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CAYO G. GAMOGAMO vs. PNOC SHIPPING AND We cannot uphold petitioner’s contention that his
TRANSPORT CORP. fourteen years of service with the DOH should be
G.R. No. 141707. May 7, 2002 considered because his last two employers were
government-owned and controlled corporations, and
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: fall under the Civil Service Law.Article IX(B), Section 2
paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution states --
FACTS: Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Petitioner was first employed with the DOH as Dental Government, including government-owned or
Aide and later on promoted to the position of Dentist controlled corporations with original charters.
1. He remained employed at the DOH for fourteen It is not at all disputed that while Respondent and
years until he resigned on 2 November 1977.
LUSTEVECO are government-owned and controlled
On 9 November 1977, petitioner was hired as company corporations, they have no original charters; hence
dentist by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation they are not under the Civil Service Law. In Philippine
(LUSTEVECO), a private domestic National Oil Company-Energy Development
corporation. Subsequently, Respondent PNOC Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
acquired and took over the shipping business of we ruled:
LUSTEVECO, and on 1 August 1979, petitioner was xxx Thus under the present state of the law, the test
among those who opted to be absorbed by the in determining whether a government-owned or
Respondent. Thus, he continued to work as company
controlled corporation is subject to the Civil Service
dentist and assumed without interruption petitioners
Law are [sic] the manner of its creation, such that
service credits with LUSTEVECO, but it did not assume
government corporations created by special charter(s)
petitioners service credits with the DOH.
are subject to its provisions while those incorporated
On 10 June 1993, President Ramos issued under the General Corporation Law are not within its
memorandum approving privatization of PNOC coverage.
subsidiaries. Accordingly, respondent implemented a Consequently, Respondent was not bound by the
Manpower Reduction Program wherein under this opinion of the Civil Service Commission of 18 May
program, retrenched employees shall receive a two 1993.
month pay for every tear of service. Petitioner
requested to be included in the next retrenchment
Petitioners contention that the principle of tacking of
schedule but it was denied for a reason that he was
holding a permanent position and that he was already creditable service is mandated by Republic Act No.
due for mandatory retirement under his retirement 7699 is baseless. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7699
plan. reads:
Eventually, petitioner retired after serving respondent SEC 3. Provisions of any general or special law or rules
for 17 years and 4 months upon reaching 60 yrs old. and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, a
However, upon approval of two permanent employees’
covered worker who transfer(s) employment from one
retrenchment, petitioner now filed a complaint at NLRC
sector to another or is employed in both sectors, shall
for the full payment of his retirement benefits arguing
that his service with the DOH should have been have his creditable services or contributions in both
included in the computation of his years of service. systems credited to his service or contribution record
Hence, with an accumulated service of 32 years and in each of the Systems and shall be totalized for
should have been paid a two month pay for every year purposes of old-age, disability, survivorship, and other
of service per the retirement plan. benefits in case the covered employee does not qualify
for such benefits in either or both Systems without
ISSUE: totalization: Provided, however, That overlapping
periods of membership shall be credited only once for
Whether petitioner’s service rendered in DOH will be purposes of totalization.
credited and will be added to his creditable service later
acquired in PNOC-Shipping and Transport, a GOCC w/o Obviously, totalization of service credits is only
original charter. resorted to when the retiree does not qualify for
benefits in either or both of the Systems. Here,
petitioner is qualified to receive benefits granted by the
Government Security Insurance System (GSIS), if such
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Petitioners file a complaint against FTI for unpaid We conclude that because respondent FTI is
retrenchment/separation pay and underpayment of government-owned and controlled corporation without
wages and non-payment of ECOLA with the DOLE. FTI original charter, it is the Department of Labor and
moved for the dismissal of the case for lack of Employment, and not the Civil Service Commission,
jurisdiction contending that employees of government which has jurisdiction over the dispute arising from
owned and controlled corporation is not governed by employment of the petitioners with private respondent
the Labor Code but the Civil Service Law and hence, FTI, and that consequently, the terms and conditions
fall within jurisdiction of the CSC and not the DOLE. of such employment are governed by the Labor Code
and not by the Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
Petitioners on the other hand contends that FTI has
still a mark of a private corporation for it directly hires
its employees without seeking approval from CSC and
that its employees are covered by SSS and not GSIS.
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ROBERTO A. FLORES Et., Al. vs. HON. the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, situation where a local elective official will work for
and RICHARD J. GORDON his appointment in an executive position in
G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993 government, and thus neglect his constitutents.
