Anthropology and the Analysis of Ideology

Author(s): Talal Asad

Source: Man, New Series, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Dec., 1979), pp. 607-627
Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2802150 .
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 ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF
IDEOLOGY*

TALAL ASAD
ofHull
University

This lecture discusses some of the conceptual problems involved in anthropological

treatmentsof ideology, and argues that most of the difficultiesarise from a theoretical
preoccupationwithessentialhuman meanings-as embodied in theauthenticsocialcategories,
actions and discoursesof given cultures.This preoccupation,it is maintained,is shared by
anthropologistswho are oftenthoughtof as being radicallydifferent fromeach other,and it
accountsforthe difficultiestheyhave encounteredin conceptualisingsocial change.The first
and longerpartofthelectureexploresthesedifficulties in some writingsby Bloch, Bourdillon,
Leach and Mary Douglas. The tendencyto reduceanthropologicalproblemsabout thenature
and consequence of particularpublic discoursesto thephilosophicalproblem of the originof
essentialhuman conceptsis noted. The tendencyto see authoritativemeaningsas the a priori
totalitywhich definesand reproducesthe essentialintegrityof a given social order is also
criticised,on thegroundsthatitleavesan importantquestionunasked:namely,how particular
political and economic conditions maintain or undermine given forms of authoritative
discourseas systems.The finalpartof thelectureis devoted to a generalcritiqueof the vulgar
Marxist theoryof the social functionof ideology, with particularreferenceto the kinds of
reductionismwhich thattheoryundertakesin its attemptto determineessentialmeanings,
and the kindsof questionwhich it failsto consideradequately.

I
In the early seventieswhen the questionof anthropologyand colonialism
was firstbeingpubliclyarguedout in thiscountry,therewas an understandable
reactionon the part of many Britishanthropologists againstthe exaggerated
role attributed,in some of the crudercriticisms,to anthropologyas colonial
ideology. In the excitementof indignantresponseit was oftenforgottenthat
the really interestingquestions concerned the ideological conditions of
anthropology,and the implicationsof theseconditionsfor its discourse,and
not the very occasionallydirectbut on the whole insignificantpracticalrole
thatBritishanthropologists hadplayedin supportofBritishimperialstructures.
Insteadofenquiringintotheeffects ofideologicalconditionson anthropological
discoursethe argumentoftendegeneratedinto assertionsabout the personal
motivesor politicsof its producers.However, I do not want to addressthis
problemdirectlyhere,but insteadto beginwitha generalpuzzle: themodesty
of anthropologistsregardingthe ideological role of their discoursesin the
determinationof colonial structuresdoes not seem to be matched by a
correspondingscepticismregardingthe role of ideology generallyin the
determinationof social structureswhich are the objects of their discourse.
* Malinowski Lecturefor 1979, given at the London School of Economics on 6 March.
Man (N.S.) 14, 607-27.
6o8 TALAL ASAD

Their scienceas discourse,so it is said,is not determinedby social reality.And

yet the social realityof which that science speaks is typicallynothing but
discourse.It is thisapparentparadox I should like to explore in what follows.
But firsta word of warning.What I say about anthropologyhere is not
intended as an empirical generalisationof the work of all self-styled
anthropologists-or even of that of the majority.For a long time now
anthropologyhas ceased to constitutea coherentfieldof intellectualenquiry,
and its presentunityis institutional and not theoretical.My commentsrelate
thereforeto particularstrandswithinsocial anthropologywhich seem to me
to hang togetherin significantways,forminga recognisablepatternthathas
become an obstacleto further development,and one which it would be worth
examining more closely. I repeat,this patterndoes not definethe unityof
anthropologybecauseit relatesto a numberof assumptionsand tendenciesthat
are neitherexclusiveto it,nor forthatmattersharedby all textswhich would
be called anthropological.

II
Questionsconcerningconceptsand society,classification and socialstructure,
rules and social behaviour have always been of central concern to social
anthropology.In recentyearsa freshimpetushas been given to suchquestions
derivingfromthe studyof language.This new impetushas occasionallybeen
representedas a radical break,a New Anthropology,and linesof battlehave
been drawn on what are alleged to be mattersof profoundimportanceforthe
theory and method of social anthropology.However, it is very doubtful
whetherthefreshdevelopmentsrepresent a totallynew departure,or whether
thelinesofbattledefinepositionswhichare as different as theyhave sometimes
been claimed to be.
In fact,many of the basic assumptionsand concernsof more recentwriters
influencedby the studyof language can be tracedback to Malinowski, not
only of those writerswho have been happy to acknowledge the connexion,
but also of many who have not. Malinowski's critics,rangingfromlinguists
such as J.R. Firth(I957) and Langendoen (I968) to the publicistsfora New
Anthropologylike Ardener (I97i), Henson (I974) and Crick (I976), have
largelyseen in Malinowski a failedlanguage-theorist. One is oftengiven to
understand that despite his commendable emphasis on the importanceof
learning native for
languages fieldwork, Malinowski had no realunderstanding
of advanced language theory.He is dismissedby anthropologistslike Sahlins
or noted brieflyby linguistslike Lyons
(I976) for his crass utilitarianism,
(I968) as someone who contributedthat quaint but not entirelyvalueless
notion,'phatic communion',to semantictheory.That Malinowski'stextson
language also containan anthropologicaltheoryof culture(which is not,by
the way, to be confusedwith his theoryof basic and derivedneeds),has gone
generallyunnoticed.Not only in his explicitlylinguistictexts,such as 'The
problem of meaningin primitivelanguages'and Volume 2 of Coralgardens,
but also in some of his otherwritingssuch as his famousessayon myth,there
is presenta notion of cultureas an a prioritotalityof authenticmeaningsto
 TALAL ASAD 609

which action and discourse must be related if they are to be properly

understoodand theirintegrity explained.' It is thisnotion,as itfindsexpression
in the writingsof more recentanthropologists, thatI shallbe questioning.
But I do not want to give theimpression-especiallyon thisoccasion-that
I am adding one more criticalvoice to the long processionof Malinowski's
detractors.Malinowski was notjust a splendidfieldworker,and an amusing
polemicist rather than a good theorist,as the received version in social
anthropologyhasit.His untidybutextremelyinteresting writingson language
do not only reveala problematicalconceptionof culture,theyalso show signs
of attemptsto breakaway fromthatconceptionand to searchfornew ways of
representingand understandingdiscoursewithin the contextof social life.2
My concernherehowever is not with Malinowski'stexts-but with thoseof
anthropologists who are stillverymuch alive.
An emphasison 'meaning' is to be found,whetherimplicitor explicit,in
much recentanthropologicalwriting.A preoccupationwith identifying and
constitutinga prioristructuresof human meaning is shared by a range of
writings that are otherwise very different-thosedealing with cultural
categories, symbolic representations,codes and communication, image
management,rationaltransactions, etc. And thepreoccupationis presentboth
in the rationalistperspectivesof thoseconcernedto asserttheuniversalityand
priorityof culturalclassificationsystems, and in theempiricistperspectivesof
thoseconcernedwith what theytake to be the ultimatedatum of flesh-and-
bone individuals,interactingintelligently withinthe real world. This interest
in meaningis not itselfnew, althoughthereis perhapsa new self-consciousness
about that interest.Anthropologicaltextswith titleslike Implicitmeanings,
Rules and meanings,Transactionand meaning,Explorationsin languageand
meaning, 'The managementof meaning','Form and meaningof magicalacts',
'The politicsof meaning',seemto be somewhatmore evidenttodaythanthey
were a generation ago-and from authors who might be described as
empiricistsor as rationalists,and sometimeseven as rationalistand empiricist
at one and the same time. It is worth notingthatLeach (1976) has recently
writtenabout thecomplementary characteroftwo majorperspectives in social
anthropology,the rationalistand the empiricist,which he regardsnot as
opposed but as eminentlycompatible.3However it is not my intentionto
suggest reassuringly,as Leach appears to want to do, that rationalistand
empiricistanthropologists are togetherproducinga sum of understanding in
which what is lackingon the one side is made up by the achievementof the
other.On the contrary,I want to tryand indicatesome thingstheyhave in
common, and to suggestwhy and to what extentthesethingsare a source of
presenttheoreticalweakness.
One aspectof thisweaknesscan be seen in what is oftenadmittedto be the
repeatedfailureof social anthropologists to produce a viable theoryof social
change.The reasonforthismay not be, as it is sometimesproposed,that'real'
factorsof social changeare manyand complex,which is a practicaldifficulty,
but ratherthatthe way the objectof changeis itselfconceptualisedmakesthe
possibilityof such a theorydifficultifnot impossible.
In the writingsof both empiricistand rationalistanthropologists, then,
6Io TALAL ASAD

human meaningsare seen almosteverywhere.More precisely,the basic social

or social order)which is presentedin the
object (called society,social structure
discourse of such anthropologistsis constructedout of essential human
meanings.Societyas therealmof conventionis generallyopposed to natureas
the realm of necessity.In extremecases,as in Sahlins'smost recentdialogue
with Marxism, thereis a tendencyfor even natureto be representedas the
product of human action and cognition,as inert raw matterordered by
constitutivehuman meanings.In a strikingpassage,which mustsurelystand
as one of the most lyrical expressionsof the humanistproject in modern
anthropology,Sahlinsin the conclusionto Cultureandpracticalreasonwrites:

