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Econometric Analysis of Health Data

Edited by Andrew Jones, Owen O’Donnell


Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
ISBNs: 0-470-84145-1 (Hardback); 0-470-84631-3 (Electronic)

Section I

Latent Variables and Selection


Problems
Econometric Analysis of Health Data
Edited by Andrew Jones, Owen O’Donnell
Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
ISBNs: 0-470-84145-1 (Hardback); 0-470-84631-3 (Electronic)

The Demand for Health: an Empirical


Reformulation of the Grossman Model
ADAM WAGSTAFF
The World Bank, Washington DC, USA

Despite the acclaim with which The Demand For Health health-care equation? Another line of enquiry concerns
[1] was greeted following its publication 20 years ago, the possibility that the apparent rejection may be due to
Grossman’s model of health capital accumulation has inappropriate assumptions in the theoretical model.
been the subject of surprisingly few empirical tests. Of Might the result be due, for example, to a failure to take
course, many empirical studies of the demand for health into account in the theoretical model that adjusting to the
care and the demand for and production of health do desired stock of health capital may not be instantaneous?
refer to Grossman’s ideas, but since very few actually set
up and test an empirical counterpart to Grossman’s
model, it is hard to tell just how far the results of these GROSSMAN’S MODEL
studies support the predictions of the model.
The few studies that have been based on Grossman’s In Grossman’s theoretical model, individuals are as-
formal model give conflicting results. All closely follow sumed to inherit a stock of health capital H . Thereafter
Grossman’s own empirical formulation and employ 
their health stock evolves according to the relationship
double logarithmic demand functions for health and
health care. The main difference between the studies is to H 9H :I 9 H , (1.1)
be found in the specification of the demand-for-health- R R\ R\ R\ R\
care equations: Grossman and Muurinen [2] estimated
where H is health stock at the beginning of period t, I
reduced-form equations, while the author in an earlier R R\
is gross investment during the period t 9 1 and  is the
study [3] estimated both reduced-form and structural R\
rate of depreciation in operation during the same period.
equations. The reduced-form estimates of all three studies
In Grossman’s formulation — the formulation adopted in
were broadly consistent with the predictions of Gross-
the present paper —  depends only on the individual’s age
man’s model, but the structural parameters of the
and is hence exogenous. The individual’s utility and in-
author’s earlier study were invariably the wrong sign.
come are both increasing functions of the stock of health
This suggested that, in contrast to what was implied by
capital, and in selecting the optimal time path of H , the
Grossman’s and Muurinen’s work, the available empiri- R
individual bears these benefits in mind, along with the
cal evidence did not, in fact, support Grossman’s theoreti-
costs of ‘holding’ health capital. The latter comprise inter-
cal model.
est costs, depreciation costs and any offsetting capital
The purpose of this paper is to examine the various
gains. All are increasing in the cost of new investment.
reasons for the apparent rejection by the data of the
Formally, the equilibrium stock of health capital is de-
Grossman model. To what extent is the rejection more
fined by the condition
apparent than real? In other words, might the rejection be
due to the introduction of inappropriate assumptions in
moving from the theoretical model to the empirical  ; a : r ;  9   , (1.2)
