo Basilio and SPO2
Roosevelt Ballesteros only established that the victim drew his gun. The trial court
went on to differentiate the act of drawing a gun and pointing it at a target. It held
that the mere act of drawing a gun cannot be considered unlawful aggression. In
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, the CA affirmed the trial courts
findings and further held that petitioner had fuller control of his physical and
mental faculties in view of the victims drunken state. It concluded that the
likelihood of the victim committing unlawful aggression in his inebriated state was
very slim.[14]

We disagree. The characterization as a mere afterthought of petitioners testimony

on the presence of unlawful aggression is not supported by the records.

The following circumstances negate a conviction for the killing of the victim:
 (1) The drunken state of the victim;
(2) The victim was also a police officer who was professionally trained at
shooting;
(3) The warning shot fired by petitioner was ignored by the victim;
(4) A lawful order by petitioner was ignored by the victim; and
(5) The victim was known for his combative and drunken behavior.

As testified by the victims companion, SPO1 Basilio, petitioner ordered him and
the victim not to leave because they were on duty. SPO1 Basilio also confirmed
that the victim was inebriated and had uttered invectives in response to petitioners
lawful order.[15]

Ordinarily, as pointed out by the lower court, there is a difference between the
act of drawing ones gun and the act of pointing ones gun at a target. The
former cannot be said to be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
In People v. Borreros,[16] We ruled that for unlawful aggression to be
attendant, there must be a real danger to life or personal safety. Unlawful
aggression requires an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent
danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude x x x.
Here, the act of the [deceased] of allegedly drawing a gun from his waist
cannot be categorized as unlawful aggression. Such act did not put in real
peril the life or personal safety of appellant.

The facts surrounding the instant case must, however, be differentiated from
current jurisprudence on unlawful aggression. The victim here was a trained police
officer. He was inebriated and had disobeyed a lawful order in order to settle a
score with someone using a police vehicle. A warning shot fired by a fellow police
officer, his superior, was left unheeded as he reached for his own firearm and
pointed it at petitioner. Petitioner was, therefore, justified in defending himself
from an inebriated and disobedient colleague.Even if We were to disbelieve the
claim that the victim pointed his firearm at petitioner, there would still be a finding
of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. We quote with approval the OSGs
argument[17] on this point:
A police officer is trained to shoot quickly and accurately. A police
officer cannot earn his badge unless he can prove to his trainors that he
can shoot out of the holster quickly and accurately x x x. Given this
factual backdrop, there is reasonable basis to presume that the appellant
indeed felt his life was actually threatened. Facing an armed police
 officer like himself, who at that time, was standing a mere five meters
from the appellant, the [latter] knew that he has to be quick on the draw.
It is worth emphasizing that the victim, being a policeman himself, is
presumed to be quick in firing.

Hence, it now becomes reasonably certain that in this specific case, it

would have been fatal for the appellant to have waited for SPO1 Espejo
to point his gun before the appellant fires back.

Reasonable Means Employed

To successfully invoke self-defense, another requisite is that the means employed

by the accused must be reasonably commensurate to the nature and the extent of
the attack sought to be averted.[18]

Supporting petitioners claim of self-defense is the lone gunshot wound suffered by

the victim. The nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are
constantly and unremittingly considered as important indicia.[19] In People v.
Catbagan,[20] We aptly held:

The means employed by the person invoking self-defense is

reasonable if equivalent to the means of attack used by the original
aggressor. Whether or not the means of self-defense is reasonable
depends upon the nature or quality of the weapon, the physical
condition, the character, the size and other circumstances of the
aggressor; as well as those of the person who invokes self-defense;
and also the place and the occasion of the assault.

In the instant case, the lone wound inflicted on the victim supports the argument
that petitioner feared for his life and only shot the victim to defend himself. The
lone gunshot was a reasonable means chosen by petitioner in defending himself in
view of the proximity of the armed victim, his drunken state, disobedience of an
unlawful order, and failure to stand down despite a warning shot.
Lack of Sufficient Provocation
The last requisite for self-defense to be appreciated is lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself or herself. As gleaned
from the findings of the trial court, petitioner gave the victim a lawful order and
fired a warning shot before shooting the armed and drunk victim. Absent from the
shooting incident was any evidence on petitioner sufficiently provoking the victim
prior to the shooting.

