Brian Ghilliotti

Central Connecticut State University

Africa Since 1800

Somalia Chapter Summary

4/1/2018

1.  The author states that at no  Point in Somali history has political life been governed
by formal institutions. It has been based on a neo-patrimonial system from
Independence.

2. It has been regulated by elements of social consensus that included a transient

vision of a united and modern Somali nationstate.

3. The power of the Somali state was at its highest in the aftermath of a 1969 coup
d’état that placed Siyad’s new revolutionary government in power.

4. He wanted to promote the idea that Somali society transcended clan and was
associated with the unification of all Somalian people. He also wanted to promote
secular and modernization  agendas.

5. Somali society is organized around patrilineal lineage. Somali children are taught
their lineage back to the ancestors who founded the main clan families. In many cases,
Somalians put their clan identity before everything else.

6. In 1977, Siyad decided to invade Ethiopia while it was undergoing a revolution. His
invasion went disastrously.  This opened up the door for popular dissent against his
regime and its principles.  Siyad  managed to survive by receiving foreign aid from the
United States on account of its geo-strategic location during the Cold War.

7. He maintained power by using a combination of repression and buying loyalty using

foreign aid. His ability to do this began to end at the end of the Cold War.

8. In addition, over 150,000 Somalis working abroad were sending money from
overseas back home to their respective clans. This made Siyad’s ability to buy loyalty
through misuse of foreign aid became less effective.

9. Siyad did not have much control over these foreign remittances. Meanwhile,
international banking institutions complained about the level of inflation in Somalia, and
demanded more austerity measures as a precondition for more foreign aid.  This
created a situation where the central government became weaker while the peripheral
clans became more powerful.

10. These patterns ultimately lead to the 1991 coup that overthrew the central Somali
government.

11.  In the aftermath of the chaos associated with the 1991 coup, the various clans in
Somalia began to act in many ways like states. Many local businesses sprung up, such
as airlines, a Coca-Cola plant in Mogadishu, and a vest telecommunications  industry.
This industry was vital in sustaining the money transfers from Somali workers abroad.

12. The owners of the telecom’s businesses were generally untouched by the clan
militias because they needed to keep these businesses functioning in order to keep
receiving funds.

13. Going back to the 1991 coup, after Siyad was overthrown, the leaders of the front
that overthrew him, the USC, began to fight amongst themselves along clan lines. The
two rival clans were led by General Aidiid and Ali Mahdi.

14. Efforts to restore a national government in Somalia  produced the Transitional

National Government through negotiations in Djibouti in 2000. The negotiations were
really about disputing how much of the collapsed state’s resources the clans could
claim instead of trying to establish a real government.

15. In any case, the peace initiative did not succeed because Ethiopia was concerned
that Eritrea was attempting to use the peace settlement as a way to gain influence in
Somalia.

16.  The second effort to establish a unified government was held in Kenya, lasting
between 2002 and 2004. It led to the creation of a transitional federal government. The
transitional federal government did not begin system of public accounting until 2009.
When it did it realized that foreign aid and port revenues were being used to support
the power of the clans that had access to these funds.

17.  A lot of these funds ended up finding the militias of various clans, who had been
spending quite a bit of time fighting for control over Radio Mogadishu. Since there was
never a reliable telephone system established in Somalia,  getting control of the main
source of information distribution, Radio Mogadishu, became a strategic goal of the
warring plans. This would not change until Somali entrepreneurs developed the
telecommunication systems in Somalia that supported overseas remittance wiring.

18. The clans, while they were fighting, did what they could to marginalize Islamist
influences in the country. Those Somalis who were tired of living in the midst of warring
clans began to look at Islamic sources of governance. The earliest Islamist movement
in Somalia that tried to establish control was the Islamic Courts Union. This group
created clandestine ties with Al- Qaeda, whose leader, Bin Laden, was hiding in Sudan
(at the time).

19. Al Qaeda and it’s Islamic Court Union proxy established a base in Luuq, Somalia, 
but this base was overrun by Ethiopian forces in 1996, which ended their influence in
Somalia for at least five years.

20. Al Qaeda had a difficult time operating in Somalia since it did not have sanctuary
from a central government. It could not effectively manipulate and gain influences over
people’s clan loyalty.

21. By 2004, the Islamic Courts Union, with the support of local powerful businessman,
we were able to re-emerge in Somalia,  this time as an effective force to contain the
warring clans. Ethiopia became concerned not only about the reemergence of Al
Qaeda, but also suspected that Eritrea was trying to use the Islamic Courts Union as a
proxy against Ethiopia.

22. Ethiopia once again intervened and disbursed the militias controlled by the Islamic
Courts Union by 2006. A more radical element within the Islamic Courts Union, al-
Shabab, emerged in its place.

23. A new transitional government was again set up in Somalia by 2012, called Somali
Federal Government. This government was primarily backed by international funding
and the military resources of countries surrounding Somalia.  It’s primary concern was
keeping Al-Shabab suppressed.

23. And umbrella organization called the African Union Mission in Somalia was set up
by 2007, aiming to replacing Ethiopian forces with a pan African force. This did not
happen, and Ethiopia remained the primary source of military support for what existed
of the Somali central government.

24.  Meanwhile, I’ll al-Shabab responded to these pressures by taxing key ports and
trade routes in the areas it controlled. While the Somali federal government relied on
international aid, the al-Shabaab movement  obtained financing by extortion. However
the Somali government was in firm control of Mogadishu, which was the economic hub
of Somalia.  Without access to the city, I’ll should al-Shabaab lost some of its key
sources of finance.

25. Buy 2012 al-Shabaab was in an internal power struggle between those who wanted
to negotiate with the government and those who did not. The faction that did not want
negotiations came up on top, with its main leader openly declaring affiliation with Al
Qaeda.

Source:

De Waal, Alex. The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War, and the Business of
Power. Polity Press, Malden, MA, 2015. Pages 109-129.