R R R R\ R
model? Might the apparent rejection be due, for example,
to an inappropriate specification of the demand-for- where  is the pecuniary marginal benefit of health capi-
R
Econometric Analysis of Health Data. Edited by Andrew M. Jones and Owen O’Donnell
© 2002 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Previously published in Health Economics, Vol. 2; pp. 189—198 (1993). © John Wiley & Sons Ltd
16 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF HEALTH DATA
tal, a is the non-pecuniary marginal benefit, r is the rate of and the cost-minimization condition for gross invest-
R
interest,  is the marginal cost of investment and  is ment. The structural demand-for-medical-care equation
R R\
its percentage change. thus has the form
Although it is the time profile of health that the individ-
ual selects, the means by which this is achieved is, of ln M : ln H ; (1 9  )ln w 9 (1 9  )ln PK
R R  R  R
course, the investment profile. If the individual wishes to ;  t 9  E, (1.5)
R 
increase his health stock from one period to the next, or if
he wishes it to decrease by less than the amount of depre- where the coefficient of plus one on the log of health
ciation, he must undertake some health investment. Since capital reflects the derived demand hypothesis (an in-
health capital cannot be sold, investment cannot be nega- crease in the desired stock of health capital ought to
tive. The model is ‘neoclassical’ in that stocks are assumed increase health care utilization). Note that the signs of
to adjust instantaneously to their new equilibrium values. coefficients are exactly the opposite of those in demand-
The predictions of the effects on health and investment of for-health equation. Thus the coefficient on education in
changes in the model’s parameters are derived from this equation reflects solely the productivity effect; i.e.,
Equations 1.1 and 1.2. holding health constant, the better educated ought to
demand less health care, since they are more efficient
producers of health. Rather than estimate Equation 1.5
PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL WORK directly, Grossman and Muurinen estimate instead a re-
duced-form demand-for-health-care equation, obtained
Following Grossman, the approach to date in empirical by substituting Equation 1.4 in Equation 1.5:
work has been to derive a double-logarithmic demand-
for-health and demand-for-health-care equations from ln M : [ ( 9 1) ; 1]ln w 9 [ ( 9 1) ; 1]
R  R 
Equations 1.1 and 1.2. ln PK ;  ( 9 1)t ;  ( 9 1)E (1.6)
The demand-for-health equation is derived by specify- R   
ing functional forms for  (or a ),  and  , and by In this equation, as in the demand-for-health equation,
R R R R
assuming that r 9  is either zero or some function of the coefficients reflect not only the parameters of the
R\
time. In the case of the pure investment model, for technology, but also the demand elasticity, .
example, the estimating equation has the form Broadly speaking, the parameter estimates obtained to
date for the demand-for-health and the reduced-form
ln H :   ln w 9   ln PK 9  t ;  E, (1.3) demand-for-health-care equations lend support to Gross-
R  R  R  R 
man’s model. In the author’s earlier study, for example,
where (0    1) is the elasticity of the MEC schedule education entered these two equations with positive and
(the schedule relating  to H ), w is the wage rate, PK is negative signs respectively, which is consistent with edu-
R R
price of medical care, t is age and E is education. The cation-efficiency hypothesis and with the demand elastic-
parameter  reflects the productivity of medical care in ity being less than one.

