G.R. No.
77425 June 19, 1991 It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still within the prohibitive period to
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF
IMUS, and the SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO
and MARTINA RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA
TOLENTINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 77450 June 19, 1991
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF
IMUS, and the SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO
and MARTINA RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA
TOLENTINO, respondents.
Severino C. Dominguez for petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite.
Dolorfino and Dominguez Law Offices for Sps. Ignao.
Joselito R. Enriquez for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
These two petitions for review on certiorari1 seek to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 054562 which reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court of
Imus, Cavite dismissing Civil Case No. 095-84, as well as the order of said respondent court
denying petitioner's motions for the reconsideration of its aforesaid decision.
On November 29, 1984, private respondents as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for nullification of deed
of donation, rescission of contract and reconveyance of real property with damages against
petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite,
together with the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XX, Imus, Cavite and which was docketed as Civil Case No. 095-84 therein.3
In their complaint, private respondents alleged that on August 23, 1930, the spouses Eusebio de
Castro and Martina Rieta, now both deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of therein
defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of land (Lot No. 626, Cadastral
Survey of Kawit), located at Kawit, Cavite, containing an area of 964 square meters, more or less.
The deed of donation allegedly provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell the property within
a period of one hundred (100) years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a
violation of such condition would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation and the
property would revert to the estate of the donors.
dispose of the property, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose administration all
properties within the province of Cavite owned by the Archdiocese of Manila was allegedly
transferred on April 26, 1962, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property subject of the
donation in favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao in consideration of the sum of
P114,000. 00. As a consequence of the sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 115990 was issued
by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on November 15, 1980 in the name of said petitioner spouses.
What transpired thereafter is narrated by respondent court in its assailed decision. 4
On December 17, 1984, petitioners Florencio Ignao and Soledad C. Ignao filed a motion to
dismiss based on the grounds that (1) herein private respondents, as plaintiffs therein, have no
legal capacity to sue; and (2) the complaint states no cause of action.
On December 19, 1984, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus also filed a motion to dismiss
on three (3) grounds, the first two (2) grounds of which were identical to that of the motion to
dismiss filed by the Ignao spouses, and the third ground being that the cause of action has
prescribed.
On January 9, 1985, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila likewise filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that he is not a real party in interest and, therefore, the complaint does not state a
cause of action against him.
After private respondents had filed their oppositions to the said motions to dismiss and the
petitioners had countered with their respective replies, with rejoinders thereto by private
respondents, the trial court issued an order dated January 31, 1985, dismissing the complaint on
the ground that the cause of action has prescribed.5
Private respondents thereafter appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issues on (a) whether
or not the action for rescission of contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale) has prescribed;
and (b) whether or not the dismissal of the action for rescission of contracts (deed of donation and
deed of sale) on the ground of prescription carries with it the dismissal of the main action for
reconveyance of real property.6
On December 23, 1986, respondent Court of Appeals, holding that the action has not yet
prescibed, rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, with the following dispositive
portion:
WHEREFORE, the Order of January 31, 1985 dismissing appellants' complaint is SET
ASIDE and Civil Case No. 095-84 is hereby ordered REINSTATED and REMANDED to
the lower court for further proceedings. No Costs.7
Petitioners Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus then filed their separate motions for
reconsideration which were denied by respondent Court of Appeals in its resolution dated
February 6, 1987,8 hence, the filing of these appeals by certiorari.
It is the contention of petitioners that the cause of action of herein private respondents has already
prescribed, invoking Article 764 of the Civil Code which provides that "(t)he donation shall be
revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions
which the former imposed upon the latter," and that "(t)his action shall prescribe after four years
from the non-compliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may
be exercised against the donee's heirs.
We do not agree.
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the revocation of a donation
must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation,
the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein expressly
provides for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the condition
therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not necessary, As aptly stated by the
Court of Appeals:
By the very express provision in the deed of donation itself that the violation of the
condition thereof would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation, WE are of
the opinion that there would be no legal necessity anymore to have the donation judicially
declared null and void for the reason that the very deed of donation itself declares it so.
For where (sic) it otherwise and that the donors and the donee contemplated a court
action during the execution of the deed of donation to have the donation judicially
rescinded or declared null and void should the condition be violated, then the phrase
reading "would render ipso facto null and void"would not appear in the deed of donation.9
In support of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on the rule that a judicial action for
rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and
cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions.10 It called attention to the holding that
there is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into an agreement that a violation
of the terms of the contract would cause its cancellation even without court intervention, and that it
is not always necessary for the injured party to resort to court for rescission of the contract.11 It
reiterated the doctrine that a judicial action is proper only when there is absence of a special
provision granting the power of cancellation.12
It is true that the aforesaid rules were applied to the contracts involved therein, but we see no
reason why the same should not apply to the donation in the present case. Article 732 of the Civil
Code provides that donations inter vivosshall be governed by the general provisions on contracts
and obligations in all that is not determined in Title III, Book III on donations. Now, said Title III
does not have an explicit provision on the matter of a donation with a resolutory condition and
which is subject to an express provision that the same shall be considered ipso facto revoked
upon the breach of said resolutory condition imposed in the deed therefor, as is the case of the
deed presently in question. The suppletory application of the foregoing doctrinal rulings to the
present controversy is consequently justified.
The validity of such a stipulation in the deed of donation providing for the automatic reversion of
the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance of the condition was upheld in the recent
case of De Luna, et al. vs. Abrigo, et al.13 It was held therein that said stipulation is in the nature of
an agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach, without
need of going to court, and that, upon the happening of the resolutory condition or non-compliance
with the conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial
declaration to that effect. While what was the subject of that case was an onerous donation which,
under Article 733 of the Civil Code is governed by the rules on contracts, since the donation in the
case at bar is also subject to the same rules because of its provision on automatic revocation
upon the violation of a resolutory condition, from parity of reasons said pronouncements in De
Luna pertinently apply.
