i i é i i é > i | & AIAA PROFESSIONAL STUDY SERIES NORTHROP F-5 CASE STUDY IN AIRCRAFT DESIGN PRESENTED BY WILLIAM G. STUART MANAGER, F-5 SYSTEMS INTEGRATION NORTHROP CORP. AIRCRAFT GROUP SEPTEMBER 1978ABSTRACT First the overall development of the T-38/F-5 family is presented in terms of configuration development motivation and constraints. Then selected systems are examined in some detail including the constraints, specifications and trade-offs that led to important design decisions, that taken together have resulted in the success of both aircraft.iINTRODUCTION This paper outlines the development of the T-38/F-5 family of fighter/ trainer aircraft from 1956 through the present. The F-SE Tiger Il is the latest model of this line. In discussing the aircraft's development, we will highlight some of the more interesting design challenges which occurred over a period of 20 years and many millions of man-hours of effort. This is a large undertaking for a 3 hour lecture, ‘There are additional equally important subjects which also could be covered only superficially in 3 hours. Here are some three-hour lectures which will not be given: 1) PHILOSOPHY AND GROUND RULES FOR DESIGN 2) A DISCIPLINE OR TECHNOLOGY /SYSTEM INTERACTION MATRIX 3) AIR-TO-AIR and AIR-TO-GROUND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS 4) THE SELECTION OF AVIONICS /WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND ARMAMENT 5) VULNERABILITY /SURVIVABILITY 6) THE SENSITIVITY OF LIFE CYCLE COSTS TO DESIGN FACTORS a) PEACETIME b) WARTIME These subjects are mentioned to emphasize the tremendous scope of interrelationships and factors which must be "considered" in the design process, The word "considered" is put in quotes because an intuitive application of the information is more often used than a rigorous analysis. For the F-5, this evolution started in 1956 with the Northrop N-156 project and is continuing at the present time with development of advanced models of the F-5. The F-5 gradually evolved over the years in response to the needs of the customer.‘The first member of the T-38/F-5 family to fly was the Mach 1.25 T-38 which became the standard supersonic jet trainer of the USAF and was also used by the German Air Force for pilot training in the U.S. ‘The T-38 is still the standard trainer in the USAF and is also used by NASA and the USAF Thunderbirds aerobatic team. The T-38 is a very reliable, highly successful airplane and more than 1100 were built. The F-5 development is typical of the steps involved in the design of a supersonic Jet fighter. The F-5 is only unique in that it was developed over the years, not for the USAF but as an aircraft for the foreign military sales program (FMS) and the military assistance program (MAP). FMS customer nations have the financial resources to pay for their aircraft whereas MAP customers receive their aircraft cost-free from the U.S. where overall defense considerations outweigh the ability of the nation to pay. As a MAP/FMS aircraft, greater emphasis was placed on low initial cost and lower maintenance requirements performed by less highly skilled technicians.: 990s fitonkenr ‘The technological upsurge of the 1950's created the demand for more sophisticated fighters for the air forces of developing nations. World War II surplus aircraft had been consumed or spoken for. In order to satisfy the appetite for continual improvement of weapon system performance, a trend of increased size, complexity was developing. Technological advances had made possible the development of systems which either were unaffordable and un- supportable within budget or whose cost was not commensurate with their military worth.WEAPON SYSTEM COST MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION COST PER YEAR 3 YEARS FROM: "N-156 IN MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM; JULY 1958 The achievement of a less costly, less complex solution to defense problems became a challenge which still confronts the defense establishment and aircraft industry. A prime example of the industry progress in meeting this challenge was the development and exploitation of the new high thrust-to-weight ratio turbo jet engines. This is because of the powerful effect upon aircraft size of the propulsion system size and fuel requirements. This is true also only to a slightly lesser degree of the electronic equipment and armament.3 OBJECTIVES FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MAP AIRCRAFT ©@ COMPLEXITY @ OPERATING COST @ MAINTENANCE REVERSE TRENDS PROVIDE MAXIMUM FORCE EFFECTIVENESS THRU APPLICATION OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY ‘The objective for the development of a new military assistance program aircraft in the late 50's was therefore to reverse the trend in complexity, operating cost and maintenance. It was realized that the utilization of small high thrust-to-weight ratio engines previously designed for missile application, in manned aircraft would result in significant reductions in aircraft size and weight. Decreased size and weight are fundamental to reduction in procurement and operating costs and are major contributors to easier maintenance and improved operational readi- ness. Studies were begun to apply these newer engines to applications in manned aircraft. This in turn led to the development of the T-38 trainer as well as the developments in the utility and lightweight cargo fields undertaken by several other major aircraft companies. The application of advanced technology was to be used to provide a maximum force effectiveness at minimum cost. This became the Northrop philosophy in the development of the T-38 and F-5 light- weight trainer and fighter aircraft.NEW TECHNOLOGY APPLIED TO THE F-5 70 MEET MAP REQMTS GENERATION” SUPERSONIC AERODYNAMICS (¢ AREA RULE FOR TRANSONIC ACCELERATION ‘*sCAMBERED LEADING EDGES FOR EFFICIENT SUBSONIC CRUISE LOW HORIZONTAL STABILIZER TO ELIMINATE PITCH-UP LIGHTWEIGHT _HIGH-THRUST/WEIGHT RATIO ENGINES: ADVANCED STRUCTURES AND FATIGUE TECHNOLOGIES: TeCHEMICAL MILLING TAPERED MACHINED SKINS ‘* HONEYCOMB BONDING LOW MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT H ‘* COMPONENT ACCESSIBILITY “EASILY REMOVED COMPONENTS * QUICK DISCONNECT FITTINGS ‘The new technology that was to be applied included second generation supersonic aerodynamics, the latest high thrust-to-weight ratio engines avail- able, and the latest structural and fatigue technology combined with a design for low maintenance and operation costs. We were fortunate to be on a crest of the wave of the second generation aerodynamic theory. Previously developed air- craft had exhibited performance deficiencies and major problems in longitudinal and lateral-directional stability which had caused loss of several aircraft, prob- lems such as pitch-up on T-tail aircraft and roll coupling phenomena on aircraft with highly swept wings. The primary areas to be considered would be reduction of transonic wave drag, transonic wing airfoil development for effective cruise performance, with emphasis on horizontal and vertical tail configurations to pro- vide superior flying qualities. The development of the J-85 engine withthe major increase in thrust-to-weight ratio was to be paramount in the design and will be discussed later. The advanced structures technology would include design disciplines which would afford the minimum weight structure airframe possible. The new technology to be applied would include chem milling, tapered machined skins, and honeycomb bonding. A further discussion of other struc- tural considerations will follow. Because the maintenance and operation of any weapon system is a major cost factor, emphasis was to be placed on compo- nent placement using the ‘one component layer" concept with easily removable components as well as ground level accessibility without use of ladders or ground personnel stands, another payoff of reduced size.g MILESTONE HISTORY T-38/F-5 FAMILY The F-5 series started with the F-5A which first flew in 1963. The F-5A was developed to meet the needs of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) for developing nations. Versions of the F-5A and two place F-5B were also developed to meet the needs of Norway, Canada, which manufactured both the CF-5A/B and the NF-5A/B for the Netherlands. The SF-5A/B was also manu- factured in Spain. The F-5E was developed in 1970 and more than 850 F-SE and two place F-S5F airplanes have been manufactured. The airplane is also manufactured in Switzerland and by the Republic of China in Taiwan. More than 3500 T-38/F-5 family aircraft have heen manufactured and are in service in more than 25 nations. Production is scheduled through 1981 and follow-on contracts for later model F-5's are expected. 107-38 AND F-5 MISSION CAPABILITY T-38 MISSIONS ‘© SUPERSONIC FLIGHT TRAINING AEROBATIC TRAINING © MULTI-JET TRAINING © CROSS-COUNTRY NAVIGATION @ INSTRUMENT LETOOWN PROCEDURES F-5 MISSION CAPABILITY © AIR-TO-AIR = CLEAR AIR INTERCEPT = IR MISSILES AND GUNS AND SIMPLE SIGHT = DOGFIGHT MANEUVERABILITY © AIR-TO-GROUND = PAYLOAD RADIUS SIMILAR TO 1960 TAC FIGHTERS = ARMAMENT STORE LOADING FLEXIBILITY ret3 WING LOADING CSA UPDATED WING LOADING 12008 ts. oom jn302 18 705718 COMBAT WEIGHT (CLEAN, 50% FUEL) | | __ WING AREA | 186 SQFT 170 5aFT 1 ' 1 1960 65 1970 CALENDAR YEAR The chart above and the following chart show the growth in airplane weight over the life of the aircraft as the customer established the need for more and more equipment and higher armament loads. The above chart shows the steady wing loading increase of the T-38, N-156, F-5A through the CF-5A which led to the wing area change in the F-5E. The increase in weight over time is typical of all aircraft, not only fighters. Note that despite the wing area increase, the wing load~ ing is now once again higher than that of the CF-5A. 12i LIFE CYCLE WE/GHT GROWTH & THRUST Ss ' EB = 9 W 8,000 ¥ 8 4,000] T-38A N-I56 F5E UPDATED) ol USABLE FUEL F5E 1955 1960 65 1970 5 1979 CALENDAR YEAR The above chart shows the growth in maximum takeoff weight, clean takeoff weight and empty weight over the life of the aircraft. Engine thrust (per engine) and usable fuel are also shown. The engine thrust plot shows the change from the T-38 -5 engine (3350 1b) to the -13 engine in the F-5A (4080 Ib) to the -15 engine in the CF-5A (4300 Ib) and finally to the -21 engine in the F-5E (5000 Ib). The weight trend curves show the weight growth of the airplane which occurred despite the stringent weight control restrictions applied. One of the difficult tasks was to establish the value in dollars per airplane of a given number of pounds saved. This task was necessary because there is a known dollar cost for each proposed weight savings item due to higher engineering, tooling, material or manufacturing costs. If the selec tion process was to accept only those weight saving ideas of real value to the customer, a method had to be devised for eliminating those ideas where the cost exceeded the value received. 13Establishing the value of a pound of weight saved for a transport aircraft is simpler and more direct because each pound of weight removed allows for an additional pound of payload. Multiply this by the known values of miles per day and revenue dollars per ton mile (with some allow- ance for inflation) and the total value of a pound of weight saved can be calculated for the life of the airplane. For a fighter airplane on the other hand, the pound of weight saved results in higher speed, rate of climb, turn rate, shorter takeoff distance, and increased mission radius. These numbers can be precisely calculated but the difficulty comes from the task of establishing the dollar value of these performance improvements. The effect of a pound of weight on airplane specific range was easily calculated and this was then translated into an increase in fuel consump- tion in pounds of fuel per flight hour. Multiplying by the service life of the airplane and the average cost of JP-4 or Jet A-1 results in the fuel cost savings of a pound of weight saved. It is interesting to note that when these calculations were first made for the F-5A in 1967, the lifetime fuel cost savings for one pound of weight saved was estimated at $8.67 per airplane. Today's figure would be many times this value. Other effects of a pound of weight were more difficult to quantify. Fortunately, at the time these calculations were made various customers were paying for improvements in the airplane which resulted in perform- ance benefits. It was assumed that the cost of these improvements was exactly equal to the value of the performance benefits received by the customer, otherwise, it was reasoned, he would not be willing to pay for the R&D and manufacturing costs of the improvement. For instance, new 275 gallon pylon tanks were being developed for one customer at a known cost per airplane and a known range improvement. Equating this to the range loss due to one pound of weight growth, it was possible to caleul- ate the cost of buying back the range loss of one pound of weight increase with the new tanks. Certain assumptions had to be made, of course, including the number of aircraft used to amortize the development costs. It was then reasoned that a pound of weight saved would be worth an equal amount to the customer. The 1967 figures show that one pound 4of weight saved was worth $13.50 per airplane to the customer solely for the range benefit received since he was spending that amount to gain back the range lost due to weight growth. In a similar manner, it was possible to calculate the dollar value of the effect of a pound of weight on takeoff distance, turn radius and rate of climb based on the cost of such improvements as the two position nose gear, takeoff doors, and more powerful engines. The total value of a pound of weight established in 1967 was $107.02. It would be several times this value today. The above depends on the validity of several assumptions, the princi- pal one being that the customer knew and was willing to pay for the improve- ment items the exact amount of the value of the performance benefit. How- ever, without an assumption of this nature, it is not possible to quantify or establish a rationale for a weight saving program. An additional factor must also be considered and that is the fuselage station of the weight reduction. If the airplane has nose ballast for instance, there is no apparent benefit for weight savings in the nose region since such savings will be cancelled by the additional ballast required. However, a weight savings in the tail region could result in an additional savings in ballast removal. Thus, once the value of a pound of weight saved at the c.g. has been established, the airplane can be divided into zones where the weight savings value in dollars per pound depends on location. 153 é CONFIGURATION DESIGN PHILOSOPHY HANDLING QUALITIES. @ PROVIDE AGILITY TO UTILIZE FULL PERFORMANCE ‘SPECTRUM © APPROACH TO STALL ~ SMOOTH BUFFET ONSET © STALL~NO ABRUPT PITCHING OR WING DROP © SPIN-RESISTANT ®@ NEGLIGIBLE TRANSONIC TRIM CHANGE PERFORMANCE © OPTIMIZE FOR IMPORTANT TACTICAL REGIONS WITHIN HANDLING QUALITIES DESIGN CONSTRAINTS A departure from the more normal design for performance approach was stressed, The effectiveness in utilizing the performance of a fighter is com- pletely dictated by the flying qualities of the aircraft. Hence, Northrop took a new approach that the initial design layout shall stress excellent flying qualities such that uninhibited utilization of the complete performance envelope is avail- able to the pilot. An underlying aspect of this philosophy was that the T-38 was to be operated as a supersonic advanced trainer and the fighter was to be flown by, perhaps, less experienced, less skilled pilots. In other words, building in "flight safety" would be significant in reducing the operating costs. 16EFFECT OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY F000) T-38*] F5A*| FSE* TAKEOFF WT (CLEAN) - LB 28,800 12,000 13347 15.292 | TAKEOFF GROUND ROLL- FT 2500 2,480' 2500 1,800 SEA LEVEL RATE OF CLIMB f 19,000 30000 ' 28,700 33,500 TIME TO 40000 FT FROM BRAKE RELEASE - MIN 52 40 43 33 Vnax(LEVELFLIGHT-MACHNO) | 137 123 40 16 TOUCH DOWN SPEED - KN 150 130 _ 30 | 121 MAX ORDNANCE PAYLOAD - LB ‘5000 oO I 6200 | 7300 > UNRESTRICTED HANDLING QUALITY FLIGHT ENVELOPE 3 é ‘The result of applying the new philosophy is shown prior to reviewing the detail aspects of the T-38/F-5 design. Significantly improved performance relative to a then contemporary aircraft was and is provided at essentially one-half the basic clean aircraft takeoff weight. Because aircraft cost is essen- tially on a dollar-per-pound basis, it is obvious that a significant procurement cost savings would be achieved. As a matter of interest and to describe a rela- tive comparison, the total weight of the T-38 (including full fuel) is less than just the fuel load carried by an F-4, 17CONFIGURATION APPROACH @ PROPULSION AND AERODYNAMICS i © STRUCTURESPROPULSION ‘The trend in the early 1950's was the development of engines of higher and higher thrust which required larger and larger airframes. Part of this was due to "bigger and better" philosophy, and in part due to emphasis on larger payload, higher performance strategic bomber aircraft. 