Culture & Psychology

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Modes of Tension Work within the Complex Self

Emily Abbey and Rachel Joffe Falmagne
Culture Psychology 2008; 14; 95
DOI: 10.1177/1354067X07082749

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 Article

Abstract As part of increased attention to the complexity of ‘self’

and subjectivity, Falmagne recently presented a theory in which
‘self’ is seen as constituted through the dialectic among processes
at societal, local and ‘personal’ (i.e., agentive) levels. The ‘self’, so
constituted, can be hybrid and filled with tensions, yet it remains
substantial rather than fluid. Building from this perspective and
related approaches, the aim of this article is to contribute to the
growing understanding of self complexity by focusing on how
individuals create cohesive ‘selves’ and ‘minds’ despite the
presence of tension and contradiction. Our focus involves a
detailed textual analysis of the ‘tension work’ that individuals
perform as they reason through contradictory beliefs. Based on
these analyses, this article identifies three unique strategies for
creating cohesion amidst contradiction.

Key Words complexity, contradiction, dialectic, mind, self,

tension work

Emily Abbey
Ramapo College of New Jersey, USA
Rachel Joffe Falmagne
Clark University, USA

Modes of Tension Work within the

Complex Self
In the past decades, researchers in the social sciences have given new
attention to the complexity of ‘self’, gradually distancing from notions
of a singular, bounded self, as ideas of social constitution, multiplicity
and hybridity increasingly find purchase. With this increased focus
of attention come perspectives that conceptualize self as cohesive,
despite the presence of discordant and potentially conflicting aspects.
Dialogical approaches, for instance, consider the self as composed of an
array of relatively autonomous I-positions, and suggest that diverging,
even opposed positions, are joined through dialogue (e.g., Hermans,
2001; Hermans & Kempen, 1993). From a different theoretical basis,
some Chicana feminists highlight the experience of hybridity and non-
belonging, putting forth notions such as ‘mestiza consciousness’
(Anzaldúa, 1999) to describe the experience of transcending
dichotomies through profound tolerance for ambiguity.

Culture & Psychology Copyright © 2008 SAGE Publications

(Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore) http://cap.sagepub.com
Vol. 14(1): 95–113 [DOI: 10.1177/1354067X07082749]

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Culture & Psychology 14(1)

As part of this increased attention to the complexity of ‘self’,

Falmagne (2004) has argued for the need to conceptualize human
functioning within a broad, societal frame of reference that draws on
macro-social as well as local processes of social constitution and
includes both the material and the discursive constituents of the social
world. The theory formulates a systemic account in which the consti-
tution of ‘self’ results from the dialectic interplay of discursive and
material processes at macro-social, local and personal levels.1 The ‘self’,
so constituted, can be hybrid, filled with tensions, yet it remains
substantial rather than fluid.
Building on this perspective and related approaches to self com-
plexity, this article focuses on how individuals create cohesive ‘selves’
despite the presence of tension and contradiction in their thinking and
their personal investments. Our focus involves a detailed textual
analysis of moments where individuals are reasoning through con-
tradictions in their beliefs. We suggest that there may be an array of
strategies for creating cohesion amidst contradiction as individuals
carry out what we term ‘tension work’, and in this article three such
modes are considered in detail.

Perspectives on Self Complexity

Falmagne’s Societal Approach
At the center of Falmagne’s (2004) systemic account of the constitution
of ‘self’ and ‘mind’ is the dialectic interplay of processes at three levels
of analysis: societal, local and personal. Two ideas are key. First,
processes at the local and the macro-social level are interdependent
and complementary. In particular, various poststructural accounts in
the past decades have emphasized the notion that ‘self’ is a continu-
ally ‘negotiated’ construction, positioned and repositioned through
local discursive processes. The theory incorporates such local discur-
sive processes but, in contrast to previous approaches, emphasizes
that any local discursive positioning is itself configured by, and
deployed within, processes operating at a societal level: ‘Local
negotiations of power and of subject positions take place within the
macro-level material and discursive social relations . . . and are con-
figured (though not determined) by those relations’ (Falmagne, 2004,
p. 827). For instance, it is noted that a local, contextually situated
discursive move of positioning oneself as an authority depends upon
the existence of a societal-level discourse/structure of authority
(i.e., based on status or expertise) to provide its meaning and legit-
imacy. Without such a societal-level discourse and structure, the local

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 Abbey & Falmagne Modes of Tension Work

discursive move would either be meaningless or have an entirely

different meaning.
Second, the constitution of ‘self’ and ‘mind’ results from dialectic
interplay between those processes of social constitution and individual
agency. While social subjects contribute to social reproduction by
instantiating processes of social constitution in their subjectivity, their
actions and their thinking, they are, equally, active agents who appro-
priate, resist, transform or modulate available societal discourses,
who negotiate their social location, and who discursively co-construct
their local positioning in specific situations. The person agentively
constructs his/her own identity over time by appropriating, contesting
or reinterpreting available discourses and positioning himself/herself
in particular ways in the discursive practices in which she/he has
participated (Falmagne, 2004, pp. 839–840). However, this agentive
work has a bounded flexibility, as the person’s agency is not only
constructed within local and societal level processes but also
constrained by the same. Because the individual is located, individual
agency is, of necessity, only deployed locally, and its effect must be
produced through a dialectic engagement with systemic processes that
both constrain and enable those local negotiations (pp. 839–840).

