(Berlin Studies in Knowledge Research) Elena Ficara-Contradictions - Logic, History, Actuality-Walter de Gruyter Inc (2014)

Elena Ficara
Contradictions
Berlin Studies
in Knowledge Research
|
Edited by
Günter Abel and James Conant
Volume 6
Elena Ficara
Contradictions
|
Logic, History, Actuality
Series Editors
Prof. Dr. Günter Abel
Technische Universität Berlin
Institut für Philosophie
Straße des 17. Juni 135
10623 Berlin
Germany
e-mail: abel@tu-berlin.de
Prof. Dr. James Conant

The University of Chicago
Dept. of Philosophy
1115 E. 58th Street
Chicago IL 60637
USA
e-mail: jconant@uchicago.edu
ISBN 978-3-11-033574-3
e-ISBN 978-3-11-034082-2
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Acknowledgements
This book goes back to a conference with the same title that took place at Tech-
nical University Berlin in the summer of 2011 and was generously supported by
the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the IZW. For help before, during and
after the conference, I am particularly thankful to Günter Abel, Franca D’Agostini,
Dagfinn Føllesdal, Hans Poser, Claudio Roller, Doris Schöps and Elisabeth Simon.
For making the publication of this volume possible, I am especially grateful to the
IZW, in particular to Günter Abel, for his friendliness and the unconditioned sup-
port of the project in every phase of its development. I am also grateful to Hadi
Faizi, who helped me revising the English texts, and to Peter Remmers for his
editorial advice. Finally, my thanks go to the publishing house De Gruyter, par-
ticularly to Gertrud Grünkorn and Konrad Vorderobermeier for help during the
production of this volume.
Contents
Elena Ficara
Introduction | 1
Part I: Logic
Graham Priest
Contradictory Concepts | 13
JC Beall
Rapunzel Shaves Pinocchio’s Beard | 27
Franca D’Agostini
Paradoxes and the Reality of Contradictions | 31
Achille C. Varzi
Logic, Ontological Neutrality, and the Law of Non-Contradiction | 53
Francesco Berto
Representing the Contradictory | 81
Part II: History
Enrico Berti
Objections to Aristotle’s Defence of the Principle of Non-Contradiction | 97
Angelica Nuzzo
The Justice of Contradiction. Logical Advancement and
Historical Transformations | 109
Luca Illetterati
Limit and Contradiction in Hegel | 127
Klaus Vieweg
Zur Logik moralischer Urteile | 153
viii | Contents
Part III: Actuality
Gianni Vattimo
Insuperable Contradictions | 173
Federico Vercellone
A Disenchanted Reenchantment. Hermeneutics and Morphology | 181
Wolfgang Welsch
Wie wir auf Konsistenz aus sind – und warum | 193
List of Contributors | 209
Index of Names | 215
Subject Index | 219

Elena Ficara
Introduction
The notion of contradiction is of the greatest importance in several fields. It is a
central topic in the history of ancient philosophy: the very beginning of philos-
ophy in history seems to be closely connected to the discovery of contradictions
in Greek language. It is of crucial importance in metaphysics: Aristotle’s inquiry
into the nature of being is also, if not mainly, inspired by the need of avoiding (and
diagnosing) the occurrence of contradictions. It is evidently, in many senses, one
of the basic concerns of logic. The problem of contradiction is also the problem
of disagreement: is it possible that contradictory theses are both true? Under nor-
mal circumstances, one of the two theses is false, and this means that one of the
disagreeing parties is wrong. And yet, at least sometimes people disagree with-
out any fault (or so it seems), and incompatible positions seem both right. In this
sense, the theme of contradiction is also the core of any political reflection about
democratic confrontation, relativism and the role of the concept of truth in polit-
ical practice. Not only that, a complete theory about the problematic and heuris-
tic relevance of contradictions in any field was typically given by the authors of
German Idealism, and specifically by the tradition of Hegelianism, so the issue is
also crucial for the history of philosophy after Kant, and for any inquiry into clas-
sical German philosophy. Finally, the problem of the existence, uses, and nature
of contradictions is at the core of many contemporary discussions in philosophy:
discussions about paradoxes, and the plausibility of paraconsistent logics,¹ but
also about the status of human subjects, as located in social and political con-
texts, and about the destiny of Marxism.²
All this stated, a typical problem affects contemporary theories on this topic.
The main concern is that the authors working on it come from radically different
philosophical traditions and contexts, and they can only very rarely communicate
with each other, and share their results.
The first aim of the book is thus to stimulate a genuine dialogue between dif-
ferent approaches, so that the understanding of the problem of contradictions be-
comes as complete as possible. Not only that, the same topic of contradictions, as
suggested above, seems to be located at the intersection of different fields, tradi-
1 See the contemporary discussions about Graham Priest’s dialetheism, which are documented
in many leading philosophical journals, as well as in Priest/Beall/Armour-Garb (2004).
2 See Judith Butler’s and Slavoy Žižek’s reconsideration of Hegelianism in Butler (1987) and Žižek
(2012).
2 | Elena Ficara
tions and schools, so it is particularly apt to overcome the divides between philo-
sophical approaches, constituting a common ground of philosophical research.
The papers collected in this volume present some of the most recent results
of the work about contradictions in philosophical logic, examine the history of
contradiction in crucial phases of philosophical thought (in ancient philosophy
and in German philosophy after Kant), consider the relevance of contradictions
for political and philosophical current times. Despite the differences between ap-
proaches and stiles, a basic question emerges, and it is more or less openly ad-
dressed in all the papers. It is the question of the irreducibility, reality, and pro-
ductive force of (some) contradictions.³
The book has three parts. In the first part, Logic and Metaphysics, leading
experts of philosophical logic and metaphysics focus on the problem – now at
the centre of living debates about non-classical logic,⁴ and in particular about di-
aletheism⁵ – of the reality of contradictions, and on the link between logic and
metaphysics. The second part, History, entails papers by specialists of ancient
philosophy and post-Kantian philosophy, the two periods in history where the
reflection on contradictions reached probably its greatest development. The pa-
pers analyse both Aristotle’s defence of the law of non-contradiction, dealing with
some problems connected with it, and Hegel’s arguments for the reality and ef-
fectiveness of contradictions, and their relevance for practical and political phi-
losophy. The last part, Actuality, is devoted to the role and uses of contradictions
for cultural and political occurrences. It collects papers by eminent contemporary
philosophers working in the mainly European tradition, on the political, aesthetic
and biological implications of contradictions.
Graham Priest (Contradictory Concepts) examines a question at the very core of

contemporary discussions within dialetheism. If dialetheism is the view that there
are (some) true contradictions, then the problem is to assess if “the contradictions
3 Evidently, the meaning of the term “contradiction”, as well as that of the expression “true con-
tradiction” is here at stake. For a first overview see Grim (2004), 49–72, as well as the papers
collected in this volume (Part One: Logic).
4 See Priest/Beall/Armour-Garb (2004).
5 The terms ‘dialetheia/dialetheism’ were coined by Graham Priest and Richard Routley in 1981
(see Priest/Routley/Norman (1989), xx) and result from the union of the two Greek words ‘di-’
(two/double) and ‘aletheia’ (truth). A dialetheia is a true contradiction (a double truth), i.e. a true
proposition whose negation is also true, and dialetheism is the view according to which there are
some dialetheias (true-and-false propositions) and this does not imply any trivialisation of logic.
For a clear overview, see Priest/Berto (2013).
Introduction | 3
are only in our concepts or also in reality”. Strictly speaking, dialetheism not only
implies that our concepts might entail contradictions, it also implies the meta-
physical insight that there are things that satisfy these concepts. But if we hold
that contradictions are in reality, the view that there are facts of the form A and
¬A, and thus that there are not only positive, but also negative facts, seems in-
evitable. This view might prove to be – so Priest – “too rich to many stomach”.
In the paper he focuses on the opposite perspective, the so-called semantic di-
aletheism,⁶ according to which contradictions are only in our languages, and do
not concern reality. Assuming that contradictions are a merely conceptual and
linguistic phaenomenon, Priest examines different strategies in order to get rid of
them simply by changing our concepts, and shows that they all fail. As a matter of
fact, semantic dialetheism, so understood, presents many difficulties, first of all
expressive loss, i.e. the impossibility to think and express concepts – such as the
concept of totality – which classically involve irreducible contradictions.
Jc Beall’s Rapunzel Shaves Pinocchio’s Beard goes back to a discussion, which ap-
peared in Analysis, between himself and Peter Eldridge-Smith concerning the so
called Pinocchio paradox,⁷ a version of the Liar paradox that involves the empir-
ical world. In this paper, Beall presents a paradoxical tale, very similar to Pinoc-
chio paradox. In the tale, grass is growing if and only if what Rapunzel says is
false, and it happens that Rapunzel says that grass is growing. Evidently, this is
a liar-like situation, since if what Rapunzel says is true, then grass is not growing
and what she says must be false; and if it is false, then grass is growing and what
she says must be true. Pinocchio’s paradox, similarly, says that Pinocchio’s nose is
growing if and only if Pinocchio lies, and Pinocchio says that his nose is growing.
At first sight, these versions of the Liar paradox seem to involve empirical-world
gluts, i.e. sentences about the empirical world (noses and grass) that are both true
and false. This would ultimately imply a metaphysical dialetheism of some sort,
6 Ed Mares has coined the expressions “metaphysical dialetheism”, distinguishing it from “se-
mantic dialetheism”. In Mares (2004), 269, he defines the two notions as follows: “Both seman-
tical and metaphysical dialetheism hold that there are true contradictions, or at least that it is
possible for there to be true contradictions. That is what ‘dialetheism’ means. The difference be-
tween the two views concerns the status of these contradictions (. . . ) The metaphysical dialetheist
holds that there are aspects of the world (or of some possible world) for which any accurate de-
scription will contain a true contradiction. Semantic dialetheism, on the other hand, maintains
that it is always possible to redescribe this aspect of the world, using a different vocabulary”.
7 The Pinocchio paradox was invented by Peter Eldridge-Smith’s daughter, Veronique Eldridge-
Smith, and occasioned a discussion on empirical-world gluts documented in Analysis. See
Eldridge-Smith/Eldridge-Smith (2010); Eldridge-Smith (2011); Beall (2011); Eldridge-Smith (2012).
4 | Elena Ficara
for instance the view that there must be something in the empirical world that
both is and is not, both has and has not a particular physical property. Jc Beall is
one of the most eminent contemporary proponents of the view called semantic di-
aletheism, according to which contradictions arise because of our language, and
because of the semantic behaviour of the concept of truth.⁸ Accordingly, Beall sug-
gests here that Pinocchio’s and Rapunzel’s stories are mere tales, and not genuine
paradoxes (that is: apparent valid arguments with true premises and an appar-
ently false conclusion). In fact, the premises of both arguments are not true, they
are only “true according to the story”. Truth in a story – so Beall – is insufficient
for truth at some world.
Evidently, in both Priest’s and Beall’s papers what is at stake is the question:
what are the metaphysical and ontological implications of the thesis that there are
true contradictions? Does the view that there are true contradictions have onto-
logical implications? And what is the link between the semantic claim that there
are true contradictions and the ontological one, according to which there effec-
tively are contradictory states of affairs, or objects that make contradictions true?
These questions are at the core of D’Agostini’s and Varzi’s papers.
Franca D’Agostini (Paradoxes and the Reality of Contradictions) explicitly ad-

dresses the first, examining the problem of the reality of contradictions, and of
the kind of realism implied by the dialetheist’s thesis according to which some
contradictions are true. D’Agostini considers the expression “true contradiction”,
inquiring into its possible meaning as made true by real (non-constructed, non-
fictional) facts. She first considers the kind of evidence involved in epistemic and
semantic paradoxes, then argues for an interpretation of the realism involved by
dialetheism as alethic realism, the view according to which a sentence or propo-
sition 𝑝 is true if and only if things stand like 𝑝 says. In the perspective of alethic
realism, a “fact” is simply what can make a proposition true, so there might be
indeterminate kinds of facts: universal, as well as conditional, mathematical or
physical, infra-subjective or intra-subjective, physical or intentional facts etc. All
this stated, D’Agostini suggests that alethic realism is perfectly adaptable to three
theses that classically constitute metaphysical realism, namely: the thesis that
there are facts, that there is a unique true description of these facts, and that we
can formulate true descriptions of facts. From this point of view, alethic realism
turns out to be a particular version of metaphysical realism, which only requires
that the field of what we count as really existing facts must be left open. All this
8 See Beall (2009).

Introduction | 5
stated, D’Agostini claims that contradictions are alethically true, which means
there are many different kinds of contradictions, in accordance with different
kinds of facts. The interpretation of dialetheism in terms of alethic realism, so
D’Agostini, may settle some controversies affecting the debate on dialetheism and
state the metaphysical (not only semantic) reality of contradictions, without any
commitment to metaphysical trivialism.
Achille Varzi (Logic, Ontological Neutrality, and the Law of Non-Contradiction) ex-
amines the connection between the universality of logic and its supposed on-
tological neutrality. If logic and its forms have to be universally valid, logic has
to abstract away from content, and to be ontologically neutral. In Varzi’s recon-
struction, Aristotelian logic, precisely because of its ontological presuppositions,
was deemed insufficient as a canon of pure logic and overcome by modern Frege-
Russell logic. Also modern quantification theory, with its existentially loaded the-
orems and patterns, has been claimed to suffer from a defect of logical purity.
In particular, Varzi focuses on the law of non-contradiction’s ontological impli-
cations, and on its critique. According to him, the critiques of the law of non-
contradiction (beginning with Łukasievicz through paraconsistent logics and di-
aletheism) are moved by the attempt of overcoming its tacit ontological implica-
tions, and directed towards the achievement of a greater universality for logic. In
this perspective, the main problem is the link between the metaphysical and the
semantic point of view, and more specifically the relation between the (ontologi-
cal) law of non-contradiction (it is not possible that both p and not p) and what
Varzi calls the semantic principle of contravalence (it is not possible that a state-
ment p both is and is not true). In particular, the failure of contravalence need
not entail genuine ontological overdeterminacy or genuine counterexamples to
non-contradiction. The problem is thus to discriminate between a merely de dicto
dialetheia and a de re dialetheia. Varzi discusses two options, which can consti-
tute an indication in order to argue that the law of non-contradiction is not an
instance of the prejudices from which logic has tried to free itself throughout its
history in the spirit of even greater ontological neutrality. In fact, every evidence
we might have against the law requires that we deploy other principles, and it is
those principles that might be deemed inadequate as canon of pure logical rea-
soning.
Francesco Berto (Representing the Contradictory) asks about the possibility of

representing contradictory states. He therefore develops a semantic and syntac-
tic extension of Priest’s basic relevant logic 𝑁4 . He introduces, on the syntactic
6 | Elena Ficara
side, the representation operator ®, which allows both to capture our capacity
of seeing or conceiving contradictions and logical impossibilities and to admit
particularly anarchic non-normal worlds, including self-contradictory worlds.
As a matter of fact, according to Berto contradictions are human phaenomena,
linked to our finite and fallible condition. Thus if we can represent and conceive
contradictions and other absolute impossibilities, non-normal worlds are natu-
ral candidates to model this human condition. In contrast, a logic that does not
admit the possibility of representing contradictions is only able to grasp highly
idealized epistemic notions, and cannot mirror the actual situation of human
beings as finite, fallible, and occasionally self-contradicting cognitive agents.
Enrico Berti (Objections to Aristotle’s Defence of the Principle of Non-Contra-

diction) considers both Aristotle’s defence of the law of non-contradiction and
some main objections to it (in particular Łukasiewicz’s and Dancy’s critiques,⁹
and Priest’s dialetheic arguments against Metaphysics Gamma¹⁰). In his view,
according to Aristotle the law of non-contradiction does not stand in the way of
saying and thinking contradictions; however, according to the Greek philosopher
the emerging of a contradiction is always – so Berti – a sign of falsity. Not only
that, the elimination of a contradiction is a necessary component of the logical
and discussive process of refutation. Thus every dismissal of the law implies a
challenge to the very procedure of refutation, and the risk of trivialism (the view
according to which everything is contradictory, and therefore everything is true
and can be proved). Dialetheism, arguing for the suspension of the law only in
special cases, could represent a genuine alternative to trivialism. However – so
Berti – dialetheism does not give a clear criterion to distinguish true contradic-
tions from false ones.
Angelica Nuzzo (The Justice of Contradiction: Logical Advancement and Histori-

cal Transformations) focuses on the practical and juridical implications of Hegel’s
logical idea of contradiction, giving a new account of one of the most contentious
Hegelian views, the idea of a Weltgeschichte (history of the world) placed as con-
clusion of the sphere of objective spirit, and the thesis that Weltgeschichte ist Welt-
gericht (the history of the world is the tribunal of the world). According to this
view, history does not only have the descriptive task of registering events, but
9 See Łukasiewicz (1910) and Dancy (1975).

10 Priest (2006).
Introduction | 7
it also has a normative import. Nuzzo argues that Hegel’s view, which has often
been disputed and variously challenged, is the direct and coherent consequence
of the claim that historical processes are structured according to the dialectical
logic of contradiction. According to Nuzzo, conflict and contradiction, rather than
being a sign of imbalance and disharmony, are the motor of historical change, and
thus the very conditions of a just political and practical order. In this perspective,
the normative function of contradiction also emerges: conflict is justice and Welt-
geschichte is Weltgericht because historical change is produced by strife. This also
means that contradictions have a discriminative and ordering power; they do lead
neither to chaos nor to nothingness but to epochal transformation.
Luca Illetterati (Limit and Contradiction in Hegel) considers the Hegelian thesis:
“things are inherently contradictory”, arguing for the necessity of interpreting it
in a literal, and not metaphorical or conciliatory way. In his reading, there is a
strong connection between Hegel’s talk of contradiction and the problem of deter-
mination. In turn, the problem of determination is, according to Illetterati, linked
to the question of limit: everything is contradictory insofar as everything is de-
terminate, i.e. limited. As Kant himself implicitly already acknowledged in some
subparagraphs of the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics,¹¹ thinking the limit
means to think a structure that constitutively entails a contradiction. In this sense,
if the limit is both an inherently contradictory structure and the locus where ev-
erything is what it is, then the view “all things are inherently contradictory” is
unavoidable.
Klaus Vieweg (Zur Logik moralischer Urteile) examines the central role of con-
tradictions and antinomies within Hegel’s practical philosophy, in particular for
morality. The concept of morality implies the opposition between particularity
and universality (the particularity of the acting and wanting human being and
the universality of the law), an opposition that Hegel interprets as contradiction.
According to Hegel, and differently from Kant, the knowledge of the idea of the
good is what allows an adequate understanding of the contradiction involved in
morality. As to Kant, a non-cognitive faith in God is what makes possible to recon-
cile the opposition between the universality of the moral law and the particularity
of the human will. From the Kantian point of view, the contradiction is not con-
ceived but only presupposed as what has to be overcome. Hegel, differently, shows
11 Kant (1900ff.), AA IV.

8 | Elena Ficara
the contradictory structure of the idea of the good as the identity of the opposites
(particularity and universality).
Gianni Vattimo (Insuperable Contradictions) argues that philosophy has always

tried to reconcile contradictions, and that the same title “Contradictions. Logic,
History, Actuality” could be intended as the attempt of controlling, and in the end
overcoming, contradictions. In explicit polemic with such an attempt, Vattimo de-
fends the view that there are irreducible contradictions, and it is necessary to let
contradictions speak, without controlling them. What he calls “ontology of revo-
lution” constitutes, in his view, the only possible frame able to address irreducible
contradictions. In this frame, contradictions emerge as the very place where, Hei-
deggerianly, being “happens” (sich ereignet). In Vattimo’s view, to propose a re-
flection on contradictions that does not assume their reduction as its main task,
is essential in order to meet the needs of contemporary culture, a culture that is
characterised by a lack of emergency, rather then by a lack of conciliation.
Federico Vercellone (A Disenchanted Reenchantment. Hermeneutics and Mor-

phology) sees in morphology (as the theory or logic of figures) the perspective
that can best inherit the role of the koiné Gadamer wanted for hermeneutics. Not
only that, the logic of figures is also able to deepen Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s
idea of a dialectic of enlightenment, thus dealing with the peculiar contradic-
tions of contemporary culture and science. In particular, Vercellone shows how
the focus on the concept of image (or figure) allows overcoming Heidegger’s,
Gadamer’s, but also Adorno’s one-sided critique of technology. According to Ver-
cellone, technology, rather than being – as Heidegger wanted – an instrument of
hiding what truly is, is fundamental in order to stimulate a “re-enchantment of
the world”, that is a creative way of dealing with images, promoting a new human
self-awareness. In this perspective, figures or images are, above all, contradictory
forms, that is: forms of conceptualisation that at the same time show the limits of
every conceptualisation.
Wolfgang Welsch (Wie wir auf Konsistenz aus sind – und warum) analyses the
role of contradictions in different dimensions of human culture and life (every-
day thought, philosophical and scientific reasoning, biological life), underlining
that they all show an effort of overcoming contradictions. Welsch thus points out
the centrality of consistency (intended as lack of contradictions) in different con-
texts, showing that the demand for logical consistency is rooted in more original
Introduction | 9
kinds of demands. He considers some typical cases where we call for consistency,
first of all our everyday need for both other people’s consistency and consistency
within ourselves, and secondly the philosophical claim (Heraclitus, Dögen, Cu-
sanus, Hegel) that oppositions on a linguistic or argumentative level should be
overcome on a higher argumentative level. In these cases, and despite the emer-
gence of apparently irreducible contradictions, the need for consistency seems to
prevail, a need that – according to Welsch – goes beyond the argumentative and
logical dimension. In particular, the pressure for consistency is – so Welsch – a
biological and ontological command: the physical, chemical, biotic forms of self-
organisation are all ways of producing consistency.
References
JC Beall, Spandrels of Truth, Oxford, 2009.
JC Beall, “Dialetheists against Pinocchio”, in: Analysis 71, 689–691, 2011.
J. Butler, Subjects of Desire. Hegelian Reflections in 20th-Century France, New York, 1987.
R. M. Dancy, Sense and Contradiction. A Study in Aristotle, Dordrecht and Boston, 1975.
P. Eldridge-Smith, “Pinocchio against the dialetheists”, in: Analysis 71, 306–308, 2011.
P. Eldridge-Smith, “Pinocchio beards the Barber”, in: Analysis 72, 749–752, 2012.
V. Eldridge-Smith, P. Eldridge-Smith, “The Pinocchio paradox”, in: Analysis 70, 212–215, 2010.
P. Grim, “What is a Contradiction?”, in: Graham Priest, JC Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb
(eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction, Oxford, 49–72, 2004.
I. Kant, Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Royal Prussian, later German, Academy of
Sciences, Berlin (quoted as AA, followed by the indication of the volume), 1900ff.
J. Łukasiewicz, “Über den Satz des Widerspruchs bei Aristoteles”, in: Bulletin international
de l’Académie des sciences de Cracovie, Classe d’histoire et de philosophie, 1/2, 15–38,
1910.
E. D. Mares, “Semantic Dialetheism”, in: Graham Priest, JC Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb
G. Priest, Doubt Truth to Be a Liar, Oxford, 2006.
G. Priest, JC Beall, B. Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction, Oxford, 2004.
G. Priest, F. Berto, “Dialetheism”, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer
2013 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/
dialetheism/, 2013.
G. Priest, R. Routley, J. Norman (eds.), Paraconsistent Logic. Essays on the Inconsistent, Mu-
nich, 1989.
S. Žižek, Less Than Nothing. Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism, London and New
York, 2012.
|
Part I: Logic
Graham Priest
Contradictory Concepts
1 Introduction
That we have concepts which are contradictory is not news. That there may be
things which satisfy them, dialetheism, is, by contrast, a contentious view. My
aim here is not to defend it, however;¹ and in what follows, I shall simply assume
its possibility. Those who disagree are invited to assume the same for the sake of
argument. The point of this essay is to think through some issues that the view
raises. In particular, we will be concerned with two inter-related questions:
1. Are the dialetheias simply in our concepts/language, or are they in real-

ity? And what exactly does this distinction amount to anyway?
2. Assuming that they are only in our concepts/language, can we get rid of
dialetheias simply by changing these?
I will take up these issues, in the two parts of the paper.²
2 Dialetheism, Concepts, and the World

2.1 Contradiction by Fiat
A dialetheia is a pair of statements of the form 𝐴 and ¬𝐴 which are both true.³ We
may think of statements as (interpreted) sentences expressed in some language –
a public language, a language of thought, or whatever. In this way they contrast,
crucially, with whatever it is that the statements are about. Let us call this, for
want of a better name, the world.
One thing that partly determines the truth value of a statement is its con-
stituents: the meanings of the words in the sentence, or the concepts the words
express. (Conceivably, one might draw a distinction here, but not one that seems
1 This is done in Priest (1995), (2006a), (2006b). The topic is discussed by numerous people in
the essays in Priest/Beall/Armour-Garb (2004) and the references cited therein.
2 A longer version of this paper will appear as “Dialetheism, Concepts and the World”, in Joke
Meheus, Erik Weber, and Dietlinde Wouters (eds.), Logic, Reasoning and Rationality, Springer.
3 Priest (2006a), 4.
14 | Graham Priest
relevant for present purposes.) Let us call these things, again for want of a better
word, semantic. In certain limit cases, such as ‘Red is a colour’, semantic factors
may completely determine the truth value of a statement. In general, however,
the world is also involved in determining the truth value. Thus, the statement that
Melbourne is in Australia is made true, in part, by a certain city, a certain coun-
try – literally part of this world.⁴
Given that dialetheias are linguistic, one natural way for them to arise is
simply in virtue of linguistic/conceptual fiat. Thus, suppose we coin a new
word/concept, ‘Adult’, and stipulate that it is to be used thus:⁵
– if a person is 16 years or over, they are an Adult

– if a person is 18 years or under, they are not an Adult
Now suppose there is a person, Pat, who is 17. Then we have:
(*) Pat is both an Adult and not an Adult.
Of course, one can contest the claim that the stipulation succeeds in giving the
new predicate a sense. Deep issues lurk here, but I will not go into them, since my
concern is with other matters. I comment only that the stipulation would seem to
be just as successful as the dual kind, endorsed by a number of people,⁶ which
under-determine truth values – such as the following, for ‘Child’:
– if a person is 16 years or under, they are a Child

– if a person is 18 years or over, they are not a Child
Assuming the stipulation of the kind involved in ‘Adult’ to work, we have a cer-
tain sort of dialetheia here. We might call it, following Mares (2004), a semantic
dialetheia. Note that, in terms of the distinction just drawn between semantic and
worldly factors, the epithet is not entirely appropriate. The truth of (*) is deter-
mined only in part by semantics; some worldly factors are also required, such as
Pat and Pat’s age. Still, let us adopt this nomenclature.
4 Quineans would, of course, reject the distinction being made here between semantic and
worldly factors. This is not the place to defend the notion of analyticity. I do so in Priest (1979)
and Priest (forthcoming).
5 See Priest (2001).
6 E.g., Soames (1999).
2.2 Semantic Dialetheism
The dialetheism engendered by the definition of ‘Adult’ is transparent. There are

other examples which are, plausibly, of the same kind, though they are less trans-
parent. One of these concerns dialetheias apparently generated by bodies of laws,
rules, or constitutions, which can also be made to hold by fiat. Thus, suppose that
an appropriately legitimated constitution or statute rules that:⁷
– every property-holder shall have the right to vote

– no woman shall have the right to vote
As long as no woman holds property, all is consistent. But suppose that, for what-
ever reason, a woman, Pat, comes to own property, then:
– Pat both has and has not got the right to vote.
Examples that are arguably of the same kind are given by multi-criterial terms.⁸
Thus, suppose that a criterion for being a male is having male genitalia; and that
another criterion is the possession of a certain chromosomic structure. These cri-
teria may come apart, perhaps as the result of surgery of some kind. Thus, suppose
that Pat has female genitalia, but a male chromosomic structure. Then:
– Pat is a male and not a male.
In this case, there is no fiat about the matter. One cannot, therefore, argue that
the contradiction can be avoided by supposing that the act of fiat misfires. What
one has to do, instead, is to argue that the conditions in question are not criterial.
Again, I shall not pursue the matter here.
A final example that is, arguably, in the same camp, is generated by the Ab-
straction Principle of naive set theory:⁹
Abs Something is a member of the collection {𝑥 : 𝐴(𝑥)} iff it satisfies the

condition 𝐴(𝑥).
7 The example comes from Priest (2006a), Section 13.2.

8 See Priest (2006a), Section 4.8, and Priest/Routley (1989), Section 2.2.1.
9 Priest (2006a), ch. 0.
16 | Graham Priest
This leads to contradiction in the form of Russell’s paradox.¹⁰ Again, there is no

fiat here.¹¹ If one wishes to avoid the contradiction, what one must contest is the
claim that satisfying condition 𝐴(𝑥) is criterial for being a member of the set {𝑥 :
𝐴(𝑥)} – or, what arguably amounts to the same thing in this case, that Abs is true
solely in the virtue of the meanings of the words involved, such as ‘is a member
of’.
Again, let us not go into this here. The point of the preceding discussion is not
to establish that the contradictions involved are true, but to show that dialetheias
may arise for reasons that are, generally speaking, linguistic/conceptual.
2.3 Contradictions in the World
Some have felt that there may be a more profound sort of dialetheia, a contradic-
tion in the world itself, independent of any linguistic/conceptual considerations.
Let us call such dialetheias, following Mares again, metaphysical dialetheias.¹²
A major problem here is to see exactly what a metaphysical dialetheia might
be. Even someone who supposes that all dialetheias are semantic will accede to
the thought that there are contradictions in the world, in one sense. None of the
contradictions we considered in the previous sections, with perhaps the excep-
tion of Russell’s paradox, is generated purely by semantic considerations. In each
case, the world has to cooperate by producing an object of the appropriate kind,
such as the much over-worked Pat. The world, then, is such that it renders certain
contradictions true. In that sense, the world is contradictory. But this is not the
sense of contradiction that is of interest to metaphysical dialetheism. The contra-
dictions in question are still semantically dependent in some way. Metaphysical
dialetheias are not dependent on language at all; only the world.
But how to make sense of the idea? If the world comprises objects, events,
processes, or similar things, then to say that the world is contradictory is simply
a category mistake, as, then, is metaphysical dialetheism.¹³ For the notion to get
a grip, the world must be constituted by things of which one can say that they are
true or false – or at least something ontologically equivalent.
10 Take 𝐴(𝑥) to be 𝑥 ∉ 𝑥, and 𝑟 to be {𝑥 : 𝑥 ∉ 𝑥}. Then we have 𝑦 ∈ 𝑟 iff 𝑦 ∉ 𝑦. Hence, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑟 iff

𝑟 ∉ 𝑟, and so 𝑟 ∈ 𝑟 ∧ 𝑟 ∉ 𝑟.
11 An example of a similar kind, which does have an explicit element of fiat, is that of the Secre-
taries’ Liberation League, given by Chihara (1979).
12 Mares (2004). A number of people have taken me (mistakenly) to be committed to this kind of
dialetheism. See Priest (2006a), Section 20.6.
13 The point is made in Priest (2006a), Section 11.1.
Are there accounts of the nature of the world of this kind? There are. The most
obvious is a Tractarian view of the world, according to which it is composed of
facts. One cannot say that these are true or false, but one can say that they obtain
or do not, which is the ontological equivalent. Given an ontology of facts to make
sense, metaphysical dialetheism may be interpreted as the claim that there are
facts of the form 𝐴 and ¬𝐴, say the facts that Socrates is sitting and that Socrates
is not sitting. But as this makes clear, there must be facts of the form ¬𝐴, and
since we are supposing that this is language-independent, the negation involved
must be intrinsic to the fact. That is, there must be facts that are in some sense
negational, negative facts.¹⁴ Now, negative facts have had a somewhat rocky road
in metaphysics, but there are at least certain well-known ways of making sense of
the notion, so I will not discuss the matter here.¹⁵
If one accepts an ontology of facts or fact-like structures, then metaphysical
dialetheism makes sense. Note, moreover, that if one accepts such an ontology,
metaphysical dialetheism is a simple corollary of dialetheism. Since there are true
statements of the form 𝐴 and ¬𝐴 then there are facts, or fact-like structures, cor-
responding to both of these.¹⁶ All the hard work here is being done by the meta-
physics; dialetheism itself is playing only an auxiliary role.
3 Conceptual Revision
3.1 Desiderata for Revision
Still, a metaphysics of facts (including negative facts) is too rich for many stom-
achs. Suppose that we set this view aside. If we do, all dialetheias are essentially
language/concept dependent. In this way, they are, of course, no different from
any other truths. But some have felt that, if this be so, dialetheias are relatively su-
perficial. They can be avoided simply by changing our concepts/language. Com-
pare the corresponding view concerning vagueness, held, for example, by Rus-
14 This isn’t quite right. Facts may not themselves be intrinsically negative: the relation between
the facts that 𝐴 and that ¬𝐴 must be intrinsic. But this does not change matters much.
15 In situation semantics, states of affairs come with an internal “polarity bit”, 1 or 0. Facts with
a 0 bit are negative. Alternatively, a positive fact may be a whole comprising objects and a posi-
tive property/relation; whilst a negative fact may be a whole comprising objects and a negative
property/relation. For a fuller discussion of a dialetheic theory of facts, see Priest (2006b), ch. 2.
16 This assumes that all truths correspond to facts. In principle, anyway, one could endorse a
view to the effect that some kinds of sentence are true in virtue of the existence of corresponding
facts, whilst others may have different kinds of truth-makers.
18 | Graham Priest
sell (1923). All vagueness is in language. Reality itself is perfectly precise. Vague
language and its problems may, therefore, be avoided by changing to a language
which mirrors this precision.
Contradictions may certainly be resolved sometimes. Thus, consider the le-
gal example concerning Pat and her rights. If and when a situation of this kind
arises, the law would, presumably, be changed to straighten out the conflicting
conditions for being able to vote. Note, however, that this is not to deny dialethe-
ism. The situation before the change was dialetheic. The point of the change is to
render it not so. Note, also, there is no a priori guarantee that making changes that
resolve this particular contradiction will guarantee freedom from contradiction in
toto. There may well be others. Indeed, making changes to resolve this contra-
diction may well introduce others. Laws comprise a complex of conceptual inter-
connections, and the concepts apply to an unpredictable world. There is certainly
no decision procedure for consistency in this sort of case; nor, therefore, any guar-
antee of success in avoiding dialetheism in practice.¹⁷
But maybe we could always succeed in principle. Consider the following con-
jecture:
– Whenever we have a language or set of concepts that are dialetheic, we

can change to another set, at least as good, that is consistent.
The suggestion is, of course, vague, since it depends on the phrase ‘at least as
good’. Language has many purposes: conveying information, getting people to
do things, expressing emotions. Given the motley of language use, I see no reason
to suppose that an inconsistent language/set of concepts can be replaced by a
consistent set which is just as good for all the things that language does. I don’t
even know how one could go about arguing for this.
Maybe we stand more chance if we are a little more modest. It might be sug-
gested that language has a primary function, namely representation; and, at least
for this function, given an inconsistent language/set of concepts, one can always
replace it with a consistent one that is just as good. The claim that representation
is the primary function of language may, of course, be contested; but let us grant
it here. We still have to face the question of what ‘just as good’ means now, but
a natural understanding suggests itself: the replacement is just as good if it can
17 Actually, I think that the change here is not so much a change of concepts as a change of the
world. Arguably, the change of the law does not affect the meanings of ‘vote’, ‘right’, etc. The
statement ‘Pat has the right to vote’ may simply change its truth value, in virtue of a change in
the legal “facts”.
represent every situation that the old language represents. Let us then consider
the following conjecture:¹⁸
– Any language (set of concepts), 𝐿, that represents things in a dialetheic

way, can be replaced by a consistent language (set of concepts), 𝐿󸀠 , that
can represent every situation that 𝐿 represents, but in a consistent way.
The conjecture is still ambiguous, depending on how one understands the possi-
bility of replacement here. Are we to suppose this to be a practical possibility, or
a merely theoretical one? If the distinction is not clear, just consider the case of
vagueness again. If there is no such thing as vagueness in re, we could, in prin-
ciple, replace our language with vague predicates by one whose only predicates
are crisp. But the result would not be humanly usable. We can perceive that some-
thing is red. We cannot perceive that it has a wavelength of between exactly 𝑥 and
𝑦 Ångstroms, where 𝑥 and 𝑦 are real numbers. A language with precise colour
predicates would not, therefore, be humanly usable. Any language that can be
used only by someone with superhuman powers of computation, perception, etc.,
would be useless.
To return to the case of inconsistency, we have, then, two questions:
– Can the language be replaced in theory?

– Would the replacement be possible in practice?
A few things I say will bear on the practical question,¹⁹ but by and large I shall
restrict my remarks to the theoretical one. This is because to address the practical
question properly one has to understand what the theoretical replacement is like.
In other words, not only must the answer to the theoretical question be ‘yes’, the
answer must provide a sufficiently clear picture of the nature of the replacement.
Nothing I go on to say will succeed in doing this. I have stressed the distinction
mainly to point out that even if the answer to the theoretical question is ‘yes’, the
replaceability conjecture has another hurdle to jump if the victory for those who
urge replacement is to be more than Phyrric.
18 Batens (1999), 267, suggests that a denial of this conjecture is the best way to understand a
claim to the effect that the world is inconsistent. “[I]f one claims that the world is consistent,
one can only intend to claim that, whatever the world looks like, there is a language 𝐿 and a
[correspondence] relation 𝑅 such that the true description of the world as determined by 𝐿 and
𝑅 is consistent”. He maintains an agnostic view on the matter. See also Batens (2002), 131.
19 I note that Batens (2002), 131, fn. 7, suggests that a consistent replacement for an inconsistent
language might well be required to have a non-denumerable number of constants, which would
make it humanly unusable.
20 | Graham Priest
So let us address the theoretical question. Is it true? Yes, but for entirely trivial
reasons. 𝐿󸀠 can be the language with just one sentence, ¥. ¥ is true of any situation.
Thus, every situation is describable, and consistently so. (The language does not
even contain negation.) But this is not an interesting answer to the question, and
the reason is obvious. We have purchased consistency at the cost of the loss of
expressive power. To make the question interesting, we should require 𝐿󸀠 to have
the same expressive power as 𝐿 – or more. That is, everything that 𝐿 is able to
express, 𝐿󸀠 is able to express. The idea is vague. What, exactly is it for different
languages to be able to express the same thing? But it is at least precise enough
for us to be able to engage with the question in a meaningful way.
3.2 The Possibility of Revision
Return to the case of multiple criteria. A natural thought here is that we may ef-
fect an appropriate revision by replacing the predicate/concept male with two
others, male1 , corresponding to the first criterion, and male2 , corresponding to
the second. Pat is a male2 , but not a male1 , so the contradiction is resolved, and
what used to be expressed by ‘𝑥 is male’, can now be expressed by ‘𝑥 is male1 ∨
𝑥 is male2 ’. So far so good; but note that there is no guarantee that in this complex
and unpredictable world the result will be consistent. The predicates ‘male1 ’ and
‘male2 ’ may themselves turn out to behave in the same inconsistent way, due to
the fact that we have different criteria for ‘genitalia’ or ‘chromosome’. More impor-
tantly, the resolution of this dialetheia depends on the fact that the old predicate
falls neatly apart into two, individuated by different criteria. This will not be the
case in general. (Just consider the case of ‘Adult’, for example, which is not multi-
criterial in the same way.)
We might attempt a more general way of resolving dialetheias as follows. Sup-
pose we have some predicate, 𝑃, whose extension (the set of things of which it is
true) and co-extension (the set of things of which it is false) overlap. Given that we
are taking it that our predicates do not have to answer to anything in the world,
we may simply replace 𝑃 with the three new predicates, 𝑃𝑡 , 𝑃𝑓 , and 𝑃𝑏 , such that
the things in the extension of 𝑃𝑡 are the things that are in the extension of 𝑃 but
not its co-extension; the things in the extension of 𝑃𝑓 are the things that are in the
co-extension of 𝑃 but not its extension; the things in the extension of 𝑃𝑏 are the
things that are in both the extension and co-extension of 𝑃. The co-extension, in
each case, is simply the complement. The situation may be depicted by the follow-
ing diagram. For future reference, I call this the Quadrant Diagram. The numbers
refer to the quadrants.
The left-hand side is the extension of 𝑃. The bottom half is the co-extension of
𝑃. Quadrant 4 comprises those things of which 𝑃 is neither true nor false, and for
present purposes we may take this to be empty.²⁰ The three new predicates have
as extensions the other three quadrants. Each of the new predicates behaves con-
sistently. Any dialetheia of the form 𝑃𝑎 ∧ ¬𝑃𝑎 is expressed by the quite consistent
𝑃𝑏 𝑎, and the predicate 𝑃𝑥 is now expressed, again, as a disjunction, 𝑃𝑡 𝑥 ∨ 𝑃𝑏 𝑥.²¹
So far so good. But recall that the new language must be able to express ev-
erything that the old language expressed. A necessary condition for this is that
any situation described by the old language can be described by the new. To keep
matters simple for the moment, let us suppose that the old language contains only
the predicate 𝑃 and the propositional operators of conjunction, disjunction, and
negation. We have seen how any atomic sentence, 𝐴, of the old language can be
expressed equivalently by one, 𝐴+ , in the new. If this translation can be extended
to all sentences, then any situation describable in the old language is describable
in the new. The natural translation is a recursive one. For the positive connectives:
(𝐴 ∨ 𝐵)+ is 𝐴+ ∨ 𝐵+
(𝐴 ∧ 𝐵)+ is 𝐴+ ∧ 𝐵+
But what of ¬𝐴? We certainly cannot take (¬𝐴)+ to be ¬(𝐴+ ). ¬𝑃𝑥 is true in the
bottom half of the Quadrant Diagram, whilst ¬(𝑃𝑡𝑥∨𝑃𝑏 𝑥) is not true in quadrant 2.
20 Note that, if it is not, the same procedure can be used to get rid of truth value gaps.
21 Batens (1999), 271 and (2002), 132 notes this idea. He also notes that in such a transition the
theory expressed in the new language may lose its coherence and conceptual clarity, making it
worse.
22 | Graham Priest
In this case there is an easy fix. ¬𝑃𝑥 is equivalent to 𝑃𝑏 𝑥 ∨ 𝑃𝑓 𝑥. So we can deal

with the atomic case. What of the others? There is a simple recipe that works:
(¬(𝐴 ∨ 𝐵))+ is ¬(𝐴+ ) ∧ ¬(𝐵+ )

(¬(𝐴 ∧ 𝐵))+ is ¬(𝐴+ ) ∨ ¬(𝐵+ )
(¬¬𝐴)+ is 𝐴+
In other words, we can drive the negations inwards using De Morgan laws and
double negation until they arrive at the atoms, where they are absorbed into the
predicate. In this way, every sentence of the old language is equivalent to a con-
sistent one in the new language.
The end can therefore be achieved for this simple language. But, for the strat-
egy to work, it must be implementable with much more complex and realistic lan-
guages. In particular, it must work for conditionals, quantifiers of all kinds, modal
and other intentional operators; and it is not at all clear that it can be made to do
so. At the very least, then, the onus is on the proponent of the strategy to show
that it can.
Moreover, there are general reasons for supposing that it cannot. Intentional
operators would seem to provide insuperable difficulties. Take an operator such
as ‘John believes that’, B. How are we to handle B𝐴? The only obvious suggestion
is that (B𝐴)+ is B (𝐴+ ), and this will clearly not work. Even logical equivalence
does not guarantee equivalence of belief: one can believe 𝐴 without believing
¬¬𝐴, for example. Hence, even if 𝐴 and 𝐴+ express the same situation in some
sense, one could have B𝐴 without having B𝐴+ . The trouble is that belief and
similar mental states are intentional, directed towards propositions/sentences.
These seem to be integral to the intentional state in question, and so cannot be
eliminated if we are to describe the intensional state. (Indeed, the same is true
of all conceptual revisions. If people’s thoughts are individuated in terms of old
concepts, one cannot describe those thoughts if the concepts are junked.)
One possible suggestion at this point is simply to take (B𝐴)+ to be B𝐴 it-
self. Of course, if we leave it at that, we have not rid ourselves of the dialetheic
concepts, since these are still occurring in the language. But we might just treat
B𝐴 as a new atomic sentence – a single conceptual unit. The problem with this
is clear. There would be an infinite number of independent atomic sentences, and
the language would not be humanly learnable. The construction would fail the
practicality test. And even then, given that the language contains other standard
machinery, there would still be expressive loss. For example, we would no longer
have a way of expressing things such as ∃𝑥(𝑃𝑥 ∧ B𝑃𝑥) or ∀𝑝(B𝑝 → 𝑝).
Nor is this just a problem about mental states. It applies to intensional notions
generally. Thus, consider the statement ‘That 𝐴 confirms that 𝐵’. This is not invari-
ant under extensional equivalence. Let us make the familiar assumption that all
creatures with hearts are creatures with kidneys. Consider the information that 𝑎1 ,
. . . , 𝑎𝑛 are creatures of kind 𝑘 with a heart. This confirms the claim that all crea-
tures of kind 𝑘 have a blood circulation system. The information is extensionally
equivalent to the information that 𝑎1 , . . ., 𝑎𝑛 are creatures of kind 𝑘 with kidneys.
But this information does not confirm the claim that all creatures of kind 𝑘 have a
blood circulation system.²²
3.3 Expressive Loss
But worse is yet to come for the conjecture that we can, in theory, always replace
an inconsistent language with a consistent one. Suppose that the project of show-
ing that every situation describable in the old language can be described in the
new can be carried out, in the way just illustrated or some similar way. This is not
sufficient to guarantee that there is no expressive loss.
Consider the naive notion of set again. This is characterised by the schema:
Abs 𝑥 ∈ {𝑦 : 𝐴(𝑦)} ↔ 𝐴(𝑥)
which gives rise to inconsistency, as we have noted. Let us suppose that it were
replaced with different notions in the way that we have just considered. Thus, we
have three predicates ∈𝑡 , ∈𝑏 , and ∈𝑓 , where 𝑥 ∈ 𝑦 is expressed by 𝑥 ∈𝑡 𝑦 ∨ 𝑥 ∈𝑏 𝑦.
Let us write this as 𝑥 ∈󸀠 𝑦. Given the above schema, we have:
Abs󸀠 𝑥 ∈󸀠 {𝑦 : 𝐴(𝑦)} ↔ 𝐴(𝑥)
and in particular:
𝑥 ∈󸀠 {𝑦 : ¬𝑦 ∈󸀠 𝑦} ↔ ¬𝑥 ∈󸀠 𝑥
Substituting {𝑦 : 𝑦 ∉󸀠 𝑦} for 𝑥 gives us Russell’s paradox, as usual. We have not,

therefore, avoided dialetheism.²³ Why is this not in conflict with the discussion
of the last section? The reason is essentially that the procedure of driving nega-
tions inwards, and finally absorbing them in the predicate, produces a language
in which there is no negation. The instance of Abs󸀠 that delivers Russell’s paradox
cannot, therefore, even be formed in this language, since it contains negation. The
22 More generally, relations relevant to confirmation are well known not to be invariant under
linguistic transformations. See, e.g., Miller (1974).
23 This is observed by Batens (2002), 132. See also his (1999), 272.
24 | Graham Priest
procedure guarantees, at best, only those instances of Abs󸀠 where 𝐴(𝑥) is positive
(negation-free).
We face a choice, then. Either dialetheism is still with us, or we lose the gen-
eral schema that we had before. But the Schema effectively characterizes the naive
concept of set membership. So if we go the latter way, even if every sentence of the
old language has an equivalent in the new, there is still an expressive loss. We have
lost a concept which we had before. We have lost the ability to express arbitrary set
formation. Not everything that could be expressed before can still be expressed.
This provides us with an argument as to why we may not always be able to
replace an inconsistent language/conceptual scheme with one that is consistent.
There are cases where this can be done only with conceptual impoverishment.
That one may achieve consistency by throwing away a concept is not surprising.
The notion of truth gives rise to contradictions. No problem: just throw it away!
But such a conceptual impoverishment will leave us the poorer. If we were throw-
ing away useless things, this might be no loss; but we are not. All the dialetheic
concepts in 2.2 had a use, and so were useful.
Indeed, the concepts may be highly useful – contradictions notwithstanding.
Thus, for example, the ability to think of the totality of all objects of a certain
kind – closely related to our ability to quantify over all such objects, and to form
them into a set – would seem to be inherent in our conceptual repertoires. It plays
an essential role in certain kinds of mathematics (such as category theory), and
in our ruminations about the way that language and other conceptual processes
work. But abilities of this kind drive us into contradictions of the sort involved in
discussions of the limits of thought.²⁴ We could throw away the ability to totalise
in this way. Maybe this would restore consistency, but the cost would be to cripple
the kind of mathematical and philosophical investigations that depend on it. To
do so simply in the name of consistency would be like doing so in the name of an
arbitrary and repressive government diktat.
The situation is not to be confused with that in which the concept of phlogis-
ton was “replaced” by that of oxygen. We did not, in fact, dispense with the con-
cept of phlogiston. We can still use it now. What we rejected was the claim that
something satisfies this notion. We now think that nothing does; in consequence,
the concept is of no scientific use. (Essentially the same must be said about the
naive notion of set, by defenders of consistent set theories such as 𝑍𝐹.)
Actually, it is not even the case that one can give up a concept in the way
required. If we have the conceptual ability to totalise, in what sense can this be
given up? One can refuse to exercise the ability, but this would seem to get us
24 A detailed discussion of all this can be found in Priest (1995).