19ENGINE STATE-OF-ART 0 10 20 30 40 THRUST - 1000 LB 4 ‘The trend toward higher thrust levels is illustrated here. Two effects are noted. First, the state-of-the-art in engine design over the decade between 1950 and 1960 would allow the thrust to more than double the thrust level considered suitable around 1950. Second, the full T/W potential was not realized because in addition to the thrust increase the weight of the engines also increased. 20ENGINE COMPARISON Core ad both eR Rar) Fe 3200 | 7650| 24 ONE u47 WITH AB WED 375 | 15800] 47 ONE J79-7 WITH AB ==> 5} 1150 | 7200 | 6.25 > 13} 1195 | 8160 | 68 Two ce-ves with a8 |-21} 1334 | 10,000 | 75 Although the J-85 thrust level was low on a per engine basis, the light weight and small size of the engines fitted into a twin-engine, lightweight fighter concept. Note that the combined thrust is more than a single J-47 and at a much lower engine weight, 21F-5E INLET DESIGN ‘AUX INLET DOORS: Stuy + ‘ ty 7 i at, Ht spurte.‘ Wine Pure ToROUEBOx’ BELL MOUTH EJECTOR MAIN LANDING GEAR J-85-GE-21 DESIGN PHILOSOPHY © FIXED GEOMETRY- RETAINS SIMPLICITY * AUXILIARY AIR INLET DOORS - MINIMIZES INSTALLATION © OPTIMIZED FOR ACM ARENA-HIGH ALT/LOW SPEED/HIGH POWER The F-5E induction system shown above, represents a considerable development improvement from the original supersonic inlet used on the T-38. The following features will be noted: Characteristic Purpose 1) Inlet location; top of inlet leading _-_Undisturbed freestream air, with edge is at same horizontal and or without ordnance delivery fuselage stations and with identi- cal forebody as the original F-5A/B 2) Fixed tvo-dimensional vertical Predictable performance combines ramp ramp with the fuselage boundary layer airflow diverter 223) 4 5) 6) D 8) » 10) 1 12) 13) Characteristic Top and side fairing only, none on bottom "D" shaped inlet Long length to diameter ratio duct Secondary air plenum at compressor face : Ramp boundary layer bleed Increased ramp angle All secondary air require- ments bled from main duct Auxiliary takeoff doors Bellmouth inlet on engine transition duct Initial duct diffuser angle increased New lip profile on inlet cowl 23 Purpose Airflow is less sensitive to angle of attack, low additive drag Reduces wetted perimeter Mild offsets, small diffuser angle, dampens inlet disturbances, reduces circumferential distortion Improves recovery and distortion levels. Stabilizes inlet normal shock dur- ing supersonic flight (higher Va. for F-5E) Increased inlet recovery for F-5E increased supersonic capability with control of oblique shock angle intersection Further improvement in recovery and distortion levels, minimizes inlet drag effects Improved static and low speed opera- tion by increasing duct pressure recovery Provides for smooth mixing of duct airflow and supplementary airflow during ground and low Mach number operation Compensates for boundary layer growth, insures maximum Mach number is at geometric throat Improved low speed performance, lower spillage draga4) 15) Characteristic Over-expansion of duct area at secondary bleed (relative to engine diameter) Inlet incidence angle decreased from 0° to -5° 24 Purpose Ensures favorable pressure gradient from bleed slot to compressor face with varying secondary flow requirements Improved angle of attack capabilityAERODYNAMICS I. KNOW IT LOOKS FUNNY BUT, YA OUGHTA SEE THE AREA PLOT/ Management must keep the aerodynamicist under control. 25COCKPIT CONFIGURATION (orriction & SO wave) CONTEMPORARY (1955) ‘T-38/F-5 + NARROW SHOULDER WIDTH ‘SAMPLE SHOULDER WIDTH ‘* RESTRICTED VISION & ACCESS _* EXCEPTIONAL VISIBILITY & CONVENIENCE LARGE CROSS: SECTION MINIMUM CROSS-SECTION FRONTAL AREA REDUCTION -15 As shown above, a major effort was applied to reduce the fuselage friction and wave drag by reducing the frontal area as much as possible. A completely new cockpit layout was provided which minimized frontal area by relocating and positioning equipment in a more optimum manner. In conjunction with this the most efficient structure possible was developed to minimize the basic fuselage cross section in the cockpit area. This area, is a critical design area because it is not possible to have an optimum completely closed structure for pilot entry reasons. A significant frontal arca reduction of about 15% was finally realized when compared with a current design of that time period. 26IN-LINE COMPONENTS COwave © CO FRICTION g Another basic design concept used to minimize friction and wave drag was that of the "in-line-component” arrangement, A one-piece wing with a main carry-through minimum weight structural box was located in line with the pilot followed by the engine placement in a manner to give minimum frontal area. In order to incorporate a wide-tread main landing gear for good ground handling and to minimize turnover angles, the main gear is located on the wing. The physical wing thickness in the area of the landing gear strut was dictated by the minimum diameter of the landing gear strut although in the final evaluation the thickness ratio of the wing of 4.8% was determined to be satisfactory. Minimum gear lengths required that the wing be placed as low as possible. The wheels were located in the fuselage behind the wing box. Initial J-85 engine configura~ tions incorporated engine-mounted accessories and gearboxes mounted on top of the engine. This would have significantly compromised the aft body lines. In 27conjunction with the General Electric Company, a major redesign was accom- plished to install the basic engine and airplane accessories at the bottom in line with the main wheels. An innovative scheme was then developed to relocate the gearbox which drives the generator and hydraulic pumps such that it would be airframe-mounted and not engine-mounted, This has allowed a significant reduction in maintenance and checkout time for these systems following an engine change. It is not necessary to disconnect or break into these systems — a procedure which can cause many problems. 28WING PLANFORM SELECTION SWEEP. 5 T T 95, Fae F101 eo * ee F100 ae 3 Feue 5 F102 3 & 2 _ i a = < Fl 1 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 SWEEPBACK ~~ DEGREES. In selecting the wing planform, handling qualities were considered to be paramount. In order to prevent aircraft pitchup due to wingtip stall (on highly swept wings) a large pitchup margin was provided by using a nominal sweep- back of the quarter chord of 24°, In combination with a taper ratio of 0.2 the leading edge sweep of 32° provided a good compromise for the supersonic drag characteristics. 29WING ASPECT RATIO SELECTION SUBSONIC SUPERSONIC 10; 8 T-38A/F-5A g° — ol a8) T : 12M (7-38), ; 3 Sar alae ont) 3 wo Soe Cc 2 os — & 5) The selection of wing aspect ratio represents an interplay between a large value for low drag-due-to-lift and a small value for reduced wing weight. The T-38/F-5 aspect ratio provides good drag characteristics, as shown above, with consideration for minimum wing weight. Selection of the wing aspect ratio dates back to the conceptual preliminary design studies for a lightweight USAF fighter/trainer, 30FINAL 7-38 WING PLANFORM g The basic wing planform developed for-the T-38 has been very successful and has been maintained for all F-5 aircraft, Continued aerodynamic develop ment of the planform for the F-5A and F-5E has included the addition of wing root leading edge extensions (to be discussed in more detail later) for much improved lift/drag characteristics, a1i WING CAMBER Cp PRELIMINARY DESIGN 8 1.0 MACH NUMBER Drag reduction and flight characteristics program conducted in high speed wind tunnels prior to construction of the first prototype prevented costly tooling changes and unnecessary flight risk and testing. ‘The T-38A has a guaranteed best cruise Mach number of 0.85 and guaran- teed top speed of 1.2 Mach, With the engines available — only 3350 pounds thrust each initially — it was important to emphasize aerodynamic cleanliness. The graph above shows the degree of drag reduction achieved from the time the con- figuration left Preliminary Design to the production line. ‘The initial design T-38 had an airfoil section of 0004. 8-64 with conical camber and 0. 5% chord leading edge droop at the root increasing to 3.2% chord droop at the tip. The body was coked for Mach 1.0, and included a rather blunt boundary layer diverter between the duct and fuselage (40° included angle). The dorsal lines aft of the canopy were pleasing to the eye, but possessed more than mild aft facing slopes. 32Following three high speed wind tunnel tests at Cornell Aero Lab totaling 267 hours, the wing section was altered to the newer 65004. 8-64 with a 1% chord constant leading edge droop. The final fuselage lines were re-area ruled for 1.15 Mach by moving the ducts and indentation forward 10 inches. The boundary layer diverter angle was reduced to 28°, the dorsal volume aft of the canopy was filled and the boattail slopes were slimmed with 17 inches of added length. 33FINAL AIRFOIL CAMBER NACA 65A 004.8 MOD AIRFOIL @ 1% NOSE DROOP FWD OF 40C — CORRESPONDS TO NACA (.65) MEAN LINE @ STRAIGHT LINES AFT OF .62C 7° TRAILING EDGE ANGLE ‘The wing has a constant percent chord leading edge camber corresponding to an NACA (0.65) 50 mean line. The mean line ordinates for the NACA (0.65) 50 cambered airfoil were obtained by multiplying the data for the NACA 250 series camber lines by the ratio 0.65/2, which reduces the camber ordinates to 32.5% of the NACA 250 series. The NACA 250 mean line, which is straight in the rear portion, is rotated into the wing chord plane so that the camber appears as a drooped leading edge. NACA 65A004.8 airfoil ordinates are ap- plied from the leading edge to 40%. Trailing edge modifications consist of straight lines from 82% aft with a 7° trailing edge angle.WING FLAPS TAKEOFE LANDING AND mANEWER, KANENEENG BELOW 20CKIAS_——_—QSOKASTSEOMAS wr 95 MACH maven Be . rasMach Se eh a MANEUVER: (200 KIAS-250 KIAS) SUPERSONIC a 16° The addition of wing leading edge flaps on the F-5A/B aircraft produced an increase in maximum lift. The inclusion of a single setting maneuvering flap on the NF-5 improved the air combat maneuvering, and the flap system on the F-5E has even further improved combat maneuvering. The use of indicated airspeed to command nearly optimum flap deflections is a design simplicity* in lieu of a complicated air data computer which would sense and schedule the flaps as a function of angle of attack and Mach number. It has been shown that the pilot can, with proper training, select the flaps to provide maximum performance. ‘This is again an example of designing as simple a system as possible to provide nearly optimum performance. The flap angles selected were a direct outcome of a research flight program conducted under U.S, Government contract to investigate the effects of transonie maneuvering devices. The flap deflection angles were essentially optimized to not only provide increased lift but also to improve the buffet characteristics and precision tracking capability at high angles of attack. *Northrop is currently designing a fully automatic maneuvering flap system for the F-5E. 35g FLAP LIFT/ DRAG EFFECTS 16 LUFT COEFFICIENT a t The lift drag benefits associated with flap deflection are shown above. Individual flap deflections improve the polar in various lift regions. Data for a representative Mach number of 0.80 is given and these general characteristics apply throughout the entire subsonic Mach region. The supersonic zero lift drag increase with leading and trailing edge flap deflection (similar to excessive camber) negates these benefits and therefore a design limit of Mach 0,95 was established for the flaps. 36FSE MAX LIFT & BUFFET BE on 5 q oesee one | The maximum lift and buffet onset characteristics are shown above. The camber of the 24° leading edge and 20° trailing edge flap deflections are not optimum for high subsonic and transonic Mach numbers even though a maximum, lift benefit is still shown to exist up to Mach 0.9. Above this Mach number i even the maximum lift benefit disappears because of the limit tail deflection, 37i WING LEADING EDGE EXTENSION (LEX) ‘The original T-38 wing planform did not include a leading edge extension (LEX) at the wing root. The effects of the LEX in terms of maximum trimmed L,.... ate shown on the plots. The F-5E LEX ‘MAX with an area ratio of 4.4% of the wing reference area provides a Cy ‘MAX increment of 38% of the no LEX value. Northrop studies suggest a practical angle of attack and trimmed C LEX upper size limit for any given configuration and the F-SE LEX is close to med angle of attack capability increases air combat this value, The higher effectiveness. The higher drag associated with the higher angle of attack is very useful in producing overshoots of the attacking alreraft. 38AREA RULE-Co yg (WHITCOMB THEORY) z 2 = 2 a BODY STATION In keeping with the latest area rule theory the initial fuselage design incorporated an area ruling for Mach 1.0. Subsequent wind tunnel tests indi- cated that area ruling for Mach 1.15 was more effective and this became the final shape. i 39g AREA RULE EFFECT 10 12 14 16 18 20 (MACH NO. ‘The benefit due to area ruling, considering a straight-sided fuselage as a base, is a large decrease in transonic drag with its attendant benefits in transonic acceleration. The benefit is most significant in a primary combat region as will be discussed later. Because of optimization in this area, the F-5E can accelerate side-by-side through the transonic region with airplanes having a considerably higher Varax- 40i TIP TANK AREA RULE FINAL ORIGINAL 800 cruise * ~-0028 Cm As a matter of interest, arca ruling has been applied to another component of the F-5A/B aircraft. Initial prototype Might and wind tunnel tests indicated that transonic buffet and longitudinal instabilities existed with the originally pro- posed wingtip tank. Continued development tests in the transonic wind tunnel proved that an area ruling concept could be used to essentially eliminate the pitch instabilities in the Mach 0.9 to 0.95 region. As would be expected, a cruise drag benefit also existed because of the improvement in wingtip airflow characteristics. The slight instability still indicated by tunnel data at nearly maximum lift is thought to have been Reynolds Number dependent. It was never found in flight testing. 433 FOREBODY CAMBER- Cp, iy ‘* REAR SEAT VISION REQUIREMENT ‘* FOREBODY CAMBER TO COUNTERACT Crm INDUCED BY VISIBILITY REQUIREMENTS, ‘© TRIM DRAG REDUCTION ‘nach NUMBER 10 INCHES, General fuselage camber resulted from student/instructor overnose cambered upward at visibility requirements. ‘The nose shape of the T-38 was the very forward stations in order to reduce the down airload on the nose and to increase overall fuselage lift slightly thereby reducing the required down tail load by shifting C,, in the positive direction, The inereased forebody lift does not produce any measurable body drag-due-to-lift penalty, which would cancel t benefit of the reduced down tail loud. reductions in overall drag-due-to-l Report NACA RMLSGA03, available shortly after finalization of the T-38 for- ward fuselage contour lines, is cited as a reference tending to confirm this practice based upon tests of a number of body shapes. A curve of horizontal tail deflection versus Mach number from flight test shows a complete lack of transonic trim change at low altitude, In fact, early in the T-38 flight program it was discovered that the only indication to the pilot of passing Mach 1.0 was a characteristic Mach jump in the airspeed/ altimeter flight instruments. 42AFTERBODY @ ENGINES CLOSE TOGETHER @ MINIMUM EXTERNAL SLOPES @ TAIL SURFACES AHEAD OF NOZZLE The afterbody design placed the engines as close together as possible. To accomplish this required canting the engines outboard slightly forward to be able to utilize a minimum weight vertical spar which also forms a major bulkhead in the aft fuselage boattail. Early in the flight development program a jet inter- i action did exist which caused aperiodic pitch trim changes. This was remedied by a fairing between the ejectors on the lower and top surfaces of the ejector tail cones and remains the only external aerodynamic change made to the aircraft as a result of the entire flight test program. As stated previously, the afterbody lines were established during the wind tunnel test program. 