Dialogical Approaches and Postcolonial Feminist Approaches

Dialogical approaches (Hermans, 2001; Hermans & Kempen, 1993;
Valsiner, 2002) are also concerned with the complexity of the self.
Theorizing unity amidst multiplicity, Hermans’ dialogical approach
combines James’ distinction between the self as knower (I) and the self
as known (me) (James, 1890) with Bakhtin’s philosophical notion of
dialogism (Bakhtin, 1981, 1929/1984). Metaphorically, Hermans
suggests that the self is composed of an array of I-positions and
remains unified as these positions, ‘endowed’ with voices, dialogue
with one another: ‘The I fluctuates among different, and even opposed,
positions and has the capacity to imaginatively endow each position
with a voice so that dialogical relations between positions can be
established’ (Hermans, 1996, pp. 11–12). In the dialogical self there can
be contradictions, and different voices may disagree or even directly
oppose one another, yet the self is understood to remain whole as these
voices are united through dialogue.
Of particular relevance, the dialogical perspective circumvents the
frustration of a singular and bounded Cartesian self while maintaining
a self that is ‘substantial’ despite its internal heterogeneity (for a
detailed discussion of this point, see Salgado & Hermans, 2005). That
said, a limitation lies in the fact that societal-level processes of social

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Culture & Psychology 14(1)

constitution generally have not been fully integrated into the theoreti-
cal formulation. The work of Bhatia (2002) and Bhatia and Ram (2001)
offers one notable exception to this relative non-attendance: Drawing
from a social-historical frame of reference, Bhatia and Ram argue that
for some non-western and non-European immigrants, the close link
between United States immigration laws and racist ideologies can be
seen as constructive in the formation of certain I-positions (Bhatia &
Ram, 2001, p. 303).
In contrast to most dialogical approaches, some Chicana feminists
have provided contributions to theory on self complexity that explicitly
integrate societal-level processes into theory on ‘self’ and subjectivity,
and on that basis have offered several important theoretical constructs.
For instance, as noted above, Gloria Anzaldúa (1999) introduces the
notion of ‘mestiza consciousness’ arising through experiences of simul-
taneously belonging and yet not belonging to various social and
cultural spaces. She describes mestiza consciousness as a consciousness
‘of the Borderlands’ (p. 99), as one that sees beyond dichotomies, holds
a profound tolerance for ambiguity, and is held together by tension.
From a similar, historicized perspective in which she theorizes the
hybrid and heterogeneous self produced by the border experience of
identifying with both the dominant and the marginalized social
group(s), Lugones (1994/1996) introduces the notion of a ‘curdled’ self.
Using the metaphor of making mayonnaise, where if oil and egg yolk
are mixed with haste they curdle into impure units, ‘yolky oil and oily
yolk’ (Lugones, 1994/1996, p. 276), Lugones points to a hybrid and
heterogeneous self that defies fragmentation through an inherent
‘curdled’ impurity: Curdles are distinct from one another, a distinctive-
ness that does not rely on homogeneity.

Toward an Account of Tension Work in a Complex Self

As here briefly summarized, the past decades have seen different
theoretical approaches to the complex self in which, broadly speaking,
tensions are seen as generative (e.g., Josephs & Valsiner, 1998). Yet these
theoretical approaches—the ‘mestiza consciousness’, the ‘curdled self’,
the ‘dialogical self’ or the systemic model presented here—need
further elaboration. The aim of this article is to contribute to an under-
standing of the strategies people employ to produce cohesion in a
complex self. Building on the theoretical approaches just discussed, we
examine in detail, using three mini-case studies, different ways in
which individuals manage to preserve the cohesiveness of ‘self’ and
‘mind’ despite the presence of tensions and contradictions in their

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 Abbey & Falmagne Modes of Tension Work