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial
intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract
already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial
intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.14
When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic revocation and
reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription
should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the
parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very
least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation,
without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of
the rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely
declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
On the foregoing ratiocinations, the Court of Appeals committed no error in holding that the cause
of action of herein private respondents has not yet prescribed since an action to enforce a written
contract prescribes in ten (10) years.15 It is our view that Article 764 was intended to provide a
judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or contravention of conditions specified in the deed of
donation if and when the parties have not agreed on the automatic revocation of such donation
upon the occurrence of the contingency contemplated therein. That is not the situation in the case
at bar.
Nonetheless, we find that although the action filed by private respondents may not be dismissed
by reason of prescription, the same should be dismissed on the ground that private respondents
have no cause of action against petitioners.
The cause of action of private respondents is based on the alleged breach by petitioners of the
resolutory condition in the deed of donation that the property donated should not be sold within a
period of one hundred (100) years from the date of execution of the deed of donation. Said
condition, in our opinion, constitutes an undue restriction on the rights arising from ownership of
petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to public policy.
Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over the
property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the
absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the
deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and
public policy. The condition imposed in the deed of donation in the case before us constitutes a
patently unreasonable and undue restriction on the right of the donee to dispose of the property
donated, which right is an indispensable attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition against
alienation, in order to be valid, must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time.
Certain provisions of the Civil Code illustrative of the aforesaid policy may be considered
applicable by analogy. Under the third paragraph of Article 494, a donor or testator may prohibit
1âwphi 1
partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty (20) years. Article 870, on its part, declares
that the dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than
twenty (20) years are void.
It is significant that the provisions therein regarding a testator also necessarily involve, in the main,
the devolution of property by gratuitous title hence, as is generally the case of donations, being an
act of liberality, the imposition of an unreasonable period of prohibition to alienate the property
should be deemed anathema to the basic and actual intent of either the donor or testator. For that
reason, the regulatory arm of the law is or must be interposed to prevent an unreasonable
departure from the normative policy expressed in the aforesaid Articles 494 and 870 of the Code.
Additionally, we have laid down the rule that the remand of the case to the lower court for further
reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute
based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and for the
expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding
them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice, would not be
subserved by the remand of the case.19 The aforestated considerations obtain in and apply to the
present case with respect to the matter of the validity of the resolutory condition in question.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent court is SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby
rendered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 095-84 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XX, Imus,
Cavite.
SO ORDERED.

In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation against the alienation of the
property for an entire century, being an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral
attribute of ownership, should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the
contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically stated in said
statutory provision, such condition shall be considered as not imposed. No reliance may
accordingly be placed on said prohibitory paragraph in the deed of donation. The net result is that,
absent said proscription, the deed of sale supposedly constitutive of the cause of action for the
nullification of the deed of donation is not in truth violative of the latter hence, for lack of cause of
action, the case for private respondents must fail.

It may be argued that the validity of such prohibitory provision in the deed of donation was not
specifically put in issue in the pleadings of the parties. That may be true, but such oversight or
inaction does not prevent this Court from passing upon and resolving the same.

It will readily be noted that the provision in the deed of donation against alienation of the land for
one hundred (100) years was the very basis for the action to nullify the deed of d donation. At the
same time, it was likewise the controverted fundament of the motion to dismiss the case a
quo, which motion was sustained by the trial court and set aside by respondent court, both on the
issue of prescription. That ruling of respondent court interpreting said provision was assigned as
an error in the present petition. While the issue of the validity of the same provision was not
squarely raised, it is ineluctably related to petitioner's aforesaid assignment of error since both
issues are grounded on and refer to the very same provision.

This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as
errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the
case:16 Thus, we have held that an unassigned error closely related to an error properly
assigned,17 or upon which the determination of the question properly assigned is dependent, will
be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error.18
G.R. No. L-69970 November 28, 1988
FELIX DANGUILAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, APOLONIA MELAD, assisted
by her husband, JOSE TAGACAY, respondents.
Pedro R. Perez, Jr. for petitioner.
Teodoro B. Mallonga for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The subject of this dispute is the two lots owned by Domingo Melad which is claimed by both the petitioner and the
respondent. The trial court believed the petitioner but the respondent court, on appeal, upheld the respondent. The case is
now before us for a resolution of the issues once and for all.
On January 29, 1962, the respondent filed a complaint against the
petitioner in the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan for recovery of
a farm lot and a residential lot which she claimed she had purchased
from Domingo Melad in 1943 and were now being unlawfully withheld
by the defendant. 1 In his answer, the petitioner denied the allegation
and averred that he was the owner of the said lots of which he had
been in open, continuous and adverse possession, having acquired
them from Domingo Melad in 1941 and 1943. 2 The case was dismissed
for failure to prosecute but was refiled in 1967. 3
At the trial, the plaintiff presented a deed of sale dated December 4,
1943, purportedly signed by Domingo Melad and duly notarized, which
conveyed the said properties to her for the sum of P80.00. 4 She said
the amount was earned by her mother as a worker at the Tabacalera
factory. She claimed to be the illegitimate daughter of Domingo Melad,
with whom she and her mother were living when he died in 1945. She
moved out of the farm only when in 1946 Felix Danguilan approached
her and asked permission to cultivate the land and to stay therein. She
had agreed on condition that he would deliver part of the harvest from
the farm to her, which he did from that year to 1958. The deliveries
having stopped, she then consulted the municipal judge who advised
her to file the complaint against Danguilan. The plaintiff 's mother, her
only other witness, corroborated this testimony. 5
For his part, the defendant testified that he was the husband of Isidra
Melad, Domingo's niece, whom he and his wife Juana Malupang had
taken into their home as their ward as they had no children of their own.