the production of health investments and — given the The parameter estimates of the structural demand-for-
Cobb Douglas production technology — ought to be posi- health-care equation reported in Wagstaff [3] tell a differ-
tive but not larger than one. The parameter  reflects the ent study, however. The coefficient on health was nega-

effect of aging on depreciation and ought therefore to be tive, which is inconsistent with the derived demand hy-
positive. The parameter  reflects the productivity of pothesis, and education had a positive coefficient in this

education in health production and is hypothesized to be equation, contrary to what is predicted by theory. These
positive. results, coupled with the reduced-form parameter esti-
To obtain the demand-for-health-care equations, the mates, imply that the demand elasticity is outside the
investment identity is log-linearized to obtain admissible range, so that the two wrong signs when multi-
plied together give the right sign for the reduced-form
ln I : ln H ; ln  ; ln[(H / ) ; 1]. (1.4) parameter. Similar results are obtained for other vari-
R\ R\ R\ R R\
ables.
The term in square brackets is assumed to be zero (Gross-
man), invariant across the sample (Muurinen), or ran-
domly distributed across the sample (Wagstaff). The de- PROBLEMS WITH PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL WORK
mand-for-health-care equation proper is then obtained
by combining Equation 1.4 with the investment produc- Two possible responses to these results seem possible.
tion function (a Cobb-Douglas technology is assumed) The first is that the theoretical model has not been tested
THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH 17
properly due to the introduction of inappropriate as- pirical results may be due to a failure to recognize that
sumptions in moving from the theoretical model to the individuals are unable to adjust their health stocks in-
empirical model. The second is that the theoretical model stantaneously. Although the assumption of instantaneous
has been tested properly and has been found to be want- adjustment may well be unwarranted, it would appear, on
ing, suggesting that modifications might be in order. reflection, that it is unlikely to be the source of the appar-
The obvious weakness in Grossman’s empirical formu- ent inconsistency between the data and the model. To see
lation lies in the derivation of the demand-for-health-care why, suppose that instead of assuming instantaneous ad-
equation. The assumption that H / is zero is particu- justment, we assume a partial adjustment framework.
R R\
larly weak. It is at odds with the theoretical model and Thus assume that desired health stocks are generated
eliminates entirely the inherently dynamic character of according to the process
the net investment identity. The implications of this as-
sumption can be most easily seen if instead of converting H* : X ; u , (1.9)
R R R
Equations 1.1 and 1.2 to log-linear equations, one retains
the inherently linear nature of the net investment identity where H* are desired stocks, and that a fraction
R
and adopts a linear specification of the demand-for- (0    1) of the gap between desired and actual stocks
health equation. Thus let the latter be of the form is closed each period. Thus

H : X ; u , (1.7) H 9 H : (H* 9 H ), (1.10)


R R R R R\ R R\
so that if  : 1, adjustment is instantaneous and actual
where X is a vector of variables reflecting the arguments
R and desired stocks coincide, as in Grossman’s formula-
of the first-order condition (i.e. Equation 1.2), such as age
tion. Combining Equations 1.1, 1.9 and 1.10 yields
and education, and  is a vector of coefficients. Substitu-
ting Equation 1.7 into Equation 1.1 and rearranging
I : X 9 ( 9  )H ; u . (1.11)
yields R\ R R\ R\ R