thinking and their personal investments, by agentively engaging in

‘tension work’. Through in-depth textual analysis of individuals as
they work through conflicting beliefs in particular situations, we
identify three modes of tension work: ‘destabilizing’, ‘self-moderating’
and ‘making inclusive exceptions’.
For this purpose, we make use of a series of interviews, conducted
as part of a larger project that explored the reasoning of people
considered as social agents occupying particular social locations and
with particular cultural histories (Falmagne, 2003; Falmagne & Iselin,
2002). The project maintains two interlinked modes of analysis:
analyses characterizing the knowledges and other resources involved
in specific ‘moments’ of reasoning; and, at a broader level, the con-
struction of a profile of each participant that particularizes her in
terms of her social location, her cultural history and family history, so
as to provide an interpretive context for her reasoning (Falmagne,
2006a; Falmagne & Iselin, 2002). It is important to note that a partici-
pant’s cultural history and social location are used interpretively to
understand her as a particular reasoner and to ground her moments
of reasoning in her unique experience in the world, and never
causally, or as a basis upon which to generalize to her social group.
The same perspective and analytical strategy guide the analyses to be
discussed here.
In terms of the present analysis, ‘self’ and ‘mind’ are construed as
closely intertwined and formed through the interplay of the person’s
agency and the forces of social constitution within her social-historical
context. ‘Self’ encompasses a person’s modes of thinking, and thought
is likewise guided by the person’s sense of self—thought and affect are
interlinked. The contradictions and tensions between beliefs the person
encounters deeply implicate her ‘self’. Given these links between
‘mind’ and ‘self’, the modes of tension work present in the person’s
reasoning are understood also to reflect her attempts toward the
achievement of a cohesive self more broadly.
That said, our present focus is on the microanalysis of what the
person does as she reasons through tensions and contradictions. The
following sections examine case studies illustrating different modes of
tension work. For each, the reader will first find a brief profile of the
participant, particularizing her in terms of her social location, her
cultural and personal history, and the salient themes that emerge from
her overall approach to reasoning, a profile that reflects the links
between self and mind. This is followed by an in-depth, textual,
consideration of the specific mode of tension work that characterized
her engagement with tensions and contradictions.

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Culture & Psychology 14(1)

Of the women2 in the baseline project whose transcripts were

analyzed specifically with the present focus, three cases have been
selected for presentation below. They were selected because their
reasoning displayed contradictions, and because together they illustrate
interesting contrasts in the moment-by-moment mode of management
of those tensions in the service of a cohesive ‘self’.

Three Modes of Tension Work

Clara
‘Clara’ is a 21-year-old Caucasian woman of Jewish heritage, who was
raised in an upper-middle-class community in the Northeastern United
States, a community that she describes as predominantly white and
protestant. Clara has always disliked the community in which she grew
up, primarily because of its racial, ethnic and religious homogeneity.
She notes explicitly an instance during her childhood where she and her
brother were taunted for their religious affiliation. Clara’s mother and
father are married, and both teach at a private school located nearby.
Clara attended this school because she found it more ‘diverse’ than the
public school in her hometown, and though she developed a few
intensely meaningful friendships, her experience was strongly colored
by a sense of being an outsider among otherwise wealthy students.
Though sharing an exceptional talent in mathematics and physics with
her brother, she recalls that until she scored highly on a middle school
achievement test, it was only her brother who was considered com-
petent in such areas. In her third year of a four-year college program,
Clara has become interested in the social sciences, particularly
sociology, though she is not clear on her future career plans.
A prominent theme in Clara’s reasoning is a distrust of others,
especially those who occupy positions of power. For Clara, this distrust
is tied closely to her belief that people are easily (and at times even
unknowingly) motivated in their decision making by prejudicial
thinking rather than some set of basic facts. For instance, when asked
about whether defendants in a criminal case should be particularized
for the judge/jury deciding their fate, Clara argues that she does not
trust either the judge or jury to be able to use such information fairly.
She seems to fear that two people committing similar offenses may be
punished differentially on the basis of their economic standing:
I don’t trust them [jury members] to differentiate correctly between differ-
ences with two people who have committed the same crime. . . . Race and
economic status . . . get taken into as much influence in the courts as they
do in our daily lives.

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 Abbey & Falmagne Modes of Tension Work

Another theme in Clara’s reasoning is her continual emphasis on ‘the

source’. For Clara, dilemmas need to be understood through a careful
account of the history leading up to them. For instance, when ponder-
ing how to approach laws enabling dangerous sex-offenders to live
among ordinary citizens, Clara immediately begins to work back-
wards, asking how the penal system failed offenders in such a way that
they are back in society yet remain potential threats: ‘Why don’t we
take it from the beginning and see when they [offenders] came to the
law in the first place. . . . Obviously something went wrong if we’re
now at the point where he’s living in his house but he’s still danger-
ous’. Clara points out how, in her emphasis on ‘the source’, she parts
ways with many of her peers, who would rather approach dilemmas
a-historically: ‘[Most people are] not looking at the source . . . because
that seems like too much of a problem’.

Mode of Tension Work:‘Destabilizing’

As Clara encounters tensions and contradictions, she often uses a mode
of tension work that can be referred to as ‘destabilizing’ (Falmagne &
Iselin, 2002), for her orientation is to question continually her own
thinking. Seen as a process, destabilizing creates what amounts to a
near constant alternation between different ‘sides’ of an issue, where
as one stance emerges, another immediately questions it.
For instance, in the following example, Clara is discussing the issue
mentioned previously, of whether a defendant’s personal information
should be allowed into a criminal trial. As discussed above, in many
ways, she does not want to allow such information to be used. At the
same time, she appreciates that some personal information (e.g.,
whether it was a defendant’s first or twenty-first offense) could be
important. Engaging with this tension by destabilizing, she argues:
(Stance 1) ‘In one way I want everything to be taken as black and white
. . . and not specific to the people’. She then immediately destabilizes
her first position with a second, stating: (Stance 2) ‘I really would like
every case to . . . be about that individual’. Characteristic of her style
of tension work, Clara moves to ‘undermine’ her second position with
a ‘return’ to her first position—(Stance 1) ‘It’s just that I don’t trust the
people involved enough in our system to let [it be specific to indi-
viduals]’—and back to the other side: (Stance 2) ‘But at the same time
[it should be] based on the specific character of that person’. And then
she switches again: (Stance 1) ‘I don’t trust [the judicial system] so . . .
I’d rather it just treat them exactly the same’. And a few lines later,
back: (Stance 2) ‘But then again, sometimes you do need to . . . really
examine a person’.