... natureas it existsin itselfis only the raw materialprovided by the hand of God, waiting
to be given meaningfulshape and contentby the mind of man. It is as the block of marble to
the finishedstatue;and of course the geniusof thesculptor-in thesame way as the technical
developmentof culture-consists of exploitingthe lines of defractionwithinthe materialto
his own ends. That marbleis refractory;thereare certainthingsone cannotdo with it-such
are the factsof natureand the action of selection.But it is the sculptorwho decides whether
the statueis to be an equestrianknightcontemplatinghis victories[.. .] or a seated Moses
contemplatingthe sins of his people. And if it be objected thatit is the compositionof the
marble which compels the formof the statue,it should not be forgottenthatthisblock of
marble was chosen fromamong all possibleones because thesculptorsaw withinit the latent
image of his own project(I 976: 2 I0).

This bold celebrationof man's creativepowers, with God complacently

occupying the rank of unskilled labourer, may not be to the taste of all
anthropologists.However that may be, thispassage fromSahlins does raise
sharplythequestionofhow thebasicsocialobjectpresentedin anthropological
texts is constitutedin those texts,and the question of what some of the
theoreticalconsequences might be of the fact that the essentialdefining
elementsof thatobject are human meaningsand humanprojects.
My concernis not with the questionof whetheror not the anthropologist
shouldacceptuncriticallyand reproducedirectlyin hismodel theexplanations
producedby thepeople he studies.The argumentsbetweenso-calledsymbolists
and literalists
(sometimesrepresented as a confrontation
betweensoft,nostalgic
liberalson the one hand, and clear-sighted, unsentimentalmodernistson the
other)arestill,afterall,argumentsaboutthecriteriato be usedfordetermining
thesenseofwhatpeople in othersocietiessayand do. On thisquestionone may
note in passingthatthe attemptto make a rigiddistinctionbetweensymbolic
and literal meaningsis coming to be seen as a distinctionthat raisesmore
problemsthanit solves.4Recently, Sperber(I975) andSkorupski (I976) have
in theirdifferentways discussedtheconfusionscreatedby theanthropological
addictionto notionsof the symbolic.That theirown treatments are not free
offurther difficulties
is somethingI cannotconsidernow. In anycase,mypoint
herehas to do not withtheproperinterpretation ofwords,gestures, and things
in theircapacityas signifiers,
but with the preoccupationthatdifferent kinds
of anthropologists have with humanmeaningsas such.
My concern in the firstplace is with the natureof the basic social object
constitutedwithinanthropologicaltextsthemselves.And I want to arguethat
in anthropologicaltextsthisobject is typicallyconstitutedwith referenceto a
 TALAL ASAD 6i i
notion of ideology whose social significancederives from its being the
expressionof an a priorisystemof essentialmeanings-an 'authenticculture'.
I shall try to explore brieflythis conceptual object constitutedof human
meaningsand to criticiseit as I proceed-not by pointingto a brute reality
whicheverysensiblepersonmustimmediatelyrecognise,butby interrogating
the texts.In thecourseof thisinterrogation I shalltryto takenote of the very
differentmodels that structurethe sense of 'meaning'-the aim of a
speaker/actor, therulesof linguistic(and stylistic)conventions,the contentof
an experiencing,construingmind,and the processof conceptualunpacking
and re-presentation thatoccurs throughobjectivediscourse-because part of
my criticismwill focuson the troublesthatarise fromthe combinationof
what are oftenincompatiblemodels in the anthropologicalattemptto define
authenticcultures.

III
That thecentralobjectof anthropologicaldiscourseis primarilyconstituted
in termsof human meaningshas very recentlybeen reaffirmed by Maurice
Bloch in his I977 paper'The pastand thepresentin thepresent'.
In thispaperBloch is concernedto specifyreasonsfortheperennialdifficulty
that anthropologistshave had in formulatingan adequate theoryof social
change.Bloch pointsout thatthe conceptof social structurein anthropology
refersessentiallyto an integratedtotalityof social classifications
and meanings,
a system of social rules and roles which can, in one widely accepted
anthropologicalsenseoftheterm,be called ritual.Now ifthisconceptof social
structureis linked to the doctrineof the social origin of concepts(the social
determination ofcognition)itbecomesimpossibleto specifyhow socialchange
can occur. This is because,so Bloch argues,a systemof meaningfulcategories,
ofsharedconceptsthatmakescommunicationpossible(a systemwhichis none
otherthansocial structure)cannotexplain thecreationof new concepts.5
Bloch believes thatthe Marxist theoryof determininginfrastructure and
determinedsuperstructure is no answerto theproblemeither,because:
the infrastructureis seen as externalto the conceptsof the actors.[And] forit to be a source
of criticismof the social order it means thatpeople mustapprehendit in termsavailable to
them and which are differentfrom and incompatible with those of the dominant social
theory. This means terms not determinedby it. Otherwise the infrastructure, however
contradictoryto the dominantsocial theory,is never transformed into action and just carries
on in itsown sweet way, totallyirrelevantto the processesof history(I977: 28 i).

Bloch's own solution is to propose that the differentconceptionsand

perceptionsrequiredforan effective criticismoftheexistingsocial ordermust
be determinedby thatwhichis otherthansociety-in otherwordsby nature.6
Now Bloch's emphasison the importanceof ideological argument(which
has its roots in some fertilesuggestionsmade by Leach in Politicalsystems of
highlandBurma)is certainlya move in the rightdirection-and I will come
back to it later.But even in sucha discourse'social structure'is presentedas a
total integratedsystemof sharedsubjectivemeaningsand conventions.Even
theMarxistnotionofinfrastructure isdeclaredto be 'irrelevantto theprocesses
6I2 TALAL ASAD

of history'unlessit can be reducedto the experiencesand aims of individual

actors.The problemof social changeis thuspresentedas being a problemof a
changeof concepts,theconceptsavailable to 'real flesh-and-blood individuals'
thatcan at once defineand transform theessenceof society.
The main difficulty with Bloch's argumentis this: the propositionthat
universallyvalid concepts(or new and betterformsof understanding)are
essentiallygeneratedby man'sencounterwith nature(which is to be thought
of as being a kind of 'undeceiving' object) and not by his encounterwith
society(which is to be thoughtof as being a kindof 'mystifying' object) may
or may not be acceptable.I would maintainthatit is not. But even ifit were,
it would not explain how people, who are presumablyall in directcontact
with the same nature,come to have verydifferent conceptswithinthe same
society,and how theyare able to engage in ideological argumentsabout the
basic transformation of social conditionsin which theyall live.
In otherwords,epistemologicalquestionsabout the ultimateoriginor the
finalguaranteeofsocialconceptsand formsof knowledge(so beloved of many
anthropologists)are really quite irrelevantto this kind of problem. They
cannot tell us anythingabout the reasonswhy different kindsof ideological
position come to be held in social life,or about the ideological force or
effectiveness ofparticularpoliticalarguments.(That is not to sayas some social
theoristsboth here and in France have recentlydone, that epistemological
problemsare in themselvescompletelyvalueless,but thatit is unnecessary, and
worse thanunnecessary, to drag in epistemologicalquestionswhen discussing
problems regardingthe constitutionof what anthropologistswant to call
social structure,or society,and the partthatsystematicideologiescan play in
the reproductionor transformation of that object.) In this respect,Bloch's
mistakeconsistsin making the assumption,which is by no means unique to
him,thatsociety-and so too socialchange-is essentially a matterofstructures
ofmeaning, structures which are at once thecollectiveformsofexperience,and
the social pre-conditionsof communication(cultureas language); and that
therefore,social criticismis not merelysometimes a necessarybut always a
sufficient pre-conditionforsocial change.
Thus anthropologistshave presentedthe basic social objectsin theirtexts
('social structure')in such a way thattheyinevitablyproposeforideologyan
essentialand determinatefunction-so thatideology is not only writtenin as
the basic organisingprincipleof social life,the integratedtotalityof shared
meaningswhich gives that societyits unique identity(its culture),but also
changingideologiesare said to be essentialto basic transformations.
In a recent issue of Man (December I978), there appears a perceptive
commenton Bloch's paper by Bourdillon.In it he observesquite rightlythat
the equation Bloch makesbetweenritualconcepts(or religiouslanguages)on
theone hand,and hierarchyand exploitation(or social structure)on theother
is far too simple and thereforeunacceptable.7However, Bourdillon has no
quarrel with the essentiallyideological constitutionof that anthropological
object called social structure.On the contrary,he insiststhatsocial structure
'is a way ofthinkingabout societywhichenablesus to bringtogethera diverse
setof relationsinto a manageablesystem,and which expressesthe continuity
 TALAL ASAD 6I3

