www.thejournalofcounterterrorism.

org

Doing Business
in the 21st Century
Where Terrorism is a Fact of Life
By Michael Perelman, Aaron Richman, Dov Zwerling

Police
experts
wearing white
overalls (rear) walk
down a street to inspect
damage caused by a truck
bombing in the Algerian town
of Reghaia, 30 km (20 miles) east of
Algiers, October 30, 2006. The bombing
was one of two simultaneous attacks on police
stations overnight believed by security sources to
have been carried out by the main rebel group, the Salafist
group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). REUTERS/Louafi
12 Larbi (ALGERIA)
Vol.15, No.3
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
Companies that have assets and personnel come a very dangerous place indeed. As
abroad and that operate in regions at high risk
of terrorism must integrate comprehensive
and customized intelligence into their
risk management program. Through the
early identification of the terrorist threat, And they have made it dangerous for all
the private sector can effectively allocate of those who are not members of their
countermeasures to survive and prosper.
Reacting to an incident is too late.
The indicators of a terrorist
organization’s intent must be used
in advance to protect a company’s
personnel and assets.
Recognizing that what happened
yesterday is of importance only
in context of what may happen
tomorrow, the Institute of Terrorism
Research and Response (ITRR)
recognized the need to employ
security service concepts to meet
clients’ needs in the 21st century.
From on-the-ground resources
to communication intercepts,
professional intelligence service
concepts and personnel must be used to
understand and predict the threat.
A
nti-government protest activ-
ity – locations, times & dates,
which can affect a company’s
personnel and assets; crime
patterns and trends that put the company’s
personnel at risk; the risk of using certain
motor routes for inbound and outbound
travel; the risk of known terror operatives
active in the area all point to the subse-
quent possibility of a criminal or terror-
related incident.
Looking at North Africa
North Africa, an area claimed by al Qaeda
of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), has be-
these aggressive Islamists attempt to unite
the area spanning North Africa from Tunisia
(some would include Libya) to the Atlantic
Ocean, they have challenged governments
of all of the sovereign North African and
Sahel countries.
organizations. AQIM’s activity in Al-
geria, Mali, and Mauritania provides an
excellent example.
One of the Algerian drivers was
killed in the attack, and several
Brits, Americans, and Canadians
were injured. Both because of the
location of the attack, in the capitol
Algiers, and the target; an American
company, this attack was a turning
point for the organization,
The targets chosen by the organization
before it changed its name from GSPC
to AQIM were mostly local government
forces and security services who were
seen to be in partnership with the once
colonist French government. This all
changed on December 10, 2006, when a
GSPC terrorist threw a bomb and fired
indiscriminately at two buses carrying
foreign employees of Halliburton.
One of the Algerian drivers was killed in
the attack, and several Brits, Americans,
and Canadians were injured. Both because
of the location of the attack, in the capitol
Algiers, and the target; an American com-
pany, this attack was a turning point for the
organization, and was coined as such by
ITRR analysts monitoring the region:
TAM-C Briefing2006-12-18
“…This 10Dec2006 attack on western
interests is a first for the group in over 5
years and the first since their 2004 pledge
of allegiance to Al Qaeda. This symbolizes
its paramilitary development and the fact
that the group is now ready and willing to
join in on the International Jihad. TAM-C
analysts see a growing threat in this group
also known as GSPC.”
Reuters has provided a sample of
incidents reported since January,
2007, when the Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat (GSPC)
swore allegiance to Osama bin
Ladin and changed its name to Al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
• In April 2007, 33 people were killed
in Algiers in a triple suicide bombing.
• On Dec 11 2007, a twin suicide
bombing claimed by al Qaeda at
U.N. offices and a court building in
Algiers killed at least 41 people.
• In February 2008, al Qaeda gun-
men attacked the Israeli embassy in
the Mauritanian capital Nouakchott,
highlighting Mauritania’s status as
one of the few Arab countries with
diplomatic ties to the Jewish state.
• In February 2008, Austrian tour-
ists Andrea Kloiber, 43, and Wolf-
gang Ebner, 51, disappeared while
on holiday in Tunisia and were held
hostage by al Qaeda’s North African
wing for eight months in a remote
desert area of Mali. The group had
demanded the release of Islamic
militants held in jail in Algeria and