433 TAIL LOCATION ANGLE OF ATTACK 0+ =0—== PITCHING MOMENT COEFFICIENT m ‘The basic aerodynamic characteristic differences are shown for low- and high-tailed configurations. The wing wake, and especially the turbulent stall wake for the low tail is always above the tail in the high angle of attack region. This location prevents the characteristics pitch-up and deep stall shown for the T-tail configuration. This tail location in conjunction with the moderate wing sweep, provided a very stable stall characteristic. With this stable stall a potential longitudinal control problem of excessively high stick deflections in the stall were alleviated through the use of a nonlinear stick to surface gearing mechanism. This system increased the tail deflection to stick motion ratio at moderate to large tail deflection angles while maintaining the proper control system gains for the cruise and high speed conditions in order to preclude pilot induced oscillation (PIO) instabilities. PIO will be discussed in detail later.VERTICAL STAB/LIZER ORIGINAL g oa Go uw 9 ANGLE OF ATTACK ~ DEG ., DYNAMIC PRESSURE A swept vertical tail was analyzed prior to and during wind tunnel testing and was determined to have adver: ‘oclastic effects. The final base pro- file resulted in essentially negligible acroclastic effects and an excellent level of directional stability well beyond stall angles of attack. i 45FINAL 7-38 CONFIGURATION The final T-38 configuration developed as a result of 5500 hours of wind tunnel testing and countless hours of detailed theoretical analyses became a baseline for later F-5 fighter configurations. Inboard ailerons were a major design feature primarily because of aeroelastic considerations. The 32° total aileron deflection available with gear up and 60° with gear down has provided more than adequate roll control with aileron reversal speeds well in excess of the design "q" limit of 1700 psf. Differential aileron is used to control aileron induced adverse yaw. Rudder deflections of 30° provide excellent yaw control for crosswinds although an essentially controls-neutral crab landing technique has proved more effective. Trailing edge flap deflections of 27° for takeoff and 45° for landing are used for the T-38. The flaps are primarily a drag pro- ducing surface but they also create a negative a, change, for improved over- ‘0 the-nose visibility, and a maximum lift benefit. It is worthy of note that after the comprehensive wind tunnel testing and analyses, the developed configura tion did not require any major modifications subsequent to flight. 46g STALL/SPIN PARAMETERS 0 O16} [Cyyr age TE ne — omg amie 22f- oes LATERAL Gonrrot °!2 ‘SPIN 008} PARAMETER Yors 04 8 2 16 2 mM 2 32 36 40 vem ANGLE OF ATTACK~ DEGS The primary stall/spin parameters can be measured on a standard wind tunnel static force model and correlated with the extremely dynamic motion of a loss-of-control stall condition or an aileron induced spin entry. The dynamic directional stability parameter C, _has been shown to correlate well with ‘dyn the dynamic stall instabilities with controls fixed whenever this value crosses zero and continues in a negative direction. The lateral control spin parameter derivation was based upon aileron deflection induced yawing which causes a rolling motion through the dihedral effect; cancelling or overpowering the in- tended rolling due to the aileron control input. Hence, the magnitude of the parameter has little or no significance and the evaluation of acceptability is made on the sign and shape of the curve. Positive values are stable and any tendency for the curve to pass through zero and diverge negatively is extremely unstable, The effects of design changes on stall/spin characteristics may be evaluated very rapidly using this technique prior to comprehensive dynamic non- linear motion analyses which is only possible on high-speed computers. 47i SPIN RESISTANCE ° g g SPIN ENTRY g REGION 3 Fi wu E | ar ‘SPIN = | COMBAT RESISTANCE 3 | MANEUveRs \ MARGIN <—_ | (Max conrRoL > INPUT RATES) som ANGLE OF ATTACK ~ DEG ‘A method of evaluating, at Ieast qualitatively, the spin resistance margin of an aircraft is shown above. Because the two primary spin parameters are yaw rate and angle of attack one may construct and compare envelopes defining the combinations of yaw rate and angle of attack where a spin entry will occur relative to an cnvelope defining the motion required to accomplish air combat mancuvering. Obviously, the greater the separation of these boundaries the less the possibility exists for the pilot to enter an inadvertent spin. This is not to say that gross misapplication of controls will not cause the aircraft to enter} severe poststall gyrations and/or spin. The T-38/F-5 flight test programs did show correlation with the spin entry boundary and did show that severe gross misapplication of controls was required to enter a spin. The almost complete: lack of in-service out-of-control and/or spin accidents on the T-38/F-5 family of aireraft has shown that carcful attention to designing in good high angle of attack flying qualities can be effective. 48PYLONS ORIGINAL DEVELOPED BLU-1B (TYPICAL) OUTBOARD Pe During the early wind tunnel tests on the F-5A it was determined that both the drag and stability could be improved by proper fore and aft location of the underwing stores. A considerable improvement in the flow occurs when the out~ i board pylons are swept forward with the pylon leading edge intersecting the wing leading edge. The effect is believed to be partly “area rule” and partly a channel flow phenomenon, and is an illustration of the value of early, detailed wind tunnel investigations. 49‘gsosoe-nIST'Ot ‘0c | so-eeee sumed | 5102 27 Aumageg 0 Tye vOT EOL ka papROTEMCGCOMBAT PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS3 MANEUVERING AIR BATTLE ARENA 60 50) 40] 30] 20] ALTITUDE - 1000 FT 002 04 06 G8 10 12 1¢ 16 18 20 MACH NUMBER Analysis of the air war in World War Il, the Korean episode, the Arab/ Israeli conflicts and in Vietnam shows that there is a region in the sky in which the major and decisive portion of the air battle takes place. This primary region extends downward from about 30, 000 feet and encompasses the Mach number range from 0.5 Mach to about 1.0, Historical studies have shown that ‘even when the combatants have Mach 2 capability very little of the maneuvering takes place above 1.4 and the terminal phase always takes place within the primary arena, Analytical studies show that there are basic reasons why air- planes do not maneuver near Mach 2. The sustained turn radii at these speeds are so great that the adversaries lose sight of each other, while maximum turn usage rapidly decelerates the aircraft. ‘The decisive maneuvering takes place within the primary arena because it is in this region where tur rates peak and turn radii are at a minimum. The various studies show Mach number 82capability much above 1.5 is not required for an air superiority fighter. V, capability in the order of Mach 2 implies larger size and complexity and a ‘requirement for more complex and higher power radar, armament and naviga~ tional equipment. Such expenditures may be more effectively directed toward a ‘MAX larger force in numbers. This is especially true when operational limitations such as precombat visual identification are imposed. 53COMBAT PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS e ENERGY RATE SPECIFIC POWER|~ACCELERATION OR DECELERATION, RATE OF CLIMB 3 é ¢ TURN PERFORMANCE LOAD FACTOR TURN RATE - TURN RADIUS **SPECIFIC POWER (Ps) = EXCESS THRUST X% Air-to-air combat maneuvering capability can be evaluated using the following parameters: Energy rate — defined as specific excess power (P, = F,V/W) indi- cates the ability of a fighter aircraft to accelerate/decelerate, which is a change in its kinetic energy level, or climb/descend, which is a change in its potential energy level, or any combination of the two. Turn performance — which consists of turn load factor, turn rate, and turn radius. Of the three, turn rate is the key parameter be- cause in air combat maneuvering the objective is to make a heading change such as to obtain a position advantage over your opponent. Specific power and turn rate then are the key parameters. 34ENERGY-MANEUVERABILITY COMPARISON GIVEN SPEED AND ALTITUDE SPECIFIC POWER @ 1g MARGIN MARGIN. 8 g _ SUSTANED TURN By / ENE et | > & oe io ‘TURN RATE -DEG/SEC SL és Rest FRIENDLY 8 = veceyearn 5 Typical comparative P, curves for a representative speed and altitude within the primary arena look like this. Note that at 1 g the aircraft has a considerable positive P. value which falls off to zero at the sustained turn rate value and continues on down to a negative value at maximum instantaneous turn rate, as limited by Ctq,q OT limit load factor. To maintain this turn rate for any period of time the normal aircraft must give up speed or altitude or both. Charts like this can be used to compare the maneuvering capabilities of an aircraft against an adversary. The “friendly” has the advantage not only in 1-g acceleration, but in sustained turn rate and maximum instantaneous turn rates as well. This is not typical for two evenly matched airplanes. Note also that the "friendly" has a deceleration margin, that is a more negative P, value at maximum instantaneous turn rate. He can use this margin for defensive maneuvering to force an attacker into making an overshoot if the handling qualities at high lift will allow operation in this region, 55: INFLUENCE OF HANDLING QUALITIES ON USEABLE LIFT CAPABILITY PATCH-UP i wine MAX DIRECTIONAL USEABLE ROLL FT MARGINAL | LAT. CONT. LIFT COEFFICIENT ANGLE OF ATTACK For many airplanes not all of the maneuvering capability theoretically available is useable. This figure shows factors which for many airplanes limit the pilot to lift coefficients far below the theoretical maximum. These are also characteristics which force a pilot to continually monitor his airspeed and angle of attack instruments, to remain below the pitch-up boundary for instance. Some airplanes have black boxes, warning horns and stick shakers to do this but the result is the same. And of course monitoring flight instruments can cause the pilot to lose sight of his opponent to say nothing of the inhibiting effects of pitch-up or spin susceptibility. The Northrop T-38/F-5 airplanes can be flown to maximum lift and beyond with none of the adverse effects shown on the chart.IMPACT OF HANDLING QUALITIES ON TURN PERFORMANCE Eo 3S TURN RaTE-ORGISEE - MAX USEABLE UFT | SQ > 2 i INFLUENCE z OF HANDLING} wo QUALITIES maxuirt —_\ ‘This chart shows the handling qualities effects on usable lift limits as reflected on the P, versus turn rate plot. The results are obvious. 87: INFLUENCE OF HANDLING QUALITIES ON ROLL PERFORMANCE MAXIMUM AVAILABLE ROLL RATE. / MAX USEABLE LIFT TURN RATE OR ANGLE OF ATTACK All aircraft exhibit a normal reduction in roll power as angle of attack is increased. Through proper aileron placement and deflection geometry, a mini- mum reduction can be achieved. The utilization of the full roll power capability is extremely important in air combat maneuvering and is a direct effect of the handling qualities limitations which may exist. If no automatic systems are installed to limit roll control inputs at high angles of attack for an aircraft which exhibits handling qualities limitations it will be necessary for the pilot to use available cucs or instruments to determine when he must begin to consider not using roll control inputs. Assuming buffet onset as a physical indicator of poor high lift flying qualities, then a forced reduction in roll rate capability will exist ‘as shown on the chart, The'effect of this limitation on air combat maneuvering can be disastrous when maneuvering against an adversary who does not suffer this defect. The F-5/T-38 aircraft exhibit only a mild reduction in roll rate with increasing angle of attack. 58SUMMARY FLIGHT ENVELOPE g ALTITUDE MACH NUMBER Any aircraft has an aerodynamic and propulsion design envelope depicted by the outer boundaries shown on the chart. The capability of the pilot to use the entire envelope is dependent on the handling qualities of the aircraft. The ‘T-38/F-5 aircraft have been developed specifically with a concept of not allowing handling qualities to limit the flight envelope. 59‘gsosoe-nIST'Ot ‘0c | so-eeee sumed | 5102 27 Aumageg 0 Tye vOT EOL ka papROTEMCGINTUITION Vs REALITY"It’s infuriating. Aerodynamically speaking we're capable of 200 miles an hour.” It's clear that intuition says “faster is better"; even the animals want more speed. But the other turtle might ask the first, "what for?" We will examine briefly some of the important factors that bear on the question - how fast should an aircraft go? We will examine intuition vs reality for tactical air superiority fighters. First, a short review of history is in order, Military aircraft were first used in WW I for reconnaissance and observation, but almost immediately enemy pilots began to attack each other with handguns and grenades. At this point, the demand for superior speed was born. The faster aircraft could always attack the slower one. The faster aircraft could always disengage from the slower. The maximum speeds of early WW I aire averaged approximately 110 mph. At the end of the war, the speeds were up to about 140 mph. Progress was slow, but the need for the advantages implicit in high maximum speeds was clearly apparent to all the protagonists. The taste for speed was born! It became the object of dreamers, doers, daredevils, enthusiasts, and the military; racing became an exciting new sport,Between WW I and WW II, the International Schneider Cup trophy races provided the framework and spur for nations to develop engines and airframes that would have meaning for the military. Many of the WW II fighters were direct descendants of the Schneider Cup racers via the testing grounds of Manchuria (1931), Ethiopia (1935), Spain (1936), and Finland (1939). With the start of WW II, the desire for ever higher top speeds was universal. Military requirements for speed were clear. Speed was useful in attack, in evasion, in out-zooming; it could be bled off to out-turn or gain an altitude advantage over the adversary. Engines generated ever more power to gain speed. Propellers initially absorbing the engine's power with two blades, acquired three, four, then five blades. Ultimately, the British produced the DeHavilland Mosquito bomber. Light, made of plywood construction, it cruised at such a high speed that it was essentially invulnerable to all of the Luftwaffe's fighters. The RAF was so confident in its superiority of speed that they took the guns off of the aircraft. It roamed over, photographed, bombed, and attacked Germany with impunity, and its success was due to speed - usable speed - but speed above all with persistence. The Korean conflict saw the first wide scale employment of jet aircraft. The maximum speeds of the F-86F and MIG-15 protagonists were near Mach 0.9. Their best cruise speeds were near Mach 0.9 also. Both aircraft flew extensively at their maximum speeds. The MIG-15, slightly faster and higher climbing than its adversaries, was difficult to bring to battle. The slower F-84's and F-80's, capable of 0.8 Mach, flew at their maximum speeds frequently in combat, especially when vulnerable to an attack by an enemy aircraft, Although the afterburner (it was called taflpipe burning at first) was developed soon after the jet engine itself, the operational fighters up to and including the F-86A's in Korea did not have it, ‘The desire for speed continued after the Korean war. From lessons learned in the war, it was felt that still more speed could be utilized. At about this time, the jet engine with operational afterburners became available and the supersonic F-100 led in the era of the "Century Series" fighters. The Europeans likewise developed the supersonic Super Mystere B-2, Mirage IM, Lightning P-1, and the Russians countered with the MIG-19 and MIG-21. But these post Korean supersonic fighters had a totally new characteristic which had not been encountered previously: the maximum speed was 50-100% greater than the best cruise speed. Remember, the subsonic fighters had a maximum speed very near the best cruise speed. But, the afterburner produced a revolution in the maximum speed of aircraft. A Mach 2 63maximum speed became very, very fashionable . . . almost a requirement. ‘Mach 2,2 maximum speeds were allegedly routine. How could one support and justify a slower speed aircraft when the opponent had a faster one? The Mach 2.8+ speed of the MIG-25 (displayed to the world while setting an international 500 Km closed course record) became the basis justifying the need for a new fighter to the U.S. Congress in 1968-1970. In the Vietnam conflict, both the USAF and USN were using various models of the F-4 as air superiority fighters with the enemy flying MIG-19 and 21's, The F-4's and MIG-21's had maximum speeds on the same order (M 2.2). Now, let's see how the pilots used their speed capability in the Vietnam war. After the war, military analysts compiled the following record from more than 100,000 sorties flown by the Mach 2.2 US aircraft over North Vietnam. 