BELLOSILLO, J.: (2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the
SBMA posts as automatically attached to the Office of
FACTS: the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase
“shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the intent
Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities to make the SBMA posts appointive and not
at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.
of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992
which directs the President to appoint a professional (3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of
manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for
“for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of example, an elective official who may be appointed to
Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as a cabinet post, may receive
the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority. the compensation attached to the cabinet position if
specifically authorized by law.
ISSUES:
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the
1. Whether the proviso violates the constitutional President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA,
proscription against appointment or designation of he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of
elective officials to other government posts. Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the
power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of
2. Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress
to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an clothes the President with the power to appoint an
excepted circumstance. officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of
the President to only one candidate. Such enactment
3. Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing
an elective official to receive power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction
double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed
useless if no elective official may be appointed to that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the
another post. officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e.,
he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly
4. Whether there is legislative encroachment on the an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe
appointing authority of the President. qualifications where only one, and no other, can
5. Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official
diems, allowances and other emoluments which he for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or
may have received pursuant to his appointment. during his incumbency, he may however resign first
from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-
HELD: attached disqualification before he may be considered
fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible
the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be for appointment to another public office.
eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity
to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless (5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman
of his position, no appointive official shall hold any and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto
other office or employment in the Government or any cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not
including government-owned or controlled necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de
corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is
directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. entitled to such benefits.
the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post
(as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what
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CITY MAYOR ROGELIO R. DEBULGADO and Panglungsod. He further avers that he had consulted
VICTORIA T. DEBULGADO vs. CSC the Field and Regional Officers of the CSC in Bacolod
G.R. No. 111471 September 26, 1994 City, and raised the question of applicability of the
prohibition against nepotism to the then proposed
FELICIANO, J.: promotion of his wife in one of the seminars conducted
by the Commission's Regional Office held in San Carlos
FACTS: City. According to petitioner Mayor, one Gregorio C.
Agdon, a supervising personnel specialist in the
Petitioner Mayor Rogelio Debulgado is the incumbent Commission's Bacolod Office, informed him that the
Mayor of the City of San Carlos, Negros Occidental. He promotional appointment was not covered by the
promoted his wife, petitioner Victoria Debulgado, as prohibition.
General Services Officer, that is, as head of the Office
of General Services of the City Government of San ISSUE:
Carlos. Before her promotion, petitioner Victoria had
been in the service of the City Government for about Whether prohibition against nepotism apply to
thirty-two (32) years and she rose from the ranks by promotional appointments.
successively occupying different government offices.
HELD:
Public respondent CSC received a letter from
Congressman Tranquilino Carmona of the First District The prohibition against nepotism applies to BOTH
of Negros Occidental, calling attention to the original and promotional appointments. Both an
promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor in original appointment and a promotion are particular
favor of his wife. After investigation, the CSC species of personnel action, which must comply with
disapproved the promotion of petitioner Victoria to the the prohibition against nepotism.
position upon the ground that that promotion violated
the statutory prohibition against nepotic appointments. The original appointment of a civil service employee
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, contending that and all subsequent personnel actions undertaken by or
the statutory prohibition against nepotism was not in respect of that employee such as promotion,
applicable to the appointment of Victoria as General transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, etc., must
Services Officer since the prohibition applies only to comply with the Implementing Rules including, of
original appointments and not to promotional course, the prohibition against nepotism
appointments. Petitioners believe that because
petitioner Victoria was already in the service of the City The prohibitory norm against nepotism in the public
Government before she married petitioner Mayor, the service is set out in Section 59, Book V of the Revised
reason behind the prohibition no longer applied to her Administrative Code of 1987 (also known as EO 292)
promotional appointment. Petitioners also affirm that under Section 59:
petitioner Victoria deserves to be promoted to General
Services Officer, considering her long and faithful All appointments in the national, provincial, city and
service to the City Government. The CSC had deprived municipal governments or in any branch or
petitioner Victoria of her right to due process by instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
unilaterally revoking her appointment. Petitioners or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative
assert that Victoria can no longer be removed from the of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the
position of General Services Officer without giving her chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons
an opportunity to be heard and to answer the charged exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby
of nepotism. prohibited.