Tunisia. The Austrians were freed
unharmed eight months later.
• In September 2008, Mauritania said
12 of its soldiers abducted in an attack
claimed by al Qaeda were found with
their heads cut off.
• In April 2009 two Canadian diplo-
mats and two European tourists held
hostage by al Qaeda’s North African
wing in the Sahara were released after
several months in captivity. The group
had demanded 20 of its members be
freed from detention in Mali and other
countries as a condition for releasing
www.thejournalofcounterterrorism.org
the hostages.
• May 31, 2009 AQIM murdered
British tourist, Edwin Dyer,
after the British government
refused to exchange him for
Abu Qatada.
• On June 23, 2009 an American
business man was killed in
Mauritania for what AQIM
claimed was his “Christianizing
activities.”
Making Intelligence
Based Decisions
One only needs to observe activity
in the region of the Mediterranean
Sea in the area of North African to
recognize the patterns of future ter-
rorist activity.
Recruitment Phase: A recent Alert
issued by ITRR’s Targeted Action-
able Monitoring Center (TAM-C)
identified the aggressive recruitment pro-
gram being conducted by al Qaeda of the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) as they attempt
to strengthen their position in Algeria. In
the 23June2009 Alert, Abu Yahya al-Libi
was quoted as saying, “…Protect your
religion and from here, I turn to the Mus-
lims of North Africa to help their brothers
in Algeria.”
To the Libyans al-Libi said, “Your chil-
dren did not hesitate to go out and fight
in Afghanistan and Iraq, and you have
neighbors that need your help. Rise and
come to their aid. They are brothers,
neighbors and of the same religion.”
It is noteworthy, that on 23June2009, less
than 24 hours after the release of the al-Libi
message and the TAM-C Alert, an American
educator was murdered by AQIM terrorists
in Mauritania’s capital, Nouakchott.
Taking credit for the murder, AQIM re-
leased a written statement claiming the
Nouakchott killing. It was perpetrated to
end the victim’s “Christianizing activities...
at time when savage bombs of Americans
harvest the lives of our innocent Muslim
brothers in Pakistan and Afghanistan....”
Equipment Acquisition Phase: To carry
out terrorist activities, weapons are need-
14
Vol.15, No.3
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
For example, on 17June2009, AQIM
attackers killed a group of Algerian
police officers in a combined
roadside IED and firearms attack on
a caravan of six vehicles escorting
Chinese laborers.
ed. As al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb
prepares to carry out additional attacks,
they equip themselves using equipment
and weaponry of government troops that
they have attacked.
For example, on 17June2009, AQIM
attackers killed a group of Algerian
police officers in a combined roadside
IED and firearms attack on a caravan
of six vehicles escorting Chinese labor-
ers. During this operation the jihadists
also stole equipment and uniforms, and
set the police vehicles on fire. During
previous attacks, AQIM terrorists added
the stolen passports of contract workers
to their inventory.
Targeting Recon and Surveillance: On
2March2009, the Targeted Actionable
Monitoring Center released an Alert
based on jihadi communications. The
intercepted communications dealt with
the pre-operational reconnaissance for an
operation in Sharm el Sheik, Egypt.
The reconnaissance cell provided GPS data,
maps, and photographs of Sharm el
Sheik. Additionally, this communica-
tions indicated the size of the terror
action cell and type of weaponry to
be used.
Moving to the Target Phase: Some-
times information of intelligence
value can result from an adversary’s
unintentional release of information.
This occurred when TAM-C analysts
recognized coded communications
that an attack would occur.
TAM-C Alert 2008-07-16
…An analysis of this threat leads
the TAM-C to believe that the large
attack may include the Persian Gulf
states or Turkey.
Such an analysis is based on earlier
communications isolating these
regions...
Conclusion
This is a clear threat on an imminent attack,
and all ITRR clients should take this threat
seriously...
Nine days after the TAM-C Alert was is-
sued, a double explosion terror attack oc-
curred in Istanbul.
The world’s economies have taken a beat-
ing, making the business environment
more difficult than ever before. In today’s
market knowledge is power, and foresight
is priceless; this is also true for security
and intelligence. Organizations that look
at all of the risks, both financial and se-
curity are organizations that will prosper
in the 21st century, refusing to surrender
to terrorism.
Authors
Michael Perelman, Co-Director, ITRR, Aaron
Richman, Co-Director, ITRR, Dov Zwerling, Director
of Tactical Operations, ITRR
References
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/
guidterr/app_a.pdf