nowhere. (It would be like solving the Liar paradox as follows. 𝐴: ‘Suppose I say
that I am lying’. 𝐵: ‘Don’t.’) If you have the ability to think certain thoughts, you
cannot, it would seem, lose this without some kind of trauma to the brain, caused
by accident or senility. And if this is the case, the recommendation to change our
language/concepts fails the practicality test in this most fundamental way.
4 Conclusion
This has been an essay about contradictory concepts, concepts which generate
dialetheias. Assuming there to be such things, two further claims are tempting.
1: Dialetheias are merely in our concepts; there are no such things as contradic-
tions in re. 2: Dialetheias may always be removed by revising our concepts. We
have seen that there are grounds for resisting both of these suggestions. I think
that Hegel would have been delighted; but that is another matter.²⁵
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G. Priest, “Two Dogmas of Quineanism”, in: Philosophical Quarterly 29, 289–30l, 1979.
G. Priest, Beyond the Limits of Thought, Cambridge (2nd edition: Oxford 2002), 1995.
25 Versions of this paper, or parts of it, have been given under various titles at a number of philos-
ophy departments and conferences over a few years: the University of Melbourne, the University
of Queensland, the Australasian Association of Philosophy (Australian National University), the
University of Chapel Hill (North Carolina), the University of Connecticut, the Massachusetts Insti-
tute for Technology, Logic and Reality (Universities of Namur and Louvain la Neuve), the Univer-
sity of Gent, the City University of New York (Graduate Center), the Fourth Cambridge Graduate
Conference on the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, and Contradictions: Logic, History, Ac-
tuality, Technische Universität, Berlin. I thank the participants for many lively discussions and
helpful comments.
26 | Graham Priest
G. Priest, “Review of Soames (1999)”, in: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52, 211–
215, 2001.
G. Priest, In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent, 2nd edition, Oxford (1st edition:
Dordrecht 1987), 2006a.
G. Priest, Doubt Truth to be a Liar, Oxford, 2006b.
G. Priest, “Logic Disputes and the a Priori”, forthcoming.
G. Priest, R. Routley, “The Philosophical Significance of Paraconsistent Logic”, in: G. Priest,
R. Routley, J. Norman (eds.), Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent, Munich, ch.
18, 1989.
B. Russell, “Vagueness”, in: Australasian Journal Philosophy 1: 84–92; reprinted in: R. Keefe
and P. Smith (eds.), Vagueness: A Reader, Cambridge 1999, 61-8, 1923.
S. Soames, Understanding Truth, Oxford, 1999.
JC Beall
Rapunzel Shaves Pinocchio’s Beard
1 A Rapunzel Story
Stories of Rapunzel are many and varied. A newly discovered one, not publicly
available before now, has emerged. The new story involves more ‘gluttiness’ than
most known stories – indeed, a far-reaching spread of empirical-world gluts (i.e.,
sentences that, according to the story, are both true and false of the empirical
world of the story). The chapters of the new story are many but much the same;
each revolves around Rapunzel’s remarkable nature as a (what else to call it) fal-
sity device. Example: according to the chapter on grass growing, we have a minor
variation of the main theme, namely, the given chapter’s Rapunzel fact:
– Grass is growing iff what Rapunzel says is false.
And the chapter ends in grassy gluttiness:
– Rapunzel says that grass is growing.
Since, by the falsity principle, what Rapunzel says is false iff its negation is true,
the world of the story is one in which, lo and behold, grass both is and is not
growing – a glut involving grass growing!¹
What the story holds in glutty intrigue, it lacks in variation. The chapter on
birds flying, like all the chapters, continues the theme:
– Birds are flying iff what Rapunzel says is false.
And the chapter ends with Rapunzel’s saying that birds are flying – and so more
gluttiness results, involving birds flying and not. And so on: a glut in the story’s
world for any claim at all – including, traditionally, both climbing and not climb-
ing long braids of beautiful but bewitched hair, etc.
1 For literary theorists quick to renounce the law of excluded, let me note that the given Rapunzel
story is post-post-modern: it enjoys the truth of 𝐴 ∨ ¬𝐴 for all 𝐴 in the story.
28 | JC Beall
2 Paradox?
The question at hand is beyond literary merits of the new Rapunzel tale. The ques-
tion, in light of recent debate (Beall (2011), Eldridge-Smith (2012)), concerns philo-
sophical weight. Specifically, the question is: are these new paradoxes?
The new Rapunzel tale is not paradoxical at all. To use Eklund’s phrase
(2002), there’s no ‘pull’ towards thinking that we have apparently true premises
and apparently valid reasoning backing an apparently false conclusion. Instead,
we have a story in which craziness happens. The only apparently true premises
are only apparently true according to the story; and that doesn’t make for paradox.
But doesn’t the story make for at least possible paradox? Doesn’t it carve out
some space of possibility of which such broad, empirical-world gluts are true? In
short: if we can make even some sense of the story (even if we can’t imagine it
in the sense of imaging), ought we not conclude that there’s a possible world –
let me just say world – of which the story is true? No. Consider a story in which
Goldbach’s conjecture is true, and another one in which it is false. Both are stories
we can make some sense of (broadly speaking), even though one of them is true
of no world whatsoever.
The point, while perhaps largely uncontroversial, bears repeating: truth in a
story is insufficient for truth at some world – insufficient, that is, for possibility.
Stories are free, subject only to our whims; possibilities are beyond us.
3 Against Pinocchio’s Beard

Plato’s beard, according to Quine (1948), purports to take us from (actual) nonex-
istence to (actual) existence. Eldridge-Smith (2012) gives us a variant, what we
might call Pinocchio’s beard, which purports to take us from (impossible) fictions
to (possible) worlds. In particular, the story of Pinocchio’s ‘paradox’ is one that is
supposed to carry metaphysical import (Eldridge-Smith (2011)). But I don’t see it;
it is no different, in the end, from the canvassed story of Rapunzel, which shows
the absurdity of Pinocchio’s beard.
To be fair, Eldridge-Smith isn’t relying on a general fiction-to-possibility prin-
ciple; his sights are focused on a particular group of theorists, whom he thinks
are subject to such a principle. In particular, Eldridge-Smith’s concern are conser-
vative glut theorists (Beall (2009)) who think that there are no ‘empirical-world
gluts’ – only ‘semantic ones’, only ‘spandrels of truth’. And his charge, at bottom,
is straightforward: since target glut theorists take the Liar paradox to motivate
gluts, they ought to take every version of the Liar paradox to motivate gluts.
Rapunzel Shaves Pinocchio’s Beard | 29
Eldridge-Smith’s argument (2012) is from a uniform-solution principle: same

paradox, same solution. But what to make of the argument? While I’m happy to
grant, at least for present argument, the uniform-solution principle, I reject the
claim – essential to Eldridge-Smith’s argument – that the Pinocchio ‘paradox’ is
the same basic paradox as the Liar. The reason is as above: I reject that Pinoc-
chio’s ‘paradox’ is even paradoxical. What is required is apparently acceptable
reasoning taking us from apparently acceptable premises to an apparently un-
acceptable conclusion. But even the conclusion of Pinocchio’s ‘paradox’ is ap-
parently acceptable: it’s true that, according to the story, a nose both grows and
doesn’t. (Of course, I can’t imagine such a story, in the sense of imaging it; but the
surface structure and its implications are clear enough.) Not only do we have an
apparently acceptable conclusion (about what, according to the story, goes on in
the world); the premises themselves are apparently acceptable only if embedded
in an according to the story operator (which, if removed, undermines the appar-
ently acceptable reasoning).
In sum, to have something count as a version of the Liar paradox, it needs to be
paradoxical; it needs to at least appear to imply something about truth or possible
truth. If there were a clear bridge between fiction and possible truth, then Pinoc-
chio’s beard, employed by Eldridge-Smith (2011), would carry whatever weight is
supported by the bridge. The trouble, dialectically, is that Eldridge-Smith (2012)
relies on the alleged paradoxicality of his Pinocchio story to build such a bridge.
But the alleged paradoxicality is only that: namely, alleged paradoxicality.
One might persist in the thought that, at the very least, the Pinocchio ‘para-
dox’ is liar-like enough to put pressure on glut theorists to acknowledge ‘empirical
gluts’, gluts beyond the ‘merely semantic’ liar gluts (the spandrels of truth). One
might persist, in short, in trying to grow Pinocchio’s beard. What Rapunzel shows,
I submit, is that there’s something deeply flawed in the reasoning behind Pinoc-
chio’s beard: it leads to all-out absurdity.
The problem with Pinocchio’s beard is that it demolishes the fiction–possibi-
lity divide. Stories are free: make them as you please. Possibility is different; pos-
sibility is independent of our creativity. There is no reason for glut theorists (of
any stripe, ‘conservative’ or not) to think otherwise.²
2 I’m grateful to Aaron Cotnoir, Michael Hughes, Andrew Parisi, and Ross Vandegrift for feed-
back. I’m particularly grateful to Elena Ficara for lively conversation at the conference which
occasioned this (or a variant of this) work, and also grateful for her patience with my delayed
submission.
30 | JC Beall
References
JC Beall, Spandrels of Truth, Oxford, 2009.
M. Eklund, “Deep inconsistency”, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80, 321–331, 2002.
W. V. O. Quine, “On what there is”, in: Review of Metaphysics 2, 21–38, 1948.
Franca D’Agostini
Paradoxes and the Reality of Contradictions
1 Introduction
In a plausible reconstruction, dialetheism, that is the perspective according to
which for some 𝛼, 𝛼 is true and ¬𝛼 is also true, is based on some simple theses:
1. the inviolability of the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC) is not justified by

pseudo-Scoto’s argument, as the argument does not work in paraconsis-
tent cases (so the justification is circular)
2. it is not justified either by Aristotle’s elenctic (discussive) argument, be-
cause this does not work for moderate paraconsistency, which admits of
only some contradictions
3. there are no reasons to accept LNC as inviolable rule, except for the two
mentioned in 1 and 2, so LNC is adopted by classical logic as such, without
justification, as a fundamental rule of rationality
4. there is another, primary, rule of reason, and it is the “rule of evidence”,
in virtue of which, if there is some evidence of contradiction, it is rational
to accept it.
They are all acceptable, I suppose. More controversial is the fifth:
5. as there is some evidence of contradiction, in virtue of 1–4 we should ac-

cept that for some 𝛼, 𝛼 is both true and false: LNC sometimes fails.
In this reconstruction, the crucial point is the evidence of contradictions; or also:

the effective occurring of true contradictions, somewhere, in some cases.¹ Usually,
dialetheists mention as paradigmatic cases semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes;
sorites (more generally: borderline properties); contradictions related to change,
motion and infinity; dilemmas and other epistemic inconsistencies.
And yet, in all these cases it is not so clear if the C (contradiction) involved
is real as such. Even in case of micro-physical inconsistencies, one could always
say the evidence of C is due to the language of modern physics. It is often con-
tended that the modern theory of matter, instantiated by the Standard Model of
1 As I will explain later, I adopt here the empiricist notion of evidence as what is grasped as such.
So if 𝛼 is evident to A, then A believes that 𝛼, and ‘𝛼’ is made true by the fact 𝛼.
32 | Franca D’Agostini
Elementary Particles, Quantum Mechanics, and the Special Theory of Relativity,

is successful, but not properly true.
All this would mean that semantic dialetheism has a certain primacy, like it
was somehow admitted by Hegel himself.² But if it is so, to what extent should
we say that semantic contradictions are real, existent, or objectively evident? In
Hegel’s use of the term ‘reality’ (as far as I can say) surely yes, they are, but is
this actually the notion of ‘reality’ involved in the evidence of Cs, dialetheistically
speaking?³
Evidently, on this point dialetheism bumps into wide philosophical (namely:
epistemological and metaphysical) problems: what really counts for evident?
What counts for real? I suggest a good approach to the theme is given by alethic
realism, the realism “based on truth”.⁴ In a word, Cs are alethically real, and the
question about the reality of Cs turns into the question: is alethic realism only
semantic, or also metaphysical realism?
What is interesting in alethic realism (which I interpret as a metaphysical ver-
sion of semantic realism), is that it may convey a realistic perspective,⁵ without
restricting the realm of facts to a specific sort of reality. Facts, intended in alethic
perspective, are ‘what makes true’, which means that there might be semantic as
well as strictly metaphysical facts, and the latter may be de se facts (such as the
fact that I feel tired now) as well as de re (the fact that here and now there is a
computer). To accept this, there is no need to renounce metaphysics (the theory
of what real facts are like); and there is no need to accept that the world is trivial,
and that the answer to the question ‘what does exist?’ is ‘everything’.⁶ What is only
needed, is to enlarge the realm of what can make true. In this sense, the perspec-
tive is well adaptable to noneism, which not by chance is dialetheists’ traditional
metaphysics.⁷
2 This is a controversial point, yet, there are positive suggestions concerning some sort of seman-
tic dialetheism in Hegel’s work. See on this Ficara (2013).
3 “Hegel’s idealism meant that the distinction between objects that are experienced and mere
‘objects of thought’ has no particular ontological significance”. Priest (1987), 3.
4 The most eminent exponent of alethic realism, also called Cornell realism, was William Alston.
See Alston (1993), Alston (1996), and Alston (2002).
5 One including the existence of independent, real, facts; the existence of a unique true descrip-
tion of these facts; and our possibility of giving sometimes a true description of them, and evalu-
ating the truth or falsity of a certain description (see later).
6 I tried to show this in D’Agostini (2009b) and D’Agostini (2012).
2 Paradoxes and the Evidence of Contradictions

2.1 What Is a True Contradiction?
A contradiction occurs when ‘𝛼’ is true, and ‘¬𝛼’ is true as well (where ‘𝛼’ is a
proper truthbearer). In realistic perspective, ‘is true’ means: is made true by some
facts or states of affairs. So ideally, there is a real contradiction when two contra-
dictory states of affairs simultaneously occur in the same world, at the same time
and under the same respect. Russell, in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism sug-
gested that a same fact 𝛼 makes true the proposition ‘𝛼’, and makes false ‘¬𝛼’. So
there would be only one fact, ultimately. The notion of falsemaking is discussed,
but the point remains. Logically, it involves the semantics of negation.⁸ But meta-
physically, and epistemically, we have to reflect on what could be a situation, or a
case, which makes 𝛼 ∧ ¬𝛼 true: are there two cases, or only one? Is truly evidence
the evidence involved?
In empiricist perspective, Humean as well as Kantian,⁹ ‘evidence’ stands for
the action of reality on an epistemic agent’s system of beliefs. I have the evidence
that 𝛼 iff a certain real fact 𝛼 causally acts on my cognitive means, making me
(truly) believe that 𝛼. In this account, ‘evident’ implies ‘true’, and ‘true’ implies
‘real’:¹⁰ if 𝛼 is evident, then ‘𝛼’ is true, and if ‘𝛼’ is true, then 𝛼 is real. So the notion
of empirically evident C implies true and real C: the fact involved is not apparent,
and it is not the result of some mistake either.
Empirical evidence may fail, as in the process from 𝛼 (state of affairs) to ‘𝛼’
(belief, or proposition) something may go wrong, so I grasp 𝛼, but my formed be-
lief (for some reasons) becomes ¬𝛼, or 𝛽. Surely, in that case, we cannot say 𝛼 was
strictly evident to me. My evidence was only believed and not true evidence. And
evidently, this also regards Cs.
Cases of only apparent Cs are frequent, in the usual practice of believing and
knowing. Sometimes, what seems to be 𝛼 ∧ ¬𝛼 is in fact something else: because
say the two are not mutually exclusive, or are not jointly exhaustive, or do not
jointly occur (so the same translation in terms of 𝛼 ∧ ¬𝛼 was wrong, actually).
In this case, we would say the C is to be dissolved.¹¹ Some other times, we come
8 See Priest (2006), ch. 2.

9 Substantially confirmed by Burge (2010).
10 The idea that Kant’s conception of truth was not realist is a wrong idea: I leave this out, but
for a wider discussion see D’Agostini (2012).
11 Dissolutions of Cs, as I will explain later, are also to be adopted in those cases in which the
C is apparent, as it conceals under-determination, so the truth value glut is in fact a truth value
gap.
to know that in fact only one of the two terms was in fact true. Then we simply
solve the contradiction. Finally, sometimes the apparent C is in fact due to some
glitch or mistake, concealed somewhere, or to some false assumption. We get rid
of the false assumption, and the C disappears. And this is the reduction to absurd,
or more generally: the epistemic reduction of Cs.
A true C is epistemically given as such when all the three procedures fail. And
usually, as ideally the three are ordered (if solution fails, try dissolution, if dissolu-
tion fails try reduction), we would say evident Cs are irreducible: the main logical
method fails.¹²
2.2 What Is a True Paradox?

According to the classical definition (Sainsbury (1995)), a paradox is the appar-
ently unacceptable conclusion of an apparently acceptable argument. Acceptable
arguments are sound, which means they have true premises, and valid inference.
So there are five possibilities: 1. the premises are only apparently (not really) true;
2. the inference is only apparently (not really) valid; 3. in fact, premises are un-
true and the inference is not valid (both 1 and 2 occur); 4. the conclusion is only
apparently (not really) unacceptable; 5. premises are truly true, inference is truly
valid, and yet the conclusion is unacceptable (false).
Only in the last case we have a true paradox. In the other cases, the evidence
(in the sense specified above) fails, because there is not really a paradox, rather:
a fallacy (cases 1, 2, 3), or what Quine (1962) called veridical paradox: we thought
the conclusion was false, but it was true, actually (case 4), and when we come to
know it is true, the paradox disappears.¹³
Now if we ask: what is unacceptable? The reasonable answer is: 𝛼 (if 𝛼 is a
truthbearer) is unacceptable iff we know (or believe) it is false, or contradictory.¹⁴
But epistemically, 𝛼 is visibly false when it contradicts something we know (be-
lieve) for sure: that ¬𝛼. So, ultimately: 𝛼 is unacceptable when it is contradictory;
what is unacceptable is the C.
12 This may happen in two ways, as I specified in D’Agostini (2009b), corresponding to the two
main kinds of paradoxes: sorites and antinomies. The first is 𝛼 → (𝛽 ∧ ¬𝛽) and ¬𝛼 → (𝛽 ∧ ¬𝛽),
both from a proposition and from its negation we get a C. The second is 𝛼 → ¬𝛼, and ¬𝛼 → 𝛼,
from a proposition we get its negation, and vice versa.
13 Lycan (2010) has recently proposed the idea that paradoxes come “in degree”, and it is fairly
similar to my point: on this, and for the definition of paradox as resistant contradiction see
D’Agostini (2009b), first part.
14 A third possibility is that 𝛼 is unacceptable insofar as meaningless. But in this case, one
couldn’t say 𝛼 is properly a truthbearer.
Now we have here a more restrictive definition: a true paradox, properly

speaking, is a contradiction. And the evidence involved, is somehow unquiet ev-
idence, of the kind ‘ “But this isn’t how it is” – we say. “Yet this is how it has to
be!” “But this is how it is” —’, as Wittgenstein wrote in the Philosophical Investi-
gations.¹⁵
When do we actually have this sort of unquiet evidence? Graham Priest, in In
Contradiction and elsewhere, mentions the following paradigmatic cases of true
Cs: 1. logical (semantic, set-theoretic) paradoxes, conveying the schema 𝜇 ↔ ¬𝜇;
2. transition states, or borderline cases (change, motion, borders and cut offs);
3. contradictory results due to the notion of infinity; 4. epistemic undecidable sit-
uations, such as the case in which I believe that 𝛼 and I believe that 𝛽, but I come
to believe that ¬(𝛼 ∧ 𝛽); 5. normative conflicts, to say conflicts occurring in nor-
mative systems, when we have apparently consistent laws, which in some appli-
cations reveal not being simultaneously observable.¹⁶
This somehow confirms that effective-real contradictions are (conveyed by)
what we usually call ‘paradoxes’: antinomies, sorites, infinity paradoxes, epis-
temic paradoxes, and those practical paradoxes that are dilemmas.¹⁷ Now the
question is: are all these Cs effective, which is to say: evident, and evident insofar
as real and truly irreducible?
As to borderline situations (borders, cut offs, transition states, etc.) there is
no doubt, or so it seems. Evidence is against LNC. The example Priest most fre-
quently mentions is: when I am on the threshold of a room, I am in and out at the
same time. Whether we truly have double phenomenic evidence or not, in these
cases, is a controversial issue,¹⁸ because usually these are micro-phenomena, not
captured by our perception. But this only holds for what Tyler Burge has called,
in his monumental work on the Origins of Objectivity, “individual representation-
alism”: the idea that cognition is a strictly individual phenomenon. Burge notes:
“there is a structural difference between perception and propositional attitudes”,
but “the representational content of perception is a veridical condition, that when
met by an appropriately sensed subject matter is veridical” (Burge (2010), 539).
So we would say: border-contradictions seem to be evident insofar as real, and
15 Wittgenstein (1985), 112–113.

16 Priest (1987).
17 Otherwise, the idea that paradoxes ultimately are epistemic or logical structures conveying Cs,
is implicit in most of the literature about non classical logic, and it is fairly reasonable to admit
that we call “paradoxical” situations that are undecidable by over-determination.
18 See Priest (2006), 57–64. On the possibility or impossibility of perceptive Cs, see Sorensen
(2003) and Sorensen (2008).
so because the conception of them is veridical, even if we cannot grasp them by

conscious perceptive means.
In other cases, and namely as to epistemic-doxastic Cs (I believe that 𝛼 and I
believe that ¬𝛼), or as to liar-like Cs (𝛼 iff ¬𝛼), there might be some doubts. There
are Cs, but one may say they are only apparent, or are the result of some glitch or
mistaken assumptions, or occur in a special system or a field (say: a semantic field,
intended as fictional or conventional), which we would not properly call real, as
such.
3 Paradoxes in Epistemic Perspective

The objective occurring of epistemic Cs is controversial, basically for two reasons:
because natural epistemic systems are “fragmented”, or intrinsically heteroge-
neous, or irreducibly dynamic (so the two contradictory terms do not properly
occur at the same time, and in the same context or field); or because very of-
ten what seems to be (or what passes off as) over-determination is in fact under-
determination.
The first account somehow legitimates non-adjunctive approaches, that is
those, which admit that 𝛼 and ¬𝛼 may occur, but not jointly (the basic rule of
Adjunction fails: you get 𝛼, ¬𝛼 but not 𝛼 ∧ ¬𝛼).¹⁹ Knowingly, some interpreta-
tions of Hegel’s logic resolutely deny that it is a paraconsistent logic, stressing
the dynamic nature of Hegel’s dialectics. In Sorensen’s perspective epistemic in-
fra-subjective systems may be inconsistent,²⁰ as beliefs are so to say produced by
“different bureaus in a firma”: the results obtained by one bureau may be ignored
by another.
However, I think the main point with epistemic Cs is the second explanation:
that often, what epistemically seems to be a glut is in fact a gap, and over-determi-
nacy is the superficial effect of underlying under-determinacy. Let’s see now some
examples.
19 See Varzi (2004).

20 Sorensen (2001) has produced an elenctic argument to the effect that epistemic contradictions
are somewhat unavoidable. The argument can be discussed, but I do not treat the problem here.
3.1 There Is No Preface Paradox
Here is a version of the preface paradox:
𝛼 = ‘In this list (in this book) there is some false sentence.’
𝛽
𝛾
𝛿
In Priest’s account (1987), the author of the preface presumably believes each sen-
tence in the book is true (insofar as she has written it), then she believes that
𝑇𝛽 ∧ 𝑇𝛾 ∧ 𝑇𝛿. But she says that in the book there are some false sentences, so she
does not believe that 𝑇(𝛽 ∧ 𝛾 ∧ 𝛿). Contradiction.
Beall and Restall (2006) suggest what we would call a dissolution by under-
determination. Suppose the author believes each sentence of the book is very likely
true, so, say: 𝛽 is 0.8 true, 𝛾 is 0.9 true, and 𝛿 is 1 true. Now it happens she is also
entitled to believe that there might be some false sentence in the book, as the
conjunction 𝛽 ∧ 𝛾 ∧ 𝛿 will totalize 0.8 × 0.9 × 1 = 0.72. More precisely, let’s
suppose the author’s epistemic standard is:
(ES) I accept 𝜑 iff 𝑃(𝜑|𝑒) ≥ 0.8
I accept 𝜑 if and only if the probability of 𝜑 given the evidence 𝑒 is 0.8 or more.
Given the evaluations above, the author must rationally accept each proposition
𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿, as each singularly satisfies (ES), but she cannot accept 𝛽 ∧ 𝛾 ∧ 𝛿, which
is 0.72, and therefore she also must accept 𝛼 as true (0.8 or more). So there is no C
in the author’s beliefs.
Surely, the probabilistic account of truth is a positive resource for epistemol-
ogy. Rather, it is the best way to connect logic and epistemology. What Christensen
(2004) has called “gradualistic model of beliefs”, as opposed to “binary model”
is reasonable, and well captured by probabilistic calculus. In this case, Beall’s
and Restall’s approach also gives good arguments in favour of non-adjunctive ac-
counts, because what fails, in the author’s beliefs, is namely the adjunction rule.
So we see that epistemic gradualism is able to dissolve epistemic Cs, at least
in case of intra-subjective Cs, such as those conveyed by the preface paradox, or
also: the lottery paradox.
3.2 Reliability Conflicts
In the preface paradox, there is no doxastic C: the author does not exactly know
what is the false sentence in the book (or to what extent the proposed sentences
are true), so he or she gives asymmetric evaluations. But are there cases in which
A positively 0.8 believes that 𝛼 and also 0.8 believes that ¬𝛼?
In principle, this may happen in two ways: because there is a conflict between
the sources of belief, or because there is a real conflict between the pieces of evi-
dence we get.
An example of the first case is the reliabilist paradox. Suppose I am perfectly
confident in both the Catholic Church and scientists. But it happens the Catholic
Pope says that 𝛼, for instance: ‘a 14 day human proto-embryo is a human being’;
and scientists say that not 𝛼: ‘a 14 day human proto-embryo is not a human being’.
What should I believe? Also in this case the main point is under-determinacy: the
conflict arises simply because I do not know what is true, as we simply lack a
shared definition of what is a human being, and I have not enough information to
judge which the preferable definition is.
If the epistemic constraint conveyed by the two sources is strong enough, I
may be possibly led to give 𝛼 a value 0.8 or so and ¬𝛼 a value 0.8 as well. And it
should be noted that beliefs are contrastive: if I 0.8 believe that 𝜑, then I 0.2 believe
that ¬𝜑. So as a matter of fact, my evaluations are: both 0.8 and 0.2 for 𝛼 and both
0.8 and 0.2 for ¬𝛼.
However, this hardly captures the effective dynamic of beliefs of an epistemic
agent who is cultivating some ideas regarding 14-day human proto-embryos. First,
possibly the two sources will act one against the other, producing some global di-
minishing of the reliability of both. Second, if the agent has to take some deci-
sions, she will produce some rational re-arrangement of the comparative reliabil-
ity of one or the other source. In other terms, if I (Catholic, but fond of science)
have to vote for a law concerning scientific research about stem cells, stated the
opposite judgements of my sources of belief, I will diminish my confidence in the
absolute reliability of the Pope (or science); or else, I will ignore the metaphysical
question concerning the effective being ‘human’ of the embryo, and I won’t vote
on the basis of metaphysical considerations. So the contrastive belief concerning
one term will increase, or both 𝛼 and ¬𝛼 will result “not designed”. In any case,
there won’t be any true doxastic C.
3.3 Conflicting Pieces of Evidence
In case of epistemic Cs conveyed by contradictory evidence, the 𝑒 in ES is double.

In virtue of my evidence, P(𝛼) = 0.8 (or more), and P(¬𝛼) = 0.8 (or more) as well.
Fermi-Hart paradox is a good example. The proposition E: ‘Extraterrestrial intel-
ligent people do exist’ is typically over-evaluated, in virtue of the two arguments:
(1) If advanced extraterrestrial civilizations existed, they would have con-

tacted us
There is no clear evidence that such a contact has taken place
Therefore: it is highly improbable that civilizations of this kind do exist.
(2) The universe is huge, or even infinite
Therefore: it is highly probable that advanced extraterrestrial civiliza-
tions do exist.
The two arguments seem to be compelling. We have the evaluation ¬𝐸 = 0.9 or

so, in virtue of (1) and 𝐸 = 0.9 or so, in virtue of (2). Defenders of E will fiercely
oppose the upholders of ¬𝐸, and vice versa. But what about the third person, the
epistemic observer A, who takes into account both (1) and (2)?
Surely, a rational A won’t admit 𝑃(𝐸 ∧ ¬𝐸) = 0.81, to say: that it is highly
probable that ETs do exist and do not exist at the same time. Rather, she will think
the issue is fundamentally under-determined. Possibly, the contrastive method
would work, because the two arguments will act one against the other, yielding a
global diminishing of the belief involved in the entire issue.
And yet, in this case the situation is slightly different. Because here the effec-
tive contradiction won’t regard 𝐸 ∧ ¬𝐸, or the external conflict between reliability
sources, but the two facts expressed in the two arguments. We have a fact, actu-
ally, which is the high estimate of probability, stressed by (2), and another fact, the
lack of evidence, stressed by (1). These two are facts, in some sense (and especially,
if one adopts a frequentistic vision of probability), so the relative propositions are
true.
Are these epistemic facts? Is their occurring to be interpreted in terms of some
positive ‘𝛼 ∧ ¬𝛼’? This is arguable, given the general under-determinacy of the en-
tire subject. But evidently, the problem is metaphysical: it concerns the nature of
facts here involved. And in this sense, we have to move to the underlying question,
which is the metaphysical question: the metaphysics of Cs, and paradoxes.
4 Paradoxes in Metaphysical Perspective

I am not sure that there are no epistemic contradictions. Maybe the probabilistic
principle of complementation, interpreted in terms of contrastivity, does not re-
ally capture what truly happens in an epistemic agent’s “stock of beliefs”, when
the believer is facing contradictory pieces of evidence. Not only that, as long as the
meaning of ‘there are’ is not specified, the idea that there are or there are not Cs, of
any sort, can hardly be defended. And yet, it is fairly reasonable to admit that epis-
temic contradictions do not involve absolute (realistic) truth, but only epistemic
truth. Epistemic truth is typically incomplete, hence “gradualistic”, hence it can
(should?) be treated by probabilistic means. And as we have seen, probabilistic
approaches to Cs are often if not always dissolutive.
Can liar-like Cs be treated in the same way? In fact, given the sentence 𝜇, which
says: ‘𝜇 is false’, or other structures conveying some 𝜇 ↔ ¬𝜇, one would say there
is true evidence of contradiction, which is not comparable to the only epistemic
evidence above mentioned. And if evident implies true, as stated before (see here,
section 2.1), it should be noted that this truth is categorical, it is the true (classical)
truth, whose values are 1 and 0.
This can be shown first by checking if the truth value gap strategy actually
works when considering the kind of evidence conveyed by liar-like paradoxes.
4.1 Truth Value Gaps?
Should we say that, when facing a liar-like C, we have lack of evidence, more than
double (unquiet) evidence, and that a gappy strategy would be in order? In fact,
this seems not satisfying, because, as it seems, no (known) case of gappy evidence
is applicable to the Liar’s sentence.
Allegedly, gappy sentences are:
1. “failed” or “ungrounded” assertions, such as pure (empty) self-refer-

ences: Paul says ‘what Peter says is true’ and Peter says ‘what Paul says
is true’; these are syntactically acceptable sentences, but they cannot
be said to be true or false, because there is no ground to be checked, in
order to see their truth (they are ungrounded), or because they “fail their
assertive aim”, like Goldstein (2000) has suggested;
2. category mistakes, like ‘this is a sad table’: if we admit it is false, then ‘this
table is not sad’ is true, which means the table is happy, or something like
that;
3. failed presuppositions: ‘Smith’s children are all blond’, but Smith has no
child; if you say it is false, this would mean some of Smith’s children are
not blond, which is false as well;
4. normative or future sentences, such as ‘the death penalty is unjust’, and
‘there will be a sea battle tomorrow’: they cannot be said to be true or
false, because there is no state of affairs which may make them true or
false;
5. epistemic gaps, to say under-determined truths, such as: ‘there are extra-
terrestrial intelligent beings’, or ‘there are infinite twin primes’.
In fact, cases from 1 to 4 can be discussed, and possibly, the only true case of truth
value gap is the last one.²¹ But there have been proposals of treating 𝜇 or simi-
lar sentences in terms of failed or ungrounded assertions (Kripke, Goldstein), or
failed presuppositions (van Fraassen), or category mistakes (Martin). These pro-
posals have explicative merits, but they cannot be applied in the ‘evidence’ per-
spective we are adopting here.
As to 1: we cannot say 𝜇 is a failed assertion, properly: the fact involved is
not of the kind of ‘snow is white’, but there are lots of non-empirical truths we
correctly believe. Besides, the Liar tells us something definite: that it is true if false,
and false if true, and this is surely a relevant information, as from this we infer lots
of things concerning logic. As to 2: ultimately, 𝜇 is a sentence, so something that is
syntactically apt to be called true or false; if 𝜇 said the fact 𝜇 is false, this would be
a positive mistake, but 𝜇 does not say so. And evidently, 𝜇 is neither a normative
nor a future sentence (case 4).
Not only that (and more importantly), there is no lack of evidence (case 5),
because we know everything about the sentence, we have all we need to state its
truth or falsity.
So the Liar perfectly succeeds in communicating what she wants to commu-
nicate: that what she’s saying is false. The problem is ours, insofar as we see that
what she’s saying is false if true and true if false. Interpreting this in the sense that
we are not able to say that 𝜇 is true, is fundamentally wrong, because we positively
know it is true, though not only true.
21 For instance 1 and 2 are discussed by admitting that failed sentences or category mistakes are
not properly ‘propositions’, so they are not truth value gaps but rather non-sentential expressions
(like ‘yellow’ or ‘what’s the time?’). Example 3 may be discussed admitting that failed presuppo-
sitions are false, which is pragmatically proved by the fact that if you tell me ‘Smith’s children
are all blond’, whereas Smith has no child, you are simply cheating me. As to 4, the question is
highly controversial, my opinion is that normative and future sentences are true or false, as they
convey, respectively: modal truth and probable truth.
4.2 What Sort of Facts Are Liar-Like Facts?
The dialetheist account of Liar paradoxes, reformulated in the perspective of the

evidence involved in Liar-cases, will lead us to say that we correctly believe that
𝜇 and ¬𝜇, because the contradiction does not regard our personal lack of knowl-
edge, but something more objective: a special sort of evidence, possibly concern-
ing a special sort of reality.
Is this semantic, that is to say: fictional, or conventional, reality? I do not think
it is properly so, but to see this, we need a closer view on the sort of facts involved
in liar-like Cs.
We can easily see that 𝜇 and ¬𝜇 are made true, respectively, by two ‘facts’: the
fact that ¬𝜇 → 𝜇, and the fact that 𝜇 → ¬𝜇, and classically, the passage from
equivalence to contradiction can be stated in two ways. The first is by considering
that we have self-refutation and self-foundation of 𝜇. By applying the ancient rule
of consequentia mirabilis, like Sainsbury (1995) suggests, it follows that 𝜇 is surely
true, because it is confirmed by its own negation, and ¬𝜇 is surely true as well,
because it is denied by its own assertion. The structure 𝜇 ↔ ¬𝜇 can thus be
reduced to 𝜇∧¬𝜇 by CM, in negative and affirmative form. The other way of ‘seeing’
the passage from 𝜇 ↔ ¬𝜇 to 𝜇 ∧ ¬𝜇 is what Field calls “the central argument from
equivalence to contradiction” (2008, 7). Here the excluded middle has a decisive
role: given 𝜇 ↔ ¬𝜇, and given 𝜇 ∨ ¬𝜇, by assuming 𝜇(𝐸∨) you get that ¬𝜇, so
𝜇 ∧ ¬𝜇, and by assuming ¬𝜇, you get that 𝜇, and then 𝜇 ∧ ¬𝜇 again.
These are logical facts, which means they are occurring in a language (a fic-
tional or conventional world), and under consideration of some very specific and
well determined principles, such as the definition of falsity (FA) 𝐹𝜇 ↔ 𝑉¬𝜇, and
the 𝑇 schema 𝑉𝜇 ↔ 𝜇. These two facts in turn confirm bivalence, i.e. that true
and false are jointly exhaustive: ¬𝑉𝜇 → 𝐹𝜇, and ¬𝐹𝜇 → 𝑉𝜇. And so they confirm
the passage from equivalence to contradiction.
So in order to have 𝜇 ∧ ¬𝜇 we need a lot of special ‘facts’. From an epistemic
point of view, the evidence of C is preserved, because one may note that the facts
above are known, and consequently believed as such. So when facing a liar-like
paradox I can say that I know that 𝜇 and ¬𝜇, – even if the real facts at stake are
not exactly of the same kind of white snow, or similar facts.²²
22 Notably, the epistemic C will survive in conjunctive, but not distributive form: face to the Liar,
we have 𝐵(𝜇∧¬𝜇), but not 𝐵𝜇∧𝐵¬𝜇. Because properly, I do not believe that only 𝜇, as I positively
know that 𝜇 → ¬𝜇, and I do not believe that only ¬𝜇, because I know that ¬𝜇 → 𝜇. But exactly
for the same reasons, I must believe that 𝜇 ∧ ¬𝜇. It is the opposite of the preface paradox: here
the simplification rule fails.
4.3 Is Pinocchio a Metaphysical Liar?
Are semantic facts truly facts? I think there is an interesting suggestion, on this
point, in Austin’s 1950 essay on Truth, where he, in passing, says that facts of
the sort ‘p is true’ may be called soft facts. And this is the difference between the
two parts, T‘p’, and p, of the T schema: the first is true with reference to a soft
fact. Which means, for us: is made true by a soft fact. However, it is difficult to
say that soft facts, i.e. semantic facts, are real, and that their evidence is exactly
of the same sort of hard facts. A possible answer to this question would require
a reconsideration of what counts for semantics, and what counts for facts. I will
briefly discuss these points later.
Now it is useful to focus on the discussion about the effective possibility of real
liar-like Cs (against semantic dialetheism) arisen between Peter Eldridge-Smith
and JC Beall with reference to Pinocchio paradox.
Pinocchio paradox, devised by Veronique Eldridge-Smith (Peter Eldridge-
Smith’s daughter), is, I would say, a physicalistic version of the Liar paradox.
Pinocchio says 𝑃 = ‘my nose is growing’; as Pinocchio’s nose grows if and only if
he is lying, in the case given his nose is growing iff it is not growing.
In Peter Eldridge Smith’s view, this is a liar-like paradox, as P logically be-
haves like the sentence 𝜇, which says ‘𝜇 is false’. But the special (physical) prop-
erty it involves is by no means comparable to the property of ‘being true’. So we
would have here a good counter-example to the etiology of paradoxes suggested
by Tarski: “paradoxes arise from the use of semantic predicates”, because “hav-
ing one’s nose grow is a facial not a semantic feature” (Eldridge-Smith/Eldridge-
Smith (2010), 213). We would have then here the case of a facial liar-like paradox.
Eldridge-Smith also notes that “‘having one’s nose grow’ is not a synonym
for ‘is not-true”’ (Eldridge-Smith/Eldridge-Smith (2010), 213): the nose grows be-
cause Pinocchio says something false, but this is a metaphysical and not a seman-
tic relation. In a further article (see Eldridge-Smith (2011)) he also specifies that
Pinocchio’s utterance conveys a metaphysical dialetheia, so it is also a counter-
example to semantic dialetheism.
JC Beall (2011) has observed that Pinocchio’s case is under the scope of the
operator “according to the story. . . ”, which means the dialetheia involved is not
metaphysical. And this is somehow unquestionable, stated that (as far as we
know) Pinocchio’s case only exists in Collodi’s novel, which is a fictional world.
One might say that also the standard Liar dialetheias are fictional, and so is
any other dialetheia. Ultimately, if Cs are logical facts, they are fictional at least in-
sofar as logic in itself is a fact of human language, and human language is human
creation. In this sense, even the regime of truth and falsity, generally intended, is
fictional. This is what Nietzsche thought (in the early paper about Truth and Lie
in Extra-Moral Sense), and this is what Kroon (2004) indirectly hypothesizes, by

noting that, as far as we know, our world might be trivial.
4.4 There Is No Pinocchio Paradox (Metaphysically Speaking)
The first point that is to be examined, in my view, is the effective (evident) occur-
ring of the contradiction 𝐺 ∧ ¬𝐺 (Pinocchio’s nose grows and it does not grow)
from 𝐺 ↔ ¬𝐺 (Pinocchio’s nose grows iff it does not grow), which is required
(see 3.2) for considering liar-like contradictions as true contradictions.
Let’s assume first that 𝑊𝑃 is the closest to our world among those in which
Pinocchio’s internal device works in the way expected. So let’s suppose 𝑊𝑃 works
exactly like our world W, but for the fact that Pinocchio (and only Pinocchio) has
the special property of revealing his lies, in the way specified. Let’s also assume
that in W𝑃 the Excluded Middle works, and then we are entitled to infer 𝐺 ∧ ¬𝐺
from 𝐺 ↔ ¬𝐺.
Would there really be two states of affairs, related to G and ¬𝐺? Possibly not.
As a consequence of the utterance, and if Pinocchio does not say anything else, the
nose will grow, but it immediately will come back, and then it will grow, and come
back again, etc., which is the simple recursive-revisional movement of truth, when
involved in liar-like situations. So there is only one metaphysical fact ultimately:
the one produced by the causal mechanism which relates 𝑃 to Pinocchio’s nose,
but this fact is not contradictory, though we would describe it in terms of 𝐺 ↔
¬𝐺. And there is another fact, possibly logical, or semantic (or epistemic): our
inference that 𝑃 ∧ ¬𝑃. And this will surely be another, distinct fact: of the same
kind of the arguments 1 and 2 in the Fermi-Hart paradox, but not of the sort of
evidence strictly involved in them.
In other terms, our logical inference that 𝑃∧¬𝑃 in 𝑊𝑃 is not supported by any
non-logical evidence that 𝐺 ∧ ¬𝐺 (in the above specified sense of evidence). And,
more importantly: we can accept this sort of inferential evidence only if we move
from a metaphysical to a semantic consideration of possible worlds. The former is
based on assuming that worlds are collections of facts (or states of affairs) the
second is based on postulating that worlds are collections of propositions, to say:
truthbearers. The former is based on considering what makes true, the latter is
based on considering what is made true. It is not a negligible difference.
Globally, the realm of truth consists of worlds containing what makes true and
worlds containing what is made true, and it is in this global domain, that true (se-
mantic or metaphysical) Cs do occur. But there are facts also in the worlds of truth-
made things: namely semantic, or epistemic facts. So in Pinocchio’s metaphysical
world there will be 𝐺 ↔ ¬𝐺, but not the fact 𝐺 ∧ ¬𝐺. Whereas in Pinocchio’s se-
mantic world there will be both 𝐺 ↔ ¬𝐺 and 𝐺 ∧ ¬𝐺.
If we accept the idea that a true paradox ultimately is a true contradiction,
then Pinocchio paradox is not a paradox, in the metaphysical version of the story,
while it is a paradox, but only in its semantic version. This possibly holds for all
liar-like Cs. However, I am not sure that the same result should be extended to any
case of contradictions, like semantic dialetheism contends. I am not sure that, for
instance, borderline contradictions, which immediately present themselves in the
form 𝛼 ∧ ¬𝛼, are only semantic, as such. But surely, contradictions occurring as
a result of inferential truth, such as those conveyed by the schema 𝛼 ↔ ¬𝛼, are
semantic, for at least a reasonable meaning of semantic.
In fact, Eldridge-Smith’s case is extremely useful, I think, exactly in the sense
suggested by Eldridge-Smith and Eldridge-Smith (2010): to reflect over the kind
of paranormal properties that we possibly need to get the form 𝜇 ↔ ¬𝜇. As a
matter of fact, the properties involved can be of the widest kind, say: heterological,
not being a member of oneself, . . . , and maybe also ‘having one’s nose growing’.
But without truth (namely: Df. 𝑇 and Df. 𝐹), you cannot have any passage from
𝜇 ↔ ¬𝜇 to 𝜇 ∧ ¬𝜇.
5 Dialetheism and Alethic Realism

Supposing that liar-like contradictions are made true by semantic facts, what is
a fact, and what is semantic? There are problems concerning both definitions.
Burgess (2009) has suggested that maybe we should do away with the term ‘se-
mantic’, because it is typically ambiguous. In fact, it means: ‘concerning mean-
ing’, and also ‘concerning truth’. To think that the two aspects are one and the
same means to assume (more or less implicitly): that reference is always refer-
ence to entities able to make sentences true; or, in contrast, that the truth of logic
has nothing to do with entities actually subsisting in some way. These opinions
could be not wrong, but evidently, the use of the term might be confounding, at
least insofar as it may legitimate opposite implications.
As to facts, the anti-referentialistic (second-Wittgensteinian, pragmatic and
post-neopositivist) trend has suggested to cultivate a certain suspicion toward the
notion of fact. Especially, insofar as by “fact” is meant the obscure independent
entity that makes true all sorts of sentences. Are there conditional facts? Or neg-
ative facts? Or universal facts? Recent theories of truth have somehow overcome
these difficulties.²³ Yet a perplexity is still alive. See for instance Putnam’s recent
‘realistic’ turn: Putnam (2012) declares being a realist, but not a realist about truth.
5.1 Alethic Realism
I suggest to consider the two problems in the perspective of alethic realism. Ac-
cording to alethic realists (see Alston (1996) and (2002)) a proposition or a sen-
tence 𝜑 is true iff things stand like 𝜑 says. This is not properly (or not necessarily)
a version of correspondence theory, but surely it is a version (slightly more robust)
of truthmakers theory, that states: if 𝜑 is true, then there is something (some fact or
state of affairs) which makes it true (see especially Armstrong (2004) and (2010)).
In this account, alethic realism is 𝑎 realistic interpretation of the T schema: if 𝜑 is
T, then things stand like 𝜑 says; and if things stand like 𝜑 says, then 𝜑 is T. It is
also a plain version of the Platonic and Aristotelian notion of aletheia (as Künne
(2003) has shown, the idea of correspondence was not contemplated in Plato’s
and Aristotle’s definitions).
In the perspective of alethic realism a ‘fact’ is simply what can make true a
proposition, so there might be indeterminate kinds of facts: universal, as well as
conditional, mathematical or physical, infrasubjective or intrasubjective, physi-
cal or intentional, etc. In fact, skepticism about the existence of a wide range of
truth-facts is due to some implicit metaphysical position, which restricts facts to
empirical or inter-subjectively observational facts.
Let’s suppose I truthfully say: ‘I am tired today’: this simply means that there
are certain conditions of my brain or muscular mass, which make true my asser-
tion, and act on my self-perception so making me say-think ‘I’m tired today’. If I
truthfully say ‘2 is a prime number’ there are positive conditions of mathematical
language (or of mathematical reality: this is not relevant here), that make true my
assertion, and make me believe and say that 2 is a prime. Significantly, if I truth-
fully say ‘I believe that God exists’, there are doxastic facts that make true what
I’m saying: these are possibly hybrid facts, of a very complex nature, and more
truthfully, I would have said something like: ‘yes, I 0.8 believe that God exists’,
but again: this is not relevant here.
These are de se facts that a restrictive metaphysics wouldn’t accept, because
they are not inter-subjectively evident. But they are perfectly truth-apt, and this
is revealed by the fact that I may lie on them. For instance, as a politician, I say ‘I
believe in God’ (while I don’t), with the intention of gaining your approval. Or I
23 See D’Agostini (2011), ch. 5.

am the Pope of the Catholic church, and evidently I say that I 0.8 believe a 14 day
human proto-embryo is a human being, but I do not truly believe this: there are de
se facts that make the negation of my sentence true. Truthmaker theories usually
are physicalist, but this does not change the picture: simply one would say that
doxastic facts supervene on physical facts, but supervening (soft) facts are able to
make true.
All this, I suggest, implies a meaning of the predicate ‘x is real’ which is beau-
tifully adaptable to dialetheic reality, that is: to the notion of real C.
Because in principle, there is no preliminary restriction on the natures a C may
assume. There are paradoxical Cs of the form 𝜇 ↔ ¬𝜇, and they are called real in-
sofar as both 𝜇 and ¬𝜇 are made true by logical (semantic) facts. There are soritical
Cs, made true by the borders of properties we encounter in empirical (though pos-
sibly not phenomenical) experience. There are dilemmatic Cs, arising from latent
inconsistencies of normative systems, so made true by normative facts.²⁴ There
are modal Cs, made true by modal facts (be they intended as metaphysically or
only semantically real, or in other way) etc.
In principle, in the perspective of alethic realism there is no need to restrict
facts to space-time occurrence, or to the actual world, or any other specific field.
For a fact being a fact, it is enough for it to be able to make something true or false.
This is somehow adaptable to the ‘open’ and ‘liberal’ metaphysics of noneism.
Which is for me a non-restrictive metaphysics. And in this sense Kant, admitting
the alethic existence also of transcendental objects (pure intuitions, schemas, cat-
egories, ideas), was not anti-realist, but rather somehow noneist.²⁵
5.2 Is Alethic Realism Truly Realism?