He and his wife lived with the couple in their house on the residential lot
and helped Domingo with the cultivation of the farm. Domingo Melad
signed in 1941 a private instrument in which he gave the defendant the
farm and in 1943 another private instrument in which he also gave him
the residential lot, on the understanding that the latter would take care
of the grantor and would bury him upon his death. 6 Danguilan
presented three other witnesses 7 to corroborate his statements and to
prove that he had been living in the land since his marriage to Isidra
and had remained in possession thereof after Domingo Melad's death
in 1945. Two of said witnesses declared that neither the plaintiff nor her
mother lived in the land with Domingo Melad. 8
The decision of the trial court was based mainly on the issue of
possession. Weighing the evidence presented by the parties, the
judge 9 held that the defendant was more believable and that the
plaintiff's evidence was "unpersuasive and unconvincing." It was held
that the plaintiff's own declaration that she moved out of the property in
1946 and left it in the possession of the defendant was contradictory to
her claim of ownership. She was also inconsistent when she testified
first that the defendant was her tenant and later in rebuttal that he was
her administrator. The decision concluded that where there was doubt
as to the ownership of the property, the presumption was in favor of the
one actually occupying the same, which in this case was the
defendant. 10
The review by the respondent court 11 of this decision was manifestly
less than thorough. For the most part it merely affirmed the factual
findings of the trial court except for an irrelevant modification, and it was
only toward the end that it went to and resolved what it considered the
lone decisive issue.
The respondent court held that Exhibits 2-b and 3-a, by virtue of which
Domingo Melad had conveyed the two parcels of land to the petitioner,
were null and void. The reason was that they were donations of real
property and as such should have been effected through a public
instrument. It then set aside the appealed decision and declared the
respondents the true and lawful owners of the disputed property.
The said exhibits read as follows:
EXHIBIT 2-b is quoted as follows: 12
I, DOMINGO MELAD, of legal age, married, do hereby
declare in this receipt the truth of my giving to Felix
Danguilan, my agricultural land located at Barrio Fugu-
Macusi, Penablanca, Province of Cagayan, Philippine
Islands; that this land is registered under my name; that I
hereby declare and bind myself that there is no one to
whom I will deliver this land except to him as he will be the
one responsible for me in the event that I will die and also
for all other things needed and necessary for me, he will be
responsible because of this land I am giving to him; that it
is true that I have nieces and nephews but they are not
living with us and there is no one to whom I will give my
land except to Felix Danguilan for he lives with me and this
is the length—175 m. and the width is 150 m.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereby sign my name below
and also those present in the execution of this receipt this
14th day of September 1941.
Penablanca Cagayan, September 14, 1941.
(SGD.) DOMINGO MELAD
WITNESSES:
1. (T.M.) ISIDRO MELAD
2. (SGD.) FELIX DANGUILAN
3. (T.M.) ILLEGIBLE
EXHIBIT 3-a is quoted as follows: 13
I, DOMINGO MELAD, a resident of Centro, Penablanca,
Province of Cagayan, do hereby swear and declare the
truth that I have delivered my residential lot at Centro,
Penablanca, Cagayan, to Felix Danguilan, my son-in-law
because I have no child; that I have thought of giving him
my land because he will be the one to take care of
SHELTERING me or bury me when I die and this is why I
have thought of executing this document; that the
boundaries of this lot is—on the east, Cresencio Danguilan;
on the north, Arellano Street; on the south by Pastor
Lagundi and on the west, Pablo Pelagio and the area of
this lot is 35 meters going south; width and length
beginning west to east is 40 meters.
IN WITNESS HEREOF, I hereby sign this receipt this 18th
day of December 1943.
(SGD.) DOMINGO MELAD
WITNESSES:
(SGD.) ILLEGIBLE
(SGD.) DANIEL ARAO
It is our view, considering the language of the two instruments, that
Domingo Melad did intend to donate the properties to the petitioner, as
the private respondent contends. We do not think, however, that the
donee was moved by pure liberality. While truly donations, the
conveyances were onerous donations as the properties were given to
the petitioner in exchange for his obligation to take care of the donee for
the rest of his life and provide for his burial. Hence, it was not covered
by the rule in Article 749 of the Civil Code requiring donations of real
properties to be effected through a public instrument. The case at bar
comes squarely under the doctrine laid down in Manalo v. De
Mesa, 14 where the Court held:
There can be no doubt that the donation in question was
made for a valuable consideration, since the donors made
it conditional upon the donees' bearing the expenses that
might be occasioned by the death and burial of the donor
Placida Manalo, a condition and obligation which the donee
Gregorio de Mesa carried out in his own behalf and for his
wife Leoncia Manalo; therefore, in order to determine
whether or not said donation is valid and effective it should
be sufficient to demonstrate that, as a contract, it embraces
the conditions the law requires and is valid and effective,
although not recorded in a public instrument.
The private respondent argues that as there was no equivalence
between the value of the lands donated and the services for which they
were being exchanged, the two transactions should be considered pure
or gratuitous donations of real rights, hence, they should have been
effected through a public instrument and not mere private writings.
However, no evidence has been adduced to support her contention that
the values exchanged were disproportionate or unequal.
On the other hand, both the trial court and the respondent court have
affirmed the factual allegation that the petitioner did take care of
Domingo Melad and later arranged for his burial in accordance with the
condition imposed by the donor. It is alleged and not denied that he
died when he was almost one hundred years old, 15 which would mean
that the petitioner farmed the land practically by himself and so
provided for the donee (and his wife) during the latter part of Domingo
Melad's life. We may assume that there was a fair exchange between
the donor and the donee that made the transaction an onerous
donation.