Examination of Equation 1.11 reveals that although the
I : X 9 (1 9  )H ; u . (1.8)
R\ R R\ R\ R signs of the coefficients on the X-variables are unaffected
by less-than-instantaneous adjustment, the sign of the
In terms of the variables included, Equation 1.8 is very coefficient on lagged health stock could actually be posi-
similar to the structural demand-for-health-care equation tive (i.e., if   ). Thus recognizing non-instantaneous
implied by Grossman’s empirical formulation: in both adjustment does not actually help to explain the negative
equations measures of investment are expressed as func- coefficient on health stocks in the structural demand-for-
tions of the arguments of the demand-for-health equation health-care equation. On the contrary, non-instan-
and the stock of health capital, albeit lagged capital stock taneous adjustment makes a negative coefficient less like-
in the case of Equation 1.8. The interpretation of the ly.
parameters is, however, quite different. In contrast to
those in the structural equation, the coefficients on the
X-variables in Equation 1.8 ought to have the same sign AN ALTERNATIVE EMPIRICAL FORMULATION
as their counterparts in the demand-for-health equation. OF GROSSMAN’S MODEL
Moreover, the sign of the coefficient on health stock in
Equation 1.8 ought to be negative, whereas the coefficient The above suggests that any empirical test of Grossman’s
on (contemporaneous) health ought to be positive in model ought to acknowledge the inherently linear char-
Grossman’s structural equation. Equation 1.8 suggests, acter of the net investment identity and should not there-
therefore, that the observed negative coefficient on health fore involve a long-linearization of this equation. Since
stock in structural demand-for-health-care equations and any empirical model will need to include a demand-for-
the positive coefficients on variables such as education in health equation as well as an investment equation, this
these equations may, after all, be quite consistent with implies that the former ought to be intrinsically linear. In
Grossman’s theoretical model. The implication is, then, what follows it is assumed that it is actually linear, al-
that it is Grossman’s empirical formulation of his model though clearly this assumption could be relaxed in future
which is to be rejected, not the theoretical model itself. work to allow for squared, cubed and cross-product
An alternative line of enquiry is that it is the theoretical terms and hence for a more flexible functional form. Since
model which requires some reformulation. One possibil- non-instantaneous adjustment seems highly plausible, it
ity, suggested by the author in his earlier paper, is that the also seems desirable to allow for this in the empirical
apparent inconsistency between the theory and the em- model.
18 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF HEALTH DATA
Equations 1.1, 1.9 and 1.10 would therefore seem to be education (if education affects the efficiency of health
a more sensible starting point for a test of the Grossman production), prices (including time prices) and possibly
model. The demand-for-health equation for this empiri- supply factors (such as the availability of the relevant
cal formulation of the model is found by combining facilities).
Equations 1.9 and 1.10 to obtain In what follows it is assumed that the answers to the
same survey questions on health are available at two
H : X ; (1 9 )H ; u , (1.12) points in time. These two vectors of variables — denoted
R R R\ R below by y and y — are assumed to be linearly related
R R\
to H and H respectively according to the health indi-
so that, in contrast to Grossman’s formulation, lagged R R\
health stocks affect the current demand for health. Gross- cator equations
man’s model is the special case where  : 1. Note that the