Petitioner Mayor denies that he had been motivated by The following are exempted from the operation of the
personal reasons when he appointed his wife to the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a
new post. He states that his wife was the most qualified confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and
among the candidates for appointment to that position, (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines:
she having worked for the City Government for thirty- Provided, however, that in each particular instance full
two (32) years and being highly recommended by the report of such appointment shall be made to the
OIC-Treasurer of San Carlos City. It is also claimed by Commission.
petitioner Mayor that his choice of his wife for the
position was concurred in by the Sangguniang
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It is essential to stress, however, that the prohibition Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary
applies quite without regard to the actual merits of the functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
proposed appointee and to the good intentions of the undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointing or recommending authority, and that the appointive officials of the Executive Department may,
prohibition against nepotism in appointments whether in addition to his primary position, hold not more than
original or promotional, is not intended by the two positions in the government and government
legislative authority to penalize faithful service. The corporations and receive the corresponding
purpose of Section 59 is precisely to take out of the compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation
discretion of the appointing and recommending shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to
authority the matter of appointing or recommending boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the
for appointment a relative. Chairman.
The promotional appointment of petitioner Victoria as The petitioners alleged that the cited provision of EO
formerly approved by the CSC did not vest in her a right 284 contravenes the provision of Sec. 13, Article VII
to that position, therefore, she was not deprived of due which declares:
process when she was terminated. Victoria was not
deprived due process as there were no administrative The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
charges in respect of which she would have been Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
entitled to notice and hearing. The CSC, in approving not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
or disapproving an appointment, only examines the hold any other office or employment during their
conformity of the appointment with applicable tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
provisions of law and whether the appointee possesses indirectly practice any other profession, participate in
all the minimum qualifications and none of the any business, or be financially interested in any
disqualifications. At all events, as the Solicitor General contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
has noted, petitioner Victoria was afforded an granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency,
opportunity to be heard when she filed an MR with the or instrumentality thereof, including government-
CSC and there challenged the disapproval by the owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Commission. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office.
Since the promotional appointment in favor of
petitioner Victoria was a violation of Section 59, it was The petitioners maintained that the phrase “unless
null and void from the beginning. A void appointment otherwise provided in this Constitution” used in Section
cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part of the 13 of Article VII meant that the exception must be
holder of such appointment. expressly provided in the Constitution.
The CSC is empowered to take appropriate action on
all appointments and other personnel actions, e.g., Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that
promotions. Such power includes the authority to recall the phrase “unless otherwise provided in the
an appointment initially approved in disregard of Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII makes reference
applicable provisions of Civil Service law and to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the
regulations. appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.
The provision relied upon by the respondents provides:
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY Sec. 7. . . . . .
G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991 Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall
FERNAN, C.J.: hold any other office or employment in the government
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
FACTS: including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
The two petitions in this case sought to declare
unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 issued by ISSUE No. 1:
President Corazon C. Aquino. The assailed law provides
that: Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their
deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the
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broad exceptions made for appointive officials in officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue
general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB? of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Does the prohibition apply to positions held in ex officio The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices
capacity? or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution must not, however, be construed as
ISSUE No. 3: applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials
specified therein without additional compensation in
Can the respondents be obliged to reimburse the an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and
perquisites they have received from the offices they as required by the primary functions of said officials’
have held pursuant to EO 284? office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise
“any other office” within the contemplation of the
HELD: constitutional prohibition but are properly an
imposition of additional duties and functions on said
Number 1: officials. The term ex-officio means “from office; by
virtue of office.” Ex-officio likewise denotes an “act
No. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was done in an official character, or as a consequence of
to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and office, and without any other appointment or authority
his official family in so far as holding other offices or than that conferred by the office.” The additional
employment in the government or elsewhere is duties must not only be closely related to, but must be
concerned. required by the official’s primary functions. If the
functions required to be performed are merely
Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a incidental, remotely related, inconsistent,
blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function
offices or employment in the government subsuming of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall
both elective and appointive public officials, the under the purview of “any other office” prohibited by
Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate the Constitution.
another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically
prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of Number 3:
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding
any other office or employment during their tenure, During their tenure in the questioned positions,
unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. respondents may be considered de facto officers and
While all other appointive officials in the civil service as such entitled to emoluments for actual services
are allowed to hold other office or employment in the rendered. It has been held that “in cases where there
government during their tenure when such is allowed is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who, in good
by law or by the primary functions of their positions, faith has had possession of the office and has
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally
may do so only when expressly authorized by the entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I- appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other
XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to compensations attached to the office. Any per diem,
all elective and appointive public officials and allowances or other emoluments received by the
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the
the exception applicable only to the President, the questioned positions may therefore be retained by
Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies them.
and assistants.
The phrase “unless otherwise provided in Overall, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as
this Constitution” must be given a literal interpretation it actually allows a member of the cabinet,
to refer only to those particular instances cited in the undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold
appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section multiple offices or employment in direct contravention
3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the
instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-
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unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution of suspension or dismissal. In the case at bar the
itself. respondents won in their appeal, therefore the period
of suspension pending their appeal would be
considered as part of the preventive suspension,
HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA, in his capacity as entitling them to full pay because they were eventually
Secretary of the DECS vs. COURT OF APPEALS exonerated and their suspension was unjustified.