Regarding the private respondent's claim that she had purchased the
properties by virtue of a deed of sale, the respondent court had only the
following to say: "Exhibit 'E' taken together with the documentary and
oral evidence shows that the preponderance of evidence is in favor of
the appellants." This was, we think, a rather superficial way of resolving
such a basic and important issue.
The deed of sale was allegedly executed when the respondent was
only three years old and the consideration was supposedly paid by her
mother, Maria Yedan from her earnings as a wage worker in a
factory. 16 This was itself a suspicious circumstance, one may well
wonder why the transfer was not made to the mother herself, who was
after all the one paying for the lands. The sale was made out in favor of
Apolonia Melad although she had been using the surname Yedan her
mother's surname, before that instrument was signed and in fact even
after she got married. 17The averment was also made that the contract
was simulated and prepared after Domingo Melad's death in 1945. 18It
was also alleged that even after the supposed execution of the said
contract, the respondent considered Domingo Melad the owner of the
properties and that she had never occupied the same. 19
Considering these serious challenges, the appellate court could have
devoted a little more time to examining Exhibit "E" and the
circumstances surrounding its execution before pronouncing its validity
in the manner described above. While it is true that the due execution of
a public instrument is presumed, the presumption is disputable and will
yield to contradictory evidence, which in this case was not refuted.
At any rate, even assuming the validity of the deed of sale, the record
shows that the private respondent did not take possession of the
disputed properties and indeed waited until 1962 to file this action for
recovery of the lands from the petitioner. If she did have possession,
she transferred the same to the petitioner in 1946, by her own sworn
admission, and moved out to another lot belonging to her step-
brother. 20 Her claim that the petitioner was her tenant (later changed to
administrator) was disbelieved by the trial court, and properly so, for its
inconsistency. In short, she failed to show that she consummated the
contract of sale by actual delivery of the properties to her and her actual
possession thereof in concept of purchaser-owner.
As was held in Garchitorena v. Almeda: 21
Since in this jurisdiction it is a fundamental and elementary
principle that ownership does not pass by mere stipulation
but only by delivery (Civil Code, Art. 1095; Fidelity and
Surety Co. v. Wilson, 8 Phil. 51), and the execution of a
public document does not constitute sufficient delivery
where the property involved is in the actual and adverse
possession of third persons (Addison vs. Felix, 38 Phil.
404; Masallo vs. Cesar, 39 Phil. 134), it becomes
incontestable that even if included in the contract, the
ownership of the property in dispute did not pass thereby to
Mariano Garchitorena. Not having become the owner for
lack of delivery, Mariano Garchitorena cannot presume to
recover the property from its present possessors. His
action, therefore, is not one of revindicacion, but one
against his vendor for specific performance of the sale to
him.
In the aforecited case of Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Wilson, 22 Justice
Mapa declared for the Court:
Therefore, in our Civil Code it is a fundamental principle in
all matters of contracts and a well- known doctrine of law
that "non mudis pactis sed traditione dominia rerum
transferuntur". In conformity with said doctrine as
established in paragraph 2 of article 609 of said code, that
"the ownership and other property rights are acquired and
transmitted by law, by gift, by testate or intestate
succession, and, in consequence of certain contracts, by
tradition". And as the logical application of this disposition
article 1095 prescribes the following: "A creditor has the
rights to the fruits of a thing from the time the obligation to
deliver it arises. However, he shall not acquire a real right"
(and the ownership is surely such) "until the property has
been delivered to him."
In accordance with such disposition and provisions the
delivery of a thing constitutes a necessary and
indispensable requisite for the purpose of acquiring the
ownership of the same by virtue of a contract. As Manresa
states in his Commentaries on the Civil Code, volume 10,
pages 339 and 340: "Our law does not admit the doctrine
of the transfer of property by mere consent but limits the
effect of the agreement to the due execution of the
contract. ... The ownership, the property right, is only
derived from the delivery of a thing ... "
As for the argument that symbolic delivery was effected through the
deed of sale, which was a public instrument, the Court has held:
The Code imposes upon the vendor the obligation
to deliver the thing sold. The thing is considered to be
delivered when it is placed "in the hands and possession of
the vendee." (Civil Code, art. 1462). It is true that the same
article declares that the execution of a public instrument is
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of
the contract, but, in order that this symbolic delivery may
produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the
vendor shall have had such control over the thing sold that,
at the moment of the sale, its material delivery could have
been made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser
the ownership and the right of possession. The thing sold
must be placed in his control.When there is no impediment
 whatever to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy
of the purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic
delivery through the execution of a public instrument is
sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the
instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and
material tenancy of the thing and make use of it himself or
through another in his name, because such tenancy and
enjoyment are opposed by the interposition of another will,
then fiction yields to reality—the delivery has not been
effected. 23

There is no dispute that it is the petitioner and not the private

respondent who is in actual possession of the litigated properties. Even
if the respective claims of the parties were both to be discarded as
being inherently weak, the decision should still incline in favor of the
petitioner pursuant to the doctrine announced in Santos & Espinosa v.
Estejada 24 where the Court announced:

If the claim of both the plaintiff and the defendant are weak,
judgment must be for the defendant, for the latter being in
possession is presumed to be the owner, and cannot be
obliged to show or prove a better right.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court is SET ASIDE and

that of the trial court REINSTATED, with costs against the private
respondent. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 112127 July 17, 1995
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REMEDIOS FRANCO, FRANCISCO N.
LOPEZ, CECILIA P. VDA. DE LOPEZ, REDAN LOPEZ AND
REMARENE LOPEZ, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY filed this petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed that
of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City directing petitioner to reconvey
to private respondents the property donated to it by their predecessor-
in-interest.