      
y  0 H 
coefficients on the X-variables in Equation 1.12 ought to R : R R ; R (1.13)
be equal to those in Equation 1.11: testing this restriction y 0  H 
R\ R\ R\ R\
provides a test of the derived demand hypothesis.
Suppose, for the moment, that  is invariant across where  and  are coefficient vectors and  and
R R\ R
individuals. Then if health stocks and investment were  are vectors of error terms. To ensure identification, a
R\
observable, one could proceed directly and estimate normalization is introduced into each of the coefficient
Equations 1.11 and 1.12. This would generate estimates of vectors; to ensure that H and H are measured in the
R R\
 and . Of course, unrestricted estimation would leave  same units, the same normalization is introduced in both
and the variance of u over-identified, since the two equa-  and  . Ideally one would allow for the possibility
R R R\
tions would give two different sets of estimates of these that  and  are correlated, but identification prob-
R R\
parameters. The answer to this is to impose the appropri- lems were encountered when this was attempted. It is also
ate cross-equation equalities in the estimation process, assumed that information on health care utilization is
which, if the derived demand hypothesis is tenable, ought available for the intervening period. Denote by M the
R\
to be accepted by the data. vector of health care utilization variables and by Z the
R\
This leaves the problem that  is unlikely to be invari- vector of variables other than gross investment which
ant across the sample. If it is assumed that  is affected influence the demand for health care. Then, if the de-
only by the person’s age, so that all other ‘environmental’ mand-for-health-care function is linear, in addition to
variables affect the efficiency of health production, the Equation 1.10, we have
answer would seem to be estimate separate models for
different age groups. If  were the only parameter which is M : BI ; Z ; e (1.14)
R\ R\ R\ R\
thought to vary with age, the appropriate cross-group
equalities ought to be imposed to ensure that parameters where B and  are a vector and matrix of coefficients
other than  are the same for all age groups. In fact it respectively, and e is a vector of error terms. Again, in
R\
seems more plausible to assume that both  and  vary order to ensure identification, one normalization is intro-
with age, since it seems likely that the elderly find it duced into the vector B. It is also assumed that some rows
harder than the young to adjust their health stocks to of  are empty, i.e. that utilization of some types of health
their desired levels. care does not depend on the Z-variables.
All this assumes that health stocks and investment are
observable. Of course, in reality they are not, but their
unobservability can be overcome using a Multiple Indi- DATA AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
cator Multiple Cause (MIMIC) latent variable model [4].
The unobservability of health capital can be overcome by The model consists of the demand-for-health equation
introducing health indicators and specifying additional (Equation 1.12), the health investment equation (Equa-
equations linking these to the stock of health capital. tion 1.11), the health indicator equations (Equation 1.13),
Obvious indicators include responses to questions such and the demand-for-health-care equations (Equation
as ‘Do you suffer from any long-standing health prob- 1.14). Data are required therefore on each of the variables
lem?’ and ‘Do you consider your health to be excellent, in each of these equations.
good, fair or poor?’ The unobservability of health invest- The data for the present empirical exercise are taken
ment can be overcome by introducing demand-for- from the Danish Health Study [5] (DHS). This followed
health-care equations. As theory requires, these equations some 1000 households (1752 adults) over a period of 12
condition on health investment, as well as on other argu- months, beginning October 1982. Data on health and
ments of the demand function for health care, such as background variables (such as education) were obtained
THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH 19
at the beginning and end of year, and detailed informa- models, the relevant elements of  are expected to be
tion on morbidity and use of health services was obtained positive and negative for SCHOOL and AGE respective-
for each week of the study by means of a diary. The rate of ly. In the pure consumption model, the relevant element
attrition is relatively low (76% of households interviewed of  for EQFAMINC ought to be positive if EQ-
at the start of the study completed the 12 months), al- FAMINC is viewed as a proxy for the marginal utility of
though there is evidence that the probability of complet- initial wealth.
ing the study was related to age, education and initial The indicators of health investment that have been
health status [5]. used are all measures of health care utilization. Other
Of the numerous health indicators available in the forms of health investment have been excluded in the
DHS, three were selected for the present exercise: present analysis. The indicators used include:
∑ FUNLIM, a question relating to functional limita- ∑ GPCONS, the number of consultations over the year
tions, defined as a dummy variable taking a value of with a general practitioner (GP). All consultations have
one in the year in question if the health of the person been included, irrespective of whether they were face-
limited them from doing anything they wanted to do: to-face or telephone consultations, and irrespective of
∑ PAH, a question relating to physician-assessed health, where they occurred;
defined in terms of categorical responses to the state- ∑ HOSPDAYS, the number of days as an inpatient in
ment ‘According to the doctors I have seen my health is hospital over the year;
now excellent’, with the value 1 corresponding to ‘agree ∑ SPCONS, the number of consultations over the year
entirely’, the value 2 to ‘agree’, the value 3 to ‘don’t with a specialist;
know’, the value 4 to ‘disagree’ and the value 5 to ∑ PHYSIO, the number of sessions with a physiothera-
‘disagree entirely’; and pist;