64VIETNAM COMBAT SPEEDS © NOT ONE SECOND OF FLIGHT COMBAT TIME AT MACH 2.2 SPEED (OR ABOVE) WAS RECORDED. @ NOT ONE SECOND OF FLIGHT COMBAT TIME AT MACH 2.0 SPEED (OR ABOVE) WAS RECORDED. @ NOT ONE SECOND OF FLIGHT COMBAT TIME AT MACH 1.8 SPEED} (OR ABOVE) WAS RECORDED. @ ALMOST NO TIME AT 1.6 MACH (OR ABOVE) WAS RECORDED (SECONDS). @ EXTREMELY LITTLE FLIGHT TIME AT 1.4 MACH (OR ABOVE) WAS RECORDED (MINUTES). © REMARKABLY LITTLE TIME AT 1.2 MACH (OR ABOVE) WAS FLOWN (HOURS). ‘The vast majority of military operations and all heavy combat maneuvering was done in the domain of speeds below 1.2 Mach number and at altitudes below 20,000 ft. This is a curious result. Top speeds were no longer used in combat! ‘The military had demanded Mach 2. 0+ capability in five aircraft used in Vietnam, the F-104, F-4D/E, F-105D, F-106A and F-111, (The F-5E and F-101 were capable of only Mach 1,6). The government had provided funds for their procurement, yet the capability went unused, At this point, it was clear that something had gone wrong. Reality had overtaken intuition, but the reason for this was not evident, Intuition said that more speed is better, but the reality was that the speed capability was never used, Were conditions peculiar in Vietnam which made Mach 2 speeds unnecessary? Was there a military restriction against it? The answer is no. ‘There may be a number of valid reasons for the low speeds (relatively low) recorded in Vietnam, but only the two primary reasons are discussed here. 65i F-SE TURN PERFORMANCE-15,000 FEET 28 wu 20 16 & g § 8 g 3 g 9 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 MACH NUMBER The first of these reasons lies in the shape of the turn rate vs Mach number relationship for an aircraft. Turn rate is a vitally significant parameter in comparing the air-to-air combat capabilities of two different aircraft. In combat, each pilot has the tendency to fly his aircraft so as to maximize his turn rate. He thus gains angular position on the enemy which, in turn, may permit a missile launch or gun firing. The above illustrates the turn rate performance of the F-SE at 15,000 ft, altitude. It can be seen that the pilot's urge to maximize his turn rate will unfailingly drive his Mach number to about 0.7. Thus, if the pilot is going to join in combat (rather than avoid combat), his speed will inevitably drop to subsonic speeds. Either that, or his opponent will be able to gain a position to his rear where he can launch a missile. The significant fact is that this turn rate chart represents the general shape of the turn rate vs Mach number variation for all aircraft; i.e., all aircraft are subsonic at their maximum turn rate. Until aircraft can be designed with the best turn rate at supersonic speed, air-to-air combat will occur at subsonic speed. Note also, that even if the turn rate is held constant while increasing the speed (in the ares of the chart between the sustained turn rate and the maximum turn 66rate), the tum radius and load factor increase, bringing with it increasing problems of keeping the enemy in sight. The chart represents the F-5E at 15,000 feet altitudes however, the turn performance charts at all other altitudes also show the maximum. turn rates at about the same Mach number ~ always subsonic. 67i F-5E MACH/ALTITUDE SUMMARY AND AIR BATTLE ARENA —1 —= 607-— T 50 —~ bE t N 8 40 | 3 Transient Yy, \eansient_| a 30 y Ly + 5 20 tio —} E GGG gel pp oe WML Lt ° © O02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 MACH NUMBER ‘The chart above is the Mach-altitude envelope for the F-5E, a 1.64 Mach airplane. Mach 2 aircraft show a greater 1 g flight envelope out tothe higher Mach numbers, but even the Mach 2 aircraft have roughly the same primary and high speed transient air battle arena areas as the F-5E. Thus, the difference between aircraft is the turn rate that each can generate within the air battle arena. Let us consider the second aspect of the Mach 2 aircraft which contributes to its being flown seldom, if ever, at Mach 2 in an operational situation. We have given a reason why air-to-air combat turning is not done supersonically, Let us now consider the possibility that the Mach 2 aircraft can use its speed to get from its base or Combat Air Patrol (CAP) station to the scene of the air battle. After all, the faster the aircraft, the further out from base or station the enemy can be intercepted. Right? Let's see, The next chart illustrates the radius of action for several aircraft including the F-5. The chart presents a gross overview of the radius of action for three aircraft: F-5E, a Vietnam Mach 2 fighter, and a new Mach 2.5 fighter. The data presented were computed utilizing first-order variables only. Accordingly, 68the absolute values of rat actual airplane capabi against another is valid. 's of action may be slightly in error compared to the jes, however, the relative comparisons of one aircraft 69g AIR COMBAT FIGHTER RADIUS OF ACTION cuz | | COMBAT PERSISTENCE VIETNAM ACH 2 1 Ye TURNS ATMEI.2 AIR COMBAT FIGHTER. LAUNCH FROM CAP 883 8 7 RADIUS OF ACTION TPse” NO EXTERNAL TANKS MISSION PROFILE omrre Tue 8888 = Zz 2 9 5 2 Q 8 5 g x ° 10 15 20 HIGH SPEED RUNOUT MACH NUMBER, ° There are several very interesting points to be made about the data of the above chart. First: aircraft performance data is rarely, if ever, presented in this manner. However, we are investigating the effect of speed, and a plot of this kind shows directly and dramatically how speed affects mission performance. . Second: supersonic runout is extremely costly to the aircraft range capability. For example, increasing the runout speed from subsonic to M 1.5 for the M 2.5 fighter reduces its radius of action by about 70%, i.e. only about one-third of the subsonic range is available at M 1.5. Third: at supersonic speeds, the radius of action capabilities of these three vastly different aircraft are astonishingly similar. Let now place these three aircraft in an operational situation and see what can be learned. The situation selected is an intercept from a CAP (Combat Air Patrol) position of an enemy intruding aircraft, The attempt here will be to keep the analysis militarily relevant, but more important, to make the analysis as general as possible using only the primary variables. 70ENEMY. | intauder aT Me 1 ACTION co INTERCEPT ~~ wy, 700300400500 LINE DISTANCE NM ‘The geometry of the situation is illustrated in the above chart. A search radar warning system detects the enemy intruder and launches the interceptor from the CAP station as the intruder crosses the action line. The intruder is traveling at Mp, the enemy Mach number. The early warning system directs the interceptor on CAP station to the intercept point. The interceptor travels at My, the interceptor Mach number, Of interest now is to illustrate the locus of intercept points for an enemy intruder crossing anywhere along the action line. 1: KINEMATIC CONSTRAINTS, HYPERBOLA, My fine >1 PaRaao.a,Mty/Me = 1 ELUPSE, Mi /Me <1 00300 CINE DISTANCE NM The chart above illustrates the intercept loci for various ratios of My/My. These loci can be called kinematic boundaries set by the requirements of velocity and time to put the enemy and the interceptor at the same point in space at the same time, Now, the geometric framework of the above chart and the previous chart is used, along with a numerical value for a ground based radar detection range, and some selected speeds for interceptor and enemy intruder. The next chart is the result. 2g ‘SPEED CONSTRAINTS, y 7) cap STATION This chart shows the loci of intercept points assuming that the interceptor leaves the CAP station and is directed toward the intercept point by (Ground Controlled Intercept) GCI radar as soon as the enemy intruder crosses the action line. As would be expected, the faster the interceptor flies, the further out from the CAP line is the intercept. The next step is to overlay the range capability for the various aircraft we are watching (the M 1.5 F-5E, the M 2 Vietnam fighter and the new M 2.5 fighter) on the kinematic speed constraints of the above chart. We take the aircraft one at a time and examine the effect of its own speed on the actual intercept envelopes. First the F-5E aircraft. The following chart is the result for an interceptor speed of M 0.85. 73‘SPEED CONSTRAINT - 0 700200300 400” 500 LINE” too DISTANCE NANI F-5E “. seeene RADIUS CONSTRAINT If we regard the significant intercept capability to be the maximum lateral distance from the CAP station that the F-5E can intercept the intruder, the F-5E capability is seen to be about 330 nautical miles (or 660 n. miles, left to right) at an interceptor speed of M 0.85. Intercepts along the radius constraint boundary are not of much interest since intercept could have been accomplished along the kinematic speed constraint boundary and in addition, intercept along the radius constraint boundary implies that the interceptor sits on the ground and waits for the appropriate take-off time. Curves similar to the above can be drawn for each Mach number up to M, i imax* 14INTRUDER aT MOBS SPEED CONSTRAINT mit Se chan ne ennA, 700" "300365405 “500” LINE CAPSTATION [100 DISTANCE NMI noes oe soo F-5E “on b RADIUS ™ 408 mags soo If the intersection of the kinematic speed constraint and the radius constraint for each interceptor speed (point A on the previous chart) is plotted on the same range~ crossrange chart and the points connected, the result shown in the above chart is a summary of the F-5E intercept capability for the given intruder speed and detection range. ‘The Mach 2 aircraft summary is seen in the next chart, 5: INTRUDER, ATM 085 ca stanion “| |MACH 2 FIGHTER Raps" CONSTRAINT, = 2 8 = 8 ‘The radius of the M2 head-on intercept case (intercept at Mach 2.0) dips back slightly toward the CAP station because the M 2 aircraft does not have the radius at M 2,0 to reach the M 2.0 kinematic constraint boundary and so must delay its take-off until the intruder gets within its radius capability at M 2.0. 16g SPEED CONSTRAINT. a on Sow Log DISTANCE NM 200 & Z |MACH 25 FIGHTER} 300 2 noes 4005 a 500 RADIUS CONSTRAINT ‘The M 2.5 aircraft summary is presented in the above chart. Subsonically it has greater radius than the other interceptors, so it has a slightly wider intercept lateral distance. However, it has zero effective intercept radius at M 2.5, so the Mach 2.5 speed does not show on this chart. 7g MAXIMUM INTERCEPT ENVELOPE TRTRUDER ATMOS, 75300 200 500 DISTANCE Nai = [ MAXIMUM LATERAL 2 | INTERCEPT ENVELOPE 3 | AS CONSTRAINED BY @ | KINEMATICS OR RAD- © ||US CONSTRAINT, WHICH ° | EVER IS LESS. TRE MAXIMUM INTERCEPT ENVELOPE RADIUS CONSTRAINT NZS AIRPLANE 0g, The above chart superimposes all three summary charts on the same chart for detailed comparison. Now we can see what a speed of Mach 2.5 will do for us in this particular intercept case. Very little - and note that where the faster aircraft have superior lateral intercept reach over the slower aircraft, the speed is between M 0.85 and M1.1. In other words, these faster aircraft have a slightly better capability not because of their speed advantage but because of their fuel advantage. You may object that the forgoing analysis selects only a special case to examine (M 0.85 speed intruder at 200 n.mi or greater detection range) and other conditions may show a much greater need for speed than is demonstrated here. Only a very small portion of Northrop's analysis of the intercept problem has been discussed here, Much more analysis of this type of intercept problem has been done with a variation of the intruder speed and the detection range and with launch delay times, and a short summary of these analyses are given in the next chart. 8CAP INTERCEPT SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS © A CLOSE-IN CAP LINE (ie REDUCED DISTANCE BETWEEN THE CAP LINE AND THE ACTION LINE) MAKES IT EASIER FORA HIGH SPEED ENEMY JO "END RUN" THE DEFENSE. (LINE BACKERS EFFECTING A PASS RUSH ALSO KNOW THIS) © 4 GLOSE-IN CAP LINE MAKES THE HIGH BURST SPEED INTERCEPTOR MORE USEFUL, BUT IT 1S SEVERELY LIMITED IN CAPABILITY TO DETECTION RANGES OF 100 N. MILES OR LESS, © THE SUBSONIC CRUISE-HIGH BURST SPEED INTERCEPTOR IS TRAPPED IN) THE PROBLEM OF EXTENDED WARNING, IF IT USES HIGH SPEED IT RUNS ‘OUT OF FUEL; IF IT SLOWS DOWN, IT ENCOUNTERS KINEMATIC CONSTRANNTS| ITS HIGH SPEED BURST CAPABILITY, INSTEAD OF BEING A FREEDOM, BECOMES A LIABILITY SINCE THE SPEED IS ACHIEVED ATA SEVERELY COLLAPSED RADIUS OF ACTION. ITS MAXIMUM SPEED 1S SIMPLY UNUSABLE. © A HIGHER SPEED TARGET SHRINKS THE INTERCEPT “FOOTPRINT,” BUT DOES NOT GREATLY ALTER THE ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS UNTIL INTRUDER SPEED GREATLY EXCEEDS THE INTERCEPTOR SPEEDS (NOTA LIKELY SITUATION). A final word: the forgoing analyses have discussed two prominent air battle situations where high burst speeds at the expense of range are unusable. However, these situations are not the only ones that must be considered in selecting aircraft top speeds. A very real situation where speed is significant is stern pursuit, for instance interception of a supersonic bomber from the rear. Here, clearly, there is no substitute for speed. Detailed analysis however shows that stern pursuit also has its constraints in radius, reaction time, and initial separation distance. But even in this case, a high top speed is unusable unless it is accompanied by a usable radius of action. 93 é STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS @ STRUCTURAL DESCRIPTION AND DESIGN PHILOSOPHY © DESIGN CRITERIA ¢ DESIGN LESSONS © TESTING Discussion of structural concepts will be grouped first into a structural description, and followed by the design criteria and some design lessons. Primary Structure ~The aircraft is a two-place primary trainer with no provision for external stores or wingtip fuel tanks. ‘The wing consists of one-piece upper and lower wing skins from tip to tip with seven spars. The fuselage has mul- tiple frames and four longerons. The empennage consists of a honeycomb all~ movable horizontal stabilizer and a multi-rib vertical tail. The airframe is con structed primarily of 7000 series aluminum alloys as typified by the 7075-T6 skins on the wing, fuselage, and vertical tail, and 7079~T6 wing ribs, wing spars, and fuselage bulkheads. Some magnesium skin is employed on the fuse~ lage. The major high-strength steel component is the 4330M (220 KSI) torque tube supporting the horizontal stabilizer. 80F-5A/B — These aircraft are lightweight fighters. The A and B models are respectively one and two place versions. Materials and basic structure were originally similar to the T-38 except for the addition of store stations on the wing and a "thick" lower wing skin (thicker section at the wing root). The aircraft operate with both external stores and wing tip tanks. F-5E/E ~ These aircraft are slightly larger and heavier versions of the F-5A/B, The E and F models are, respectively, one and two place air super- iority fighters. In addition to the longer wing and fuselage, maneuvering flaps have been added and the overall geometry at the wing root area has been changed. Aluminum alloys on the F-5E/F are employed in heat treat conditions which yield improved fracture toughness and resistance to stress corrosion. For example, 7075-T6 has been replaced by 7075-T73 and T-76. High strength steel has been retained in some components, specifically, the torque tube supporting the horizontal stabilizer. 81STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENT - AIRFRAME @ THIN SGN FRAME CONSTRUCTION MULT! LONGERON. TWO MANUFACTURING BREAKS, ONE FIELO BREAK 7000'SERIES ALUMINUM 2 TITANIUM ENGINE BAY. The structural arrangement resulted from much attention to direct and continuous load paths with a minimum of splices. The number and size of structural elements were determined from detailed analysis of minimum weight arrangements for the local load levels, the required service life of the aircraft, and the ease of manufacturing and maintenance. The aircraft fuselage is of all-metal, stressed skin structure, consisting primarily of conventional aluminum, stainless steel, magnesium and titanium, the latter primarily being used in the boattail. Honeycomb construction and chemically milled skins are also used. The fuselage is semimonocoque struc ture consisting primarily of longerons, skins, decks, bulkheads and formers. For ease of engine installation, a field break separates the boattail structure from the aft fuselage. 