1. RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.
SALONGA, preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues
are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the
political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a
legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out
to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in
legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and
collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as
to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick
v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure
of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of
the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside
of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
 and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance
to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all
times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion
of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in
the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of
employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute.
(Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge
or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of
the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this
provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who
are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work
within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners,
even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in
the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the
Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore,
the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice
of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
 ... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and
two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants
with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the
word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that
the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law
Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may
be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the
members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is
defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role
for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much
of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know
that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the
diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients,
and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to
an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills
of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which
the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are
those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in
corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members
participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the
major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the
need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
"contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and
response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting
the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little
organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal
education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital
necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in
the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context
and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a
master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the
legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and
analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the
services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each
and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the
"abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is
that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large
corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-
house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of
a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal
research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of
the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as
determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or
not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can
be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a
corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the
running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational
corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced
in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign
country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In
most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger
attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law
Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow
the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who
fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent
lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No
longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study
to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the
intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate
counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area
linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a
unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the
need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-
state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not
only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in
some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop
alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry
that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries.
In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises
a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of
both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising
their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial
liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for
new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users
to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles
more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity
and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the
settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk
involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly
by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part
of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights
 for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered
and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those
activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive
of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay
competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is
not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global
economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and
varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make
or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to
make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the
understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also
gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the
basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p.
4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman
of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic,
and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco
Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman
(1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his
personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and
lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the
Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice
Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with
individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal
counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in
negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven,
"Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central
Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as
far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p.
13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For
aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed
from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at
the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law
Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and
in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business
specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with
the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the
Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987,
p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of
both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to
discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they
beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of
quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and
Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the
framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement —
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA
744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to
revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular
position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To
do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject
to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. (
Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in
the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-
taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of
those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five
years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished
from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what
was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition
but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the
phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming
that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent
President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no
abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who
was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming
with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
"Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying
on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge
of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court of Antique, and AVELINO T.
JAVELLANA, respondents. ULANDU
RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:
On September 8, 1999, we denied the Peoples motion seeking reconsideration of our August 13,
1990 decision in these cases. In said resolution, we held that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz
Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving
custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal
Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why private respondent Javellana
should not be detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial courts order specifically provided for
private respondents detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent
was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as detention prisoner in said
residence.
This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because private respondent was not
detained in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a
free man, including engaging in the practice of law. Despite our resolution of July 30, 1990
prohibiting private respondent to appear as counsel in Criminal Case No. 4262,[1] the latter accepted
cases and continued practicing law.
On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Henrick F. Guingoyon filed with the Supreme Court a
motion seeking clarification on the following questions: "(1) Does the resolution of this Honorable
Court dated July 30, 1990, prohibiting Atty. Javellana from appearing as counsel refer only to
Criminal Case No. 4262? (2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias del Rosario still the custodian of Atty.
Javellana? and (3) Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never really held and detained
Atty. Javellana as prisoner in his residence, is not Atty. Javellana considered an escapee or a fugitive
of justice for which warrant for his arrest should forthwith be issued?"[2] Mis spped
In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the above motion.
After we denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1999, the trial court resumed
hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, a motion seeking the revocation of the trial
courts custody order and the imprisonment of private respondent Javellana in the provincial jail.
On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana filed with the Supreme Court an urgent
motion seeking to clarify whether the June 18, 1997 resolution finally terminated or resolved the
motion for clarification filed by the State Prosecutor on April 7, 1997.
Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against him. By
such arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias
del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana with the obligation "to hold and detain" him
in Atty. del Rosarios residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of the regional trial court.
Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of
accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the custodian under the same
undertaking.
In our mind, the perceived threats to private respondent Javelanas life no longer exist. Thus, the trial
courts order dated August 8, 1989 giving custody over him to the clerk of court must be recalled,
and he shall be detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique at San Jose, Antique.
Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not
allowed to practice his profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner.
The trial courts order was clear that private respondent "is not to be allowed liberty to roam around
but is to be held as a detention prisoner." The prohibition to practice law referred not only to
Criminal Case No. 4262, but to all other cases as well, except in cases where private respondent
would appear in court to defend himself. Spped
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the
custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of the offense.[3] He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the
case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.[4]Let
it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can
not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or
appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
Consequently, all the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must be confined in the Provincial
Jail of Antique.
Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more than ten
(10) years, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is ordered
to continue with the trial of said criminal cases with all deliberate dispatch and to avoid further
delay.
WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3350-3355, including Avelino T. Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are ordered detained
at the Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique, effective immediately, and shall not be allowed
to go out of the jail for any reason or guise, except upon prior written permission of the trial court
for a lawful purpose.
Let copies of this resolution be given to the Provincial Director, PNP Antique Provincial Police Office,
San Jose, Antique and to the Provincial Jail Warden, Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique.
SO ORDERED.
3. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L.
Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in
Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga for Falsification of Public
Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40. [1] While
respondents letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private complainant in
Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator, dated September 2, 1998,
requesting for a certification with regard to respondents authority to appear as counsel for the
accused in the said criminal case.[2] On September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator
referred the matter to respondent for comment.[3]
In his Comment,[4] dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had appeared in
Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior authorization. He reasoned out that the factual
circumstances surrounding the criminal case compelled him to handle the defense of his cousin who
did not have enough resources to hire the services of a counsel de parte; while, on the other hand,
private complainant was a member of a powerful family who was out to get even with his
cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice his
office nor the interest of the public since he did not take advantage of his position. In any case, his
appearances in court were covered by leave application approved by the presiding judge.
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a resolution denying respondents request for
authorization to appear as counsel and directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal
charges against him for appearing in court without the required authorization from the Court. [5] On
January 25, 1999, the Court Administrator filed the instant administrative complaint against
respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.- Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, Provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on the
administrative complaint.
In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are close blood cousins who
belong to a powerless family from the impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From
childhood until he finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had always supported and guided him while
he looked up to her as a mentor and an adviser. Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga
sought respondents help and advice when she was charged in Criminal Case No. 84885 for
falsification by the private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in filing the said
criminal case was to seek vengeance on her cousin. He explained that his cousins discord with Ms.
Andres started when the latters husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit
with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3)
children. The birth certificate of their eldest child is the subject of the falsification charge against Ms.
Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the only lawyer in their family, he felt it to be his duty to
accept Ms. Ladagas plea to be her counsel since she did not have enough funds to pay for the
services of a lawyer. Respondent also pointed out that in his seven (7) years of untainted
government service, initially with the Commission on Human Rights and now with the judiciary, he
had performed his duties with honesty and integrity and that it was only in this particular case that
he had been administratively charged for extending a helping hand to a close relative by giving a
free legal assistance for humanitarian purpose. He never took advantage of his position as branch
clerk of court since the questioned appearances were made in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding office. He stressed that during the hearings of the
criminal case, he was on leave as shown by his approved leave applications attached to his
comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondents comment and referred the
administrative matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge Josefina
Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report and recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following findings and
recommendation:
There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin,
Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for Falsification of Public
Documents before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said
respondent in said case was without the previous permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the respondent appeared as
such counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his
Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. That the
respondent appeared as pro bono counsel likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa
Ladaga herself positively declared that the respondent did not receive a single centavo from
her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent
her out of his compassion and high regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a
member of his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of
settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel
for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been in government service, he has
maintained his integrity and independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as counsel for his cousin
without first securing permission from the court, and considering that this is his first time to do it
coupled with the fact that said appearance was not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his
Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern
warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely. [6]
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of
their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession.The said
section reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice.- No judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the
bar or give professional advise to clients.
However, it should be clarified that private practice of a profession, specifically the law
profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather,
it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self
to the public as a lawyer.
In the case of People vs. Villanueva,[7] we explained the meaning of the term private practice
prohibited by the said section, to wit:
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice,
within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance,
for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words,
it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768) Practice of
law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding
ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4
S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the
Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services
are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration
of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is RESOLUTION
a relative.[8]
CASTRO, J.:
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared
as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the private practice Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed
of the law profession contemplated by law. on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed
against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal
Nonetheless, while respondents isolated court appearances did not amount to a private
"peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own
practice of law, he failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the head of the Department,
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's
which is this Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:
he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation,
symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the
or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this
argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent
prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside
activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any
permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not
time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may
involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way
retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the
enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors.[9]
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on
September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous
occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the
own admission. It is true that he filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in
tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions
court. However, he failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The
or appeals without any reason.
presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department
contemplated by law.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is hereby condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more
severely. xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our
4. IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who
ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO, ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations
vs. of the Constitution with impunity.
 xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his
living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all
cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis
supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of
[sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28,
1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal
of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the
constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H.
Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing,
rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the
decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the
adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing
on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For
"lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the
adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a
second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This
second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August
30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had
already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal
and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee
praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by
defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the
appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp.
90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of
hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not
interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was
perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not
decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in
Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A.
Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the
supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for
reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case
and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No.
L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967.
Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417,
May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by
appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss
the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on
November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the
decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution
in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without
prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said
case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio
presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November
26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case.
Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute
resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well
as his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry
of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed
by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from
beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks
hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as
unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition
until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his
proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had
earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said
reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-
27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28,
1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer
was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross
misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause
"why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the
November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary
action should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on
December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for
such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for
decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and
Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public
hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a
written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him the
ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was
heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from
being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time
embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment
you judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you
measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see the
speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in
thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out
the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own
eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and
then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's
eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also
to them: for this is the Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his
petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with
his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements
contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the
entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct
unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been
asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with
the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members
have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us
on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest
of JUSTICE, — what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its
hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas
and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.
 xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this
Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict
punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE,
CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their
stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is
given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis,
DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own
President, said: — "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still
being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be
before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is
a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We
attack the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were
compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the
decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered
nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the
Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that
you have not performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence
and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth
and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we
sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling
Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are
committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy
name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who
would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong
public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts
and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf
and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries
for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in
the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us
reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We
refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the.
impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this
Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN
TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the
offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to
when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard
our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members
of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied
disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We
have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for
denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a
lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his
arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however,
most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at
all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and
large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject,
we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The
proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined
it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate
importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition
different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for
denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the
Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that
the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed
the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During
the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their
merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189
petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not
be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune
that would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated
different reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in
concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this
Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter.
There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article
VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised
before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above
constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not
be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even
ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a
petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial.
For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals'
opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in
alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme
Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of
Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to
buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the
supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give
every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a matter of right
but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully
measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be
considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in
accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower
court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the
pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of
his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from
the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this
Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its
supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or
ought to have known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of
appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did),
but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This
rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule
15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state
the time, and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at
least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion
shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been
held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper
(Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v.
Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil.
866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the
movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way to
determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects,
to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within
which he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has
only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which,
incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his
carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a
martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this
Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there
is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration.
We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he
sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ
with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they
are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers.
This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is
articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our
decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property,
and the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure
them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions
before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity,
competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason
why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations. 9 This danger
lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are
themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their
actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the
tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of
courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil
of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to
serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in
the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the
courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as
of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp.
487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the
prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he
dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to
see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by
Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or
publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than
members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a
correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an
attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account
and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he
 may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
"professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become
conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to
abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of
an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212,
216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of
those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly.
"Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed,
but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand,
and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux
and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more
basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He
vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court
constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance
of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express
declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely
to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by
merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes
abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward
judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those
gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than
the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he
regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions
of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and
the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In
Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his
privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is
his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to
harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to
jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice
Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at
one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private
conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in
insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the
attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of
his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608,
nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties,"
adding that:
 It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is
beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of
decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in
the judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the
administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then
the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a
leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed
judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject
to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is
BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did
not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to
do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and
besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension
of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-
election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with
a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said
the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism
members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of
the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney
capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and
integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA
(N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep.
637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication
by an attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile
and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than
those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which
requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the
strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness,
especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the
due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts
be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman
who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He
wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the
judge and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is
protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be
compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political
manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois
declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground
for serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit
his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the
administration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and
respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct
toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend
to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in
their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an
attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and
the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday
papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the
public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by
corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear
that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was
charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The
Court said:
 A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the
court against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt,
undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere
with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of
disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which
he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases
that have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest
comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of
legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of
speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court,
is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an
appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal
was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension
from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted
that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The
Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession
of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their
duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the
impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every
attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty,
to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial
officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of
his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has
improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the
tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the person
making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided
against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the
courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of
judicial officers in the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is
not against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the
confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the administration of
justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound
by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such
charges is guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible
temporary observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my
clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision
in their favor against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and
privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and
innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima
facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from
this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the
court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an
article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the
court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of
the public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the
requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime
importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man
would concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to
public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be
served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not
have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and
honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if
administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good by
designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of
 purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a
municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health
of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and
malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the public, through its
duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the private
individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money to
maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of the bar the
law itself demands retribution — not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a
pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked
conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution,"
"calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct
unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from
the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater
latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This
lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning
both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of
certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published
in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the
burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the
court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no
undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable,
short of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals
and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from
its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its
hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other
person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall
not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will
gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months,
delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in
sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have
found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and
the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by
him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made,
could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to
gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would
not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or
integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any
privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have
any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position,
can resent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any
words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the
judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a
libelous communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not
constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In
these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was
wholly different from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said,
wholly different principles are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he
exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by
considerations of public policy, to which reference has been made, he was immune,
as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as
a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of
this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice
personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the
contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and
judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of
courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court from all
insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their
official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears
to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an
assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult
for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or
at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from
criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we
think entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex
parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained
the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it
held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that
case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in
the power of any person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge
because of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge
leaves the building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the
regard of the people by tame submission to the indignity, or else set in his own
person the evil example of punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands?
... No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes
professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has
been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a
personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his
integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court."
Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re
Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it
appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the
City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not
law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was
decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter
should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to
discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the law are
permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance,
with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not
be long before the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied
grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy
one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much
the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a
letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his
home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct
of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this
it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to
maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached
his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its
application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall
(U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2
Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351;
Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as
to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and
a suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for
publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence
of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the
official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was
disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was
dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases,
criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said
the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the
public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared
over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts
involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment
was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical
of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend
the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into
disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of
justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other
lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives
inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of
counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature
have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although
resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that
universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner
Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although
conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his
client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is
not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or
proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts
requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of
their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very
shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional
contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than
having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the
untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted
the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching
to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge
the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a
statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said
law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority
of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately
committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change
the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty
and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of
Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor
and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he
would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and
his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the
press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the
Parazo case, which was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon
petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this
Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the
members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices
from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo
case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order
to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or
obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty
and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this
Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding
in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse
party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases
decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence
of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The
Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to
which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or
protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe
that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into
their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member
of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in
his conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or
stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A.
[N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra,
where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering
to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of
Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the
sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks
of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of
the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of
this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction.
It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier
rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent
statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all
these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the
industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the
point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line
drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is
that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are
not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and
respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members —
and some former members of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph
quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule
against splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of
brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved
contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the
doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against
scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after
the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt
charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were
made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality.
For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification
thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran
dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the
rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In
re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in
contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted
in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved
and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in
his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case
has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt
which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in
any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally
punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded
against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the
courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of
contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any
act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence
in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there
is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication.
In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is
sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their
utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and
actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had
attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated
during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for
such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of
November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns
Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this
Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to
safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of
unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-
pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is
to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose
misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn
duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this
prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those
who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus —
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and
incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly
discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration
that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint.
Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be
tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state
that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound
judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is
worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that —
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy
of the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the
right, but the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him
the privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is
almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are
judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an
attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior
and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent
or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment
of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the
object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty.
Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond
making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually
availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety
of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect
to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he
categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf
and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal
talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at
the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced
threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he caused the publication in the
papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public
indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no
regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his
vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its
members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose
disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation
speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend
the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the
spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this
Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the
orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming
feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a
whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross
transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way
for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a
critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of
last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy,
and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant
striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and
must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as
Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors
and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total
distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an
action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not
being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations
as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and
the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against
the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members
thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and
distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a
collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted
court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30So that, in a very real
sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the
individual members thereof — as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and
properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be
threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of
membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the
power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively
in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction
legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense
the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that
power because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases
which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the
merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely
inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty.
Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere
suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the
imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which,
being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever
be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously
guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be
overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed
where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be
futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive
language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there
is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the
circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance
nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last
and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are
empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also
because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority
to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite
suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of
that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty.
Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time
after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to
resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby,
suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the
Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.
5. IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY.
FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining
Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C.
Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for
disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction
and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho — who
flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%,
respectively — invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one
examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before
the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed,
according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar
Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe
that the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations — to
raise the grades — prior to the release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion
or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned
reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now
when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due
process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for
their grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not
afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to
ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar
Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public International Law,
Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate with
office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and
authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the
bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who
flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%,
72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a
grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered
as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant
Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on
the matter, with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five
examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same
was done and his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated
and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him
by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee
concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court
required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within
ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing
average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him
"to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by
the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while
respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27,
1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his
answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his
unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by
the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-
110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-
evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and
Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr.,
examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a number
of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline for
submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was
likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded
as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public
International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code
No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg.
Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a
notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50% This
notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify
in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of
the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y
Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University,
was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court
of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted
with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent
Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical
injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this
fact which he is required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October
2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents
Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia,
where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only
his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their
direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same became
the basis for their cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the
investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances
under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the
examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the
practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of
the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an
extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will
bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of
grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the
owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the
candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and
policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to
75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-
evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based
on the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos.
3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to
5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972
affidavit with following additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no
longer to make the reconsideration of these answers because of the same
evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9
at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did
not know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable
Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I
am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based
on the following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16,
1971, relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had
developed to the point that with respect to the correction of the
examination booklets of bar candidates I have always followed him
and considered his instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of
the Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the same; that I have
no alternative but to take his words;
 b) That considering this relationship and considering his
misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and policy of the
Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the
consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee.
Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members of the
Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for
fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such
recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in
Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the original correction
of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and
Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the
last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to
1400) which according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my
residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court,
with at least two companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's
notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me
if it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said notebook because it
appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar
Confidant, the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the
highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as
I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so
because the same was still within my control and authority as long as the particular
examinee's name had not been identified or that the code number decode and the
examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the
examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had not been identified or
revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a particularly low
grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and
as it was humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the said
notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in
accordance with the same standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire
notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an increased grade of 66.
After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and
as he had assured me that the code number of the examinee in question had not
been decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the
notebook and the grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I
also corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets
of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with
him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy
the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo
P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement
and in additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international
law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to
know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing
his name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and that I have never
met him even up to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such
review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to
make such revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of the examinee
had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance
was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of express
prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the Bar
Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as
much as possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be
identified as an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening
at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It
did not appear to me that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious.
Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a
 Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which was usual, and thus
looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour
that he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when
I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661,
my aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not to make the
examinee pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred,
because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering
especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had
obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in remedial
law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar
Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the position to know and that there
was nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee
with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9
points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the subject,
and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass,
notwithstanding the representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee
consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the
rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it
as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the
names of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no
knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did
not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or
rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.;
emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination
books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in
Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another
subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying
that that particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a
percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to
75%then he would make the general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I
remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the
mark and revised also the mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the
Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in
question who up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive any
personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney
Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854
Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's notebook in
Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me
that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He
requested me to review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I
had previously given. He explained that the examine concerned had done well in
other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him
in Remedial Law his general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked
that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving
of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called
my attention to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and
in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would
 reconsider the grades I had previously given and submitted was entirely within my
discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to
address such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the
presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item
of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased
the grades in some items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the
same grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had
totalled the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the total grade
increased by a few points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his
sworn statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total
grade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein
respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not
having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy
of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in
attenuation of such omission, that —
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not
aware, not having been apprised otherwise, that it was not within
the authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request
or suggest that the grade of a particular examination notebook be
revised or reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to
the highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that
the request was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in
the notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the
Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of
Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular
subject that the said examine failed, herein respondent became
convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that
previously given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein
respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of
75%. It should also be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers,
herein respondent downgraded a previous rating of an answer
written by the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar
Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all other
subjects except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate
the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No.
1613) showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this
particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade
sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn
statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-
evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile
Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made
 during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a
candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-
evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned
re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this time
this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and
the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers
on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that
those five merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the
examiners shortly earlier to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be
given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-
evaluation and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the
results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees
that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and
have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of them would file motions
or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of
such motions or requests which we are reading for submission to the Honorable
Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be
denied because the result of the examinations when released is final and
irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to
bring those notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his
hotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his
intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the
contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was
inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he
does not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he
remembers having brought to the attention of the Committee during the meeting a
matter concerning another examinee who obtained a passing general average but
with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the
disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject, respondent brought the
notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus
enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned
is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such
serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all
good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing
that the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the fact of the
matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they so merited on the
basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo,
particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the
examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in
question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of
February, 1972, on my way back to the office (Bar Division) after
lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it
a point that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from
any object and the first number that comes into my sight becomes
the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number
that I saw was "954" boldly printed on an electrical contribance
(evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing
along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the Supreme
Court building from San Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the
south-eastern corner of the fence of the Araullo High
School(photograph of the number '954', the contrivance on which it
is printed and a portion of the post to which it is attached is
identified and marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954"
as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to
look for a ticket that would contain such number. Eventually, I
found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digits
corresponded to "954". This number became doubly impressive to
me because the sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was
"27", a number that is so significant to me that everything I do I try
somewhat instinctively to link or connect it with said number
whenever possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on the
Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the
examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the
number "27" (or "227") or end with said number. (1968 Master List
is identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" at
the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as
Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as
Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure
"227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971
Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end of the
list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these
incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the
Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the
last Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still
confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by
Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties.
From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a
new life for me having been saved from the possibility of being
among the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out
of the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27,
1947, I got married and since then we begot children the youngest
of whom was born on February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I
resumed my work which at the time was on the checking of the
notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing
the office code number "954". As the number was still fresh in my
mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents
of the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and
language and the apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby,
believing in all good faith on the basis of the aforementioned
Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)
that they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took
them back to the respective examiners for possible review recalling
to them the said Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely
the matter to their discretion and judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of
the two cases which I brought to the attention of the committee during the meeting
and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but
with a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of
this examinee bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked
as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the
Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade of 4% increased to
50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and
 (b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average
of 73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at
the time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office
the data thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political and
International Law under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The
notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622
identified and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in
Political and International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661
with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation,
as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and International
Law is precisely the same notebook mentioned in the sworn
statement of Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. -------
Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only
one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile
Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in the latter, under the
facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the
Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners
concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-
check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that
there was very little time left and that the increase in grade after re-evaluation,
unless very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject carries
the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is
devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of
notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on
the first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading
sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that
the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of
respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio
Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as required by the latter
respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider
"failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a
"passing" case, especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar confidant
do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary course of official
business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a
reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution
dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant
Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In fact,
the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein respondent
utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the
Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having redounded to the
benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of
Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or
especially for him and not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar
candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's
grades was done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of
policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's
examination and, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-
evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not
far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in
herein Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having caused
actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume this
could be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the members of
the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves
and the result of their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these
inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which
only goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
 7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this
Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well
as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy
between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and it is
contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties and that
they should be regarded as such in the consideration of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and
cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the
answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the respondents-examiners
to make the desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected
notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply
the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before
Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in
the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that
as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he
finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one on
another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of
grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-
examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the
examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said
subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-
examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the
practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said
subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code
Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-
evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil
Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing
average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street,
Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and
previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to
review the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing
subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent
Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent
Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he thought that if the notebook were
reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar.
Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in
his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent
Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential
Memorandum that read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal
fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a test of
memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to clarify of
language and soundness of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that
respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further believing
that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of
Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law,
from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made by
him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136,
instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53,
rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing
grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to
deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in
Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a
notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said
notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and Public International
Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%,
said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is
possible — the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help
out examinees who are failing in just one subject — respondent Pablo acceded to the request and
thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-
evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased
to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding
corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with
Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-
46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the
passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the
latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law,
as he had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal
Law — that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only
a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%,
then the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and
seeing the justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure of the
examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the
revised mark and also revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The
examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66
and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when
the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to
him that where a candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one subject, as a
matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing
subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this
was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by
him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing
grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision
of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of
his quite ingenious scheme — by securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for
the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo
suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner
concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee
adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63;
Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed
by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This
information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all
closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the
particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar
candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent
Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase
the final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee
for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V,
pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular
examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to make
the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that
there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he
had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the
notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613
and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned
to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second
week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee. respondent
Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No.
661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-
examine, if possible, the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who
owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84%
in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the
grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an
increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office code number. It
belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V,
pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.
A Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN
E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners
concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that
eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or
a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971
Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's
examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his
lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the
Committee to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other
examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed
only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo
sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential
Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162;
Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that
he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing
so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the
contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous
manner because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the
examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum
was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination
papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the
examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not
only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian — whose
declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent
Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No.
1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and hearing
of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E.
that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the
Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence
that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers
of only respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein,
ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-
studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five
examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was
on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made,
Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average
was only 66.25% — which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the
examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first
notebook of Galang was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only
one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of
81%. The averages and individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation
are as follows:
BAI
1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
BAI
 Labor Laws and Social prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain
Legislations 67% 67% = no re- average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will
evaluation made. determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business
evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to
or 33 weighted points. know better than the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and
the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant
Taxation 74% 74% = no re- who takes such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well
evaluation made. as the image of the Court.

3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts. Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of
or 30 weighted points. betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite
belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation,
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from
22 weighted points. 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more
properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) = absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For
11 pts. or 44 weighted points. certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any
dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of
Legal Ethics and Practical reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave
Exercises 81% 81% = no re- injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said
evaluation made. more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the
———————————— Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the
said re-evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any
General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15% pretension of good faith.

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5)
subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was
increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the
integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in
favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who — Political
Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-
evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before
or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are
submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every
examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto
Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the
case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far
better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of
Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject.
Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter
shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook,
unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3-
Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to
why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man
desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent
Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he
filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing
that it was just an after-thought.
B In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS
GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO
QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION,
RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on
Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the
Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and
Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these
two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI,
pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-
evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty
dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these
two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the
Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the
Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the
date of the two examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not
presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the
Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45,
rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential
Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p.
74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in
Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and
record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613
(Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however,
that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in
the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of
Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the
notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as
Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the
figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p.
48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection
to their admission in evidence.
presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the
Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in which the
examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was
not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an
examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that
was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging
to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the
Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code
Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-
evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was
taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V,
pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the
Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political
Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of
the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the
Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V,
p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo,
Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72,
rec.).
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back
to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:
Labor Laws 3%
Taxation 69%
Mercantile Law 68%
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
Law are as follows: —————————————————

BA Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27 (Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in
Civil Law 75% 75% = " Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which
Taxation 69% 69% = " violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = " It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner
Remedial Law 85% 85% = " Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = " because even at the time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his
———————————————— answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-
evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the Confidential
Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5% Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-
evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations
Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.
grades. These are:
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken
Political Law 70% from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause and the
Taxation 72% corresponding investigation conducted.

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows: III

BA Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.

Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation A

Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = " The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the
Taxation 72% 72% = " Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9 in five(5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law,
weighted points and Mercantile Law.
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles;
(2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as
to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition
for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has
obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice
Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a
member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners
in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer
between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the
Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court.
Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the
admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules
of the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar
Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in
connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court
and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in
five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any
authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him
as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971
Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not
possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not
clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or
re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not
the examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is
whether the proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in
accordance with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the
character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for
admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending
in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was
required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character
(Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully
ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral
turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing
the Court of one's personal record — whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or
the case dismissed or is still pending — becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take
the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure
not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of
all other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form
used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require
the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task
to show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the
Court all his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the
ascertainment and determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's
criminal records before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral
character; for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether
pending or terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his
character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the
Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of
applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused of,
indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that
there is no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar
examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for use of applicants
required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In
paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been
charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted
for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a
pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to
intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which
was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to
make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and
withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966,
1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared
under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that
he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take
the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that
he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license
to practice law is well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in
withholding from the board of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to
whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an
indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he
applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of
the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law
Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the
clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p.
710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the
Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed
truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the applicant and
his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of indictments
against him, one of which was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts
which should have been submitted to the court, with such explanations as were
available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the
court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his
having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case
including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by
the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen
years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite
attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member
of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring
him to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang
was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal
case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed
to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have
no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his
name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound
discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which
merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a
disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer
of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit
him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing American cases)
[52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is
not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the
admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others,
of (a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's
educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of
Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators
contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-
478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of
the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52
Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and
Castro, the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were
convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge
Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G.
Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-
correction of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant
Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of
the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and
that they did the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly
demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners
made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the
Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care
and caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent
Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee,
who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners
should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or
the average of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their
respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves
that the examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the
stain on the Bar examinations could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath
that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with
respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political
Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the
grades of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent
Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said
that this particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something, I
cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing
average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp.
60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis
ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in
allot her subject except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and
increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe I
asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help
out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just
leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over the
book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were
wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not
complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the
grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents
Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in
grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by
the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo —
Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of
the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the
absence of such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time"
(Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5,
Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2,
Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian —
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him the
owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75%
the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and
policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the
grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I
am authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio
Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo —
 (c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent
carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the
answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the
benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that
particular subject that said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced
that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given him, but
he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing
grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo —
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that
particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher
grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the
herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that
the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper influence, their
conceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the
said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners, which
were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers
of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE
find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein
respondents-examiners that their participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one
impressed with the highest consideration of public interest — absolute purity of the proceedings —
and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their
duties relative thereto.
V A
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed
that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue
assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be
pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend — a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations
whom said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said
examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice
Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's
insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the investigation which in
his words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the
investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against
Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia
"until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as
a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does
not invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971
Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising
the grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar
Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for
the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian
advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian
mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian)
before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was
divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an
indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his
actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to
undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent
Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable
consideration.
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release
of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar
Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes,
Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount
of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on
April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife
executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes,
Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No.
90913: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972:
Second mortgage — P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument — April 5,
1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent
Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to
him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00.
Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings while
the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan
and received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000)
[Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from his
sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in
the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under
Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00
bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00
was used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in
his 1971 statement was not realized because the transaction therein involved did
not push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from
1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married
sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000
(P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on
January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his
sister at the time he received the $200 was not even presented by respondent
during the investigation. And according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he
considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode
or time of payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the address
of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the records.
Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of her own, is
among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to him, the
conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-
gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes
house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14,
1972 — date of instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of inscription). On February 28,
1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed
by respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143.
Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry
No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled
on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor
of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to
respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a
month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation
and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his
assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the
same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972
Statement of Assets and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car
valued at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and
November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any car was
listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to
1965. It appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his
1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972)
Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was
P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar
examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to link
or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by respondent
Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that
the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties
came from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of
the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential
Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the
matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on
October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was
required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is
indicative of a consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January
15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially
claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house
and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in
relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or
allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or
offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evidence
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it
is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets
and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as
they are part of the records of this Court.
B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang
and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the
Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days — 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at
the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958,
respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the
governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the
Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of
Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans
Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time,
therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans
Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the
date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the
availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his
pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already
19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of
Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that
he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however,
that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ
Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute
to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school year 1955-56 was
directly addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo,
Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine
Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location
of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational
benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings
(Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of
Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol.
V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building
and is obliquely across the City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he
investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability
benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans
investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that
he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49,
rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at
Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later
he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the
Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During
the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no
communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not
remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the
Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII,
p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was bombed
and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo
dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise
known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January
16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into the XI-
Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva
Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations
against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of
demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar
Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from
the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the
bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY
DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS
HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS.
6. BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father
validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This
is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to
the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A.
Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching
has resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University
in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court,
dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that
he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following
documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the
Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public
accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election
Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that
Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing
that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union
during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the
successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May
1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to
take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to
submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the
documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued
to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict
compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the
Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose
Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate
Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of majority." 2 In this
regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine
citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a
citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age of
majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a
reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by
the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec.
of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But
in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made
within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if
ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence.
However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the
relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the
allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his
oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of
Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation,
Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school
records and other official documents;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino
citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a
notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to
the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;
 9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the
Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is whether
he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his
citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV,
Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority,
the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in
the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the
Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987
Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted,
however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship
should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of
citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was subject to
challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the
judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the
party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election
should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon
reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the
validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on
the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the
proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the
Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be
made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time"
has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching
the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is
not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after
reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three
(3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the
constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under
certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself
a Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is
not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became
of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951,
when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he
had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made
"upon reaching the age of majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14)
years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon
reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the
allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that
the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected
public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as
informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio
Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien,
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban
 Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when
he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections and
campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his
preference for Philippine citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very
different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was
born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the
requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing
Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter
since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect
Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother.
In this regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a
Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and
privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos
Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223,
May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs.
Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous
belief that he is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is
rightfully entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House
of Representatives, 18 where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal
process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the
exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute
a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of
the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age
constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis
supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his
life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to have
elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re
Mallare rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who
still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came
up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a
profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other
categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations for these
persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien.
Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt
in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in
an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the
special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his
consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree
with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect
Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age
of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way
beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority."
Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and
unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an
inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as
a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for
admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
7. IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002
BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA
BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while
the other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition[1] to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002
Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral
Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when
Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media
practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife
causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used
the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod
of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Courts Resolution[2] dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the
OBC.
In his Answer,[3] Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because
the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in
the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and
involving the same parties as closed and terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds
that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word Attorney as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation[4] dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge
of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the
Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction
can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are
still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still
required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take
the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of
concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the
public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied
by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable
under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be
answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with
his application for admission to the bar.[5]
As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not
acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as
attorney whoever may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing
his communications as Atty. Haron S. Meling knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto.As
held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation attorney may render a
person liable for indirect contempt of court.[6]
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and
sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it
recommended that Melings membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until further orders from
the Court.[7]
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not
pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from
taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate
sanctions upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but
merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also
known to possess good moral character.[8] The requirement of good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.[9]
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
requires the applicant to aver that he or she has not been charged with any act or omission
punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or
indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving
moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her. Despite the declaration
required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate
silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory
evidence of good moral character of the applicant.[10] The nature of whatever cases are pending
against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral
fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks
the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to
impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him
speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege
bestowed upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its
use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,[11] the Court had the occasion to discuss the
impropriety of the use of the title Attorney by members of the Sharia Bar who are not likewise
members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial
Sharia District in Marawi City, used the title Attorney in several correspondence in connection with
the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:
persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only
practice law before Sharia courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who
has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered counselors, in the sense that they
give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title attorney is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully
taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.[12]
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The
solemn task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service
therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and
dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this
standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the
constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to
take the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found
the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him
therefrom until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate
sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.Accordingly, the
membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further
orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to
prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a
member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
8. SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court,
Marawi City, respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B.
Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is
the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were
classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm
(hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to
Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the
Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on
the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales
agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an
Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds
which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co.
"agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on
record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before
said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by
your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no
stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free
Postage PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-
President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.;
and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable from
salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided,
the 'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as
represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently
manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without my
authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the
attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit,
dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me and
the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous
actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April
15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the
cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account
thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal
Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop
deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner
by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to
stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa &
Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with
this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the letter,
and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In
that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance
and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may
properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing
his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance
and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and
completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be
appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with
established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of
Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant
Division Clerk of Court.[2]
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he questioned the authority of Atty.
Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere
Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the
Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result
of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the
complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of
court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal Family
**."[4]
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even
obsequious tones,[5] Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that
he might comment thereon.[6] He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and
within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by
falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly
deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it
was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and
untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted
from his salary.[7] He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with
Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking
privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted
with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were typewritten on the
envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C.
Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the
comment as Annex J);[8] and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the
money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the
court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.[9]
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous"
with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he
prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or
the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not
consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured."[10] He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a
classmate and friend.[11] He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she
would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him;
despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property -- subject of
his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;[12] He says Alawi
somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she
did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with
Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the
down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which
he ever saw.[13]
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless
allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in
the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan
(dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15,
1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does
not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.[14]
 The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and
libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad
faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In
those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to **
(his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against ** (his)
will," and "concealed the real facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in
defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured,"
who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial
suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his
salary.[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service.[16] Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and
employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to
law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest."[17] More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every
official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge
to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their
conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to
earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary."[18]
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public
policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed -- however
sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent
language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law
requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm
to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order,
supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative
language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi
is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a
man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or
otherwise improper.[20] As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person
and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by
prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps
be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously
wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare
that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may
only practice law before Shari'a courts.[21] While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and
one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the
sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The
title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of
law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to
local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of
"counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record
contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for
usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Note: For In Re: Galang Case, the full text is under number 5. 
9. DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for
membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than
possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees
as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled
oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center.However, the Court
ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge
against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the
Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave
misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of
Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading
dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel
for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for
George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal
government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such,
respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of
acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging
respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent
the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath
but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him.
In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him
before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but
as a person who knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected
to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing.He explains, however, that he did not sign the
pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he
submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He
submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed
by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically
motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for
mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit
and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim
of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan.
Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in
this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his
appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an
employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the
instant administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the
May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively
participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC
proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that
respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The
OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission
to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the
Philippine Bar.
 On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent
allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee.
Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was
authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that
respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the
lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in
Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for
George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was
the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T.
BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana
as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her
counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana
has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the
said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering
his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-
PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the
MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of
Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent
engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262,
263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the
legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of
legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings
before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the
charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he
was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority
to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. [3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not
acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced law without a license.[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a
candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of
Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar.
Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized
practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.[7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However,
it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification
to become an attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential requisites for
becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this
Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.[9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow
respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since
respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
 Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts
complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001
addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon your acceptance. [10]Vice-Mayor Relox
accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the evidence does not support
the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed
authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While
there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
10. FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO SABSALON, respondents.
Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action for certiorari to annul
the decision 1 of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to
pay private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and
car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of
judgment to the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees.
We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de minimis amounts involved
should not impose upon the valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to clarify some
issues the resolution of which are important to small wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we
have heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the rich or the
powerful, with their reputed monumental cases of national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or
the underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that beset their individual lives.
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi
drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the
daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they
were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer
for any deficiency in their "boundary," for every actual working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already
failed to report for work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was working for
"Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on
September 6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter
stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to his home province to
recuperate.
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and
conditions as when he was first employed, but his working schedule was made on an "alternative
basis," that is, he drove only every other day. However, on several occasions, he failed to report for
work during his schedule.
On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous day.
Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated
requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed
that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company."
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits
for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these
were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was
allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their
taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his
services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected when he
refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office of
the National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal
deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding that it took private respondents
two years to file the same and such unreasonable delay was not consistent with the natural reaction
of a person who claimed to be unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a
mere afterthought.
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private respondents failed to
controvert the evidence showing that Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company
from February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September
1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators. It,
accordingly, affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that private respondents' services were not
illegally terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to
pay private respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this resolution.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now before
us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of said public respondent.
This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC,
which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence. 3 Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they
must be struck down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse
of discretion. 4
Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray any shortage
in their "boundary" is covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor Code against
requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that the Secretary of Labor has
recognized the same as a "practice" in the taxi industry. Consequently, the deposits made were
illegal and the respondents must be refunded therefor.
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall require his worker to
make deposits from which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss
of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except
when the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the
practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as
determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.
It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to
tools, materials or equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or
permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his
"boundary." Also, when private respondents stopped working for petitioners, the alleged purpose
for which petitioners required such unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case, any
balance due to private respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them with legal
interest.
However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES
1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00
1988 720.00 760.00 200.00
1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00
1990 605.00 570.00
1991 165.00 2,300.00
———— ———— ————
P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00
The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his deposits
through vales or he incurred shortages, such that he is even indebted to petitioners in the amount
of P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning the same
even in the present petition. We accordingly agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor
General that since the evidence shows that he had not withdrawn the same, he should be
reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash deposits. 5
On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent the
issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a
tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same clean
condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case),
complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the
amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal
in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the
context of the law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.)
Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments
they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the
taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly
noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by
fair play.
On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized
representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they
represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the members thereof. While it
may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of private respondents, he
was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of
the law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees.
Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client
a reasonable compensation for his services 7 necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client
relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist
unless the client's representative is a lawyer. 8
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is
hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's
fees and directing said public respondent to order and effect the computation and payment by
petitioners of the refund for private respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest
thereon from the date of finality of this resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.
11. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEONCIO SANTOCILDES, JR. y SIGA-
AN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Where an accused was not duly represented by a member of the Philippine Bar during trial, the
judgment should be set aside and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial. A person who
misrepresents himself as a lawyer shall be held liable for indirect contempt of court.
Subject of the present appeal is the decision dated October 29, 1992, of the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo City, Branch 33, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of rape, sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the offended party the amount of
P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of rape[1] of a girl less than nine (9)
years old, committed on December 28, 1991, in the town of Barangay San Luis, San Joaquin, Iloilo.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued and the prosecution
presented as its witnesses the victim, her mother, her six (6) year-old playmate, and the medico-
legal officer who examined the victim.
For the defense, appellant presented one German Toriales and himself. Appellant denied
committing the rape and claimed that he merely tried to stop the two girls, the victim and her
playmate, from quarreling.