∑ SAH, a question relating to self-assessed health, defined ∑ OUTPATIENT, the number of outpatient visits dur-
in terms of categorical responses to the statement ‘My ing the year;
health is excellent’, with values of 1 to 5 defined as in ∑ ACCEMER, the number of visits to a hospital accident
PAH. and emergency department.
The values of these variables for 1982 are denoted below It is assumed that the last two indicators depend only on
by FUNLIM82, PAH82 and SAH82, and those for 1983 the amount of investment undertaken, and do not depend
by FUNLIM83, PAH83 and SAH83. The two FUNLIM on other factors.
variables have been chosen for the normalizations: the Variables included in the Z-vector include SCHOOL,
relevant elements of  and  have been set equal to but also several variables reflecting the availability of
R R\
91.0, thus ensuring that the unobservable health vari- health care facilities, as well as distance to GP:
ables are both increasing in good health.
∑ GP/1000, the number of GPs per 1000 population in
The empirical model has been estimated for all adults,
the individual’s district (kommune);
irrespective of whether or not they are in paid employ-
∑ SP/1000, the number of community specialists per 1000
ment. Four variables have been included in the X-vector:
population in the individual’s district;
∑ EQFAMINC, equivalent household pre-tax monthly ∑ BEDS/1000, the number of hospital beds per 1000
wage income in October 1982. The equivalence scale is population in the individual’s district;
that discussed by Buhmann et al. [6], with a household ∑ PHYS/1000, the number of physiotherapists per 1000
size elasticity of 0.5. It is regrettable, but no information population in the individual’s district;
is available on household wage income at the end of the ∑ DIST-GP, distance in km from the individual’s home
study or on non-wage income at either date. EQ- to his or her GP.
FAMINC will thus substantially understate the pre-tax
The first and last are assumed to affect only GPCONS.
incomes of pensioners, and will understate — but pre-
The second is assumed to affect only SPCONS, BEDS/
sumably to a lesser extent — the incomes of households
1000 is assumed to affect only HOSPDAYS and PHYS/
containing social security recipients:
1000 is assumed to affect only PHYSIO.
∑ SCHOOL, the level of schooling attained, converted
into years of schooling. Measures of post-school educa-
tion were also included, but were found to be insignifi-
cant: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
∑ MALE, a dummy taking a value of one for males;
∑ AGE, the individual’s age in years. To take into account the possibility that  varies accord-
In Grossman’s pure investment and pure consumption ing to age, the sample (consisting entirely of adults) was
20 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF HEALTH DATA
split into two sub-samples of roughly equal size, the first tion methods available in LISREL, this tended to give the
comprising the under-41s (N : 707, after listwise dele- best fit (i.e., the smallest chi-squared value).
tion) and the second comprising the over-41s (N : 655). Tables 1.1 and 1.2 present the parameter estimates of
The most restrictive model is where only  9  varies the least restrictive model. The lack of t-statistics for
across the two age groups (and therefore only  varies, FUNLIM82 and FUNLIM83 in Table 1.1 and for OUT-
since (1 9 ) is invariant) and where the coefficients on PAT in Table 1.2 reflects the fact that these indicators
the X-variables are constrained to be equal in the de- have been used to scale the three latent variables, H ,
R\
mand-for-health and investment equations. The least re- H and I .
R R\
strictive model is that in which all parameters — including Since all three health indicators are likely to be decreas-
 and  — vary across the two age groups and the ing in good health it is reassuring to find negative coeffi-
R R\
equality constraints across the demand-for-health and cients in both sets of health indicator equations. It is also
investment equations are not imposed. reassuring to find that the latent health variables explain
Parameters were estimated using the computer pro- a substantial proportion of the variation in the health
gram LISREL [7]. Since the health indicators are all indicators. The same is not true of the investment vari-
ordinal variables and the health care utilization variables able. Although all utilization measures are increasing in
are heavily concentrated around zero, the best estimation health investment, the Z-variables and health investment
strategy would be to explicitly recognize that the health combined account for a relatively small proportion of the
indicators are ordinal variables and treat the utilization variation in the utilization variables, except in the case of
variables as censored variables. This can in principle be out-patient visits, where the R is fairly high. It is, of
done with LISREL by using Weighted Least Squares course, not uncommon to find low R values in micro-
(WLS) to analyse a matrix of polychoric correlations (i.e., econometric health care utilization equations. But the
estimates of the correlation in the latent bivariate normal implication for the Grossman model is that health care
distribution representing the two ordinal variables), with utilization may be a poor indicator of health investment.
the asymptotic variances and covariances of the poly- This probably explains — at least in part — why the R of
choric correlations as weights. In the present case this the investment equation in both sub-samples is very
proved infeasible: the program PRELIS [8] — which ac- low.
companies LISREL and computes the correlation and Turning to the parameter estimates of the equations in
covariance matrices required by LISREL — was unable to Table 1.2, the coefficients of the demand-for-health equa-
compute the asymptotic covariance matrix. Instead, the tions have the expected sign, except in the case of the
polychoric correlation matrix was analysed by means of coefficient on AGE in the under-41s equation. Although
Maximum Likelihood (ML), since, of the various estima- this is not significant, the signs in the two sub-sample