All told, We are convinced that petitioner was only defending himself on the night
he shot his fellow police officer. The rule is that factual findings of the trial
court and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.[21] This rule is
binding except where the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance.[22] As earlier
pointed out, the trial court did not consider certain facts and circumstances that
materially affect the outcome of the instant case. We must, therefore, acquit
petitioner.

Given the peculiar circumstances of this case, We find that the prosecution was
unable to establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner. Even the OSG
shares this view in its Comment appealing for his acquittal.

WHEREFORE, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The CA

Decision dated July 20, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 30907
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner SPO2 Lolito T. Nacnac
is ACQUITTED of homicide on reasonable doubt.

The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to

immediately RELEASE petitioner from custody, unless he is being held for some
other lawful cause, and to INFORM this Court within five (5) days from receipt of
this Decision of the date petitioner was actually released from confinement.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 213699, September 28, 2016

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. P/SUPT. ROGER JAMES BRILLANTES, PO3 PETER PAUL
PABLICO, AND PO11 NOEL FABIA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 215008

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. POLICE SENIOR INSPECTOR2 DANTE G.

YANG, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In G.R. No. 213699, petitioner assails the Decision3 and Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated January
14, 2014 and July 21, 2014, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 127487. The assailed CA Decision nullified and set
aside the Decision dated January 20, 2012, as well as the Order dated May 16, 2012 of the Ombudsman, which
dismissed respondents Brillantes, Pablico and Fabia from the Philippine National Police (PNP), in an administrative
case for oppression, grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a police officer; while the CA Resolution denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and modified the appellate court's January 14, 2014 Decision.

In G.R. No. 215008, petitioner questions the Decision5 dated July 24, 2014 and Amended Decision6dated October
15, 2014, of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 127647. The questioned CA Decision reversed and set aside the same
Decision dated January 20, 2012, and Order dated May 16, 2012 of the Ombudsman which also dismissed
respondent Yang from the PNP. The assailed Amended Decision denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration and
modified the July 24, 2014 CA Decision.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Herein respondents were officers of the PNP who, at the time material to this case, were assigned at the District
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Intelligence and Investigation Division, Quezon City District Command, Camp Karingal, Quezon City.

On October 15, 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 162, issued an Order of Arrest7 against
twenty-three (23) persons who stand charged in an Information for twenty-one (21) counts of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with ransom. Among those ordered to be arrested was "a certain Ali." 8 chanrob leslaw

Subsequently, a group of police officers, consisting of thirty-eight (38) members, who all belonged to the Quezon
City District Command's Anti Terrorism Operations Team, was formed in order to effect the arrest or the persons
named in the above Order of Arrest. This group included herein respondents, together with a certain PO2 ReynaIdo
Yap (PO2 Yap). As a result of the group's operation on March 10, 2006, a certain Allan Almoite (Almoite) was
arrested in Quezon City. In respondents' Joint Affidavit of Arrest,9 as well as respondent Brillantes' Special
Report10 dated March 12, 2006, Almoite was identified as the same person who carries the aliases "Alih Ambing"
and "Alih Bin Nasser" and that his identification and subsequent arrest was the product of a series of surveillance
and other follow-up operations. The report alleged that he is a bomb expert of the Rajah Sulaiman Islamic
Movement which has close ties with the Abu Sayyaf Group and that he is linked to a series of bombings in
Zamboanga City as well as the 2005 Valentine's Day bombing in Makati City. As incident to Almoite's arrest, the
anti-terrorism team conducted a search of his residence which yielded unlicensed explosives consisting of an "MK2
fragmentation grenade," three (3) pieces of "40 MM Ammunition (live)," "one (1) pc. 1/2 lbs. C4 Explosive," "one
(1) pc. 1/4 lb. block of C4," "two 2-and-1/2 meters of detonating cord," "twenty-seven (27) pcs. non-electric
blasting cap with time fuse," and several strands of electric wire.11 chanroble slaw

Almoite was then detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City and was subsequently charged with violation of P.D. No.
1866,12 as amended by R.A. No. 8294,13 for his unlawful possession of explosives.14 chanrobleslaw