in any process of social events' (I978: 595). As against Bloch, Bourdillon

maintainsthatthisintegratedsystemof roles,rulesand ritualsis essentialfor
any formoforderlysocial life,and notjust a sourceof mystification which can
and should be done away with. Bourdillon is here of course echoing the
argumentby Douglas (1970) thatthe dissolutionof structure, farfrombeing
therationalaim of revolutionsis merelytheempiricalcause of rebellions.But
he does not ask himself,as he mightwell have done: is the systemwhich is
supposedto be necessaryforthinkingand speaking(whetherspeculatively, or
withauthoritative force)about sociallifeto be identified withwhatis necessary
forliving in it?
The ambiguity here is between what is supposed to be the way the
anthropologistactually thinksand speaks aboutsocial life and the way the
people the anthropologistis studyingare supposedactuallyto thinkand speak
intheirsociallife.In otherwords,theambiguityis betweentheanthropologist's
discourse,and thediscourseofthesociety(thediscoursethatis itslived culture)
which is supposedto be reproducedin the anthropologist's definitivetext (an
interpretative,reflectivediscourse).This ambiguityis not concernedmerely
with the question mentioned previously of the degree to which the
anthropologistmay or mustdraw on theexplanationsprovidedby thepeople
studied-sometimesreferred to in theanthropologicalliterature as theproblem
of the informant'smodel versus the anthropologist'smodel. The question
being raised here is really concernedwith the relationshipthe other way
around.And the formwhich thatquestionmighttake is this:to what extent
do anthropologicaltextsconstructan essentialsystemof meaningsin their
attemptto presentthe'authentic'structure of social lifeand of discourseof the
people studied?
Let me firstillustratethispoint with a familiarexample.

IV
Some years afterPoliticalsystemsof highlandBurmawas firstpublished,
Gellner(i958) wrote a paperdrawingattentionto thebook as:

perhapsthe most lucid statementof a certainkind of Idealism that I know, and teachersof
philosophycould profitablyuse a selectionof his statementsas a means of explainingto their
studentswhat such Idealism is about (I958: 202).
Leach in effectsees otherFunctionalistsas holding a kind of Platonism.Only the staticis
properlyknowable, it is merely approximated by the empiricallyreal. [...] Leach's own
variantto thisis a kind of Hegelianism: realitychangesbecause it is in conflict,the conflictis
a conflictof embodied ideas,and the change and conflictare knowable by means of concepts
thatare themselvesin conflictin a parallelway (I958: I93).

Gellner'spaper containedsome usefulpointsof criticism,but I believe he

was mistaken in his philosophical reading of Leach's text. Besides, the
propositionthatPoliticalsystemsof highlandBurmarepresentsa view thatis
appropriatelydescribedas Hegelian cannotbe sustainedby a carefulanalysisof
thattext.But thatis all by theway. The interesting
thingwas Leach'sresponse
6I4 TALAL ASAD

in his IntroductoryNote to the I964 reprint.There, you may remember,

Leach wrote as follows:
Incidentally,in a friendlycomment,ProfessorGellnerhas writtenoffmy whole argument
as one of 'idealist error'.Truth and errorare complicatedmattersbut it seemsto me thatin
suggestingindirectlythat the Kachins have a rather simple minded philosophy which
presumesa relationshipbetween'idea' and 'reality'not verydifferentfromthatpostulatedby
Plato, I am not arguing thatPlato was correct.The errorsof Platonismare very common
errors which are shared not only by anthropologistsbut also by the people whom
anthropologistsstudy.

This attributionby Leach of the Platonicdoctrineof formsto the Kachins

is quite astonishing-not because the Kachins are too simple-mindedto hold
it, but because the doctrineis essentiallya metaphysicalone, and thereis no
evidencein thetextof Kachin metaphysics in thissense.Whateverthe'errors
of Platonism' may be, they are not the errors of everyday political and
economic life(which is what thebook deals with) but theerrorsof systematic
philosophicalspeculation.
Such is the awe in which philosophyis held by anthropologists, thatLeach
feltconstrainedto replyto a philosophicalchargein philosophicalterms.And
yet therewas no need forthiswhatever.Gellner had attributeda particular
philosophicaltheoryof meaningto Leach,8and it was in thiscontextthathe
criticisedhim for assuming that one needed changing concepts to know
changing reality.But Leach's text is not based on a specificphilosophical
theoryof meaning at all:9 a basic argumentof Politicalsystemsof highland
Burma(likethatofBloch'spaper)is thattheremustbechangingsocialconcepts
forsuch a thingas social changeto occur. Now such an argumentcould have
been countered-by pointing,not to a faultyphilosophicaltheoryabout the
relationbetween 'ideas' and 'reality' (as Gellner did), but to an ideological
conceptionof social change.More precisely,it could have been counteredby
drawingattentionto a veryquestionabletheoryofculture-the theorywhich
giveslogical priorityto thesystemofauthenticmeaningsupposedlysharedby
an ideologically-defined community,and independentof the politicalactivity
and economic conditionsof itsmembers.
Politicalsystems
ofhighlandBurma isrightlyregardedby manyanthropologists
as a most importanttext-although its remarkableoriginalityand its failure
have rarely been adequately appreciated.But note how argumentsabout
systematicconceptswithinanthropologicaldiscoursecan be easilyshiftedinto
anotherkey-and thusstopped,by an appeal to the discourseof the natives
'out there'which theanthropologist has witnessedand recorded.Since Gellner
did not respond,we can perhapsassumethathe acceptedLeach's authorityin
thisargument.However thatmay be, on thisoccasion,as on othersin which
anthropologicaldiscourseseeks to re-presentan authenticsystemof human
meanings(theenduringcategorieswhich define,fromone historicalmoment
to another,who 'the Kachin' are),no nativewas available to contestthesystem
being imputed-if not to him or herindividually,thenat leastto the'society'
which was supposedto be authentically his or hers.
Here is one example, then, of the way in which the anthropologist's
discursiveobject comes to be presentedas a reproductionof the essential
 TALAL ASAD
discourseofa whole society.(Although,be it noted,it is nottheKachin butthe
anthropologist who actuallywrites.)The examplemaybe unusualin substance
but perhapsbecauseof thatit servesall thebetterto raisethe questionof how
anthropologicaltextsconstructfora whole society,or even fora groupwithin
it, a total,integratedsemanticsystem,which definesforthatsocietywhat its
essentialidentityis.
Let me pursuethisquestionwithfurther reference
to Leach'sPoliticalsystems
Burma.
ofhighland
The significanceof Leach'stextderivesnot fromthefactthatit illustrates a
simple philosophicalerror(idealism)which should be replacedby a sounder
epistemologybut fromthe factthatit is a rich and complex statementof a
particularanthropologicalproblemand itsproposedsolution.The textis not
simply the reflectionof an essentialphilosophy.It is the productionof an
anthropologicalobject. I cannot here discussthis work in the detail that it
deserves,but will draw on an aspectof it which is relevantto my theme.
The startingpoint of Leach's study,of course,was the questionof Kachin
identity.The problem was thatthe so-calledhill peoples of the north-eastern
Burma frontier regionwere ratherdiversein theirculture,lived in contrasting
ecological settings,spoke a number of quite distinct (often mutually
unintelligible)dialects, and were organised in local communitieswhich
apparentlyheld to very differentpolitical principles-varying from the
comparativelyrich,autocraticShan princedomsto theoftenratherpoor, and
relativelyegalitarianKachin gumlaovillage domains. Leach's answer to this
basic problem was that Kachin identitywas based on a common 'ritual
language', an ideological systemwhose primaryorganisingcategorieswere
political.
Leach's notion of a common ritual language enabled him to rationalise
apparentlocal divergenciesin the Hills Area into conceptualmomentsof the
'same' social structure,and apparenthistoricalchanges into elementsof the
transformational This rationalist
logic ofthatstructure. solutionto an empirical
problem was thusin effectthe constructionof a systemof human meanings
(a 'grammarof ritualaction' Leach called it) which was thenidentifiedas the
essentiallanguagethatdefinedthepoliticaleconomicintegrity oftheKachins-
and in terms of which the Kachins must speak if they are to remain
authenticallyKachin. In this way Leach's text defineswhat can and what
cannotbe 'correctly'said in thepoliticaldiscourseof theKachins.
Of course Leach allows forand refersin his text to ideological argument
among the Kachins. But the argumentsdescribedrevolve in generalaround
the abstractprinciplesof hierarchyversusequality,and Leach relatesthe way
in which theauthoritative Kachin rituallanguageis usedto claim one or other
of thesetwo abstractprinciples,which are at once theprinciplesof prevailing
social conditionsand the principlesof meaningfuldiscourse.The resulting
account of social change,as manycriticshave observed,is thusan accountof
an eternalcycle-better describedas a processof ideologicalself-reproduction.
The difficulty here is not thattherecannot be argumentand criticismof
social arrangementsif thereis only one language which is 'determinedby
society'.The difficultyis notthatLeach shouldhave looked moreto 'economics
6I6 TALAL ASAD