823 STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENT -WING © ONE-PIECE UPPER & LOWER THICK SKINS TIP-TO-TIP- *SIXSPAR MAIN BOX. ‘© FOUR-POINT PRIMARY ATTACH, TWO-POINT SECONDARY ‘© 7000 SERIES ALUMINUM * HY-TUF STEEL LANDING GEAR RIB The wing was designed to be constructed in one piece from tip to tip to provide structural continuity and eliminate splices in heavily loaded members. The continuous skins from tip to tip required special mill runs and forming techniques. They are also extensively chem milled to provide maximum strength-to-weight ratios. The wing is a multi-spar, all aluminum structure, except for steel ribs supporting the landing gear and wingtip stores. It is attached to the fuselage at four primary attach points, located at the 15% and 44% spars. Two secondary shear ties are located at the 66% spar. The upper and lower wing skins are both one-piece machined aluminum plate, 7075-T651 and 7075-17351, respectively. ‘The spars are 7000 series aluminum forgings and extrusions. The ribs, except for those mentioned above, are also 7000 series aluminum forgings. 83.STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENT- VERTICAL STABILIZER g ONE PIECE THICK SKIN TWO POINT MAIN SPAR ATTACH ‘TWO CELL MULTI RIB BOX © 7000 SERIES ALUMINUM The vertical stabilizer is essentially a single spar, multi-rib type all aluminum structure with homogeneous integrally stiffened machined skins. ‘The main spar is swept back 12.4 degrees while the sweep-back of the elastic axis is slightly less. The basic structural box extends from the 12% to 72% chord where .050 sheet metal spars are used as closing members. The main spar extends below the exposed surface of the fin and into the fuselage. It is attached to the fuselage by means of bolts through the adjacent fuselage frames and through the attach angles around the periphery of the fin at the fuselage deck. 84g STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENT - HORIZONTAL STABILIZER @ ALL- MOVABLE SURFACE @ FULL DEPTH ALUMINUM HONEYCOMB: @ TWO POINT SUPPORT © 43M30 STEEL CARRY THROUGH TORQUE TUBE ‘The horizontal stabilizer is an all movable surface, driven by dual hydraulic actuators housed inside the fuselage tail cone. Surface deflection limits are +5° (nose up) and -20° (nose down). ‘The surfaces are basically a two cell bonded assembly composed of 7075-T6 chem-milled skins supported by aluminum honeycomb core and a central spar. At the panel root the spar must transfer all surface loads to the fuselage. A steel hinge fitting (43M30), which forms the main spar in the in- board region of the surface, serves also as a carry through member across the fuselage. The fitting is in the form of an "I" section outboard and a torque tube section inboard. The right and left surfaces are connected at the airplane centerline by a splice to the hinge fittings. In addition to the structural bonding, mechanical fasteners between the skin and internal members give a fail safe aspect to the design. 85STRUCTURAL DESIGN CRITERIA 7-38 | FSA ESE | LATEST 1950 ERA SPEC] 1950 ERA SPEC SPECIFICATION! "(mit §-5700) | (MILS-5700) (L860) j 738.95 AT 7.33 q's AT 733 q's AT LOAD FACTOR Yo FUEL WT. Ye FUELWT, ueL wt 15000 HOURS 4000 ee 8000 HOURS | 37,500 4000 LANDINGS | LANDINGS. SERVICE LIFE ‘The weight of the aircraft for limit load design has been increased from half fuel to full fuel for the F-5E and the latest structural design specification has been used. 86MAINTENANCEF5E MAINTENANCE FEATURES EASY REMOVAL AND INSTALLATION ‘© LOW MAINTENANCE INDEX #2400 HOUR TBO. * 400 HOUR PERIODIC INSPECTION © BASE REPAIR CAPABILITY AVAILABLE 8 PERIODICS ACCOMPLISHED eee Engines are easily removable by two men. A removable boattail and rails are built-in to transfer the engines onto an engine removal trailer. Most engine and airplane accessories can be replaced without removing the engine from the airplane, The J85-21 P.E. Time is 400 hours, twice the time span of comparable supersonic fighters. 88F-SE MAINTENANCE FEATURES AIRFRAME] ge _¢ a ne Pe EASY ACCESS T0 Y EQUIPMENT © LOW MAINTENANCE MANHOURS PER SORTIE (0 PROGRAMED DEPOT MAINTENANCE REQUIRED 000 -HOUR SERVICE LIFE © 400- HOUR PERIODIC INSPECTION This chart shows the airplane with the boattail off and most of its access doors open, 89F-SE MAINTENANCE FEATURES ~[SSIMBUFIED INSTALLATIONS FAST FAULT DETECTION ‘* LIGHTWEIGHT MODULES RAPIO ACCESS] ." |» MODULAR CHANGE The F-5 maintenance concept is based on accessibility. Components are one deep. Doors allow complete and unrestricted access to all components. Components are shoulder high - no maintenance stands are required. 90MAINTENANCE COSTS ora 0F-46(5) rise g MH FH pre TIME This chart shows the upward trend in maintenance manhours per flight hour which is taking place. Note that the T-38/F-5 values are of the order of half the level of the F-89, F-4 and F-104, This illustrates the degree of success achieved toward the original objective of significant reduction in system operat- ing and maintenance costs, which are the major contributors to cost of owner- ship of a system. a1SEE NT ET 200 Severo | prec ‘iz Emopeee Tyr veren SPHDESIGN LESSONSSTRESS CORROSION IN HIGH STRENGTH ALUMINUM ALLOYSSTRESS CORROSION CRACKING PROBLEM © DEFINITION @ CAUSE © CORRECTIVE ACTION © DESIGN LESSON The problem of stress corrosion cracking in structural members will be reviewed by first defining what stress corrosion is, then covering the cause as related to the factors that allowed this particular problem to take place. The corrective action taken from 1965 to the present will also be reviewed. If we want to continue to design efficient aircraft structure we must benefit from our mistakes, therefore, the last section will be a dis- cussion on the lesson learned. 95DEFINITION OF PROBLEM @ AN INDUSTRY-WIDE PROBLEM SINCE EARLY 19605, @ HIGH STRENGTH 7079-16 DIE FORGINGS MOST SUSCEPTIBLE. @ CRACKING IN SHORT TRANSVERSE GRAIN IN PARTING PLANE © CRACKS OCCURRED DURING MANUFACTURING AND IN-SERVICE @ CRITICAL AND EXPENSIVE STRUCTURAL PARTS: — LANDING GEAR CYLINDERS. — MAJOR WING RIBS AND SPARS — LARGE BULKHEADS AND FITTINGS Stress corrosion cracking of high strength aluminum alloys became a problem in the T-38 and F-5A/B aircraft in the early 1960's. The suscep- tible alloys were used extensively by most airframe manufactures so that stress corrosion cracking became an industry wide problem on aircraft produced during this period. Most cracking was confined to forgings and extrusions of alloys 7079, 7075, and 2014 in the T6 condition. The most sensitive being the 7079-76 die forgings where the cracking was usually confined to the short transverse grain in the parting plane. Cracks were detected on parts dur- ing manufacturing process as well as on parts in-service. Because the alloy involved was high strength, the parts were naturally primary structure and expensive. During this time period many different aircraft were experiencing stress corrosion cracks in landing gear cylinders, major wing ribs and spares, and large fuselage bulkheads and attachment fittings. 96LANDING GEAR CYLINDER STRESS CORROSION CRACK DETECTED IN- SERVICE This is an example of a stress corrosion crack detected in a T-38 7079-6 landing gear cylinder. The crack was detected on an in-service gear. Note that the crack has progressed almost the full length of the cylinder. Cracks were also found in new cylinders setting on the shelf waiting to be assembled. 97STRESS CORROSION INTERGRANULAR CRACKS CAUSED BY THE COMBINED ACTION OF ELECTROCHEMICAL CORROSION & SUSTAINED TENSILE STRESSES Stress corrosion cracking in aluminum is a complex failure mechanism caused by electro-chemical corrosion acting in conjunction with sustained tensile stresses in the material. The elements required to realize cracking are discussed on the following pages. 98i REQUIRED INTERACTING FACTORS SN, CONTROL OF ANY ONE CAN PREVENT SCC There are four basic interacting factors that are required to create stress corrosion cracking. The elimination of any one of the factors will eliminate the problem. Alloy and temper refer to a stress corrosion susceptible material. Product form relates to the susceptible grain direction. Sustained stress refers to a sustained or residual tensile stress that can be induced within a part during machining, straightening, heat treatment, or final assembly. The last factor is environment. In the presence of the first three factors the only corrosive environment necessary is moist air. Any defect in the chemical surface treatment of the part, such as a scratch or abrasion, that exposes the aluminum to the atmosphere will permit the corrosion to occur that is requird to initiate a stress corrosion crack. Moist air is always present around any aircraft so there is no practical way to eliminate the environmental factor. 99i ALLOW/TEMPER PROPERTIES 2 38 pS & TENSILE STRENGTH - KSI ° TOTS-T6 TOT9-T6 2014-6 EE) SCC THRESHOLD IN GHORT TRANSVERSE GRAIN The stress corros on eracking (SCC) threshold in the short transverse grain direction is shown versus tensile strength for the three most s uscep- tible alioys. The threshold stress is determined by an alternating immersion test of a loaded ring in a 3.5 percent sodium chloride solution. The 7 ksi threshold stress indicates the degree of susceptibility of these three alloys with all other factors being equal. 100i PRODUCT FORM SHORT TRANSVERSE GRAIN Materials are more susceptible to stress corrosion along the short transverse grain than in the long transverse or longitudinal grain. The corrosive environment attacks the exposed short transverse grain as in the parting plane of a typical rib forging shown here. The finished part, depen- ding on the amount of material machined away, could have exposed short transverse grain across the entire width of the flanges. Cracks will start at the surface at a grain boundary and progress along the length of the part as long as sufficient tensile stress is present appearing very much like a piece of wood racking along the grain. 101PRODUCT FORM Cylindrical forgings may have very pronounced short transverse grain at the parting plane as shown by this typical landing gear cylinder. 102SUSTAINED TENSILE STRESS ORIGINS — BASIC FORMING/MACHINING — HEAT TREATMENT/QUENCHING — STRAIGHTENING OPERATIONS —FIT-UP AND ASSEMBLY 3 é Sustained tensile stresses can be induced within a part during any one or any combination of the many steps it goes through from initial form- ing to final assembly. Most parts are machined from raw material in the heat treated T6 condition. High residual surface tensile stresses are exposed by this method which lead to a considerable amount of warpage. This is caused by the quenching operation after solution heat treatment. The quench produces significant surface compressive stress and internal tensile stresses, especially in 7079-T6 where a cold water quench is utilized. During the machining operation the residual stresses must react to establish equilibrium, so the part distorts. Straightening may be required and this induces additional residual stresses. Significant ten- sile stresses can also be induced in the part during assembly by improper fit or interference. 103g i STRAIGHTENING OPERATIONS TYPICAL EXTRUDED SPAR FLANGE 3 Co C An example of the effects of straightening are shown for a typical T-38/F-5 extruded wing spar. The extruded shape has a large amount of excess material only in the flange area to allow for spanwise taper of the finished part. The machining operation distorts the flange thus requiring straightening which results in residual tensile stresses on both sides of the spar flange. 104FIT-UP & ASSEMBLY TYPICAL FORGED RIB FLANGE g An example of induced fit-up stresses is shown by a case where a forged wing rib with relatively thin flanges is joined to a thick skin at a point where the skin is formed for wing dihedral. A small mismatch will i result in residual bending stresses in the rib flange. This is typical of a configuration which resulted in root ribs being replaced in 250 T-38 wings. 105CAUSE OF PROBLEM @ USE OF HIGH STRENGTH ALUMINUM WITH LITTLE CONCERN FOR OR KNOWLEDGE OF SIDE EFFECTS © 7079-T6 PROVIDED LARGE HIGH STRENGTH FORGINGS © LIMITED KNOWLEDGE OF STRESS CORROSION IN MID 1950's @ NORMAL FABRICATION PROCEDURES UNTIL FIRST FAILURES OCCURRED The factors that allowed this problem to come about are relatively obvious. In the constant pursuit of higher performance and lighter weights, the aluminum alloys have been developed to a high strength capability. These gains in strength were not obtained, however, without some detri- mental side effects, one of them being a potential for stress corrosion cracking. The material with the highest susceptibility was 7079-T6 which was very attractive to use on aircraft because of the ability to forge large sections with high mechanical properties. The alloy was introduced in the mid 1950's when there was very limited knowledge of stress corrosion in aluminum. Because of its advantages it received wide spread use through- out the industry. Normal production procedures were utilized in the fab- rication of the parts and little or no special handling was considered until the first failures occurred. 106CORRECTIVE ACTION 1965 STATE -OF-ART CONTROL TECHNIQUES PRESERVATION DURING PROCESSING CONTROLLED STRAIGHTENING SHOT PEENING IMPROVED PENETRANT INSPECTION CHANGE TO 7075-773 WHERE STRENGTH ALLOWED ‘The attractive characteristics of 7079 still supported its use even after the stress corrosion problem was identified. In early 1965 the first incident of stress corrosion on a T-38 resulted in immediate action to con- trol the four basic elements previously discussed. Changes were made to Northrop control practices. Requirements were established to protect in-process parts with protective coatings throughout the manufacturing cycle, and to introduce control procedures for straightening to minimize residual tensile stresses. On critical parts, controlled shot peening was added. More sensitive penetrant inspection systems were used on all 7079 parts. The most effective method to solve this problem is to elimin- ate the susceptible materials. During this time period the only alternate material was 7075-T73, an overaged temper which has high resistance to stress corrosion, however, the strength properties are significantly lower. Therefore, this temper could not be used for the critical parts without redesign and requalification. 107ALLOY/TEMPER PROPERTIES — 6 | ! T 2 | ' | =z + 5 2 a F a9) & 20 “| . a | Va Zo. 7 —\ 2 7075-T6 7079-16 2014-T6 TO7S-T73 SWSCC THRESHOLD IN SHORT TRANSVERSE GRAIN The use of 7075-T73 provides a dramatic improvement as shown here where the threshold stress is 42 ksi as compared to approximately 7 ksi for the susceptible alloys and tempers. Today, 7075-T73 is still considered to be the most corrosion resistant alloy available. 108CORRECTIVE ACTION (Conran) 1968-1971 STATE-OF-ART CONTROL TECHNIQUES *@ SEQUENTIAL MACHINING *®INCREASED SHOT PEENING ®CONTROLLED PROCESSING THROUGH ALL STAGES OF MANUFACTURE ®CHANGE TO 7175-T736 ON ALCOA FORGINGS. ©T-38 REPLACEMENT ROOT RIB CHANGED TO 7075-173 The 1965 improvements were believed, at the time, by both Northrop and the USAF to have controlled the problem; however, subsequent ser- vice experience proved this was not the case. Additional controls were implemented including sequential two-stage machining to minimize residual stresses. The degree of shot peening was increased to insure complete coverage of all surfaces. Additional processing controls were added through- out all stages of manufacture. Since the problem was industry wide, con- siderable material research and development was taking place. As a result Alcoa introduced 7175-1736 which had the strength properties of 7079-T6 plus low stress corrosion susceptibility. The material was approved by the USAF and implemented on three major wing spars. Wing repair proce- dures were developed for the T-38 including a replacement root rib made of 7075-13. 