On March 17, 2006, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) conducted a physical and psychological examination
of Almoite based on the latter's complaint that he was tortured during his detention. Subsequently, the Forensic
and Medical Division of the CHR issued a report indicating that physical injuries were found on different parts of
Almoite's body and that these injuries are consistent with torture and ill-treatment.15 chanroblesl aw

On June 21, 2006, the RTC which issued the arrest warrant came out with an Order which, among others, directed
the release of Almoite on the ground that he was not identified as the same person mentioned in the Information
as "Ali" and that neither was the name "Allan Almoite y Morales" mentioned in the same Information for kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with ransom.16 chanrobles law

Thereafter, Almoite filed an administrative complaint against herein respondents for oppression, grave misconduct
and conduct unbecoming a police officer before the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices then came up with a
report finding respondents guilty of simple misconduct and recommending to the Ombudsman that they be
penalized with suspension from office for three (3) months without pay.17 chanrobles law

However, on January 20, 2012, the Ombudsman issued its questioned Decision finding respondents
administratively liable for grave misconduct and imposed upon them the penalty of dismissal from the service. The
dispositive portion of the Ombudsman's Decision reads, thus: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

WHEREFORE, [this] Office finds respondents P/SUPT. ROGER JAMES BRILLANTES, PO3 NOEL FABIA, PO3 PETER
PAUL PABLICO, PO2 REYNALDO YAP and PO1 DANTE YANG GUILTY or Grave Misconduct and hereby metes upon
them the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits,
and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service.

SO ORDERED.18 chanroblesvi rt uallawl ibra ry

Respondents filed a motion tor reconsideration but the Office of the Ombudsman denied it in its Order 19dated May
16, 2012.

Respondents Brillantes, Pablico and Fabia then filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court assailing the above Decision and Order of the Ombudsman. The petition was docketed as CA G.R. SP No.
127487.

In the same manner, respondent Yang filed a separate petition for review with the CA questioning the same
January 20, 2012 Decision and May 16, 2012 Order of the Ombudsman. The petition was docketed as CA G.R. SP
No. 127647.

In its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 127487, dated January 14, 2014, the CA ruled in respondents' favor and set aside
the assailed Decision and Order of the Ombudsman. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of public respondent Ombudsman
dated January 20, 2012 and the Order dated May 16, 2012 are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE Petitioners
are ABSOLVED from administrative liability. The Chief PNP, Camp Crame Quezon City
is DIRECTED to REINSTATE PETITIONERS to their former positions.

SO ORDERED.20 chanroblesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

The Office of the Ombudsman filed a motion for reconsideration. On the other hand, respondents filed a
Manifestation with Motion21 praying that the above dispositive portion of the CA Decision be amended to include the
payment of respondents' backwages from the time of their illegal dismissal up to the date of their actual
reinstatement. Respondents also prayed that the CA Decision which orders their reinstatement be immediately
enforced.

In its Resolution dated July 21, 2014, the CA denied the Ombudsman's Motion for Reconsideration and granted
respondents' Manifestation with Motion and modified the dispositive portion of its January 14, 2014 Decision to
read as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of public respondent Ombudsman
elated January 20, 2012 and the Order dated May 16, 2012 are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners are
absolved from administrative liability. The Chief Philippine National Police (PNP), Camp Crame, Quezon City is
directed to reinstate petitioners to their former positions upon receipt or this decision. Likewise, the said office
must pay their backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of their dismissal up to the time of their
reinstatement upon finality of this decision.

SO ORDERED.22 chanroblesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

Subsequently, the CA rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 127647 on July 24, 2014, granting POI Yang's
petition for review by reversing the Decision of the Ombudsman and also absolving him from administrative
liability. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads, thus: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 20, 2012 and the Order dated May 16,
2012 of the Office or the Ombudsman are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Police Senior Inspector Dante G.
Yang is ABSOLVED from administrative liability and is deemed ENTITLED to retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.23 chanroblesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

The Office of the Ombudsman also filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On the other hand, respondent Yang filed an
Omnibus Motion consisting of an Opposition to herein petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion to
Amend/Modify Decision to Include Payment of Backwages.24 Yang prayed that petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration be denied and that the CA Decision be affirmed with modification by requiring the payment of his
backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of his dismissal up to the date of his reinstatement.