and politics'(whereallegedlyMan is in directcontactwith Nature) and lessto

ritual and religion in order to identifythe origins of Kachin concepts of
Reality.The difficulty residesin the very notion of a 'grammar' which is at
once theprinciplethatdefinestheanthropologist's objectof discourseand also
thesystemof conceptswhich is held to integrateand defineKachin political
and economic lifeas a whole. This ideologicaldefinitionof theKachin system
misses the question of whether there are not specificpolitical economic
conditions which make certain rhetoricalforms objectivelypossible, and
authoritative. For when Kachins become Shan, for example, the process
involved is not merely a matterof the mental or behavioural change of
subjects,but ofthepartialunderminingofa givenformofdiscourse,and ofthe
production and re-affirmation of another form,within the very different
materialconditionswhich Shan politicaleconomy articulates.The question
that we might ask, therefore,is whetherthereis a 'grammar' that always
definesfor the population of the entireHills area what are the politically
correctutterances(or actions),and what are necessarilymeaninglessones.
The unsatisfactory state of such anthropologicaltheorisingcomes, I am
arguing,fromthefactthatthebasic social objectit presentsis constructedout
of an integratedsystemof 'sharedmeaningfulideas', and so fromthefactthat
a closed, definitivestatusis given to thatsystem(otherwiseit would not be
'integrated'or 'shared' fromone generationto the next), and all thisin the
attempt to reproduce an authenticculture. What makes that system of
meanings'authentic'is this very re-presentability fromthe past'0 (froman
original generationto its authorisedsuccessors;and from the moment of
graspingit in the fieldto the momentof embodyingit in the text).Thus the
political discourseof particularsocieties(as opposed to theirknowledge of
Reality) is assumed to be self-defining and self-reproducing. Because of this
assumption,recentcommentatorslike Bloch cannot see any way out of the
Leachean impasse other than by reducingthe problem of the authorityof
political discourse(which definescertainmeaningsas essential)to the very
different problem of the epistemologicalfoundationand growthof objective
knowledge('Man's experienceofNature,direct/indirect'). And in thisway an
anthropologicalquestionis answeredin philosophicalterms.Neither Leach
nor his later critics make any attempt to explore the systematicsocial
connexionsbetween historicalforcesand relationson the one hand, and the
characteristicformsof discoursesustainedor underminedby them on the
other.
In case it should still be thoughtthat I am merelyconcernedto criticise
structuralistauthorsfortheiridealism,let me remindyou thatLeach'sPolitical
systems ofhighlandBurmais in itsown way as materialistand as actor-oriented
as arethemorerecenttextsbyself-proclaimed materialistsor transactionalists.

V
But perhapsthisargumentcan be made morestronglyifwe turnto Douglas
in her most recent,transactionalist
mood-I referof course to the booklet
Cultural
entitled bias.
 TALAL ASAD 6I7

PraisingCicourel for his attackon sociology and ethno-science,Douglas

comments:
Everythinghe writesabout our colleagues strikesthisanthropologistas good clean fun,but
it is a pitythathe never writesanythingabout Englishsocial anthropologyat all. For we are
hisnaturalallies.We also believe thatour work is to understandhow meaningsare generated,
caught and transformed.We also assume that meaningsare deeply embedded and context-
bound. We are also stuckat the same fencethathe has baulked. Like him we cannotproceed
very farwithoutincorporatingreal live culturesinto our analysis.For the cognitiveactivity
of the real live individual is largely devoted to building the culture,patchingit here and
trimmingit there,according to the exigenciesof the day. In his very negotiatingactivity,
each is forcingculturedown the throatsof his fellow men. When individualstransact,their
medium of exchange is in unitsof culture(I978: 5-6).

I thinkwe should not be distractedby thesevivid images of threatened

authority-of horsesthatwill not take the fence,and of prisonerswho are
forciblyfed. What Douglas wants to know is whethercultureis capable of
being radicallyaltered,and herconclusionis thatit is not.In orderto establish
this,sheattemptsa specificationoftherangeofconstraints on individualchoice
and exchange,and thisshedoes by theapplicationofwhat shecallsgrid-group
analysis-an anthropologicaloffspring of Bernstein'swell-knowndistinction
between elaboratedand restrictedcodes. The resultingmorphologyof four
basictypesofsocialcontext,and theirsupportingtypesofcosmology,formthe
settingswithinwhichthe'real live individual'makesdecisions,experienceshis
or her environment,and transactsvalueswith others.
Douglas produces ethnographic examples from a wide variety of
anthropologicalstudiesof non-capitalistsocietiesfor each of the four main
cultural types. But illustrationsfor all the types are also provided from
industrialcapitalistsociety,such that 'individualism',for example, can be
inscribedas a basic definingcomponentof 'middle classindustrialculture',as
well as that of highland New Guinea culture. And this is not without
significance,for she claims thatone of the meritsof her approach lies in its
abilityto 'cut acrosstheclassstructure'.
Douglas is quiteclearabout thefutilityofwhatshedescribesas classanalysis.
Ever since [the eighteenthcentury]Europe's self-knowledgehas consideredsocial change
in termsthat are based upon stratification, economic and political,and upon occupational
categories.For the anthropologist'sproject,the stratified
hierarchicalperspectivehas not lent
itselfto sayinganythingvery usefulabout the relationbetween cultureand ideology on the
one hand or between culture and formsof social organisationon the other. The present
exercise in understandingcosmologies is intendedto cut a different kind of slice into social
reality(I978: 54).