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Culture & Psychology 14(1)

In a second example of ‘destabilizing’, Clara is considering the merit

of generalizations (e.g., ‘many women are x’). She oscillates between a
sense that generalizations are problematic because they rob the indi-
vidual of the power to determine his or her own identity, and a sense
that generalizations are necessary, to the extent that they can reveal
societal-level patterns of discrimination. As in the first example, she
engages with the tension between these stances through destabilizing,
arguing first against generalizations: (Stance 1) ‘In my ideal world, we
wouldn’t need to categorize people . . . because we could all just . . . do
our own thing and that would be all right’. Given that in her opinion,
such a world does not exist (‘Obviously we don’t live in a world like
that. We never will. We never have’), Clara then moves to argue that
generalizations are in some ways necessary to expose societal-level
patterns of discrimination: (Stance 2) ‘We need to use them [generaliz-
ations] to reexamine the facts, the way that our society functions’.
Characteristically, this is not the end of her consideration, for Clara
destabilizes immediately this second stance by returning to the side
that is anti-generalization: (Stance 1) ‘Even though we do see a certain
generalization, it’s important to also notice that there’s always going to
be that part that doesn’t function that way’. She, in turn, destabilizes
this stance by mentioning generalizations as a sort of necessary evil
with the following example: (Stance 2) ‘This thing about women being
interrupted more than men in conversations . . . when you really do a
lot of observation . . . you realize it’s really not because of the speed the
women are talking, it’s because of the men that are interrupting’. Clara
then moves again to destabilize, returning to her first stance and
pointing out again that any generalization needs to be seen as such:
(Stance 1) ‘I just think that everything needs to be looked at as
generalization and not facts, and not full . . . black and white’.
Destabilizing, as seen in these examples, is not a mode where one is
merely ‘playing devil’s advocate’, but where one is adamant in one’s
consideration of each side. As a style of tension work, ‘destabilizing’
seems to allow one to represent all of what one thinks about an issue,
without ‘having’ to choose only one side at the exclusion of the other.
In this regard, it can be said that for Clara in these instances, it is exactly
this deep connection to each side of her argument that is critical for
the maintenance of cohesion, for such connection seems to assure the
co-existence of both sides, as neither can dominate.

Molly
As will be discussed shortly, during our interview this second partici-
pant often used a strikingly different mode of engaging with tension.

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 Abbey & Falmagne Modes of Tension Work

The participant, ‘Molly’ is a young Caucasian woman from the

Midwestern United States, and is reluctant to further elaborate on her
family history. Molly spent most of her school-age years in a predomi-
nantly working-class part of a large city where she encountered people
of a variety of ethnic and class backgrounds. When Molly was 10 years
old, her father, a minister for much of his life, divorced her mother.
Following the divorce, her mother, who worked as a secretary, took the
primary role in raising Molly and her older brother. In her second year
of college, Molly has been urged by some members of her family to use
her talent in the ‘hard sciences’ to seek a job that would afford social
mobility. Molly has decided that an interesting career is more import-
ant than a profitable one, and as a double major in environmental
science and biology, she thinks she might, in the future, work to
preserve coastal ecosystems.
For Molly, one theme that stands out during the interviews is an
extreme caution toward attaching absolute certainty to knowledge
claims. This caution does not seem to stem from a relativistic perspec-
tive (i.e., from a view that all knowledge claims are equally valid).
Rather, it is related to her awareness that there are a great number of
‘factors’ that contribute to any situation. She says: ‘There’s . . . so many
different . . . variables in the world, and . . . different things going on
that influence everything’. For Molly, insofar as only a certain number
of these can be considered at any given time, all knowledge claims
must be somewhat tentative. On this basis, she says that while one can
strongly believe in a particular claim, it is impossible to ‘prove’
anything: ‘I don’t think you can ever really prove something
completely’. One cannot ‘prove’ anything, because the addition of a
previously excluded factor could potentially change such a claim.
Also prominent in Molly’s reasoning is an emphasis on considering
power structure, and on the importance of thinking about the views of
those who do not occupy positions of power (and whose opinions, for
this reason, may often go ignored) as well as those who do. For
instance, on the topic of global development, she is asked whether the
United States should ask developing countries to preserve their natural
resources as they industrialize. She agrees that they should do so, yet
points out how the ‘real’ problem lies in the very pressure to industri-
alize: ‘We’ve put a lot of pressure on . . . third world countries to like
develop into what we are’. Focusing on the perspective of those on the
‘other’ side of the issue, she points out how, despite the fact that many
developing countries actually oppose industrialization altogether, the
United States often ignores this and simply assumes industrialization
as the ideal.