109CORRECTIVE ACTION (Conr) PRESENT @ PRESENT CONTROL TECHNIQUES — ELIMINATE STRESS CORROSION SUSCEPTIBLE MATERIALS — IMPROVED MANUFACTURING METHODS TO MINIMIZE RESIDUAL TENSILE STRESSES @ IMPLEMENTED ON LATE F-5A/B PRODUCTION AIRCRAFT @ F-5E/F DESIGN SPEC. REQUIRES STRESS CORROSION} RESISTANT ALLOYS AND TEMPERS: @ 7075-173 © 7175-1736 © 7049-173 As stated before, the obvious solution for this problem, especially in a new design is to eliminate the use of susceptible materials. One of the overaged (T7) conditions should be selected with 7075-73 being the first choice for most applications. Where higher strength is required for criti- cal designs, then forging alloys like 7175-1736 or 7049-T73 should be used. Many of the improved manufacturing techniques developed over the last fifteen years to minimize residual stresses are common practice today, e.g., extensive use of liquid shim during assembly operations. These controls were implemented on the late production F-5A/B and all F-5E/F aireraft, ‘The Air Vehicle Specification for the F-5E/F clearly states that stress corrosion susceptible alloys and tempers shall not be ut! 110DESIGN LESSONS YOU SELDOM GET SOMETHING FOR NOTHING @ AN IMPROVED MATERIAL MAY ALSO HAVE AN UNKNOWN SERIOUS DISADVANTAGE @ WRONG SELECTION CAN BE COSTLY @ MATERIAL SELECTION DEMANDS CRITICAL EVALUATION - TEST ALL PROPERTIES FOR FORM AND USE - AWARENESS ON INTERRELATED PROPERTIES SELECT FOR OPTIMUM COMBINATION OF PROPERTIES FOR REQUIRED APPLICATION In the world of metallic materials the old adage seems to hold true that "you can't get something for nothing”. The design case we have reviewed seems to clearly point out the fact that a new alloy that offers a signifi- cant design advantage may also carry with it a serious disadvantage. In this case the selecting of 7079-T6 material resulted in tremendous mainte- nance and redesign costs to the airframe contractors and their customers. Structural material selection demands a critical review by the design, struc- tural analysis, and materials engineers. All known properties of a new material should be thoroughly tested for product form and intended use. There should be an awareness of interrelated properties where a change in one could compromise another. The final selection must be based on the optimum combination of properties for the specific application with consid- eration for all aspects of strength, durability, damage tolerance, corrosion, and producibility. iFLIGHT LOADS PROGRAMS 7-38] F-5SERIES | F-5E NUMBER. OF AIRCRAFT AND 2 4 1 Ty Reis DATA POINTS 806 | 625 341 TYPES OF FUT. 198 LND. & FLT LDS. UND. & FLT LDS. PROGRAMS LIND, LOS.) BARRIER ENGAGEMENTS | BARRIER ENGAGEMENTS. DRAG CHUTE STORE EJECTION ‘STORE EJECTION. AIR-TO-AIR COMBAT SEES ean Flight loads testing on all Northrop aircraft has been extremely thorough and in keeping with the latest USAF specifications. Obviously, each successive test program benefits to a great extent from the previous program. Thus, follow-on programs focus attention on the new systems, components, higher weights, etc. The T-38 and F-5 series flight loads program was based on MIL-A-571 requirements and the F-5E program is based on MIL-A-8871 requirements. 112FE STRUCTURAL MATERIAL IMPROVEMENTS ELIMINATE STRESS CORROSION CRACKING © PROHIBIT USE OF: ~7079-T6 IN ANY FORM ~7075-T6 IN FORGINGS, PLATE AND EXTRU. WITH EXPOSED END GRAIN @ REPLACE WITH 7075-173, 7I7S-T736 OR 7049-173 IMPROVE FRACTURE TOUGHNESS Lt © PROHIBIT USE OF 17-4PH-H900 STEEL © REPLACE WITH PHI3-8M0-Hi000, © USE VACUUM MELT STEEL ABOVE 180 KSI HEAT TREAT go Changes have been incorporated in the F-5E material selection in order to eliminate potential problems based on actual T-38 and F-5A/B service exper- ience. The aluminum alloys and tempers which have displayed a high suscepti- bility to stress corrosion have been eliminated. The fracture toughness of stainless steel used in high wear/maximum strength applications has been significantly improved. 113,F-5E FATIGUE IMPROVEMENTS- LOWER WING SKIN © 7075-1735! ALU PLATE WAS 7075-T65! @ REDUCED STRESS LEVEL @ PLANFORM RADI] CHANGES @ POCKET RADII INCREASED © SKIN TO ROOT RIB ATTACHMENT FIT AND COLD WORKED HOLES @ 100% SHOT PEENING © CONTROL FOR HANDLING & SURFACE FINISH Full scale wing fatigue test programs on the T-38 and F-5A showed that the critical area was the lower wing skin at the intersection of the root rib and 44% spar. The improvements in the F-5E lower wing for maximum fatigue life included changing to a T73 temper for better fracture toughness; detailed changes to control the operating stress levels and reduce stress concentration factors; and employing cold working with close fix attachments in the critical area. 14SPECIFIC SYSTEM DESIGN PROBLEMSi “GUN GAS PLUME. © (2) 20mm M-39 GUNS @ HIGH GUN LOCATION @ DEFLECTORS @ MINIMUM TRIM CHANGES The first F-5A airplanes had no guns since they were designed at a time when air-to-air missiles were supposed to make guns unnecessary for air combat. This rationale soon was discarded and guns were added to the airplane. The gun trade studies evaluated numerous gun arrangements with dual, M-39, 20MM guns mounted high in the nose of the aircraft being the most practical. This arrangement presented some interesting challenges; the most interesting being as follows: Gun Gas - With the guns located forward of the engine inlets there was the potential of engine flame out during gun firing. Barly in the design stage, simulated gun firings were flight tested to measure gas flow patterns and engine flame out characteristics. This was accomplished using cold gas with a marking powder and hot gases from a 2.75" FFAR rocket motor. The simulated gun firings did result in engine flame outs. Three solutions were considered: 1) modify the engine to tolerate guns, 2) collect and exhaust gases in a acceptable area of the aircraft, 3) deflect 116gases away from the inlet. The latter solution appeared to have the highest probability of success as well as being the least expensive. A hydraulically actuated, two vane deflector was designed to fair with the mold line retracted, then "pop" up in front of the muzzle before firing to deflect gases up and out- board away from the engine inlets. This proved to be very effective. An addi- tional advantage of this system is that it provides a nose down aircraft pitching moment that balances out the nose-up moment created by gun firing recoil forces. 7i F-5E M-39 GUN INSTALLATION PURGE AIR DISTRIBUTION DUCTS. 4 (GUN CHARGING HANDLE “UN BAY UPPER D00R FORWARD GUN MOUNT REAR GUN MOUNT ‘+ —— FLEXIBLE FEED CHUTE SS ——CISE EVECTION CHUTE 2p EAPENDED LINKS : STOWAGE GUN GAS. COMPARTMENT DEFLECTOR DOOR’ a GUN BaY ae Lower 000R — —NAMMUNITION 80x. "AMMUNITION BOX LOADING DOOR Gun Loads - The primary structure of the nose had been designed without a gun consideration. Accommodating the peak recoil loads of a hard mounted gun would require extensive structural modifications and add weight to the air- craft. On the F-5 the front mount of the gun, normally hard mounted to struc- ture, was attached to a sliding spring centered soft mount which reduced the recoil loads by a factor of 10, thus reducing the structural beef-up required. Feed and Ejection Systems - The original studies of the gun compartment located the ammo box forward under the gun with the feed belts taking ammo from the aft end of the ammo box through a short belt and up into the aft end of the guns. The empty ammo cases went aft and down a tube of the gun com- partment. The used ammo belting links were to be pushed upward through a belt and stored in a compartment over the nose gear. Very early tests on a stand demonstrated that the gun was a better ammo puller than a link pusher. Pushing links through a curving belt resulted in a gun jam in the majority of 118bursts. After additional study an arrangement was made where the links could drop into a compartment directly below the gun and ammo could be pulled from the front of the box. This arrangement was very successful. Ejecting the brass cases overboard with sufficient velocity to clear the aireraft was another challenge. Two critical areas to clear were the centerline external store and the engine inlets. Clearance was required for all load factors and all attitudes of flight. Since the soft gun mount allowed the gun recoil displacement to be on the order of 1 inch, the case ejection chute was made flexible and an overlapping "fish scale" type of construction was used for the chute. The brass was deflected aft out of the gun and into the flexible chute. The flexible characteristics of the chute reduced the velocity of the ejected brass. A new chute would work reasonably well but repeated usage resulted in bra stacking within the chute and dribbling from the exit. Many shapes of chute and even a high pressure ejection boost system was evaluated unsuccessfully to solve the problem. In the end, a simple internal curved leaf spring inside the aft side of the chute solved the problem. While the above provided some of the more interesting opportunities, con siderable effort was expended in measuring the dynamic environment from the gun, and shock mounting all the nose avionic equipment to withstand this environment. Here, again, the gun gas deflector proved beneficial in reducing blast pressures on the nose structure. F-5F Gun Bay - The F-SE/F aircraft are utilized by the air forces of numerous MAP and FMS countries worldwide and in a few of these countries, detail maintenance leaves something to be desired. During design of the F-5F this problem was anticipated, based on knowledge of problems caused by inade- quate maintenance of the F-5A/B and F-SE aircraft. One area which created an interesting design problem was the bay which houses the M-39 20mm gun. During gun firing, a small amount of gas leaks from the gun into the gun bay and is purged by air which circulates through the bay and then is exhausted overboard. When careless maintenance of the gun results in failure to replace worn or damaged seals, more gun gas escapes into the bay, than the purge system can eliminate and an explosive concentration accumulates. The gun is an ignition source and an explosion occurs. On the F-5E, this explosion bends the lower aft end of the gun bay door allowing the pressure to equalize and 119preventing damage to the nose primary structure. The door is then easily replaced. The F-5F gun bay door, however, is of a different design that does not easily bend. In order to prevent damage to the nose primary structure in the event of an explosion, two options were considered. The first was to design the structure to resist damage from the pressure levels occurring during the most severe explosive environment. This solution was discarded because of the resultant weight penalty. The option selected was to provide a pressure relief door. Design of the pressure relief door was a simple matter, except that analysis of the springs and mechanisms, which were needed to keep the door closed, allow it to open at the desired pressure and close again after the bay pressure neutralized, showed that the time lag for all these actions was excessive and would allow almost maximum pressures to build up in the event of an explosion with, possible failure of the webs in the bay. The designer solved the problem one morning while he was shaving when he noticed the magnetic latch on his medicine cabinet. He correctly surmised that, with a magnetic latch on the pressure relief door, the only lag in door opening would be hinge friction anc door inertia and that would be minimal. A method of closing the door afterward was his next design problem, but he resolved this quite easily. Knowing that the aircraft flys at a nose up angle of attack, it seemed reasonable to assume that a component of the air flow in the up direction over the nose area would exist. Wind tunnel data verified this assumption. The door was designed with a hinge on the lower edge and magnetic latches on the upper edge. Ground firing tests where gun gas explosions were deliberately created proved the effectiveness of the design. However, the convincing test was inadvertent. During the first air-to-air gun firing testing of the development aircraft, a gun bay explosion occurred. The chase plane pilot saw the door open. The smoke from the explosion exited and the door then closed automatically. 120i TWO POSITION NOSE GEAR = ‘STEERING MECHANISM -- \ FoRwaRo k\ ooR: | “[>~]+—strut 000r ice spans “= BuNSe F-5E GEAR SHOWN F-SF GEAR DIFFERS ONLY IN FUSELAGE STATION LOCATION F-5E Two Position Gear In the evolution of the F-5E from the T-38, the gross weight of the aircraft more than doubled. Much of the weight was additional avionic equipment and 20mm guns in the nose and added external store capability. The original T-38 horizontal tail could not generate adequate rotational force at the normal lift-off speed to overcome the forward CG encountered with fully loaded guns and a 2,000 Ibs centerline store. Increasing the horizontal tail for proper lift-off revealed many additional changes that would result in significant cost increases. There was no lack of horizontal tail aerodynamic power once the aircraft was off the ground and the ability of the pilot to control the airframe in the pitch axis was excellent. Increasing the area of the horizontal would have increased the sensitivity of the pitch control (using the existing control system) particularly at high "q” and was not desirable. The most difficult problem relating to a horizontal tail 12kincrease was the necessity of maintaining the same flutter margins of safety. This would add considerable weight to the surface to increase stiffness; another problem was the increase in the size of the hydraulic actuators. The largest contribution to reducing the rotational resonance of the surface was from the oil chambers of the hydraulic actuators. Even in the T-38 the actuators were oversized from a power requirement standpoint since it was necessary to size them for system rotational stiffness. This increase in cylinder area required additional hydraulic flow to maintain the same surface rates. Hydraulic power requirement sized the the hydraulic pump, the airframe mounted gearbox that drove the pump and finally, the engine accessory power take-off to the gear box. Increasing the horizontal tail size for the F-5E would create a chain reaction back through the hydraulic system and finally require a change in the engine. Because of the economic considerations and the extensive development required, the decision to increase the horizontal tail was delayed in search of a more feasible solution. Relocating the main gear forward to increase the moment arm of the hori- zontal was given only token consideration due to the extensive changes required. Relocating the centerline store to a more aft position closer to the CG would be beneficial and was accomplished as part of the F-5E configuration. 122TWO POSITION NOSE GEAR The change that seemed most attractive was to equip the aircraft with a two position nose gear. If the nose of the F-5 could be raised to provide the wing with an increase in angle of attack on its take-off roll, the aircraft could start to lift off when flying speed was attained. The challenge was to accom- plish this within the same nose gear compartment used for the standard nose gear. The standard nose gear used a single wheel with a conventional air oil shock strut. It retracted forward and upward into the gear well by folding the drag brace with hydraulic power. A study was made to determine the maximum amount of nose elevation that could be obtained by a two position gear fitting into the existing nose gear compartment. By changing the outer cylinder of the shock strut to a larger diameter and utilizing it as the cylinder of a large hydraulic actuator and design- ing the shock strut function to fit within a large diameter piston rod of that hydraulic actuator, it was possible to raise the nose of the aircraft 13 inches. This would increase the ground angle of attack from -0° 13! to a +3° to 22. 