In its Amended Decision dated October 15, 2014, the CA denied the Ombudsman's Motion for Reconsideration and
granted respondent Yang's Motion to Amend by modifying its July 24, 2014 Decision to read as follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated July 24,
2014 of this Court is MODIFIED to the extent that petitioner is likewise deemed ENTITLED to backwages and
other monetary benefits from the time of his dismissal up to the date of his retirement, plus retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.25 cralawredchan roble svirtual lawlib rary

Hence, the present petitions filed by the Office of the Ombudsman. In G.R. No. 213699, petitioner contends
that:ChanRob les Vi rtualaw lib rary

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDING OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN THAT
RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.26 chanroble svirtual lawlib rary

In the same manner, the Office of the Ombudsman raised the following ground in G.R. No. 215008, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE OMBUDSMAN'S FINDINGS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, THEREBY SUBSTITUTING ITS OWN JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
OFFICE.27 chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

Petitioner's basic contention in both petitions is that the Ombudsman properly found respondents liable for grave
misconduct based on substantial evidence. In support of its position, petitioner's mam argument is that
respondents failed to establish that Almoite was the same person referred to as "Ali" in the RTC's order of arrest.

The petition lacks merit.

Misconduct, in the administrative sense, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action.28 It is an intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior, especially by a government official.29 Misconduct is considered grave if accompanied by
corruption, a clear intent to violate the law, or a flagrant disregard of established rules, which must all
be supported by substantial evidence.30 If the misconduct does not involve any of the additional
elements to qualify the misconduct as grave, the person charged may only be held liable for simple
misconduct.31 chanrobleslaw

Moreover, in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.32 The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable
ground to believe that a person is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence
might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.33 chanrobleslaw

In the present case, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the rulings of two Divisions of the CA finding
that respondents are not guilty of grave misconduct.

Respondents were acting on the strength of a warrant which directs the arrest of certain personalities including one
who goes by the alias of "Ali". The validity of the subject arrest warrant issued by the RTC may be put in question
but this is not the issue in the instant petition. The matter sought to be resolved here is whether or not
respondents are guilty of grave misconduct in the arrest and detention of Almoite.

The Court agrees with the CA that no substantial evidence was adduced to show the presence of the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule on the part of respondents when
they arrested and detained Almoite. Neither arc respondents liable for simple misconduct as there was also no
showing that they are guilty of any intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior.

The settled rule is that law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duties in the
absence of proof to the contrary.34 Almoite failed to show that respondents have any reason to arrest him for
no cause or that they were impelled by any unlawful motive to arrest him. As found by the CA, respondents acted
in good faith and in the honest belief, as based on the information they have gathered from their surveillance and
intelligence operations which points to Almoite as the same "Ali" being referred to in the warrant of arrest. As
pointed out by the CA, Almoite goes by different names or aliases. Nonetheless, he was sufficiently identified
through a profile as well as a cartographic sketch provided by a detained suspected terrorist who pointed to
Almoite as the same person who goes by the alias of Ali Ambing.

Petitioner contends that the cartographic sketch presented by the police "cannot be linked to [Almoite] inasmuch
as no official photo of the latter was presented by respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman showing that
Almoite is indeed the person depicted in the cartographic sketch." 35 But herein respondents arc acting under and
are dealing with peculiar circumstances. In fact, petitioner agrees with the CA in its statement that criminal
elements use different aliases to hide their true names or identities and to avoid arrest and prosecution. In the
instant case, Almoite was also known as Alih Bin Nasser Morambi, Alih Muallamin Murabbi and Abu Alih.36 However,
whatever name Almoite may have been using, the fact remains that the cartographic sketch provided by the police
informant fit his profile, which led respondents to conduct further surveillance and later conclude that he was
indeed the Abu Sayyaf bomber they were looking for.