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Culture & Psychology 14(1)

Mode of Tension Work:‘Self-Moderating’

As Molly encounters tensions in her thinking, she often engages in a
mode of tension work that can be described as ‘self-moderating’,
because she seems to approach tension from a sort of impartial ‘third
position’ from which different perspectives are given consideration.
Crucially, in contrast to the ‘destabilizing’ mode, where there is deep
engagement with both sides of an issue, in ‘self-moderating’ Molly is
deliberately more removed in her contemplation. In meta-cognitive
reflection, Molly explains that she is aware of her tendency to avoid
commitment to one side of an issue in the name of the middle ground.
She states: ‘I never have my mind made up . . . I am all about the happy
medium’.
In an initial example of the ‘self-moderating’ mode, Molly is
discussing whether companies can, without public consent, expose the
public to chemicals that pose health risks. She says, on the one hand,
that she is against such unbeknownst exposure, on the grounds that it
seems to constitute a disregard for basic human rights by those in pos-
itions of power: ‘It is really that word “impose” . . . I picture someone
. . . being exposed to radiation without their knowledge’. Yet she offers
a competing claim from her perspective as a ‘scientist’: ‘having the
scientific background that I do . . . [if] someone tells me that my risk is
so much . . . I can understand that better than your average person’.
Again, characteristic of a ‘self-moderating’ mode of engagement, Molly
does not support one side over the other, and in contrast to Clara, she
also does not deeply commit to her contrasting viewpoints. Rather, she
maintains a ‘neutral’ third position, stating: ‘I guess I am just some-
where in between’.
In another instance, Molly is considering genetic modification of
food crops, and her dilemma is whether or not such modifications
should be used. On the one hand, she thinks that such modifications
are positive, as they help humans by increasing food production. Yet,
at the same time, Molly is not certain that such modifications should
be made, as she appreciates that some species of insects would be
adversely affected, leading to their demise.
Molly’s approach to this dilemma is characteristic of ‘self-
moderating’ and the preservation of an impartial position in
numerous ways. For one, as she reasons through the dilemma, she
maintains her distance by drastically limiting her movement between
each side of the issue. She begins her contemplation on the side of
insects by arguing: ‘I can’t really . . . say . . . “well our species is more
important,” because . . . our species can’t exist without other species’.
She then offers the contrasting position, saying that some could argue

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 Abbey & Falmagne Modes of Tension Work

that humans are more important than the harmed non-human

animals: ‘But . . . ultimately from . . . the majority perspective . . .
humans are more important, you know?’ These statements made by
Molly mark the end of any movement ‘back-and-forth’, in stark
contrast to the mode of ‘destabilizing’.
Molly’s concluding statement on this issue is also important for
illustrating ‘self-moderating’ and the maintenance of an impartial
third position. In this statement she places an emphasis on the
provisional nature of her thinking by stating: ‘I think . . . ultimately . . .
it would probably be that . . . food . . . would be produced for
. . . people without any . . . thought on its effect on other species I
guess. I don’t know’. This emphasis on the provisional nature of each
view (e.g., ‘probably’) is again suggesting that she speaks from a third
and distanced position, one from which there is no hard and fast
commitment to a particular idea. Equally interesting is how she ends
her brief consideration with the statement ‘I don’t know’, which also
seems suggestive of distancing.
Self-moderation is a mode of tension work that characterizes much
of Molly’s reasoning during the interviews. Self-moderation seems to
allow her to preserve a belief in many sides of an issue without having
to choose, and in this regard, ‘self-moderating’ is ostensibly similar to
‘destabilizing’. However, in terms of the means through which this
‘end’ is achieved, ‘self-moderating’ and ‘destabilizing’, as modes of
tension work, are strikingly different. In a ‘destabilizing’ mode, it is
precisely the deep connection to each side of the argument that seems
to sustain the co-existence of conflicting beliefs—ideas are held together
by that tension. In stark contrast, a ‘self-moderating’ mode seems based
on the distance afforded by the ‘third’ neutral position, and it is that
distance that provides room for conflicting ideas to co-exist.