In Alston’s view (see his (1996)), alethic realism is not committed to any sort of
metaphysical realism. You can be alethic realist, so Alston claims, even refus-
ing the independence thesis, that is the thesis, according to which real things or
facts are independent from my mind, or from “conceptual schemas”. The sentence
‘there is a computer on this desk’ is said (or believed) true, even by those people
who believe that the computer and the desk involved are produced by mental de-
vices, or by linguistic stipulations.
The idea that alethic realism does not necessary involve the independence of
reality is arguable. Actually, the acceptance of the independence thesis seems to
24 I have developed the problem of the realistic truth of norms or moral judgment elsewhere:
see D’Agostini (2013).
25 See D’Agostini (2012).
be the minimal condition for a theory being considered ‘realist’. As van Wouden-
berg (2002) has shown, there are at least some implicit assumptions, in alethic
perspective, that can be said ‘metaphysical’, in a certain way. For instance: the
existence of facts related to sentences, or the idea of truth as an objective prop-
erty, related to positively existent properties. An epistemic agent A who believes
that properties are all “secondary”, won’t admit that the object 𝜆 truly has the
property F, so for A, no sentence F𝜆 will be true.
On this point, I think a relevant circumstance should be taken into account.
To keep to a reasonable sense of making, for making-𝛷 whatever object 𝜆, where 𝛷
is whatever property, the resulting 𝛷𝜆 must be distinct both from the act of mak-
ing, and from what makes. So alethic realism, being committed to making-true,
is minimally committed to a certain kind of independence, and namely: the in-
dependence of the made true proposition from the fact that makes it true. Even if
in the perspective of my metaphysics the fact 𝛼 only occurs in my mind, in con-
ceding that I am truthfully asserting ‘𝛼’ (or truthfully believing it), I must admit
an independent (mental) fact 𝛼, which makes ‘𝛼’ true. This independence, ulti-
mately, is what rules the distinction between metaphysics and semantics, in the
sense above specified. Because I would say my 𝐺 ∧ ¬𝐺 is made true by the fact
that 𝐺 ↔ 𝐺: while the former, in the case given, is only semantically true, and
the latter is also metaphysically true.
5.3 Semantic or Metaphysical?

At first sight, alethic realism is only committed to the idea that ultimately, there are
(not specified) facts that may make true our sentences. In this sense, dialetheias
are alethically real, and in this sense one would ask: what is the difference be-
tween this idea and the basic idea of semantic dialetheism, that is: that dialetheias
are semantical, which means they do not stay out there, but only in the fictional-
conventional realm of concepts and linguistic structures?
Semantic dialetheists would say for instance that true Cs are due to concepts,
say ‘overdefined’ concepts, like Mares (2004, 269–270) suggests, and therefore
there are Cs, but they are conceptual and not real phenomena (constructed phe-
nomena, in Beall’s terminology).²⁶ In this sense, semantic dialetheism is commit-
ted to the ontological thesis according to which ‘real’ facts are, say, natural facts,
while Cs are not natural, not real but linguistic, so artifacts, or conventional facts.
This is somehow confirmed by the idea that dialetheism ultimately is a fictional
26 See Beall (2004), 207. The underlying conception of truth of Beall’s semantic dialetheism is
specified in Beall (2009).
perspective (see Kroon (2004), 253), admitting that there are useful concepts, such
as the concept of truth, though these concepts are “deeply flawed” because they
convey Cs; while as to the world (to say as to true effective reality), it is not to be ex-
cluded that it might be “deeply inconsistent”, or rather trivial. In the perspective
of semantic dialetheism, trivialism can thus be admitted, as a consequence of ad-
mitting Df. T, Df. F, but not LNC. In Kroon’s account, Priest’s dialetheism would try
to reconcile the fictional idea that things are exactly like our classical logic says,
with the idea that (maybe) everything is true, and so everything is contradictory.
And it would do this, by adopting the moderate position, according to which there
are some Cs, but trivialism is to be rejected, otherwise, we won’t be able to make
choices, and act in the world.²⁷
Now, the crucial point is that if things stand in this way, there is no point for
dialetheists in saying that there are evident Cs, in the empiricist sense of evidence,
because these Cs would be only fictional or conventional, and there are plausi-
ble doubts that fictional or conventional Cs could really threaten in any sense the
inviolability of LNC.
5.4 What Is Metaphysical Realism?
I think all these perplexities might be eliminated, by a more accurate distinction

between semantic realism (SR) and alethic realism (AR), and by specifying why
AR is in fact, and fundamentally, a sort of metaphysical realism (MR).
In Putnam’s account, MR requires three theses: “(1) the world consists of some
fixed totality of mind-independent objects; (2) there is exactly one true and com-
plete description of ‘the way the world is’; (3) truth involves some sort of corre-
spondence relation between words and thought-signs and external things or set
of things”.²⁸ This is a very demanding perspective. I suspect that nobody has ever
endorsed such a position.
Though, in a slightly different but maybe more plausible account, MR is sim-
ply the idea that:
1. there are facts (for a plausible meaning of facts)

2. there is a unique true description of these facts
3. sometimes we can formulate true descriptions of facts, and evaluate if a
certain description is true or false.
27 Kroon (2004), 244.

28 Putnam (1981), 49.
These three theses are unquestionable, if we keep to the usual (Aristotelian) mean-
ing of predicates such as ‘being a fact’, ‘being true’ and ‘being false’. Let’s suppose
I am ineffabilist, so I accept 1, and 2 but not 3: I will be forced to admit that there is
at least one true description of facts accessible to me, namely: the one consisting
of the theses 1 and 2. Suppose now I accept 1, and 3, but refuse 2 (relativist real-
ism, see Putnam (2012)): I will be forced to acknowledge that 1 and 3 constitute the
unique true description of facts concerning our knowledge of facts, or else I will
admit that this is only one among possible descriptions (but in this case, what’s
the point in defending it?). Finally, suppose nihilists, who do not accept any of the
three theses. What the nihilist is intending is that the entire mechanism of truth
is to be rejected, and possibly substituted by other things (other concepts). This
might be interesting (and it is the basis of some continental positions toward real-
ism). But the nihilist must justify and explain his position by using the concepts
of ‘truth’ and ‘reality’, so he will be forced to accept the three theses. And if he
wants to do away with them later (like ancient sceptics wanted), he will be forced
to renounce arguing and reasoning, and he should live – like Nietzsche wanted –
“like sheeps on the grass”. I am not sure it is a good attitude. As it seems, the only
consistent position is a form of radical subversion of the entire mechanism, which
will lead to renounce the usual meaning of factuality (reality), falsity and truth.
But in so doing, one should get rid of all our ways of reasoning, and discussing.
AR is perfectly adaptable to the three theses. So it is MR, to the extent that it
postulates the occurring of facts, the existence of true descriptions of them, and
the possibility of evaluating and formulating true or false descriptions of facts.
The only requisite is that the field of really existing facts must be left open to fur-
ther metaphysical inquiry. So truth is a metaphysical property, even if it does not
convey any commitment to some specific metaphysics.
In this perspective, Cs are metaphysically real. In the sense that they are T-
facts, facts of truth, and the use of truth positively requires metaphysical realism,
in the above mentioned meaning. If we intend ‘semantic’ as detached from meta-
physics, we must admit that truth is not only a ‘semantic’ concept, but also some-
thing else. It is more-than-semantic.
6 Conclusion
Metaphysical alethic realism (in the minimal and I would say unavoidable version
of the three theses specified above) isolates a specific ontological field, typically
located at the intersection of metaphysics and epistemology.²⁹ What is ‘real’ there,

is not preliminarily specified or restricted. It surely contains what we may call
‘real’ according to a more or less restrictive metaphysics (say naturalist, or actual-
ist, or spiritualist), but it also contains what we may call derivate reality, with re-
spect to the given restriction. For instance a naturalist may admit that 𝐹𝜆 is made
true by the positive occurring of 𝐹 + 𝜆, where 𝐹 might be a natural property; but
also a “supervenient” property, supervening on physical properties of 𝜆.
This special field is the wide realm of both truthmakers and propositions (and
beliefs). All this was partially clear in Aristotle’s Met. B (where “first philosophy”
is called the “science of truth”), and it was somehow specified and isolated by
Kant. And this was what exactly Hegel held (as far as I know), by talking about
the ‘reality’ of conceptual phenomena.
Calling this semantic reality, as opposed to metaphysical reality, is reductive,
if not decidedly wrong, I think. First because among the real facts included there,
there are also ‘real’ facts in a strong and restricted sense. Second because known
facts (as Kant stated) are hybrid entities: they come from the joined efforts of real-
ity “in itself” and human cognitive means. If our evidence of Cs is true evidence,
we may say that Cs (in the various contents they may assume) are real, as located
in that field, to say: they are alethically real.
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29 Possibly, also of ethics.

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and Possibility, Oxford, 337–368, 2003.
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Achille C. Varzi
Logic, Ontological Neutrality,
and the Law of Non-Contradiction
1 Logic in the Locked Room

As a general theory of reasoning, and especially as a theory of what is true no mat-
ter what is the case (or in every “possible world”), logic is supposed to be ontolog-
ically neutral. It should be free from any metaphysical presuppositions. It ought
to have nothing substantive to say concerning what there is, or whether there is
anything at all. For Kant, it is “pure” and “a priori”.¹ For Russell, it doesn’t deal
with “mere accidents”.² For Gödel, it is “a science prior to all other”.³
This conception of logic may be illustrated with the help of the “locked room”
metaphor.⁴ Logicians must pretend to be locked in a dark, windowless room, and
to know nothing about the world outside. When confronted with a statement, they
must try to evaluate it exclusively on the basis of their linguistic competence. If
they can establish that it is true, then the statement is logically true. And if they
can establish that the statement is true on the assumption that certain other state-
ments are true, then the corresponding argument is logically valid. Logical truth
and validity are based on how our language works, and on our ability to keep track
of the fixed meaning of certain syncategorematic expressions such as connectives
and quantifiers. They do not depend on what extralinguistic reality might look
like.
It is precisely because it didn’t measure up to this conception that traditional
Aristotelian logic has eventually been deemed inadequate as a canon of pure logi-
cal reasoning. The relations among categorical statements that make up the tradi-
tional Square of Opposition (Figure 1) were supposed to determine valid patterns
of inference.⁵ Yet some of them really rest on implicit existential assumptions con-
cerning the extension of the subject term, 𝑆, and should not, therefore, count as
valid as a matter of pure logic.⁶
1 See A53/B77, A54/B78, A131/B170, and elsewhere.

2 Russell (1919b), 205.
3 Gödel (1944), 125.
4 From Bencivenga (1999), 6–7.
5 The traditional Square emerges from Aristotle’s remarks in De Interpretatione 6–7 (17b.17–26)
and in Prior Analytics I.2 (25a1–25).
6 For a history of the issue, see e.g. Church (1965).
54 | Achille C. Varzi
Every S is P No S is P
A CONTRARIES E
SUBALTERNS CONTRADICTORIES SUBALTERNS
SUBCONTRARIES
I O
Some S is P Some S is not P
Figure 1. The traditional Square of Opposition.
For example, the inference from an A-form universal statement to its I-form par-
ticular subaltern,
(1) Every 𝑆 is 𝑃.
∴ Some 𝑆 is 𝑃.
depends on the existence of at least one 𝑆, since in an 𝑆-less world the conclusion
would be false whereas the premise would be true, albeit vacuously. Of course,
one could just reject the notion of vacuous universal truth by insisting that the
non-emptiness of the subject term is presupposed in every A-form statement. After
all, most ordinary-language speakers share that intuition. However, such a move
would leave us with a logical theory that cannot distinguish between those argu-
ments whose validity depends on the presupposition, such as instances of (1), and
those that do not, such as instances of
(2) Every 𝑆 is 𝑃.
∴ It is not the case that some 𝑆 is not 𝑃.⁷
Besides, the move would still not suffice to salvage the traditional Square. For,
if ‘𝑆’ is indeed an empty term, then certainly the I-form statement, ‘Some 𝑆 is 𝑃’,
must be false. But then its contradictory E-form, ‘No 𝑆 is 𝑃’, must be true, and that
7 This complaint goes back to Lambert (1967), 134.

would imply the truth of the subaltern O-form, ‘Some 𝑆 is not 𝑃’ – contradicting
the assumption that there are no 𝑆s to begin with.⁸
Modern quantification theory, as rooted in the work of Frege, Russell, and
Whitehead,⁹ is much better in this respect, as it is free from all the existential com-
mitments of Aristotelian logic. The modern interpretation of the Square of Opposi-
tion condones only the two relations of contradictoriness – along the diagonals –
rejecting all other relations as strictly speaking invalid:
Every S is P No S is P
A E
CONTRADICTORIES
I O
Some S is P Some S is not P
Figure 2. The revised Square of Opposition.
In order to permit, for instance, an inference of subalternation, the modern logi-

cian requires that an additional premise be added, making explicit the existential
assumption that in (1) was implicit:
(1󸀠 ) Every 𝑆 is 𝑃.
There exists some 𝑆.
∴ Some 𝑆 is 𝑃.
As it turns out, however, quantification theory cannot claim full ontological neu-
trality, either. For while it blocks the problematic inferences of Aristotelian logic,
8 This reasoning goes back to Kneale/Kneale (1962), 55–60. It should be noted that on some
translations of De Interpretatione the argument does not go through, since the O-form is rendered
as ‘Not every 𝑆 is 𝑃’. See Wedin (1990).
9 Frege (1893/1903) and Whitehead/Russell (1910/1913).
it still sanctions as valid inferential patters that are, on the face of it, ontologically
committing, as in (3) and (4):
(3) Everything is 𝑃.
∴ Something is 𝑃.
(4) Everything is 𝑃.
∴ 𝑎 is 𝑃.
Obviously, the inference in (3) rests on the implicit assumption that something
must exist, since in an empty world the conclusion would be false whereas the
premise would be (vacuously) true, while the inference in (4) rests on the specific
assumption that 𝑎 exists, i.e., that ‘𝑎’ denotes something. Indeed, modern quan-
tification theory also sanctions as logically true statements that carry explicit ex-
istential import, such as
(5) Something is either 𝑃 or not 𝑃.

(6) Something is self-identical.
Even the following comes out as a logical truth:
(7) Something exists.
and to the extent that ‘𝑎’ is treated as a genuine singular term, so does
(8) 𝑎 exists.
One can tinker with the pieces, alter the reading of the quantifiers, make room
for mere possibilia, get rid of singular terms, etc.¹⁰ But all this just confirms the
problem. As Russell himself acknowledged a few years after the publication of
Principia Mathematica, the provability of such existential theorems is a “defect in
logical purity”.¹¹
Free logic, as rooted in the more recent work of Leonard, Lambert, Hintikka
and others,¹² is so called precisely because it is “free” from the existential pre-
10 For example, Russell’s (1905) theory of descriptions provides the resources for disposing of
(8) by rewriting it as ‘There exists exactly one thing that 𝑎-izes’, which is not a theorem of quan-
tification theory. (See Quine (1948).)
11 Russell (1919a), 203. See also Russell (1919b), 205. In both cases, Russell was referring explic-
itly to (7).
12 See e.g. Leonard (1956), Hintikka (1959), and Lambert (1967). For a survey of free logic, see
Bencivenga (1986) and Lehmann (2002).
suppositions that are responsible for such remnants of logical impurity. It allows,
not only for empty general terms, but also for non-denoting singular terms, and it
does not rule out the possibility that the domain of quantification be empty, i.e.,
that there exist nothing at all.¹³ Again, the remedy lies in revising the problematic
inferential patterns by making the relevant existential presuppositions explicit.
For example, (3) and (4) become
(3󸀠 ) Everything is 𝑃.
Something exists.
∴ Something is 𝑃.
(4󸀠 ) Everything is 𝑃.
𝑎 exists.
∴ 𝑎 is 𝑃.
Once this is done, the contentious existential claims in (5)–(8) are no longer prov-
able, either, and free logicians can fairly claim to have achieved greater purity in
the spirit of the “locked room” metaphor.
Is this the end of the story? Is free logic completely pure, universal, ontologi-
cally neutral? Today this is still an open question, as it is an open and controver-
sial question whether there is in fact any logical theory that can claim the honor.
Among other things, it may be observed that free logic shares with classical quan-
tification theory the Square of Opposition in figure 2, which in turn is meant to
retain the uncompromising patterns of inference of the traditional Square of fig-
ure 1. But are the surviving relations of contradictoriness truly neutral from an
ontological perspective? If, for example, it were possible for something to be nei-
ther 𝑃 nor not 𝑃, then the A-form statement ‘Every 𝑆 is 𝑃’ and the corresponding
O-form statement ‘Some 𝑆 is not 𝑃’ could both be false simultaneously. And if
it were possible for there to be something that is both 𝑃 and not 𝑃, then those
statements could be both true. More generally, from traditional Aristotelian logic
through modern quantification theory all the way to free logic, the following two
principles are assumed in the background (for any predicate ‘𝑃’):
(9) Everything is either 𝑃 or not 𝑃.

(10) Nothing is both 𝑃 and not 𝑃.
13 Strictly speaking, logics admitting the empty domain of quantification are called “inclusive”.
While an inclusive logic for a language whose non-logical vocabulary contains singular terms
must perforce be free, a free logic need not be inclusive. (The first inclusive logic – without sin-
gular terms – goes back to Jaśkowski (1934).)
Yet one might object that these principles – the law of excluded middle and the
law of non-contradiction, on some terminology – betray a conception of possibil-
ity that is ultimately rooted in metaphysics, not in the linguistic competence that
should guide our work in the locked room. It is the business of metaphysics, not
of logic, to legislate on whether an object can ever be indeterminate, or overde-
terminate, with respect to any given property or condition 𝑃. And if this objection
is granted, then clearly the alleged neutrality of free logic, as of any other theory
endorsing (9) or (10), founders.
In fact, (9) has been especially challenged over the years, though often in
terms that leave the question open. For example, it has frequently been pointed
out that vagueness is a natural source of counterexamples to the law of excluded
middle.¹⁴ To the extent that the extension of a predicate ‘𝑃’ may not be fully pre-
cise, it may admit of borderline cases that do not comply with (9) – things that
are neither definitely 𝑃 (i.e., falling inside the extension) nor definitely not 𝑃 (i.e.,
falling outside). Yet it might be replied that cases of this sort do not necessarily
affect the generality of (9). They may induce a violation of the semantic (metalin-
guistic) principle of bivalence, namely
(11) Every statement is either true or false,
but that need not entail a failure of the law of excluded middle as such.¹⁵ In order
to have a genuine counterexample to (9), we need to make room for genuine on-
tological, de re indeterminacy, and according to a certain line of reasoning, that is
not a coherent option.¹⁶ As Russell famously put it, to claim that linguistic vague-
ness is a sign of ontic indeterminacy is to incur a “fallacy of verbalism”.¹⁷
It is indeed an open question whether this sort of response is acceptable from
the present perspective, i.e., whether it does not already betray a metaphysical
stance that ought not to be built into the laws of logic.¹⁸ More importantly, it is an
open, deep question whether there may be other legitimate sources of ontic inde-
terminacy over and above vagueness, hence other legitimate reasons to doubt the
ontological neutrality of (9). I’m not, however, going to delve into such questions
14 The point goes back to Frege (1893/1903), vol. 2, §56, though Frege himself saw it as a reason
to require that all vagueness be banned from the scope of logical theorizing.
15 This is the gist, for instance, of Fine’s (1975) supervaluational account of vagueness. For the
argument that the excluded middle does entail bivalence (so that failure of the latter would entail
failure of the former), see Williamson (1992), esp. 145–146.
16 See e.g. Evans (1978), Salmon (1982), 243–246, and Pelletier (1989).
17 Russell (1923), 85.
18 See Williams (2008) and Hyde (2008) for a survey of some views on this question. For my own
thoughts, I refer to Varzi (2001). I’ll come back to this below, too.
here, at least not in their own right, as they would take us to far afield. Rather, my
purpose is to focus on (10) and consider the parallel question of whether the law of
non-contradiction, too, is open to the charge of infringing the expected ontologi-
cal neutrality of logic. Aristotle called it βεβαιοτάτη δ’ ἀρχὴ πασῶν, “the most cer-
tain principle of all”,¹⁹ and it is fair to say that this characterization has survived
more or less intact until our days. Indeed, Aristotle himself viewed the incompat-
ibility between contradictories as the most fundamental form of opposition, thus
predicting the destiny of the traditional Square in our times.²⁰ Nonetheless, even
this principle has occasionally been questioned on various grounds, were it only
to exhibit its status as an “unshakable dogma” (Łukasiewicz’s phrase²¹) of West-
ern thought. The development of paraconsistent logic, as grounded in the work of
Vasil’év, Jaśkowski, Asenjo, da Costa, Priest, and others,²² bears witness to the de-
termination with which the project of resisting the dogma has actually been pur-
sued since the early twentieth century. In many cases, the original motivations
had little to do with the quest for a pure, universally applicable, ontologically
neutral theory: from the Liar paradox and the set-theoretic antinomies to belief
revision, relevant implication, automated reasoning, and beyond. All of these are
areas which, as Priest puts it, lie “at the limits of thought and language”,²³ but it
is not obvious that they provide good evidence for the possibility of genuine de re
counterexamples to (10), as opposed to evidence against the semantic principle
of contravalence:
(12) No statement is both true and false.
Even the rise of dialetheism in recent times – the view according to which, not
only could there be, but there are violations of the law of non-contradiction – is
in principle subject to this worry,²⁴ and the step from semantics to ontology is as
vulnerable to the “fallacy of verbalism” in this case as it is in the case of putative
failures of the excluded middle. Still, all of this demands close scrutiny. I’ll leave it
to others to assess the pros and cons of paraconsistent logic and dialetheism vis-
à-vis the many motivations that led to their development. The specific question
19 Metaphysics, IV.3 (1005b11–12); W. D. Ross’s translation.

20 Metaphysics, IV.5 (1008a35–b12).
21 Łukasiewicz (1910a), 87, retained in the (1910b) summary, 37.
22 See e.g. Vasil’év (1912), Jaśkowski (1948), Asenjo (1966), da Costa (1974), and Priest (1979). For
a survey of paraconsistent logic, see Priest (2002).
23 Priest (1995). See also Priest (1987).
24 After all, the term ‘dialetheism’ comes from di-aletheia, a two-way truth. See Priest/Routley
(1989a), xx. It is worth noting, however, that Priest takes (12) to express the law of non-
contradiction itself; see e.g. Priest (1998), 416.
I’m interested in, here, is whether and to what extent the pressure to relinquish
such a fundamental principle as (10) may be viewed as an expression of the gen-
eral need to develop logical theories in the spirit of the “locked room” conception
mentioned at the beginning. Does (10) betray a genuine ontological bias? If so,
what does it mean to forego such a bias in the interest of even greater neutrality?
2 A Big Deal
It is, in fact, not quite accurate to frame the issue exclusively in terms of the prin-
ciple of non-contradiction, as formulated in (10). Before looking at the details,
however, there is a general point that needs to be clarified. For if the worry is that
(10) delivers a notion of validity that is ontologically biased, one might wonder
whether the worry is well grounded at all. Never mind (10) itself. Are there any
other theorems or inferential patterns that depend on such a law?²⁵ In the Meta-
physics, Aristotle famously says that
all who are carrying out a demonstration reduce it to this as an ultimate belief; for it is nat-
urally the starting-point even for all the other axioms.²⁶
But this sounds more like a closing flourish than a precise assessment of the role
of (10) in actual arguments, as when Leibniz says that everybody – even “barbar-
ians” – must tacitly rely on it at every moment.²⁷ In fact, the relevant section of
the Posterior Analytics says explicitly that the law itself does not actually feature
in the context of any interesting proof:
That it is not possible to affirm and deny [the same predicate of the same subject] at the
same time is assumed by no demonstration – unless the conclusion too is to be proved in
this form.²⁸
The latter view became especially popular among medieval philosophers, not
least through Aquinas’s reading of it: Nulla demonstratio accipit hoc principium.²⁹
So, if that view is indeed correct, then one might as well say that the worry does
not bite deep. The law of non-contradiction may be an entrenched dogma, but
doing away with it needn’t be a big deal.
25 This is – correctly, in my opinion – the starting point of Berto (2007), at p. 4.

27 New Essays, I. i.4.
28 Posterior Analytics, I.11 (77a10–11); W. D. Ross’s translation.
29 Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, I.l.xix.
The view, however, is not correct. For one thing, this is already apparent from
the Square of Opposition, in the original form as well as in its modern, weaker vari-
ant. The very inference from a statement to the denial of its contradictory, as in
(2) above, depends crucially on (10). For, as already mentioned, in a world where
the A-form premise ‘Every 𝑆 is 𝑃’ is true, the existence of an 𝑆 that is both P and
not 𝑃 would warrant the truth of the corresponding O-form statement ‘Some 𝑆 is
not 𝑃’, hence the falsity of the conclusion in (2). Thus, exactly as with the move
from Aristotelian logic to modern quantification theory with regard to the infer-
ence in (1), and the move from quantification theory to free logic with regard to
the inference in (3), the move from any such theory to a logical theory that is not
committed to the law of non-contradiction would require that the inference in (2)
be revised by adding a further premise asserting the relevant instance of the law:
(2󸀠 ) Every 𝑆 is 𝑃.
Nothing is both 𝑃 and not 𝑃
∴ It is not the case that some 𝑆 is not 𝑃.
The same applies to other inferential patterns that make up that core of Aris-
totelian logic that has survived all the way to free logic, such as obversion (e.g.,
from the ‘Every 𝑆 is 𝑃’ to ‘No 𝑆 is not 𝑃’), exactly as some of those patters depend
implicitly on the law of excluded middle (e.g., the inference from ‘No 𝑆 is not 𝑃’
back to ‘Every 𝑆 is 𝑃’).
Second, and more important, modern logic is characterized by several addi-
tional patterns of reasoning that rely implicitly on the law of non-contradiction,
beginning with so called indirect proofs (also known, quite aptly, as “proofs by
contradiction”, though they depend just as much on excluded middle). The fol-
lowing inference is an obvious case in point:
(13) If 𝑎 is 𝑆, then 𝑎 is 𝑃.
If 𝑎 is 𝑆, then 𝑎 is not 𝑃
∴ 𝑎 is not 𝑆.
It is indeed telling that precisely this sort of inference founders in most systems of
paraconsistent logic. Another obvious example is the inferential pattern known
as ex contradictione quodlibet, the rejection of which is a central feature of most
systems of paraconsistent logic:
(14) Something is both 𝑃 and not 𝑃.

∴ 𝑎 is 𝑄.
The validity of this inference, as of any inference from the same premise to
any conclusion whatsoever, rests implicitly on the fact that the law of non-
contradiction completely rules out any possibility for the premise to be true.
And if there is no possible circumstance under which the premise is true, then a
fortiori there is no possible circumstance under which the premise is true and the
conclusion false.
Finally – though this is more controversial – a similar point could be made
with regard to argument forms that do not, on the face of it, involve any explicit use
of negation. Łukasiewicz remarked that such direct proofs do not in fact depend
on the law of non-contradiction, since the law “always joins an affirmative propo-
sition and its contradictory negative”.³⁰ But as some commentators have pointed
out, what is presupposed by a pattern of inferential reasoning may not be part of
that reasoning itself.³¹ Consider, for instance, the following argument:
(15) 𝑎 is 𝑆 and 𝑏 is either 𝑃 or 𝑄.

∴ Either 𝑎 is 𝑆 and 𝑏 is 𝑃, or 𝑎 is 𝑆 and 𝑏 is 𝑄.
On the face of it, this argument is valid, not only in standard quantification the-
ory, but also in free logic – a mere instance of the distributivity of conjunction
over disjunction. And surely enough, this is a direct argument whose validity does
not require an appeal to (10) as an implicit premise. However, to the extent that
the notion of validity is defined semantically in the spirit of the “locked room”
metaphor – as the relation that holds between the premises of an argument and
its conclusion if and only if there is no possible circumstance under which the
former are true while the latter is false – one could reason as follows. Why is
(15) valid? Answer: precisely because there is no circumstance under which its
premise is true while the conclusion is false. But neither is there any circumstance
under which the premise is false while the conclusion is true; the premise and the
conclusion stand or fall together, i.e., they are equivalent, they are true exactly
under the same circumstances. Thus, the answer boils down to this: (15) is valid
because there is no possible circumstance under which the premise is true while
the premise itself is false, which is to say, no possible circumstance under which
the premise is both true and false. And isn’t this just another way of saying that
(15) is valid owing to contravalence, hence to the law of non-contradiction?
As I said, this third point is more controversial, among other reasons because
it is not quite clear what exactly warrants the crucial central claim, to the ef-
fect that the premise and the conclusion are true under exactly the same circum-
stances. But never mind. Even short of this last point, we have enough good rea-
sons to conclude that there are theorems and inferential patterns that depend
30 Łukasiewicz (1910b), 33.

31 See e.g. Wedin (2000), 117ff., though his examples are erroneous.
strictly on the law of non-contradiction, contrary to Aristotle’s remarks in the sec-

ond quote above.³² Hence, the worry on the table is not ill-grounded. On the con-
trary, forgoing the law is a big deal indeed, for so much depends on it. The discus-
sion of (15), however, is also useful in relation to the other issue mentioned at the
beginning of this section. For the reasoning offered in connection with (15) rests
on the idea that there is an intimate link between the law of non-contradiction, as
stated in (10), and the principle of contravalence, (12). It’s easy to see that in the
presence of the latter, the former admits of no counterexamples, so in this respect
the reasoning is not fallacious. But I have already pointed out that contravalence
is, strictly speaking, the profession of a semantic principle, the dual of bivalence.
And just as it may be argued that the semantic principle of bivalence, understood
as in (11), is not implied by the law of excluded middle, understood strictly as in
(9), one can argue that the semantic principle of contravalence is not implied by
the law of non-contradiction. Aristotle himself did not seem to see any significant
difference, treating (10) and (12) as expressing the same fundamental idea³³ (an
attitude that is shared, more or less carelessly, by many contemporary philoso-
phers and logicians³⁴). Indeed, he helped himself with a third way of formulating
what he thought was the same idea, namely, that “it is impossible for any one to
believe the same thing to be and not to be”.³⁵ We can safely set this third formu-
lation aside here, for there are good reasons to think that it pertains the realm of
psychology rather than ontology proper, or semantics.³⁶ But the relationship be-
tween (10) and the attendant semantic principle of contravalence, (12), is central
to our present concerns. How does it work, exactly? And how does it play out in
relation to the desideratum of an ontologically neutral logic?
32 For a full account of the role of the law in Aristotelian logic, see Cavini (2008).
33 See e.g. Metaphysics, IV.3 (1005b19–20) and IV.6 (1011b13–14), respectively.
34 Even authors who carefully draw the distinction between bivalence and excluded middle of-
ten conflate contravalence and non-contradiction; see e.g. Haack (1978), at pp. 246 and 246. In
fact, there is still a pervasive tendency to conflate the former distinction, too. To give just one
example, Copi’s (1953) popular textbook survived all its fourteen editions, up to Copi and Cohen
(2010), treating (9) and (11) as if they expressed one and the same doctrine. (See DeVidi/Solomon
(1999), for an assessment of this ubiquitous practice.) All of this over and above any differences
in terminology, which in the case of (10) and (12) is especially striking: even authors who draw
all the relevant distinctions tend to use ‘law of non-contradiction’ to refer to contravalence (oth-
erwise known as biexclusion, or exclusion, or just as the dual of bivalence).
36 The three formulations were clearly distinguished for the first time by Łukasiewicz (1910a)
and (1910b), though he used the label “logical” for what I have called the “semantic” principle
of contravalence – a terminology that is still current practice.
3 Contravalence and Contradiction

I have already remarked that, in one direction, the relationship between the law
of non-contradiction and the principle of contravalence is straightforward. If we
have a counterexample to (10), say
(16) 𝑎 is both 𝑃 and not 𝑃,
then the following must hold:
(17) ‘𝑎 is both 𝑃 and not 𝑃’ is true.
From this, it follows that each of the following must hold, too:
(18) ‘𝑎 is 𝑃’ is true
(19) ‘𝑎 is not 𝑃’ is true
But (19) is equivalent to
(19’) ‘𝑎 is 𝑃’ is false.
Hence we can conclude that
(20) ‘𝑎 is 𝑃’ is both true and false.
Thus, our putative counterexample to the logical law of non-contradiction turns

automatically into a counterexample to the semantic principle of contravalence.
And since nothing in our reasoning depends on the specific form of the coun-
terexample, by generalization this means that the logical law is entailed by the
semantic principle.
The converse entailment, however, need not stand. More precisely, if we ran
the argument in reverse, i.e., from (20) to (16), our reasoning would be accept-
able only under certain semantic assumptions which, in the present context, can-
not be taken for granted. I am referring specifically to the semantic assumptions
that govern the truth conditions of statements involving the logical operators –
here, the connectives for negation, ‘not’, and for conjunction, ‘and’. Standardly,
the conditions for these connectives would be formulated as follows:
(21) ‘Not 𝐴’ is true if and only if ‘𝐴’ is false.

(22) ‘𝐴 and 𝐵’ is true if and only if ‘𝐴’ and ‘𝐵’ are true.
Given these conditions, there is no question that the argument could be run sym-
metrically in either direction. Absent contravalence, however, the validity of the
truth conditions for conjunction, (22), may be questioned: from left to right, the
biconditional is irreproachable, warranting the inference from (17) to (18)–(19),³⁷
but from right to left the biconditional may fail, thus blocking the inference in the
reverse. Since to establish the entailment from non-contradiction to contravalence
one cannot assume the latter at the start, it follows therefore that in that direction
the entailment founders.
When exactly does (22) fail from right to left? It depends on the relevant mo-
tivations for rejecting contravalence. Suppose, for example, that our motivations
for doing so stem from the desire to model the logic of a discussion group, as in
Jaśkowski’s “discursive logic”.³⁸ We want to say that a statement counts as true, in
the context of a discussion, if and only if it is held true by at least one of the par-
ticipants. Evidently, different participants in the discussion may disagree while
being perfectly self-consistent. For instance, some may claim that 𝑎 is 𝑃 while
others may claim that 𝑎 is not 𝑃, though no one will claim that 𝑎 is both 𝑃 and
not 𝑃. In such a case, then, each of ‘𝑎 is 𝑃’ and ‘𝑎 is not 𝑃’ will be true, yet their
conjunction will not. For another example, suppose that our motivations stem in-
stead from the need to deal with a data bank compiled from different sources, or to
explain how a useful data processor “should think”, as Belnap put it.³⁹ The data
come from sources which, alas, may not always agree, though each one is on the
whole trustworthy. If one source says that 𝐴 while another says the opposite, the
data processor should treat both ‘𝐴’ and ‘not 𝐴’ as true. Yet, again, as long as each
of the sources is self-consistent, the processor should refrain from treating ‘𝐴 and
not 𝐴’ as also true. A third example comes from the need to “quarantine inconsis-
tencies”, as Lewis put it,⁴⁰ in the context of literary fiction. We have all read the
Holmes stories and we know how to put them together. Truth in Holmes’s world
is truth according to at least one of the stories. Yet there are discrepancies. We
are told that Dr. Watson suffered a bullet wound during the Afghan campaign in
which he participated, but in A Study in Scarlet the wound is said to be located in
Watson’s shoulder, in The Sign of Four it is located in his leg. It would be logical
chaos if we inferred that Watson’s wound both is and is not in his shoulder (and
37 I am of course assuming, here as elsewhere, that ‘𝑎 is both 𝑃 and not 𝑃’ is shorthand for ‘𝑎 is
𝑃 and 𝑎 is not 𝑃’.
38 Jaśkowski (1948).
39 Belnap (1977).
40 See Lewis (1982), though the example that follows is from Lewis (1983). I am, in fact, just
offering it as a simple example, with no intention to be dismissive of the complications discussed
e.g. in Proudfoot (2006).
in his leg). But we don’t, for once again we do not infer the truth of a conjunction
from the truth of its conjuncts.
Of course, one might protest that none of these cases should be given much
credit. That is, one might protest that a fictional story, a data bank, the record
of a discussion, etc. do not constitute good examples of the sort of possible “cir-
cumstance” under which a statement can properly be said to be true or false in
the sense that matters when it comes to reasoning in the logician’s locked room;
there are other ways to address the relevant needs. For example, one could resort
to a suitable sentential operator that maps every statement 𝐴 to a corresponding
statement of the form
(23) According to 𝛷: 𝐴
where 𝛷 is the story in question, the computer’s data bank, the record of a discus-
sion, or what have you. Then the cases discussed above would provide us with
good reasons to question the following biconditional:
(24) ‘According to 𝛷: 𝐴 and 𝐵’ is true if and only if ‘According to 𝛷: 𝐴’ and

‘According to 𝛷: 𝐵’ are true.
But this would have no bearing on the status of (22). ‘According to 𝛷’ is an operator
that may introduce an intensional context, on a par with ‘Possibly’, or ‘Graham
said that’, and the question of whether such intensional contexts distribute over
conjunction should be kept distinct from the question of whether conjunction it-
self is properly governed by the truth conditions in (22). In fact, that question has
no bearing on whether contravalence holds, either, for obviously a statement of
the form (23) and a statement of the form
(25) According to 𝛷: not 𝐴
do not contradict each other; they simply attest to the self-contradictoriness of 𝛷

(just as the statements
(26) Graham said that 𝐴

(27) Graham said that not 𝐴
do not contradict each other but rather attest to the contradictoriness of Graham’s
pronouncements).
There is indeed nothing wrong with this line of thought, except that it misses
the point. For the issue on the table is the relationship between the principle of
contravalence and the law of non-contradiction, specifically whether the former
is entailed by the latter. We may find good ways of dealing with the three cases
mentioned above (and similar ones) so as to preserve (22) along with contrava-
lence, and the use of a suitable sentential operator may well be one of them.⁴¹
In that case, the entailment would be safe and we might conclude that contrava-
lence and non-contradiction stand or fall together. This is not an unpopular view,
equally available to the friends and foes of the law of non-contradiction. But to
the extent that any of those cases counts as a legitimate motivation for rejecting
contravalence, to that extent we have reasons to deny the entailment and, with it,
the equivalence between contravalence and non-contradiction. Since it is a fact
that a variety of logical theories have been developed that violate contravalence
precisely on such grounds, a dismissive attitude would not, in the present context,
be of service.
Besides, the very question of what constitutes a good example of the notion of
“circumstance” that is relevant to the concepts of logical truth and logical valid-
ity is part of the problem. Obviously, to rule out certain options just because they
would infringe contravalence would beg the question. It might be fine to insist on
the use of a suitable sentential operator, as in (23). But then, again, nothing pre-
vents us from doing the same when ‘𝛷’ stands for a possible world of the garden
variety. In that case, ‘According to 𝛷’ would presumably be redundant, which is
to say that the following biconditional would hold
(28) [According to 𝛷: 𝐴] if and only if 𝐴.
and (24) would reduce to (22). But so be it. The question is precisely whether there
are any other candidates for ‘𝛷’ that behave in the same way. There is no obvious
a priori reason why the logician in the locked room should answer this question
in the negative.
Finally, even if we kept to the idea that the only admissible “circumstances”
are genuine worlds of sorts (as opposed to the “ersatz worlds” that emerge from
fictional stories, data banks, etc.), the argument for (22) can hardly be that truth
commutes with the truth-functional connectives.⁴² That is, that can hardly be the
argument as soon as we entertain the possibility that a genuine world may be the
41 Thus, for example, Jaśkowski’s discursive logic can be embedded into modal logic through
the familiar Kripkean modalities. See da Costa/Dubikajtis (1977). For a general overview of this
strategy, see Arló-Costa (2005).
42 That is how Lewis (1986), 7n, draws the line. What follows draws on my response in Varzi
(1997).
source of counterexamples to such semantic principles as bivalence and contrava-

lence. If that were the case, then the rationale for (22) would also be a rationale for
(29) ‘Not 𝐴’ is true if and only if ‘𝐴’ is not true.
Yet clearly (29) is controversial. In classical logic, ‘not true’ just means ‘false’, so
(29) is equivalent to the condition given in (21). But as soon as we allow for the
possibility of sentences that are neither true nor false, or both true and false, (29)
is stronger than (21). On most counts, if ‘𝐴’ is neither true nor false, then so is
its negation, hence the right-to-left direction of (29) may fail. And if ‘𝐴’ is both
true and false, then it is the left-to-right direction of (29) that fails. Thus, on most
theories, truth does not commute with negation. Why should conjunction behave
any differently? Why should (22) fare any better when we leave the terra firma of
classical logic? As it turns out, failure of bivalence is harmless in this respect.⁴³
Failure of contravalence need not be, at least with respect to the right-to-left di-
rection of (22). Why should this departure be regarded as a violence to the “normal
interpretation” of the logical connectives?⁴⁴
4 Genuine Contradictions?
I hope this will suffice to establish the main point so far: while there is a straight-
forward argument from the principle of contravalence to the law of non-contra-
diction, i.e., from
(12) No statement is both true and false,
to any instance of
(10) Nothing is both 𝑃 and not 𝑃.
the argument in the opposite direction is wanting. Indeed, it is worth noting that
precisely the same sort of consideration may be called upon to motivate the par-
allel claim mentioned earlier in connection with bivalence and excluded middle,
namely, that while the former,
(11) Every statement is either true or false,
43 Of course, absent bivalence it becomes necessary to supplement (22) with necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for a conjunction to be false. In itself, however, (22) stands.
44 See Priest/Routley (1989b), n. 159, where the departure is compared to that of intuitionistic
negation.
entails all instances the latter,
(9) Everything is either 𝑃 or not 𝑃,
the converse entailment need not hold. One can reason from, say, the denial of
(30) 𝑎 is either 𝑃 or not 𝑃.
to the denial of
(31) ‘𝑎 is 𝑃’ is either true or false.
in a way that is perfectly dual to the foregoing argument from the acceptance of
(16) to the acceptance of (20), this time using the right-to-left direction of the stan-
dard truth conditions for the disjunction connective, ‘or’:
(32) ‘𝐴 or 𝐵’ is true if and only if ‘𝐴’ or ‘𝐵’ is true.
That is a perfectly legitimate way of reasoning. But running the argument in re-
verse, from the falsity of (31) to the falsity of (30), would call for the left-to-right
direction of (32), and inspection shows that in that direction (32) fails in each of
the three cases considered above – Jaśkowski’s discursive logic, Belnap’s com-
puter logic, or Lewis’s logic of fiction. That is why I said that failure of bivalence
need not entail genuine ontological indeterminacy, i.e., genuine counterexamples
to excluded middle.⁴⁵ Likewise, the present point is that failure of contravalence
need not entail genuine ontological overdeterminacy, i.e., genuine counterexam-
ples to non-contradiction.
Our question then comes to this: When is the inference legitimate, if ever?
Under what conditions can we warrantably say that a dialetheia – a statement
that is both true and false – is bona fide evidence of a contradiction arising in the
world? After all, typically the only evidence we can rely on, in logic as elsewhere
in philosophy, comes in the form of claims or intuitions to the effect that certain
statements are true and others are false. But as I remarked before, this is slippery
business. The fallacy of verbalism – the fallacy of mistaking facts about words for
facts about worlds – is constantly lurking. Is there any way of detecting it when
it comes to assessing putative infringements of logical laws? Specifically, is there
any way of discriminating a merely de dicto dialetheia from a genuinely de re one?
In my opinion, that is the best question we can ask if we are interested in the
45 In essence, this is my reply to Williamson’s argument mentioned in n. 15 above.

status of the law of non-contradiction vis-à-vis the desideratum of the ontological

neutrality of logic.
Alas, I do not have a clear and distinct answer to offer. But I do have two sug-
gestions that, hopefully, will at least be indicative of the kind of answer that I think
we should seek. Both are probably too loaded, philosophically, to be of much ser-
vice. And both come with reservations, the most important of which is that in
some cases they yield the wrong verdict. Let me try to outline them none the less.
5 First Suggestion
The first suggestion builds directly on the foregoing. To the extent that a coun-
terexample to contravalence results in a violation of the law of non-contradiction
only insofar as it can be conjoined with its own negation to yield a single, explicit
statement of the form
(16) 𝑎 is both 𝑃 and not 𝑃,
we can say that it counts as bona fide evidence of a contradiction arising in the
world if, and only if, the logical theory assumed in the background licenses such
a move. Pretty clearly, a sufficient condition for that to be the case is that the theory
validate the relevant instances of conjunction introduction:
(33) 𝑎 is 𝑃
𝑎 is not 𝑃
∴ 𝑎 is both 𝑃 and not 𝑃.
And we have seen that such a move need not be valid insofar as the semantic
behavior of ‘and’ may run afoul of the standard truth conditions, (22). Thus, the
suggestion is simply to look at the whole picture, which is to say the whole set of
axioms and inferential patterns that define the logic whose neutrality we are try-
ing to assess. After all, the meaning of a statement is at least in part determined by
its logical relations to other statements, hence it is only the network of such rela-
tions that can help us answer our question. And when it comes to contradictions,
the crucial relation is the one reflected in (33).
A different way of putting the same point is this. There are two ways of constru-
ing the notion of a contradiction. The first is the one we have been using through-
out, the “collective” sense, according to which a contradiction manifests itself
in the form of a single statement, as the joint assertion of a proposition and its
denial. The other is the “distributive” sense, according to which a contradiction
arises whenever someone asserts something she is also denying, whether or not
she does both things “in the same breath” (as Strawson used to put it⁴⁶). Both no-
tions are perfectly legitimate. But it is only a contradiction in the strong, collective
sense that bears witness to a circumstance in which things infringe of the law. At
least, this is the suggestion I am offering:
(S1) A contradiction is de re if and only if it is closed under conjunction.
Contradictions that arise only in the distributive sense – contradictions that don’t
conjoin – are merely evidence of discrepancies in our ways of talking about things,
as with Sir Arthur’s slips of the pen. That’s why they do not imply logical chaos.
Absent (33), the law of non-contradiction may still warrant the “explosive” infer-
ential pattern in (14), ex contradictione quodlibet. It need not, however, warrant
its distributive variant:
(14󸀠 ) 𝑎 is 𝑃
𝑎 is not 𝑃
∴ 𝑎 is 𝑄
If this account is accepted, then we can draw our first moral. Our initial ques-
tion was whether the law of non-contradiction reflects an ontological prejudice
that should not be built into our logic. We now see that it need not be so unless we
endorse (33). Since classical logics (including free logic) warrant (33) unrestrict-
edly, it follows that something has to give. One way or the other, a paraconsistent
logic has better claim to ontological neutrality.⁴⁷ Unfortunately, there is an obvi-
ous problem with the account, which is why I said it is just a “suggestion”. That
is, there is an obvious problem over and above the fact that one may just not agree
with the idea that distributive contradictions fall short of biting at the ontological
level.⁴⁸ A simple example will suffice. Suppose the predicate ‘𝑃’ was introduced,
by definition, in a way that is not quite coherent: we stipulated that, say, ‘𝑃’ is
true of every individual who is at least 16 years old, and false of every individ-
ual who is less than 18 years old. Clearly, both ‘𝑎 is 𝑃’ and ‘𝑎 is not 𝑃’ will turn
46 Strawson (1952), ch. 1, passim. For further details on the distinction between collective and
distributive construals of the notion of a contradiction, see Varzi (2004).
47 For the record, paraconsistent logics in which (33) does not hold are generally known as non-
adjunctive. As it turns out, Jaśkowski’s discursive logic was the first of this kind. For a brief survey
of other non-adjunctive logics, see e.g. Priest (2002), §4.2.
48 For example, Rescher and Brandom’s (1980) “logic of inconsistency” is non-adjunctive pre-
cisely in the sense described here. Yet they are adamant about distributive contradictions being
grounded in the world itself, not just our discourse about it.
out to be true when ‘𝑎’ picks out an individual whose age is between 16 and 18.
But suppose now that our logic does license the inference in (33) by conjunction
introduction (as in many systems of paraconsistent logic). It follows that we can
derive a genuine counterexample to the law of non-contradiction, and (S1) would
confirm that the contradiction in question is genuinely de re. But that is ludicrous.
Why should the world be blamed for the sloppiness of our linguistic stipulations?
Even a hard-core dialetheist such as Priest would resist that conclusion.⁴⁹
Of course, one could respond that this sort of case provides further evidence
against conjunction introduction. But this is a familiar predicament that leads
nowhere: one philosopher’s modus ponens is another philosopher’s modus tol-
lens. That is why I said that the suggestion on the table is too loaded, philosoph-
ically, to be of much service when it comes to applying it to actual cases. We are
still missing some independent criteria for saying whether the truth conditions of
a given statement suffer from our contradictory semantic practices. We need nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for determining whether ‘𝑎 is 𝑃’ is supposed to
violate contravalence because of the meaning of ‘𝑎’ and ‘𝑃’, or because of how 𝑎
and 𝑃 are. Absent such criteria, we have an account that cries for guidelines.
6 Second Suggestion
It is here that the second suggestion enters the picture. And it is a suggestion that
builds once again on the duality between non-contradiction vs. contravalence, on
the one hand, and excluded middle vs. bivalence, on the other. As it turns out, in
connection with the latter opposition there has been a conspicuous debate con-
cerning precisely the dual of our question – namely, under what conditions can
we warrantably say whether a statement being neither true nor false is bona fide
evidence of an indeterminacy arising in the world? Precisely because of Russell’s
influential attempt to discredit all putative ontological vagueness as a form of ver-
balism, several efforts have been made to explicitly address this question in its
general form, at least with respect to certain varieties of indeterminacy such as
indeterminacy due to vagueness. And such efforts have often included an account
of what it is for an expression to lack a definite, fully determinate meaning – ex-
actly the dual of what we are missing. The suggestion, then, is to capitalize on
such efforts; to “piggy back” on what I take to be the best account that arose out
of them and “dualize” it.
49 See Priest’s contribution in this volume for an explicit statement to that effect.
Before explaining how that works, let me briefly illustrate with a concrete ex-
ample the force of the duality between the two cases. Suppose someone says that
the statement
(34) Tibbles is white.
is neither true nor false. This flies in the face of bivalence. Does it mean that we
have a (purported) counterexample to excluded middle? It depends on the se-
mantic theory assumed in the background. If we assume that the name ‘Tibbles’
picks out a unique individual, the cat Tibbles, and the predicate ‘white’ picks out
a unique property, the color white (or whatever sort of entity we take the semantic
value of our predicate to be – e.g., a class of individuals), then the answer is in the
affirmative: we are told that it is a fact of the matter, a matter of how things are in
the world, that Tibbles neither definitely is nor definitely isn’t white. On the other
hand, one might resist that semantic assumption and maintain instead that the
name ‘Tibbles’ fails to pick out a unique individual, or that the predicate ‘white’
fails to pick out a unique color. There are many (slightly different) cat-like individ-
uals and many (slightly different) white-like colors out there, one for each admis-
sible way of “sharpening” the reference of ‘Tibbles’ and the reference of ‘white’,
and each of those individuals either definitely has or definitely fails to have each
of those colors. If our statement turned out to be true under every such sharpen-
ing, then we could say that the statement is true. If it turned out to be false under
every sharpening, then we could say that the statement is false. But if, as we may
suppose, the truth value of our statement changes depending on which sharpen-
ing we consider, then there’s no way for us to settle the issue. No sharpening is
better than the others, hence neither truth value will trump the other. That is why
(34) lacks a truth value altogether, yielding a counterexample to bivalence.⁵⁰ But
the answer to our question is in the negative. For note that a statement such as
(35) Tibbles is either white or not white.
would come out true under every sharpening, since every sharpening will verify
one disjunct or the other. The law of excluded middle still holds.
This is perfectly parallel to the case we are interested in, where someone might
say that (34) is both true and false. If we assume that ‘Tibbles’ and ‘white’ have a
perfectly coherent semantic connotation, then the claim in question is warranted
if, and only if, it is a fact of the matter that Tibbles both is and is not white – a gen-
uine violation of the law of non-contradiction. But one might also contend that it
50 This is the gist of the supervaluationist account mentioned in n. 15 above.

is just the word ‘Tibbles’, or perhaps the word ‘white’, that comes with a contra-
dictory interpretation. There are several ways of clearing up the interpretation of
these words, each corresponding to a (slightly different) way of extracting a gen-
uine semantic value from their incoherent semantic behavior: a genuine individ-
ual as the referent of ‘Tibbles’ and a genuine color property as the value of ‘white’.
Since each way of doing so is as legitimate as the others, each will warrant a legiti-
mate truth-value assignment to (34), and since each of those individuals turns out
to possess one of those properties while failing to possess the others, (34) turns
out to be both true and false, yielding a counterexample to contravalence. How-
ever, note that a statement such as
(36) Tibbles is both white and not white.
would come out false and only false in each case, since every coherent interpre-
tation of ‘Tibbles’ and ‘white’ will falsify one conjunct or the other. Hence the law
of non-contradiction still holds.⁵¹
So how can we tell? How can we say whether our interlocutor’s claim should
be interpreted in accordance with a definite and coherent semantics that speaks
to an indeterminate and/or contradictory world, or in accordance with a seman-
tics that is indefinite and/or incoherent, not because of the way things are in the
world, but because of deficient stipulations? There is, I’m afraid, no way of telling
just by looking at the statement in question. Nor would it be of any help to just ask
our interlocutor what kind of semantics she has in mind, for that would leave ev-
erything up for grabs. However, we can once again rely on the fact that the mean-
ing of an expression is determined, at least in part, by its logical behavior, hence
by the network of logical relations that tie those statements in which the expres-
sion occurs, and we can try to answer our question by looking at how the claim at
issue fits the rest of our interlocutor’s logic.
Now, in the first case – where the claim is that (34) is neither true nor false –
it seems to me that there is a good account available for this purpose. The basic
idea grew out of the extensive debate triggered by Evans’s argument against vague
objects, especially through Lewis’s revisitation of it,⁵² but it is independent of that
argument and admits of a general formulation. It can be put thus:
(S) An expression ‘𝑒’ has a definite meaning if and only if ‘𝑒’ admits of scope
raising in contexts of the form ‘it is indeterminate whether . . . ’.
51 This “dualization” of supervaluationism is examined in detail in some of my earlier works,

especially Varzi (1999) and (2000).
52 See Evans (1978) and Lewis (1988), respectively.
where by “scope raising” I mean, quite generally, the move from a statement in
which the expression in question has narrow scope with respect to a certain oper-
ator to a statement in which it has wide scope – thus, in particular, the inferential
move in an argument of the form
(37) It is indeterminate whether . . . 𝑒 . . .