Table 1.1a ML estimates of health indicator equations for under 41s

FUNLIM82 PAH82 SAH82 FUNLIM83 PAH83 SAH83

H 91.000 91.385 91.622


R\
(16.18) (16.39)
H 91.000 91.264 91.310
R
(17.53) (17.72)
R 0.342 0.656 0.900 0.427 0.684 0.736

Note: t-values in parentheses.

Table 1.1b ML estimates of health indicator equations for over 41s

FUNLIM82 PAH82 SAH82 FUNLIM83 PAH83 SAH83

H 91.000 91.183 91.257


R\
(20.75) (21.55)
H 91.000 90.998 91.071
R
(23.56) (25.62)
R 0.520 0.727 0.821 0.673 0.671 0.775

Note: t-values in parentheses.


THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH 21
Table 1.2a ML estimates of structural equations for under 41s

H I OUTPAT ACCEMER GPCONS HOSPDAYS SPCONS PHYSIO


R R\
H 0.687 90.265
R\
(11.03) (4.18)
I 1.000 0.189 90.442 90.752 0.222 0.342
R\J
(3.14) (6.58) (8.42) (3.66) (5.37)
EQFAMINC 0.032 0.030
(1.43) (0.86)
SCHOOL 0.072 0.005 0.014 90.054 0.025 90.071
(3.01) (0.13) (0.38) (1.49) (0.66) (1.93)
MALE 0.000 90.089
(0.02) (2.55)
AGE 0.023 90.009
(0.98) (0.25)
GP/1000 0.077
(2.12)
SP/1000 0.027
(0.72)
BEDS/1000 0.012
(0.37)
PHYS/1000 90.057
(1.57)
DIST-GP 90.037
(1.03)
cov(u , u ) 90.074
 
(3.57)
 0.313
 0.048
R 0.394 0.096 0.591 0.021 0.122 0.335 0.031 0.076

Note: t-values in parentheses. Cov(u , u ) is covariance of error terms of first two equations.
 

equations suggest the possibility of a non-linear effect of health and investment equations. In the LISREL pro-
age. The coefficients on H suggest that, contrary to gram, this can be accomplished by comparing the model’s
R\
what is assumed in Grossman’s model, individuals do not chi-squared values with and without the restrictions im-
adjust instantaneously to their desired health stocks. The posed. The relevant value is 18.58 with 8 degrees of free-
results suggest, unsurprisingly, that the elderly adjust dom, which compare with tabular values at the 1% and
more slowly to their desired stocks than do the young. 5% levels of 20.09 and 15.51. The restriction implied by
Turning to the investment equation, the results suggest the derived demand hypothesis is therefore rejected at the
that in both samples   , but surprisingly the implied 5% level but not at the 1% level. This contrasts with the
value of  is smaller for the over-41s than for the under- decisive rejection of the hypothesis in the author’s earlier
41s. Moreover, the value of  is actually negative for the empirical work using Grossman’s own empirical formu-
former group. One possible explanation of this is that  lation.
has in effect been specified in two different ways in the Turning to the demand-for-health-care equations, it is
model: as a linear function of age in the X vector and as a apparent that, again in contrast to the author’s earlier
step function of age when ( 9 ) in Equation 1.7 is empirical work, the results also lend some support to the
allowed to vary with age. A more consistent treatment education-efficiency hypothesis. Holding the quantity of
(with the effect of age specified as a step function in both investment constant, education tends to reduce the de-
cases) might yield more sensible results. mand for health care, as the Grossman model predicts.
The coefficients on the X-variables in the investment Moreover, the negative sign of the coefficients on GP-
equation all have the expected sign, except that on EQ- DIST lends support to the time-price hypothesis. The
FAMINC in the over-41s sub-sample, but this is not availability of facilities also appears to have some effect
significant. As noted above, the derived demand hypoth- on utilization, with greater availability increasing utiliz-
esis can be tested by testing the restriction that the coeffi- ation except in the case of physiotherapy.
cients on the X-variables are the same in the demand-for- As indicated above, a chi-squared test does not reject
22 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF HEALTH DATA
Table 1.2b ML estimates of structural equations for over 41s