As earlier discussed, in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary, respondents are presumed to
have regularly performed their duties and that they acted in good faith and with good motives. In
common usage, the term good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty
of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon
inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even
through technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of
facts which render transaction unconscientious.37 In short, good faith is actually a question of
intention.38 Although this is something internal, a person's intention can be ascertained by relying not
on his own protestations of good faith, which is self-serving, but on evidence of his conduct and
outward acts.39 Indeed, there is no showing in the present case that, in arresting Almoite, respondents were
driven by any motive other than to apprehend a suspected bomber who is linked to notoriously known terrorist
groups. On the contrary, their operation leading to the arrest of Almoite was based on data gathered through
intelligence which was later on confirmed when they recovered several pieces of highly explosive materials from his
possession. Indeed, this is a sufficient validation of their belief in good faith that Almoite is the Ali Ambing they
were looking for.

Even assuming that respondents committed a mistake in identifying Almoite as the same person referred to as Ali
in the warrant of arrest, the fact remains that they have sufficient information to establish probable cause to arrest
Ali as, in fact, a warrant for his arrest was issued.

In the case of US. v. Marshall,40 the police had art arrest warrant for a person named Beasley and, based on
information from an informant, mistakenly arrested a person named Marshall thinking he was Beasley. A
subsequent search of Marshall's person revealed that he was carrying a loaded gun. After the denial of his motion
to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search was illegal, Marshall pleaded guilty to a federal gun charge.
Marshall later appealed and raised a single issue, whether the gun seized incident to his arrest should have been
suppressed. In its ruling against Marshall, the United States Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit had occasion to discuss
that in a circumstance where the police mistake a person for someone else they seek to validly arrest, the arrest is
constitutional if the arresting officers (1) have probable cause to arrest the person sought, and (2) reasonably
believe that the person arrested is the person sought. In affirming the conviction of Marshall, the court also held
that the arrest warrant gave the police a sufficient basis to arrest Beasley and, taking into consideration the totality
of the circumstances, the court found that the actions of the police in thinking that Marshall was Beasley were
reasonable.

In Hill v. California,41 decided by the United States Supreme Court, and which was cited in the Marshallcase, it was
held that when the police have probable cause to arrest one party, and the arresting officers had a reasonable,
good-faith belief that the person arrested was in fact the one being sought for a crime, then the arrest of the
second party is a valid arrest.

From the foregoing, it is clear that courts upheld the actions of the police in mistakenly apprehending a person
whom they believe in good faith as the one they are seeking for the commission of a crime. Applying this principle
in the instant case, even granting that respondents mistakenly identified Almoite as Ali, they cannot be held guilty
of misconduct for his arrest because they acted in their belief in good faith that Almoite was indeed Ali. Their act in
arresting Almoite was not proven to be predicated on or attended by corruption, a clear intent to violate the law, or
a flagrant disregard of established rules.

As aptly cited by the CA, this Court, speaking through Justice Malcolm, in the case of U.S. v. Santos,42ruled
that:ChanRob les Vi rtualaw lib rary

One should however not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle
reasoning of a judicial officer. Often he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste on
his own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal. To err is human. Even the most conscientious officer must at
times be misled. If, therefore, under trying circumstances and in a zealous effort to obey the orders of his superior
officer and to enforce the law, a peace officer makes a mere mistake in good faith, he should be exculpated.
Otherwise, the courts will put a premium on crime and will terrorize peace officers through a fear of themselves
violating the law.
While the issue in the said case is the liability of a police officer who arrested and detained suspected criminals in
the absence of a warrant, the Court finds that the principle enunciated therein, as quoted above, is applicable to
the instant case.

Lastly, as to the alleged torture, it is true that the physical examination conducted by the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) indicates that, at the time of examination, Almoite had slight physical injuries consisting of abrasions
and contusions on different parts of his body.43 However, the Court agrees with the findings of both the two
Divisions of the CA that Almoite failed to specifically and categorically identify respondents as the persons who
supposedly maltreated him. This is evident in the report of the CHR.44 It was only in his Sinumpaang
Reklamo,45 which he subsequently filed, that Almoite implicated respondents and made a sweeping statement that
they were the ones who tortured him. Nonetheless, the records at hand show no competent evidence to prove this
allegation. It is settled that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.46 Hence, for Almoite's
failure to substantiate his accusations, the administrative complaint against respondents was correctly dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
dated January 14, 2014 and July 21, 2014, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 127487, and the Decision dated July
24, 2014 and Amended Decision, dated October 15, 2014, of the same court, in CA-G.R. SP No. 127647,
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.