For Douglas, cultureis representedas a structuredfieldofauthenticmeanings

on which individualexperience,socialinteraction, and collectivediscourseare
all in differentways parasitic.The total culture,which mediatesbetween
ideologyand social organisation, is at once thecollectivepreconditionand the
long-termresidueof meaningfulchoice and experience.And because social
factsare representedin termsof theshapeand contentofsubjectiveexperience,
rationalismand empiricismbecome, in her text,complementarymodes of
accounting for the origin of those facts-a typical piece of reductionist
reasoning.Furthermore, sincetheparticularpatternof meaningfulindividual
6I8 TALAL ASAD
interaction,and the patternof collective cosmologies,togetherdefine the
ultimateformationof social conditionsin theirfourcontextualvariants,the
experiencing,transacting individualhas reallyonly one oftwo options:either
to adjust to a given integratedcontext (like learning to use a language
correctly)-or to leave it altogetherfora more congenialsocial context(or
language). And this is so because,in her own words, 'Each positionon the
[typological]chartis presentedas an integralunit incorporatingcosmology
and social experienceas a singleclose-meshedstructure'(p. 4I).
Thus for Douglas, the transformation of social structureis impossible,or
impossibleto understand,because thereis no social object that is specified
independentlyof a systemof humanmeanings,and becausesucha system,like
a given language, has the functionof renderingthe structureof cultural
experience and of political action isomorphic.As in Natural symbols,the
culturaland politicalpre-conditions forsayingand doing things,as well as the
meaningfulstatementsand actionsproduced in those conditions,are neatly
fusedtogether.Nothingcan be said or done withmeaningifit does not fitinto
an a priorisystem,the 'authentic' culturewhich definesthe essentialsocial
being of the people concerned. The process of radical transformation is
describedquite literallyas 'an emptying meaning'-and quite rightly if
of so
the re-presentation of essentialmeaningsis themarkof an authenticculture.
There is no spacein Douglas's textfora conceptofformsofsociallifewhich
have their own material conditionsof existence,their own relationsand
tendencies-thatis to say,conditions,relationsand tendencieswhichcannotbe
reduced to the origins of human meaning, whether collective cognitive
categoriesor individualsocial activity.The conceptof mode of production,
and therelatedconceptof classstructure, are of coursepreciselysuchconcepts.
These conceptsare not 'slices of social reality'.They are not the'true objects'
of human experience.And theyare not the ultimateorigin or guaranteeof
everydaycategoriesor of languagesor of ideologies. Such conceptsare for
theorisingthe systematichistoricalaspectsof social forcesand relationsby
which the materialbasesof collectivelifeare produced-forces and relations
whose existenceis distinctfromthatof individual meanings,intentionsand
actions.I need not elaborateon thispoint hereexcept to note in passingthat
conceptsof forcesand of relationsmustbe historicised, otherwisetheorisation
in terms of modes of production is bound to become legalistic and/or
idealistic.'2What I want to emphasiseis thatsocial lifeis not simplya matter
of systemsof meaning(whetherconventionalor intentional),even ifit is true
that communicationbetween human beings is necessarilypresentin every
domain ofsocial activity-thatsociallifeis notidenticalwithcommunication,
althoughcommunicationis necessaryto it. The logic of historicalstructures
based on theforcesand relationsofproductionis quite different fromthelogic
ofspecifichumanintentions, ofspecifichumanlanguages,and ofspecificforms
of human understanding.'3
Not only is the logic of ideological structures differentfromthe logic of
modes of production,but the formeris also, in complex ways,dependenton
thelatter.14Put moreconcretely:the'individualism'ofhighlandNew Guinea
societiescannotbe assimilated,as Douglas triesto assimilateit,to thebourgeois
 TALAL ASAD 619

'individualism' of the middle classes in advanced capitalistsociety. The

parametersof the bourgeois ego are definedby an authoritativediscourse
which is rooted in materialconditionsprofoundlydifferent fromthosethat
sustainthe relevantdiscoursesof highlandNew Guinea. For,to take a crucial
aspect of authoritativediscourse:it is only in particularkinds of social and
material conditions that given forms of performativeutterancecan be
effective.'5But fortheseutterancesto be effectiveit is necessarythattheybe
understoodand acceptedin appropriatekindsofsituationby appropriatekinds
of person.That is to say, given formsof effectiveperformatives presuppose
certaintypesof ego,just as particularkindsof performativecan be effective
only in the rightmaterialand social conditions.The difference between the
New Guinea Big Man and the bourgeoisego is thereforenot merelyone of
degree.
What can be said,in short,about all theseanthropologicaltendencieswhich
accord a criticalpriorityto systemsof human meaning is that they leave
unposedthequestionofhow different formsofdiscoursecome to be materially
produced and maintainedas authoritativesystems.And, of course,once this
questionis seriouslyaddressed,thetheoreticalstatusof sucha systemas a priori,
and itslatentfunctionas theorganisingmode withinanthropologicaldiscourse,
are also called into question.

VI
Perhapsthisis the place to considervery brieflysome popular misunder-
standingsof Marx's famousformulationabout the relationof ideologyto the
materialconditionsof existence.In thiswhole area too many different kinds
of question are often confounded,by defendersand critics alike of that
formulationin anthropology.Let me try,however sketchily,to sortsome of
themout.
Take firstideology as systematic formsof sociallyconstitutedknowledge.
The Marxian propositionthatthereare specificmaterialconditionsforthe
existenceof specificideologiesin thissensedoes not necessarilyimplythatthe
ideologiesare simplyeffectsor reflections of thoseconditions.Thus if we say
thatthedomainsofsystematic discoursewithinwhich specificknowledgesare
produced, testedand communicated,are dependent on specificinstitutional
conditionsand relations,thisdoes not requireany commitmentto the view
that the knowledges reflectthose institutionalconditions-that there is an
isomorphic relation between the structureof knowledge and that of
institutionalconditions.If we say thatgiven social conditionssustain,and at
certainstagesbecome obstaclesto thedevelopmentofscholarlyunderstanding,
thisdoes not imply thatthe conceptof objectiveknowledgesis nothingbut
illusion.If we say thatparticularmodes of systematicdiscoursecan be and are
used forfurthering particularclassinterests,
thisdoes not imply thatall such
modes of discourseare essentiallynothingbut an 'expression'of the positions
thatare supposedto definethoseinterests. So much may be familiarenough
and acceptableto manyof you.
620 TALAL ASAD

But where the notion of ideology relatesto notionsof politicsand social

functionit becomes more problematical.
Discourse which seeks to reflecton the nature of social conditionsin a
systematicway can, in the processof being re-stated,contested,acted upon,
have some criticalconsequencesforgivenconditionsofsociallife.But ideology
as suchcannotbe saida priorito have a universal,determinatefunction, because
what verbal discourses(as well as othermodes of communication)signifyor
do can only be determinedby analysingthe concretesocial conditionsin
which they are produced. It is no accident,for example, that attemptsto
specifya determinateset of rulesfor definingperformatives in English-let
alone in all languages-have not succeeded.'6Because the developingmaterial
conditionsof social lifealways determinethe force,if not the occurrence,of
discursiveevents.And theseconditionsare not merelythoseof theface-to-face
encounterin which utterancesoccur (as many speechevent theoriestend to
assume17)but thoseof thepoliticaleconomic structureof societyas a whole.
My pointis notthatwe will onlyhave a viable theoryof ideologywhen we
can develop a proper scienceof the symbolic,as some anthropologists have
argued.'8 It is thattherecannotbe a generaltheoryof ideology,a theorywhich
will specifythe universalpre-conditions, significances and effectsof discourse.
This is, of course,in itselfnot a novel argument.'9But it mustbe said thatit
is one thatstandsopposedto thepositionnot only of manyanthropologists but
also of manyMarxistson thisquestion-although not thatof Marx himself.20
It is all verywell to say,as manyMarxistsand anthropologists do, thatgiven
formsof social organisation(or given relationsof production)always require
given ideological (or cultural)systemsto maintainand reproducethem.But
sucha statementappearsextremelyproblematicalformanyreasons.In thefirst
place such a formulais eithertautological-as when ideologyis said to define
relationsof propertyso thatwhat has to be maintainedis identicalwith what
is supposed to do the maintaining;or it is reductionist-as when particular
utterancesare said to have a predetermined impacton the'interpreting minds'
of thosewho uphold basic setsof social relationships, theirsensebeing thereby
equated with their effect.What we can deduce, incidentally,from these
difficulties is thatsometimesideologyis treatedas socialrelation,and sometimes
as systematicutterance,and thatin both itsguisesit is sensedas being mediated
and structured, in an obscureway, by authorisingdiscourses.
When the questionarisesof specifying, in concretecases,what the crucial
ideologicalsystemsare,theanthropologist respondsby postulatingthepresence
of an authenticsystemof meaningsas the key to the discoursenoted in the
field,and essentiallyreconstituted in thefinaltext.It is thiskey thatis used to
identifyparticularutterancesas mererepetitionsof the same discourse,and to
determinefor them a mental effectas the crucial part of theirmeaning.In
other words, in order to establish the determinatefunctionof a given
'meaningful' discourse,the anthropologistisolates what was said from its
rhetorical context, and separatestendencieswhich might support given
conditionsfromthosewhich mightcontributeto theirundermining-taking
his theoreticalseparationsfor reproductionsof the original.In thisway, the
anthropologist's textsuppressesthetensionsand ambiguities(consciousas well
 TALAL ASAD 62I