H I OUTPAT ACCEMER GPCONS HOSPDAYS SPCONS PHYSIO


R R\
H 0.849 90.253
R\
(15.98) (4.68)
I 1.000 0.246 0.526 0.763 0.279 0.513
R\J
(4.66) (9.63) (12.68) (5.29) (9.35)
EQFAMINC 0.074 90.016
(2.51) (0.36)
SCHOOL 0.005 0.109 90.102 90.100 90.045 0.012
(0.19) (2.73) (2.75) (2.81) (1.11) (0.33)
MALE 0.004 90.117
(0.17) (3.17)
AGE 90.061 90.005
(2.15) (0.13)
GP/1000 0.097
(2.68)
SP/1000 0.137
(3.41)
BEDS/1000 90.020
(0.60)
PHYS/1000 90.048
(1.31)
DIST-GP 90.068
(1.90)
cov(u , u ) 90.16
 
(6.56)
 0.151
 90.102
R 0.595 0.077 0.703 0.043 0.210 0.408 0.072 0.189

Note: t-values in parentheses. Cov(u , u ) is covariance of error terms of first two equations.
 

the cross-equation restrictions implied by the derived necessarily be a cause for concern. Indeed, the alternative
demand hypothesis. A further set of restrictions of interest formulation of the empirical model proposed in the pres-
are the equality restrictions across the two age groups. ent paper appears to be more consistent not only with
Are the data consistent, in other words, with only  Grossman’s theoretical model but also with the data. In
varying across age groups? The relevant chi-squared stat- contrast to the author’s earlier results obtained using
istic is 113.22, with 30 degrees of freedom. (The cross- Grossman’s own empirical formulation, the results in the
equation restrictions implied by the derived demand hy- present paper lend support to the derived-demand and
pothesis are imposed in both models.) The cross-group education-efficiency hypotheses. They also suggest, how-
restrictions are thus rejected by the data, suggesting that ever, that, contrary to what is assumed in Grossman’s
there are parameters other than  which also vary across theoretical model, individuals do not adjust their health
age groups. stocks instantaneously.
It remains to be seen, of course, whether these empirical
results can be replicated on other data-sets. The results
reported in van Doorslaer [9], suggest that such replica-
DISCUSSION
tions might well be successful. The equations estimated
This paper has argued that the empirical formulation of there are different from those estimated in the present
the Grossman model used in previous tests of the thoreti- paper, being health investment production functions
cal model is inappropriate, since it fails to take into rather than demand equations, but there are similarities.
account the inherently dynamic character of the health Van Doorslaer’s results add weight, for example, to the
investment process. The fact that the author’s earlier finding that adjustment of health capital stocks is non-
structural equations estimates were inconsistent with the instantaneous.
predictions of the theoretical model may not therefore
THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH 23

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS lished DPhil Dissertation, York, University of York, 1982.


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This paper was written whilst I was a Visiting Research 4. Jöreskog, K.G. and Goldberger, A.S. Estimation of a model
Fellow at the Centre for Health Economics (CHE) at the with multiple indicators and multiple causes of a single
University of York. I am grateful to CHE for financing latent variable. Journal of the American Statistical Associ-
the visit and to Terkel Christiansen for making the Dan- ation 1975; 70: 631—639.
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helpful comments from Michael Grossman, Andrew Equivalence scales, well-being, inequality and poverty: sensi-
Jones, an anonymous referee and participating at the tivity estimates across 10 countries using the Luxembourg
European Workshop on Modelling and Econometrics in Income Study database. Review of Income and Wealth 1988;
June: 115—142.
Health Economics held at York in July 1992. I alone am 7. Jöreskog, K.G. and Sörbom, D. LISREL 7: A Guide to the
responsible for any errors. Program and Applications, 2nd edn. Chicago IL, SPSS Inc.,
1989.
8. Jöreskog, K.G. and Sörbom, D. PRELIS: A Program for
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Preprocessor for LISREL. Mooresville IA, Scientific Soft-
1. Grossman, M. The Demand for Health: a Theoretical and ware Inc., 1986.
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