11.

PRACTICE UNDER DETENTION

DIGEST 2: PEOPLE VS MACEDA GR No. 89591-96

FACTS: This case stems from denial by the SC of the People’s motion seeking
reconsideration of our August 13, 1990 decision holding that respondent Judge Bonifacio
Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989
giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the
Antique RTC, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos.
3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why Javellana should not be detained
at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial court’s order specifically provided for private
respondent’s detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent
was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as detention prisoner in said
residence. It was however found that the order was not strictly complied with because
Javellana was not detained in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal
activities as if he were a free man, including engaging in the practice of law.

RULING: Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal
cases against him. By such arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The
trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana
with the obligation “to hold and detain” him in Atty. del Rosario’s residence in his official
capacity as the clerk of court of the regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was
appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of accused Javellana and the
succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the custodian under the same undertaking.

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed

placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that
he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail
during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be
released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under
preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage
in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention.

12. PRIVATE PRACTICE

DIGEST 3: OCA VS ATTY LADAGA AM No. P-99-1287

FACTS: Atty. Ladaga, an RTC Branch Clerk of Court, acted as pro bono counsel for a
relative in a criminal case, without the previous authority from the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court as required by the Administrative Code. An administrative complaint was
filed against Atty. Ladaga for practicing law without permission from the Department Head
(CJ) as required by law.

He was charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private
practice of their profession. Sec. 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court also prohibits
certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession. However, it should
be clarified that the "private practice" of the law profession that is prohibited does not pertain
to an isolated court appearance. It contemplates succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer. Here, the isolated
instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin does not constitute
the "private practice" of the law profession contemplated by law.
 Atty. Ladaga justified his appearance as he merely gave a free legal assistance to a
relative and that he was on an approved leave of absence during his appearances as such
counsel. Moreover, the presiding judge of the court to which he is assigned knew his
appearances as such counsel.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Ladaga’s appearances as a pro bono counsel for a relative constitutes
practice of law as prohibited by the Administrative Code.

HELD: No. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance
as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private
practice of law. The following observation of theSolicitor General is noteworthy:

"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the lega lprofession and that his
professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his —
livelihood or in consideration of his said services.”

Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of the statute should be customarily or
habitually holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. It does not pertain to isolated court appearances as in this case. Nevertheless, for
his failure to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department (CJ) as required by
law, respondent was reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would
be dealt with more severely.

13. ADMISSION TO THE BAR

DIGEST 4: In Re: ALMACEN GR No. L-27654

FACTS: Vicente Raul Almacen’s “Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title,” filed
on Sept. 26, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is “a great injustice committed
against his client by Supreme Court”. He indicts SC, in his own phrase, as a tribual “peopled
by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.” His
client’s he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court’s “unjust judgment,” has
become one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.”

He ridicules the members of the Court, saying “that justice as administered by the
present members of the Supreme Court is not only bline, but also deaf and dumb.” He then
vows to argue the cause of his client ”in the people’s forum,” so that “ people may know of
the silent injustices committed by this court’ and that “whatever mistakes, wrongs and
injustices that were committed must never be repeated.” He ends his petition with a prayer
that:

“………a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and
confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.”

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Yaptichay v. Calero,
in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court rencered judgment
agains his client. On June 15, 1966 atty. Almacen receive acopy of the decision. Twenty
days later on he moved for its reconsideration but did not notify the latter of the time and
plce of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, onJuly 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for
execution of the judgment. For lack of proof of service, ‘the trial court denied both motions.
To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration,
atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration, however, was
ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen
himself, who earlier, that is, on Aug. 22, 1966 had already perfected the appeal. Motion for
reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals.

HELD: Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen,
to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts
and judges.

As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the
right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right.
Nor is he “professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges,
which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen is
suspended from the practice of law until further orders.

DIGEST 5: In Re: LANUEVO, AC 1162

FACTS: Administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanuevo for disbarment.

1. Admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to
the respective examiners for re-evalution or re-checking.
2. The five examiners admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by
the Bar Confidant, stating that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee
concerned failed only in his particular subject and was on the borderline of passing.
3. Ramon galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of Lanuevo’s move but the
exam results bears that he failed in 5 subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile,
Criminal & Remedial).
4. Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of Slight Physical Injuries on
Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU.

RULING: The court disbarred Lanuevo as he has no authority to request the examiners to
re-evaluate grades of examinees w/o prior authority from Supreme Court.