Lena
The third and final participant we consider, ‘Lena’, offers yet another
approach to the management of tension and contradiction. Lena is a
young Caucasian woman of Jewish heritage; she was raised in an
upper-middle-class family in a ‘diverse’ middle-class community of a
major metropolitan area of the Northeastern United States. Her
mother’s parents are from the Southern USA and her father’s parents
emigrated from Germany, where many members of Lena’s paternal
lineage were interned and perished during World War II. She attended
a private school that she describes as ‘diverse’ but segregated by
income. Her mother is the CEO of a major accounting firm and her
father is an artist. In her second year in college, Lena plans to major in

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Culture & Psychology 14(1)

sociology, minor in philosophy and hold a concentration in Holocaust

and Gender Studies.
A relativistic orientation is central to Lena’s reasoning. During the
interview, she points out that she believes every story can have (at
least) three sides: ‘There’s three sides to every story. There’s her side,
his side, and then the truth’. She continues: ‘If two people are telling
you the same story, it’s always going to be different’. Lena places
specific stress on the fact that these ‘differences’ in ‘the truth’ as people
tell their version of ‘the story’ are unintentional. For instance, regarding
the differing perspectives between a police officer and the accused in
a case involving someone driving while intoxicated, Lena points out
that, as the officer describes to a judge his version of what happened,
he will in fact be unaware that the ‘truth’ will be shaped by his personal
belief: ‘He’s going to try and make it seem through his story that that’s
how it was . . . he won’t even realize that he’s doing it’. Thus, it is not
that individuals are knowingly ‘shifting’ the truth, but that what is
seen as ‘truth’ and individual beliefs are one and the same.
Much of Lena’s reasoning is experientially based, that is, she reasons
on the basis of what has happened in her life, instead of, for instance,
relying on pure logical argument. As one example of such an orien-
tation, asked what she would do if given competing medical diagnoses
and competing treatment options, she states that she would begin with
the least invasive of the options, even if the majority of doctors recom-
mended the alternative treatment. Her reasoning, she explains, is based
on her mother’s recent breast cancer, and the fact that, while numerous
doctors suggested that her mother should have a mastectomy, this
assessment was shown to be mistaken and she needed a far less
invasive treatment.

Mode of Tension Work:‘Making Inclusive Exceptions’

As Lena encounters tensions and contradictions, a mode of tension
work is discernible that can be referred to as ‘making inclusive excep-
tions’. Many times as Lena reasons, she forms one side of an issue—
the one for which she seems to have the most ‘evidence’—into what
can be thought of as her general belief. This general belief is given a
dominant role over her contrasting belief, which becomes an ‘excep-
tion’. The exception does not negate the general belief—it is equally
‘valid’—and therefore, exists inclusively. This mode can be seen in an
example in which, for the sake of discussion, Lena invents a hypo-
thetical person who thinks all people of a certain nationality are
‘ignorant’. In her example, this ‘prejudiced’ person meets up with
another person, and through conversation, concludes that this new

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 Abbey & Falmagne Modes of Tension Work

acquaintance is intelligent. If it is later discovered that the new

acquaintance is of the ‘ignorant’ nationality, Lena states that the hypo-
thetical person will create an exception to their general belief: ‘Their
story is then going to be “All [individuals of a given background]. . .
are ignorant, except for this individual”. . . And that’s how it’ll fit’. This
exception is inclusive, insofar as it does not negate the general belief,
but rather, merely functions to allow a connection between opposing
ideas, making the pieces ‘fit’ together.
As an example of ‘making inclusive exceptions’, Lena is reasoning
about the death penalty. She mentions how, for most of her life, she has
been strongly against this form of punishment: ‘I was always really
anti-death penalty’. At the time of the interview, Lena claims she is still
against the death penalty, yet she also mentions how, for the per-
petrators of a then recent ‘large-scale’ crime, she favors its use. ‘I’m
like, find whoever did it and just kill ‘em. Because . . . it was so close
to home, and . . . such a large-scale act that . . . they don’t deserve to
live’. Characteristic of this mode, Lena then suggests that, in general,
she is still against the death penalty, yet in this one situation, she can
make an exception, and she can argue for it: ‘I have to put a little sub-
section in there that says in cases of [such] large-scale acts . . . it’s okay’.
Another instance of using inclusive exceptions to engage tensions
arises on the topic of her views on police officers. She describes
personal experiences where she has seen police officers behave in
violent and or racist ways:
I had a friend who was doing something wrong . . . he was drinking in
public, but he was black with his three white friends from high school. And
the cops told his three friends to go away, and then they proceeded to beat
up my friend.

On this basis, she generally feels negatively about police officers. At

the same time, recently, she has moved to a new city for college, where
she says: ‘And I also met a lot of the officers that work at [her college].
. . . So I’m starting to know ‘em more on a personal level, and it’s
getting me a little bit easier with them’. When asked how she resolves
what seem to be two different orientations toward police officers, she
again uses inclusive exceptions, saying: ‘Police officers in general, I’m
hesitant around, but these ones are okay, which is still just because I
know them now on a personal level’.
‘Making inclusive exceptions’ is yet another style of tension work.
As is the case for the other two modes considered here, this mode
allows the participant a way to maintain two contradictory positions
at the same time, thwarting fragmentation. Yet ‘making inclusive

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Culture & Psychology 14(1)

exceptions’ differs from the other two modes discussed so far. In

contrast to ‘self-moderating’, where the participant seems to refrain
from genuinely embracing either side of an issue, ‘making inclusive
exceptions’ suggests commitment to each of the sides rather than
neutrality, on the part of the participant. In contrast with ‘destabiliz-
ing’, ‘making exceptions’ does not involve continually going back-and-
forth between positions, and recurrently undermining one’s own
thinking. Rather, in ‘making inclusive exceptions’, resolution seems to
be attained by having one idea dominate permanently over the other.