∴ 𝑒 is such that it is indeterminate whether . . . it . . .
Here is why (S) is a good account. If the expression ‘𝑒’ lacks a definite mean-
ing, then clearly the inference in (37) is fallacious. For whereas the premise can
be true insofar as ‘𝑒’ may admit of alternative sharpenings that do not settle the
truth-value of ‘. . . 𝑒 . . . ’, precisely the variety of such sharpenings will prevent the
conclusion from being true. Thus, to return to our example, and setting aside the
nuances of the grammatical etiquette of English, if (34) is neither true nor false
owing to some indefiniteness in the meaning of the name ‘Tibbles’, or of the pred-
icate ‘white’, then the following arguments (respectively) are not truth-preserving,
hence invalid:
(38) It is indeterminate whether Tibbles is white.

∴ Tibbles is such that it is indeterminate whether it is white.
(39) It is indeterminate whether Tibbles is white.
∴ White is such that it is indeterminate whether Tibbles is it.
In this sense, the alternative sharpenings that come with an expression whose
meaning is not fully specified play a role analogous to the alternative worlds of
modal logic, ‘indeterminate’ being the analogue of ‘contingent’, and the invalidity
of (38) and (39) is analogous to the invalidity of, say
(40) It is contingent whether the number of planets is greater than 7.

∴ The number of planets is such that it is contingent whether it is greater
than 7.
(41) It is contingent whether 7 is less than the number of planets.
∴ Less than the number of planets is such that it is contingent whether 7
is it.
However, if ‘𝑒’ is not a semantically deficient expression – if it definitely picks out a

unique individual, a unique property, etc. – then the inference in (37) is perfectly
legitimate. For in that case ‘𝑒’ behaves like a rigid designator across any sharp-
enings that may still be necessary in order to evaluate ‘. . . 𝑒 . . . ’. Indeed, when
‘Tibbles’ and ‘white’ are taken to have a definite semantic value, (38) and (39) are
just as valid as
(42) It is contingent whether 7 is less than the number of planets.

∴ 7 is such that it is contingent whether it is less than the number of
planets.
(43) It is contingent whether the number of planets is greater than 7.
∴ Greater than 7 is such that it is contingent whether the number of plan-
ets is it.
So why is (S) a good account? Because it pinpoints a crucial inferential pattern

with respect to which the logical behavior of a well-defined expression and the
logical behavior of an indefinite expression part company. Insofar as our problem
was to identify such a pattern, (S) does the job. And insofar as any claim to the
effect that a statement 𝐴 is neither true nor false warrants a corresponding claim
of the form
(44) It is indeterminate whether 𝐴,
the pattern in question is central enough for (S) to count as useful in relation to the
general question of determining the conditions under which failure of bivalence
entails failure of the law of excluded middle. As with the distinction between col-
lective and distributive readings of a contradiction, the entailment holds to the
extent that we are willing to buy into a certain pattern of reasoning.
Let us, then, return to the case we are interested in, where the general ques-
tion concerns instead the conditions under which failure of contravalence entails
failure of the law of non-contradiction. I have already said that the two cases are
fundamentally parallel – or rather, dual. And I take it that the duality extends to
the point of saying that any claim to the effect that a statement 𝐴 is both true and
false warrants a corresponding claim of the form
(45) It is overdeterminate whether 𝐴
My suggestion, then, is simply to exploit the duality all the way and dualize the
account in (S) to fit the case:
(S2) An expression ‘𝑒’ has a coherent meaning if and only if ‘𝑒’ admits of scope
raising in contexts of the form ‘it is overdeterminate whether . . . ’.
7 Concluding Remarks
Does (S2) do the job? Unfortunately, it is once again only a suggestion – and a ten-
tative one at that. For there are at least two important respects in which (S2) is
deficient.
The first is that it hinges on shaky philosophical assumptions. In particular,
it might be objected that it rests too heavily on contentious doctrines about refer-
ence. This is already apparent with (S). If, for example, one holds that every singu-
lar term has its reference fixed by descriptive means that invoke a sortal, and that
all sortals are somewhat indefinite in meaning, then no singular term will have a
definite meaning in the relevant sense. Hence, our strategy will imply that there
are no good reasons to posit indeterminate objects – a conclusion that can hardly
be justified on such grounds.⁵³ Indeed, the whole idea of deriving ontic indeter-
minacy from violations of bivalence that do not involve indefinite language is in
jeopardy, for it may leave us with no genuine ontic indeterminacy just because of
widespread linguistic indeterminacy. This problem, and any variant thereof, are
imported into (S2) holus bolus.
The second respect in which reference to (S2) won’t take care of the problem in
its generality is that failure of contravalence may come in the form of a statement
that contains both expressions with a coherent meaning and expressions whose
meaning has not been fixed in a coherent way. Accordingly, while (S2) itself pro-
vides both necessary and sufficient conditions for telling such expressions apart,
knowing that a dialetheia involves expressions of the former sort may be neces-
sary but not sufficient for classifying it as a sign of a genuine de re contradiction,
just as knowing that it contains expressions of the latter sort may be insufficient
for classifying it as a mere de dicto discrepancy. For instance, suppose that ‘𝑃’
turns out to be an incoherent predicate, and suppose someone holds that
(46) The round square is 𝑃
is both true and false. Insofar as both ‘round’ and ‘square’ are perfectly coherent
predicates, (S2) would license the inference
(47) It is overdeterminate whether the round square is 𝑃.

∴ The round square is such that it is overdeterminate whether it is 𝑃.
Yet it is far from obvious that this should count as evidence of a contradiction
arising in the world. The round square may be an excellent candidate for the real
53 This point draws on Sainsbury (1989), 99–100, mutatis mutandis.

content of Sylvan’s box⁵⁴ – a genuine, authentic, truly contradictory object. But

the overdeterminacy of (46) may have nothing to do with this. It may still be a
mere dialetheia ex vi terminorum due entirely to the incoherence of ‘𝑃’.
I’m afraid I don’t have much to offer in response to these concerns. As with
(S1), (S2) turns out to be philosophically loaded, and prone to misjudgment. I wish
I could say that while neither account does the job properly, both of them (collec-
tively) do. But that is just not true. Let me simply say that in spite of the limits and
defects of each, I hope that (S1) and (S2) provide at least a rough indication of the
kind of criterion that I think is required in order to address the difficult question
that has been the main concern of this paper, namely, whether the law of non-
contradiction is yet another instance of the sort of prejudices from which logic
has tried to free itself throughout its history in the spirit of ever greater ontologi-
cal neutrality. The answer to that question may well be in the negative, since any
evidence against the law may require that we deploy further principles to make
the case, and it is those principles that may be deemed inadequate as canons of
pure logical reasoning. Precisely for this reason, however, there seems to be no
option short of confessing our narrow ontological horizons: something – if not
the law, one of those principles – has gotta give.⁵⁵
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Francesco Berto
Representing the Contradictory*
1 Overview
Relevant logics are perhaps the most developed among paraconsistent logics,
these being logical systems rejecting the principle Ex contradictione quodlibet
(ECQ), according to which a contradiction entails everything (in object language’
version, (𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐴) → 𝐵). Arguably, the most discussed kinds of formal seman-
tics for relevant logics are world semantics. As specialists know, these include
so-called non-normal or impossible worlds, often thought of as situations where
the truth conditions of logical operators are different. Non-normal worlds are
crucial for providing model-theoretic counterexamples to ECQ as well as to other
irrelevant entailments, such as 𝐴 → (𝐵 ∨ ¬𝐵) and 𝐴 → (𝐵 → 𝐵).¹ They can thus
help in modeling our capacity of reasoning non-trivially also in the face of incon-
sistent information or full-fledged contradictions. And such a capacity is widely
attested, thus providing counterexamples to ECQ. For an often mentioned case:
Bohr’s atomic theory includes both the assumption that energy has the form of
quanta, that is, discrete packs, and Maxwell’s usual electromagnetic equations,
which are inconsistent with that assumption.² Nevertheless, Bohr provided quite
a successful theory. More importantly for our purposes: he did not infer arbitrary
conclusions from his contradictory assumptions – for instance, that electrons
have the same electric charge as protons.
* A version of this paper has appeared also in The Logica Yearbook 2011 (College Publications,
London) with the title “Non-Normal Worlds and Representation”. Thanks to the organizers of the
Logica conference 2011 for allowing me to draw on that material here.
1 Intuitively, a premise or conditional antecedent is irrelevant within an inference or a condi-
tional, if it is of no utility in getting to the conclusion, or in grounding the consequent. The re-
search program of relevant logic is based on the positive view that the intuition of relevance can
be given formal substance, together with the negative view that classical logic legitimates irrele-
vant inferences – on the ground, for instance, of its admitting logically valid conditionals with no
content connection between antecedent and consequent. At least part of the formal substance to
the idea of relevance as content-connection is provided by the so-called Variable Sharing Prop-
erty (VP), also called weak or necessary condition of relevance. As far as the conditional goes,
this states that if 𝐴 → 𝐵 is logically valid, then 𝐴 and 𝐵 must share some sentential variable.
On this ground, ECQ and the two aforementioned formulas count as fallacies of relevance, not
passing the VSP test. For a short and accessible introduction to relevant logic, see Mares (2004).
2 For an account of this story, see Brown (1993).
82 | Francesco Berto
The main philosophical issue concerning world semantics for relevant log-
ics has traditionally been the one of the intuitive reading of its worlds, and of
the relations and operations defined on them: what does it mean that a world is
such that contradictions can be true at it, for instance? Some well-known views in-
terpret these worlds precisely as information states, or conduits thereof (see e.g.
Mares (2004)). Given such an epistemically-driven reading, non-normal worlds
may model our ability of conceiving or representing contradictions, and broadly
logical impossibilities. This is tightly connected to our aforementioned capacity of
reasoning efficiently in contradictory informational circumstances – if not a pre-
condition of it. As Bohr knew he was making incompatible assumptions in his the-
ory, for instance, he was arguably able to conceive those contradictory hypotheses
as holding together. This did not lead him astray, though. Supposing the non-
normal worlds of relevant semantics are essentially realizations of intentional
states, such as conceiving or representing,³ this paper explores the phenomenon
by combining a formal setting with philosophical discussion. I proceed as follows:
in Section 2, I introduce the syntax of a first-order intensional language 𝐿 and, in
Section 3, I present a model-theoretic semantics for it, which draws upon the rel-
evant logic 𝑁4 proposed in Chapter 9 of Priest (2001). This combines techniques
of many-valued and modal logics, including locally contradictory and incomplete
non-normal worlds, but has standard definitions of logical consequence and va-
lidity. Despite being simpler than the mainstream world semantics for relevant
logics, the 𝑁4 setting allows to model all the features of relevant systems that are
significant for our purposes in a friendly formal setting. The language includes a
representation operator, whose role is to capture our capacity of representing or
conceiving contradictions and logical impossibilities. Section 4 provides a brief
discussion of the distinction, embedded in the model, between two kinds of non-
normal worlds, displaying different degrees of logical lawlessness and labeled, for
reasons to be explained, as extensionally and intensionally impossible worlds. In
Section 5, it is shown that the semantics makes of 𝐿’s conditional a fully rele-
vant (albeit weak) one, invalidating the fallacies of relevance and, in particular,
ECQ: contradictions do not entail anything whatsoever. Section 6 explains how
the representation operator invalidates (the formulations in terms of it of) typi-
cal unwelcome inferences of epistemic logic gathered under the rubric of “logical
omniscience”, such as the non-contradictoriness of our beliefs, or their closure
under entailment. It is well known that logical omniscience phenomena make for
3 I employ these two terms as generics for a range of broadly cognitive human activities, all in-
volving the depiction of scenarios, situations, or circumstances, which count as their contents. I
take a dim view on such intentional phenomena, and leave their serious investigation to philoso-
phers of mind, cognitive scientists, or neuroscientists.
highly idealized epistemic notions, not mirroring the actual condition of human
beings as finite, fallible, and occasionally self-contradicting cognitive agents. If
we can conceive contradictions and other absolute impossibilities, non-normal
worlds are natural candidates to model this human condition: the content of a
representational state is the set of worlds that make the representation true, that
is, where things are as they are conceived or represented to be. This may include
non-normal worlds where those inferences fail. Finally, some open questions are
raised in Section 7, as to the best strategies to regiment the representation opera-
tor in order for it to express specific and more vertebrate kinds of conceivability;
these should intuitively be closed under some (albeit weaker-than-classical) log-
ical consequence relation and, more importantly, allow for ceteris paribus import
of information from actuality.
2 Syntax of 𝐿
𝐿 consists of a fully standard first-order vocabulary with individual variables 𝑥,
𝑦, 𝑧 (and, if more are needed, indexed ones, 𝑥1 , . . . , 𝑥𝑛 ); individual constants: 𝑚,
𝑛, 𝑜 (if more are needed, 𝑚1 , . . . , 𝑚𝑛 ); 𝑛-place predicates: 𝐹, 𝐺, 𝐻 (𝐹1 , . . . , 𝐹𝑛 ); the
usual connectives, negation ¬, conjunction ∧, disjunction ∨, the conditional →;
the two quantifiers, ∀ and ∃; the two standard alethic modal operators for neces-
sity ◻ and possibility ⬦; a unary sentential operator ®; round brackets as auxil-
iary symbols. Individual constants and variables are singular terms. If 𝑡1 , . . ., 𝑡𝑛
are singular terms and 𝑃 is any 𝑛-place predicate, 𝑃𝑡1 . . .𝑡𝑛 is an atomic formula.
If 𝐴 and 𝐵 are formulas, ¬𝐴, (𝐴 ∧ 𝐵), (𝐴 → 𝐵), (𝐴 ∨ 𝐵), ◻𝐴, ⬦𝐴, and ® 𝐴 are;
outermost brackets are normally omitted in formulas. If 𝐴 is a formula and 𝑥 is a
variable, then ∀𝑥𝐴 and ∃𝑥𝐴 are formulas, closed and open formulas having their
standard definitions.
The only piece of notational novelty is ®, which I shall call the representation
operator. The intuitive reading of ‘® 𝐴’ will be “It is represented that 𝐴”, or “It is
conceived that 𝐴”.
3 Semantics for 𝐿
The semantics for 𝐿 is largely down to Priest’s work in non-standard intensional
logic (see Priest (2001) and (2005)), with a few modifications. An interpretation
is an ordered septuple ⟨𝑃, 𝐼, 𝐸, @, 𝑅, 𝐷, 𝑣⟩ the intuitive reading of whose mem-
bers is as follows. 𝑃 is the familiar set of possible worlds; 𝐼 and 𝐸 are two sets of
non-normal or impossible worlds of two kinds, the intensionally and extension-
ally impossible ones respectively (what this means, we will see soon); 𝑃, 𝐼 and
𝐸 are disjoint, 𝑊 = 𝑃 ∪ 𝐼 ∪ 𝐸 is the totality of worlds simpliciter. @ is the ob-
taining world (or, better, its foster in the formalism). I assume, for prudence, that
@ ∈ 𝑃, the actual world is possible. 𝑅 is a binary relation on worlds, 𝑅 ⊆ 𝑊 × 𝑊;
if ⟨𝑤1 , 𝑤2 ⟩ ∈ 𝑅(𝑤1 , 𝑤2 ∈ 𝑊), I write this as ‘𝑤1 𝑅𝑤2 ’ and claim that world 𝑤2
is representationally accessible (R-accessible), from world 𝑤1 (what this means,
we will also see soon). 𝐷 is a non-empty set of objects. 𝑣 is a function assigning
denotations to the descriptive constant symbols of 𝐿, as follows:
If 𝑐 is an individual constant, 𝑣(𝑐) ∈ 𝐷 .
If 𝑃 is an n-place predicate and 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊, 𝑣(𝑃, 𝑤) is a pair:
⟨𝑣+ (𝑃, 𝑤); 𝑣− (𝑃, 𝑤)⟩ , + 𝑛 −
with 𝑣 (𝑃, 𝑤) ≤ 𝐷 , 𝑣 (𝑃, 𝑤) ≤ 𝐷 .
𝑛
𝐷𝑛 = {⟨𝑑1, . . ., 𝑑𝑛 ⟩|𝑑1 , . . ., 𝑑𝑛 ∈ 𝐷}, and ⟨𝑑⟩ is stipulated to be just 𝑑, so 𝐷1 is 𝐷.

To each pair of 𝑛-place predicate 𝑃 and world 𝑤, 𝑣 assigns a (positive) extension
𝑣+ (𝑃, 𝑤) and an anti-extension or negative extension, 𝑣− (𝑃, 𝑤). The extension of
𝑃 at 𝑤 is to be thought of as the set of (𝑛-tuples of) things of which 𝑃 is true there,
the anti-extension as the set of (𝑛-tuples of) things of which 𝑃 is false there. Such
double extensions are to model inconsistencies -things being both true and false
(truth value gluts; or also, neither true nor false – truth value gaps). On the other
hand, one may sensibly want truth and falsity to be exclusive and exhaustive at
possible worlds (this is part of what makes them possible, after all). We can re-
cover the classical setting by imposing the following double clause – let us call it
the Classicality Condition:
+ −
(CC) If 𝑤 ∈ 𝑃, for any 𝑛-ary predicate 𝑃: 𝑣 (𝑃, 𝑤) ∩ 𝑣 (𝑃, 𝑤) = 0 ,
𝑣+ (𝑃, 𝑤) ∪ 𝑣− (𝑃, 𝑤) = 𝐷𝑛 .
At possible worlds, extensions and anti-extensions are exclusive and exhaustive.
We need the usual assignments of denotations to variables. If 𝑎 is an assignment
(a map from the variables to 𝐷), then 𝑣𝑎 is the suitably parameterized denotation
function, so that we have denotations for all singular terms:
(1) If 𝑐 is an individual constant, 𝑣𝑎 (𝑐) = 𝑣(𝑐) .
(2) If 𝑥 is a variable, 𝑣𝑎 (𝑥) = 𝑎(𝑥) .
Let us read ‘𝑤 ⊩+𝑎 𝐴’as “𝐴 is true at world 𝑤 (with respect to assignment 𝑎)”,
and ‘𝑤 ⊩−𝑎 𝐴’ as “𝐴 is false at world 𝑤 (with respect to assignment 𝑎)” (and an
interpretation, but I will omit to mention it when no confusion arises). The truth
and falsity conditions for atomic formulas are:
𝑤 ⊩+𝑎 𝑃𝑡1 . . .𝑡𝑛 iff ⟨𝑣𝑎 (𝑡1 ), . . . , 𝑣𝑎 (𝑡𝑛 )⟩ ∈ 𝑣 + (𝑃, 𝑤)
𝑤 ⊩−𝑎 𝑃𝑡1 . . .𝑡𝑛 iff ⟨𝑣𝑎 (𝑡1 ), . . . , 𝑣𝑎 (𝑡𝑛 )⟩ ∈ 𝑣 − (𝑃, 𝑤) .
The extensional vocabulary has straightforward clauses at all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑃 ∪ 𝐼:
𝑤 ⊩+𝑎 ¬𝐴 iff 𝑤 ⊩−𝑎 𝐴

𝑤 ⊩−𝑎 ¬𝐴 iff 𝑤 ⊩+𝑎 𝐴
𝑤 ⊩+𝑎 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 iff 𝑤 ⊩+𝑎 𝐴 and 𝑤 ⊩+𝑎 𝐵
𝑤 ⊩−𝑎 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 iff 𝑤 ⊩−𝑎 𝐴 or 𝑤 ⊩−𝑎 𝐵
𝑤 ⊩+𝑎 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 iff 𝑤 ⊩+𝑎 𝐴 or 𝑤 ⊩+𝑎 𝐵
𝑤 ⊩−𝑎 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 iff 𝑤 ⊩−𝑎 𝐴 and 𝑤 ⊩−𝑎 𝐵
𝑤 ⊩+𝑎 ∀𝑥𝐴 iff for all 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷, 𝑤 ⊩+𝑎(𝑥/𝑑) 𝐴
𝑤 ⊩−𝑎 ∀𝑥𝐴 iff for some 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷, 𝑤 ⊩−𝑎(𝑥/𝑑) 𝐴
𝑤 ⊩+𝑎 ∃𝑥𝐴 iff for some 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷, 𝑤 ⊩+𝑎(𝑥/𝑑) 𝐴
𝑤 ⊩−𝑎 ∃𝑥𝐴 iff for all 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷, 𝑤 ⊩−𝑎(𝑥/𝑑) 𝐴
‘𝑎(𝑥/𝑑)’ stands for the assignment that agrees with 𝑎 on all variables, except for
its assigning 𝑑 to 𝑥. As for the modals, we have the following for all 𝑤 ∈ 𝑃:
𝑤 ⊩+𝑎 ◻ 𝐴 iff for all 𝑤1 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑤1 ⊩+𝑎 𝐴

𝑤 ⊩−𝑎 ◻ 𝐴 iff for some 𝑤1 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑤1 ⊩−𝑎 𝐴
𝑤 ⊩+𝑎 ⬦ 𝐴 iff for some 𝑤1 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑤1 ⊩+𝑎 𝐴
𝑤 ⊩−𝑎 ⬦ 𝐴 iff for all 𝑤1 ∈ 𝑃, 𝑤1 ⊩−𝑎 𝐴
(Unrestricted) necessity/possibility is truth at all/some possible world(s) (I am not

making much use of the box and diamond in this work, but they can be usefully
contrasted, within the model, with the behavior of the representation operator).
While we have the normal material conditional, say 𝐴 > 𝐵 =𝑑𝑓 ¬𝐴 ∨ 𝐵, our more
vertebrate intensional conditional is the following. At all 𝑤 ∈ P:
𝑤 ⊩+𝑎 𝐴 → 𝐵 +
iff for all 𝑤1 ∈ 𝑃 ∪ 𝐼 such that 𝑤1 ⊩𝑎 𝐴, 𝑤1 ⊩𝑎 𝐵 .
+
𝑤 ⊩−𝑎 𝐴 → 𝐵 +
iff for some 𝑤1 ∈ 𝑃 ∪ 𝐼, 𝑤1 ⊩𝑎 𝐴 and 𝑤1 ⊩𝑎 𝐵 .
−
So far everything works familiarly enough as far as worlds in P are concerned, the
main change with respect to standard modal semantics being that truth and falsity
conditions are spelt separately. But even this does not change much at possible
worlds. The CC dictates that, at each possible world, any predicate is either true
or false of the relevant object (or 𝑛-tuple thereof), but not both. That no atomic
formula is both true and false or neither true nor false entails that no formula is,
as can be checked recursively. Overall, there are no truth value gluts or gaps at
possible worlds.⁴ In particular, for instance, if 𝑤 ∈ 𝑃 then 𝑤 ⊩+𝑎 ¬𝐴 if and only

if it is not the case that 𝑤 ⊩+𝑎 𝐴: at possible, contradiction-free worlds negation
works “homophonically”, the classical way. And since @ ∈ 𝑃, the actual world is
possible, truth simpliciter, truth at the actual world, behaves in an orthodox way
with respect to negation.
Things get more exciting at non-normal worlds. At points in I, 𝑣 treats formu-
las of the form 𝐴 → 𝐵, 𝐴, and ⬦𝐴 essentially as atomic: their truth values are not
determined recursively, but directly assigned by 𝑣 in an arbitrary way. At points
in E, all formulas can be treated as atomic and behave arbitrarily: 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 may turn
out to be true even though both 𝐴 and 𝐵 are false, etc. Hence the denominations
for the two kinds of worlds: at intensionally impossible worlds, only the condi-
tional and the modals are anarchic; at the extensionally impossible ones, also the
extensional vocabulary behaves arbitrarily.⁵
The idea of having complex formulas behave as atomic at some worlds comes
from the classic Rantala (1982), where non-normal worlds were introduced to
make logical omniscience fail for epistemic operators. I use non-normal worlds
for similar, but more general, purposes. Such worlds are to be accessible via the
binary 𝑅 when the truth conditions for ® are at issue. At 𝑤 ∈ 𝑃:
𝑤 ⊩+𝑎 ® 𝐴 iff for all 𝑤1 ∈ 𝑊 such that 𝑤𝑅𝑤1 , 𝑤1 ⊩+𝑎 𝐴

𝑤 ⊩−𝑎 ® 𝐴 iff for some 𝑤1 ∈ 𝑊 such that 𝑤𝑅𝑤1 , 𝑤1 ⊩−𝑎 𝐴
The semantics for ® is similar to the ordinary binary accessibility semantics for
the standard modal operators. ‘𝑤𝑅𝑤1 ’ (“world 𝑤1 is R-accessible from world 𝑤”),
should be read as the claim that, at world 𝑤1 , things are as they are conceived or
represented to be at world 𝑤. So it is represented that 𝐴 (at 𝑤) just in case 𝐴 is
true at all 𝑤1 where things are as they are represented to be. For instance, if ® 𝐴
is your dreaming that you win the lottery, (an R-accessible) 𝑤1 is a fine world at
which your dream comes true. The difference with the usual binary accessibility
for modalities is in the broader set of accessible worlds: representation allows us
to imagine contradictions and impossibilities.
4 One would need a couple of technical additions to rule out gaps and gluts when operators
involving non-normal worlds are included, but we can skip them for simplicity.
5 Priest (2005) calls our extensionally impossible worlds open worlds, meaning that they are not
closed under any non-trivial consequence relation; but they deserve to be called impossible if
any world does.
The definitions of logical consequence and validity are standard. If 𝑆 is a set

of formulas:
𝑆 ⊨ 𝐴 iff for every interpretation ⟨𝑃, 𝐼, 𝐸, @, 𝑅, 𝐷, 𝑣⟩, and assignment 𝑎,

+ +
if @ ⊩𝑎 𝐵 for all 𝐵 ∈ 𝑆, then @ ⊩𝑎 𝐴 .
As for logical validity:
⊨ 𝐴 iff 0 ⊨ 𝐴, i.e., for every interpretation ⟨𝑃, 𝐼, 𝐸, @, 𝑅, 𝐷, 𝑣⟩,

+
and assignment 𝑎, @ ⊩𝑎 𝐴 .
4 Two Kinds of Worlds

There are collateral, but philosophically interesting, reasons for adding items in I
among the non-normal worlds, that is, worlds less anarchic than those in E, where
only the intensional logical vocabulary behaves in a deviant fashion. The distinc-
tion between intensionally and extensionally impossible worlds mirrors the pres-
ence of two positions in the current debate on the subject. The first may be la-
beled as the “Australasian stance”. In the Australasian approach, worlds are con-
stituents of interpretations of some relevant logic or other, which imposes to them
some logical structure: they are closed under a relevant consequence relation,
weaker than classical consequence relation (see e.g. Mares (1997), Restall (1997)).
Since this position draws especially on the conception of non-normal worlds as
worlds where “logical laws may fail or be different”, it is naturally allied to the idea
that, at the (admissible) non-normal worlds, only intensional operators, such as
a relevant conditional, behave in non-standard fashion. After all, it is the conduct
of such operators that concerns the laws of logic. The truth conditions for conjunc-
tion, disjunction, or the quantifiers, should thus remain the same as in ordinary,
possible worlds.⁶ The more radical view may be labeled the “American stance”,
since it reflects the opinion of some north-American impossible worlds theorists.
The American stance focuses on the definition of non-normal worlds as “ways
things could (absolutely) not be”, and adopts what we may call an unrestricted
comprehension principle for them. Roughly: for any way the world could not be,
there is some impossible world which is like that. This can deliver particularly an-
archic worlds, not closed under any non-trivial notion of logical consequence (see
e.g. Vander Laan (1997), Zalta (1997)).
6 For similar considerations, see e.g. Priest (2001), ch. 9.

5 Relevant Conditional
Having world quantifiers range on 𝑃 ∪ 𝐼 in the semantic clauses for → makes of it
a relevant conditional, in the sense of fulfilling the aforementioned Variable Shar-
ing Property. In particular, the arrangement above makes irrelevant entailments
like 𝐴 → (𝐵 → 𝐵) fail – take a world 𝑤 ∈ 𝐼 where 𝐴 is true but 𝐵 → 𝐵 is
not. The failure is in the spirit of the “illogical” features of non-normal worlds:
these are situations where laws of logic, like the law of sentential identity, may
fail. EFQ as (𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐴) → 𝐵, and 𝐴 → (𝐵 ∨ ¬𝐵), also fail (take a non-normal
𝑤 ∈ 𝐼 where a contradiction obtains, i.e., 𝐴 is both true and false but 𝐵 is untrue
for the former, one where 𝐴 is true but 𝐵 is neither true nor false for the latter).
The conditional counts as a weak one by relevantist standards (it does not satisfy
minimal contraposition, for instance). This may or may not be a problem, depend-
ing on what one expects from a conditional. A stronger setting can be obtained by
adding to the interpretations for 𝐿 a ternary relation on worlds and providing the
semantics for a conditional in terms of it, as per the classical approach of Rout-
ley/Meyer (1973). This would complicate matters here, though. Our main concern
is the representation operator ®, to which I now turn.
6 The (Non-)Logic of Representation

The traditional debate in epistemic logic concerns the logical principles that
should characterize the epistemic operators at issue, so as to mirror at best the
corresponding intuitive notions. Some views are straightforward, for instance,
knowledge being factive: if ‘K 𝑐’ stands for cognitive agent 𝑐 knows that, it should
sustain the entailment from K 𝑐𝐴 to 𝐴 for any 𝐴. Other inferences are more con-
troversial. Must K 𝑐 allow the entailment from K 𝑐𝐴 to K 𝑐 K 𝑐𝐴, i.e., must one
always know that one knows that 𝐴? While this turns on issues concerning our
intuitions about knowledge, it is not difficult to vindicate the inference, if we
like it, by tampering with accessibility between worlds (in this case, just have it
be transitive). But the failure of some basic logical inferences in epistemic and
intentional contexts is more difficult to handle. This is the cluster of problems
gathered under the well-known label of “logical omniscience”. When modeled in
standard possible world semantics, knowledge (or belief) turns out to be closed
under entailment:
(Cl) 𝐴 → 𝐵, K 𝑐𝐴 ⊨ K 𝑐𝐵
Also, all valid formulas turn out to be known (believed):
(Val) If ⊨ 𝐴, then ⊨ K 𝑐𝐴.
And, most interestingly for our purposes, beliefs form a consistent set:
(Cons) ⊨ ¬(K 𝑐𝐴 ∧ K 𝑐¬𝐴)
Taken together, these principles deliver an idealized notion of knowledge (belief),

not mirroring the status of fallible and occasionally inconsistent cognitive agents.⁷
Now Rantala’s non-normal worlds were proposed to deal with these phenomena:
despite being logically impossible, and not closed under any non-trivial conse-
quence relation, they can be seen as viable epistemic alternatives by imperfect or
inconsistent cognitive agents. A similar story is to be told for ®. If we can con-
ceive and represent contradictions and impossibilities, the content of our repre-
sentational state is the set of worlds that make our representation true, that is,
where things are as they are conceived or represented to be; and this has to in-
clude non-normal worlds. Given the way things were set up above, non-normal
worlds have no effect at the actual world @ on formulas not including ®. By al-
lowing such worlds to be R-accessible in the evaluation of formulas including
it, though, one can eliminate any unwelcome closure feature, thereby dispens-
ing with (the formulations with ® in place of K 𝑐 of) (Cl), (Val), and (Cons). As
for (Cl), for instance: assume ⊨ 𝐴 → 𝐵. Then at all worlds in 𝑃 ∪ 𝐼 where 𝐴
holds, 𝐵 holds. But there can be a non-normal world, 𝑤, at which 𝐴 holds and
𝐵 fails. If @ 𝑅𝑤, then we can have that @ ⊩+𝑎 ® 𝐴, but it is not the case that
@ ⊩+𝑎 ® 𝐵 . Similarly for consistency, or our believing contradictions: when the
relevant R-accessible worlds are inconsistent worlds where both 𝐴 and ¬𝐴 are
true, we can have @ ⊩+ ® 𝐴 ∧ ® ¬𝐴.
7 Constraints
By accessing non-normal worlds of any kind on the one hand, and by not having
constraints on its R-accessibility relation on the other, ® has quite a poor logic –
one may indeed wonder whether it is worth being called a logic at all. What is
doing the interesting work here, though, is not the logic but the semantics. I am
interested in the general form of the latter, and representability or conceivability
7 E.g., I know Peano’s axioms as basic truths of arithmetic, and Peano’s axioms entail (let us
suppose) Goldbach’s conjecture; but I do not know whether Goldbach’s conjecture is true. With
other intentional states such as belief or desire, also broad consistency is at stake.
had better be, generally speaking, quite anarchic. In order to have ® express spe-
cific intentional operators under the generic umbrella of conceivability, say, men-
tally representing a scenario as opposed to hallucinating, we may nevertheless
demand more structure. When one mentally represents a scenario, say, engaging
in speculations on the next move of the financial markets, one’s representation
must have some more or less minimal coherence, that is, be closed under some,
however weaker-than-classical, notion of logical consequence. This is proved by
the fact that people meaningfully argue on how things are, and on what follows
from what, in the relevant scenarios, that is, they accept or reject some things as
holding in the situations at hand. Even when we represent to ourselves the im-
possible, we generally believe that we can draw inferences from what we explic-
itly represented. One way to achieve this would be to place appropriate constraints
on R-accessibility. We could then have ® model different species of representation
depending on the constraints at issue. If there is something like truthful represen-
tation which is factive, we stipulate its 𝑅 to be reflexive.
Conversely, we may have make-believe representations such that the world
𝑤 where the representing takes place is ruled out as a candidate for realizing
them (as per the proviso to much function: “Any resemblance with real people or
actual facts is merely accidental”). To have ® express something like “It is rep-
resented as holding purely fictionally that 𝐴”, we stipulate R to be irreflexive.
Another way would be to make sub-distinctions between non-normal worlds of
various kinds. One may then allow only worlds that are closed under some form
of entailment to be R-accessible, for instance, worlds in 𝐼. This gives us interest-
ing results: representation then only accesses “typical” worlds of relevant logics,
which are occasionally contradictory or incomplete, and can also violate some
logical laws, but are nevertheless adjunctive and prime (conjunction and disjunc-
tion behave standardly there). Then ® becomes closed under relevant entailment.
Thus, this kind of “relevant conceivability” brings a form of logical omniscience
for relevant consequences of what is represented. However, inconsistent represen-
tation, that is, the conceiving of contradictions, is still allowed, i.e., (Cons) fails,
as well as (Val), i.e., not all logically valid formulae are represented.⁸ The need
for further constraints is apparent when the representational act at issue is fic-
tional representation, that is, the conceiving of situations described in fictional
works, tales, stories, myths, etc. Sherlock Holmes is represented (at @), by Doyle
and his readers, as a detective living in Baker Street, gifted with acute observa-
tional and logical skills, etc. Things are as they are represented at the worlds that
8 The closest antecedent to this in the literature, as far as I know, is Levesque’s logic of explicit
and implicit belief – see Levesque (1984).
make the relevant representational characterization true. But which are the rel-
evant R-accessible worlds? That is: under which conditions does a world count
as such that things are at it as they are represented? We want the relevant repre-
sentations to be closed under some notion of logical consequence, so that if ® 𝐴,
and 𝐵 is a consequence of 𝐴, then ® 𝐵. In general, then, things represented in
a certain way may well have further properties besides those they are explicitly
represented as having. Some such properties will just follow on the basis of the
entailments mandated by the logic for ®. For instance, from the fact that Tolkien
represents Gandalf as a friend of Bilbo and Bilbo as a pipe-smoker, we can infer
that Gandalf is represented as being friends with a pipe-smoker even though (let
us suppose) Tolkien never says that explicitly. On the other hand, what holds in a
representation in many cases goes beyond both what is explicitly represented and
what is entailed by logical implication. For while making inferences on what does
or does not hold in a representation, we often import information from actuality,
which we want to retain when assessing what goes on in a certain represented sit-
uation. What the relevant information is depends on our background knowledge
of reality; but may also depend on our beliefs (even contradictory beliefs!). The
import can rely on ceteris paribus and default clauses. Again, the case of fictional
representation makes the point evident, and has been extensively studied, e.g., in
Lewis (1978), Proudfoot (2006). Doyle never explicitly represents (let us suppose)
Holmes as living in Europe, or as having lungs. We are inclined to take these things
as holding at all worlds that realize Doyle’s characterization of Holmes, though,
for we integrate the explicit representation with information imported from actu-
ality. Now Doyle certainly characterizes Holmes as a man living in London. At the
actual world, London is in Europe and, if something is a normally endowed man,
then it has lungs. Doyle says nothing against this, so, absent contrary indications
from the author, the import is legitimate. Intuitively, we should exclude from the
R-accessible worlds that matter in evaluating what holds in the representation
those worlds that, despite making true what is explicitly represented, add gratu-
itous changes with respect to actuality: we must exclude worlds that differ from @
more than required. Holmes is represented by Doyle as walking through London;
we infer that Holmes is represented as walking through a European city. All worlds
where Holmes walks through London but London is in Africa must be ruled out,
for that would be a departure from actuality not mandated by what Doyle explic-
itly represents. London’s being in Europe has to be held fixed across the worlds
where things are as they are represented. This means that, to some extent, rep-
resentations (of this kind) are about the real world as well. For what holds in a
representation depends on what holds at the R-accessible worlds, where things
are as represented. And which worlds these are depends also, to some extent,
on how our reality is. Even if this is worked out in a satisfactory way, it does not
mean that we can expect precise answers to all the questions we may ask concern-
ing a represented situation. Is Holmes, as characterized in Doyle’s stories, right-
handed or left-handed? Doyle does not say. And, intuitively, it is not the case that
worlds where Holmes is left-handed in general differ gratuitously from @ more
than worlds where he is right-handed, or vice versa. Representation typically un-
der-represents. Providing a detailed account of the workings of the representa-
tion operator, especially of how one is to select the worlds that are relevant to
address what holds in a certain representation, is overall a difficult issue. Part
of the difficulty is similar to the one of the standard treatment of counterfactuals
à la Stalnaker-Lewis, where a counterfactual “If it were the case that 𝐴, then it
would be the case that 𝐵” is true just in case the world(s) most similar to the ac-
tual world that make(s) the antecedent true, make(s) the consequent true as well.
We need to invoke some notion of similarity between worlds, having to take into
account worlds with minimal differences from actuality in certain respects. And
this notion is notoriously slippery. The task becomes exceptionally tricky when
we have to consider the intentions and beliefs of those who do the representing.
Sometimes, for instance, an author of a work of fiction can make claims that, later
on, turn out to be false in the story, or can make claims that are subtly ironic,
etc. What the appropriate constraints on R-accessibility are to be for the various
species of representational activities is a difficult issue, and I am happy to leave
it open here. Besides the similarities there is, in fact, a philosophical dis-analogy
between ® and more traditional epistemic and intentional notions. That we are
fallible as cognitive agents, and sometimes inconsistent in our cognitive activity
so that not only we can conceive contradictions, but also believe them, may be
seen as a defect due to our finite and imperfect nature – when it’s about knowing
and, perhaps, believing. This is not so when it’s about imagining and conceiving:
in this case, logical fantasy is, generally speaking, a gift (or so I view it).
References
F. Berto: “Non-Normal Worlds and Representation”, The Logica Yearbook 2011, College Publica-
tions, London, 15–30, 2012.
B. Brown: “Old Quantum Theory: A Paraconsistent Approach”, in: Proceedings of the Philoso-
phy of Science Association 2, 397–441, 1993.
H. Levesque: “A Logic of Implicit and Explicit Belief”, in: Proceedings of the National Confer-
ence on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-84), 198–202, 1984.
D. Lewis: “Truth in Fiction”, American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978), 37–46.
E. Mares: “Who’s Afraid of Impossible Worlds?”, in: Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38
(1997), 516–526
E. Mares: Relevant logic. A philosophical interpretation. Cambridge, 2004.
G. Priest: An introduction to non-classical logic. Cambridge, 2001.

G. Priest: Towards non-being. The logic and metaphysics of intentionality, Oxford, 2005.
D. Proudfoot: “Possible Worlds Semantics and Fiction”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 35
(2006), 9–40.
V. Rantala: “Impossible Worlds Semantics and Logical Omniscience”, in: Acta Philosophica
Fennica 35 (1982), 106–115.
G. Restall: “Ways Things Can’t Be”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (1997), 583–596.
R. Routley, R. Meyer: “The Semantics of Entailment”, in: H. Leblanc (ed.), Truth, syntax and
modality, Amsterdam, 194–243, 1973.
D. A. Vander Laan: “The Ontology of Impossible Worlds”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38
(1997), 597–620.
E. N. Zalta: “A Classically-Based Theory of Impossible Worlds”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic 38 (1997), 640–660.
|
Part II: History
Enrico Berti
Objections to Aristotle’s Defence of
the Principle of Non-Contradiction
1 The Main Objections

In this paper, I recall the main objections to Aristotle’s defence of the Principle of
Non-Contradiction (PNC), in order to show that they exclude the possibility of one
of the most frequent arguments used by dialectic, conceived in the ancient mean-
ing of the word, i.e. as a technique of discussion in general, and consequently also
of the philosophical discussion. I will not mention the position of Hegel, because
it is not properly a criticism of Aristotle’s defence of the PNC, but perhaps of the
PNC itself, although in my opinion it is rather a criticism of the modern principle
of identity, as formulated by Leibniz and by Kant.¹
As is well known, the first important criticism of Aristotle’s defence was the
book of Jan Łukasiewicz (1910), resumed by himself in German in an article,
which was translated into English (twice), French and also Italian: On the Princi-
ple of Contradiction in Aristotle (1971). (The book was also translated into German,
French, and Italian, but – as far as I know – not yet into English.) Łukasiewicz
distinguishes, like Heinrich Maier in Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles (1896–1900), an
ontological, a logical, and a psychological formulation of the PNC, and he affirms
that not one of these three formulations was really proved by Aristotle. Even the
proof by refutation, which Aristotle develops in the IV book of his Metaphysics is,
according to Łukasiewicz, inadequate, because it also falls in the petitio principii
which Aristotle attributes to the adversaries of the PNC.
Concerning the PNC itself, Łukasiewicz maintains that it is in no way demon-
strable that it is not the first principle of logic, because it is preceded by other
principles, like the principle of identity, and finally that its psychological formu-
lation is false, because it is possible to have contemporary contrary beliefs, i.e. it
is possible to profess a contradiction. Łukasiewicz however never affirms that the
PNC, in its ontological formulation, is false. On the contrary, he says that “we do
not know of a single example of a contradiction existing in reality” and that “the
Law of Contradiction [as he calls it] has no logical value, since it only has the sta-
tus of an assumption; but it does have a practical and ethical value”, because “the
1 Cfr. Berti (1987), 177–222.