as unconscious)thatobtainwithina givenfieldofdiscoursein specifichistorical

conditions,and thussuppressesalso the processby which motives,rhetorical
devicesand formsof comprehensionare constructedand reconstructed. It is of
coursepreciselytheseambiguitiesof discourse,and theelaborationwhich they
call for, that make political argument possible. Yet even when the
anthropologist'stext presentstwo or more 'competing ideological systems'
(officialand unofficial,say),actualdiscourseis generallyreducedto something
else-something thathas a determinatesocial role which can be definitively
establishedin a neutralfashionby theanalyst.
There is another (not unconnected)difficulty with the doctrine of the
maintenancefunctionofideology.When ideologyispresentedas theculturally
inheritedlens of a given societyby which external realityis filteredand
internalisedforitsmembers,or as thesystemof symbolsby which theirdirect
experience is rendereduniquely communicable,a well-known paradox is
created.For in doing so theanthropologist's textclaimsforitselftheabilityto
representthatexternalrealitydirectly,or to reproducethatinnerexperience
through very differentsymbols which are neverthelessassumed to be
appropriate-abilities which the exotic peoples studied necessarilylack. In
such an anthropologicalexercise,historicallyspecificdiscoursesare typically
reducedto the statusof determinatepartsof an integratedsocial mechanism,
and an epistemologicalparadigm which purportsto definethe problem of
objective knowledge is passed off as a sociological model for analysing
ideology.
It may be suggestedherethatthepossibilityof sucha reductionis locatedin
the absence,in anthropology,of an adequate understandingof authoritative
discourse-i.e. of materiallyfoundeddiscoursewhich seekscontinuallyto pre-
empt the space of radicallyopposed utterancesand so to preventthem from
being uttered.2' For authoritativediscourse,we should be carefulto note,
authorisesneither'Reality'nor'Experience'butotherdiscourse-texts,speech,
visual images,etc.,which are being structuredin termsof given (imposed)
concepts,and reproducedin termsof essentialmeanings.Even when actionis
authorised,it is as discoursethatsuchactionestablishesitsauthority.The action
is read as being authorised,but the readingand the action are not identical-
thatis why it is always logicallypossibleto have an alternativereading.
The problem of understandingideology is thereforewronglyformulated
when it is assumedto be a matterof predictingwhat 'real' or 'experiential'
social formsare necessarilyproducedor reproducedby it. And thisis so not
becauseformsof utteranceneverhave systematic consequences(performatives
do, given thattherelevantpremissesare understoodand accepted)but because
the effectiveness of such utterancesis dependenton conventionswhich are
viable only withinparticularmaterialconditions.

VII
One consequenceof what I have been sayingof course is thatthe vulgar-
Marxistview of ideologyas a coherentsystemof falsebeliefswhich maintains
622 TALAL ASAD

a total structureof exploitationand dominationcannot reallybe sustained.

This is because,as I have alreadyimplied,such a view attributesat once too
much to ideology and also too little:too much because the maintenanceand
continuityofa totalsocialformationis supposedto dependon an integratedset
of concepts,and too little because the discourse in which ideologies are
articulatedis identifiedas having an essential,univocal significancewhich
establishesat once itsstatusas falsebelief,and as social determinant. This view
is not centralto Marx's own analysisof capitalism,but it does have a certain
currencyamong some Marxists.
It shouldnot be imagined,however,thatthisview ofideologyis peculiarto
vulgar-Marxists.On the contrary,like the conceptionof the integratedsocial
formationwhich many FrenchMarxistanthropologists have been theorising
(and which I have criticisedforsome years)thisview of ideology is a central
doctrineof functionalanthropology.
Gellner'sdiscussionof barakaamong the Muslim Berbersof Morocco22-
to take a well-known example-is very much in line with this particular
view of ideology. His analysisis concerned,in his words,with showingthat
'There is here a crucialdivergencebetweenconceptand reality,a divergence
which moreover is quite essentialfor the working of the social system'
(1970: 142). Gellner describeshow a distinctiveminorityof Berbers,called
Saints,who act as mediatorsand arbitrators among the feudingtribesaround
themare believedto possessa divinequality,baraka,a qualitywhichis thought
to be the origin of theirauthorityand influence.But althoughthe Saintsare
believed to be selectedby God forthisoffice,so Gellnerargues,the realityis
quite otherwise,because it is the tribesmenthemselveswho, by resortingto
thesemediators,in effectselectand accordthemtheirauthority-but without
knowing that this is what they do. In Gellner'smemorable phrase,'What
appearsto be vox dei is in realityvoxpopuli' (I970: 142). By which we learn
thatcertainIslamicreligiousdoctrinesare essentiallymystified appearancesof
politicalreality.
This whole styleof anthropologicalanalysisis based on what might be
called theWizard of Oz theoryof ideology.Like Dorothy,theanthropologist
tearsaside the veil of a seemingdiscourseto disclosethe essentialreality-an
ordinary-looking old man busilyworkinga hand-machine.Even so, you will
rememberthe Tin Man reallygets his heart,the Lion his courage and the
StrawMan his brain,so thatbelief,howeverabsurd,is shown to have itssocial
function.But perhapsmore important,you will also rememberthatafterall
the whole episode is Dorothy's dream-that the essentialrealitywhich is
revealedis itselfa phase in thenarrativeof Dorothy'sunconscious.By which,
of course,I do not want to suggestthat'reality'is insubstantial, but only that
the uncoveringof 'essentialmeanings'is itselfa productionin discourse.In
otherwords,I want to remindyou thatGellner'stext is the place where the
essentialmeaningof barakais revealed/constructed, and so to pose thequestion
of thecriteriaby which thatmeaningis established.For thequestionthatarises
hereis this: Why do thesurfacesof Berberreligiousconceptsnot reflecttheir
political meanings? Alternatively,why do the Berbers fail to see the
commonsense reality (the essential meaning) to which Gellner so easily
 TALAL ASAD 623

penetrates?It is not much help to answerthatGellneris trainedin philosophy

and in anthropologyand thatthe Berbersare not, for thatmerelyshiftsthe
problem fromGellner as the writingsubjectto anthropologyas the fieldof
authoritativediscoursereproducingothercultures,a disciplinewhich defines
certaintextsas competent.And bear in mind thatthe mistakethe Berbersare
supposed to be continuouslymaking is about the everydaycommonsense
politicalconditionsin which theylive,and not about some finalphilosophical
Reality.Partof mypointhereis thatthereis an obvious difference betweenthe
epistemologicalnotionofmystification (implyingdirectv. indirectexperience
of Reality) and the notion of mistakesor deceptionin everydaysocial and
politicallife-and thatit is not veryclear which notionGellneris deploying
and why. But my main argumentis thatin eithercase,theauthority of Berber
religious ideology is left entirelyunexplained.For baraka is not simply a
conceptwitha constructed(or 'disclosed') meaning,but a partofauthoritative
Berber religiousdiscourse,and it is no explanationof such discourseto say
simplythatpeople believein it.23And stilllessis it explainedwhen we aretold
thatin essencethe conceptrepresents a delusion.24
Of course we can and should enquire into the political and economic
implicationsof religious discourse and argumentfor particularhistorical
conditions,and into the materialpreconditionswhich make such discourse
possibleand authoritative.We can even attemptto establishparticularinstances
ofpoliticaldeceptionand error,as and when theevidenceallows. But we need
not thinkthatin doing thiswe are uncoveringthetruepoliticalor economic
essenceofreligiousideologies.Thus we do nothave good groundsforarguing,
as many Westernwriterson modernIslamic reformmovementshave done,
forexample,thatthe'real' meaningof reformist discourseis not religiousbut
political,thatauthenticIslamis not reproducedin suchdiscourse.25I stressthat
thisis not a plea for respectingthe true meaningof religiousdiscourse-for
saying,as Evans-Pritchardsaid in Nuer religion,that the 'real' meaning of
religiousconceptslies not in the externalworld of commonsenseobjectsbut
in the innerworld of religiousexperience.It is not at all my intentionto try
to rescuetheultimateintegrity ofpersonalexperience.On thecontrary.What
I am arguing here is merely that the whole businessof looking for and
reproducingtheessentialmeaningsofanothersociety'sdiscourse(its'authentic
culture')shouldbe problematisedfarmoredrasticallythanit has been in social
anthropology-justas,indeed,it hasalreadybegunto be problematisedoutside
social anthropology.26The search for essentialmeaningsin anthropology
invariablyresultsin thetreatmentof ideologyin a reductionist fashion(either
by reducing ideology to economic political conditions,or by reducing
economic political conditions to ideology) and in confoundingit with
philosophicalissues.And it is thistreatment ofideologythatis so characteristic
offunctionalanthropologyin itsdesireto reproducedefinitively theauthentic
cultures of other peoples. Instead of taking the production of 'essential
meanings'(in theformof authoritativediscourse)in given historicalsocieties
as the problem to be explained,anthropologytakesthe existenceof essential
meanings(in theformof'authenticdiscourse')as thebasicconceptfordefining
and explaininghistoricalsocieties.
624 TALAL ASAD