The Differing Qualities of Tension Work

As argued previously, moments of contradictions need not be seen as
leading inherently to fragmentation or disunity. Increasingly, some
scholars are beginning to explore the notion that tensions may exist in
contexts of cohesion and unity (Arner & Falmagne, 2007; Collins, 1991;
Lugones, 1994/1996). Consistent with such approaches, the preceding
analysis shows individuals as social agents, using unique styles of
tension work to create cohesion amidst multiplicity as time unfolds.
To further explore the differences between these modes of tension
work, it is of interest to contrast the respective modes along the dimen-
sions of dynamicity and dominance relations3 as well as in regard to
the epistemic status of tensions each mode reflects.

Dynamicity
‘Destabilizing’ can be argued to hold a heightened level of movement,
as compared with the other two modes of tension work because in
destabilizing, one continually oscillates from one ‘side’ to another.
Moreover, as the different sides of an issue are considered, it can be
suggested that ‘back-and-forth’ movement becomes more rapid and
intense rather than less so—this is definitely the case for those times at
which Clara is using this mode.
Compared to the mode of ‘destabilizing’, ‘self-moderating’ and
‘making inclusive exceptions’ can be seen as substantially less
dynamic—though certainly not static—modes of engaging with
tension. In ‘self-moderating’, for instance, movement occurs as
consideration is given to both sides of an issue, and yet because
shifting between positions is held to a minimum, this dynamicity is
attenuated as compared to ‘destabilizing’. Also, each swing of perspec-
tive can be said to be of smaller range than is the case in ‘destabilizing’
because in ‘self-moderating’ each one originates from an impartial
neutral position, rather than the opponent position as in the case of

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 Abbey & Falmagne Modes of Tension Work

‘destabilizing’. Likewise, in ‘making inclusive exceptions’ there is

motion as one contemplates the various sides of an issue, yet this mode
presents the least movement of the three considered here, for once the
ideas are placed in relation to one another—and one idea is held as the
dominant view—there is no subsequent reversal.

Dominance Relations
These modes of tension work can also be contrasted in terms of the
extent to which each makes use of dominance relations to create
cohesion within contradiction. For one, dominance relations seem
central to the mode ‘making inclusive exceptions’, for this mode of
tension work depends upon an imbalance of power between different
beliefs for enabling coherency within the opposition. It can be con-
jectured that without this imbalance, confusion, fragmentation or
disarray might result, whereas positioning one idea as an exception—
and in this way lessening its power—enables the meaning-making
process to proceed. Likewise, dominance relations are also central to
‘self-moderating’. In ‘self-moderating’ it is the power of the impartial
third position over all others that seems to enable cohesion, for without
such dominance of this position in respect to ‘non-neutral’ commit-
ments, fragmentation within contradiction could ensue.
Dominance relations also seem to be a central component of
‘destabilizing’, though in quite a different way. In contrast to ‘self-
moderating’ and ‘making inclusive exceptions’—where dominance
relations seem to be constructed and then preserved—it would seem
that destabilizing is actually aimed at constantly reconfiguring and
challenging fixed dominance structures, and it is precisely this im-
balance that allows for cohesion within contradiction, as no single idea
can emerge as more important than any other.

Nurturing or Eliminating Tension

It is also interesting to explore these modes in relation to the implicit
perspective on tensions they reflect. In a meta-theoretical discussion of
the epistemic status of tensions between different theoretical frame-
works, Falmagne (2006b) argues that tensions between theoretical
frameworks can be attributed different meanings and functions. On
one view, tension signifies incompatibility and merely signals the
necessity to choose between two theories, each conceptualized as being
bounded. On the other view, tensions can be seen as productive and
even generative: Tension indicates that there is something amiss or
lacking in each of the theoretical discourses, that some constructs need
to be reconceptualized with an eye toward synthesis rather than

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Culture & Psychology 14(1)

entrenchment: ‘So, tensions are best seen as grounds for transformative

reconceptualization, a reconceptualization that selectively draws from those
strands of theorizing that can be put at the service of a selective synthesis.
Tensions are occasions for contingent, selective synthesis’ (Falmagne, 2006b,
italics in original). Thus, on the first view, tension is, in the end, to be
eliminated. On the second view, by contrast, the goal shifts from prac-
tices that eliminate the tension, to those that are aimed at preserving it
in constructive form.
Along related lines, it is of interest to examine the epistemic perspec-
tive on tensions that appears to underlie the three styles of tension work
considered here. ‘Self moderating’ seems to be grounded in a frame-
work in which tensions are ultimately to be eliminated. Admittedly, in
‘self-moderating’ one does work within tension while considering
opposing viewpoints. Yet, ultimately, this mode appears oriented
toward the elimination of tension by adopting a middle ground (inci-
dentally, for Molly, this is consistent with her broader epistemological
frame which includes elements of objectivity).
In contrast, the modes of ‘destabilizing’ and ‘making inclusive
exceptions’ appear oriented toward nurturing tension. In ‘destabiliz-
ing’ the ‘value’ or ‘importance’ of tension is highlighted in an extreme
way, as this mode preserves and nurtures tension between different
beliefs not only by enabling multiple perspectives to be considered at
the same time, but also by leading to a constant ‘building’ and ‘rebuild-
ing’ of this tension through oscillation between perspectives. So too,
‘making inclusive exceptions’ conserves tension, allowing it to remain
within the carefully constructed imbalance of ideas, which eliminates
the necessity of choosing one idea over another.