Sometime in 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., who was then a
member of the Board of Trustees of the Central Philippine College (now
Central Philippine University [CPU]), executed a deed of donation in
favor of the latter of a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3174-B-1 of
the subdivision plan Psd-1144, then a portion of Lot No. 3174-B, for
which Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3910-A was issued in the name
of the donee CPU with the following annotations copied from the deed
of donation —
1. The land described shall be utilized by the CPU
exclusively for the establishment and use of a medical
college with all its buildings as part of the curriculum;
2. The said college shall not sell, transfer or convey to any
third party nor in any way encumber said land;
3. The said land shall be called "RAMON LOPEZ
CAMPUS", and the said college shall be under obligation
to erect a cornerstone bearing that name. Any net income
from the land or any of its parks shall be put in a fund to be
known as the "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS FUND" to be
used for improvements of said campus and erection of a
building thereon.1
On 31 May 1989, private respondents, who are the heirs of Don Ramon
Lopez, Sr., filed an action for annulment of donation, reconveyance and
damages against CPU alleging that since 1939 up to the time the action
was filed the latter had not complied with the conditions of the donation.
Private respondents also argued that petitioner had in fact negotiated
with the National Housing Authority (NHA) to exchange the donated
property with another land owned by the latter.
In its answer petitioner alleged that the right of private respondents to
file the action had prescribed; that it did not violate any of the conditions
in the deed of donation because it never used the donated property for
any other purpose than that for which it was intended; and, that it did
not sell, transfer or convey it to any third party.
On 31 May 1991, the trial court held that petitioner failed to comply with
the conditions of the donation and declared it null and void. The court a
quo further directed petitioner to execute a deed of the reconveyance of
the property in favor of the heirs of the donor, namely, private
respondents herein.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 18 June 1993
ruled that the annotations at the back of petitioner's certificate of title
were resolutory conditions breach of which should terminate the rights
of the donee thus making the donation revocable.
The appellate court also found that while the first condition mandated
petitioner to utilize the donated property for the establishment of a
medical school, the donor did not fix a period within which the condition
must be fulfilled, hence, until a period was fixed for the fulfillment of the
condition, petitioner could not be considered as having failed to comply
with its part of the bargain. Thus, the appellate court rendered its
decision reversing the appealed decision and remanding the case to
the court of origin for the determination of the time within which
petitioner should comply with the first condition annotated in the
certificate of title.
Petitioner now alleges that the Court of Appeals erred: (a) in holding
that the quoted annotations in the certificate of title of petitioner are
onerous obligations and resolutory conditions of the donation which
must be fulfilled non-compliance of which would render the donation
revocable; (b) in holding that the issue of prescription does not deserve
"disquisition;" and, (c) in remanding the case to the trial court for the
fixing of the period within which petitioner would establish a medical
college.2
We find it difficult to sustain the petition. A clear perusal of the
conditions set forth in the deed of donation executed by Don Ramon
Lopez, Sr., gives us no alternative but to conclude that his donation was
onerous, one executed for a valuable consideration which is considered
the equivalent of the donation itself, e.g., when a donation imposes a
burden equivalent to the value of the donation. A gift of land to the City
of Manila requiring the latter to erect schools, construct a children's
playground and open streets on the land was considered an onerous
donation.3 Similarly, where Don Ramon Lopez donated the subject
parcel of land to petitioner but imposed an obligation upon the latter to
establish a medical college thereon, the donation must be for an
onerous consideration.
Under Art. 1181 of the Civil Code, on conditional obligations, the
acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those
already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which
constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person donates land to another
on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school, the
condition imposed was not a condition precedent or a suspensive
condition but a resolutory one.4 It is not correct to say that the
schoolhouse had to be constructed before the donation became
effective, that is, before the donee could become the owner of the land,
otherwise, it would be invading the property rights of the donor. The
donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition.5 If there
was no fulfillment or compliance with the condition, such as what
obtains in the instant case, the donation may now be revoked and all
rights which the donee may have acquired under it shall be deemed lost
and extinguished.
The claim of petitioner that prescription bars the instant action of private
respondents is unavailing.
The condition imposed by the donor, i.e., the building of a
medical school upon the land donated, depended upon the
exclusive will of the donee as to when this condition shall be
fulfilled. When petitioner accepted the donation, it bound itself to
comply with the condition thereof. Since the time within which the
condition should be fulfilled depended upon the exclusive will of
the petitioner, it has been held that its absolute acceptance and
the acknowledgment of its obligation provided in the deed of
donation were sufficient to prevent the statute of limitations from
barring the action of private respondents upon the original
contract which was the deed of donation.6
Moreover, the time from which the cause of action accrued for the
revocation of the donation and recovery of the property donated cannot
be specifically determined in the instant case. A cause of action arises
when that which should have been done is not done, or that which
should not have been done is done.7 In cases where there is no special
provision for such computation, recourse must be had to the rule that
the period must be counted from the day on which the corresponding
action could have been instituted. It is the legal possibility of bringing
the action which determines the starting point for the computation of the
period. In this case, the starting point begins with the expiration of a
reasonable period and opportunity for petitioner to fulfill what has been
charged upon it by the donor.
The period of time for the establishment of a medical college and the
necessary buildings and improvements on the property cannot be
quantified in a specific number of years because of the presence of
several factors and circumstances involved in the erection of an
educational institution, such as government laws and regulations
pertaining to education, building requirements and property restrictions
which are beyond the control of the donee.