G.R. No. 131012. April 21, 1999
They are still entitled to back salaries even if they were
MENDOZA, J.: still reprimanded.
reasonable limits. The public-school teachers pleading which appears to be an omnibus pleading
committed acts prejudicial to the interest of the service relating to, inter alia, Administrative Case No. 3135.
by staging the mass protests on regular school days, Insofar as Administrative Case No. 3135 is concerned,
abandoning their classes and failing to return despite the Court treated this pleading as a Motion for
the return to work order. Reconsideration. By a per curiam Resolution dated 15
April 1988, the Court denied with finality Mr Cuenco's
2. NO, they are not entitled to back wages. The Motion for Reconsideration.
teachers were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably
suspended, the 2 circumstances necessary for the ISSUE:
grant of back wages in
administrative disciplinary cases. Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be
disbarred during his term of office.
IN RE FIRST INDORSEMET FROM HONORABLE
RAUL M. GONZALEZ REQUESTING HONORABLE HELD:
JUSTICE MARCELO B. FERNAN TO COMMENT
ON AN ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT. A public officer (such as Justice Fernan) who under the
A.M. No. 88-4-5433 April 15, 1988 Constitution is required to be a Member of the
Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by
RESOLUTION him and who may be removed from office only by
impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment
PER CURIAM: during the incumbency of such public officer. Further,
such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be
FACTS: charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or any
other court, with any offense which carries with it the
The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 penalty of removal from office.
March 1988 from Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez,
"Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor" forwarding to Mr. Another reason why the complaint for disbarment
Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a "letter-complaint, dated 14 should be dismissed is because under the Constitution,
December 1987 with enclosure of the Concerned members of the SC may be removed only by
Employees of the Supreme Court," together with a impeachment. The above provision proscribes removal
telegram of Miguel Cuenco, for "comment within ten from office by any other method. Otherwise, to allow
(10) days from receipt hereof." Mr. Justice Fernan had such public officer who may be removed solely by
brought this 1st Indorsement to the attention of the impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his
Court en banc in view of the important implications of office with an office that carries the penalty of removal
policy raised by said 1st Indorsement. from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of
the Constitution.
Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor.
He forwarded to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a letter- The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of
complaint. The letter was said to be from concerned position and disqualification to hold any office of honor,
employees of the SC (an anonymous letter). trust or profit under the Republic. Judgment in cases
of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales from office and disqualification to hold any office. But
referring to the charges for disbarment sought by Mr. the party convicted shall nevertheless be held liable
Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and asking him and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment
(Gonzales) to do something about it. according to law.
The Court furnished to Mr. Raul M. Gonzales a copy of
the per curiam Resolution in which, the Court Resolved The court is not saying that its Members or other
to dismiss the charges made by complaint Cuenco constitutional officers are entitled to immunity from
against Mr.Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit. In the liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation
same Resolution, the Court Resolved to require of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed
complainant Cuenco to show cause why he should not misbehavior. What the court is saying is that there is a
be administratively dealt with for making unfounded fundamental procedural requirement that must be
serious accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan. Upon observed before such liability may be determined and
request of Mr. Cueco, the Court had granted him an enforced. A member of the Supreme Court must first
extension of up to 30 March 1988, Mr. Cuenco filed a be removed from office, via the constitutional route of
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Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the U.P. BOARD OF REGENTS vs. HON. JAINAL D.
authority to impose administrative sanctions over RASUL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
public officials Branch 69 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig,
Metro Manila, and DR. FELIPE A. ESTRELLA, JR.
HELD: G.R. No. 91551. August 16, 1991
This committee ought to choose a replacement SAGANA and J. M. Builders as vendors, and petitioner
for Dr. Estrella as to fill up the alleged vacant UP-PGH Wenonah L. Marquez-Azarcon (Azarcon) as vendee,
Director. entered into a contract to sell a house and lot located
at Sagana Homes, Culiat, Tandang Sora, Quezon City
Dr. Estrella filed an injunction case against the under which Azarcon was to pay, as she did, an initial
Nomination Committee and the Board of Regents to amount of P49,740.00, the balance to be paid through
forestall the removal or dismissal of Dr Estrella. an SSS housing loan.