Conclusion
As stated at the start of this article, the past decades have seen different
theoretical approaches to the complex self in which, broadly speaking,
tensions are seen as generative. Yet these theoretical approaches—the
‘mestiza consciousness’, the ‘curdled self’, the ‘dialogical self’ or the
systemic model presented here—need further elaboration of the local
processes through which tensions are negotiated. In this article, we
introduce and analyze three different modes of tension work as one
modest step toward an account of the unique ways in which particular
individuals manage the cohesiveness of self and mind amidst tension
and contradiction. The aim of this article has been to articulate analyti-
cally some of these processes, and in so doing, contribute to a detailed
understanding of the agentive strategies people employ to maintain

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 Abbey & Falmagne Modes of Tension Work

cohesion. It is perhaps unnecessary to state that, as we rely upon

two one-hour interviews, care must be exercised to avoid unwanted
generalization about each woman’s overall mode of reasoning, as is
always needed in studies of this nature. Rather, it is hoped that the
constructs offered here can inform further research.
Notions of a complex self raise new challenges for social sciences. As
discussed previously, one such challenge is to find ways of understand-
ing how individuals construct unified selves and minds amidst an
array of differing and potentially contradictory aspects. Toward this
end, this article has explored the construct of tension work as a way to
describe the process through which individuals manage contradiction
as they work through various dilemmas.
As complexity of ‘self’ and ‘mind’ becomes increasingly accepted
within the social sciences, it seems useful to complement ongoing
discussion of theoretical constructs with detailed analysis of how the
person, considered interpretively in the context of his or her social
location and cultural history, manages this complexity. The women
discussed here, and the modes of tension work they demonstrate in
their reasoning, suggest the usefulness of expanding theoretical
consideration of the role of tensions as constructive, and of further
exploring the intertwined relation of ‘self’ and ‘mind’ in this process.

Notes
Preparation of this article was supported by a Spencer Foundation, Grant
# 200000081 to Rachel Joffe Falmagne and by a grant from the Hiatt Fund of
Clark University’s Psychology Department to Emily Abbey. The authors are
grateful to Genevieve Iselin, Irina Todorova, Eric Amsel and Jennifer Arner for
constructive comments on earlier presentation of these ideas, and to the
reviewers of an earlier draft for critiques and suggestions that helped improve
the article. The authors would also like to thank each research participant for
her candid and thoughtful discussion.
1. The term ‘dialectic’ reflects the assumption that processes at the macro-
social, local and personal levels are dynamically and mutually constitutive,
as also are discursive and material processes, respectively.
2. This study focused on female participants for the reason that historically
their voices have not been given equal attention and consideration.
3. These notions are loosely inspired by Hermans (e.g., 1996, 2001) but are
used as generalized constructs, rather than in their more specific senses
within dialogical self theory.

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Biographies
EMILY ABBEY is an assistant professor in the Department of Psychology at
Ramapo College of New Jersey. Working from a developmental orientation
and a cultural perspective, she is generally curious about the process of
identity change. Recently, she has published in the journals Culture &
Psychology and Estudios de Psicologia, and is co-editor of a forthcoming volume
on microgenetic approaches titled, Innovating Genesis: Microgenesis and the
Constructive Mind in Action (with Rainer Diriwächter, InfoAge). ADDRESS:
Emily Abbey, Ramapo College of New Jersey, Mahwah, NJ, 07430, USA.
[email: eabbey@ramapo.edu]

RACHEL JOFFE FALMAGNE is Professor of Psychology at Clark University

and President of the International Society for Theoretical Psychology. Her
interests include feminist theory, critical psychology and methodological and
epistemological issues for the social sciences. She has published on the
gendered foundations of thought, culture and development, on the dialectic of
macro-social, local and agentive elements in the social constitution of ‘self’
and ‘mind’, on the politics of knowledge production, on the transdisciplinary
feminist study of reasoning and personal epistemology, on critical appraisals
of developmental and cognitive psychology, and on the dialectic of the
particular and the general in qualitative research. Her books include
Representing Reason: Feminist Theory and Formal Logic (with Marjorie Hass,
Rowman & Littlefield, 2002) and Mind and Social Practice: Selected Writings by
Sylvia Scribner (with Ethel Tobach and Mary Parlee, Cambridge University
Press, 1997). ADDRESS: Rachel Joffe Falmagne, Psychology Department,
Clark University, 950 Main Street, Worcester, MA, 01610, USA.
[email: rfalmagne@clarku.edu]

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