123Prior to take-off the pilot would extend the hydraulic actuator piston that contains the internal shock strut until that piston bottoms. The shock strut would function in a normal manner from this extended position. This design would require unusually long scissor links to connect the wheel fork to a steering actuator collar mounted on the outer cylinder, A decision was made to install the two position gear in the F-5 Es however, it did present some unique problems. Keeping the nose wheel centered as it entered a narrow wheelwell was necessary. The hydraulic actuator was centered by internal cams in the extended position, but as it retracted it was free to rotate. The use of hydraulic power to hold the wheel was not acceptable since the nose wheel steering system connected to the rudder pedals was deenergized as the aircrait lifted off the ground, Sliding internal splines to hold the actuator piston from rotating were consi- dered, but previous experience using this approach resulted in high wear rate, scored splines and undesirable shock strut ground servicing requirement. It was also ex- pensive and heavy. Centering cams were selected; when lift-off occurs the shock strut extends into a centering cam. The wheel is now locked to the shock strut which is inside the piston rod of the hydraulic actuator. As the actuator completely retracts it enters an external centering cam locking the nose wheel in the centered position for retraction into the wheel well. ‘The extra time to shorten the nose gear increased the time required to raise the gear and clean up the aircraft. The nose gear was sequenced to retract as soon as the shortening operation was completed but, due to rapid aircraft acceleration, the gear placard speed was being exceeded before gears and doors were locked, Several sec- onds were saved by automatically sequencing the shortening operation as soon as the aircraft lifted off without requiring pilot reaction, Additional time was gained by speeding up hydraulic retraction of the gears and doors. In a conventional air oil shock strut, servicing the strut with the proper amount, of oil and air is accomplished from the top of the strut. ‘The proper volumes are usually controlled by an inverted stand-pipe in the top of the strut. The strut is filled with oil until it reaches the top of the stand-pipe. ‘The bottom of the stand-pipe estab- lishes the air chamber volume trapped at the top of the strut. In the two position gear, since the shock strut was contained inside the rod of a moving piston, there was no practical way to service it from the top. However, by mounting a hollow metering pin on the bottom of the strut it became a stand-pipe for servicing. The strut could now be 124serviced pumping oil into the bottom until it flowed down the hollow metering pin. The top of the stand-pipe, or metering pin, controlled the proper volume of air and oil for the strut. Designing the two-position function into the gear made it a tight fit in the gear well. Clearances between the tire and the forward end of the wheel well were minimal and any extension of the actuating cylinder portion of the strut while in the retracted position could jam the gear in the well. While in the retracted position, both oil chambers of the gear actuating cylinder were interconnected and also communicated with other lines of the gear and hydraulic power retum system. Any significant pres- sure buildup in these chambers due to pressure surges, trapped oil, etc., could ex- tend and jam the gear since the area to extend the actuating piston was 6.8 times greater than the retract area. To prevent this from occurring a hydraulic lock feature was added to hold the actuating piston in the retract position. The two position gear design added approximately 50 pounds of weight to the aireraft but since it increased the static angle of attack, a typical operational take-off roll was reduced by 33 percent and the take-off velocities were reduced by 18 percent when compared to the standard F-5A nose gear. 125ARRESTING HOOK The original F-5A design had no arresting hook provisions. As the aircraft was introduced into countries with short airfields and frequent inclement runway conditions, an arresting hook became a desirable feature. An arresting hook system permits the aircraft to engage a cable stretched across the runway in lieu of running out of runway or engaging large net type barriers or barriers designed to pop off the ground and engage the main landing gears. The net type barrier can inflict heavy aireraft damage; the "gear grabber" type barriers not only inflict aircraft damage, but their engagement reliability is poor if the aircraft is carrying external stores which tend to deflect pop-up devices down; if the aircraft speed is too low they tend to miss the landing gear. Arresting hook system design factors include; the arresting loads that need to be absorbed, the geometry required to minimize aircraft directional instability, 126gear loads, and potential aircraft damage. Specific design tasks were develop- ing an energy absorbing device to prevent hook bounce and supplying a hook hold down moment to hold the hook on the runway. The F-5A arresting hook system is essentially identical (except for load carrying capability) to the one now installed on all F-5E/F aircraft. It consists of a stiff steel shank to engage the cable, torsion bars to provide hook down moment, a self contained hydraulic damper designed to minimize arresting hook runway bounce, an electro-mechanical rotary solenoid for lock and release, aerodynamic fairings to minimize aircraft drag, a centering spring to keep the hook centered as it runs down the runway prior to cable pickup and a retrac- table upstop bumper to minimize hook /fuselage impact damage during barrier engagements. The hook is used only under emergency ground conditions, and it is not designed to retract. ‘The F-SE/F arresting hook and its back-up structure have been designed to react tensile loads of 57,000 Ibs (37,750 Ibs on early F-5A/B aircraft). This tensile load capability permits safe arrestment up to 160 knots (depending on the arresting system engaged) with a minimum of aircraft damage. 127MAIN LANDING GEAR STRUT DOOR FLAP FLAP FULLY DEFLECTED One of the first T-38 problems was the inability to complete retraction of the main landing gear (MLG) before reaching the 240 knot gear placard speed. The aerodynamic forces on the MLG appeared to be higher than originally estimated and the friction forces in the retraction mechanism were higher than anticipated. Reducing the 240 knot gear placard speed to reduce aerodynamic loading, was not considered a viable solution since it would necessitate reducing aircraft power right after lift-off or adjusting climb-out angle to maintain air- speed until the gear retracted. Increasing the power available by simply resizing the gear retract hydrau- lic cylinders was impractical due to lack of space in the thin wing and lack of, room for growth in the existing retraction mechanism. Adding protruding con- tours on the upper and lower surface of the wing to accommodate resized hydraulic cylinders and retraction mechanism was not a desirable solution due to the effect on aireraft performance. 128‘The problem was resolved within the existing wing contour by modifying the retraction mechanism to inerease the power available and by adding a hydrau- lic power flap to the trailing edge of the MLG strut door (the MLG strut door is physically fastened to the MLG and is pulled closed by the MLG). The addi- tion of the flap to the MLG strut door had the effect of "flying" the MLG to the closed position and thus reducing the power required to retract it. The net effect of adding the flap reduced aerodynamic loads required to retract the MLG by approximately 25 percent. The hydraulic power MLG strut door flap on the T-38 was eventually replaced by a much simpler and less expensive mechanical MLG strut door flap. ‘The mechanical flap was powered open by small torsion bars which locked a linkage overcenter whenever the MLG was not up and locked. The mechanical flap was driven to the closed position by a striker plate in the wing which con- tacted a roller on the torsion bar linkage during the last few degrees of door closing motion. ‘The torsion bar powered mechanical MLG strut door flap proved to be very effective in aiding MLG retraction and was again used on the F-5A/B aircraft. On the F 5E/F, the torsion bar striker plate and roller had to be replaced with a mechanical linkage which permitted the strut door flap to fair in the door-open position. This design modification was required to provide clearance between certain wing inboard pylon stores and the strut door when the landing gear was down and locked. ‘The MLG strut door flap originated on the T-38 to solve a real design problem, and has proven to be an effective tool, even on the F-5E, in decrea ing the amount of power requried to retract a MLG into a very thin wing. 129g F-5E/F EJECTION SEAT “> DROGUE CHUTE F-5E SEAT SHOWN. F-SF | CONTAINER ‘SEATS SIMILAR EXCEPT. FOR CANOPY PIERCERS Hose "Evolution of the Northrop T. 8/ of the current Northrop Improved and Sequenced Escape System is characterized by three major design and development stages. During the initial development Escape System" - The evolution stage (1958-1961), the major problems were structural integrity of the ejection seat for supersonic ejections and ejection seat catapult performance. The second stage consisted of a development design and test program to improve the capa~ bility of the existing seats with a retrofitable kit utilizing state-of-the-art, off- the-shelf hardware. The second development stage was initiated in 1968, and the development testing was successfully completed in 1970. However, due to government funding problems, the final qualification tests were deferred to 1973, and only one-third of the new system, the M-38 catapult, was incorporated in the design and development of the F-SE aircraft in 1971. The field modification of over 1,000 T-38 aircraft was initiated in 1976 to incorporate the Improved Northrop Escape System Configuration, The third stage was a short-fused development design and test program leading to the incorporation of a sequenced 130ejection system in the first two place F-SF production aircraft in 1976, just twelve months after go-ahead. The sequenced system incorporates the TF-15 selector valve logic which provides 3 modes of operation. The balance of this discussion is devoted to the major design problems and challenges which were encountered during the three development stages of the Northrop T-36/F-5 Escape System, Initial Development (1958-1960) - Initial design of the T-88 escape system was based on the M-5 ballistic catapult, the only fully qualified catapult available at that time which would fit in the T-38 cockpit. Its limited performance was known however, and one major reason for the twin canopy design was to enable use of a rocket catapult when one of proper size could be developed. This was a variance with A. F. specifica tions at that time which called for a single, aft hinged canopy for tandem seated pilots. When testing began Frankford Arsenal had developed an experimental T-20 rocket catapult which the A. F. directed Northrop to use, but the first tests showed catapult design problems so Frankford Arsenal dropped development of the T-20 and the Air Force directed a return to the M-5 testing. During this period sled tests at Edwards AFB and Hurricane Mesa test sites exposed design problems which dictated structural changes to the seat bucket. The leg-brace attachment to the seat bucket had to be reinforced to prevent leg-brace separation at supersonic speeds. The seat bucket had to be widened, and ultimately a seat-man separator system was added to provide consistent seat-man separation. As expected, system performance with the M-5 cata~ pult was marginal and the tests clearly demonstrated the need for a rocket catapult, Successful low speed ground-level ejections were not achieved with the M-5 catapult, and seat-man tail clearance was marginal at high speeds. In 1960 the Frankford Arsenal XM-9 rocket catapult was available, and tests were conducted which showed considerable improvement over the ejections using the M-5 catapult. Tests also showed that the thickness of the aft canopy had to be in- creased to 0,40 inches to prevent collapse of the canopy under the XM-9 rocket blast, when the pilot ejects from the forward cockpit. The tests in 1961 demonstrated successful low speed ground-level escape capability with the XM-9 rocket catapult, and the seat- man tail clearance was satisfactory at all speeds tested from Mach No. 0,13 to 1.05. The tests also demonstrated adequate protection from the XM-9 rocket catapult blast as well as "through-the-canopy" ejection capability with the 0.40 inch thick aft canopy. The early T-38 aircraft were retrofitted with the M-9 rocket catapult, 131The T-38 escape system configuration qualified in 1961 with the M-9 rocket catapult was carried on through the T-38, F-5A and P-5B aircraft with only minor changes. Development of Improved Northrop Escape System (1968-1973) - The major goals of the improved system were to provide improved seat stability, controlled seat deceleration during high speed ejection conditions, positive seat-man separ- ation and a general overall reduction in sequence time required for a successful ejection. The Air Force ground rules dictated the development of a retrofit kit for existing aircraft, utilizing only existing proven and qualified components available off the shelf, which would have a minimum impact on the seat configuration. The emphasis was placed on improvements in those areas or conditions where the majority of unsuccessful ejections or crew-member injuries had occurred in the past. The records showed that a high percentage of unsuccessful ejections occurred at low altitudes and adverse dive and bank angles at velocities of 150 to 200 knots, and that seat-man-chute entanglement was a significant problem. The final configuration established for the improved ejection seat can be broken down into three basic subsystems, The first of these is a rocket cata~ pult developed by Frankford Arsenal, the M-38 which provides a variable angle rocket nozzle to compensate for CG shift due to seat position, and an increase in catapult thrust and rocket impulse. The second improvement is a stabilization retardation system, composed of a ballistically deployed drogue chute system which was developed for the F-104G aircraft. The system packaging of the drogue chute had to be modified due to pilot visibility requirements in the aft seat of T-38/F-5B aircraft. The third major item was an improvement to the personnel parachute low-speed deployment characteristics and the replacement of the mechanical one-second ripcord actuator with a ballistic 0.25 second ripcord actuator. The testing conducted in 1970 and 1973 utilized a modified BA-18 personnel parachute with the Stencel spreader gun which ballistically deploys the parachute line for rapid canopy fill at low speeds. However, the Air Force subsequently substituted the BA-25 Pull Down Vent Line personnel parachute, which was subjected to sled tests, with the Improved Northrop Escape System in 1967. 132The development tests of the improved escape system were succe! fully completed on the high speed test track at Holloman AFB in April 1970. Nine seats were tested at velocities from static to 580 knots util ing the drogue chute and prototype seat structures. It was anticipated that the new system would be incorporated in the initial production of the F-5E aircraft in 1971. However, the program was temporarily shelved, and only the M-38 catapult portion of the system was included in F-5 aircraft with the intent that the improved seat could be installed at a later date without modifying the airframe. Interest in the improved escape system was revived in 1972, and the final qualification tests were conducted on seven seats with production hardware at Holloman AFB in the spring of 1973. Again, Air Force funding problems and priorities delayed the procurement of retrofit kits until 1975. The modification of over 1,000 T-38 aircraft with the Improved Northrop Escape System was finally commenced in early 1976. The improved escape system has been phased into IF production, and kits are currently being prepared for F-5E air- craft in the field. Development of Sequenced Ejection System (1975-1976) - The development, design, test and fabrication of the sequenced ejection system a short-fused program which resulted in the incorporation of the system in the first production two-place F-SF aircraft in just twelve months after go-ahead. The F-5F sequenced ejection system provides 3 modes of operation, "Dual" Normal"; and " ‘olo". In the "Dual" mode, either seat occupant can eject both seats. In the "Normal" mode, the forward occupant can eject both seats, but the aft occupant can only eject himself, In the "Solo" mode, each seat is totally independent of the other. In both the "Dual" and "Normal" mode, the aft seat ejection precedes the forward seat by 0.75 seconds. The single selector valve is located in the aft cockpit which is normally occupied by the instructor pilot. The testing was limited to qualification tests on the new components and breadboard testing of the complete gas system. Three major problems were encountered during the breadboard system tests; incompatible materials, pressure losses, and marginal hoses, 133wan-scar SEPARATION 2) ipcoRo —— iniriateD PARACHUTE PACK OPENS. SAFETY BELT OPENS, ROTARY ACTUATOR AcTIvATED. NOTE ELECTION OCCURS ABOVE 14,000, 1500 FEET, AUTOMATIC PARACHUTE (0.25-5Ec DELAY) OPENING WILL BE 14,000 500 FET, Roce cure [28 SEC] aLossoM SURVIVAL KIT AUTO- fuanic RELEASE CcanTaioce acTUATED i (a-see vey) (OT SEC [SESEC) RoGue cHuTE waIN CHUTE LINE STRETCH AND ———— FULLY DEPLovED cauTe sLeeve SEPARATION | (Os SEC = SEAT CLEAR OF aincRAFT INQ (EAE EED) ovocve con wanion ; SEAT MOTION ACTUATES SAFETY BELY INTIATOR I /__ [DAS SEC] sno horanvacruavoR td.05 Sec DEAN a= [DSSER) See Tine Sear oP acs Saeed FULLY oePLovED. 