98 | Enrico Berti
Law of Contradiction is our only weapon against error and falsehood”.² Faced with
these words, one could wonder whether error and falsehood have only a practical
meaning, and not also a logical and ontological one.
Many interpreters of Aristotle have replied to Łukasiewicz that the Greek
philosopher has never tried to demonstrate the PNC, that his defence of this
principle aims only to show that it cannot be explicitly denied, that perhaps this
defence is inadequate (we will see why), and that in fact it is possible to profess
some contradictions, but only in an implicit way, i.e. without having a perfect
consciousness of them.³ On the other hand Łukasiewicz himself mentioned, like
Husserl, the case of people deceived by fallacies, who contrive at times to be-
lieve contradictories together, or the case of the insane, hypnotic states, delirium
tremens, etc. To all of this one could add the case of the unconscious, described
by Ignacio Matte Blanco in his “bilogic”.⁴
An interesting criticism of the adequacy of the defence of the PNC has been
made by an American scholar specialized in ancient philosophy, Robert Dancy.⁵
He observed that Aristotle’s defence depends on a view of sense that may well be
wrong: it depends on saying that where a word has a sense, we can give its sense
in other words, and that this is a source for non-trivial necessary truths. More-
over, Dancy says that Aristotle’s arguments are directed against a denier of the
PNC which is supposed to formulate a strong negation of it, i.e. a negation follow-
ing which the PNC falls into pieces in every case. But these arguments do not hold
against a weak negation of the PNC, following which the PNC breaks down only
in some cases. In other words, Aristotle supposes that the denier, called “Antipha-
sis” by Dancy, maintains that all things are contradictory, and consequently his
defence does not hold if Antiphasis would maintain that only something is con-
tradictory. In conclusion – says Dancy – Aristotle often acts as if the Antiphasis’
thesis were not simply that the PNC is false, i.e. that something somewhere does or
could have and lack some predicate or other, but that the principle breaks down
all the time, that everything that has a predicate also lacks it.
Dancy’s criticism has provoked an interesting debate among the specialists of
Aristotle, some of whom have objected to his theses⁶, while others have approved
them⁷. In the meantime some contemporary logicians formulated the first systems
2 Łukasiewicz (1975), 61–62. The other English translation is Łukasiewicz (1971), 485–509.
3 One of the most recent and rigorous replies to Łukasiewicz is Severino (2005), 39–60.
4 Matte Blanco (1975). I wrote about this in Berti (2002), 22–32, repr. in Berti (2010), 485–494.
5 Dancy (1975).
6 See for instance Code (1986), 341–358; Cohen (1986), 359–370; Furth (1986), 371–382; Gottlieb
(1994), 183–209.
7 Mignucci (1996), 53–60.
of “paraconsistent logic”, which show the possibility of avoiding the Pseudo-Sco-

tus’ theorem, according to which everything can follow from a contradiction, what
makes the system containing the contradiction trivial. In particular the system
developed by Newton da Costa shows the possibility that from a contradiction
not all the consequences can be deduced, but at least one can be avoided,⁸ while
Richard Routley (later Sylvan) and Robert Meyer’s system, thanks to the “logic
of relevance”, shows that a contradiction contained in it can be in some way iso-
lated, so that it cannot make the whole system trivial.⁹ The birth of paraconsistent
logics confirms, in my opinion, Dancy’s criticism of Aristotle’s defence of the PNC,
i.e. that this defence proves only the impossibility of a theory which admits that
“all things are contradictory” (like, for instance, the philosophy of Hegel), but not
the impossibility of a theory which admits that only some things are contradictory.
Besides, paraconsistent logics seem to concern only the possible worlds, not the
real world, because they show the possibility of avoiding the pseudo-Scotus the-
orem only in logical systems.¹⁰
The strongest objection which has been made not only against Aristotle’s
defence of the PNC, but against the PNC itself, is in my opinion the so-called
“dialetheism”, i.e. the theory elaborated by Richard Routley and Graham Priest,
which maintains that some contradictions are not only possible, but also true,
i.e. really existing, in the sense that the same sentence is contemporarily true
and false or that contradictory sentences are both true. The examples of true
contradictions made by the supporters of dialetheism are the paradoxes of self-
reference (e.g. Russell’s paradox), the paradox of the Liar, the transition states,
Zeno’s paradoxes, the borderline cases of vague predications, the multi-criterial
predicates, certain legal situations.¹¹ They also claim that in the history of phi-
losophy there were many dialetheists, among whom they mention Heraclitus, St.
Pier Damiani (who attributes to God the power of making what is done undone),
Nicholas of Cusa (who said that God is a coincidentia oppositorum), Hegel (who
maintained however that everything is contradictory, but that contradictions
firstly are necessary and then must be removed, although in the sense of Aufhe-
bung) and Buddhist logicians. Concerning Aristotle in particular, Priest repeats
Łukasiewicz’s and Dancy’s objections, and adds some other objections of his
own, concluding that Aristotle’s defence does not provide any kind of arguments
against dialetheism, nor does it give any transcendental reason for the PNC; it
shows, however, that a rejection of triviality (i.e. the deducibility of everything
8 Da Costa (1997).
9 Routley/Meyer (1976), 1–25.
10 I have discussed the paraconsistent logics in Berti (1987), 264–279.
11 See Priest/Routley/Norman (1989); Priest (1987); Priest (2004), 23–40; Berto/Priest (2013).
100 | Enrico Berti
from the contradiction) is a condition for reflective purposive activity, especially

for the institution of communication.¹²
Obviously, dialetheism has also been discussed, from a general point of
view – and some philosophers have approved it¹³, while others have criticised
it¹⁴ – and with particular regard to Aristotle, the majority of scholars have de-
fended the Greek philosopher¹⁵. Now I am not interested in this general discus-
sion, which has been greatly developed, but only in one particular aspect, i.e.
in the relationship between dialetheism and Aristotle’s dialectic, particularly
Aristotle’s theory of refutation. This has nothing to do with the defence of PNC,
although Aristotle called this defence a “demonstration by refutation”, because
the refutation presupposes the PNC and therefore cannot be a demonstration of it.
But refutation, precisely because it presupposes the PNC, uses it and is the major
use of it, i.e. the only use where PNC works as a premise, although not explicitly
formulated.
2 The Refutation according to Aristotle

Aristotle’s classical definition of refutation (elenchos) is Prior Analytics II 20:
If what is laid down (to keimenon) is contrary to the conclusion, a refutation must take
place; for a refutation is a deduction which establishes the contradictory (sullogismos an-
tiphaseôs).¹⁶
In this definition “what is laid down” (to keimenon) is the thesis of the interlocu-
tor of a dialectical discussion, i.e. the proposition supported by the respondent, as
was suggested by W. D. Ross and accepted by all the interpreters.¹⁷ The word “con-
trary” (enantion) has the value of “opposite”, so that the conclusion of the “deduc-
tion” is the opposite, i.e. the contradictory proposition of the thesis proposed by
the respondent. The “deduction” (sullogismos), whether it is used in the techni-
cal sense of “syllogism”, as it is described in the Analytics, or whether it is used
in the larger sense introduced in Topics and Sophistical Refutations, indicates an
12 Priest (1998), 91–130.

13 See for instance Beall (2004), 197–216; Mares (2004), 264–275.
14 See Littmann/Simmons (2004), 314–335; Shapiro (2004), 336–354; but also Berto (2006); Berto
(2007), 45–62. See on this debate also Gaio (2006), 69–92.
15 Wedin (2004), 225–265; Tahko (2009), 32–47; Gottlieb (2011).
16 Aristotle (1984a), An. Pr. II 20, 66 b 9–11.
17 A complete status quaestionis and a convincing interpretation of the subject have been given
by Gobbo (1997), 309–357.
argumentation in which the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises.¹⁸

Consequently, the conclusion established by the deduction, which Aristotle sim-
ply calls “contradiction” (antiphasis), must be intended as the proposition which
is contradictory in respect to the interlocutor’s thesis, i.e. which denies what it
affirms or which affirms what it denies.
In Sophistical Refutations, the work dedicated to unmask the false refutations
used by the Sophists, Aristotle explains what he means when speaking of contra-
diction (antiphasis) about the refutation:
To refute is to contradict one and the same attribute – not the name, but the object (pragma)
and one that is not synonymous but the same – and to confute it from the propositions
granted (ek tôn dothentôn), necessarily (ex ananchês), without including in the reckoning
the original point to be proved, in the same respect and relation and manner and time in
which it was asserted.¹⁹
Here Aristotle’s intention to recall exactly the definition of contradiction given in

the formulation of the PNC is evident, in order to show that the refutation is the
deduction not of a simple contrariety or opposition to the interlocutor’s thesis,
but a real contradictory proposition, with all the precisions given in that formula-
tion. The “object” is the predicate of a subject which can be affirmed or denied: if
the interlocutor affirms it, the refuter tries to deny it, and if the interlocutor denies
it, the refuter tries to affirm it.²⁰ The observation that it must not be synonymous
but the same, means that this predicate must be one and the same thing which
is affirmed or denied, not another thing with the same name. There are not many
formulations of PNC; the true formulation is only one, the ontological formula-
tion. The others are only applications of it. The so-called psychological formu-
lation affirms the impossibility of believing in a contradiction, not of conceiving
it, where to believe means to consider something as true, not only to think or to
understand it.
However, if Aristotle says that the contradiction can be deduced, this means
that, according to him, the contradiction can be thought and said. Before the refu-
tation, the contradiction is only implicit in the position of the interlocutor, who
is perhaps unconscious of it, but after the refutation the contradiction becomes
explicit, therefore it is recognised by both the discussants. This means that the
interpreters who attribute to Aristotle the thesis of the impossibility of thinking
and saying the contradiction, on the basis of the affirmation that it is impossible
18 Crubellier (2011), 17–36.

19 Aristotle (1984b), El. Soph. 5, 167 a 23–27.
20 See Fait (2007), 120.
102 | Enrico Berti
to be in error about the PNC, have not well understood the intention of Aristotle.
If he considers the contradiction to be essential to the refutation, and the refuta-
tion to be the argument most frequently used in dialectical discussions, he admits
the possibility of thinking and expressing the contradiction, so that the so-called
logical and psychological formulations of the PNC do not mean the impossibility
of thinking and saying the contradiction.
But the contradiction is not only thought and expressed by the interlocutor; it
must also be recognised as a contradiction, i.e. an opposition between two contra-
dictory propositions that forms the thesis of the interlocutor and the conclusion
which is deduced, which is accepted by him, because the premises from which it
is deduced are admitted by him himself (ek tôn dothentôn). Consequently, the in-
terlocutor, thanks to the refutation, discovers he is in contradiction with himself,
and this authorises one to suppose that he abandons his thesis, not yet because he
recognises it as false, but because he recognises it as contrasting with the conclu-
sion that he himself has accepted. From a point of view which is only dialectical,
i.e. not yet implied in questions of true and false, the refutation of a thesis is suf-
ficient to determine the refusal of this thesis. If there is no refusal, the refutation
is useless and the whole discussion is in vain.
The possibility of thinking and expressing the contradiction is confirmed by
a third definition of the refutation given in the Rhetoric, where Aristotle says:
The significance of contrasted ideas (tanantia) is easily felt (gnôrimôtata), especially when
they are thus put side by side (par’allêla), and also because it has the effect of a logical ar-
gument (sullogismos); it is by putting two opposing conclusions side by side (sunagôgê tôn
antikeimenôn) that you prove one of them false (elenchos).²¹
The Oxford translation of this passage, although revised, is too free, it is nearly
a paraphrase of Aristotle’s text, which in its concision is much more efficacious:
refutation is a collecting, or a bringing together, of opposites, i.e. of two contra-
dictory propositions, whose meaning in this way is grasped much more easily.
This passage shows that the refutation not only uses the contradiction, but also
emphasises it and permits one to understand it better.
In the definition of the Rhetoric, in spite of its free Oxford translation, the true
and the false are not yet mentioned. They are introduced in another passage of
the Sophistical refutations, where Aristotle says:
Refutations may be true as well as false (kai alêtheis); for whenever it is possible to demon-
strate something, it is also possible to refute the man who maintains the contradictory of
the truth (tên antiphasin tou alêthous); e.g. if a man has stated that the diagonal is com-
21 Aristotle (1984c), Rhet. III 9, 1410 a 21–23.

mensurate with the side of the square, one might refute him by demonstrating that it is
incommensurate.²²
Also in this case the Oxford translation is too free, because Aristotle says that the
refutations can be “also true” (kai alêtheis), that is they do not serve only in dialec-
tical discussions, where at stake is not truth, but only success: they serve also in
scientific discussions, where the contradiction concerns propositions which can
be either true or false. In this case, for Aristotle, the contradictory of a sentence
which is true, for instance the contradictory to “the diagonal is incommensurate”,
i.e. “the diagonal is commensurate”, is false. Evidently, Aristotle was not a di-
aletheist, and he believed that two contradictory sentences cannot be both true
(thanks to the PNC), but one of them must be true and the other false (thanks to
the principle of the third excluded, PTE).
In conclusion the Aristotelian theory of the refutation shows: 1) that an im-
plicit and perhaps unconscious contradiction can be made explicit and conse-
quently can be thought and expressed in an intelligible way, which means that
the PNC does not exclude the possibility of thinking and of saying contradictions;
2) that Aristotle considers the contradiction existing in the thought and the speech
as a sign of falsity, i.e. of non-conformity of the thought and the speech to reality.
3 Is Refutation Still Possible?

My aim in this presentation is not to discuss the value of the PNC and of the objec-
tions which have been addressed to it: I am not a specialist of logic and I do not
have the necessary competence to evaluate, from a logical point of view, the para-
consistent logics and the dialetheism. My aim is to compare the Aristotelian the-
ory of refutation in particular with dialetheism, in order to decide whether from
a dialetheist point of view the refutation is still possible. At first sight I should
say that it is possible no more, because it implies the falsity of the contradiction,
while the dialetheism admits that at least some contradictions can be true. This
could mean that a dialetheist can never refute an interlocutor with whom he is
discussing, and, as the refutation is the best instrument to criticize a theory, he
cannot criticize any theory.
This was already remarked by Karl Popper in his famous paper What is Dialec-
tic?, where, speaking about the Hegelian dialecticians, he writes:
22 Aristotle (1984b), El. Soph. 9, 170 a 23–26.

104 | Enrico Berti
They observe, correctly, that contradictions are of the greatest importance in the history of
thought – precisely as important as is criticism. For criticism invariably consists in pointing
out some contradiction; either a contradiction within the theory criticized, or a contradiction
between the theory and another theory which we have some reason to accept, or a contradic-
tion between the theory and certain facts – or more precisely, between the theory and certain
statements of facts. Criticism can never do anything except either point out some such con-
tradiction, or, perhaps, simply contradict the theory (i.e. criticism may be simply the state-
ment of an antithesis). But criticism is, in a very important sense, the main motive force of
any intellectual development. Without contradictions, without criticism, there would be no
rational motive for changing our theories: there would be no intellectual progress.²³
And afterwards:
If we [. . . ] decide to put up with contradictions, then contradictions must at once lose any
kind of fertility. They would be no longer productive of intellectual progress. For if we were
prepared to put up with contradictions, pointing out contradictions in our theories could
no longer induce us to change them. In other words, all criticism (which consists in point-
ing out contradictions) would lose its force. Criticism would be answered by ‘And why not?’
or perhaps even by an enthusiastic ‘There you are!’; that is, by welcoming the contradic-
tions which have been pointed out to us. But this means that if we are prepared to welcome
contradictions, criticism, and with it all intellectual progress, must come to an end.²⁴
To these observations it could be added that, if the contradiction were not a sign of
falsity, but of truth, we should not have a criterion to distinguish truth from falsity,
true theories from false theories, therefore all theories would have the same value,
and we should be infallible.
Obviously dialetheists have considered this objection and have replied to it.
Graham Priest, who is the most important representative of this position, writes:
The most obvious failing of this argument is that it makes the familiar and illicit slide from
‘some’ to ‘all’. The mere fact that some contradictions are rationally acceptable does not
entail that all are. The charge ‘you accept some contradictions to be true, so why shouldn’t
you believe any contradiction to be so?’ is as silly as the charge ‘you believe something to be
true, so why shouldn’t you believe anything to be so?’²⁵
This reply is right, but how are we to distinguish the contradictions that are true
from all the others? Even for this question Priest has an answer:
I am frequently asked for a criterion as to when contradictions are acceptable and when they
are not. It would be nice if there were a substantial answer to this question–or even if one
23 Popper (2002), 424.

24 Ibid.
25 Priest (2004), 34.
could give a partial answer, in the form of some algorithm to demonstrate that an area of
discourse is contradiction-free. But I doubt that it is possible.²⁶
However, perhaps to console us for this difficulty, Priest adds:
I think that there are general reasons as to why contradictions are a priori improbable [. . . ].
The statistical frequency of true contradictions in practice is low. This low frequency suf-
fices to determine a low probability [. . . ]. The counter-examples to the universality of the
LNC [=PNC] are of very particular sorts (involving self-reference, or states of affairs that are
but instantaneous, etc.), and we do not deal with these kinds of situations very often. As a
measure of this fact, recall the disjunctive syllogism (𝑎, ¬𝑎 ∨ 𝑏 ⊢ 𝑏). This is not valid in the
semantics we looked at. Yet we use it all the time in practice, and rarely does it lead us astray
[italics mine].²⁷
I wonder what the expression “in practice” means in this passages, which recurs
twice. It seems to me that it means the same as what Łukasiewicz said at the end
of the article I quoted at the beginning of this paper, that is:
The Law of Contradiction has no logical value, since it only has the status of an assumption;
but it does have a practical and an ethical value, which is all the more important for that.
The Law of Contradiction is our only weapon against error and falsehood. [emphasis in the
original]²⁸
But Priest in his article on Aristotle said in a footnote:
The end of Łukasiewicz’ essay is a little disappointing, though. After demolishing Aristotle’s
arguments, he nonetheless seems to think that Aristotle was justified in entrenching the law
as ‘unassailable dogma’, for the sketchiest of reasons.²⁹
Regarding the rare counter-examples indicated by him, it is well known that the
paradoxes “involving self-reference” have been considered by many logicians as
problems concerning language, not reality,³⁰ and “the states of affairs that are
but instantaneous” depend on a conception of time as composed by separate in-
stants, so that the problems concerning the notion of corporeal “limit” depend
on a conception of space as composed by separate points. But when discussing
the arguments of Zenon of Elea, Aristotle demonstrated that time, like space, is a
continuous magnitude to which the arguments of Zeno cannot be applied. If they
26 Priest (2004), 35.

27 Ibid.
28 Łukasiewicz (1971), 509.
29 Priest (1998), 92, note 1.
30 D’Agostini (2011), 128–137.
106 | Enrico Berti
were valid, the examples of contradiction would not be so rare, because every ob-
ject of experience is in space or in time, and in this case Hegel, who says that “all
things are in themselves contradictory”³¹, was right. But this is not the position of
dialetheism.
More recently Priest has given us a criterion to distinguish true contradictions
from others, the criterion which he calls “The Rationality Principle”, that is:
(RP) If you have good evidence for (the truth of) 𝐴, you ought to accept 𝐴.³²
And:
Belief, acceptance, and assertion have a point: when we believe and assert, what we aim
at is believing and asserting what is the case or, equivalently, the truth. Therefore, the di-
aletheist will accept and, sometimes, assert both 𝐴 and ¬𝐴, if she [or he] has evidence that
𝐴 is a dialetheia – that both 𝐴 and ¬𝐴 are true, as it happens, for instance, with the Liar
sentences.³³
I would like not to be too obstinate, but I observe that also in this case the only
dialetheia which is produced as an example of evident contradiction is the Liar,
i.e. a linguistic paradox. I must admit that I do not understand the advantage of
admitting local contradictions, because either the contradictions are impossible,
and in this case this impossibility concerns all the contradictions, or they are pos-
sible, and in this case why should we admit only some of them and not all? We
have to choose between Aristotle and Hegel, I cannot see a third way. The con-
tradiction, in my opinion, cannot be local. If there is a local contradiction, there
must be an error or an inadequacy of language or even something that is not real.
We must remember that our language is wider than reality, because it can express
not only truth, i.e. the real, but also falsity, i.e. the not real. Contradictions belong
to falsity, i.e. to the not real.
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31 Hegel (1969), book 2, sect. I, ch. II, C, footnote 3.

32 Priest (2006), 109, and Berto/Priest (2013).
33 Berto (2008), 169.
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Angelica Nuzzo
The Justice of Contradiction
Logical Advancement and Historical Transformations
In this essay I look at the implications that the systematic foundation of Hegel’s
philosophy of objective spirit in the Logic and the logical method has for his idea
of freedom and for his conception of history as the culmination of the movement of
freedom’s realization within the sphere of ethical life. In particular, I am interested
in the role that contradiction and negativity play in structuring logical, practical,
and historical processes as processes. On the basis of an analysis of this issue and
in contrast with a long-standing interpretation of Hegel’s idea of history, I claim
that the most innovative and for us today useful features of such an idea must be
brought back precisely to history’s logical foundation. My overall claim regards
the fundamental solidarity between Hegel’s logical thought of contradiction and
his awareness of its practical and historical relevance.
I begin with a discussion of the Frankfurt fragment “Der immer sich ver-
grössernde Widerspruch [. . . ]” (1799/1800)¹ which testifies of the complex con-
stellation of problems that occupies Hegel’s reflection on contradiction in his
early years. After having shown how Hegel uses the dialectical idea of contradic-
tion against traditional and Kantian Verstandeslogik, I turn to the philosophy of
spirit and to the practical significance of the idea of contradiction at work in the
dialectic-speculative logic. Here I offer a new account of Hegel’s critique of Kant’s
moral formalism – an account that is based on the function of contradiction in
relation to action. I argue that contradiction is what grounds the crucial transi-
tion from Moralität to Sittlichkeit in the Philosophy of Right. At this point, laying
out the framework for an interpretation of the idea of history that concludes the
sphere of ethical life, I move back to the logical use of contradiction, offering a
brief account of the second moment of the “absolute method” in the Science of
Logic, the moment of the “advancement”. Finally, I bring this analysis to bear on
Hegel’s idea of Weltgeschichte and on its placement as conclusion of the sphere
of objective spirit. I argue that Hegel’s choice for this position, which has often
been disputed and variously challenged, is the direct and coherent consequence
of the claim that historical processes are structured according to the dialectical
logic of contradiction.
1 Hegel (1969ff.), TW 1, 457–460.

110 | Angelica Nuzzo
1 Contradiction and Verstandeslogik

There is a fundamental continuity between the task that Hegel assigns to his prac-
tical philosophy or philosophy of objective spirit and the thought that leads him
from early on to the idea of a dialectic-speculative logic that replacing the un-
moved fixity of traditional Verstandeslogik (of which Kant is one of the latest rep-
resentatives) is able to account for change and transformation – in reality as well
as in thinking. In short, in Hegel’s view, the most pressing issue of the modern,
post-revolutionary world is understanding how to live with and how to practically
overcome the contradiction present in the world of spirit’s objective reality, i.e.,
ultimately, how to change practical norms with the changing of historical condi-
tions. This is the fundamental task that he assigns to a new type of logic and to a
practical philosophy based on that logic. Hegel’s concept of freedom, his system-
atic articulation of the relation between Moralität and Sittlichkeit, and the conclu-
sion of the Philosophy of Right with “world history” should all be brought back to
that core issue. Contradiction sums up for Hegel the chief question of the present
age and defines, at the same time, the structure of logical processes and the space
of freedom’s realization.
Hegel’s concern with the historical present and the idea that its fractured ac-
tuality poses to philosophy a fundamental task – that this is indeed the funda-
mental task of practical philosophy – can already be detected in the fragment
that opens the Verfassung Deutschlands (1799/1800).² As will be the case in 1807
and, albeit under different conditions, in 1820, the starting point is the apparent
evidence of “what is there” and seems “not difficult to see”, the deceitful trans-
parency of immediate facts that pose to the philosopher the much more difficult
problem of recognizing the relevant issue of the time – “die Vernunft als die Rose
im Kreuze der Gegenwart”,³ as Hegel eloquently puts it in 1820. This is the con-
tradictory reality of historical change. As Hegel registers in the preface to the Phe-
nomenology, “it is not difficult to see that our time is a time of birth and transition
(Übergang) to a new era”.⁴ It has been observed that a confrontation between the
Verfassung Deutschlands and Hegel’s works on political philosophy of this period
2 Hegel (1969ff.), TW 1, 451–610.

3 Hegel (1969ff.), Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (henceforth RPh), preface, TW 7, 26.
4 Hegel (1969ff.), TW 3, 18; see also the “Anstrengung und Bemühung” at 19. Many are the
contemporary voices that express a similar assessment of the present time. See, among them,
Goethe’s passage at the end of Hermann und Dorothea (written between 1796 and 1797) where a
German revolutionary says: “Alles bewegt sich/ auf Erden einmal, es scheint sich alles zu tren-
nen./ Grundgesetze lösen sich auf der festen Staaten,/ [. . . ] Alles regt sich, als wollte die Welt, die
gestaltete, rückwärts/ lösen in Chaos und Nacht sich auf und neu sich gestalten”. Goethe (1988),
The Justice of Contradiction | 111
(System der Sittlichkeit, Naturrechtsaufsatz) yields radically conflicting views. For,

while philosophical reflection leads Hegel to attempt overcoming the contradic-
tions found in the historical world, in the Verfassung Deutschlands all the con-
tradictions are left un-reconciled as plain and hard facts – as facts that “should
remain”, as it were, in their contradictory, unmediated character.⁵ This important
observation supports, in my view, the opposite conclusion, namely, the idea of the
fundamental continuity and solidarity between Hegel’s occasional political writ-
ings and his dialectic-speculative philosophy. Neither could be understood with-
out the other. As the comprehension of the present world leads to a contradiction
that can neither be healed nor overcome, the effort of philosophy struggling for
a conceptual comprehension of the dynamics of change leads to the thought of a
possible conciliation and to the conditions thereof. In both cases the central ques-
tion of the time concerns the reality of contradiction – the logical problem of its
conceptualization and the practical problem of living with it and overcoming it.
The project of Hegel’s dialectic-speculative logic as a logic of contradiction and,
as I have claimed elsewhere, as a “logic of transformative processes” arises, from
early on, from the need to learn how to live with and give a philosophical account
of the fundamental contradictions and transformations of modernity.⁶
The fragment “Der immer sich vergrössernde Widerspruch [. . . ]”,⁷ offers at the
same time a philosophical diagnosis of the historical crisis faced by Germany at
the end of the 18th century, the first emergence of Hegel’s dialectical logic, and
one of the central tenets of his practical philosophy. The problem herein is: What
is change? How shall the philosopher conceptualize the moment of historical tran-
sition, the unrest that everyone feels as the prevailing dimension of the present,
the necessary pull (Trieb, Drang) toward the unknown and the new which one
must grasp and embrace in order to withstand its unstoppable affirmation? Unlike
the dead fixation of life in “positive” institutional forms and in their destructive,
blocked contradictions, the contradiction that shapes transformative processes is
the condition of survival – individual and collective, personal and national. For,
contradiction bears within itself the possibility of a way out and the conditions
of a new beginning. Significantly, Hegel does not point to any guaranteed solu-
tion to the “growing contradiction”. Insecurity and the striving for the unknown
vol. 2, 512f.) The political diagnosis turns here into a metaphysical view of the development of
history out of and back to the original Chaos.
5 Maier (1963), 340; this observation is supported by Cesa (1972), vii–lii, xxii.
6 See Nuzzo (2006), 85–104.
7 In Hegel (1969ff.), TW 1, 457–460. With regard to the period of its composition and its editorial
history, see the remarks by Baum/Meist (1998). A commentary of this fragment is in Luporini
(1972), 440–450.
are the predicament of the age.⁸ He indicates in the “growing contradiction” and
the “need” for its “Aufhebung” or “Widerlegung”⁹ both the logical and practical
structure of change.¹⁰ Contradiction is a real force operating in history, a force
moved by its own inner logic, which is a logic of immanent development. Con-
tradiction defines the relation between the ideal and the real, nature and life,¹¹
between what political and juridical institutions have to offer to their citizens and
what individuals more or less consciously seek and desire but cannot see fulfilled
by those institutions. The tension catalysed in contradiction is the mark of an
epoch in which all certainty and security has been shattered and the only hope
for survival – individual and collective – lies in the acceptance of transformation,
in the capacity to face the negativity to which life has been reduced. Knowledge
by itself cannot produce transformation, although it may be one of its conditions.
And neither a pure act of the “will” [(individual or collective)], nor a social con-
tract or mere revolutionary “violence”¹² can overcome contradiction and bring
change about. Rather, Hegel seems to suggest that transformation lies in the na-
ture of things, in the inner logic of the contradiction that animates the present
time once the obstacles to its radicalization and free development are removed
and contradiction is let grow to its extreme consequences without being fixated
or hypostatized into something self-standing and “absolute”.¹³ Contradiction is a
force independent of human cognition and will. It is rather the force within which
all human action is inscribed. Only the recognition and expression of real needs
and desires can lead to the articulation and thereby (dis)solution of the growing
contradiction.¹⁴ Change takes place as contradiction gives rise to a “need” and
thereby to the movement of its own “refutation”. For, the need that contradiction
be overcome – a need that arises once life has met pure negativity and has rec-
ognized that it can no longer live with it and in it – is already in itself change.
In sum, contradiction is for Hegel the sign of historical crises; practical transfor-
mation and change are the manifestation and internal development of the reality
of contradiction, the movement that contradiction necessarily marshals in once
it is not taken as static and absolute, once it is not fixed within illusory limits or
repressed.
8 See also the “Unbekannte(s)” in Hegel (1969ff.), TW 3, 18.

9 Hegel (1969ff.), TW 1, 458 and 459 respectively.
10 Hegel (1969ff.), TW 1, 457f.
11 Hegel (1969ff.), TW 1, 458 and 457 respectively.
12 Hegel (1969ff.), TW 1, 459.
13 Hegel (1969ff.), TW 1, 457.
14 See Bodei (1987), 19.
Hegel’s dialectic-speculative logic elaborates this seminal thought in oppo-

sition to the Verstandeslogik of which Kant’s transcendental logic is one of the
most recent examples. If unforeseeable change, the unrest of transition, and the
violence of contradiction are essential features of the historical present and not
merely contingent aspects of it, they are also the stumbling-block that philos-
ophy encounters in its attempts at a comprehension based on formal logic, on
Kant’s transcendental philosophy, and on contemporary epistemologies more
generally. Hegel brings together all these approaches under the designation of
Verstandeslogik. Thereby he indicates the logic that makes of the principle of
non-contradiction the first and foremost law of thinking and proceeds by apply-
ing fixed concepts (taken from an allegedly complete table of categories), which
in their empty formality have no grip on reality. Herein lies Hegel’s critique: the
present world is not understandable assuming traditional logic and metaphysics
as paradigm of comprehension because the present is contradictory, has no fixed
features, and being characterized by change cannot be held fast and pinpointed
by any given definition or a priori concept. Hence, on Hegel’s account, it is also
not surprising that philosophy has yielded in recent years either skepticism or
various forms of irrationalism and Schwärmerei. Common to these positions is
the confessed defeat that radically disengages philosophy from the comprehen-
sion of the contemporary world and from active participation in it. The need for a
new method of understanding the contradiction proper to the historical present
is also, at the same time, the practical need for what Hegel calls, in that early
fragment, a “better life”,¹⁵ the striving toward different conditions of life.
Verstandeslogik is characterized by two interconnected flaws. First, it is a
logic that unable to cope with contradiction reduces reason to the understand-
ing, whose chief activity is to avoid contradiction but whose main predicament
is ironically to remain trapped in it – for the understanding is the very source
of the contradiction it tries so hard to avoid. Second, since the categories of Ver-
standeslogik “as fixed determinations fall outside one another and are not held
together in organic unity, they are dead forms that do not have in themselves
the spirit which alone constitutes their living unity”.¹⁶ As dead, unmoved forms
the categories of formal and transcendental logic have the same status as those
political and juridical institutions from which life has forever departed. They
are forms with no actual relevance, no normativity, no real grip on reality. They
are “dead” insofar as they are irrelevant to human practices: their consecrated
authority or alleged “ideality” is no longer authority over people’s lives nor guar-
15 Hegel (1969ff.), TW 1, 458.

16 Hegel (1969ff.), TW 5, 41.
antee of meaningfulness in relation to lived practices and beliefs. In their dead

fixity and unmoved abstract existence, they are useless relicts of a long gone past.
Importantly, the two flaws of Verstandeslogik are connected: its forms are dead
and meaningless or irrelevant precisely because they are set to avoid the contra-
diction that would put them at odds with reality but would also make them alive
in interaction with reality; and since they refuse to embrace contradiction and
thereby change, they remain locked into the unmoved ideality of their a-historical
a priori status. Significantly, for Hegel, the Verstandeslogik perfectly corresponds
to the “dürre[s] Verstandesleben”¹⁷ of Kantian morality, which goes hand in hand
with the arid and egoistic economic existence of modern civil society.¹⁸ Contrary
to Kant’s reassurance, pure practical reason is unable to overcome the limits –
and the contradictions – that undermine the understanding and an impotent,
merely antinomic reason. Unable to sustain the force of real contradiction, in fact
utterly destroyed by it, pure practical reason and its highest a priori principle,
the categorical imperative, follow the same logic of non-contradiction or abstract
identity prescribed by the understanding. The consequence is the impossibility
of the “transition” from morality to ethical life, just as the implication of the Ver-
standeslogik is the incapacity to conceptualize the predicament of the time. Herein
we meet the critique of Kant’s morality that Hegel articulates in the Philosophy
of Right. Morality is condemned to be ineffectual, i.e., to have no grip on reality
as long as it assumes a practical version of the logic of non-contradiction as its
highest principle. If, however, morality (or better the “moral standpoint”) does
resolve to embrace contradiction, we are ipso facto led “outside” of morality into
the sphere of ethical life. From here on, fuelled by the unavoidable conflicts met
within ethical life, freedom’s realization proceeds into world history and into the
development of art, religion, and philosophy in the successive sphere of absolute
spirit. Let’s see now how Hegel, on the basis of his dialectical understanding of
contradiction, moves freedom “outside” of morality.
17 Hegel (1969ff.), TW 1, 458.

18 In the historical sequence of the Phenomenology, later reversed by the systematic of the Phi-
losophy of Right, the loss of ancient Sittlichkeit is followed by the “becoming of Moralität” that
characterizes modernity.
2 Contradiction: Kant’s Moralität and Hegel’s

Sittlichkeit
In the Philosophy of Right as the historical situation has changed, Hegel’s rhetoric
is more restrained than in his early years. The diagnosis is not as dramatic and is
now filtered through and reflected by the complex systematic construction of the
work. Although contradiction plays a crucial role at many junctures of the devel-
opment of freedom in the ethical world (in the family, civil society, and the state)
being precisely the inner force of such development, I shall limit my analysis to
two places in which contradiction displays a systematic and practical function,
namely, to the critique of Kant’s concept of morality which leads to the “transi-
tion” to Sittlichkeit, and to the conclusion of the sphere of objective spirit with the
moment of “world history”.
Although Hegel praises Kant for introducing the idea of the “infinite auton-
omy” of the will, the crucial point of his critique is that Kant ultimately revokes
this gain by “holding fast to the merely moral standpoint that does not make the
transition to the concept of ethical life” but remains instead an “empty formal-
ism”. In fact, the “transition” (Übergang) it makes is rather in the opposite di-
rection, namely, toward the “unconditioned”.¹⁹ The only determination duty at-
tains is to be “abstract universality”, indeterminate “identity with no content”,
which “lacking contradiction” is only the will’s “formal correspondence with it-
self”. What interests me in particular in Hegel’s objection is the connection be-
tween the idea that Kant’s duty is based on the principle of non-contradiction
(hence is formal, lacking content, merely tautological, etc.) and the notion that
from the standpoint of morality so construed the transition to Sittlichkeit (to its
“concept” and its “standpoint”)²⁰ is made impossible (hence the realization of
freedom is blocked).
While Hegel seems to criticize the idea that the mere lack of contradiction
cannot be principium dijudicationis for moral action (it implies the justification of
all actions indiscriminately, even of wrong and immoral ones),²¹ the crux of his
attack is rather the idea that it cannot be principium executionis. This explains the
misconstruction to which Hegel subjects Kant’s formulation of the moral law. In
the Metaphysik der Sitten Kant’s formulation is: “Act according to a maxim that
19 RPh §135 and Anm. respectively.

20 RPh §135 Anm. for the former, §33 Anm. for the latter.
21 RPh §135 Anm.
can, at the same time, be valid as universal law”.²² Hegel renders it as “Kant’s fur-
ther formulation that presents an action as a universal maxim”.²³ At issue for Kant
is not the possibility for an action to be represented as a universal maxim; but
the possibility for a maxim to become (or to be willed as) a universal law valid
for all rational agents. What Hegel thereby misconstrues is the place where con-
tradiction (or, respectively non-contradiction) occurs. For Kant what ought not to
contain contradiction is the maxim (or, alternatively, the will determined by the
maxim);²⁴ in Hegel’s rendering of the position of morality it is instead, directly, the
action itself. This is a crucial shift. How are we to understand the occurrence of
contradiction in the action itself (or contradictory action)? While the idea that an
action (as opposed to a maxim) may or may not contain contradiction is meaning-
less for Kant (for whom contradictory are propositions not actions), it is for Hegel
the condition of realization or actualization that may characterize an action as free
by leading from the inner ineffectual world of subjective intentions to the outer ob-
jective world of a shared intersubjective and always conflictual actuality.²⁵ Recall
that in the 1799/1800 fragment discussed above Hegel placed the “growing contra-
diction” at the intersection of the inner and the outer world of consciousness. This
is precisely the transition that leads outside the sphere of morality – and outside
the subject-centered idea of the good – into the complex social world of Sittlich-
keit. To actualized freedom contradiction belongs as a necessary dimension since
to realized action necessarily belongs the possibility to be intersubjectively chal-
lenged.
In the 1797 treatise Verkündigung des nahen Abschlusses eines Traktats zum
ewigen Frieden in der Philosophie Kant contends that the principle of non-contra-
diction, under certain conditions to be specified, can indeed become the principle
from which duties can be cognized. “The following is clear”, says Kant, “that this
is an unmistakable sign of moral impossibility of an action, not that, if the maxim
of my will is made into a universal law, it contradicts the maxim of someone else,
but if it contradicts itself (which I [. . . ] can judge according to the principle of con-
22 Kant (1900ff.), AA VI, 226: “Handle nach einer Maxime, die zugleich als allgemeines Gesetz
gelten kann”.
23 RPh §135 Anm.: “die weitere Kantische Form, die Fähigkeit einer Handlung, als allgemeine
Maxime vorgestellt zu werden”. For a punctual reconstruction of the discussion in a Kantian per-
spective, see Baum (1987), 238f.
24 Given the examples offered by Kant in the Grundlegung (chapters 1–2), the former is the case
of perfect duties the latter of imperfect duties.
25 To this extent, I agree with Pippin’s reconstruction of Hegel’s account of rational agency. Un-
like Pippin, however, I insist on the crucial importance of the moment of contradiction (see Pip-
pin (2008), ch. 3 dwells on the Hegelian inheritance of the Kantian idea of self-legislation; with
regard to the Phenomenology, Pippin (2010), 413f.).
tradiction)”.²⁶ On the basis of the principle of contradiction one knows that not
to commit such an action, namely, acting according to the opposite maxim from
the one that has been tested, is a duty. Significantly, Kant insists that at stake is
the contradiction of the subjective maxim with itself, not the contradiction of my
maxim with the maxims of others. This latter, by contrast, is what interests Hegel
from the outset, and drives his shift from a contradiction in the maxim to a con-
tradiction in the action itself. For, when action (and not a subjective maxim) is
directly at stake, since action is the unfolding of a realization process in the ob-
jective and intersubjective world, it unavoidably comes into conflict with others
or is challenged by others. Maxims can be considered in their utter abstraction,
laws may be entirely formal, but actions being effectual cannot.
The way in which Hegel raises the problem of content against the formalism
of Kant’s idea of duty is connected precisely to this shift. Now, the idea that contra-
diction can occur only in relation to a content perfectly corresponds to Kant’s own
view – to the notion that what is tested for contradiction is a subjective maxim,
which as such always provides the “moral content” of the action; but also to Kant’s
claim concerning the ontological argument (existence as real predicate must be
assumed for the definition of a necessary being to be possible).²⁷ Hegel’s point,
however, is a different one. He claims: “a contradiction can only occur with a con-
tent that already constitutes the basis as an established principle”.²⁸ On Hegel’s
account, what makes contradiction a principle that can indeed meaningfully dis-
criminate among actions (and not, notice, among maxims) with regard to their
rightfulness, justice, and freedom, is not just the necessary assumption of a con-
tent but of “a content that already constitutes the basis as an established principle”.
For, Hegel continues, it is only “in relation to such a principle that an action is ei-
26 Kant (1900ff.), AA VIII, 420f.: “Es is aber offenbar: [. . . ] dass nicht, wenn die Maxime meins
Willens zum allgemeine Gesetzt gemacht, der Maxime eines Anderen, sondern wenn sie sich
selbst widerspricht (welches ich [. . . ] nach dem Satz des Widerspruchs beurteilen kann), dieses
ein unfehlbares Kennzeichen der moralische Unmöglichkeit der Handlung sei”.
27 See Baum (1987), 240 who refers to Kant’s critique of the ontological proof. It is interesting that
at RPh §141 Anm., with regard to the “Übergang des Begriffs” into actuality that is the transition
taking place between Moralität and Sittlichkeit, Hegel refers back to the Logic, to the “idea of the
good” in which reference to the ontological proof is made. Now, the ontological proof is often
used by Hegel to indicate the necessity of the transition to objectivity which takes place through
action (see Hegel (1969ff.), TW 6, 404f.: just like the subjective will (RPh §124), god “can be known
only through his action (Tun)”. See Cesa (1981), 174).
28 RPh §135 Anm. (my emphasis): “ein Widerspruch kann sich nur mit etwas ergeben, das ist,
mit einem Inhalt, der als festes Prinzip zum voraus zugrundeliegt”.
ther adequate or contradictory”.²⁹ In other words, Hegel’s charge against Kant is

that what his moral principle lacks is not simply content but a content capable
of being intersubjectively, i.e., ethically relevant and normative, a content that
being valid as a principle can determine not just subjective maxims but the ac-
tual realization of actions. In other words, Kant’s formalism is undermined not by
its lack of content but by its lack of actual relevance. His moral principle is non-
contradictory because it has no traction in the objective world of action. Hegel’s
point is that Sittlichkeit needs to be Grundlage of Moralität: when the relation is
reversed the moral principle looses normativity and relevance (not just content).
It becomes a principle that can neither be implemented nor applied but remains
a dead, ineffectual “positive”. Such is, for Hegel, the status of Kantian morality –
the “dürres Verstandesleben” corresponds to an ineffectual reason that, unable to
sustain contradiction, is ultimately identical with abstract understanding.
Thus, Hegel’s critique of Kant’s formalism is not simply that the form of duty
lacks content, hence that from it particular duties cannot be derived. His charge
is that the mere form of duty lacks normativity over actual actions because it flees
the contradiction that alone anchors the will’s determination to the action’s real-
ization, the latter always and necessarily occurring in a social context. Ultimately,
what is not formal, for Hegel, is contradiction. Contradiction does reveal the na-
ture of an action because it occurs “with a content that already constitutes the
basis as an established principle”, that is, is ethical hence normative content. If
free action is identical with moral action and moral action is action in which the
will is determined by a principle from which contradiction must be excluded, then
free action becomes impossible. For, lack of contradiction and formal self-identity
cannot provide the will with a ground for determination – after all, since all deter-
mination implies negation, on this path conflict is unavoidable. By contrast, the
transition to Sittlichkeit requires the acceptance that free action is not the action
that paralyzed by contradiction is determined only by the injunction to avoid it
at all costs; an action is free when it embraces contradiction and the confronta-
tion with others, and eventually is “at home” in it – freedom is a movement of
externalization (Äusserung and Entäusserung) that is formally characterized as
bei-sich-selbst-sein-im-Anderssein. While for Kant non-contradiction sustains and
guarantees the purity of the moral principle, i.e., its formality, for Hegel it blocks
the development of freedom and makes the transition to the concept of ethical
life impossible. For both Kant and Hegel, however, contradiction is the force that
29 RPh §135 Anm. (my emphasis): “In Beziehung auf ein solches [Prinzip, a.n.] ist erst eine Hand-
lung entweder damit übereinstimmend oder im Widerspruch”; see Baum (1987), 240f. On his
view, Hegel’s misconstruction of Kant’s position is no more than a sheer misunderstanding.
ultimately leads “outside” morality – to non-moral maxims for Kant; to the real-
ization of freedom in the ethical world for Hegel.
I now turn to the connection between Hegel’s Logic and the idea of world
history.
3 Contradiction, Logical “Advancement”,

and Historical Justice
Hegel’s idea of a dialectic-speculative logic (in contrast to the un-dialectical Ver-
standeslogik) constitutes the most adequate basis for the introduction and pre-
sentation of history in the systematic of spirit and for the understanding of the
specific developmental structures of history itself. To claim that history has its
systematic foundation in the Logic means that it is dialectical logic and not some
metaphysical or theological or even moral assumption or goal that guides its de-
velopment. Herein, I suggest, we should recognize the contemporary relevance
of Hegel’s idea of history. My thesis can be summarized by the following three
claims.³⁰ Hegel’s Logic is the best-suited tool for articulating the structures of his-
tory, first, because it is the logic of the transformative process that pure thinking
itself undergoes when considered in its immanent activity; second, because such
logic replaces the metaphysical (ontological, cosmological, theological) problem
of origin with the methodological problem of the beginning of thinking’s most
proper activity; and third, because the logical movement is a movement of trans-
formation and advancement fuelled by the dynamic of contradiction and the prac-
tice of judgment. Hegel’s specific conception of history directly follows from and is
shaped by these three programmatic logical objectives. Presently, I can dwell only
on the latter claim. History is the immanent development of real transformative
processes, which display human, worldly beginnings, advancements and epochal
transitions but is not the search for metaphysical first ‘origins’ or ultimate, un-
reachable or transcendent final ends. On Hegel’s idea of history, the latter are not
properly ‘historical’ and do not belong to a dialectic philosophy of history. Finally,
the motor of history and the authority to which history is subject is the justice done
by the power of contradiction, the same immanent contradiction that determines
historical advancements: Weltgeschichte is Weltgericht.³¹
30 I have argued for these claims extensively in Nuzzo (2012); see in particular ch. 4.
31 RPh §340; Enz §548 (Enz refers to Hegel (1969ff.), Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wis-
senschaften, TW vol. 8–10).
In the last chapter of the Logic, Hegel presents the three moments of the “ab-
solute method”: beginning, advancement, and end.³² The moments that account
for the development of logical truth are, at the same time, the crucial structures
of the historical realization of freedom. For, in the first case the method discloses
the generative forms of thinking’s pure activity, while in the second case history
brings to light the structures of spirit’s own realization. Here I can only discuss
the intermediary moment, the moment of advancement (Fortgang).
Methodologically, dialectical contradiction is the fundamental structure of
the advancement – of the purely immanent movement advancing out of the be-
ginning. The second moment of the logical method considered in its formality is
the action (of thinking) that advances – Fortgehen. This is immanently developed
from the first moment because Anfang is the “beginning of a process and a de-
velopment”.³³ And yet advancing is not a mere “Überfluß” over and above the be-
ginning.³⁴ Advancing is the activity of dialectical contradiction. What character-
izes the advancement is the intervention of “difference” (Unterschied, Differenz)
and negativity, the transition to otherness with the split that this implies, and the
“judgment” (Urteil) that draws differences and acknowledges, reflectively, that
the simplicity of the beginning is re-visited in the advancement as the unity of
that which is in itself different or which carries difference in itself.³⁵ In the second
moment advancement is made because the first moment, in its immanent devel-
opment, shows itself as contradictory: the simple is in itself different, the imme-
diate entails mediation. Although the advancement in its negativity seems to do
violence to the beginning and betray its simplicity, it is truly the act that does
justice to it, bringing the beginning to completion, making it real, and thereby
manifesting what the beginning truly is. Thus, the second moment of the method
brings to the fore its properly dialectical negativity. Methodologically, dialectic is
the “standpoint in which a universal first, considered in and for itself reveals it-
self as the other of itself”.³⁶ This standpoint is crucial to Hegel’s notion of freedom
as self-actualization in (relation to) otherness. In the final perspective offered by
the method dialectic discloses that the process of the whole is both continuous
(the method is analytic, difference is immanent) and fundamentally discontinu-
ous (the method is synthetic, difference is in the gap that produces the transition
32 See Nuzzo (2005), 187–205; see also Nuzzo (2011), 111–139.