He does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of
examinees to the bar. He does not a have any business evaluating the answers of the
examinees.

Consequently, Galang was also disbarred Sec. 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Curt of 1964, candidates for admission to the bar must be of good moral character.
Galang has a pending criminal cases of Physical Injuries, he committed perjury when he
declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case this resulted him to revoked his
license

14. CAN THE LEGISLATURE ENACT LAWS TO REGULATE THE PRACTICE OF LAW?
 No. The Supreme Court has the power to control and regulate the practice of law.
Thus, the Constitution, under Article VIII, Sec. 5 (5) provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the under privileged.

The Supreme Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee in the Exercise of his
judicial function to admit candidates to the legal profession.

Also, as held in IN RE CUNANAN 94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954, in the judicial
system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have
been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial
system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. On
this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government. It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power
to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed
by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely
to fix the minimum conditions for the license. Republic Act Number 972 is held to be
unconstitutional.

15. ENUMERATE THE 10 INITIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

To practice law in the Philippines:

1. Academic Requirement: One must first complete “a bachelor’s degree in arts or

sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration:
political science, logic, English, Spanish, history and economics. These majors are,
however, merely directory and not mandatory, as one can gain admission to a duly
accredited law school, provided his or her bachelor’s degree meets the minimum
requirements of the admitting law school.

2. To be eligible to take the bar examinations, a candidate must complete courses in

“civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international
law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and
legal ethics”.

3. One must be a Filipino citizen

4. be at least 21 years old

5.be a resident of the Philippines

6. They must have also taken and passed (75% general average, with no subject
falling below 50%) the Bar Exam, t

7. Taken the Attorney's Oath before the Supreme Court and Signed the Roll of
Attorneys
 8. Must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

9. Being a member of and paying the yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

10. Must have taken and passed the PHILSAT Exams.

DIGEST 6: IN RE: APPLICAION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR OF

VICENTE CHING

FACTS: In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in
Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof
that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Ching’s father
was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married before
he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a
foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching maintained that he
has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant – a
profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La
Union.

The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of

a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority; that under prevailing jurisprudence, “upon reaching the age of majority” is
construed as within 7 years after reaching the age of majority (in his case 21 years old
because he was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution was in place).

Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the
bar in 1998 or 14 years after reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the Solicitor-
General recommended that the rule be relaxed due to the special circumstance of Ching.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

HELD: No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court
cannot agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen years had lapsed
and it’s way beyond the allowable 7 year period. The Supreme Court even noted that the
period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it can’t be extended any
further). Ching’s special circumstances can’t be considered. It is not enough that he
considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was)
serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t give any
explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess it’s simply
because he never thought he’s Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed
procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable
and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

16. PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR

DIGEST 7: IN RE: DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING
FACTS: Atty Froilan Melendrez filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to
disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose
on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
Petitioner Alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases both for Grave Oral Defamation
and for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
• Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front
of media practitioners and other people.
• Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the
injuries to the latter.
• Alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member
of the Bar.

Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases because retired Judge
Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle misunderstanding. Believing
in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy
over them, considered the three cases that arose from a single incident as “closed and
terminated.”

Melting also Denies the charges and added that the acts do not involve moral
turpitude.
On the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word “Attorney” as they were typed by the office clerk. The Office of Bar
Confidant disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling:

• Meling should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can
dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed
against Meling are still pending.
• Even if these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the
same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character.

ISSUE: Whether the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling is proper
and shall subsequently barred him from taking his lawyer’s oath and signing on the Roll of
Attorneys

HELD: Rule 7.01: “A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.”

He is aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he
signed as “attorney” whoever may have typed the letters. Unauthorized use of the
appellation “attorney” may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.

The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions

upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the
membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until
further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the
Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the
Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having
become moot and academic.
 Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right
but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but
who are also known to possess good moral character. The requirement of good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is

satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant. The nature of whatever cases
are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed
with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases,
the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be
unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.

17. WHO MAY BE CALLED ATTORNEY

DIGEST 8: ALAWI VS ALAUYA

FACTS: Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of
Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, They were
classmates, and used to be friends.

Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments
by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent
was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President of
Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.

On learning of Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him.

One of her grounds was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of “attorney,” which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar may properly use. Alauya justified his use of the title,
“attorney,” by the assertion that it is “lexically synonymous” with “Counsellors-at-law.” a title
to which Shari’a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of “attorney”
because “counsellor” is often mistaken for “councilor,” “konsehal” or the Maranao term
“consial,” connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider
himself a lawyer.