VIII
Let me try to statein a few words the generalposition which underlies
much of what I have been tryingto say (a dangerousthingto do, but even so,
probablynecessary).It is an old position,but one which bearsre-stating given
the presentself-consciousness about ideology and about meaning.However
muchwe might,as professional talkersand writers,wishto affirm theprofound
importanceof systematicdiscourse,it is difficult to avoid the obvious,but by
no means trivial,conclusion that political and economic conditionshave
developed and changed in ways that are rarelyin accord with systematic
discourse.Or let me put it anotherway: it is surelyneitherthepower ofsocial
criticismnor the relativestrengthof competingsocial ideologieswithinthe
societiesstudied by social anthropologists(in Asia, in Africa and in Latin
America) which explains why and how they have become basically
transformed, but the historicalforcesof world industrialcapitalismand the
way thesehave impingedupon particularpoliticaland economic conditions.
Of coursepoliticalargumentscan be important(and especiallyiftheyhelp to
mobilisepowerfulsocial movements)butperhapsneverin theway,nor to the
extent,thatwe flatterourselvestheyare important.Given thatthisis so, the
main troublewith much colonial anthropology-and with much contempo-
rary anthropologytoo-has been not its ideological servicein the cause of
imperialism,but itsideological conceptionof social structureand of culture.

NOTES

'It is thistotalityto whichMalinowskirefers whenhe writesforexample,that'Sincethe

wholeworldof"things-to-be expressed"changeswiththelevelofculture, withgeographical,
socialandeconomicconditions, theconsequence is thatthemeaningofa wordmustbe always
gathered, notfroma passivecontemplation ofthisword,butfroman analysis ofitsfunctions,
withreference to thegivenculture.Eachprimitive or barbaroustribe,as well as eachtypeof
civilisation,has its world of meanings...' (I923: 309). Accordingto Malinowski,the
ethnographer's viewoflanguageis superior to thatofthephilologist's,becauseunlikethelatter,
he or she has directaccessto thisessential totalityand can therefore correctly interpret
the
meaningswhichit imparts to people'sactsand utterances. 'What "meanings" do existin any
givenaspectofnativeculture? By"meaning" I understand a conceptembodiedinthebehaviour
of thenatives,in theirinterests,or in theirdoctrines. Thustheconceptof magicalforce,for
instance, existsin theverywaytheyhandletheirmagic.[ ...] But theproblemofascertaining
that,forinstance, theconceptof magicalforceis embodiedin nativebehaviourand in their
wholetheoretical approachto magic;andthenofascertaining thattheycertainly haveno term
forthisconceptandcan onlyvicariously expressit-this,in spiteofitsnegativequality,is the
real problem of ethnographiclinguistics'(I935, II: 68).
, Malinowski'sexplicitpreoccupationwithlexicography and grammarhas divertedthe
attentionof manyof his anthropological thosewho approachhiswritings
critics(especially
froma Saussurian perspective)away fromhisattempts to deal withtherhetoricalaspectsof
language.It hasbeenleftlargelyto theworkofexceptional literary
critics,
likeBurke(I950),
to drawourattention, to thissideofMalinowski.
albeitverybriefly,
3 Thus,'thetwo anthropological viewpointswhichI haveheresummarised as "empiricist"
are to be regardedas complementary
and "rationalist" ratherthanrightor wrong' (Leach
I976: 6).
paper by G. Lakoffand M. Johnson'Toward an experientialist
4See the interesting
philosophy:the case from literalmetaphor',(mimeographed), LinguisticsDepartment,
University ofCalifornia,Berkeley,I979.
sighta strange
S 'This seemsat first problembecauseit is difficult
to see whysomeof the
actorsata certainpointin thesocialprocesscannotsay:thissystem is no goodat all,letustake
a freshlookat thesituationandbuildup a newsystem. The reasonwhytheycannot,withinthe
theoretical framework discussed,
liesin theunanalysednotionof thesocialdetermination of
 TALAL ASAD 625