33 It is “Anfang des Fortgehens und der Entwicklung” (Hegel (1969ff), TW 6, 556).
34 Hegel (1969ff), TW 6, 555; see the corresponding passage on the relationship between Anfang
and Fortgang in Hegel (1969ff.), TW 5, 71.
35 Hegel (1969ff.), TW 6, 556.
36 Hegel (1969ff.), TW 6, 561.
to the other).³⁷ This is the fundamental logical structure that underlies all histori-
cal transition and epochal transformation – it is the ground of historical continu-
ities and discontinuities, the basis of the negativity and destructiveness but also
of the recovery from such destructiveness that characterizes historical develop-
ment.
The difficulties met by the conclusion of the sphere of objective spirit with
the moment of Weltgeschichte are well known. The field of world history seems to
represent an abrupt interruption – even a reversal – in the ascending structure of
the progress of freedom from “abstract right” through “morality” up to the differ-
ent moments of “ethical life”. Already in the confrontation among autonomous
states (Völkerrecht) right loses its power of actuality, sinks back to the level of the
dreaded Kantian Sollen,³⁸ and is constantly undermined by contingency,³⁹ while
the anarchy of a renewed state of nature seems to propose, yet again, the resurgent
condition of abstract right. How then can Hegel attribute to world history the func-
tion of establishing the last “judgment” on what is the highest and absolute level
of right, the most advanced development of freedom – the famous claim: Welt-
geschichte is Weltgericht? How can the impasse of an un-reconciled confrontation
between nature and freedom be proposed as closure for the ascending realization
of freedom and considered the ultimate Weltgericht? Hegel’s systematic choice
has often been discussed (and rejected) on the ground of its political and ideolog-
ical implications. Leaving this discussion aside, I am interested in the conceptual
nature of the figure of world history introduced by Hegel at this point. What can
we infer with regard to Hegel’s idea of world history from its systematic place-
ment, and from the logic that such placement suggests history follows? In short,
my contention is that framed as Weltgericht world history fulfills the same func-
tion in the conclusion of the sphere of objective spirit that the second moment of
the method fulfills in the conclusion of the Logic.
The account of the second moment of the logical method offers a crucial in-
sight into the connection between contradiction, judgment, and justice that be-
comes relevant in Hegel’s thinking of history. As the result of the logical activity
of judgment, justice – which discloses the “truth” of the beginning and its nec-
essary implications but also subverts it by negating and mediating its simplicity
and immediacy – is neither the starting point nor the conclusion of a process. It
is neither the absolute value positioned in an original moment before the begin-
ning of history (the Absolute, the Garden of Eden, an alleged mythical Golden Age)
37 Hegel (1969ff.), TW 6, 557.

38 RPh §§330, 333.
39 RPh §334 Anm., §335.
nor the final goal beyond history to which the process approximates (the Himmel-
reich, Perpetual Peace). Justice is instead the intermediary, ‘critical’ moment of
the advancement – a moment of fragmentation and split in which contradiction
is responsible for continuing the overall movement and orienting it. Logical ad-
vancement is the dynamic structure of the dialectical process of history. Justice
is the loss of the innocence of immediacy that advances historical processes and
thereby brings freedom to actualization. Justice is neither a first origin nor a final
end; it rather lies in the middle and constitutes the dynamic form of the process it-
self. Viewed on this logical basis, the historical movement is carried on neither by
an absolute origin nor by a final goal (both placed beyond history – before or af-
ter it) but by the capacity that the middle, mediating force of contradiction has to
produce difference and thereby to discriminate or judge – the capacity to be both
the crisis in the process and the critic thereof. Justice is precisely the intermediary
‘critical’ moment that immanently moves on the process of transformation – the
logical as well as the historical process.
At issue are the conditions that structure a process as historical, making the
movement of Entwicklung, which both in the Logic and all along in the Philos-
ophy of Right was a-temporal and non-historical, into the development in time
that is world history. What is it that transforms, alternatively, a logical Stufe or
a discrete number of successive empirical events within the development of the
concept of right or freedom into an epoch of world history? What is the system-
atic principle of history? My claim is that the idea of historical justice whereby
Weltgeschichte in its contradictory tensions is framed as Weltgericht (and placed
above international justice) provides the answer in Hegel’s late system.⁴⁰ As the
political state becomes the agent and the subject of history the traditional idea of
God’s final judgment is secularized in the idea of historical justice,⁴¹ which now
becomes the principle responsible for the immanent generation and “partition”
of the historical process, that is, for the historical periodization that concludes
the Philosophy of Right.⁴² On the basis of the dialectical method, the immanent
partition/periodization of the process generates the process itself as the totality
40 The extensive argument in support of this claim is in Nuzzo (2012), ch. 4.

41 Assmann (2001), 302f., traces the beginning of history in the move taking place from Egypt
to Mesopotamia and ancient Israel whereby the idea of a “tribunal of the dead” judging of one’s
individual life (before the life’s end) is replaced by the idea of a worldly responsibility of the kings
toward the gods and then by the Jewish idea of a historia sacra in which God himself participates.
In Hegel’s idea of world history there is a parallel move from the idea of divine justice taking place
after the end of history to the idea of an intra-historical judgment that falls within history itself.
The tribunal of justice is now history itself.
42 See RPh §§354–360.
of history. Significantly, such periodization does not presuppose history but first
establishes a temporal sequence as world history. The tribunal that judges of the
actions of the states on the world scene, is no longer placed beyond history but is
now history itself. Historical justice is the immanent principle of historical judg-
ment, i.e., is the principle on which the advancement of the process is made. Here
again, the structure of history leads us back to the logic of the process. For, the
tribunal of history neither reflects a divine providential order nor dictates ideal
conditions of ethical or international justice (for the pursuit, for example, of per-
petual peace, which always remains for Hegel an unreal Sollen). Its function is
rather to indicate the conditions under which alone the historical process can ad-
vance as the immanent movement of freedom’s realization (and is not stalled, for
example, or pushed back to preceding stages or forced to sterile repetitions of the
same errors). Because of its logical basis, history’s justice is neither theological
nor moral but is pragmatic worldly justice. Just is that stage of the process which
allows for and actually accomplishes historical advancement within the totality of
Weltgeschichte. Just is the stage in which freedom is brought to its advancement.⁴³
As we have seen, the idea of dialectical contradiction is directly connected
for Hegel to the task of thinking transformation in its logical forms. In this regard,
Hegel’s Logic is framed as the last chapter in the history of dialectic that begins
with ancient Greek philosophy. “One must realize that war is common and conflict
is justice, and all things come about by way of conflict and necessity”, reads a fa-
mous fragment by Heraclitus.⁴⁴ On his view, constant transformation constitutes
the very essence of reality, the principle to which everything existing is subject.
Change, however, is generated by conflict, i.e., by the clash of opposites and their
coexistence. War is a universal all-pervading principle to which nothing escapes.
To this extent, Conflict is promoted to the dignity of a first metaphysical princi-
ple next to Necessity. Opposing Pythagoras who proposed the ideal of a peaceful
and harmonious universe, and Anaximander who saw the warfare of opposites
as outright injustice, Heraclitus identifies Conflict and its necessity with Justice
(dike).⁴⁵ On his view, justice is not harmonious and changeless balance but the
restless tension of strife. Contradiction does not lead to chaos but to a just order
that is the necessary dynamic order of universal transformation. The Pythagorean
tradition is continued in Plato and Aristotle. In their view, conflict – political, so-
cial, but also psychological as imbalance and disharmony of the different parts of
43 I want to insist that the criterion that measures advancement is neither moral nor theological
or providential but merely logical.
44 Heraclitus D. 80, M 28 in Kahn (1981), 66f.
45 Kahn (1981), 206, says that such identification “is at first sight utterly perverse” (see his further
commentary on this fragment at 207).
the soul – is considered the great evil to be corrected by the harmonious force of
reason which is itself justice. On this crucial point, Hegel follows Heraclitus. Rea-
son is justice because reason is fundamentally dialectical, i.e., because it bears in
itself the necessity of conflict. But reason is also, at the same time, the power able
to overcome contradiction. Unlike Kantian reason, which is truly understanding,
Hegelian reason does not remain stuck in the still stand of unresolved antinomies.
As the dynamic unity of conflict and its resolution, Hegel’s Vernunft is justice. The
verse from Schiller’s poem Resignation that Hegel appropriates in introducing the
idea of world history has, after all, a pre-Socratic root in Heraclitean dialectic. Con-
flict is Justice: Weltgeschichte is Weltgericht because historical change is produced
by strife and strife is justice. Ultimately, Hegel’s rejection of Kant’s ideal of perpet-
ual peace has the same metaphysical motivation as Heraclitus’ polemic stance
toward Pythagoras’ harmonious universe. Contradiction determines the ongoing
movement of the historical process the justice of which lies in the self-regulating
development of contradiction. The order of justice is the very order of (historical)
change, not a changeless state beyond transformation and conflict. Contradiction
is ‘critical’ in the sense of discriminative and ordering; it does lead neither to chaos
nor to nothingness but to epochal transformation.
References
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W. Mesch (eds.), Die Weltgeschichte – das Weltgericht?, Stuttgarter Hegel-Kongreß 1999,
Stuttgart, 296–311, 2001.
M. Baum, “Hegels Kritik an Kants Moralprinzip”, in: Hegel Jahrbuch, 235–244, 1987.
M. Baum, K. R. Meist, Kommentar zu: Hegel. Gesammelte Werke, vol. 5. Schriften und Entwürfe
(1799–1808), ed. by M. Baum, K. R. Meist, Hamburg, 1998.
Remo Bodei, Scomposizioni. Forme dell’individuo moderno, Turin, 1987.
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C. Cesa, “Tra Moralität e Sittlichkeit. Sul confronto di Hegel con la filosofia pratica di Kant”, in:
V. Verra (ed.), Hegel interprete di Kant, Naples, 147–178, 1981.
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Works of 1832–1845. Ed. by E. Moldenhauer, K. M. Michel. Frankfurt a. M. (quoted as TW,
followed by the indication of the volume and page), 1969ff.
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Commentary, Cambridge, 1981.
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334–349, 1963.
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Hegel’s Theory of the Subject, London, 187–205, 2005.
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tions, Chesham, 85–104, 2006.
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ion to Hegel, Oxford, 111–139, 2011.
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2010.
Luca Illetterati
Limit and Contradiction in Hegel
1 Introduction
At the beginning of the second book of Hegel’s Science of Logic, and more pre-
cisely in chapter II of section I, Hegel analyses the so-called essentialities or the
determinations of reflection. These determinations are: A) Identity, B) Difference
and C) Contradiction.
In the remark preceding this analysis Hegel claims:
The categories of reflection used to be taken up in the form of propositions, in which they were
asserted to be valid for everything. These propositions ranked as the universal laws of thought
that lie at the base of all thinking, that are absolute in themselves and incapable of proof,
but are immediately and incontestably recognized and accepted as true by all thinking that
grasps their meaning.¹
In these lines Hegel discusses the determinations of reflection: identity, differ-

ence, opposition and contradiction. Nevertheless, by making explicit the logical
structure of these determinations, Hegel casts doubt on their propositional form
as universal laws of thought such as to be immediately and incontestably recog-
nized and accepted as true. Therefore the critical analysis of identity, difference
and contradiction is also a critical discussion of the law of identity “which is usu-
ally adduced as the first law of thought”,² of the law of contradiction (considered
by Hegel as an expression of the principle of identity), of the law of identity of
indiscernibles and of the law of the excluded middle.
The critique of the universal laws of thought depends on the impossibility to
reduce the determinations of identity, difference and contradiction to these uni-
versal laws. Such impossibility should not be underrated in the analysis of the
problem I am to discuss. Hegel’s focus does not seem to be the status of the propo-
sitional structure of the determinations as universal laws of thought. The main is-
sue seems to lie at an antecedent stage, namely the function performed by these
determinations in the process through which everything “realizes” its essence,
that is, the role they play in the development of determinateness itself.
In the third remark on the determination of contradiction, Hegel explains
some features of his conception of contradiction. This conception represents a
1 Hegel (1969), 409. (Ger. orig.: Hegel (1968ff.), GW XI, 258).

128 | Luca Illetterati
breaking point of Hegel’s philosophy with respect to the classic pattern of thought
by making room for an account of contradiction that sounds scandalous from
the standard philosophical perspective. Hegel explicitly refers to this perspective
when he claims: “one of the fundamental prejudices of logic as hitherto under-
stood [bisherige(n) Logik] and of ordinary thinking [gewönliche(s) Vorstellen]” is
“that contradiction is not so characteristically essential and immanent a determi-
nation as identity”.³
On the one hand, the expression logic as hitherto understood is referred to for-
mal logic, namely the logic of the Aristotelian tradition as it got developed in the
Wolffean logic studied in German universities at the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury; on the other hand, ordinary thinking is common thought, that is the way we
usually conceive of thought and reality. Both of them are ways of thinking whose
basis lies on a certain set of unjustified presuppositions. A common and funda-
mental presupposition of the logic as hitherto understood and of ordinary thinking
is the idea that contradiction is something that we need to get rid of within any
thought and discourse concerning reality and truth.
This ways of thinking are characterized by what Hegel describes as a horror
towards contradiction.⁴ More specifically, in the logic as hitherto understood and
in ordinary thinking reality and truth are thought of as immune to contradiction.
The contradictions we meet in reality are not contradictions that actually are in
reality. In actuality, contradiction has its place only in the experience of error and
misunderstanding depending on the finitude of thought insofar as it cannot think
reality the way it is:
[W]hether it occurs in actual things or in reflective thinking, it ranks in general as a contingency,

a kind of abnormality and a passing paroxysm of sickness.⁵
Hegel endorses a provocative approach with respect to both logic as hitherto un-
derstood and ordinary thinking. He claims that contradiction is the root of all move-
ment and vitality.⁶ Everything we experience in reality as characterized by an in-
trinsic dynamic, by an internal movement and by life is not conceivable at all
outside of contradiction. Contradiction, as an absolute determination of essence,

4 With respect to the speculative value of contradiction, Hegel remarks that “ordinary – but not
speculative – thinking, which abhors contradiction, as nature abhors vacuum, rejects this con-
clusion”. Hegel (1969), 442. (Ger. orig.: Hegel (1968ff.), GW XI, 289).
6 “Contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has
a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity”. Hegel (1969), 439. (Ger. orig.:
Hegel (1968ff.), GW XI, 286).
must be present – Hegel claims – in every experience, in everything actual, as well

as in every notion.⁷ Contradiction – and this is a central point in Hegel’s view –
is not a local phenomenon, a structure typical of certain exceptional situations
which are inexplicable regardless of a reference to contradiction:
[Contradiction] is not to be taken merely as an abnormality which only occurs here and there,
but is rather the negative as determined in the sphere of essence, the principle of all self-
movement, which consists solely in an exhibition of it.⁸
Speculative thinking is that kind of thought aimed at sublating both logic as hith-
erto understood and ordinary thinking. It is a new paradigm of thought insofar as
it does not think reality through a given logical apparatus. Therefore, speculative
thinking does not presuppose the universal and necessary validity of the laws of
thought. Quite the contrary, its approach to contradiction – if compared with the
standard logical paradigm based on the principle of non-contradiction (from now
on PNC) – is revolutionary:
[S]peculative thinking consists solely in the fact that thought holds fast contradiction, and
in it, its own self, but does not allow itself to be dominated by it as in ordinary thinking,
where its determinations are resolved by contradiction only into other determinations or
into nothing.⁹
From this point of view, contradiction is not the evidence of anything lacking or of
something having mislead us. Rather contradiction represents the essential struc-
ture of every determination in its concrete nature, namely in its truth.
Hegel resumes all these considerations in a propositional form that mirrors
the structure of the universal laws of thought:
[E]verything is inherently contradictory, and in the sense that this law in contrast to the others
expresses rather the truth and the essential nature of things.¹⁰
Despite the ironical tone¹¹ depending on the approach Hegel wants to endorse
against the universal laws of thought – something to which thought should al-
7 “Now as regards the assertion that there is no contradiction, that it does not exist, this state-
ment need not cause us any concern; an absolute determination of essence must be present in
every experience, in everything actual, as in every notion”. Hegel (1969), 440. (Ger. orig.: Hegel
(1968ff.), GW XI, 287).
8 Hegel (1969), 440–441. (Ger. orig.: Hegel (1968ff.), GW XI, 287).
9 Hegel (1969), 440–441. (Ger. orig.: Hegel (1968ff.), GW XI, 287).
11 “To my knowledge, no commentators who quote this remarkable passage have paid attention
to the quotation marks, the conditional form of the sentence that introduces it, or the larger con-
ways obey – this sentence could be defined by Hegel as the fundamental law of
speculative thinking.
Such a proposition could be read as the evidence of the absolute inconsis-
tency of Hegel’s account. Nevertheless, according to Hegel, the necessity of ac-
knowledging the objective value and the truth of contradiction does not entail
the possibility of ascribing any predicate to any subject. The scandalous Hegelian
claim “contradictio regula veri, non contradictio falsi”,¹² namely the first thesis
Hegel discussed in Jena in order to get his teaching habilitation, cannot be trans-
lated as “anything goes”, that is the conclusion of the ex falso quodlibet infer-
ence.¹³
How is it possible to avoid the explosive consequences of the ex falso quodlibet
in such an account that is meant to make room for the truth of contradiction?
This problem has given rise to different interpretative strategies toward the
notion of contradiction in Hegel’s thought:
1. The metaphorical interpretation.

2. The interpretation of contradiction as a critical moment in the dialectical
process.
3. The interpretation of contradiction as principle of determination.
Each interpretation explains an important aspect of Hegel’s notion of contradic-

tion.
In the following pages I will briefly analyse the first two interpretative strate-
gies and then I will focus on the third one. More specifically, I will test it by inves-
tigating Hegel’s dialectic of the limit and the way it implies an essential determin-
ing contradictory structure. I will finally work on the correspondence between this
concrete and contradictory conception of the limit with the conception of true in-
text of Hegel’s account. In my view, Hegel here ironically couches his conception of contradiction
in the metaphysical language he is intending to overcome”. De Boer (2010), 364.
12 Hegel (1968ff.), GW V, 227.
13 Criticism like Popper’s refers to the ex falso quodlibet inference in order to show the non-
scientific character of Hegel’s dialectic: “if a theory contains a contradiction, then it entails ev-
erything, and therefore, indeed, nothing [. . . ]. A theory which involves a contradiction is therefore
entirely useless as a theory”. Popper (2002), 429. In a logical system containing true contradic-
tions everything is true as well as false. This system cannot say anything scientifically relevant.
Horstmann writes: “Wenn Hegel also Widersprüche für notwendig und demnach unvermeidbar
hält und insofern die Gültigkeit des Satzes vom Widerspruch bestreitet, dann liefert er seine
eigene Theorie offensichtlich der Irrationalität und Unwissenschaftlichkeit aus”. Horstmann
(1978), 19.
finity on the one hand, and the strong connection between the notion of limitation
and the bad infinite on the other.
In the final part of the paper I will try to show to what extent this ontological
reading allows a dialetheistic reading of Hegel’s notion of contradiction.
2 The Metaphorical Strategy

The first kind of reading considers Hegel’s notion of contradiction in a metaphori-
cal way. In this interpretation, the idea that contradiction is inherent in everything
does not mean that logical contradictions exist in reality. Contradiction should
rather be meant as a strong symbolic expression able to represent a whole system
of notions like ‘division’, ‘separation’, ‘struggle’, ‘opposition’, and everything that
can be included in what can be generally defined as ‘the negative’. Hegel uses
this kind of notions throughout all his works. In Hegel’s view, these notions ex-
press the relation between the conflicting elements characterizing the essence of
reality and historical experience. This conflicting essence does not find any room
within an abstract and one-sided way of conceiving reality and history. Such an
abstract conception is built on the paradigm of the fixed identity of everything
with itself, independently from the relation to what is other than itself. Instead,
a concrete way of thinking of reality and of historical development acknowledges
the constitutive and determining value of the relation between opposed elements.
This kind of relation sounds ‘contradictory’ when compared with the fixed iden-
tity paradigm. Nevertheless, it turns out not to imply the presence of true logical
contradictions in thought or of real ontological contradiction in reality.
As J. N. Findlay clearly claims:
We may, however, maintain that, whatever Hegel may say in regard to the presence of con-
tradictions in thought and reality, the sense in which he admits such contradictions is de-
termined by his use of the concept, and not by what he says about it. And since he uses
‘contradiction’ to illuminate the workings of ordinary notions, and things in the world, and
not to cast doubt on their meaning or reality, it is plain that he cannot be using it in the
self-cancelling manner that at first seems plausible. By the presence of ‘contradictions’ in
thought or reality, Hegel plainly means the presence of opposed, antithetical tendencies, ten-
dencies which work in contrary directions, which each aim at dominating the whole things
and worsting their opponents, but which each also require these opponents in order to be
what they are, and to have something to struggle with.¹⁴
14 Findlay (1958), 77. In the same way, Popper remarks: “instead of the terminology we have used
in speaking of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, dialecticians often describe the dialectic triad
by using the term ‘negation (of the thesis)’ instead of ‘antithesis’ and ‘negation of the negation’
In this perspective, a claim like “everything is inherently contradictory”¹⁵ can hence

be read as a provocative statement against an abstract and one-sided conception
of thought determinations.¹⁶ Moreover, such a sentence is meant to highlight the
relational nature of thought determinations.¹⁷
Such reading has some clear advantages. First of all, it defuses the explosive
consequences of the truth of contradiction. Furthermore, it defends Hegel’s ac-
count against the classic objections addressed to his conception of contradiction
as an objective contradiction. The focus of these objections is the notion of ‘real
contradiction’. Contradiction – this is the thesis of this criticism – can only be log-
ical contradiction, namely something belonging to the sphere of thought.¹⁸ The
notion of real contradiction would be a nonsense. This does not mean that there
are not oppositions, struggles, and conflicts in reality, but that all these kinds of
things do not deal with logical contradiction, but with what Kant has defined as
“real opposition”.¹⁹
instead of ‘synthesis’. And they like to use the term ‘contradiction’ where terms like ‘conflict’
or perhaps ‘opposing tendency’ or ‘opposing interest’, etc., would be less misleading”. Popper
(2002), 433.
16 “Si donc, en appelant ‘contradiction’ la relation essentielle, Hegel veut dire que, par suite
de la dualité qu’elle implique, elle peut paraître à première vue logiquement contradictoire au
point de vue partiel et provisoire de l’entendement, il s’ensuit que l’expression ‘contradiction’
est employée ici par métaphore. Et cette métaphore est d’intention polémique”. Gregoire (1958),
92. An interpretation which follows this guideline is Berti’s. Berti conceives of Hegel’s notion of
contradiction as an effort to highlight the constitutive role of difference and opposition within a
conceptual framework built on the pattern of the fixed identity. In such a context, everything not
reducible to this identity, and therefore difference and opposition too, sounds contradictory. See
Berti (1980), 629–654; Berti (1983); Berti (1987); Berti (1977a and 1977b).
17 The interpretations of dialectic as a kind of semantic holism are based precisely on the rela-
tional nature of thought determinations: the relation in question is an internal relation, that is,
a necessary condition in order to define the determination in question. See Berto (2007), 19–39;
Brandom (2002), 178–209.
18 “La contradiction, par son essence, appartient a la sphère des pensées et des concepts. Pour
‘contredire’ il faut ‘dire’: la contradiction, en bonne logique, suppose le jugement. Des concepts
et des jugements peuvent se contredire [. . . ]. Mais des choses, des événements, des rapports réels
ne le peuvent pas, a la rigueur. [. . . ] Ce qu’on appelle, très improprement, contradiction dans la
vie et dans la réalité n’est pas le moins du monde une contradiction, mais, a la vérité, un conflit”.
Hartmann (1931), 314–315.
19 Kant distinguishes real opposition from logical opposition (contradiction) because: 1. it does
not imply any kind of contradiction, it is ohne Widerspruch, it does not deal with logic; 2. it is an
opposition between real determinations that are not positive or negative in themselves (the nega-
tivity characterizing their opposition is not inherent in these determinations); 3. the oppositions
rise from their being characterized by a functional homogeneity, namely their being applied to
This criticism is based on the semantic definition of the notion of contradic-

tion, according to which contradiction is the conjunction of two propositions, one
of which is necessarily true, while the other is necessarily false. Therefore, con-
tradiction does not pertain to ontology and to states of affairs, but to propositions.
Moreover, given the standard definition of negation and conjunction, it can never
be the case that contradiction is true and there cannot be a state of affairs verify-
ing a contradiction. Objective contradictions cannot exist. Only real oppositions
exist, yet real oppositions are not logical contradictions.²⁰
The metaphorical interpretation of the notion of contradiction blunts the
power of the objection based on the ex falso quodlibet by getting rid of the core
of the objection itself, namely the notion of logical contradiction. In this way,
Hegel’s pretence of casting doubt on the standard conception of contradiction
and on the PNC fades away. Finally, the bomb is defused insofar as the possibil-
ity for Hegel’s account to be aimed at an acknowledgement of the presence of
contradiction in reality falls down.
3 Contradiction as a Necessary Error

of the Understanding
There is chance to avoid the weakening of Hegel’s conception of contradiction
and at the same time to save it from the inconsistency raised by the claim of an
ontological value and of the truth of contradiction. This chance can be found in
the conception of contradiction as a logical contradiction (and not as a metaphor)
that corresponds to a necessary moment in the dialectical process: contradiction
is supposed to bring about the passage from an abstract and one-sided way of con-
sidering reality – namely understanding (Verstand) – to the complex and concrete
consideration of reality, which is reason (Vernunft).
In this kind of interpretation, contradiction can be thought of as the necessary
result of the understanding’s abstract consideration of the world. The contradic-
the same object in which each one act in a way that is the opposite of the other; 4. the two opposite
determinations are not nullified in this opposition, because they simply tend to annul the effects
of their opposite. Take for instance two forces acting on the same body in opposite directions. See
Kant (1968), KW II, 86; Kant (1968), KW II, 171; Kant (1968), KW III, 222.
20 “Non esistono ‘contraddizioni reali’, fatti contraddittori tra loro, ‘contraddizioni’ oggettive. La
contraddizione è solo ed esclusivamente ‘logica’, del pensiero. Parlare di realtà contraddittorie è
un non senso. [. . . ] Ciò non significa, ovviamente, che nella realtà non si diano opposizioni, lotte,
scontri. Si danno e come! Ma, in questo caso, si tratta di ciò che Kant ha chiamato ‘opposizione
reale”’. Colletti (1981), 7.
tory nature of things would be the outcome of the understanding’s abstractive way
of determining things in themselves. The acknowledgement of understanding’s
contradiction would imply the acknowledgement of the necessity to overcome its
abstract paradigm. The awareness of the presence of contradiction would imply
the passage from understanding’s abstract approach to the rational (vernünftig)
conception of reality.
In other words, the task of reason, which is the task of philosophy, is to ac-
knowledge the contradictoriness of the contradiction of the understanding, that
is to make it explicit in order to resolve it. Understanding conceives of everything
as simply and immediately identical to itself and as independent from the rela-
tion to what is other than itself. This one-sided conception of reality contradicts
the intrinsic nature of everything there is, which is inherently relational. The task
of reason is to make explicit this contradiction and to solve it by developing a
concrete comprehension of the determinateness that necessarily involves the re-
latedness which constitutes the way everything is what it is. Consequently, the ac-
knowledgement of the necessary and constitutive value of logical contradictions
in the dialectical process, which brings to light the limitedness of the comprehen-
sion of the understanding and the necessity to overcome it in a concrete and com-
plete comprehension of every kind of determination, does not imply any denial of
the PNC: making the contradictions of the understanding explicit does not mean
claiming their truth. Quite the contrary, since contradiction arises from a sort of
abstract and atomistic conception of reality, contradiction can and does need to
be solved by overcoming this abstract conception in a sort of holistic comprehen-
sion of determinateness. In such a kind of conception everything is characterized
by a relational nature insofar as every element is a moment of a whole, within
which only it gains its own consistency and its specific determinateness.
This does not mean that contradiction is a simple accident or an arbitrary
mistake of thinking activity. Contradiction is not something that can be simply
avoided. In this kind of reading contradiction plays a constitutive role because it
allows the overcoming of a one-sided and abstract view of reality in a concrete
and true comprehension of the way everything articulates itself. Actually, contra-
diction is the necessary condition for moving toward a different level of discourse,
i.e. the speculative one.
Nevertheless, at the speculative level of discourse where we experience the
contradiction as affecting understanding’s comprehension, contradiction itself is
not only made explicit but also removed (aufgehoben). Hence, in this interpreta-
tive approach, contradiction does not affect what exists as such. Therefore, the
fact that everything is inherently contradictory does not mean that everything is
actually nothing. Contradiction does not characterize reality in itself, but the ab-
stract conception of it developed by the understanding. This very experience of
contradiction is what leads to the necessary overcoming of the point of view of

the understanding.
In this way, the solution of contradiction does not imply the inconsistency of
things in themselves, that is to say the elimination of their existence in the world
in front of us. In this perspective, the solution of contradiction implies the over-
coming of the necessary contradiction of an abstract thought determination. The
result of this overcoming is the unity of opposites, i.e. the necessary link between
opposite determinations that constitutes their relational nature. If contradiction
is raised by the omission of the understanding of the necessary conditions for
defining something in the very pretence of defining this something – namely the
relations that connect and distinguish this something from what it is not – the so-
lution of contradiction consists in the reintegration of these relations in the defi-
nition of the something in question.
Hence, the true discourse, that is the discourse of reason, does not imply the
necessity of making room for some kind of true contradiction. The only contradic-
tion acknowledged in the discourse of reason as a constitutive contradiction is the
one that has to be removed. Contradiction plays a constitutive role with respect to
the concrete truth only insofar as it brings to light the necessity of its own over-
coming and then the necessity to develop a consideration of reality that cannot
depend anymore on the fixity and abstractness of the understanding.
This way of getting rid of the scandal of Hegel’s conception of contradiction
is quite common in a lot of contemporary readings of Hegel’s dialectic. This in-
terpretative approach, as we have seen, is based on the presupposition of a sharp
distinction between the level of reason and the level of understanding. This dis-
tinction allows showing how dialectic does not involve a denial of PNC, as it is
claimed in the classic objection against Hegel’s dialectic. This process is rather
based on a radicalization of the value of this principle. As Robert Brandom claims
in Tales of the Mighty Dead: “far from rejecting the law of non-contradiction [. . . ]
Hegel radicalizes it, and places it at the very center of his thought”.²¹ Francesco
Berto combines in a very effective way different interpretative paths. According to
his interpretation, the cause of contradiction in Hegel’s dialectic is basically the
indeterminateness (both semantic and syntactic) of understanding’s determina-
21 Brandom (2002), 179. In the same way, Gregoire claims: “Loin de supposer le rejet du principe
de non-contradiction, ce processus est, tout au contraire, entièrement et visiblement appuyé sur
lui”. Gregoire (1958), 61; according to McTaggart (2000), 15: “If [. . . ] the dialectic rejected the law
of contradiction, it would reduce itself to an absurdity, by rendering all argument, and even all as-
sertion, unmeaning [. . . ] In fact, so far is the dialectic from denying the law of contradiction, that
it is especially based on it”; and Marconi (1980), 168, writes: “it is a basic principle of Hegelian
dialectic that there be an urge [. . . ] to get away from contradiction –or, rather, over it”.
tion: dialectic is a process of critical analysis of language through language itself,

namely a process of re-definition of conceptual terms of our natural language on
the basis of the inconsistencies arising from the fact that these terms assume in-
compatible meanings or incompatible syntactic roles.²² In this way, the authentic
result of the dialectical process is the removal of the contradiction of the finite
determinations of thought (determination of the understanding), that is the con-
tradiction of the abstract comprehension of the understanding.²³
Focusing one more time on the scandalous Hegelian sentence claiming that
“contradictio regula veri, non contradictio falsi”, these readings seem to emphasize
the meaning of the word regula, which is “way” or “path”. In this sense, claim-
ing that “contradictio regula veri” does not imply the claim of the truth of con-
tradiction. It rather means that contradiction is a decisive moment in the process
that leads towards the truth. Reason can grasp the truth of things only insofar as
understanding gets entangled in a contradiction whose solution allows the de-
velopment of a concrete, complete, and non-contradictory way of understanding
reality.
In this perspective, contradiction is not a metaphor, nor an accident that can
be avoided. It rather represents a decisive and essential moment in the process of
thought self-determination developed in its most complete form, namely as rea-
son. By going through the experience faced by the abstract approach of the un-
derstanding, reason is not affected by contradiction, because it constitutes itself
on a level of discourse within which the PNC finds its more radical confirmation.
In this sense the sentence everything is inherently contradictory does not in-
volve any ontological commitment. The rising of contradiction has only an epis-
temological character. More precisely, it is the product of an inadequate and one-
sided consideration of reality and then it is in no way constitutive of the way reality
is in itself.
22 Important antecedents of Berto’s idea are Fulda (1973) and Marconi (1980). Fulda claims:
“die dialektische Logik soll nicht nur die Gebrauchs-bedeutungen vorhandener Ausdrucke
analysieren. Sie soll diese Bedeutungen korrigieren und damit die Mittel für neue propositionale
Gehalte bereitstellen”. Fulda (1973), 241. Marconi shares the same interpretative approach: “nat-
ural language, with its intensional contents (meanings) and syntactic structure, is the starting
point of philosophical discourse. Philosophy cannot do without natural language, though it may
go beyond it”. Marconi (1980), 174. This idea recently had further development in the work of
Nuzzo, more precisely in Nuzzo (2010).
23 Berto (2005), 189–224.
4 Contradiction and Determination

The thesis I want to argue for is the idea that Hegel’s sentence “everything is in-
herently contradictory”²⁴ expresses an ontological commitment.
This claim does not imply the dismissal of the first two interpretations. The
metaphorical interpretation as well as the one considering contradiction as a re-
sult ofthe understanding’s comprehension of reality are supported by some pas-
sages of Hegel’s works. Nevertheless, by trying to get rid of the scandalous import
of Hegel’s theory of contradiction in order to make it acceptable and substantially
reducible to the paradigm of standard logic, both interpretative approaches lose
the most decisive aspect of this theory, that is the idea that contradiction is the
root of the constituting process of the determinateness of things.
My claim is that, according to Hegel, the way things determine themselves is
articulated through contradictory structures. Therefore, if the process of self-artic-
ulation of everything determinate is considered to be non-contradictory, the very
nature of determinateness itself is misunderstood. The removal of contradiction
gives rise to a one-sided and abstract picture of the status of things. This picture
does not provide a good account of their way of being.
It is no accident that the structure of contradiction comes out already in the
first and more basic levels of articulation of the logic, that is the Doctrine of Being,
and more precisely in the dialectical development of Determinate Being (Dasein).
The place where contradiction comes out in this basic level of the logical
structures of reality is the determination of the limit. The limit is not a marginal
determination with respect to our cognitive practices and our relation with the
world. The limit is a structure that is the necessary condition for something to be
determinate. It is a structure that allows us to deal with things in their being deter-
minate. Given its capacity to delimit something from what is other than itself, the
limit constitutes the principle of determination of everything. It is the locus where
something comes out from indeterminateness in order to realize its own nature,
i.e. its being itself and what is other than itself.
Using Aristotle’s words with respect to the notion of ‘peras’:
The limit is the terminus of everything, e.g., the first thing outside which there is nothing to be
found and the first thing inside which everything is to be found.²⁵

25 Cfr. Aristotle, Metaph., V, 17, 1022 a 4–6.
This is why the limit – in Hegel’s view – shows an inherently contradictory struc-
ture.
This contradiction is at once to be found in the circumstance that the limit, as something’s
negation reflected into itself, contains ideally in it the moments of something and other, and
these, as distinguished moments, are at the same time posited in the sphere of determinate
being as really, qualitatively distinct.²⁶
The peculiar status of the limit was already highlighted by Kant. According to
Kant, reason’s disposition to understand what is beyond the realm of experience
is grounded in the fact that reason itself is beyond the limit of this realm in the
very act of determining its limits. The limit, as a principle for determining what is
limited, is in contact with what is other than the limited too. In determining the
phenomenal dimension as the dimension of what is knowable and the noumenal
dimension as the dimension of what is not knowable, reason is placed under a
limit. As Kant writes at the end of § 57 of the Prolegomena: “this boundary belongs
just as much to the field of experience, as to that of beings of thought” (“diese [die
Grenze] gehört eben so wohl zum Felde der Erfahrung, als dem der Gedankenwe-
sen”).²⁷
According to Hegel, the limit plays a mediating role between what it deter-
mines and what it negates. In the very act of delimiting and determining the way of
being of something, the limit (that is: Kant’s Grenze, which is to be distinguished
from the notion of Schranke) shows to be “the mediation through which some-
thing and other both is, and is not” (“wodurch Etwas und Anderes sowohl ist als
nicht ist”).²⁸ The limit is the structure where something as well as its other starts
and ceases to be what it is. In being the structure where something and the other
both gain and lose their being, the limit is – to use Hegel’s words – “the other of
both” (“das Andere von beiden”).²⁹
In order to explain the structure of the limit, Hegel refers to some examples
taken from Euclidean geometry. The same examples have been used also by Kant
just with respect to the notion of limit. In the Prolegomena to Any Future Meta-
physics Kant assumes the Euclidean definitions according to which the limit of a
solid is a surface, the limits of a surface are lines, the limits of a line are points, in
order to show that in limits (Grenzen) there is always something positive. Limits
26 Hegel (1969), 126. (Ger. orig.: Hegel (1968ff.), GW XXI, 113).

27 Kant (1968), KW IV, 356–357.
are not simple negations (as in the case of that form of limitation which Kant calls
Schranke):
[A] surface is the boundary of corporal space, yet it is nonetheless itself a space; a line is a
space, which is the boundary of the surface; a point the boundary of a line, yet is nonetheless
a locus in space.³⁰
30 Kant (1968), KW IV, 354. In Kant’s philosophy there is an explicit distinction between the
structure of the limit as Grenze and the structure of the limit as Schranke. More specifically, in
the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics Kant shows that both expressions involve a form of
negation. Nevertheless, whereas Schranken “sind bloße Verneinungen, die eine Größe afficieren,
so fern sie nicht absolute Vollständigkeit hat” (Kant, ibid., 352), Grenzen are negations that have
also a positive value insofar as their limiting confers determinateness to the way things are, i.e.,
they are what allows to grasp things in their concreteness: “denn in allen Grenzen ist auch etwas
positives” (ibid., 354).
The starting condition of this distinction between the function of Schranke and the function of
Grenze lies in the different basis on which these two different limiting structures lie. Schranke is
always set in a context of continuity: what is beyond Schranke is characterized by the same fea-
tures of what is be-schränkt. Instead, Grenze is a limiting structure which distinguishes things
or areas of reality that are not homogeneous. Therefore, precisely because of Grenze’s being at
the origin of this not-homogeneity, Grenze itself provides the possibility of grasping the area be-
grenzt in its completeness. On the one hand, even if Schranke can always be shifted on and on, it
never reaches a point in which it encounters something not homogeneous that marks the end of
the area within which what is be-schränkt is developed. On the other hand, Grenze is posited just
on this distinguishing point and thus it can determine what is be-grenzt in its completeness. Ac-
cording to Kant, the difference between these two limiting structures is not merely formal; rather,
it is a substantial difference which has fundamental implications. This is testified by the fact that
the two structures play a crucial role in the distinction of scientific and philosophical knowledge.
The first one never deals with Grenzen: “In der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft erkennt die
menschliche Vernunft zwar Schranken, aber keine Grenzen, d. i. zwar daß etwas außer ihr liege,
wohin sie niemals gelangen kann, aber nicht daß sie selbst in ihrem innern Fortgange irgendwo
vollendet sein werde” (ibid., 352). Hence, scientific knowledge is an infinite knowing process.
It always reaches new results, but these results never reach a level of completeness, because
they always have the possibility to be extended just like the skyline always shifts if the observ-
ing subject tries to come up to it: “Die Erweiterung der Einsichten in der Mathematik und die
Möglichkeit immer neue Erfindungen geht ins Unendliche” (ibid.). This happens because math-
ematic and natural sciences are developed in a context which is homogeneous. On the one hand,
this is their strong point because it is what allows them to continuously advance their knowledge.
On the other hand, this is also what prevents them to reach any kind of completeness: “So lange
die Erkenntniß der Vernunft gleichartig ist lassen sie von ihr keine bestimmte Grenzen denken”
(ibid.). Differently from scientific knowledge, philosophy deals with areas of thought that are not
homogeneous. Philosophy searches for the condition of possibility of experience that necessarily
need to be different from what is conditioned. The conditions of intelligibility of a certain field of
experience cannot share the same features of the field of experience itself. In this sense, philoso-
phy deals with Grenzen, that are not simply negations pertaining to a quantity, but also positive
In these definitions, the limits – surface with respect to solid, line with respect
to surface, point with respect to line – are not only the locus where something
is not, namely the locus where something ceases to be, but also the locus where
something starts to be what it is.
Starting from Kant’s definitions, Hegel wants to shed light on these two differ-
ent conceptions of the limit. According to Hegel, the claims that ‘the point is the
limit of the line’, that ‘the line is the limit of the surface’ and that ‘the surface is
the limit of the solid’ do not have to be meant as if the line appeared (erscheint) as
such only out of the point, that surface showed its way of being only out of the line
and the solid only out of the surface. This conception of the limit and of what is
limited as having their being out of one another, beyond one another, focuses on
the aspect of the limit which is sized by pictorial thought (Vorstellung) especially
in reference to spatial objects: “it is primarily this aspect of limit which is seized
by pictorial thought – the self-externality of the Notion – and especially, too, in
reference to spatial objects” (“Dies ist die Seite, von welcher die Grenze zunächst
in die Vorstellung – das Außersichsein des Begriffs – fällt, als vornehmlich auch in
den räumlichen Gegenständen genommen wird”).³¹ Vorstellung is not able to grasp
the essential structure of the limit, namely the fact that, with respect to what is
limited, the limit
is, however, equally their common distinguishedness, their unity and distinguishedness,
like determinate being (ist aber ebenso ihre gemeinschaftliche Unterschiedenheit, die Einheit
und Unterschiedenheit derselben wie das Dasein).³²
As a matter of fact, the limit is not something external or something that is other
with respect to what is limited. On the contrary, it is its constitutive element.
Therefore, coming back to the Euclidean definitions, claiming that ‘the point is
the limit of the line’ does not merely mean that in the point the line ceases to be
what it is and finds its being only outside of it. It means also that “in the point
determinations that allow us to grasp a certain field of knowledge in its completeness. In Kant’s
transcendental dialectic, what is experienced by reason are not only negative limits making the
line beyond which reason cannot venture, but Grenzen. In the effort of showing the insupera-
ble difficulties rising from pure reason’s pretense of determining the inherent constitution of the
object of transcendental ideas, dialectic gets entangled in contradictions which depend on the
nature of human reason itself: what is reached in the conflicting experience of dialectic is the
unavoidability of these situations and, in this unavoidability, – this is Kant’s thesis that Hegel is
not willing to support – the constitutive limit of human reason.
31 Hegel (1969), 127. (Ger. orig.: Hegel (1968ff.), GW XXI, 114). The term ‘pictorial thought’ is the
translation of the German term Vorstellung. The same term was before translated with ‘ordinary
thinking’.
the line also begins”, namely that point is “absolute beginning” (“absoluter An-
fang”)³³ of the line. In this sense limits are not only the locus where something
ceases to be what it is, but at the same time “these limits are the principle, of that
which they limit” (“diese Grenzen sind Prinzip dessen, das sie begrenzen”).³⁴
By being the determining principle of something determinate, the dialecti-
cal development of the limit is lead to the concrete and dynamic articulation of
its structure. Insofar as it is the principle of something that is both different and
identical to this something, the limit is not only a simple element of something,
but also its generative component:
[T]hat point, line and plane by themselves are self-contradictory, are beginnings which spon-
taneously repel themselves from themselves, so that the point, through its Notion, passes out
of itself into the line, moves in itself and gives rise to the line, and so on, lies in the Notion
of limit which is immanent in the something (Daß Punkt, Linie, Fläche für sich, sich wider-
sprechend, Anfänge sind, welche selbst sich von sich abstoßen, und der Punkt somit aus sich
durch seinen Begriff in die Linie übergeht, sich an sich bewegt, und sie entstehen macht u.s.f. –
liegt in dem Begriff der dem Etwas immanenten Grenze).³⁵
Limit’s being immanent to the thing itself, namely its belonging to this thing but
also to everything that is other than such thing, allows to say that the thing in
question, in its limit
points beyond itself to its non-being, declaring this is to be its being and thus passing over
into it (über sich hinaus auf sein Nichtsein weist und dies als sein Sein ausspricht und so in
dasselbe übergeht).³⁶
Limit, in being both a constitutive component of what is limited and something

which points beyond itself to its not being, turns out both to be and not to be part
of what is limited at the same time and under the same respect. This is why the
limit is characterized by a contradictory structure and is defined by Hegel as the
unrest of the something (“die Unruhe des Etwas”). The limit is the contradiction

35 Hegel (1969), 128. (Ger. orig.: Hegel (1968ff.), GW XXI, 115–116). On the development of the
dynamical conception of the limit within Hegel’s thought, on the philosophical roots of this con-
ception especially on Plato’s speculative background and on the implications of this conception
in the debate on the infinitesimal method during modern age, see Moretto (1984) and Moretto
(1988).
36 Hegel (1969), 127–128. (Ger. orig.: Hegel (1968ff.), GW XXI, 115).
inherent in the structure of something, “which impels the something out beyond
itself” (“der es über sich selbst hinausschickt”).³⁷
In this way, the dialectical development of the limit brings about the first def-
inition of the finite:
[S]omething with its immanent limit, posited as the contradiction of itself, through which
it is directed and forced out of and beyond itself, is the finite (Etwas mit seiner immanenten
Grenze gesetzt als der Widerspruch seiner selbst, durch den es über sich hinausgewiesen und
getrieben wird, ist das Endliche).³⁸
This definition of the finite is meant to show, in Hegel’s view, how the structure
of the finite is inherently contradictory, because it has the limit as its determining
principle.
In this way we have achieved a first conclusion: since everything is what it is in
its limit, and since the limit is a contradictory structure, “everything is inherently
contradictory”.³⁹ This thesis is stated in the doctrine of essence, but it is first artic-
ulated in the doctrine of being, and more specifically in the dialectic of the limit.
In this sentence and in the analysis of the limit the meaning of the term ‘contradic-
tion’ is not metaphorical, and it cannot perform the epistemological function of
making explicit the limited perspective of the understanding. Rather, contradic-
tion has an ontological value with regards to the structure of every determinate
being, or, it could be said, it is the constitutive structure of determinateness itself.
5 What Is the Finite?