Thus, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature and
circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the general
rule provided in Art. 1197 of the Civil Code applies, which provides that
the courts may fix the duration thereof because the fulfillment of the
obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the
period for compliance therewith and such period has arrived.8
instant action, petitioner has failed to comply with its obligation as
donee. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length
of time. Hence, it is only just and equitable now to declare the subject
donation already ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so that
petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to the heirs
of the donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Br. 34,
of 31 May 1991 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED, and the decision of
the Court of Appeals of 18 June 1993 is accordingly MODIFIED.
Consequently, petitioner is directed to reconvey to private respondents
Lot No. 3174-B-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-1144 covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-3910-A within thirty (30) days from the finality
of this judgment.

This general rule however cannot be applied considering the different Costs against petitioner.
set of circumstances existing in the instant case. More than a
reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed petitioner SO ORDERED.
to avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be
burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid. But, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no more need to fix the
duration of a term of the obligation when such procedure would be a
mere technicality and formality and would serve no purpose than to
delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive multiplication of
suits. 9 Moreover, under Art. 1191 of the Civil Code, when one of the
obligors cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him, the obligee
may seek rescission and the court shall decree the same unless there
is just cause authorizing the fixing of a period. In the absence of any
just cause for the court to determine the period of the compliance, there
Separate Opinions
is no more obstacle for the court to decree the rescission claimed.

Finally, since the questioned deed of donation herein is basically a

gratuitous one, doubts referring to incidental circumstances of a DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
gratuitous contract should be resolved in favor of the least transmission
of rights and interests. 10Records are clear and facts are undisputed that
since the execution of the deed of donation up to the time of filing of the
I agree with the view in the majority opinion that the donation in
question is onerous considering the conditions imposed by the donor on
the donee which created reciprocal obligations upon both parties.
Beyond that, I beg to disagree.
First of all, may I point out an inconsistency in the majority opinion's
description of the donation in question. In one part, it says that the
donation in question is onerous. Thus, on page 4 it states:
We find it difficult to sustain the petition. A clear perusal of
the conditions set forth in the deed of donation executed by
Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., give us no alternative but to
conclude that his donation was onerous, one executed for
a valuable consideration which is considered the equivalent
of the donation itself, e.g., when a donation imposes a
burden equivalent to the value of the donation . . . .
(emphasis supplied)
Yet, in the last paragraph of page 8 it states that the donation is
basically a gratuitous one. The pertinent portion thereof reads:
Finally, since the questioned deed of donation herein is
basically a gratuitous one, doubts referring to incidental
circumstances of a gratuitous contract should be resolved
in favor of the least transmission of rights and interest . . .
(emphasis supplied)
Second, the discussion on conditional obligations is unnecessary.
There is no conditional obligation to speak of in this case. It seems that
the "conditions" imposed by the donor and as the word is used in the
law of donations is confused with "conditions" as used in the law of
obligations. In his annotation of Article 764 of the Civil Code on
Donations, Arturo M. Tolentino, citing the well-known civilists such as
Castan, Perez Gonzalez and Alguer, and Colin & Capitant, states
clearly the context within which the term "conditions" is used in the law
of donations, to wit:
The word "conditions" in this article does not refer to
uncertain events on which the birth or extinguishment of a
juridical relation depends, but is used in the vulgar sense
of obligations or chargesimposed by the donor on the
donee. It is used, not in its technical or strict legal sense,
but in its broadest sense.1 (emphasis supplied)
Clearly then, when the law and the deed of donation speaks of
"conditions" of a donation, what are referred to are actually the
obligations, charges or burdens imposed by the donor upon the donee
and which would characterize the donation as onerous. In the present
case, the donation is, quite obviously, onerous, but it is more properly
called a "modal donation." A modal donation is one in which the donor
imposes a prestation upon the donee. The establishment of the medical
college as the condition of the donation in the present case is one such
prestation.
The conditions imposed by the donor Don Ramon Lopez determines
neither the existence nor the extinguishment of the obligations of the
donor and the donee with respect to the donation. In fact, the conditions
imposed by Don Ramon Lopez upon the donee are the very obligations
of the donation — to build the medical college and use the property for
the purposes specified in the deed of donation. It is very clear that
those obligations are unconditional, the fulfillment, performance,
existence or extinguishment of which is not dependent on any future or
uncertain event or past and unknown event, as the Civil Code would
define a conditional obligation.2
Reliance on the case of Parks vs. Province of Tarlac3 as cited on page
5 of the majority opinion is erroneous in so far as the latter stated that
the condition in Parks is a resolutory one and applied this to the present
case. A more careful reading of this Court's decision would reveal that
nowhere did we say, whether explicitly or impliedly, that the donation in
that case, which also has a condition imposed to build a school and a
public park upon the property donated, is a resolutory condition.4 It is
incorrect to say that the "conditions" of the donation there or in the
present case are resolutory conditions because, applying Article 1181
of the Civil Code, that would mean that upon fulfillment of the
conditions, the rights already acquired will be extinguished. Obviously,
that could not have been the intention of the parties.
What the majority opinion probably had in mind was that the conditions
are resolutory because if they are notcomplied with, the rights of the
donee as such will be extinguished and the donation will be revoked. To
my mind, though, it is more accurate to state that the conditions here
are not resolutory conditions but, for the reasons stated above,
are the obligations imposed by the donor.
Third, I cannot subscribe to the view that the provisions of Article 1197
cannot be applied here. The conditions/obligations imposed by the
donor herein are subject to a period. I draw this conclusion based on
our previous ruling which, although made almost 90 years ago, still
finds application in the present case. In Barretto vs. City of Manila,5 we
said that when the contract of donation, as the one involved therein,
has no fixed period in which the condition should be fulfilled, the
provisions of what is now Article 1197 (then Article 1128) are applicable
and it is the duty of the court to fix a suitable time for its fulfillment.