On October 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision[2] finding appellant guilty as
charged. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together its accessory penalty. The
accused is ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 to the complainant and another amount for
costs, without subsidiary penalty in case of failure to pay the civil liability and the cost.
If qualified under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 6127, as amended, and he
has agreed in writing to abide by the same rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be
credited with the full duration of his preventive imprisonment; otherwise, he shall only be credited
with 4/5 of the same.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, appellant duly filed a Notice of Appeal.[3] In his brief,[4] appellant made the following
assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED IS
GUILTY OF RAPE INSPITE OF CONFLICTING TESTIMONIES OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND HER
WITNESSES ON MATERIAL POINTS.
II. THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED THOUGH NO FAULT OF HIS OWN TO BE
DEFENDED BY A PERSON AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW AMOUNTING TO DENIAL OF DUE
PROCESS.
Considering the importance of the constitutional right to counsel, we shall now first resolve the
issue of proper representation by a member of the bar raised by appellant.
Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a person named Gualberto C.
Ompong, who for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel and even conducted the direct
examination and cross-examinations of the witnesses. On appeal, however, appellant secured the
services of a new lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who discovered that Gualberto C. Ompong is
actually not a member of the bar. Further verification with the Office of the Bar Confidant confirmed
this fact.[5] Appellant therefore argues that his deprivation of the right to counsel should necessarily
result in his acquittal of the crime charged.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, maintains that notwithstanding the fact
that appellants counsel during trial was not a member of the bar, appellant was afforded due
process since he has been given an opportunity to be heard and the records reveal that said person
presented the evidence for the defense with the ability of a seasoned lawyer and in general handled
the case of appellant in a professional and skillful manner. However, the right of the accused to be
heard by himself and his counsel, in our view, goes much deeper than the question of ability or
skill. It lies at the heart of our adversarial system of justice. Where the interplay of basic rights of the
individual may collide with the awesome forces of the state, we need a professional learned in the
law as well as ethically committed to defend the accused by all means fair and reasonable.
On the matter of proper representation by a member of the bar, we had occasion to resolve a
similar issue in the case of Delgado v. Court of Appeals.[6] In Delgado, petitioner and two others were
convicted by the trial court of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public and/or official
documents. One accused did not appeal. Petitioner Delgado and her remaining co-accused appealed
to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed petitioners conviction but acquitted her co-accused. After
entry of judgment, petitioner discovered that her lawyer was not a member of the bar and moved to
set aside the entry of judgment. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion, hence, she filed a
petition for certiorari with this Court. The Court set aside the assailed judgment and remanded the
case to the trial court for a new trial, explaining that -
This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a
criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer,
there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the
legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due
process.[7]
Indeed, the right to counsel is of such primordial importance that even if an accused was
represented by three successive counsels from the Public Attorneys Office, the Court has ordered
the remand of a rape case when it found that accused was given mere perfunctory representation
by aforesaid counsels such that appellant was not properly and effectively accorded the right to
counsel. In the recent en banc case of People v. Bermas, G.R. No. 120420, April 21, 1999, the Court,
speaking through Justice Vitug, admonished three (3) PAO lawyers for failing to genuinely protect
the interests of the accused and for having fallen much too short of their responsibility as officers of
the court and as members of the Bar. Verily, we can do no less where the accused was not even duly
represented by a certified member of the Philippine Bar, no matter how zealous his representation
might have been.
The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should never be taken
lightly.[8] Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. [9] The right of an accused to
counsel is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused is
pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State. [10] Such a right proceeds from the
fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before
being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a persons basic rights; it is not a mere
formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.[11]
The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in no less than Article III, Sections 12 and 14 (2)
of the 1987 Constitution. This constitutional mandate is reflected in Section 1 of Rule 115 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which declares the right of the accused at the trial to be present in
person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation
of judgment. In turn, Section 5 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests the power to promulgate
rules concerning the admission to the practice of law to the Supreme Court.Section 1 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court explicitly states who are entitled to practice law in the Philippines, and Section 2
thereof clearly provides for the requirements for all applicants for admission to the
bar. Jurisprudence has also held that the right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right
but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited to persons of good moral character with
special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The right does not only presuppose in its
possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly
personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust. [12] Indeed, so strict is the regulation of the
practice of law that in Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[13] a Bar candidate who has already successfully hurdled
the Bar examinations but has not yet taken his oath and signed the roll of attorneys, and who was
caught in the unauthorized practice of law was held in contempt of court. Under Section 3 (e) of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who undertakes the unauthorized practice of law is liable for
indirect contempt of court for assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED to the trial
court for new trial.
With respect to the unauthorized practice of law by the person named Gualberto C. Ompong in
connection with this case, the local Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of Iloilo City is
DIRECTED to conduct a prompt and thorough investigation regarding this matter and to report its
recommendations to the Court within ninety (90) days from notice of this order. Let all concerned
parties, including the Office of the Bar Confidant, be each furnished a copy of this Decision for their
appropriate action.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
12. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO
TENAZAS petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN
MUNING respondents.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.
Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue presented in
this petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8
December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting
respondent Quintin Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the said case.
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs.
Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision,
on 29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and
Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates,
counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of
the total backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a
reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation
indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the
same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20%
of the backwages. Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is
not a lawyer.
The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates
through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in
behalf of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin
Muning.
On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation
for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:
Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%
Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10%
Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be
voided in the present petition.
Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late filing
but his motion was overruled on 20 January 1965.1 He asked for reconsideration, but, considering
that the motion contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and
considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer to the petitioner
for review.2 The case was considered submitted for decision without respondent's brief.3
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et
al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968,4 that an agreement providing for
the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees
with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An
award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present
case.
The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —
In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall
not be required to be represented by legal counsel ...
is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of
Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section
adds that —
it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and
cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly
presentation of evidence.
thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified
members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on
behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such
representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing —
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, ...
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's
fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since
respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique
Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees.
Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be
entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules
and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the
protection of courts, clients and the public.
On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:
But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting
persons not licensed or admitted to the bar from practising law, and under statutes
of this kind, the great weight of authority is to the effect that compensation for legal
services cannot be recovered by one who has not been admitted to practice before
the court or in the jurisdiction the services were rendered. 5
No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless
he has been duly admitted to practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the
time.6
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated;7 that acting as an
attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment
or both,8 and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in
violation of law;9 and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless
confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition,
aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures. 10
And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by
non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by
seeking to recover as an "agent" and not as an attorney. 11
The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees
should suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of
Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special
jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an
exception.
The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which
are deductible from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it was the union
PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union
members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the
present petition that was subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila and
Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.
We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees which
are deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor organization is
permitted to institute an action in the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the union
was organized "for the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic well-
being"; 13 hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal
as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides:
Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any order
of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,
since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of
litigations.
Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the
Court of Industrial Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed to practice, registering
their appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a
serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should actively pursue and
enforce by positive action to that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in issue before the
court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action
against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the
backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other
respects. Costs against respondent Muning.
13. CATU VS. RELLOSA
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot[1] and the building erected thereon located at
959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu,
contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu[2] and Antonio Pastor[3] of one of the units in the
building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was
initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of
Manila[4] where the parties reside.
 Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section
meetings.[5] When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a
7(b)(2) of RA 6713:[8]
certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor
of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing
in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel
laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative
official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
complaint,[6] claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public
officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the
conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear
employees during their incumbency shall not:
complaints referred to the barangays Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of
Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with
xxx xxx xxx
utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the
not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for
conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)
free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent
injustice against her.
According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition constituted a
breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBPs Commission on
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating
LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.[7]
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents suspension from
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over
the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or
the conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and
similar act will be dealt with more severely. [9] This was adopted and approved by the IBP
Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed
against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings Board of Governors.[10]
including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so
doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE
while in said service. OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES ONLY TO FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
 Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in
connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. In PCGG v.
Sandiganbayan,[11] we ruled that Rule 6.03prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in
said service.
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act
complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA 6713, GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF
PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency,
from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions. This
is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160[12] governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors
are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other
than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided,
That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a
local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the
government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an official;
and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when
the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the
Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official
hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials
concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective
local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective
local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging
in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat
generalibus.[13]
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are
the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for
provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for
cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang
bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and
the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited
from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service. They
should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city
mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayanare required to hold regular sessions only at least once a
week.[14] Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any
occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure
prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial
board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice
their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong
barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius.[15] Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to
practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full
time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.[16]
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his
Department, as required by civil service regulations.