16 db Level 2 Gain Margin = 16 db Level 3 Gain Margin = 5 db 156SURVIVABILITYSURVIVABILITY EQUATIONS Ps=Po * Pa/oXPHiA™ Pk/ Ps = PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL Pp = PROBABILITY OF DETECTION Pao = PROBABILITY OF ACQUISITION, GIVEN DETECTION Piya = PROBABILITY OF HIT, GIVEN ACQUISITION PuyH= PROBABILITY OF KILL, GIVEN A HIT 158REDUCTION OF PROBABILITY OF BEING HIT @ LOW OPTICAL-RADAR-INFRARED SIGNATURE LEVELS @ NO VISIBLE SMOKE OUTPUT FROM ENGINES @ EXCELLENT VISION FROM COCKPIT @ HIGH SPEED, AGILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS @ STABLE, ACCURATE WEAPON DELIVERY PLATFORM @ STAND-OFF WEAPON DELIVERY (OPTION) @ RADAR WARNING RECEIVER (OPTION) @ ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES (OPTION) @ RADAR CHAFF AND IR FLARE DISPENSER (OPTION) © CAMOUFLAGE PAINT SCHEMES TO REDUCE VISUAL SIGNATURE (OPTION) 159REDUCTION OF FIRE/ EXPLOSION HAZARDS @ LOW PRESSURE IN ALL INTERNAL FUEL TANKS DUE TO OPEN VENT SYSTEM @ RETICULATED FOAM IN INTERNAL FUEL TANKS @ ENGINES SEPARATED FROM FUEL TANKS @ FUEL FEED SHUT OFF VALVES AT FIREWALL @ ENGINE BLEED AIR SHUT-OFF VALVE IN ENGINE BAY © GUN AMMUNITION IN NON-CRITICAL STRUCTURAL BAY 160PREVENTION OF LOSS OF CONTROL REDUNDANT, INDEPENDENT HYDRAULIC PUMPS & AC GENERATORS © PITCH/YAW STABILITY AUGMENTATION NOT REQUIRED FOR SAFE FLIGHT TRIM AVAILABLE FOR ASYMMETRIC CONDITIONS RESULTING FROM COMBAT © SPIN RESISTANT AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION © AILERON CENTERING IN CASE OF MECHANICAL FAILURE © WINDMILLING ENGINE SUPPLIES EMERGENCY HYDRAULIC POWER IF BOTH FAIL 161RETENTION OF SINGLE ENGINE POWER @ INDEPENDENT FUEL SUPPLY FOR EACH ENGINE WITH CROSS FEED @ FUEL SUPPLY LINES LOCATED INSIDE FUEL TANKS © GRAVITY FLOW CAPABILITY FOR ENGINE FUEL SUPPLY 162F-5E SURVIVABILITY ‘The F-SE provides a relatively high level of survivability in the threat environments postulated for tactical fighter aircraft. This charac~ teristic is the result of minimal size, high performance, basic arrangement of fuel and engines, combat damage redundancy in structures and flight critical subsystems, and the installation of countermeasure equipment. The previous charts summarize the specific features that enhance survivability by reducing the probability of being detected, tracked and hit. Those features that collectively reduce the probability of being hit are: (1) Signature levels which affect detection and tracking, (2) cockpit vision, aerodynamic performance and weapon delivery capabilities that affect frequency and duration of exposure to enemy defenses, and (3) active and passive countermeasures that effect the performance of enemy missiles after launch. The charts also include those vulnerability reduc- tion features in the aircraft that reduce the probability that a hit will result in kill of the aircraft. 163‘gsosoe-nIST'Ot ‘0c | so-eeee sumed | 5102 27 Aumageg 0 Tye vOT EOL ka papROTEMCGAVIONICS : DEVELOPMENTAVIONICS FLOW DIAGRAM 166F-5A/B FIRE CONTROL AND WEAPON DELIVERY ‘@ AIRCRAFT CONFIGURED FOR BOMBS, ROCKETS, GUNS AND AiM-9 AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES @ AIRCRAFT STABILITY MADE HIGH ACCURACY POSSIBLE WITH A SIMPLE, MANUALLY DEPRESSIBLE RETICLE TYPE SIGHT SYSTEM @ THEATERS OF UTILIZATION DID NOT HAVE SOPHISTICATED OR DENSE DEFENSES WHICH WOULD REQUIRE COMPLEX WEAPON DELIVERY AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS, @ USERS COULD NOT MAINTAIN SOPHISTICATED LOW- RELIABILITY AVIONICS The F-5A/B aircraft was simple, easy to maintain, and compatible with the self-defense needs of developing nations from 1960 to 1966. 167F-5A/B WEAPON DELIVERY TECHNIQUES AIR-TO- GROUND: @ PILOT PRACTICES CANNED WEAPON DELIVERY CONDITIONS UNTIL HE ACHIEVES PROFICIENCY (@ STRAIGHT LINE APPROACHES TOLERABLE FOR LIGHTLY DEFENDED TARGETS © F-SA's WON OVER 90% WEAPON DELIVERY MEETS ENTERED AIR-TO-AIR @ VISUAL ACQUISITION @ PILOT REQUIRED TO OBTAIN TAIL-ZONE POSITION @ BOTH MISSILES AND GUNS CAN THEN BE EMPLOYED WITHOUT COMPUTING DEVICES @ COMPATIBLE WITH INITIAL F-5 EMPLOYMENT The F-5A/B weapon delivery system was based first on superior F-5 maneuver capabilities coupled with agility and stability. The unsophis- ticated environment in user countries was the second factor which permitted maximum fire control and weapon delivery simplicity. 168F-5A/B GUNSIGHT © OPTICAL-MECHANICAL NORTHROP DESIGN @ SIMPLE, LOW-COST, COLLIMATED RETICLE DISPLAY @ MANUALLY ADJUSTABLE FROM O TO 200 MILS DEPRESSION © ALMOST FAILURE-FREE ACCEPTABLE FOR AIM-9B MISSILE AIMING AND AIR-TO-GROUND GUNS, ROCKETS AND BOMBS The simplest most reliable gunsight conceivable was designed and manufactured by Northrop for the F-5A/B. The reticle display was collimated to avoid sighting errors and manually adjustable to provide air- to-ground sighting for various weapons. 169‘gsosoe-nIST'Ot ‘0c | so-eeee sumed | 5102 27 Aumageg 0 Tye vOT EOL ka papROTEMCGAVIONICS SYSTEM REQUIREMENTSEVOLUTION FACTORS 1960-1970 @ THROUGHOUT THE SIXTIES USERS LEARNED HOW TO EMPLOY AND MAINTAIN THE F-5 @ POTENTIAL USERS DESIRED MORE SOPHISTICATION AND CAPABILITY @ NO ONE COUNTRY COULD FINANCE A TOTAL FIRE CONTROL OR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEM During the sixties more than a dozen countries received the F-5A/B and learned how to successfully employ and maintain it. Gradually users and potential users came to desire increased operational capabilities with sophisticated fire control, weapon delivery, and navigation systems to achieve higher levels of mission effectiveness.A FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM WAS NEEDED @ AIR-TO-AIR GUNNERY CAPABILITY WITH FIXED SIGHT WAS LIMITED @ AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES WERE OFTEN LAUNCHED OUT OF LETHAL ENVELOPE @ TWO-MILE VISUAL DETECTION RANGE AGAINGT SMALL FIGHTERS WAS NOT ADEQUATE FOR TARGET INTERCEPTION © NO NIGHT CAPABILITY WITHOUT RADAR Although the F-5A/B provided outstanding air-to-ground weapon delivery accuracy, it did not contain a fire control system which would provide adequate intercept capability and high probability of success against small, highly maneuverable MIG-family aircraft. 113IN THE BEGINNING @ IN 1966 THE DECISION WAS MADE TO INTEGRATE A FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM INTO THE F-S @ THE FIRST NECESSITY WAS TO DEVELOP AN APPROACH WHICH COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED @ REALITIES AND GROUND RULES: = NO ONE COUNTRY COULD AFFORD TO DEVELOP THE COMPLETE SYSTEM — SYSTEM HAD TO BE DECENTRALIZED WITH ELEMENTS. PREDESIGNED TO INTEGRATE AS A COMPATIBLE WHOLE ~ EACH ELEMENT HAD TO BE WORTHWHILE AND MARKETABLE AS A STAND-ALONE SUBSYSTEM. 3 3 No one country could affort to fund the development of the complete fire control system. A strategy had to be devised which would result in gradual development of the system on a country-by-country basis. 174THE ELEMENTS © COMPUTING GUNSIGHT ® RADAR — SEARCH — RANGE TRACK — ANGLE TRACK @ MISSILE LAUNCH COMPUTER, © GYROSCOPIC PLATFORM @ AIR DATA INPUTS The fire control system was decentralized into stand alone elements. Each element would provide enough improvement to the aircraft to make it desirable to incorporate as an entity.REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM IT MUST BE SIMPLE AND COMPACT IT MUST BE RELIABLE AND STABLE IT MUST BE EASY TO TEST, REPAIR, AND MAINTAIN INITIAL AND SUPPORT COSTS MUST BE LOW IT MUST PERFORM ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS MUST BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED IT MUST BE ACCURATE ENOUGH TO ACHIEVE THE MISSION} OBJECTIVE WITH MARGIN FOR FIELO DEGRADATION IT MUST BE PRODUCED AT COST AND ON SCHEDULE The fire control system was conceived and designed to be compatible with basic aircraft design concepts of providing essential capabilities and avoiding undue complexity, cost or loss of reliability. Mistakes made in prior fire control systems were carefully reviewed to avoid common pitfalls. 176IMPROVED MAINTAINABILITY PRIOR FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS WERE TOO DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN (@ TOO MANY ADJUSTMENTS (@ LRUS NOT INTERCHANGEABLE (LINE REPLACEABLE UNITS) (@ MODULES WITHIN LRU's NOT INTERCHANGEABLE CIRCUITS DRIFTED EXCESSIVELY @ MARGINS FOR FIELD DEGRADATION WERE NOT ADEQUATE MAINTAINABILITY CONCEPTS APPLIED TO THE F:5 FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM (@ DESIGN TO MINIMIZE ADJUSTMENTS AND ELIMINATE ADJUSTMENTS ON AIRCRAFT INTERCHANGEABLE LRUS @ INTERCHANGEABLE MODULES INSIDE LRUS (@ TEST PROBLEMS DESIGNED INTO EACH SUBSYSTEM FOR QUICK SELF TEST (@ FAILURE MONITORS ON CRITICAL FUNCTIONS: (@ TRIPS TO PREVENT DAMAGE In keeping with the F-5 philosophy of design for ease of maintenance, design ground rules were imposed on each F-5 fire control system element to achieve specified maintainability requirements. Mean-time-to-repair demonstrations were required of each supplier. qtAIR DATA REQUIREMENTS @ INPUT DATA REQUIRED FOR LEAD COMPUTATION — ALTITUDE (~ TRUE AIRSPEED = TRUE ANGLE OF ATTACK @ INPUT DATA REQ‘D FOR MISSILE LAUNCH ENVELOPE COMPUTATION ~ ALTITUDE — TRUE AIRSPEED = MACH @ INPUTS FOR AIRCRAFT — SERVOED ALTIMETER — TAKE-OFF DOORS — ANGLE OFATTACK INDICATOR — AUTOMATIC FLAP CONTROL LANDING GEAR WARNING IFF/ALTITUDE REPORTING STABILITY AUGMENTER Air data for F-5A/B aircraft were supplied by seven separate transducers. While these transducers were adequate for the limited F-5A/B applications, they did not provide the accuracy, range, or output format required for fire control, weapon delivery, navigation, or altitude report- ing. 178GYROSCOPIC PLATFORM REQUIREMENTS @ MUST PROVIDE ACCURATE PITCH AND ROLL DATA TO SPACE STABILIZE RADAR ANTENNA SEARCH PATTERN AND RADAR DISPLAY @ MUST PROVIDE ACCURATE ROLL DATA TO STABILIZE SIGHT DEPRESSED RETICLE AND AVOID PENDULUM EFFECT ‘@ MUST PROVIDE ACCURATE PITCH AND ROLL DATA FOR ATTITUDE INDICATION AND AIR-TO- GROUND WEAPON DELIVERY @ MUST PROVIDE ACCURATE GYRO-STABILIZED HEADING DATA FOR INSTRUMENTS AND PILOT NAVIGATION @ MUST FUNCTION PROPERLY DURING ALL AIR COMBAT MANEUVERS WITHOUT GIMBAL LIMITING OR TUMBLING ‘The requirements for the gyroscopic platform were also formulated to be compatible with F-5 pilot navigation, pilot flight instruments, radar and sight under conditions of all air combat maneuvers. Several two-gyro plat- forms were available which could be modified to meet F-5 requirements. Extensive development was avoided by selecting an existing platform; the penalties were limited growth and precession error during sustained acceleration. 179COMPUTING GUNSIGHT REQUIREMENTS ®@ COMPUTATION AND OPTICAL DISPLAY FOR AIM- ING TWIN_ 20mm CANNONS TO HIT EVASIVE MANEUVERING TARGETS IN AIR COMBAT COMPUTATION AND OPTICAL DISPLAY TO DETER: MINE WHEN TARGETS ARE WITHIN AIM-9 MISSILE LETHAL ZONE MANUALLY DEPRESSED RETICLE DISPLAY FOR AIR-TO- GROUND WEAPON DELIVERY No lead computing optical sight system in existence provided the capability to hit evasive maneuvering aircraft of the MIG type. The need for a new approach to air-to-air gunnery presented a challenging and complex task.2 é RADAR REQUIREMENTS @ RADAR SEARCH TO DETECT THE TARGET BEYOND VISUAL DETECTION RANGE. (© SPACE STABILIZED DISPLAY FOR MANEUVERING INTO POSITION TO EXECUTE SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS @ ACCURATE RANGE AND CLOSING RATE DATA FOR GUN AND. MISSILE COMPUTATIONS @ ANGLE TRACKING WITH DATA DISPLAY FOR INTERCEPTION OF PENETRATING ENEMY THREATS: @ DISPLAY FOR RADAR MAPPING OF PROMINENT TERRAIN OR SHIPS AT SEA @ CAPABILITY TO FUNCTION AT ANY SPEED, ALTITUDE, ATTITUDE, MANEUVER, OR LOAD FACTOR The requirements for the F-5 radar system were developed to be compatible with the aircraft air combat mission in a GCI controlled environ~ ment utilizing AIM-9 missiles and 20 mm cannon to their fullest effectiveness. ‘The trade offs between detection range, search coverage, range accuracy, space, weight, reliability, and maintainability were carefully evaluated to develop specifications for a radar that was optimum for the F-5 at that time. 181MISSILE LAUNCH COMPUTER REQUIREMENTS ‘© INDICATE VALID AIM-@ LAUNCH OPPORTUNITIES © AVOID LAUNCHING TOO FAR AWAY = MISSILE LOSES SPEED — MISSILE POWER EXPIRES © AVOID LAUNCHING TOO MUCH OFF TAIL POSITION = MISSILE GIMBAL LIMIT = MISSILE GUIDANCE Limit — MISSILE CONTROL LIMIT © PROVIDE COLLIMATED DISPLAY FOR HEAD-UP VIEWING OF BOTH TARGET AND LAUNCH INDICATIONS: © PROVIDE HEAD-DOWN LAUNCH INDICATIONS COMPATIBLE WITH RADAR DISPLAY ELIMINATE PILOT TASKS, DELAYS, AND WORKLOAD. PREVIOUSLY INVOLVED IN MISSILE LAUNCHING: In the F-5A/B the task of estimating when the target was within the AIM-9 lethal launch envelope was left to the pilot. Southeast Asia combat experience showed that the pilot's concentration became riveted on the aerial combat and could not be diverted to launch envelope estimation. The need for a valid and reliable missile launch computer became recognized as essential. 182AVIONICS SYSTEMS IMPLEMENTATION TASKSGYROSCOPIC PLATFORM IMPLEMENTATION (@ NORTHROP IDENTIFIED AND EVALUATED PLATFORMS AVAILABLE AND IN DEVELOPMENT AS CANDIDATES FOR VARIOUS F-8 PROGRAMING. |@ STANDARD BENDIX TWO-GYRO PLATFORM SELECTED FOR SKOSHLTIGER FS PROJECT @ CANADIAN SPERRY TWO-GYRO PLATFORM SELECTED BY CANADIAN DESIGN AUTHORITY FOR CF-S © BENDIX HIGH ACCURACY TWO-GYRO PLATFORM WAS SELECTED BY NORTHROP ON NETHERLANDS AIRCRAFT TO ACHIEVE 3/49 DOPPLER NAVIGATION ACCURACY, USING TRANSFER GYRO INITIAL ALIGNMENT (@ STANOARD GFAE (MODIFIED) VERSION WAS PROPOSED AND ACCEPTED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT (IFA) @ IFA COMPETITION IMPOSED CONSTRAINTS. — minimize cost = minimize Risk = USE OFF-THE-SHELF HARDWARE @ PROVED ATTITUDE INDICATOR ALGO INCORPORATED @ PITCH AND ROLL OUTPUTS WERE PROVIDED FOR FUTURE RADAR SPACE STABILIZATION, COMPUTING SIGHT ROLL STABILIZATION, AND AUTOMATIC BOMBING The first element of the fire control system to be incorporated into the F-5 was the gyroscopic platform, or Attitude and Heading Reference System (AHRS). As a stand alone element, it provided the pilot vital information under all-attitude, air combat maneuver conditions. Because of the intense competition for the International Fighter F-5E the AHRS had to be the lowest cost, off-the-shelf item compatible with the F-5 Fire Control system, 194AIRPLANE ATTITUDE COURSE ARROW INDICATOR UPPER LUBBER LINE SPHERE DISTANCE COUNTER, COURSE COUNTER HAIRLINE BEARING POINTER HEADING MARKER —HoRIZON DEVIOF FLAG DEVIATION DOT POWER.OFF FLAG prea COURSE DEVIATION 1 TRIM ‘O1FROM moe. BAR. HEADING SET KNOB: HEADING CARO LOWER LUBBER LINE COURSE SET KNOB ‘AIRPLANE REFERENCE BANK ANGLE HORIZONTAL INDEX SITUATION STA BEARING, TO/FROM INDICATOR [AND DEV. FLAG. f UHFIOF TACAN /OF SELECTOR RELAY TACAN, STA BAG, RANGE. TO/FROM AND DEVIATION UHE RADIO SELECTOR SWITCH GYAO STABILIZED MAGNETIC HEADING TACAN LatiTupe CORRECTION CONTROL UNIT f LL __ ELECTRONIC CONTR 5 wacnenic Annie [wscnericazmura | eanine | “OeTectoR No ‘COMPENSATOR GYRO HEADING PITCH FUNCTION Fine (CONTROL RADAR ROLL FUNCTION COMPASS MODE AND FAST SLAVE SWITCH RIGHT HORIZONTAL CONSOLE (FRONT COCKPIT ONLY F-5F) ——— erection ano [ marr swivowna | SLAVING CUTOUT yao Two-syro PLATFORM, LEAD COMPUTING OPTICAL SIGHT (PITCH AND ROLL) FAST-ERECT SWITCH ROLL FUNCTION (INSTRUMENT PANEL) ATTITUDE-AND-HEADING REFERENCE SYSTEM (AHRS) 185AIR DATA IMPLEMENTATION @ ANALYSIS SHOWED THAT CANADIAN COST OF OWNERSHIP FOR CENTRAL AIR DATA COMPUTER (CAC) WAS LESS THAN FOR SEVEN SEPARATE AIR DATA TRANSDUCERS = ONE UNIT TO TEST = MORE FUNCTIONS © ~ LESS WEIGHT = ONE UNIT TO INSTALL = LESS SPace = HIGHER AccuRACY © GADG PROVIDED 1% TRUE AIRSPEED ACCURACY FOR FUTURE NAVIGATION ‘AND MISSILE LAUNCH ENVELOPE COMPUTATIONS: (@ CADO PROVIDED 0.2% ALTITUDE ACCURACY FOR FUTURE MISSILE LAUNCH ENVELOPE AND LEAD COMPUTATION AND ALTITUDE REPORTING (@ CADC PROVIDED TRUE ANGLE OF ATTACK FOR FUTURE GUNS, ROCKETS AND BOMB AINING COMPUTATIONS (@ THREE BUILT-IN TEST (BIT) PROBLEMS (MINIMIZED MAINTENANCE TIME AND COSTS © VALUE ENGINEERING CYCLE REDUCED ORIGINAL COST OVER 50% The next opportunity to incorporate one of the elements of the fire control system arose during the configuration definition phase for the Canadian F-5. Following the ground rule that each element had to be worthwhile on a stand alone basis, study results were presented to the Canadian Design authority to verify that the cost of ownership for a CADC would be less than for seven separate air data transducers. In addition, the Canadians were pleased to be able to incorporate a more accurate altimeter, provisions for altitude reporting, and inputs for a lead computing sight and for a doppler navigator, both of which were being considered for growth. 186187AIR-TO-AIR GUNNERY DEVELOPMENT @ FIXED OPTICAL- MANUALLY DEPRESSIBLE (NORSIGHT) @ CANADIAN CF-S USED FERRANTI SIGHT WITH STADIAMETRIC RANGING © NORWAY INSTALLED A LIMITED CAPABILITY FERRANT! SIGHT FOR F-5 RETROFIT @ LIMITATIONS OF STATE-OF-THE-ART LINEAR PRE- DICTORS WERE FULLY EXPLORED WITH THE CONCLUSION THAT A NEW APPROACH FOR EVASIVE MANEUVERING TARGETS WAS REQUIRED Lead computing gunsights were introduced into air-to-air combat in the Spitfire. The original Ferranti gunsight doubled the kill ratio and had a definite impact on the outcome of the Battle of Britain. The original approach provided only linear lead prediction and was not effective against evasive or highly maneuvering targets. No really new approaches were developed during the 30 years between 1940 and 1970. 188