Indeed, from the nature and circumstances of the conditions/obligations
of the present donation, it can be inferred that a period was
contemplated by the donor. Don Ramon Lopez could not have intended
his property to remain idle for a long period of time when in fact, he
specifically burdened the donee with the obligation to set up a medical
college therein and thus put his property to good use. There is a need
to fix the duration of the time within which the conditions imposed are to
be fulfilled.
It is also important to fix the duration or period for the performance of
the conditions/obligations in the donation in resolving the petitioner's
claim that prescription has already barred the present action. I disagree
once more with the ruling of the majority that the action of the
petitioners is not barred by the statute of limitations. There is misplaced
reliance again on a previous decision of this Court in Osmeña vs.
Rama.6 That case does not speak of a deed of donation as erroneously
quoted and cited by the majority opinion. It speaks of a contract for a
sum of money where the debtor herself imposed a condition which will
determine when she will fulfill her obligation to pay the creditor, thus,
making the fulfillment of her obligation dependent upon her will. What
we have here, however, is not a contract for a sum of money but a
donation where the donee has not imposed any conditions on the
fulfillment of its obligations. Although it is admitted that the fulfillment of
the conditions/obligations of the present donation may be dependent on
the will of the donee as to when it will comply therewith, this did not
arise out of a condition which the donee itself imposed. It is believed
that the donee was not meant to and does not have absolute control
over the time within which it will perform its obligations. It must still do
so within a reasonable time. What that reasonable time is, under the
circumstances, for the courts to determine. Thus, the mere fact that
there is no time fixed as to when the conditions of the donation are to
be fulfilled does not ipso facto mean that the statute of limitations will
not apply anymore and the action to revoke the donation becomes
imprescriptible.
Admittedly, the donation now in question is an onerous donation and is
governed by the law on contracts (Article 733) and the case of Osmeña,
being one involving a contract, may apply. But we must not lose sight of
the fact that it is still a donation for which this Court itself applied the
pertinent law to resolve situations such as this. That the action to
revoke the donation can still prescribe has been the pronouncement of
this Court as early as 1926 in the case of Parks which, on this point,
finds relevance in this case. There, this Court said,
[that] this action [for the revocation of the donation] is
prescriptible, there is no doubt. There is no legal provision
which excludes this class of action from the statute of
limitations. And not only this, the law itself recognizes the
prescriptibility of the action for the revocation of a donation,
providing a special period of [four] years for the revocation
by the subsequent birth of children [Art. 646, now Art. 763],
 and . . . by reason of ingratitude. If no special period is
provided for the prescription of the action for revocation for
noncompliance of the conditions of the donation [Art. 647,
now Art. 764], it is because in this respect the donation is
considered onerous and is governed by the law of
contracts and the general rules of prescription.7
More recently, in De Luna v. Abrigo,8 this Court reiterated the ruling
in Parks and said that:
It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code,
actions for the revocation of a donation must be brought
within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the
conditions of the donation. However, it is Our opinion that
said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of
the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous
donations are governed by the rules on contracts.
In the light of the above, the rules on contracts and the
general rules on prescription and not the rules on
donations are applicable in the case at bar.
The law applied in both cases is Article 1144(1). It refers to the
prescription of an action upon a written contract, which is what the deed
of an onerous donation is. The prescriptive period is ten years from the
time the cause of action accrues, and that is, from the expiration of the
time within which the donee must comply with the conditions/obligations
of the donation. As to when this exactly is remains to be determined,
and that is for the courts to do as reposed upon them by Article 1197.
For the reasons expressed above, I register my dissent. Accordingly,
the decision of the Court of Appeals must be upheld, except its ruling
that the conditions of the donation are resolutory.
Padilla, J., dissents
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
I agree with the view in the majority opinion that the donation in
question is onerous considering the conditions imposed by the donor on
the donee which created reciprocal obligations upon both parties.
Beyond that, I beg to disagree.
First of all, may I point out an inconsistency in the majority opinion's
description of the donation in question. In one part, it says that the
donation in question is onerous. Thus, on page 4 it states:
We find it difficult to sustain the petition. A clear perusal of
the conditions set forth in the deed of donation executed by
Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., give us no alternative but to
conclude that his donation was onerous, one executed for
a valuable consideration which is considered the equivalent
of the donation itself, e.g., when a donation imposes a
burden equivalent to the value of the donation . . . .
(emphasis supplied)
Yet, in the last paragraph of page 8 it states that the donation is
basically a gratuitous one. The pertinent portion thereof reads:
Finally, since the questioned deed of donation herein is
basically a gratuitous one, doubts referring to incidental
circumstances of a gratuitous contract should be resolved
in favor of the least transmission of rights and interest . . .
(emphasis supplied)
Second, the discussion on conditional obligations is unnecessary.
There is no conditional obligation to speak of in this case. It seems that
the "conditions" imposed by the donor and as the word is used in the
law of donations is confused with "conditions" as used in the law of
obligations. In his annotation of Article 764 of the Civil Code on
Donations, Arturo M. Tolentino, citing the well-known civilists such as
Castan, Perez Gonzalez and Alguer, and Colin & Capitant, states
clearly the context within which the term "conditions" is used in the law
of donations, to wit:
The word "conditions" in this article does not refer to
uncertain events on which the birth or extinguishment of a
juridical relation depends, but is used in the vulgar sense
of obligations or chargesimposed by the donor on the
donee. It is used, not in its technical or strict legal sense,
but in its broadest sense.1 (emphasis supplied)
Clearly then, when the law and the deed of donation speaks of
"conditions" of a donation, what are referred to are actually the
obligations, charges or burdens imposed by the donor upon the donee
and which would characterize the donation as onerous. In the present
case, the donation is, quite obviously, onerous, but it is more properly
called a "modal donation." A modal donation is one in which the donor
imposes a prestation upon the donee. The establishment of the medical
college as the condition of the donation in the present case is one such
prestation.