A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE LAW MUST SECURE
PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the
disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written
permission of the head of the department concerned. [17]
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head
of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of
those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their
entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an
employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted
outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not
impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally,
that no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or
employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his
duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become
an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written
permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his
appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service
Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the
law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote
respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first
canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission,
respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules
which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards
of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards
legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the bar.[18] Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. [19]
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for
violation of the lawyers oath[20] and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied
in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional
misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six
months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the
records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish
copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
14. Spouses FRANKLIN and LOURDES OLBES, complainants, vs. Atty. VICTOR V.
DECIEMBRE, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
 Constituting a serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility was the
malevolent act of respondent, who filled up the blank checks entrusted to him as security for a loan
by writing on those checks amounts that had not been agreed upon at all, despite his full knowledge
that the loan they were meant to secure had already been paid.
The Case
Before us is a verified Petition[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre, filed by
Spouses Franklin and Lourdes Olbes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. Petitioners
charged respondent with willful and deliberate acts of dishonesty, falsification and conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar. After he had filed his Comment[2] on the Petition, the Court
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay, held
several hearings. During those hearings, the last of which was held on May 12, 2003,[3] the
parties were able to present their respective witnesses and documentary evidence. After the filing of the
parties respective formal offers of evidence, as well as petitioners Memorandum,[4] the case was
considered submitted for resolution. Subsequently, the commissioner rendered his Report and
Recommendation dated January 30, 2004, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors in its Resolution No. XV-2003-177 dated July 30, 2004.
The Facts
In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were government employees working at the
Central Post Office, Manila; and that Franklin was a letter carrier receiving a monthly salary
of P6,700, and Lourdes, a mail sorter, P6,000.[5]
Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 her application for a loan from Rodela
Loans, Inc., in the amount of P10,000. As security for the loan, she issued and delivered to
respondent five Philippine National Bank (PNB) blank checks (Nos. 0046241-45), which served as
collateral for the approved loan as well as any other loans that might be obtained in the future. [6]
On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid respondent the amount of P14,874.37 corresponding to the
loan plus surcharges, penalties and interests, for which the latter issued a receipt,[7] herein quoted
as follows:
August 31, 1999
Received the amount of P14,874.37 as payment of the loan of P10,000.00 taken earlier by
Lourdes Olbes.
(Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre
8-31-99
P10,000.00
PNB Check No. 46241 8/15/99[8]
Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four (of the five) blank PNB
Checks (Nos. 0046241, 0046242, 0046243 and 0046244) for the amount of P50,000 each, with
different dates of maturity -- August 15, 1999, August 20, 1999, October 15, 1999 and November 15,
1999, respectively.[9]
On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal an
Affidavit-Complaint against petitioners for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22. He
alleged therein that on July 15, 1999, around one-thirty in the afternoon at Cainta, Rizal, they
personally approached him and requested that he immediately exchange with cash their postdated
PNB Check Nos. 0046241 and 0046242 totaling P100,000.[10]
Several months after, or on January 20, 2000, respondent filed against petitioners another
Affidavit-Complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22. He stated, among others, that on the same
day, July 15, 1999, around two oclock in the afternoon at Quezon City, they again approached him
and requested that he exchange with cash PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and 0046244
totaling P100,000.[11]
Petitioners insisted that on the afternoon of July 15, 1999, they never went either to Cainta,
Rizal, or to Quezon City to transact business with respondent. Allegedly, they were in their office at
the time, as shown by their Daily Time Records; so it would have been physically impossible for
them to transact business in Cainta, Rizal, and, after an interval of only thirty minutes, in Quezon
City, especially considering the heavy traffic conditions in those places. [12]
Petitioners averred that many of their office mates -- among them, Juanita Manaois, Honorata
Acosta and Eugenia Mendoza -- had suffered the same fate in their dealings with respondent.[13]
In his Comment,[14] respondent denied petitioners claims, which he called baseless and devoid
of any truth and merit. Allegedly, petitioners were the ones who had deceived him by not honoring
their commitment regarding their July 15, 1999 transactions. Those transactions, totaling P200,000,
had allegedly been covered by their four PNB checks that were, however, subsequently dishonored
due to ACCOUNT CLOSED. Thus, he filed criminal cases against them. He claimed that the checks had
already been fully filled up when petitioners signed them in his presence. He further claimed that he
had given them the amounts of money indicated in the checks, because his previous satisfactory
transactions with them convinced him that they had the capacity to pay.
 Moreover, respondent said that the loans were his private and personal transactions, which A. Yes, Your Honor, because the checks were deposited at different banks.
were not in any way connected with his profession as a lawyer. The criminal cases against
Q. These four checks were accordingly issued to you by the complainants on July 15, 1999,
petitioners were allegedly private actions intended to vindicate his rights against their deception
is that correct?
and violation of their obligations. He maintained that his right to litigate should not be curtailed by
this administrative action. A. I will consult my records, You Honor, because its quite a long time. Yes, Your Honor, the
first two checks is in the morning and the next two checks is in the afternoon (sic).
COMM. DULAY:
Report of the Investigating Commissioner
Which are the first two checks?
In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
The first two checks covering check Nos. 46241 and 46242 in the morning. And Check
Responsibility.
No. 46243 and 46244 in the afternoon, Your Honor.
The commissioner said that respondents version of the facts was not credible. Commissioner
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Dulay rendered the following analysis and evaluation of the evidence presented:
Q. Could you recall what particular time in the morning that these two checks with number
In his affidavit-complaint x x x executed to support his complaint filed before the Provincial 0046241 and 0046242 xxx have been issued to you?
Prosecution Office of Rizal respondent stated that:
A. I could not remember exactly but in the middle part of the morning around 9:30 to
10:00.
2. That last July 15, 1999, in the jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal, both LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN
A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to immediately exchange with cash, right there and Q. This was issued to you in what particular place?
then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their
A. Here in my office at Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.
business venture.
Q. Is that your house?
Again in his affidavit-complaint executed to support his complaint filed with the Office of the City
A. No, its not my house?
Prosecutor of Quezon City respondent stated that:
Q. What is that, is that your law office?
2. That last July 15, 1999, at around 2PM, in the jurisdiction of Quezon City, M.M., both LOURDES E.
OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to immediately exchange A. That is my retainer client.
with cash, right there and then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately Q. What is the name of that retainer client of yours?
used by them in their business venture.
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
The above statements executed by respondent under oath are in direct contrast to his testimony Your Honor, may I object because what is the materiality of the question?
before this Commission on cross-examination during the May 12, 2003 hearing, thus:
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing) That is very material. I am trying to test your credibility because according to you these
Q. Based on these four (4) checks which you claimed the complainant issued to you, you checks have been issued in Pasig in the place of your client on a retainer. Thats why I
filed two separate criminal cases against them, one, in Pasig City and the other in am asking your client
Quezon City, is that correct?
 COMM. DULAY: Complainants version that they issued blank checks to respondent as security for the payment of a
loan of P10,000.00 plus interest, and that respondent filled up the checks in amounts not agreed
The name of the client is not material I think. It is enough that he said it was issued here
upon appears to be more credible. Complainants herein are mere employees of the Central Post
in Pasig. What building?
Office in Manila who had a previous loan of P10,000.00 from respondent and which has since been
ATTY. DECIEMBRE: paid x x x. Respondent does not deny the said transaction. This appears to be the only previous
transaction between the parties. In fact, complainants were even late in paying the loan when it fell
AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor. due such that they had to pay interest. That respondent would trust them once more by giving them
COMM. DULAY: another P200,000.00 allegedly to be used for a business and immediately release the amounts
under the circumstances described by respondent does not appear credible given the background of
What is the materiality of knowing the name of his clients office? the previous transaction and personal circumstances of complainants. That respondent who is a
ATTY. PUNZALAN: lawyer would not even bother to ask from complainants a receipt for the money he has given, nor
bother to verify and ask them what businesses they would use the money for contributes further to
Because, Your Honor, the materiality is to find out whether he is telling the truth. The the lack of credibility of respondents version. These circumstances really cast doubt as to the version
place, Your Honor, according to the respondent is his client. Now I am asking who is of respondent with regard to the transaction. The resolution of the public prosecutors
that client? notwithstanding we believe respondent is clearly lacking in honesty in dealing with the
COMM. DULAY: complainants. Complainant Franklin Olbes had to be jailed as a result of respondents filing of the
criminal cases. Parenthetically, we note that respondent has also filed similar cases against the co-
Your answer. employees of complainants in the Central Post Office and respondent is facing similar complaints in
ATTY. DECIEMBRE: the IBP for his actions.[15]

A. It is AIC Realty Corporation at AIC Building.

Q. And the same date likewise, the complainants in the afternoon issued PNB Check Nos. The Courts Ruling
0046243 and 0046244, is that correct?