The conclusions I drew might not be sufficiently convincing for those who claim
that the true result of the dialectical movement of determinate being is not the
contradiction as constitutive of what is real, but the removal of contradiction it-
self.
In the third remark after the analysis of the determination of contradiction,
Hegel explicitly acknowledges that finite things are those very things that are
“contradictory and disrupted within themselves”.⁴⁰ This feature of the finite con-
stitutes the transitoriness of the finite, its “non-being”. The main thesis of those
interpreters who try to underline how contradiction is only a passing moment of

the dialectical process is that the passage towards the absolute, namely towards
the speculative dimension which is the discourse of reason, is the passage towards
a dimension of discourse where the contradiction of the finite is finally removed.⁴¹
In other words, in the discourse of reason the contradiction is removed because
the main feature of its dimension – the absolute – is precisely the resolution of
the contradictory dimension of finitude.
In this interpretation the absolute is meant to be the overcoming of the finite
since it belongs to a dimension that is radically other than the finite one. The risk
implied by this interpretation is falling back into a conception of the absolute af-
fected by the aporia of bad infinity. It is no accident that the analysis of bad infinity
follows precisely the analysis of finitude. In effect, bad infinity is a finite infinity,
and the first goal Hegel seems to aim at in the infinity section is getting rid of such
a limited conception of infinity.
In order to better understand this point it is necessary to focus on Hegel’s
conception of the finite. Given the conception of the finite arisen from the analy-
sis of the notion of limit, namely the finite as something with its immanent limit,
posited as the contradiction of itself, through which it is directed and forced out of
and beyond itself, Hegel’s path does not immediately move towards infinity. The
achievement of the definition of the finite clears the way for the dialectical devel-
opment of the so-called finitude (Endlichkeit).
In Hegel’s analysis, there seems to be a distinction between the finite (das
Endliche) and finitude (die Endlichkeit). On the one hand, the finite, as we have
seen, is brought about through the dialectic of limit as the “unrest of the some-
thing”, as “the contradiction of itself”. Because of this contradiction, the some-
thing in question “is directed and forced out of and beyond itself”. On the other
hand, finitude “is the negation as fixed in itself ”, that “stands in abrupt contrast
to its affirmative” (“ist die als an sich fixierte Negation und steht daher seinem Af-
firmativen schroff gegenüber”).⁴² What Hegel calls finitude “is the most stubborn
category of the understanding” (“die hartnäckigste Kategorie des Verstandes”).⁴³
This conception of finitude implies an absolute opposition between the finite and
infinity.
It could be said that what Hegel calls finitude (Endlichkeit) is not the real na-
ture of what Hegel calls the finite (das Endliche). It rather corresponds to the way
the understanding fixes the finite (das Endliche). Insofar as finitude is meant to be
41 Berto (2005), 223–224.

the most stubborn category of the understanding, the limit (Grenze) turns into a
limitation (Schranke).⁴⁴
There’s a substantial difference between limit and limitation. The limit – as
constituted by the contradictory structure within which only it fully articulates its
way of being – could be said to correspond to the way in which reason articulates
the separating structure in question. The specific feature of the limit (Grenze) is to
belong both to what is limited and to the other of what is limited (the limit is in gen-
eral what is common to both something and the other), that is to say, to be the struc-
ture of the “common distinguishedness” (“gemeinschaftliche Unterschiedenheit”)
in which the thing limited and its other both meet and get separated. Instead, the
limitation or restriction (Schranke) is the way through which understanding fixes
the limit.⁴⁵ Even if the limitation represents a further development of the dialec-
tic of the limit, in this determination the something is still opposed to its other.
More precisely, even if the other of what is limited rises from its own movement
(and this is the element reached through the dialectic of the limit), this other still
stands beyond the something as what the something could never reach, i.e. the
Ought:
[T]he other of a limitation (Schranke) is precisely the being beyond it (das Andere einer
Schranke ist eben das Hinaus über dieselbe).⁴⁶
In the limitation (Schranke), the other of the finite is something that is beyond the
finite itself. Therefore, on the one hand the limit is articulated and can be thought
of only by making room for the contradiction of the identity and distinction of
something and its other. As we have seen, this contradiction is their common gen-
erative element. On the other hand, limitation is built on the fixation of the move-
ment which leads the finite to pass over into its other, that is, its not-being.
44 Miller translates the German word Schranke as limitation. Di Giovanni uses ‘Restriction’, oth-
ers use ‘Barrier’.
45 It must be said that there is a proper intellectualistic account of the limit at the beginning
of the dialectic of the limit (Grenze). It is the limit that has not fully developed its inherent and
contradictory articulation. It is the first immediate articulation of the limit, according to which
limit is simply a separating point, a ‘third’ between something and its other. In such a conception
of the limit, the something remains simply external to its other. Instead, in limitation, the other
rises from the movement of the something itself, but it is also an other that the something can
never reach. Therefore, in a certain sense, there is still a kind of exteriority between the something
and its other. This is why I think limitation can still be conceived as an intellectualistic conception
of the limiting structure.
Therefore, since limit (Grenze) and limitation (Schranke) respectively repre-

sents understanding’s and reason’s conception of the limiting structure, it could
be said – playing with the terminology Hegel uses in the dialectic of the infinite
and more precisely with the distinction between bad and true infinity – that the
limit (Grenze) is the true limit, while the limitation (Schranke) is a sort of bad limit.
The structure of limitation (Schranke) is characterized by some fundamental
features defining the structure of bad infinity.⁴⁷ First, the structure of bad infinity
is grounded on the fixed opposition of infinity with respect to the finite as well as
the limitation is rooted on a fixed opposition to its Ought. Second, bad infinity is
condemned to an undefined and reiterated re-emergence of the finite itself as well
as the overcoming of a limitation is condemned to an undefined and reiterated re-
emergence of another limitation that always and necessarily prevents to touch
what is beyond the limitation itself. Finally, as I have already pointed out, bad
infinity corresponds to the conception of the limit of the understanding just like
limitation can be said to represent an intellectualistic conception of the limit. This
is why I think of limitation as essentially connected to bad infinity.⁴⁸
Correspondently, true infinity is essentially connected with the structure of
the finite and, moreover, with the structure of the limit at the basis of the finite
itself. In fact, true infinity and the limit share crucial and essential features. True
infinity is not simply the opposite of the finite or what is beyond the finite. True
infinity is the sublation of the finite, but not as the simple negation within which
the finite is nullified. Rather, true infinity is the process through which the finite
passes over into its other. Therefore, true infinity consists of the contradictory dy-
namic of such passing over: in being itself the finite ceases to be itself and it is its
not-being; but in passing over into its not-being the finite fully realizes itself as
finite, or it concretely realizes its finitude.⁴⁹ True infinity, in rising from this very
process of the passing over of the finite, is both identical to and different from
the being and not-being of determinate being. This contradiction is nothing but
47 The relation to Kant’s conception of Schranken is clear. In fact, Kant’s conception of Schranken
and of mathematical and scientific knowledge is such that their development always meets new
limitations, new Schranken, in an indefinite process that never reaches any kind of completeness
or exhaustiveness.
48 It is important to highlight that just as Schranken and Grenzen are forms of finitude that are
distinct, but not completely separated, the infinite of the understanding and the infinite of rea-
son are not two completely different determinations either. They are not two mutually exclusive
notions insofar as the true infinite include in itself the bad infinite and, in a certain sense, it is
that infinite.
49 “The finite thing is something, or the negation of negation, not as the explicit negation of
negation but as the explicit negation of its own being. Here lies the basic contradiction at the
core of all finitude – the real contradiction that every finite thing itself is”. Houlgate (2006), 377.
a further explicitation of the contradiction of the limit, which is identical to and

different from the something and its other.⁵⁰
Therefore, true infinity realizes itself not in the sublatedness of the finite, but
in the very unrest of the sublation, namely, in the self-sublating of the finite that is
structured on the contradictory dynamic according to which being and not-being
of determinate being are both identical and different. This contradiction is the
structure of the moment of the passing over of the finite, and it turns out to be
the concrete realization of the dynamical and contradictory structure of the limit.
The structure of true infinity is based on the unrest of the sublating that is, as we
have seen, the true nature of the finite which rises from the dialectic of the limit
itself: the articulation of infinity is the proper explication of the limit meant as the
constitutive element through which something points beyond itself.
If we assume the limit as a structure determined as the unrest of the something,
as the absolute contradiction that points beyond itself, it is possible to grasp a fun-
damental connection between the limit and true infinity (wahre Unendlichkeit).
This connection has its basis in the self-contradictory structure that these deter-
minations share.
Therefore, on the one hand, the structure of bad infinity mirrors the structure
of limitation (Schranke) because both are articulated on the basis of the fixed op-
position to their opposite: bad infinity is opposed to the finite, while limitation
(Schranke) is understanding’s fixation of finitude with respect to infinity. On the
other hand, true infinity (wahre Unendlichkeit) is the concrete development of the
structure of the limit (Grenze) and therefore they are inherently related: both are
articulated on the basis of the overcoming of the fixed opposition between op-
posed determinations. True infinity gets realized in the sublation of the abstract
opposition between the finite and infinity, while limit is a constitutive structure
inherent in the “something”, and it is the locus where this something realizes its
being and at the same time is pushed towards its other.
50 In the Jena System (Hegel (1968ff.), GW VII) the true infinity is defined with the same words
used in the Science of Logic in order to highlight the structure of the finite: as “absolute contra-
diction” (“der absolute Widerspruch”) (35, 34), “the absolute unrest of sublating itself (the oppo-
sition)” (“die absolute Unruhe, sich selbst (der Gegensatz) aufzuheben”) (34, 36), “being-outside-
itself within being-within-itself” (“das Außersichsein in dem Insichsein”) (34, 35) “the simple sub-
lating of the antithesis; it is not the sublatedness” (“das einfache Aufheben des Gegensatzes, nicht
das Aufgehobensein”) (36, 37).
6 Conclusions
The limit and the contradictory structure it involves are not elements that are sim-
ply removed at the level of speculative discourse, which is the discourse of reason.
This level of discourse is not simply placed beyond the discourse of the under-
standing as well as the dimension of the absolute is not simply a dimension placed
beyond the dimension of the finite. The discourse of reason is rather that kind of
discourse able to grasp the sublation of those determinations. This means that
the discourse of reason is able to grasp the contradictory structure of the unrest
of the something (Unruhe des Etwas) without dissolving it. What reason grasps is
not the sublatedness, but the sublating of the finite, which is the basic dynamic
of both the finite and infinity.
From this point of view in the sentence “everything is inherently contradic-
tory” contradiction is neither a mere evocative metaphor, nor a necessary moment
through which we need to pass in order to get to the speculative level of discourse
where contradiction itself is completely removed. In Hegel’s view, contradiction
is a constitutive element of the discourse of reason.
In a certain way, this thesis is crucial in contemporary paraconsistent logics
too, and more precisely in dialetheism. Dialetheism is the philosophical thesis
according to which there are true contradictions – in discourse and in reality. In
Hegel’s logic and dialetheism contradiction is not thought of as something to be
removed or to be eliminated, but rather as the logical structure able to express
essential aspects of reality and thought. Contradiction is the structure through
which everything is determined, because contradiction lies at the very basis of
determinateness itself. As we have seen, contradiction is the constitutive logical
dynamic of the limiting structure through which everything is determined, but
also of the articulation of the finite that characterizes every determinate being.
Priest is the most important advocate of the dialetheist thesis. His analysis of
the articulation of the limit is extremely close to Hegel’s:
I walk out of the room; for an instant, I am symmetrically poised, one foot in, one foot out,
my centre of gravity lying on the vertical plane containing the centre of gravity of the door.
Am I in or not in the room? By symmetry, I am neither in rather than not in, nor not in rather
than in. The pure light of reason therefore countenances only two answers to the question:
I am both in and not in, or neither in nor not in. [. . . ] If I am neither in nor not in, then I am
not (in) and not (not in). By the law of double negation, I am both in and not in.⁵¹
51 Priest (1998), 415.

The limit of the room is an example of an ontological contradiction. Its structure

is characterized by the same kind of contradiction we meet in Hegel’s logic: when
I am in the limit between the room and what is outside of it I am both in the room
and not in the room.
In this sense, we can wonder whether it is possible to develop a dialetheist ex-
planation of Hegel’s notion of contradiction. The answer seems to be both nega-
tive and positive. It is possible to support a dialetheist reading of Hegel’s notion of
contradiction insofar as Hegel, just like Priest, claims that some contradictions are
true. Nevertheless, there are some crucial differences between Hegel’s and Priest’s
approach to contradiction. Here I will focus only on the most important one, con-
cerning the truth value ascribed to contradiction.
Priest agues for the thesis of the truth of contradiction by claiming that these
true contradictions are dialetheias: “A dialetheia is any true statement of the form:
𝛼 and it is not the case that 𝛼”.⁵² In order to show that some contradictions are
true, Priest uses a three-truth-values (V, F, V and F) logical system. True contra-
dictions are logical structures within which each contradictory element is both
true and false. This strategy is not applicable to Hegel’s conception of contradic-
tion at all.
According to Hegel, contradiction is a principle of determination that can-
not be said to be both true and false. Contradiction is simply and radically true
because it is the speculative structure of logical-ontological determinations. In
this sense, Hegel’s approach to contradiction seems to be even more revolution-
ary than Priest’s, to which it is not reducible, even if Priest’s account highlights
some crucial aspects of it.
For this very reason only the thought that does not stop and does not move
back in front of contradiction is – in Hegel’s perspective – a thought that can con-
ceive of the reality we experience in its more authentic and vital concreteness.
This does not mean that the discourse of reason, insofar as it makes room for
a determining and constitutive contradiction that has a true ontological value, is
a contradictory discourse condemned to insignificance. A discourse which makes
room for true contradictions that are meant to outline the logical dynamic lying at
the basis of essential aspects of reality implies a kind of critique to the PNC, and
more specifically to the semantic formulation of this principle. According to this
formulation, as I have already pointed out, contradiction is necessarily false.
Instead, according to Hegel, contradiction can be true insofar as it can be said
to be the structure of determinateness itself. Within the linguistic context, true
contradictions are expressed by syntactic contradiction, namely, a conjunction
52 Priest (1987), 4.
of two propositions, one being the negation of the other. It is worth noting that
Hegel’s way of conceiving this conjunction is different from the standard one, ac-
cording to which if a conjunction is true, both the conjuncts are true too. Accord-
ing to Hegel, even if a contradiction is true, the two propositions expressing it –
singularly considered – are not. Actually, each one expresses only one part of the
whole contradictory structure in question, and therefore it is a necessary but not
a sufficient condition for expressing what determinateness is. This is why each
proposition is really true only in the conjunction that inherently unites it with the
other contradictory proposition.
Yet, this does not imply the contradictoriness of the discourse containing this
kind of contradictions. Quite the contrary, the possibility to grasp and to make ex-
plicit these contradictions presupposes – on the linguistic level – an assumption
of the PNC as guarantee of the coherence of any kind of discourse, even of that
discourse that wants to express contradictions. In this sense, Hegel’s conception
of contradiction can be said to be a non-contradictory conception of the truth of
contradiction.⁵³
7 Appendix: A Marginal Digression

In the first remark following the analysis of the determination of contradiction, Hegel refers
to the relation between light and darkness. When I re-read these lines, the movie Der Himmel
über Berlin by Wim Wenders came to my mind.
In the remark in question Hegel talks about the opposition between the negative and the pos-
itive, and he mentions the example of light and darkness, as he frequently does in the logic. If
the two determinations are assumed as fixed determinations, the one is simply the negative of
the other, or, in other words, the one is the not-being of the other. In order to bring this fixed
exclusion of the opposite terms into question Hegel writes: “it is a familiar fact that light is
dimmed to grey by darkness”.⁵⁴
Under an intellectualistic perspective, opposite determinations are conceived as mutually ex-
clusive. Instead, grey shows how they encounter and, in this very encounter, how they don’t
get nullified. They rather give rise to a new determination, which involves both of them even in
their being negated.
Nevertheless, grey is not a real unity of opposite determinations. Grey – Hegel says – is a merely
quantitative alteration. The encounter of darkness and light gives rise also to an alteration that
Hegel defines as qualitative:
53 The thesis of the non-contradictory conception of contradiction has been developed by

Chiereghin (1981), 257–270 and Chiereghin (2004).
Besides this merely quantitative alteration it suffers also the qualitative change of being
determined to colour by its relation to darkness.⁵⁵
Hegel’s reference in these lines is implicit but evident, namely, Goethe’s theory of colours. Hegel
studied this theory, which plays an important role in his philosophy of nature. In the Theory of
Colour Goethe claims that colour doesn’t arise from the dispersion of white light, as Newton
thought. Colour has its origin in the encounter of light and darkness within a medium, which is
the eye.
In the point where light meets darkness something rises, and this something is neither light nor
darkness, nor the simple mix of the two.
This is what reminded me of Wim Wenders’ movie. In this movie the limit, meant as the locus
within which the contact between light and darkness gives rise to colour, is the world of human
beings, namely, the world concretely experienced by men and women. Men and women do
not live in the pure light, or in the deepest darkness. Living in the pure light or in the deepest
darkness is an experience that can be thought of only by an abstract thinking. Men and women
do not live in that kind of grey mix of light and darkness either. In Wenders’ movie this grey mix
dimension corresponds to the world of angels.
The core issue of the movie is the story of an angel and of his meeting with the world of humans.
The movie camera’s perspective corresponds to the eye of the angel, especially in the first part
of the movie. The world of men and women flows as if it was something separated from this
perspective. Reality appears to the angel’s eyes as something lacking concrete time, or, bet-
ter said, as something immerged in a timeless and lifeless movement, i.e. a spatial movement
lacking every kind of qualitative determination. Moreover, it could be said that the angel can
see movement, but he cannot feel it. Looking at the screen through the angel’s eyes is watching
(the) frames of a colourless world, a world in black and white, a world made of grey nuances.
That is a world without pauses, a timeless world which flows as something strange and unfa-
miliar with respect to the eye watching it. The world is seen as coloured only when the framing
represents human being’s perspective.
Anyway, at a certain point even the angel’s eye gets to see colours. This happens just for a
moment, when, for the first time, he looks at the body of a woman, a trapeze artist, who looks
like a human angel. In this moment, the angel feels desire. According to Hegel, desire is an
experience radically marked by contradiction. Through this very experience the angel lives a
wholly human experience.
Only this concrete experience of lack and laceration allows the angel to see colours.
In the experience of desire the angel renounces its own nature and becomes a man. By re-
nouncing himself in order to get into time, he renounces the aseptic timeless dimension within
which he lived as an angel. By renouncing himself in order to get into history, he renounces an
unstoried infinity characterizing his dimension. The angel decides to take on the weight of a
body, which leaves traces on earth. He abandons the bird’s-eye view that allowed him to view
everything from an external perspective. Now he looks at everything with a human’s eye.
The angel chooses a mortal life. He decides to let himself go to the concrete experience of the
world, that is an experience where time is time, body is body and desire is desire. Until the
angel remained an angel he lived beyond any effort and struggle, beyond any pain and any

distress. Nevertheless, this “being beyond” was what made it impossible for him to experience
joy, which is to experience sharing and to experience love.
He chooses that very experience made of contradictions, which is real life.
Der Himmel über Berlin ends with a message, which is a wonderful image reminding of the
beginning of the movie. In that image there is a hand that is writing. It is the angel’s hand after
having become a man. He is writing these words:
Ich weiss jetzt, was kein Engel weiss. I now know what no angel knows.
What is this something that is known now by the angel and that he did not know before? When
the angel roams around and listens to the thought of humans, he already knows that the world
of men and women is a world of struggle, of laceration, of suffering; but once he gets into it he
then knows what this struggle and pain means. Only when he gets into this world he realizes
that the world of humans is the world where what is other is really the other, namely a world
where other people can be someone I meet and someone whose hand I can shake and feel each
other’s warmth. The world of humans is a world where there are no indifferent choices, because
choices are always real choices. The angel gets to know the world of life, the world of humans
that is not a world in black and white but a world full of colours.
Such coloured world cannot be felt and thought out of contradiction. Therefore, contradiction
is not a sign of a malediction, of damnation and of a downfall. Contradiction is somehow the
sign of life itself, of the world where touching means to touch, feeling means to feel, suffering
means to suffer and love means to love.
Hegel seems to say that men and women try everything to hide contradiction. They don’t realize
that hiding contradiction is hiding the possibility of life itself, or at least the possibility of that
coloured life which is the life that we concretely experience.
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Klaus Vieweg
Zur Logik moralischer Urteile
Das Kernanliegen der folgenden Überlegungen besteht darin, die Relevanz der
Hegelschen Logik, speziell seines Verständnisses von Widerspruch und Antino-
mie, für die praktische Philosophie, hier für die Moralität als der zweiten Form im
Stufengang der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie zu verdeutlichen.¹ Der Fortgang in
drei Stufen – abstraktes Recht, Moralität, Sittlichkeit – bedeutet keinesfalls, dass
die Sittlichkeit als dritte Stufe ,der Zeit nach etwas Späteres‘ darstellt als Recht
und Moralität. Die Sittlichkeit wird sich vielmehr als Grundlage des Rechts und
der Moralität erweisen (RPh § 81, A)², im systematischen Fortschreiten erfolgt die
Legitimation des Anfangens.
1 Die Moralität oder die Freiheit des moralischen

Subjekts
Im Kapitel Moralität der Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts wartet Hegel mit
einer subtilen Fortbestimmung der Begriffe Wollen und Handeln auf, mit der
Prüfung, welches Wollen und Handeln einem freien Wesen angemessen und da-
her als ,gut‘ zu bewerten ist, mit einer Konzeption des moralischen Urteilens.
Nachdem in der Personalität das Dasein der Freiheit im Bezug auf eine äußerli-
che Sache lag, geht es jetzt um den ,in sich reflektierten Willen‘, um die innere
Willensbestimmtheit, worin der Wille notwendig auch als besonderer gedacht
werden muss.³ Die Binnenperspektive des Subjekts, die Willensbestimmtheit des
moralischen Akteurs kommt teils als die innerliche Zuschreibung, im Setzen der
Bestimmungen als den seinigen, und teils als tätliche Äußerung, als Handlung
zum Tragen: das Subjekt anerkennt nur das, lässt sich nur das zurechnen, was es
1 Ausführlich zur logischen Grundlegung von Hegels praktischer Philosophie: Vieweg (2012).
Dieser Aufsatz ist eine gekürzte Passage aus dem Kapitel der Monographie über die Moralität.
2 RPh bezieht sich im Folgenden auf die Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Hegel (1969ff.),
TW Bd. 7; RPh, A bezieht sich auf die eigenhändigen Zusätze Hegels zu den einzelnen Paragra-
phen, RPh, Z auf die Zusätze aus Nachschriften von Vorlesungen.
3 Die innovative Bedeutung sowie die logische und praktisch-philosophische Mittelposition der
Moralitätslehre hebt schon Rosenkranz (1844), 331, hervor: „Der Begriff der Moralität, der früher
in die übrigen Begriffe absorbirt war, ist selbständig als die Mitte zwischen dem abstracten Recht
des Einzelnen und dem concreten Recht des Staates zum Wesen der ganzen Sphäre des objectiven
Willens gemacht.“
154 | Klaus Vieweg
in sich gewusst und gewollt hat (Enz § 503).⁴ Auch hier wäre Hegels Absicht an
den Anfang zu rücken, dass praktische Philosophie eine logische Grundlegung
benötigt, nur insofern ist sie angemessen als eine Handlungsphilosophie, als eine
philosophische Handlungstheorie zu beschreiben.
Auf die Problematik der Logizität des freien Willens und Handelns soll spe-
zielles Hauptaugenmerk gelegt werden, wie in den anderen Passagen stellt sich
diese Freilegung des logischen Koordinatensystem auch hier als eine entschei-
dende Aufgabe für die Interpretation der Grundlinien.⁵ Es handelt sich um eine
theoretische Herausforderung, die bis heute trotz einiger wichtiger Beiträge als
weitgehend unerledigt gilt.⁶
Der Aufweis dieser Grammatik muss beinhalten, inwiefern den Stufen des
moralischen Willens und Handelns in besonderer Weise die logischen Formen des
Urteils zugrunde liegen – die philosophische Theorie der Moralität hat ihre Tie-
fenstruktur in der Urteilslogik. Die in der Anmerkung zu RPh § 114 erwähnte logi-
sche Stützung des Weges der Moralität hilft beim Erschließen der Leistungen und
Begrenzungen des moralischen Standpunkts, der Feststellung seines speziellen
Rechts⁷, seiner Berechtigung, der Reichweite seiner Geltung: so werden unmittel-
bares Urteil, Reflexionsurteil und Begriffsurteil unterschieden. Auf dieser Dynamik
der Urteilsformen ruht das Aufsteigen der Bestimmungen der Moralität in ihren drei
Wegmarken.⁸
4 Enz bezieht sich im Folgenden auf die Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, Hegel
(1969ff.), TW Bd. 8 bis 10.
5 Henrich (1982), 428–450.
6 Wichtige Beiträge hierzu lieferten Schick (2002), Quante (1993) und James (im Erscheinen).
Der Verf. dankt Herrn Daniel James für die Möglichkeit der Nutzung der Studie. Der Position von
Pippin (2008), 169, dass mit dem Moralitäts-Kapitel keine unabhängige Diskussion von Hegels
Theorie der Handlung vorliegt wäre zuzustimmen, die sittliche Dimension ist konstitutiv für die
höchste Bestimmung des Handlungsbegriffs.
7 Die „Moralität hat auch ihre Rechte“. Hegel (2005), 103.
8 „Das Urteil ist die Diremption des Begriffs durch sich selbst; diese Einheit ist daher der Grund,
von welchem aus es nach seiner wahrhaften Objektivität betrachtet wird. Es ist insofern die
ursprüngliche Teilung des ursprünglich Einen“, das „ursprüngliche Teilen des Begriffs“. Hegel
(1969ff.), TW 6, 304, 306.
2 Die drei Stufen des Rechts des moralischen

Willen (die drei Momente der Moralität) – § 114
a)
Der Vorsatz und die Schuld Das abstrakte Recht der Handlung, ihr unmittelba-
res Dasein und ihr Inhalt als der Meinige unmittelbares Urteil
b)
Die Absicht und das Wohl
Das Besondere der Handlung als ihr innerer Inhalt,
Reflexionsurteil
b1) der Wert der Handlung für mich und wonach sie für mich gilt (Absicht)
b2) der Inhalt der Handlung als mein besonderer Zweck meines partikularen
Daseins (Wohl)
c)
Das Gute und das Gewissen Der Inhalt der Handlung in seiner Allgemeinheit,
als in die an und für sich seiende Objektivität erhoben – das Gute als absoluter
Zweck des Willens, in der Sphäre der Reflexion mit dem Gegensatze der subjekti-
ven Allgemeinheit, teils des Bösen, teils des Gewissens
Begriffsurteil
Die zugrunde gelegte Urteilslehre der Wissenschaft der Logik enthält keine bloße
Aufzählung verschiedener Weisen des Urteilens, sondern die Fortbestimmung der
Urteile als ,notwendig auseinander folgend, als ein Fortbestimmen des Begriffs,
insofern kann das Urteil als der bestimmte Begriff angesehen werden‘.⁹ Die paral-
lele, kombinierte Berücksichtigung der Logik des Urteils und der Logik des Zwecks
ist deswegen erforderlich, da moralisches Handeln zureichend nur als logische
Einheit von Subjektivität, der Urteilslogik, sowie der Objektivität, der Logik des
Zwecks, erschlossen werden kann.
9 In Bezug auf das Verbrechen wurde dieses Verfahren schon praktiziert, daran kann direkt an-
geschlossen werden. Behandlung des Eigentums § 53: ,Urteil des Willens über die Sache‘ und Enz
§ 171.
156 | Klaus Vieweg
Der spezifische Zusammenhang des Standpunkts der Moralität und der Ur-
teilslogik geht aus der Charakteristik der moralischen Subjektivität hervor, die
als ,urteilende, d. h. ursprünglich teilende Macht, die alles zerlegt und besondert‘,
auftritt. Es geht um die Besonderung des Ich und die Unterscheidung der Willens-
formen. Zudem wäre wiederum auf Hegels Verständnis von ,Urteil‘ im Sinne der
ursprünglichen Teilung zu erinnern: das Urteil wird zum Inbegriff der Trennung,
des Widerspruchs und des Gegensatzes.¹⁰ Die gesamte Sphäre der Moralität stellt
die Kollision, den Widerspruch der Besonderheit gegen die Allgemeinheit dar. Beim
Ur-Teilen wird den Dingen, den ,Sachen‘ ein ihnen eigenes, besonderes Prädikat
zugemessen, im Sinne des Zerlegens des ursprünglich Einen in ein in sich Unter-
schiedenes. Zugleich ist die Besonderheit des Wollens auf die Objektivität bzw.
Allgemeinheit bezogen, es geht somit um das sich fortentwickelnde Verhältnis
der Besonderheit zur Allgemeinheit (B zu A). Dies impliziert den Standpunkt der
Moralität als Standpunkt des Verstandes, der Reflexion, der Relation, des Sollens,
der Forderung, der Erscheinung des Willens. Wir bewegen uns im Terrain der Lo-
gik des Wesens und auf dem Standpunkt der Subjektivität und Objektivität, auf
dem Standpunkt der moralischen Urteilskraft, der Differenz, der Endlichkeit und
Erscheinung des Willens.
Nachdem Hegel in seiner logischen Urteilslehre die grundsätzliche Form des Ur-
teils bestimmt hat, würdigt er das Verdienst von Kant, eine logische Einteilung
der Urteile nach dem Schema einer Kategorientafel vorgenommen zu haben. Trotz
der Unzulänglichkeit dieses Schemas liegt diesem doch die Einsicht zugrunde,
dass „es die allgemeinen Formen der logischen Idee selbst sind, wodurch die ver-
schiedenen Arten der Urteile bestimmt werden“. Entsprechend der Hegelschen
Logik sind „drei Hauptarten des Urteils zu unterscheiden, welche den Stufen des
Seins, des Wesens und des Begriffs entsprechen“ (Enz § 171, Z). Hier kann eine Stu-
fenfolge der ,praktischen Urteile‘ entfaltet werden, d. h. der Urteile, die sich auf
Handlungen beziehen – Hegel Urteilstafel als System praktischer Urteile.¹¹ Für
ein leichteres Nachvollziehen der folgenden Schritte erscheint eine solche an der
Logik orientierte Übersicht über die praktischen Urteilsformen (inklusive entspre-
chender Beispiele) von Vorteil. § 114 fixiert die grundsätzliche Struktur des Rechts
10 Sans (2006), 219, verweist zu Recht auf Enz § 166: „Die etymologische Bedeutung des Urteils
in unserer Sprache ist tiefer und drückt die Einheit des Begriffs als das Erste und dessen Un-
terscheidung als die ursprüngliche Teilung aus, was das Urteil in Wahrheit ist.“ Vgl. auch Sans
(2004).
11 Vgl. dazu: Vieweg (2012), Kapitel zur Moralität. Vgl. dazu auch: Quante (2008). Hegels Konzept
der Imputation bezeichnet Quante dort als „cognitivist ascriptivism“ (ebd., 226); aufschlussreich
auch Quantes „Hegel’s map of our ascriptive practices“ (ebd., 224).
des Moralischen, die „Bewegung des Urteils“ (WdL 6, 309),¹² die drei Stufen der
Imputation durchläuft.
3 Das Gute und das Gewissen – Der gute Wille

und das gute Handeln
Der Gegenstand – das Handeln – wird in Relation auf den Begriff betrachtet, in Be-
zug auf seinen Begriff, nämlich der Freiheit als dem Begriffsinhalt des Handelns.
Hierin wird der Transfer zu praktischen, normativen Urteilen vollzogen. Das Prä-
dikat ,gut‘ drückt aus, dass „die Sache [das jeweilige Handeln] an ihrem allgemei-
nen Begriffe [Freiheit] als dem schlechthin vorausgesetzten Sollen gemessen und
in Übereinstimmung mit demselben ist oder nicht“ (WdL 6, 344). Dieses ,Gemes-
sen-Werden‘ bedeutet das Fällen eines normativen Urteils: Eine bestimmte einzel-
ne Handlung wird geprüft und bewertet, ob sie als ,gut‘ gelten kann oder nicht,
ob sie ihrem Begriff angemessen ist oder nicht. „Wenn wir sagen: »diese Hand-
lung ist gut«, so ist dies ein Urteil des Begriffs [. . . ] das Prädikat [ist] gleichsam die
Seele des Subjekts, durch welche dieses, als der Leib der Seele, durch und durch
bestimmt ist“ (Enz § 172 Z). Die Kopula ,ist‘ und das für das Handeln wahrhafte
Prädikat ,gut‘ enthalten die Bedeutung der Angemessenheit mit dem Begriff, die
Form ,ist nicht gut‘ die der Unangemessenheit. Der Begriff der Handlung – frei
zu sein – gewinnt jetzt eine zweite fundamentale Bestimmtheit: Freies Handeln
muss nicht nur rechtens (gemäß dem formellen Recht), nicht nur eine Einheit von
Intention und Aktion darstellen, sondern muss auch als gut bewertbar sein. Ein
Spaziergang, das Gehen in eine Eisdiele, das Werfen eines Glases von einem Tisch,
das Einschalten einer Kaffeemaschine oder das Backen einer Pizza sind nicht per
se als Handeln zu klassifizieren.¹³ Die Handlung muss als ,der Beurteilung unter-
worfen‘ gedacht werden, der Beurteilung der eigenen und der Handlung anderer
(RPh § 124 A).
Auf die folgende Struktur des Begriffsurteil, der höchsten Form des Urteilens,
soll im Blick auf Widerspruch und Antinomie besondere Aufmerksamkeit gerich-
tet sein: Die drei Stufen des Begriffsurteils bilden a) das assertorische Urteil, ver-
bunden mit unmittelbarem Wissen und praktischem Dogmatismus; b) das proble-
matische Urteil, welches zu Isosthenie, Antinomie, Urteilsenthaltung und prakti-
12 WdL bezieht sich im Folgenden auf die Wissenschaft der Logik, Hegel (1969ff.), TW Bd. 5 bis 6.
Die Angaben verweisen auf Band und Seitenzahl.
13 In manchen analytischen Handlungstheorien werden häufig solche insuffizienten Beispiele
für Handlung benutzt.
158 | Klaus Vieweg
schem Skeptizismus führt und c) das apodiktisches Urteil, dessen Muster der ka-
tegorische Imperativ darstellt. Jeder Versicherung in einem assertorischen Urteil
steht mit „eben dem Rechte die entgegengesetzte gegenüber“ (WdL 6, 347), was
die Isosthenia und die Epoché, den Suspens des Urteilens nach sich zieht, dann
liegt problematisches Urteil vor. Die Allgemeinheit der Handlung muss zusammen
mit ihrer Beschaffenheit, ihrer besonderen Einzelheit, gedacht werden. Das Sub-
jekt – Handlung – wird in die Allgemeinheit oder objektive Natur (das Sollen) und
in die besondere Beschaffenheit des Daseins unterschieden und es ,enthält somit
den Grund, ob es so ist, wie es sein soll‘. Die Teilung des Allgemeinen und Be-
sonderen (welche das Urteil selbst ist) verweist hier auf ihre an sich bestehende
Einheit in der Einzelheit, auf den Begriff.¹⁴
Die Beurteilung ,gut‘ verlangt die Berücksichtigung der Modalität des Han-
delns.¹⁵ Dies erfordert den Übergang zum apodiktischen Urteil, als dessen Modell
Kants kategorischer Imperativ gilt.
4 Der kategorische Imperativ und

das apodiktische Urteil
Als logisches Fundament der Kantischen Moralitätsauffassung diagnostiziert He-
gel das apodiktische Urteil, es fungiert zugleich als Übergangsform vom Verstand
zur Vernunft, von der Reflexion zum begreifenden Denken. Kants kategorischer
Imperativ kommt aus der Perspektive seiner Fundierung im Begriffsurteil und als
Transformationsstufe zur logischen Form des Schließens in den Blick.¹⁶ Zuerst ei-
nige Anmerkungen zur betreffenden logischen Struktur E–B–A: Die eine einzelne
(partikulare) Handlung – ,Handle so . . . ‘ – leitenden Gründe besonderen Han-
delns – ,Maximen deines Handelns‘ – sollen der Allgemeinheit gemäß sein, sollen
als Prinzip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten können. Die ,objektive Parti-
14 Hegel (1969ff.), TW 6, 348. „Die Sache selbst ist eben dies, daß ihr Begriff als die negative Ein-
heit seiner selbst seine Allgemeinheit negiert und in die Äußerlichkeit der Einzelheit sich her-
aussetzt.“ Die Feststellung des Gut-Seins einer Handlung verlangt die Anstrengung des Begriffs,
das Denken des Verhältnisses von Allgemeinheit, Besonderheit und Einzelheit, die Einschätzung
Güte des Handelns entspringt keineswegs bloß aus Gefühlen oder Intuitionen. Ethiken, die ihr
Fundament in Empfindungen, Gefühlen oder Intuitionen sehen, bewegen sich von vornherein
auf brüchigem Eis und vertreten relativistische Positionen.
15 Hegel versteht Modalität allerdings nicht nur als Bestimmung der subjektiven Stellung des
Denkens zu einem Sachverhalt wie Kant, sondern als interne Qualifikation des Verhältnisses von
Einzelheit, Besonderheit und Allgemeinheit. Vgl. hierzu Schick (2002).
16 James (im Erscheinen), 51ff.
kularität (E) an dem Subjekt gesetzt‘, seine Besonderheit als die ,Beschaffenheit
seines Daseins‘ ist gut oder nicht gut.
Die partikulare, unmittelbare Einzelheit (E) der Handlung (A) findet ihren sprach-
lichen Ausdruck im indexikalischen ,diese‘, die Besonderheit in der Rede vom ,So
und so Beschaffensein‘, der Beschaffenheit des Daseins der Handlung.¹⁷ Die jetzt
erreichte logische Binnenstruktur des Begriffs ,Handlung‘ lässt sich in einer Weise
fassen, die ungeachtet der fortbestehenden Ur-Teilung schon die konkrete Iden-
tität des Begriffs ,Handeln‘ antizipiert: Handlungen sind eine, in der Freiheit ihre
Bestimmung und ihren Zweck habende Gattung in einer einzelnen Wirklichkeit und
von einer besonderen Beschaffenheit.¹⁸ Obschon sich der Begriff potentiell als Ein-
heit seiner Momente und die Kopula, die Verbindung sich kraft ihrer ,Erfüllung‘
in die logische Form des Schlusses zu wandeln beginnt, verbleiben Besonderheit
und Allgemeinheit und ihr Verhältnis unzulänglich bestimmt.
Die Idee als des Guten, als Einheit des Begriffs des Willens und des besonde-
ren Willens hat noch den Status einer Relation, noch nicht den gesetzter Identität.
Das Gute hat somit die Struktur der Idee, aber von Begriff und Realität wird erst
die Einheit gefordert, gesollt, die Einheit soll sein – das ,imperative‘ Paradigma.
Das Prädikat ,gut‘ drückt aus, dass „die Sache an ihrem allgemeinen Begriffe als
dem schlechthin vorausgesetzten Sollen gemessen und in Überstimmung mit dem-
selben ist oder nicht“ (WdL 6, 334).¹⁹
Insofern die Idee des Guten noch abstrakt ist, besteht nur ein Sollen der Ge-
mäßheit, der subjektive Wille soll dies sich zum Zwecke machen und vollbringen,
zugleich kann das Gute nur mittels der subjektiven Willen in Wirklichkeit treten.
Die Besonderheit steht in einem Sollensbezug, in einem Verhältnis zum Allgemei-
nen, sie ist ,noch nicht gesetzt‘ (RPh § 131, A).
Das Recht der Einsicht in das Gute unterscheidet sich vom Recht der Einsicht
in Bezug auf die Handlung als solche, thematisiert wird eine höhere Stufe der Ein-
sicht, welche die Begrenzung der Moralität anzeigt und auf die Sittlichkeit vor-
greifen muss: Das Respektieren des Rechtes der Objektivität impliziert die Aner-
kennung der Gesetze der wirklichen Welt, natürlich nur dann, wenn diese dem
17 ,Die Handlung so und so beschaffen ist gut‘. Hegel (1969ff.), TW 6, 349.

18 Das apodiktische Urteil gilt Hegel als ,wahrhaft objektiv‘, als ,die Wahrheit des Urteils über-
haupt‘. „Subjekt und Prädikat entsprechen sich und haben denselben Inhalt, und dieser Inhalt
ist selbst die gesetzte konkrete Allgemeinheit; er enthält nämlich die zwei Momente, das objekti-
ve Allgemeine oder die Gattung und das Vereinzelte. Es ist hier also das Allgemeine, welches es
selbst ist und durch sein Gegenteil sich kontinuiert und als Einheit mit diesem erst Allgemeines
ist“. Hegel (1969ff.), TW 6, 349.
19 Das apodiktische Urteil strengt „den Vergleich von Begriff und Sache auf der Grundlage der
gewußten wirklichen Beschaffenheit an“. Schick (2002), 220.
160 | Klaus Vieweg
Begriff der Freiheit genügen. Man darf von einem speziellen Recht, vom ,Recht
des Subjekts‘ sprechen, die Handlung in der Bestimmung des Guten oder Bösen,
des Gesetzlichen und Ungesetzlichen zu kennen‘ (RPh § 132). Hier haben wir es
mit der ,dritten Zurechnungsfähigkeit‘ zu tun, mit dem Bezug zum Wissen des Gu-
ten: „nicht wie ich fühle – sondern weiß – Freiheit, Subjektivität im Wissen“ (RPh
§ 132, A). Hegels Grundlinien sprechen vom absoluten und unendlichen Recht des
Wissens vom Guten – ein Recht des Wissens, was gut ist²⁰ – das Recht des Vernünf-
tigen als des Objektiven und somit denkend Geprüften. Insofern kann das Gute als
,das Wesen des Willens in seiner Substantialität und Allgemeinheit‘ (RPh § 132)
beschrieben werden.
Daraus erwächst die Möglichkeit der Differenz zwischen dem Recht des sub-
jektiven Willens (B) – der subjektiven Bildung – und diesem Allgemeinen (A); sie
können in Widersprüche und Konflikte miteinander kommen. Es ist nur etwas gut,
wenn es vom subjektiven Willen als berechtigt eingesehen wird, zugleich hat sich
das Recht des Objektiven etabliert. Dieses Objektive darf aber nicht mit dem ge-
rade Bestehenden und gerade Geltenden verwechselt werden.²¹ Wie das Ich als
partikulare Besonderheit irren kann, so auch die bestehenden besonderen Geset-
ze und Regierungen (RPh § 132). Das Gute fungiert nur dann als Prüfstein für jeg-
liches Handeln, insoweit es der Wille in seiner Wahrheit ist, insofern es sich im
und durch das Denken legitimiert.
§ 133 der Grundlinien verhandelt das Verhältnis zwischen einer einzelnen Hand-
lung (E) in ihrer Besonderheit (B) zum Guten als dem Allgemeinen (A), das Gu-
te soll das Wesentliche des Handelns sein, dessen unbedingte Verpflichtung. Die
Maxime als Legitimationsprinzip meines besonderen Handelns soll als objektives
Prinzip, als ,allgemeines Gesetz‘ Geltung beanspruchen können. Die dem katego-
rischen Imperativ eingeschriebene Struktur der Beziehung von E–B–A entspricht
der Verfasstheit des apodiktischen Urteils bei Hegel: ,Diese Handlung (unmittel-
bare Einzelheit – E), die so und so beschaffen ist (Besonderheit – B), ist gut (All-
gemeinheit – A)‘ (Enz § 179). Der Charakter des Imperativs besteht darin, dass
die Allgemeinheit dasjenige ist, was unbedingt sein soll. In der Beschaffenheit, in
der Maxime der Handlung, die eine solche unbedingte Forderung erfüllen muss,
hat das Urteil seinen Grund. Dieses Besondere, das ,So und so Verfasstsein‘ bil-
det das Kriterium dafür, ob diese Handlung ihrem Begriffe entspricht oder nicht.
Den Kerngedanken sieht Hegel in der vom apodiktischen Urteil erreichten Iden-
tität von E, B und A fundiert. Es handelt sich um das alleinige (einzige und allen
20 Hegel (2005), 129.

21 Der höchste Maßstab ist die Idee des Staates, nicht das positive Recht, der Staat als die „Ob-
jektivität des Vernunftbegriffs“ (§ 132).
gemeinsame) Gesetz, das sich jedes Subjekt frei und mit Vernunft selbst auferlegt
und dem es aus Vernunft beipflichten kann.
Es wird kaum überraschen, dass von Hegel die Gründung in der Vernunft be-
sonders betont wird, die Fundierung in the autonomy of reason. Während die ers-
te Zurechnung auf der Vorstellung, die zweite auf Reflexion und Verstand beruh-
te, fußt die ,dritte Imputation‘, die dritte Weise der Zurechnungsfähigkeit, auf der
Kenntnis um das Gute: ,dass ich weiß, ob dieses Tun, diese Handlung gut oder
böse ist‘. Diese dritte Form basiert somit ausdrücklich auf dem Denken, auf dem
Begriffsurteil, das selbst den Übergang vom Verstand zur Vernunft anzeigt. Das
apodiktische Urteil überwindet die Einseitigkeiten des assertorischen wie des pro-
blematischen Urteils, des dogmatischen Urteils der Art ,Diese Handlung ist gut‘
und ebenso die Beschränktheit der Urteilsenthaltung.
Erst dem apodiktischen Urteil liegt der Begriff als Begriff zugrunde. Das as-
sertorische Urteil hingegen beinhaltet die Setzung der allgemeinen Natur des Be-
griffs, dies aber in Gestalt der Willkür des Versicherns, in Form eines Subjektivis-
mus des Postulierens und bloßen Behauptens. Das assertorische und das proble-
matische Urteil fixieren dagegen die negative Seite des Begriffs und führen in das
Dahingestelltseinlassen des Urteils. Insofern zwei Assertionen kontradiktorisch
gegenüberstehen, tritt ein Verfahren ein, welches ,auf gelegentliche Veranlassung
die eine oder die andere Maxime anwendet, je nachdem sie für gegebene Objek-
te für passend gehalten werden und nach der Wahrheit eben nicht gefragt wird‘
(WdL 6, 443). Der Begriff der Handlung bleibt so unterbestimmt und einseitig.
Woran genau soll sich die Besonderheit orientieren? Was heißt ,allgemeines
Gesetz‘? Laut Hegel bewegt sich dieses Allgemeine oder Vernünftige bei den Prot-
agonisten der höchsten Stufe der Moralität der Form nach auf der Ebene des Be-
griffsurteils, somit auf der Höhe des Urteils des Begriffs, was eine positive und
negative Konnotation hat. Eine konkrete Handlung kann erst jetzt eine wahrhafte
Beurteilung erfahren, sie wird erst jetzt an ihrem Begriff gemessen: ,Das Schen-
ken des Holzpferdes ist gut‘ – ,Das Fehlinformieren des Polizisten ist schlecht‘.²²
Als Subjekt firmiert ein konkretes, unmittelbar Besonderes, das ,zum Prädikat die
Reflexion des besonderen Daseins auf sein Allgemeines hat‘ (Enz § 178).
Die Besonderheit, die konkrete einzelne Handlung – das Schenken des Holz-
pferdes, das Fehlinformieren des Polizisten – figuriert nur als Besonderung der
Art und als negatives Prinzip der Gattung, d.i. die Besonderheit ist auch gleichgül-
tig gegen das Allgemeine und kann der Allgemeinheit angemessen sein oder auch
22 Urteile wie „Diese Katze ist grau“ oder „Dieser Tisch ist groß“ sind selbstverständlich keine
assertorischen Urteile.
162 | Klaus Vieweg
nicht, B kann A gemäß sein oder eben nicht.²³ Am Subjekt (an diesem Schenken,
an diesem Informieren) ist die Bestimmtheit noch nicht gesetzt, nicht die Bezie-
hung von B zu A, welche somit erst nachträglich im Prädikat ausgedrückt werden
muss. Kann das Schenken eines Holzpferdes als dem Prinzip des Allgemeinen ge-
mäß, somit schlechthin als gut eingeschätzt sein? Die ,Bewährung‘ des gefällten
Urteils hat nur den Status einer Versicherung, einer Assertion, einer Zusicherung,
einer Meinung, einer Überzeugung, eines Glaubens (belief ) und befindet sich da-
her keineswegs im Modus des Wissens im Sinne des begreifenden Denkens. Dass
etwas gut oder schlecht, richtig oder falsch ist, hat seinen Zusammenhang in ei-
nem äußeren Dritten.²⁴
Der kategorische Imperativ weist zwar die formale Struktur des apodiktischen
Urteils, damit des höchsten Begriffsurteils auf, aber die Bestimmungsmomente E,
B und A sind noch einseitig festgelegt, von vornherein wesentlich getrennt, nicht
austauschbar und unterbestimmt. Da die Besonderheit vom Guten unterschieden
ist und in den subjektiven Willen fällt, kann das Gute zunächst nicht als Beson-
derheit genommen werden, es trägt zunächst nur die Bestimmung der ,allgemei-
nen, abstrakten Wesentlichkeit‘: Die Pflicht soll Kant zufolge um der Pflicht willen
getan werden. Die Handlung soll nicht aus besonderer Neigung, sondern eben le-
diglich gemäß dem allgemeinen Gesetze ohne alle Neigung erfolgen. Eine solche
Allgemeinheit des Gesetzes soll für sich das Wahre, das Höchste, das objektive
Prinzip sein. Die Besonderung, die Maxime, kommt hinzu, geht nicht aus der All-
gemeinheit hervor, da es dieser Allgemeinheit ja an der immanenten Negativität
gebricht. A und B sollen mit dem ,Hinzu-Kommen‘ bzw. mit dem ,Auch‘ verknüpft
werden, was strenger logischer Stringenz entbehrt.
Die subjektive Maxime soll dem universellen Gesetz gemäß sein. In Hegels
Sicht leidet diese Hierarchie von abstrakter Allgemeinheit und Besonderheit und
der damit einhergehende Dualismus an einem eklatanten logischen Defekt: Die
anvisierte Identität von B und A wird nur formaliter erreicht, nur mittels eines
unzulänglichen ,Hinzu-Kommens‘ des Besonderen, somit eines bloßen Herüber-
und Hinübergehens von A und B, von Unendlichkeit und Endlichkeit, von Unbe-
stimmtheit und Bestimmtheit.
Wie die Allgemeinheit als reine, abstrakt einseitig und unterbestimmt bleibt,
so auch die Besonderheit. Die Maxime als Grundprinzip subjektiven Handelns,
der Wille ,seiner subjektiven Beschaffenheit nach‘²⁵ erscheint im Vergleich zum
23 „Das Besondere soll dem Allgemeinen gemäß sein, aber das Erstere ist zugleich ein Anderes,
also ist das Gute nur als Sollen gesetzt und der Gegensatz von dem Guten und Besonderen und
der Pflicht ist nicht aufgehoben“. Hegel (1973ff.), 360.
24 Hegel (1969ff.), TW 6, 346.
25 Kant (1900ff.), AA IV, 413.
,Reinen‘ als Herabgesetztes, jede Bestimmung erscheint als Beschränkung, als

Schranke. Es geht um das Bestimmte und Endliche, das Negative, was Hegel zu-
folge schon dem Allgemeinen inhärent ist, die immanente Negativität. Die Beson-
derheit als ,die Beschaffenheit des Daseins des Handelns‘ bildet ein Moment des
Begriffs des Handelns, das ,So und so-Beschaffen-Sein‘ bildet ein konstitutives
Element des Handlungsbegriffs, so erweisen sich A und B in ihrem Unterschied als
identisch. Die Besonderheit enthält die Dimensionen des Formalen und Inhaltli-
chen, die Mannigfalt des Besonderen. Kant reduziert jedoch das Substantielle der
Handlung auf „die Form und das Princip, woraus sie selbst folgt“. Das Wesentli-
che-Gute der Handlung „besteht in der Gesinnung, der Erfolg mag sein, welcher er
wolle“.²⁶ Damit wird der Besonderheit ein entscheidendes Bestimmungsmoment
entzogen. Obschon die Definition der Maxime als Lebensregel, die besondere Be-
schaffenheit, in allen Dimensionen ins Visier nehmen müsste, bleiben Intersub-
jektivität und Kontextualität ausgeblendet. Dies verlangt nähere Bestimmung und
markiert die Grenze der Moralität überhaupt, erst die Sittlichkeit gilt als die ,all-
gemeine Sphäre‘ des freien Handelns.²⁷
5 Der Synkretismus des Widerspruchs

des moralischen Standpunkts –
Antinomien des perennierenden Sollens
In der Diagnose der abstrakten Allgemeinheit artikuliert sich Hegels Kritik am
moralischen Standpunkt schlechthin, nicht bloß der Einwand gegen Kants prak-
tische Philosophie.²⁸ Das perennierende Sollen kristallisiert sich auch als Achil-
lesferse des Utilitarismus als einer Spielart des Konsequentialismus heraus, der
letztlich auf der Ebene der Reflexion verharren und damit in die Sackgasse der
unendlichen Approximation, der schlechten Unendlichkeit geraten muss. Sowohl
Konsequentialismus als auch die Deontologie verfehlen den Begriff des Handelns,
da sie die Gesamtheit der Dimensionen des Handelns nicht zureichend und ange-
messen berücksichtigen, da sie einzelne widerstreitenden Momente zum alleinig
entscheidenden Kriterium für gutes Tun fixieren. „Der Grundsatz: bei den Hand-
lungen die Konsequenzen verachten, und der andere: die Handlungen aus den
Folgen zu beurteilen und sie zum Maßstab dessen, was recht und gut sei, zu ma-
26 Kant (1900ff.), AA IV, 416.