The conditions imposed by the donor Don Ramon Lopez determines
neither the existence nor the extinguishment of the obligations of the
donor and the donee with respect to the donation. In fact, the conditions
imposed by Don Ramon Lopez upon the donee are the very obligations
of the donation — to build the medical college and use the property for
the purposes specified in the deed of donation. It is very clear that
those obligations are unconditional, the fulfillment, performance,
existence or extinguishment of which is not dependent on any future or
uncertain event or past and unknown event, as the Civil Code would
define a conditional obligation.2
Reliance on the case of Parks vs. Province of Tarlac3 as cited on page
5 of the majority opinion is erroneous in so far as the latter stated that
the condition in Parks is a resolutory one and applied this to the present
case. A more careful reading of this Court's decision would reveal that
nowhere did we say, whether explicitly or impliedly, that the donation in
that case, which also has a condition imposed to build a school and a
public park upon the property donated, is a resolutory condition.4 It is
incorrect to say that the "conditions" of the donation there or in the
present case are resolutory conditions because, applying Article 1181
of the Civil Code, that would mean that upon fulfillment of the
conditions, the rights already acquired will be extinguished. Obviously,
that could not have been the intention of the parties.
What the majority opinion probably had in mind was that the conditions
are resolutory because if they are notcomplied with, the rights of the
donee as such will be extinguished and the donation will be revoked. To
my mind, though, it is more accurate to state that the conditions here
are not resolutory conditions but, for the reasons stated above,
are the obligations imposed by the donor.
Third, I cannot subscribe to the view that the provisions of Article 1197
cannot be applied here. The conditions/obligations imposed by the
donor herein are subject to a period. I draw this conclusion based on
our previous ruling which, although made almost 90 years ago, still
finds application in the present case. In Barretto vs. City of Manila,5 we
said that when the contract of donation, as the one involved therein,
has no fixed period in which the condition should be fulfilled, the
provisions of what is now Article 1197 (then Article 1128) are applicable
and it is the duty of the court to fix a suitable time for its fulfillment.
Indeed, from the nature and circumstances of the conditions/obligations
of the present donation, it can be inferred that a period was
contemplated by the donor. Don Ramon Lopez could not have intended
his property to remain idle for a long period of time when in fact, he
specifically burdened the donee with the obligation to set up a medical
college therein and thus put his property to good use. There is a need
to fix the duration of the time within which the conditions imposed are to
be fulfilled.
It is also important to fix the duration or period for the performance of
the conditions/obligations in the donation in resolving the petitioner's
claim that prescription has already barred the present action. I disagree
once more with the ruling of the majority that the action of the
petitioners is not barred by the statute of limitations. There is misplaced
reliance again on a previous decision of this Court in Osmeña vs.
Rama.6 That case does not speak of a deed of donation as erroneously
quoted and cited by the majority opinion. It speaks of a contract for a
sum of money where the debtor herself imposed a condition which will
determine when she will fulfill her obligation to pay the creditor, thus,
making the fulfillment of her obligation dependent upon her will. What
we have here, however, is not a contract for a sum of money but a
donation where the donee has not imposed any conditions on the
fulfillment of its obligations. Although it is admitted that the fulfillment of
the conditions/obligations of the present donation may be dependent on
the will of the donee as to when it will comply therewith, this did not
arise out of a condition which the donee itself imposed. It is believed
that the donee was not meant to and does not have absolute control
over the time within which it will perform its obligations. It must still do
so within a reasonable time. What that reasonable time is, under the
circumstances, for the courts to determine. Thus, the mere fact that
there is no time fixed as to when the conditions of the donation are to
be fulfilled does not ipso facto mean that the statute of limitations will
not apply anymore and the action to revoke the donation becomes
imprescriptible.
Admittedly, the donation now in question is an onerous donation and is
governed by the law on contracts (Article 733) and the case of Osmeña,
being one involving a contract, may apply. But we must not lose sight of
the fact that it is still a donation for which this Court itself applied the
pertinent law to resolve situations such as this. That the action to
revoke the donation can still prescribe has been the pronouncement of
this Court as early as 1926 in the case of Parks which, on this point,
finds relevance in this case. There, this Court said,
[that] this action [for the revocation of the donation] is
prescriptible, there is no doubt. There is no legal provision
which excludes this class of action from the statute of
limitations. And not only this, the law itself recognizes the
prescriptibility of the action for the revocation of a donation,
providing a special period of [four] years for the revocation
by the subsequent birth of children [Art. 646, now Art. 763],
and . . . by reason of ingratitude. If no special period is
provided for the prescription of the action for revocation for
noncompliance of the conditions of the donation [Art. 647,
now Art. 764], it is because in this respect the donation is
considered onerous and is governed by the law of
contracts and the general rules of prescription.7
More recently, in De Luna v. Abrigo,8 this Court reiterated the ruling
in Parks and said that:
It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code,
actions for the revocation of a donation must be brought
within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the
conditions of the donation. However, it is Our opinion that
said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of
the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous
donations are governed by the rules on contracts.
In the light of the above, the rules on contracts and the
general rules on prescription and not the rules on
donations are applicable in the case at bar.
The law applied in both cases is Article 1144(1). It refers to the
prescription of an action upon a written contract, which is what the deed
of an onerous donation is. The prescriptive period is ten years from the
time the cause of action accrues, and that is, from the expiration of the
time within which the donee must comply with the conditions/obligations
of the donation. As to when this exactly is remains to be determined,
and that is for the courts to do as reposed upon them by Article 1197.

For the reasons expressed above, I register my dissent. Accordingly,

the decision of the Court of Appeals must be upheld, except its ruling
that the conditions of the donation are resolutory.