A. Yes. We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner Dulay, as approved and adopted
by the IBP Board of Governors. However, the penalty should be more severe than what the IBP
Q. So would you want to tell this Honorable office that there were four checks issued in recommended.
the place of your client in Pasig City, two in the morning and two in the afternoon?
A. That is correct, sir.
Respondents Administrative Liability
Respondent was clearly not being truthful in his narration of the transaction with the complainants.
As between his version as to when the four checks were given, we find the story of complainant[s]
Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions.[16] It is
more credible. Respondent has blatantly distorted the truth, insofar as the place where the
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good
transaction involving the four checks took place. Such distortion on a very material fact would
moral character.[17] A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly
seriously cast doubt on his version of the transaction with complainants.
circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of
the quest for truth and justice, for which he [or she] has sworn to be a fearless crusader. [18]
Furthermore respondents statements as to the time when the transactions took place are also
obviously and glaringly inconsistent and contradicts the written statements made before the public By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an
prosecutors. Thus further adding to the lack of credibility of respondents version of the transaction. indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. [19]Lawyers should act
and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to
promote the publics faith in the legal profession.[20]
The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following:
Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.
xxxxxxxxx
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxxxxxxx
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and required of members of the
[21]
bar. Such conduct of nobility and uprightness should remain with them, whether in their public or
in their private lives. As officers of the courts and keepers of the publics faith, they are burdened
with the highest degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a
manner consistent with truth and honor.[22]
The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest
degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others. The oath is a sacred trust
that must be upheld and kept inviolable at all times. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any
conduct, whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders them
unfit to continue to be officers of the court.[23]
In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave credence to the story of petitioners, who said
that they had given five blank personal checks to respondent at the Central Post Office in Manila as
security for the P10,000 loan they had contracted. Found untrue and unbelievable was respondents
assertion that they had filled up the checks and exchanged these with his cash at Quezon City and
Cainta, Rizal. After a careful review of the records, we find no reason to deviate from these findings.
Under the circumstances, there is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable
conclusion. Respondent does not deny the P10,000 loan obtained from him by petitioners.
According to Franklin Olbes testimony on cross-examination, they asked respondent for the blank
checks after the loan had been paid. On the pretext that he was not able to bring the checks with
him,[24] he was not able to return them. He thus committed abominable dishonesty by abusing the
confidence reposed in him by petitioners. It was their high regard for him as a member of the bar
that made them trust him with their blank checks.[25]
It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed
by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed
upon at all and despite respondents full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the
checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document,
resorted to for his material gain.
And he did not stop there. Because the checks were dishonored upon presentment, respondent
had the temerity to initiate unfounded criminal suits against petitioners, thereby exhibiting his vile
intent to have them punished and deprived of liberty for frustrating the criminal duplicity he had
wanted to foist on them. As a matter of fact, one of the petitioners (Franklin) was detained for three
months[26] because of the Complaints. Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and
professional misconduct. He committed an act indicative of moral depravity not expected from, and
highly unbecoming, a member of the bar.
Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of
law. It is equally essential to observe this norm meticulously during the continuance of the practice
and the exercise of the privilege.[27] Good moral character includes at least common honesty.[28] No
moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness and candor. [29] The
rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous
behavior.[30] Lawyers must be ministers of truth. Hence, they must not mislead the court or allow it
to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith. [31]
Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful
and dishonorable;[32] they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not
satisfied by conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. [33]
Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild. His
propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up
checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome.
In Eustaquio v. Rimorin,[34] the forging of a special power of attorney (SPA) by the respondent to
make it appear that he was authorized to sell anothers property, as well as his fraudulent and
malicious inducement of Alicia Rubis to sign a Memorandum of Agreement to give a semblance of
legality to the SPA, were sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law for five years. Here,
the conduct of herein respondent is even worse. He used falsified checks as bases for maliciously
indicting petitioners and thereby caused the detention of one of them.
 WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of
Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
indefinitely SUSPENDED from the practice of law effective immediately. Let copies of this Decision
be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is directed to append a copy
to respondents personal record. Let another copy be furnished the National Office of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
15. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR
APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of
homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of
Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of
"hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused
then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded
guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the
trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the
lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by
Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years,
counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the
1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then
probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En
Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however,
allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's
oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had
terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his
probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge
Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3)
Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with
special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.2 The essentiality of good moral
character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with
approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the
applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which
he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements
necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad
character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have
acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have
conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or
does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of
least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is
right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently
proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor,
and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney
at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the
administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx4
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis
359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to
deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances
that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an
applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore
becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is
required to cause a minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each
candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to
arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to
the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the
bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented,
for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has
established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court
when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment
of his license.
In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the
right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and
continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment
and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all
will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards
fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are
allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are
allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss:7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant
is not to punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the
examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not
only protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the
trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such
agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and
officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due
administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that both
those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had
them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the
administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than
the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10
Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to
the practice of the law unless he covered an upright moral
character. The possession of this by the attorney is more
important, if anything, to the public and to the proper
administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be
acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of
the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that his
character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace
instead of an ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of a
benefit to his community — a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of
a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking
admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry
into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his
admission to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the
California Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it
appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or
 suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that
in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to
show the applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general
morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish
his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the
bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the
general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal
profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a
perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law
and in our legal system as we know it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the
required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who
inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to
protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity
involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten
and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless
physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and
was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then
possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is
prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of
the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is
a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for
permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application
for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence
that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed
upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications
from responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who
have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of
conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make
up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is
a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned
profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation,
of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any,
of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished
to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
16. EMILIO GRANDE, complainant, vs. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to
96-1353, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for Estafa and Violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, entitled People of the Philippines, Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad,
Accused. During the proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva, counsel for the accused,
tendered to complainant Check No. 0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her
account with the Philippine National Bank, as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her
client. Complainant refused to accept the check, but respondent assured him that the same will be
paid upon its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested that as a lawyer, she would not issue
a check which is not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was prevailed upon by complainant to
accept the check. Consequently, he desisted from participating as a complaining witness in the
criminal case, which led to the dismissal of the same and the release of the accused, Sergio
Natividad.
When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee bank for
the reason: Account Closed. On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to respondent demanding
that she pay the face value of the check.[1] However, his demand was ignored by respondent; hence,
he instituted a criminal complaint against her for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina, which was docketed as I.S. No. 97-
1036. On September 22, 1997, the Marikina City Prosecutor filed the necessary information for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva.[2]
On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment
of respondent for deceit and violation of the Lawyers Oath.[3]
In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondents given address at Carmelo
Compound, Newton Avenue, Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was required to comment on the
complaint within ten (10) days from notice.[4] However, it was returned unserved with the notation
Moved.[5] The Assistant National Secretary of the IBP submitted the latest address of respondent as
274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig City.[6]
 On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on the administrative profession, whether it be professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a
complaint filed against her was served at the aforesaid address. This was again returned unserved lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is
with the notation: Refused. Thus, the case was referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the bar, for a lawyers professional and
(IBP-CBD) for investigation, report and recommendation.[7] personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.[12]
In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on
respondent guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyers Oath.Thus, he her betrays a deplorably willful character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. profession.[13] Her conduct not only underscores her utter lack of respect for authority; it also brings
to the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw in her psyche which renders highly
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554 which
questionable her moral fitness to continue in the practice of law: a defiance for law and order which
adopted the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent be suspended
is at the very core of her profession.
from the practice of law for two (2) years.
Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice
We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
because obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer.How else
The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her personal check by would respondent even endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law when she disdains to follow
way of settlement for the civil liability of her client, Sergio Natividad, with the assurance that the even simple directives? Indeed, the first and foremost command of the Code of Professional
check will have sufficient funds when presented for payment. In doing so, she deceived complainant Responsibility could not be any clearer:
into withdrawing his complaint against her client in exchange for a check which she drew against a
closed account. CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check
amounted to deceit and constituted a violation of her oath, for which she should be accordingly
Needless to state, respondents persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her
penalized.[8] Such an act constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties for such malfeasance is
with not even an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct which merits no
prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the Rules of Court, to wit:
compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all
times. She can only do this by faithfully performing her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member of
and to her clients.[14] We can not tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
honorable profession.
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years, effective upon receipt
for a party without authority to do so. hereof. Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral
SO ORDERED.
character. Since this qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of
law, the maintenance thereof is equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the
exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyers moral character in serious doubt
may render her unfit to continue in the practice of law.[9]
The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension
or disbarment,[10] because it is important that members of the legal brotherhood must conform to
the highest standards of morality.[11] Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the