thought.Simply,ifall conceptsandcategoriesaredetermined
bythesocialsystem a fresh look
is impossiblesinceall cognitionis alreadymouldedto fitwhat is to be criticised'(Bloch
I977: 28I).
wheremanis in mostdirectcontactwithnaturethatwe
6 'It is in contexts finduniversal
concepts,[andso] itissomething in theworldbeyondsocietywhichconstrains atleastsomeof
ourcognitivecategories' (Bloch I977: 285).
7 Bourdillonis also surelyrightin criticisingBloch'sviewson 'formal'language-views
whicharedevelopedat lengthin hisIntroduction to Politicallanguageandoratoryin traditional
Buthe couldhavegonemuchfurther
society. in hiscriticism.(See below,mynote2 I.)
8 'Roughlyspeaking, Leachbelievesthatlanguage,systems of propositions
[sic],describea
it in somefairlyliteralsense,in otherwordshe believesin what
realityin virtueof reflecting
mightbecalledtheparallelism theory ofmeaning. Thisiswhatwe needknowofhisphilosophy.
As a matterofanthropology, he believesthatritualreflectsthesocietyin whichit occursin a
similarway' (Gellner I 9 5 8: I 89).
9 Gellner's assertion thatLeachbelievesina parallelist theory ofmeaningisclearlywrongfor
thefollowingreasons.(i) In thefirst placeLeach'sown discourse claimsto present a cultural
grammar, nota system ofpropositions whichreflects Reality'in somefairly literalsense'.As we
shallseelater,thisgrammar is presentedas authentic,in thesensethatitis simplyre-presented
in his text.This culturalgrammaris intendedto helpus understand theheterogeneous and
changingsocialconditionsof theKachinHills Area,in theway thata grammarbook of a
foreign languagehelpsusunderstand theprocessesofspeechandwriting inthatlanguage.(2) As
forLeach'sanalysisofthediscourse oftheKachinsthemselves, he arguesthattheirmyths, for
example,mustbe seenas 'a languagein whichto maintain controversy' (pp. 85-97),andsince
in hisview thetruthor untruth of whatis uttered in thislanguage'is quiteirrelevant' to an
understanding ofitsmeaning, to seehowsucha conception
itisdifficult oflanguagecanbe said
to be foundedon a parallelist theoryofmeaning.(3) Furthermore, whenLeachdefines 'ritual'
as thataspectofalmostanybehaviourwhich'servesto expresstheindividual's statusas a social
personin thestructural system in whichhe findshimself forthetimebeing'(pp. i o-i i), he is
asserting notthatritual'reflects butthatitssignifying
society', function ofsociety.
is constitutive
(4) Finally, thereareplacesin thetextwhereLeachseemsat first sightto invokeparallelism in
his elucidationof the meaningof ritual-as in his analysisof ceremonies of sacrifice(e.g;
pp. I 72-82). Leach'sargument hereisthatsuchceremonies havea mnemonic function byvirtue
of thefactthattheyrepresent to theparticipants whattheiridealsocialstructure shouldbe.
However,notethatwhatissaidto be themeaninghereisnot'society'or 'socialreality insome
fairlyliteralsense'-but ideasin themindsof theparticipants. In otherwords,whatLeachis
proposing is notthatthemeaningofritualisto be foundinthewaytheIdeaitembodiesreflects
Reality(whichwouldbe rather likethephilosophical theory Gellneralludesto) butin theway
theceremonial evokescertainideasinthemindsoftheparticipants-and thatisnota parallelist
theoryofmeaningat all,noris itnecessarily linkedto an idealistphilosophy.
10Cf. Walter Benjamin'sseminalessay'The work of art in the age of mechanical
reproduction' in Benjamin(I970).
11 MarvinHarris(I969) was notmistaken in hisreadingwhenhe praisedthatbook forits
materialist method-Gellner's judgements aboutitsidealismnotwithstanding.
12 An a-historical approachto theconceptofmodeofproduction hasbeencharacteristic of
theworkofFrenchanthropologists likeGodelier, andofEnglishsociologists whofollowthem.
Anthropologists and sociologists who have beenstrongly influenced by thisworkare often
quite unawareof the strongresemblances betweentheirwork and old-fashioned British
functional anthropology.
13 Semioticians in France,who have addressedthemselves to the taskof formulating a
Marxisttheoryof ideology,havesometimes takenup whatseemsto be a contrary position.
Thus Veronwrites:'One mustunderstand thatsemioticactivityis inevitably embodiedin
everyformofsocialorganisation-regardless ofwhether theorderconcerned isdescribed asthe,
"economic", the"political",the"cultural", the"ritual",etc.,i.e.whenitistreated independently
of its signifying aspect.Withoutthissemioticactivity,no formof social organisation is
conceivable'(I978: I4). Veronisofcoursequiterighttostress theseriousdifficultieswhichthe
Marxistmodel of economicbase and ideologicalsuperstructure engenders foran adequate
understanding of ideology,but it is not at all certainthathis insistence on the ubiquityof
semioticactivity constitutesa resolution ofthesedifficulties-even thoughhe goeson to warn
thereaderthat'This is notto saythatthissemioticactivity running through societyis capable
ofbeingdescribed in itsentiretyintermsofa simpleprinciple ofinternal coherence-quitethe
contrary'. Forin placeofthedistinction betweenthediscursive andthenon-discursive aspects
ofsociallife,whichthenotionof basis/superstructure was intended, howeverunsatisfactorily,
626 TALAL ASAD
to articulate, he proposesa heterogeneity ofdiscursive principles (distinctive 'grammars'), i.e.
contradictory principles ofdiscourse whichin industrial capitalist societies aresituated on the
level of class conflict.There is alwaysa dangerin tendenciesrepresented by thisarticle
(interesting andingenious thoughitis) thatin theendevenMarxistswillbe leftwithnothing
but 'real discourse',and 'real people' who producethatdiscourse, whilehistorical political
economiesare bracketedon one side as beingno more than'abstractions' or 'theoretical
concepts'.
14 Voloshinov's Marxismandthephilosophy oflanguage, firstpublished fifty yearsago,is still
one of the mostfruitful discussions of thisproblem,and althoughit leavesmanydifficult
questionsunanswered, it revealsa sensitivityto thecomplexsocialfoundations of discourse
whichsurpasses muchofwhatis written on thissubjecttoday.
15 See Austin(I962), who firstcoinedtheterm'performative' and thenabandonedthe
concept.In hisinteresting recentstudyofAustin, Graham(I977) hasforcefully arguedthatthe
conceptofperformative, properly defined, shouldbe retained, andfortheveryreasonthatled
to the latter'sgivingit up-namely, the impossibility of establishing, throughit, a sharp
separation betweenactingin theworldandmerelyconceiving ofitin a particular way.
16 I referto theattempt thatbegan-with Searle'Whatis a speechact?' (I965)-reprinted in
Giglioli (1972). See Coulthard(977), chapter2, for some of the problemsinvolvedin
identifying and classifying performatives (or illocutionary acts) in English.As for other
languages, M. K. Fosterwrites(inBaumanandSherzer[I974: 468]) thatPhilipRavenhill who,
morethananyoneelse,has exploredthestrengths and weaknesses of thisnotionforcross-
culturalcomparison, has'effectively arguedagainstan uncritical application of performative
analysis, basedon English,to otherlanguages(andcultures).' The workof Ravenhillwhichis
citedbyFosteris a mimeographed paperwhichI have,unfortunately, notbeenableto secure.
17 Such an assumption is perhapsevidentin thefollowingremarks by theeditorsof that
valuablecollection, Explorations intheethnography ofspeaking: '. . . theethnography ofspeaking
fillsthegapintheanthropological recordcreatedbytheneglectbyanthropological linguistsof
thesocialuseoflanguageandbythelackofinterest ofethnographers in patterns andfunctions
ofspeaking.The importance oftheethnography ofspeakingto anthropology cutsfardeeper
thanthis,however,fora careful focuson speaking as aninstrument fortheconductofsociallife
bringsto theforetheemergent natureofsocialstructures,notrigidly determined bytheinstitutional
structure ofthesociety, butrather largely createdin performance by thestrategic andgoal-directed
manipulation ofresourcesfor speaking'(Bauman& SherzerI974: 8, myemphasis). Thisnotion
thatit is thelevelofindividualtransaction andcommunication whichgenerates thehistorical
structure of societiesis also proposedby Kapferer (1976: I 5-I6)-and it is one of thethings
againstwhichI am arguing.In thiscontext,it may be worthstressing thatthedistinction
betweentheconditions ofthepoliticaleconomyandthoseofdiscourse doesnotparallelbutcuts
acrosstheanthropological distinction between juralandstatistical norms.
18 ForexampleGeertz(1973: 208-9).
19 Thus in his more recent work, Roland Barthes has abandoned his early attemptsat
establishinga universalscienceof semiotics.Compare Barthes(I967) with Barthes(I974).
20 It is no accident thatMarxdid notputforward a generaltheoryofideology.Contrary to
theassumption thathe did notfindthetimeto developsucha theorybeforehe died,it can be
arguedthatthereis no placeforitinhisanalysis ofthecapitalist modeofproduction, andin his
commitment to theclassstruggle.
21 Authoritative discourseshouldnot be confusedwith'formalised language',whichM.
Blochhaswritten aboutin hisIntroduction to Political
language andoratory intraditional
society.
Bloch(I975: I2) seesformalised speechas 'a kindofpower'whichis employedbytraditional
leadersto coercefollowers('the extremeformalisation of languagewithitsaccompanying
exerciseofpoweris characteristic oftraditional authority situations as definedbyWeber'),and
contrasts itwitheveryday speechwhich,beingflexible, allowsfordisagreement andopposition.
It is notveryclearwhetherBloch'sargument is logicalor psychological, and in eithercaseit
seemsuntenable. Is it thatcertaincrucialthingscannotbe saidin 'formalised speechacts'even
ifonewantstosaythem?Inthatcase,whatprevents thespeaker fromresorting toanother style?
Or is it perhapsthatspeakers are lulledintoacceptingthingsas theyare whentheyemploy
'formalised language'?In thatcase,whatgivestheinitiator an immunity whichtherespondent
lacks?The difficulty withthiskindofargument residesin theveryvaguenotionof'formalised
language'whichmightincludeanything fromsymboliclogic throughlegal disputation to
authoritative discourse. Strictly
speaking, authoritative discourse is nota kindofsocialpower,
of one will over another, buta discoursewhichbindseveryego who recognises himselfor
herself init-regardlessofwhichistheinitiator andwhichtherespondent. (SeeArendt[I958],
fora provocative discussion oftheconceptofauthority in classicalGreekandRomansociety.)
 TALAL ASAD 627
22 I referheretotheinfluential paperentitled asprinted
'Conceptsandsociety', inEmmetand
Maclntyre (I970).
23 Woulditmakeanydifference to Gellner'sargument 'luck'or'socialand
ifwe substituted
politicalskills'forbaraka?In otherwords,is theallegedlydelusorycharacter of theconcept
barakareally'essential fortheworkingofthesocialsystem'?
24 In a slightly different context,but one stillappositeto the presentproblem,Foucault
delusionisa function
observes:'.. . religious ofculture:religion
ofthesecularization maybe the
objectofdelusional beliefinsofar as thecultureofa groupno longerpermits theassimilationof
religiousor mystical beliefsinthepresent content ofexperience'(FoucaultI976: 8 i).
2 See forexampleKedourie(I966).
26 See forexampleHacking
(I975).
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