Azarcon thus filed a Petition for Certiorari with the In the absence of payment through housing loan, the
Court of Appeals. In its Comment to Azarcons petition buyer
before the Court of Appeals, SAGANA alleged that should effect payment through other means within a r
Azarcon failed to exhaust all administrative remedies, easonable period. The seller should also extend all
she having failed to appeal to the Office of the support and assistance to make it possible for the
President following the 1987 HLURB Rules of buyer to find such means, particularly if it contributed
Procedure. to the non-release of the loan. If parties cannot agree
on the substitute method of payment on the period for
ISSUE: effecting the same, then the Board may step to fix the
same.
Whether amount of rental shall form part of the
amount of the purchase price. Meantime we believe
that until this matter can be resolved, complainant sh
RULING: ould pay rentals as equitable payment for use of the p
remises, which can be applied to the balance of the p
To follow the interpretation proffered by SAGANA urchase price.
would allow the Board to alter the parties’ agreement
on the purchase price. From the immediately foregoing disquisition of the
Board, it is clear that the payment of rentals was
Upon the other hand, Azarcons interpretation is more devised by it merely as an interim scheme, until a
in accord with the finding of the Board that the delay in substitute method of payment [of the balance of the
the payment of the purchase price was not due to her purchase price] was agreed upon by the parties.
fault, precisely on account of which finding it deleted
the order for the payment of interest by Azarcon. Held Since Azarcon fully paid the balance of the purchase
the Board: price on July 22, 1993, less than three months after
the Board decision was promulgated on May 10, 1993,
[SAGANA] has failed to convincingly refute that part of the decision respecting payment through
[AZARCONs] argument that the non-release of the loan other means devised by the Board for Azarcon to, in
was due to its non-submission of certain requirements. the meantime, pay rentals as equitable payment for
the use of the premises, which can be applied to the
Hence, for this reason, the . . . issue [of whether or not balance of the purchase price, had become functus
Azarcon is liable for the payment of interest] is resolved oficio. To hold otherwise would be to fault Azarcon in
in the whom none was, as reflected above, found by the
negative. We are convinced that [Azarcon] should not Board. It would also gloss over Azarcons initial
be held responsible for the delay in the release of the payment of a substantial amount when they entered
loan andconsequently for the non- into the contract to sell and her tender of payment of
payment of the purchase price. the balance which was, however, rejected by SAGANA.
Such being the case, we believe that a recall of our It would thus ignore the interest of justice and equity
previous ruling ordering [Azarcon] to pay interest by which underlies all systems of justice.
way of damages is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
If Azarcon had been spared by the Board of paying assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
interest by way of damages because she was not REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The position of petitioner,
responsible for the delay in the release of the loan and Wenonah L. Marquez-Azarcon, that the Writ of
consequently for the non-payment of [the balance] of Execution in question varied the terms of the HLURB
the purchase price, why should the Board have May 13, 1993 decision is upheld.
intended to make her liable to pay rentals over and
above the balance of the purchase
price, especially given her tender of payment of such
balance after the loan application was not approved,
which tender SAGANA refused to accept without
interest being paid thereon? That the Board had no
such intention, the following portion of its May 10,
1993 decision instructs:
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PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING The OMBUDSMAN takes a different view. For one, he
COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS vs. HON. asserts that Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution
ANIANO A. DESIERTO as Ombudsman is not applicable, since what the COMMITTEE seeks is
G.R. No. 130140 October 25, 1999 not to recover the unlawfully acquired wealth from the
respondents therein but to hold them criminally liable
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: for violation of R.A. No. 3019.
In the resolution OMBUDSMAN dismissed the In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the
complaint on the ground of prescription. Relying State, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at
on People v. Dinsay, a case decided by the Court of the time the questioned transactions were made
Appeals, he ratiocinated that since the questioned because, as alleged, the public officials concerned
transactions were evidenced by public instruments and connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the
were thus open for the perusal of the public, the loans." Thus, the prescriptive period for the should be
prescriptive period commenced to run from the time of computed from the discovery of the commission
the commission of the crime, not from the discovery thereof and not from the day of such commission.
thereof. OMBUDSMAN forthwith dismissed the complaint
without even requiring the respondents to submit their
The COMMITTEE argues that the right of the Republic counter-affidavits and solely on the basis of the dates
of the Philippines to recover behest loans as ill-gotten the alleged behest loans were granted. It should have
wealth is imprescriptible pursuant to the mandate of first received from the complainant and the
Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution, which respondents to resolve the case on merits and on the
provides: issue of the date of discovery of the offense.
Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the
The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully preliminary investigation.
acquired by public officials or employees, from them or
from their nominees as transferees, shall not be barred
by prescription, laches, or estoppel.