ISSUE: Whether Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of Attorney

HELD: He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar. As
regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this Court has already had occasion to declare
that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the
Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
“counsellors,” in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only
the latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained
the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have
been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction

DIGEST 9: IN RE: GALANG, 66 SCRA 282

FACTS: The case is one of the consolidated cases in In re Lanuevo. Ramon E. Galang passed the 1971
bar examination but his exam papers were subjected to unauthorized re-correction and re-
evaluation by 5 examiners. An investigation by the NBI revealed:

• that Ramon (Roman/Romy) was a student of School of Law of MLQU;

• that in Sept 8, 1959, he was charged with the crime of slight physical injuries(SPI) of
another student of the same university;
• that in a 1973 hearing, he was confronted with this information but declared he does
not remember being charged with the same.

The victim was summoned and narrated the case and identified Galang as the very same person
charged with SPI in that case. An administrative proceeding was filed for his disbarment along with
Bar Confidant Lanuevo.

HELD:

1. Under Rule 127, Sec 2 every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in
any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or
determine applicant's moral character.

2. As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine. Hence, the
necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal record — whether he was
criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending — becomes more
compelling.

3. In 1963 and 1964, when Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the
application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to
declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or
tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature
against him."

4. By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form
prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases
whether involving moral turpitude or not. Yet, Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal
from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending
in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his
applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

5. That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact
that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his
license to practice law is well — settled.

6. Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was
allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar,
WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking
out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys.

DIGEST 10: AGUIRRE VS RANA

FACTS: Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the scheduled mass
oath-taking, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the
Bar. The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in an election.

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal

government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such,
respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent

of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the latter engaging
respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent
the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

ISSUE: Whether respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar

RULING: The Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge
or skill.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited
to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not
acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced law without a license.

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath.
However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The
fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites
for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by
this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys

18. WHAT ARE THE OBLIGATIONS OF A NEWLY CONSTITUTED LAWYER?

 To be a full-fledged lawyer in the Philippines and be eligible to use the title
Attorney, a candidate must graduate from a Philippine law school, take and pass the
Philippine Bar Examinations, take the Attorney's Oath, and sign his name in the Rolls of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The full names of lawyers are found in the Rolls of Attorneys of the Supreme
Court, and in a similar list included in a Supreme Court publication entitled Law List.

19. WHAT ARE THE CONTINUING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PRACTICE OF LAW AFTER PASSING THE
BAR?

• MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

Requirements of completion of MCLE. Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall
complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education activities
approved by the MCLE Committee.

• Membership in Good Standing

This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership

dues in the IBP; payment of the annual professional tax; compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement; faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and
being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.

• Compliance “Community Legal Aid Service Rule”.

Under the rule, rookie lawyers are given one year after signing the roll of attorneys to
complete the required 120-hour free legal services in criminal, civil and administrative cases. Aside
from indigent litigants, also entitled to pro bono legal aid are groups, individuals and organizations
that cannot get the services of the Public Attorney’s Office due to conflict of interest. The new
lawyers may also render their professional services for public interest cases and legal issues that
affect the society.

• Faithfully observe rules and ethics of the profession. Subject to judicial discipline and control.

20. MAY A NON-LAWYER APPEAR IN COURT?

Yes. Non-lawyers may be authorized to appear in court in the following instances:

1. Cases before the MTC: Party to the litigation, in person OR through an agent or friend or
appointed by him for that purpose (Sec. 34, Rule 138, RRC)
2. Before any other court: Party to the litigation, in person (Ibid.)
3. Criminal case before the MTC in a locality where a duly licensed member of the Bar is not
available: the judge may appoint a non-lawyer who is:
4. resident of the province
5. of good repute for probity and ability to aid the accused in his defense (Rule 116, Sec. 7, RRC).
6. Legal Aid Program – A senior law student, who is enrolled in a recognized law school’s clinical
education program approved by the supreme Court may appear before any court without
 compensation, to represent indigent clients, accepted by the Legal Clinic of the law school. The
student shall be under the direct supervision and control of an IBP member duly accredited by
the law school.
7. Under the Labor code, non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any Labor Arbiter, if
8. they represent themselves, or if
9. they represent their organization or members thereof (Art 222, PO 442, as amended).
10. Under the Cadastral Act, a non-lawyer can represent a claimant before the Cadastral Court (Act
no. 2259, Sec. 9).