27 Hegel (1969ff.), TW 6, 325.
28 Vgl. dazu Wood (1997).
164 | Klaus Vieweg
chen – ist beides gleich abstrakter Verstand“ (RPh § 118). Allerdings sieht Hegel in
den Konzepten von Kant und Fichte den bislang höchsten Ausdruck des Gedan-
kens moderner Moralität. Hegel zielt immer auf die Grundstruktur von Moralität
als einer idealtypischen Form. Mit diesem Paradigma – mit dem Begriff der Mo-
ralität, nicht nur einer bestimmten geschichtlichen Ideenformation – haben wir
das Wollen in der subjektiv-logischen Struktur des Begriffsurteils. Vor diesem Ho-
rizont sollen weitere Argumente vorgeführt werden, mit denen Hegel den Stand-
punkt der Moralität als einen vom Widerspruch geprägten Durchgangspunkt im
Fortbestimmen des freien Wollens fasst, als ein notwendiges, aber nicht hinrei-
chendes Definiens des Handlungsbegriffs.
6 Die Handlung als Einheit des inneren Zwecks

und der Realisierung dieses Zwecks
Glückswürdigkeit und Glückseligkeit, Recht und Wohl sind unabdingbare Kon-
stituenzien für die Bewertung der Handlung; die notwendige Einheit kann als
der umfassende Gute beschrieben werden. Allerdings hat Kant die Moralität der
Glückswürdigkeit zugeordnet und so von der Glückseligkeit zunächst getrennt
und braucht für die unverzichtbare Überwindung des Widerstreits und die Her-
stellung der Harmonie zwischen beiden das Postulat eines höchsten Gutes, wel-
ches eben das Übereinkommen von Glückswürdigkeit und Wohl garantiert, ein
allergütigstes Wesen, von dem wir aber weiter nichts wissen können. So erscheint
Hegel die Moralität bei Kant auf ein Forum Internum, auf die innere Prüfung, auf
das Postulat und das Erhoffen von Glück und Wohl reduziert, entspringend aus
der ursprünglichen Trennung, dem Widerspruch beider Momente. Bei der An-
tinomie von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit handelt sich um eine Antinomie, die
wie jede Antinomie „auf dem formellen Denken [beruht], das die beiden Mo-
mente einer Idee getrennt, jedes für sich, damit der Idee nicht angemessen und
in seiner Unwahrheit, festhält und behauptet“ (RPh § 57). Das Zusammenspiel
von kategorischem Imperativ und Glückspostulat vermag Kant nur mithilfe der
Konstruktion des all-gütigen Wesens zu sichern, die Gewährleistung des Glücks
wird auf die Hoffnung einer künftigen Glückseligkeit reduziert. Hierzu benötigt
Kant das Konstrukt der Unsterblichkeit der Seele und dieser Gedanke verbindet
sich sodann mit der Annahme einer künftigen transzendenten Welt.²⁹ Für Hegel
stellen sowohl Absicht und innerer Zweck, aber eben auch das Wohl und der Voll-
zug des Zwecks die unerlässlichen Komponenten moralischen Handelns dar. Nur
29 Vgl. Guyer (2000), 26.

in dieser von vornherein zu denkenden Einheit von Beweggründen und Folgen

haben wir eine vollständige moralische Handlung. Der Einspruch gegen Kant und
dem Moralismus erfolgt so vom Standpunkt des Begriffs der Handlung.
Das höchste, umfassende Gut gilt als rein, abstrakt und leer, wir vermögen es
nicht weiter zu bestimmen, können nichts weiter erkennen. Es resultiert eine un-
heilige Allianz zwischen dem dogmatischen und dem skeptischen Moment. Die
höchste praktische Vernunft als ,heiliger Gesetzgeber‘ erscheint so als Sein im
Modus der Vorstellung, obschon gerade Kant stets klare Begriffe statt Bilder und
Vorstellungen einfordert. Darin sieht Hegel nun einen eklatanten Verstoß gegen
das ,Recht auf Wissen‘, hier genauer gegen das Recht auf Wissen des Guten.³⁰ Die-
ses Gute, dem ja auch Kant Allgemeinheit beimisst, kann nur im Denken und durch
das Denken bestimmt werden. Wer behauptet, dass der Mensch aber nur Erschei-
nungen³¹ , nicht das Wahre – hier das höchste Gut – begreifen könne, ignoriert
ein fundamentales Recht des moralischen Subjekts, das Recht vernünftiger We-
sen auf Einsicht und Wissen.
7 Selbstbestimmung und Fremdbestimmung

Das postulierte höchste Wesen als heiliger Gesetzgeber ,sorgt‘ für das Gelingen
der Harmonie von Allgemeinem und Besonderem, denn „das moralische Bewußt-
sein kann nicht auf Glückseligkeit Verzicht tun und dies Moment aus seinem ab-
soluten Zweck weglassen.“³² Es kommt ihm die Rolle eines Hervorbringers, eines
Herrn und Beherrschers zu, was mit dem Charakter des assertorischen Urteils kor-
respondiert – das Subjekt in diesem Urteil ist dem Prädikat unterworfen, wird un-
ter dieses subsumiert. Das einzelne moralische Subjekt steht diesem höheren We-
sen als ein unvollständiges, unvollkommenes entgegen; die Zwecke dieses Sub-
jekts sind ja durch das Sinnlich-Natürliche, die Begehrungen und Neigungen ver-
unziert und kontaminiert. Das Wohl, die Bedürfnisse des menschlichen Körpers
30 Bei der kritischen Philosophie moniert Hegel, dass der Vernunft kein konstitutives, sondern
nur ein regulatives Verhältnis zum Wissen erlaubt wird. Hegel (1969ff.), Glauben und Wissen oder
Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjektivität in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen als Kantische, Jacobi-
sche und Fichtesche Philosophie, TW 2, 179.
31 Signifikant ist der Sprachwechsel hinsichtlich der Kopula vom ,Es ist‘ zum ,Es scheint‘. Die
Kopula tritt hier also noch nicht als der vollständig bestimmte Begriff hervor. „Es ist darum die
größte Inkonsequenz, einerseits zuzugeben, daß der Verstand nur Erscheinungen erkennt, und
andererseits dies Erkennen als etwas Absolutes zu behaupten, indem man sagt, das Erkennen
könne nicht weiter, dies sei die natürliche, absolute Schranke des menschlichen Wissens“ (Enz §
60).
32 Hegel (1969ff.), TW 3, 444.
166 | Klaus Vieweg
und Geistes werden damit nicht zureichend beachtet und als ,Unreines‘ gegen-
über dem Vortrefflich-Reinen herabgestuft.
Das Postulat eines jenseitigen Herrn und Gesetzgebers – im Diesseits sei kei-
ne zureichende Glückseligkeit zu erlangen – steht aber dem selbst aufgestellten
Prinzip der strikten Selbstgesetzgebung diametral entgegen. Denn gegenüber die-
sem ,Herrn‘ muss das endliche, moralische Subjekt die Epitheta ,unvollständig‘,
,unheilig‘, ,unvollkommen‘, ,den hohen Zweck verunzierend‘ und ,unwürdig‘ hin-
nehmen.³³ Das Perennierende am Sollen, das unaufhörliche Sehnen und Streben
führt zum Hinausschieben, zur Vertröstung auf die schlechte Unendlichkeit, führt
in die ewige Iteration des Gleichen, in die Langweiligkeit als absoluter Aufgabe,
die stets eine solche bleibt und gegenwärtig nicht gelöst werden kann, die Anti-
nomie bleibt unaufgelöst zurück. Der Weg geht in die logische Insuffizienz der un-
endlichen Progression. „Streben ist ein unvollendetes Tun oder an sich begrenz-
tes Tun.“³⁴ Die Angemessenheit des Willens vermag Kant zufolge ,nur in einem ins
Unendliche gehenden Progressus zu jener völligen Angemessenheit angetroffen
werden‘.³⁵ Hegel zufolge pflegt dieser Gedanke der unendlichen Approximation,
obwohl dieser ,nichts als der perennierend gesetzte Widerspruch selbst ist‘ (Enz
§ 60), für etwas Erhabenes, ja gar für eine Art Gottesdienst gehalten zu werden
(WdL 5, 264).
Hierin liegt der logische Kern der Hegelschen Kritik: Der Widerspruch wird
nur einfach reproduziert, bleibt bestehen, seine Auflösung soll am St. Nimmer-
leinstag erfolgen, ad calendas graecas. Dieser Befund trifft (leider) heute noch
immer zu. Ein solcher, heute sich mit verschiedenen Farben schmückender und
sich als freies Denken auftretender Relativismus feiert ungeahnte und schier über-
mächtige Triumphe, obschon bereits einer seiner Väter, Friedrich Schlegel, den
performativen Widerspruch feststellte und scharfsinnig darauf hinwies, dass der
Satz ,Alles Wissen ist relativ‘ auch auf diesen Satz appliziert werden müsste. Heute
scheint dies wahr, morgen etwas Anderes und übermorgen wieder etwas Anderes,
so das relativistische Evangelium, das mit seiner Apotheose der Beliebigkeit dem
Offenbarungseid der Philosophie leistet – banca rotta.
Auf dem moralischen Standpunkt haben wir die Allgemeinheit im Status der
Abstraktion, der inhaltslosen Identität, die Subsumtion von B unter A erscheint
als nicht stringent, sondern zufällig. Zugleich sind die beiden entgegenstehenden
Bedeutungen des Subjekts ihrer Wahrheit nach vereinigt, dies macht die Hand-
lung als ,Eine‘ und zugleich als Eine ,je nachdem sie beschaffen ist‘ aus. Somit
33 Vgl. dazu den Abschnitt Der seiner selbst gewisse Geist. Die Moralität (besonders a. Die mora-
lische Weltanschauung) in der Phänomenologie des Geistes, Hegel (1969ff.) TW 3.
34 Hegel (1969ff.), Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, TW 20, 407; Herv. K. V.
35 Kant (1900ff.), Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, AA V, 156.
muss die nächste Form des Urteils die Art und Weise der Beschaffenheit einbe-
ziehen. Zu dieser Beschaffenheit, dem So- und So-Sein gehört der Kontext der
Handlung³⁶, die wesentlichen Umstände des Handelns, somit nicht nur forma-
le, sondern inhaltliche Momente: ,Das Schenken des Holzpferdes als Spielzeug an
die Tochter des Freundes ist gut‘ – ,Die athenische Schenkung eines Holzpferdes
an die Trojaner war böse‘ – ,Das Fehlinformieren des Freundes (die Lüge) wegen
meines finanziellen Vorteils war böse‘ – ,Das Fehlinfomieren seiner Freunde (die
Not-Lüge) durch Jakob den Lügner war gut‘.³⁷ Die Grundstruktur dieser apodikti-
schen Urteile lautet: ,Diese Handlung unter bestimmten Umständen, in so und so
beschaffenen Umständen vollzogen ist gut‘.³⁸ Darin wird die konkrete Allgemein-
heit erreicht – das Allgemeine, welches es selbst ist und durch sein Gegenteil sich
kontinuiert und als Einheit mit diesem erst Allgemeines wird. Das Resümee könn-
te lauten: Alle Handlungen sind eine Gattung in einer einzelnen Wirklichkeit von ei-
ner besonderen Beschaffenheit. Einer Handlung, die als frei beschrieben werden
soll, inhäriert die logische Einheit von E, B und A. Diese Identität wird im bösen
Tun verfehlt.
Es gibt auch für Hegel kein vermeintliches Recht aus Menschenliebe zu lügen,
das Kantische prinzipielle Lügenverbot bezüglich substantieller moralischer Tat-
bestände bleibt daher uneingeschränkt in Kraft. Nur bei der Bewertung der Hand-
lung ,Fehlinformation‘ wird logisch stringent die Beschaffenheit einbezogen und
damit ein neues Verständnis von Lügen konzipiert.³⁹ Jakob, der Lügner, war somit
im strengen moralischen Sinne keinesfalls ein Lügner. In einem Mord- und Ter-
rorregime – so die bereits behandelte Umkehrung aller Rechte – besitzt solch mit
Fehlinformation agierender Widerstand Legitimität, eben als moralische Notwehr,
ausschließlich als zweite, auf Unrecht und Unmoralität reagierende Handlung.
An dieser Stelle kündigt sich schon das Überschreiten der Moralitätssphäre
an. Das Urteil über eine Handlung, die zunächst nur eine moralische Bewertung
erfährt, kann sich so durchaus umkehren. Formale Unehrlichkeit im Sinne von
36 Hegels Logik ist auch in diesem Sinne „eine Logik des Kontextprinzips avant la lettre [. . . ]
Person bin ich nur in und durch meine sozialen Beziehungen zu anderen Personen in einer Per-
sonengemeinschaft“. Stekeler-Weithofer (2006), 42.
37 Vgl. Becker (1992). Die Hauptfigur, der Jude Jakob, erfindet im Warschauer Ghetto optimisti-
sche Nachrichten über den Kriegsverlauf und das Heranrücken der Roten Armee an Warschau
und stärkt mit dieser Desinformation den Lebensmut der Gefangenen im Ghetto.
38 Bei Kant gilt der kategorische Imperativ als ein ,apodiktisch-praktisches Urteil‘, ohne dass
Kant die logische Form eines solchen praktischen Urteils einer gründlichen Prüfung unterzieht.
39 Von Gewicht ist Hegels spezielles Verständnis von Wahrheit: ,Man soll die Wahrheit sagen‘,
da gibt es aber ,viele Rücksichten‘. „Solche Wahrhaftigkeit ist dann eben eine solche, wo nichts
dahinter ist. Wahrheit sagen in Rücksicht auf die endlichen Dinge, da ist größtenteils nicht darin.
Jeder Augenblick tötet tausend Wahrheiten“. Hegel (2000), 82.
168 | Klaus Vieweg
Not-Lügen, von moralischer Not-Wehr darf als gut eingeschätzt werden, nicht das
Lügen schlechthin, denn letzteres erfüllt nicht die Bedingungen des Begriffs frei-
er Handlung. Hierin sieht Hegel sowohl die Leistung als auch das Defizitäre des
Formalismus, der intrinsischen Pflichten, der unbeschränkten Verbote, und zwar
in dem Sinne, dass aus dieser deontologischer Perspektive die ethische Qualität
dem Handlungstyp ungeachtet der Umstände und der sich ergebenden (mögli-
cherweise desaströsen und unmenschlichen) Konsequenzen zukommen soll.⁴⁰
Die ,Gegenfüßler‘ der Glückseligkeitslehrer bezeichnete Jean Paul als „kategori-
sche Imperatoren“, die eine ,formale Tugend‘ lehren. Sie opfern ,fremdes ebenso
kalt wie eigenes Wohl auf‘, sie suchen ,andern wie sich nichts zu verschaffen als
das einzige und höchste Gut‘, die ,formale Tugend‘.⁴¹
Kant hat Hegel zufolge in seinem Verständnis des Wollens als Zweck schon
das konkrete Allgemeine im Auge, das objektive Urteil, worin der Zweck schon
,mehr als ein Urteil‘ darstellt, nämlich die logische Form des Schlusses, das Hin-
ausweisen über die moralische hin zur sittlichen Perspektive, welche auf der Logik
des Schlusses ruht. Aber die für Kant ebenso charakteristische ,Festhaltung des
bloß moralischen Standpunktes‘, des Standorts des Urteilens, der nicht in den
sittlichen Standort fortbestimmt wird, setzt den Gewinn, der mit den Rechten der
Moralität erreicht wurde, wieder aufs Spiel.
8 Kurzes Resümee
Der Übergang von der Moralität zur Sittlichkeit beinhaltet die Aufhebung des Wi-
derspruchs des Moralischen, die Überwindung der Antinomie des perennieren-
den Sollens. In seiner Wissenschaft der Logik behandelt Hegel den logischen De-
fekt des unendlichen Progresses auch ,vornehmlich in seine Anwendung auf die
Moralität‘ (WdL 5, 268). Der reine Wille und das moralische Gesetz einerseits und
die Natur und die Sinnlichkeit andererseits werden schon als völlig ,selbständig
und gleichgültig gegeneinander vorausgesetzt‘, der Gegensatz somit als Axiom
postuliert und damit bereits ein Überschreiten des Widerspruchs ausgeschlossen.
Der Widerspruch „wird im unendlichen Progreß nicht aufgelöst, sondern im Ge-
genteil als unaufgelöst und unauflösbar dargestellt und behauptet“ (WdL 5, 269).
Es resultiert stets ,derselbe Widerspruch, mit welchem angefangen wurde‘ (WdL 5,
270). Der Progressus ad infinitum erweist sich als Widerspruch, der sich selbst zu
Unrecht als Auflösung des Widersprechenden ausgibt (WdL 5, 166). Eine echte
40 Quante (1993), 131–133.

41 Jean Paul (1975), 813, 809.
Überwindung der Antinomie scheitert, die Verlegung ins Jenseits und die vorge-
stellte Auflösung an einem jüngsten Tag bleibt eine Verlegenheitsantwort, ist nur
Ausdruck für zuviel Zärtlichkeit gegenüber der Welt, die Widersprüche, die Kolli-
sionen im moralischen Handeln sind letztlich entfernt, was das Verharren in un-
überwundenen Widerspruch impliziert. Hegels Lösungsvorschlag wäre ein ande-
res Thema. Die Natur des spekulativen Gedankens sieht er darin, die Idealität bei-
der Seiten des Widerstreitenden zu denken, d. h. sie von vornherein als Momente
des Begriffs des moralischen Handelns zu verstehen, die entgegengesetzten Mo-
mente in ihrer sich bewegenden Einheit zu begreifen und den Übergang von der
Moralität ins sittliche Handeln zu denken, zur Sittlichkeit, in welcher der Wider-
spruch des Moralischen nicht abstrakt verschwunden, sondern aufgehoben, be-
wahrt und überwunden wird.
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|
Part III: Actuality
Gianni Vattimo
Insuperable Contradictions
Philosophy never tolerated contradictions. One may say that it was born exactly
in order to eliminate them by the recourse to the ultra-mundane order of Plato’s
ideas, or to the principle of non-contradiction in Aristotle’s logics and meta-
physics, and so on. One may suggest that even the famous reversal expressed by
Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach is basically directed against this traditional
conciliatory essence of philosophy. That’s another reason for the “definitive”
supremacy of Hegel; and, of course, the conservative appearance of his theory.
When Berthold Brecht opposed a non-Aristotelian, or epic, theatre to the one
described and prescribed by Aristotle’s Poetics, he was clearly re-vindicating the
resistance of contradictions to the pretended force of the mediating reason.
Given these presuppositions, it would be strongly self-contradictory (!) to pro-
pose the idea of insuperable contradictions for theoretical reasons. A theory, we
assume in the ordinary language of philosophy, has to be non-contradictory, so
it belongs to its very essence to be an overcoming of contradictions. The general
character of philosophy since its birth in Greece is a sort of “pedagogical” voca-
tion to offer a way of salvation to human beings. Very often, this offer is presented
in the terms of the myth of the Platonic Republic, where the one who succeeds
in seeing the true things outside the cavern calls on his fellow men to come and
share his “vision”, with the constant temptation to oblige them for the sake of
their happiness to follow him outside. My impression is that also the purpose of
promoting a philosophical reflection upon contradiction follows this traditional
path: there would be no point in discussing contradictions if it were not in order
to create the conditions for a conciliation. (Remember Spinoza: neque flere neque
ridere sed intelligere.)¹ Of course, as we can see from the reference to Spinoza, at
the basis of the conciliation there is the view of the “objective” truth, independent
from personal interests, which has to be “observed” both in terms of knowledge
and in practical terms, which means that it imposes the respect of the given ob-
jective truth as the source of moral law.
If one does not want to follow the traditional path of the metaphysical concil-
iation of contradictions, how would he/she explain the interest in a philosophical
reflection on them? Is the pedagogical-metaphysical attitude the sole possible for
philosophy? What I want to do in this paper is to propose a reflection on con-
tradictions which does not assume that conciliation is the task of philosophy; but
1 Spinoza (1677): I, § IV, vol. 2, 434.

174 | Gianni Vattimo
refusing this assumption implies several radical changes in the very notion of phi-
losophy one tries to practice. First of all, the decision to propose a reflection on a
topic like contradictions – as on any other topic chosen for a philosophical discus-
sion – cannot be motivated by theoretical reasons. This would require that theory
feels by itself the need to discuss – confirm, correct, renew etc. – its idea of con-
tradictions. As if it were “contradictory” not to do that; as if philosophy needed to
complete itself by clarifying this theme. I know that the editors of this book would
not accept such a simplification of their decision. Very likely – and this is impor-
tant especially from a “Hegelian” point of view – they would appeal to a sort of
“actuality” of the theme in our present situation. It is exactly this implicit, pre-
supposed actuality of the theme that I would like to challenge, in order to be able
to better answer the questions proposed. Are we invited to discuss on contradic-
tions because the current situation (a very general term, of course; analogous to
the “general condition of world” which Hegel evokes in a point of his Vorlesun-
gen über Ästhetik²) demands from philosophy a special cooperation in order to
reduce conflicts, contradictions, etc.? This, I assume, would be more or less the
explanation of the theme we are invited to discuss – an explanation which does
not seem to need a strong analysis and attention: we all know that the problem
of peace, both on international and on domestic level, is urgent. The fact is that
the emphasis on the problem of conciliation has always been the favourite topic
of philosophy, very often explicitly and many times at least implicitly. I do not re-
member a philosophy advocating for conflict, or for insuperable contradictions.
Even Karl Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach as formulated within a perspec-
tive dominated by an eschatological hope in the final victory of the general class,
the proletariat, entitled to make the revolution because of its capacity to catch the
truth beyond the veil of ideology, i.e. without an interest disturbing the objective
knowledge of the real meaning of history.
What I mean is that, when we accept easily, and as obvious, that philosophy
responds to the need for peace and reconciliation, we probably are already pre-
pared for this by the fact that philosophy (love for Sophia, wisdom) has always
thought of itself as a factor of pacification. My paper asks, very simply, if it is so
obvious that today we need pacification, and therefore the task of philosophy has
to be that of reflecting upon contradictions in order to overcome them in a realm of
non-distorted truth.³ You may recognize at the root of this question the basic op-
position between hermeneutics and the epistemological belief in the objectivity of
2 Hegel (1969ff.), TW 13, ch. 3

3 This is Fukuyama’s idea of the end of history: philosophy triumphs because and insofar as
there aren’t conflicts. See Fukuyama (1992).
scientific truth. In my view (not only mine, but also the view of classical authors of
hermeneutics, starting with Heidegger), hermeneutics is not the discipline which
studies the method of deciphering what appears prima facie non understandable,
discovering its hidden meaning. Hermeneutics is basically the philosophy of the
irreducible otherness of the other; which does not mean necessarily that it is a
philosophy of conflict, but surely it is not a theory of the conciliation on the basis
of the shared objectivity of (scientific) truth. Paradoxically, Marx’s eleventh the-
sis on Feuerbach is much closer to hermeneutics than to scientific objectivism.
And more than that: Marxism cannot believe that changing the world involves
overcoming interpretation in favour of objectivism if it does not want to turn into
dogmatic Stalinism.
Let me try to show that today’s world does not need more conciliation (also)
through philosophy, or more catharsis through Aristotelian theatre, but rather
the opposite. Take the rather generally acknowledged crisis of democracy; i.e.
the loss of credibility of the representative institutions – something of the kind
of the problems that were already well known to Winston Churchill, today inten-
sified and magnified by the increasing possibilities of social control. In many of
our “democracies” people don’t believe any longer in their capacity of influenc-
ing by their vote the policies of government. The participation in elections dimin-
ishes constantly; the public discussion is more and more limited to the gossip or
to the complaint against politicians etc. Would anybody describe this situation as
a multiplication of conflicts? Or is what we see simply a condition of progressive
“neutralization” – to take the term from Carl Schmitt: or better of “lack of emer-
gency” to use the expression of Heidegger? More recently, one uses to speak of
“la pensée unique”; which, translated into political terms, means roughly “the
Washington consensus”. The pensée unique is a strong enemy of hermeneutics,
to which it reproaches its relativism. The more or less new “realism” of philoso-
phers like John Searle (prized by George W. Bush some years ago) and that sort of
mésalliance of the residues of phenomenology with the post-analytic empiricists
seems to be substituting for the epistemological metaphysics of the past decades
is, as a matter of fact (and sometimes independently from the intentions of the
authors), the intellectual support of the neoliberalistic world, still centred in the
imperial (military and economic) power of the US and the multinational capital-
ism. The Searle-Bush ideology wants to purify philosophy from the hermeneutic
relativism, which appears as a threat to the official, scientific truth; its connec-
tions to the social and economic power don’t need to be proved, if one thinks of
the public (military) and private money involved in the modern scientific enter-
prise.
I don’t want to expand here on the analysis of the current condition of “lack
of emergency”. In many senses, I could also refer to Fukuyama’s famous thesis
on the end of history; though I don’t share its ideological apologetic implications
(democracy, liberal capitalism have triumphed, therefore no more history, i.e. no
more conflict, neither of interpretations⁴ nor of weapons). Apparently, and not
only apparently, nothing can happen. The sole emergencies seem to be those of
“international terrorism” which has not the character of an enemy (in the Schmit-
tian sense) but only of a criminal: NATO and even the UN are more and more in-
volved in operations of international police; the so called public opinion seems
to ask mainly for security, no matter how much it costs in terms of freedom, pri-
vacy, meaning of everyone’s life. Even the general humanitarian respect for “life”,
which means, by the way, the mere biological survival, no matter in which condi-
tions (see what happens with the euthanasia, prohibited even in case of pure veg-
etative status and of free decision of the individual etc.) seems to belong to this
atmosphere of acceptance of a low-profile existence, very probably determined
by the fear diffused by the media (fear of terrorists, fear of unemployment, fear of
immigrants. . . ). In one word: the triumph, in practice and in theory, of the status
quo.
As I said, neither a reflection on contradiction(s) nor a theory advocating
conflict corresponds to a theoretical need internal to philosophy. But even if one
wants to explain theoretically the choice made by the editors of this book, one has
to refer to “the general condition of the world”, whatever it means. To admit this
elementary observation means already – be cautious – to accept a hermeneutical
approach instead of the scientific objectivistic. But this does not mean to admit a
realistic attitude, i.e. the idea that if you claim to correspond to a historical need
of “the world” you have to “know” that need correctly, therefore its truth etc.
What we call facts is what WE call facts: matter of experience more in a Hegelian
sense than in empiricist terms.
Do we have good reasonable, also philosophically motivated (obviously not
“proved”) reasons to advocate for more conflict instead of a more intense paci-
fication? The situation of “lack of emergency”, or neutralization, I described
above may either be considered as a desirable “end of history” or as the extreme
“Gefahr”, danger, of the forgetting of Being in favour of beings – the existent
order taken as the sole possible “reality”. As Walter Benjamin wrote in his Theses
on the Philosophy of History, there may well be people who prefer the existent
order instead of any change: they are the “winners” in the game of history, for
whom the actual world is the best possible one. Why should philosophy stay
on the side of the others, the losers, and therefore advocate conflict in order to
produce change? In other words: is philosophy intrinsically conservative or nec-
4 See Ricoeur (1969).

essarily revolutionary? Again: from the point of view I am trying to propose, there
cannot be any “logical” proof for one or the other alternative. One can only offer
“historical” (even psychological) experiences; which are consciously related to
a specific historical condition, the lack of emergency, and don’t claim to hold for
ever. Of course, also the supporters of a metaphysical and logical order may be in
favour of change – if the world is “out of joint”, it deserves to be put back in its
joint.⁵ But always in the name of a given metaphysical structure, which is bound
to eliminate conflicts (all wars are presented as the last one, in view of peace. . . )
and to re-establish to ti en einai, quodquid erat esse. . . With the already cited risk
of Stalinism: revolution is over, now let’s go to work. . .
I have the motivated impression that the philosophers engaged in a project on
contradictions feel radically unsatisfied with a theory which does not propose, at
least at the end, a conciliated ideal of rational life based in the acceptance of a
metaphysical (stable, objective, etc.) truth. What can philosophy imagine instead
of that? Even revolution – think of Marx – can only be inspired by the ideal of
a final elimination of alienation, albeit remote and hard to reach. Hermeneutics
accepts the risk of proposing a sort of open dialectics (I don’t know whether or
not we are facing once more the Freudian duality between eros and thanatos.);
which, considering itself nothing but a historically situated response to the call
of the current situation (in theory and in political practice), does not have to offer
a “complete” system, not even in terms of an ideal of “good life”: the sole good
life (I think it’s a suggestion by McIntyre) is the one in which everybody is in the
condition of deciding what good life means to her/him.
Now, on the basis of what I argued for till now, insuperable contradictions are
those which escape any logical conciliation; i.e. the claim by an “objective truth”
to decide who is right and who is wrong. The simple introduction of interpreta-
tion into the picture “corrupts” everything. There is no “meta-language” capable
of guaranteeing a radical translation, therefore one has to introduce the “principle
of charity”; and there is no absolute neutral point of view independent of inter-
ests, and therefore one has to introduce the principle of negotiation or, when this
does not work, the conflict. Even in order to regulate conflicts by a constitution one
has very often to struggle, more or less violently, against the existing (dis)order.
Insuperable contradictions may be described in the terms used by Richard Rorty
in his (insuperable) book of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature⁶: hermeneutic
vs. epistemological. Should we really believe that a world in which every contra-
5 See Shakespeare (1996), act 1, scene 5, 186–190.

6 Rorty (1979).
diction is reducible to an epistemological “puzzle”⁷ would be better than ours?

Should philosophy cooperate to that “end” (which would have the double sense
of the term)?
I don’t want to call hermeneutics an ontology of revolution, but it is in fact
something of this kind. The reduction of every contradiction to an epistemolog-
ical puzzle involves a Parmenidian ontology of eternal structures – even only in
terms of stable laws of the becoming, where the sole possible changes concern the
more or less complete knowledge of truth or the more or less complete develop-
ment of a given plan. Metaphysics, in the sense criticized by Heidegger from the
very beginning of his philosophical career in Being and Time, by its belief in truth
as correspondence, involves the denial of any possible event, of course of any in-
terpretation non purely functional to the correspondence intellectus et rei, and
finally of historicity and freedom. I know very well that all this seem to be a way
of charging too many faults on the shoulders of metaphysics, which at the very
end seems to have helped strongly so many revolutions, starting with the French
Aufklärung of the 18th century. If you cannot appeal to truth (natural law, natural
human rights, etc.), how can you revolt against the tyrant? Well objected; but let’s
not forget the dictum of the Gospel: truth will set you free. Relativists and pragma-
tists like Rorty (and myself, allow me to say) willingly agree with this sacred word.
Only they take it very seriously: truth is (only) what sets you free. In order to ac-
complish this task, truth has to be historically effective. The idea of natural rights
connected to the very nature of human beings has often been a useful device for
revolutions (e.g. in order to combat the opposite belief in the divine right of the
monarch), but in other situations it can become a way of reinforcing oppression:
see what happens in the catholic morals where surely absurd authoritarian im-
peratives (the ban on condoms in times of Aids) are always justified in the name
of the pretended natural law.
To talk, as I dare to do, of an ontology of revolution in a time in which the
dominating new realism of the Searle-Bush school tends to reduce ontology to
the description of what objects “are”, proposing as phenomenology and ontology
the everyday meaning of the words with a further apologetic addition, a “sup-
plement d’ame” (in this case, a supplement of pretended reality), involves many
risks. Not only of being considered a potential terrorist (relativism is social disor-
der) but also the risk of being expulsed from the category of philosophers. I can
try to justify myself by recalling that the idea of Being as Event, Ereignis, proposed
by Heidegger, which implies the consequences I tried to illustrate very shortly in
this paper, is still (one of) the most reasonable alternative(s) philosophy has been
7 See Kuhn (1970).

able to imagine to the metaphysical submission of theory and practice to the often
violent authority of “what there is”. Insuperable contradiction is in many senses
the very place where Being happens (sich ereignet, or: es, das Sein, gibt) and truth
puts itself into work. The strong connection between truth, the event of being, and
conflict, is a constant of the thought of the late Heidegger which a peaceful and
irenic version of hermeneutics may have a bit left aside in its effort of “urbaniza-
tion”. Let the philosophical meditation on contradiction, albeit inspired by the
same purpose of promoting conciliation, serve (contradictorily) to remind us of
the ontological necessity of conflict.
References
W. Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History”, in: W. Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. by
H. Arendt, London, 1999.
F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York, 1992.
G. W. F. Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden. Theorie Werkausgabe. New edition on the basis of the
Works of 1832–1845. Ed. by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel. Frankfurt a. M. (quoted as
TW), 1969ff.
M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen, 1927.
T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edition, Chicago, 1970.
P. Ricoeur, Le conflit des interprétations: essais d’herméneutique, Paris, 1969.
R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton, 1979.
W. Shakespeare, “Hamlet”, in: William Shakespeare. The Complete Work, Hertfordshire, 670–
713, 1996.
B. De Spinoza, OperaPosthuma, Amsterdam, 1677.
Federico Vercellone
A Disenchanted Reenchantment
Hermeneutics and Morphology
1 Hermeneutics and the Disenchantment

of the World
Hermeneutics pertains in essence to the epoch of the Weberian “disenchantment
of the world”. An experience of opacity of the world is present in the development
of the theory of interpretation from beginning to end. The awareness that things
have lost their language and their power is an important motivation for its rise.¹
It is therefore legitimate to hypothesize that there is something similar going
on in Gadamer’s approach. In Gadamer, in fact, as is well known, the conscious-
ness of a fracture with fundamental traditions, which determines the ulterior ne-
cessity of a suture – of a recomposition – is notably present. From this demand,
the urge arises in him to take back the modern hermeneutical tradition, and to put
it into contact with Martin Heidegger’s thinking.
It is also well known that Jürgen Habermas saw the way to build bridges in
hermeneutics.² Through the recourse to traditions and to their founding force,
hermeneutics explains in many ways the demand to restore what I would define as
a “symbolic membership” in the world, where symbolic membership itself disap-
pears. With “membership” here one means, above all, the idea of a remedy to the
uprooting produced by modernity, a sort of compensation in the face of the exces-
sive dominion of subjectivity in mature modernity. That domain, which resulted
in the idea of a “purely self-sufficient humanism”,³ is an unconscious symptom of
the political messianism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and of a tech-
nique which has for a long time denied all responsibility toward nature.
As a response to this tendentially omnipotent domain of subjectivity, Ga-
damer returns to a compensatory ideal which is summed up in the idea of a
“fusion of horizons”.⁴ As has been argued, the modern “disenchantment of the
world”, as a consequence of a deployed subjectivity, which is produced in the
1 See on this point Taylor (2007), in particular chapter I.

2 See Habermas (1971), 392–401.
3 See Taylor (2007), 18.
4 See Gadamer (1986), 311–312.
182 | Federico Vercellone
technical domain of the world, necessitates in Gadamer’s eyes a recuperative

meditation not just on traditions but also on common sense.
As for Aristotle, a competent science is not sufficient in Gadamer’s eyes; a
culture of the science in question must accompany it.⁵ In other words, no one can
do anything without a sense of his work.
It is upon this base, moreover, as is well known, that Gadamer reevaluates
taste as a model of common sense, that depository of sense that is not immediately
conceptual. This move is in contrast to aesthetic consciousness.
We are talking about two dimensions that are completely antithetical even to
Kantian aesthetics. We could say – borrowing perhaps too freely from Gadamer’s
argument – that the creation of a sphere that is absolutely autonomous, destined
for beauty, provided by the four moments of the “judgment of taste”, ends up com-
ing into contrast with the ideal of taste as a depository of common sense.⁶ While
aesthetic consciousness provides a substantial self-referential dimension, which
alludes, to be clear, to the situation in which autonomous art is organized into its
proper institutions (which are factories of a signification and of a valorization of
the artistic product that is solely aesthetic), taste, as aesthetic “sensus communis”,
alludes to an opposite signification. Taste roots art in tradition, demanding a uni-
versal judge that does not come, and cannot be given exclusively to the officers of
art as an institution. Taste excludes the principle of an aesthetic function of art in
favor of its rooting in the Lifeworld.
It is thus important to ask if what can rightly be defined as the “democracy
of taste”, the ideal of a communis opinio that guides the valuation of the artistic
fact, can live with an autonomous system of art which opens into the institution –
art here intended as a closed circuit which asserts itself. In this framework, for
Gadamer, the model of play opens into a communality between subject and ob-
ject, between myself and the world.⁷
In simple terms, hermeneutics proposes a return, as I said above, as an inte-
gration of sense and as a compensation toward a technological and instrumental
rationality which suggests itself as the only possible model of reason. We have
to do with an unambiguous, rigid model, which regulates the movement of the
world in a disciplined and functional way, which necessitates, precisely for this
reason, a supplementary logic, a grammar of sense which accompanies that of
the concept.
5 Aristotle (2001), 639 a 1–5.

6 See Gadamer (1986), 48–61.
7 See Gadamer (1986), 107–126 and 491–494.
A Disenchanted Reenchantment | 183
Late-modern consciousness traverses its contradictions, searching for mod-

els of compensation. The expropriating domain of the concept, which creates re-
ality under the auspices of a bad technique, insensible to cultural differences and
of the capacity of nature to self-organize, makes new extramethodical forms of
signification necessary. In other words, stretching the intentions of Gadamer, in
contraposition to the expropriation of historical contexts and the places produced
through the unambiguous path of uniform reason, which claims to equalize every-
thing in its course, we can propose a recalibrating step. This is the idea of a new
“rootedness”.
In this way, Gadamer responds to a fundamental instance of German ide-
alism, in particular Hegel, an instance contained in the idea of philosophy as
Wissenschaft, as universal science. Philosophy, as an achievement of knowledge,
as knowledge conscious of itself, represents, from this point of view, the sum of
knowledge because it is the only one that cannot be separated from its own sense.
Knowledge that does not know itself is not, from this point of view, real knowl-
edge. It loses, among other things, a fundamental component of knowledge: the
cognition of self that announces the responsibility of knowledge itself, which has
its performance, for Gadamer, in the living text of the objective spirit reverberat-
ing in a story of sense, divided, sedimented, and codified in its passage through
the many bends in the river of tradition.
2 Morphology and the Reenchantment

of the World
In many respects, in trying to give a solution to the contradictory movement of
secularization considered above, the idea of morphology recaptures the idea of
the hermeneutical system and its inspiration. But it does so with the awareness
of a profound revision of cultural paradigms, a revision that follows the idea of
the secular world and the secularized product of the rational “disenchantment of
the world”, with its immediate, violent kickbacks and the profound modifications
to its paradigms. At the most diverse levels there is a rediscovering of a sort of
renewed necessity of juxtaposing universal reason with a model of reason that is
more open to context, which we can define as “local reason”.
The necessity of resuming the motivations of Horkheimer and Adorno’s Di-
alectic of the Enlightenment (varying the discourse and utilizing another refer-
ence point) is announced in this way. And it would perhaps be permissible in this
framework to retranslate the polarity within which, in the eyes of the two authors,
the fundamental contradiction of mature modernity is reflected. The dialectics of
myth and enlightenment becomes in this frame the dialectics of rooting and up-
rooting. To come to the point, the following must be said. The uprooting of reason
produces at the most diverse levels the necessity of new rootings that assume the
aspect of myth, at least inasmuch as they are offered as absolute members, as new
founding assets of the community and of existence.
Do we want to say this in terms that make reference to the present day politi-
cal panorama? As is all too well known, we are not so unrelated, for example, and
in ways that are more and more worrisome, to fundamentalisms. And fundamen-
talisms, too, are derived at their core from the demand to renew their roots in the
face of a too-abstract development that is uniform and equalizing. The necessity
of escaping into this logic reverberates in the violent will of giving oneself back or
returning oneself, as if speaking of a violated right, to the ubi consistam.
This confirms, in the end, that this late-modern life suffers from its own up-
rooting. The “nonplaces” of late-modern existence, stations, airports, and so on,
are precisely the places of transit, uninhabitable, alienating places that cause anx-
iety.⁸
We can confront the question from another perspective. We could say that in-
evitably secularization has found its limits in national and local culture, limits
that were already revealed in the eyes of Gadamer, but in their positive signifi-
cance, as motives of resistance against a sort of imperialism of conceptual reason
that has been developed as a technical domain of the world. Nevertheless, on the
one hand, the limits and the resistances of culture are revealed not just as limits
or positive contradictions of a sort of imperialism of reason, but also as real and
proper wells of a quantity of negative feedbacks. As we have said above, the ne-
cessity of rediscovering oneself produces newly rooted identities, as well new po-
litical-cultural structures of identity, which suggest nevertheless as absolute – as
universal and inextensively valid and cogent – what should be relative to context
instead (and that probably only from this last aspect can invoke the universal).
That is: I refer to the fabric of customs, manners, beliefs, and common sense.
All of this was, in a nutshell, already there in Gadamer, but now develops
in terms of a conflictual and not complementary identity with respect to that of
deployed reason. The integration of sense proposed by Gadamer is not in itself
sufficient before the necessity of recovering identity or of producing it anew, even
using the resources of tradition. This, it seems to me, is the real critical point of
Gadamerian hermeneutics. The hermeneutical remedy is too weak in the face of a
present evil. The integration of sense reveals itself as an ineffectual remedy when
faced with the contradictory logic of secularization, when faced with the reactive
8 See Augé (1992).

crisis of religious-cultural identity which aims to transform itself and suggest itself
as a political power.
For that matter, the radicality of identities, derived from the contradictory pro-
cess of secularization, does not only cross cultures in declaratively violent frame-
works, like those of the modern wars of religion, but also in places where, at least
explicitly, totalitarianisms and fundamentalisms are not in question. After all,
considering all the differences, in Italy too we see that a similar process takes
place. In the end, Lega Nord and Slow Food provide a very different answer to
the same need. The radical ethnic, religious, and gastronomic identities, in every
case fictitious precisely because of their radicality, impose themselves like a kind
of indispensable historical necessity, which proceeds with determination to meet
violent or at least too apodictic outcomes.
They impose an absolute identity that seems to negate one of the presupposi-
tions of secularization, the resolving of identities in cultures that do not coincide
necessarily with political boundaries or with ethnicities.
But, in this picture, there is one remaining surprise. The same technology, in
fact, now modifies those characteristics. From many points of view, technology
seems increasingly less to lead to the disenchantment of the world, according to
the model that is variably expressed by thinkers who are (no less) intellectually
distant from one other, like Max Weber and Martin Heidegger. And it is increas-
ingly configured instead as a form of enchantment,⁹ in the service of an art that
attempts to produce new rootings. From the digital image, to the new possibilities
discussed by the rendering of the image, to the work of artists like Olafur Eliasson,
it is more and more evident that technology suggests itself, at least in some of its
particularly significant moments, as a motivation for a new “re-enchantment of
the world”, which is to say that it produces a new belonging. They seem, in other
words, to open the possibility of a technology that is more inventive, more prudent
toward place and nature, less devastating.
One need think only of the meaning of an installation like Weather Project by
Eliasson at the New Tate in London in 2004. We have here a sun, capable even
of tanning, which illuminates and, as it were, “invents” a new environment that
modifies our way of feeling, which intervenes, like a new energy, in the individual
and collective sentiment, creating a new community which is lyrical and epical at
the same time.
All of this has coincided with an indubitable oscillation of the cultural
paradigms that have brought to the center of attention the question of the im-
age which, in the meantime, has become one of the dominant factors of cultural
9 See on these topics Gell (1992).

communication. The image in this case does not suggest itself just as antithetical
with respect to the concept, but also, and above all, as a form of conceptualiza-
tion.
And at this point, we must ask what image we are dealing with. It was Hans
Belting who broached the question in the most perspicuous terms when he con-
trasted the image as representation, an outcome of the western perspective of vi-
sion, with the Arab world, which thinks of the image as from light and not from the
gaze.¹⁰ According to Belting the eye that sees in perspective transforms the world
into an image. The perspective gaze, we could say in this context, extremizing the
thesis of Belting, becomes the principle of a nihilistic dissolution of the world,
of its transformation into mere representation. That dissolution of the world into
a multiplicity of points of view that vie with one another for the center of the
perspective is what Nietzsche lucidly announced with the notion of the “will to
power”. Heidegger took this up and developed it, proposing the idea of an Age of
the World Picture.¹¹
3 Rooting Oneself in Images. . .

The image reduced to a representation opens therefore into the logic of modern
uprooting. But the image reduced to a representation is also an impoverished im-
age, which has left behind it that invitation to rooting inherent in the mythical
image.¹²
I would like to explain this thesis, articulating it here in a series of points.¹³
a. In reality, the image opens a logic of membership that coincides with the his-
torical, theoretical, and cultural demands upon which we have paused.¹⁴ In the
image, the intuition that constitutes its prelude configures membership in places
and contexts. The consciousness of images develops within a visible camp (and
therefore, in a sense, “local”) in which it comes to clarify itself, moving from its ini-
tial motivation, i.e. the intuition, to expand itself into total articulation of vision.
From this point of view, the logic of the image is next to hermeneutics, precisely to
the extent that it articulates and gives development to a deposit of implicit sense.
10 See Belting (2008).

11 See Heidegger (1977), 74–113.
12 See Vercellone (2008), 7–29.
13 See on these topics also Breidbach/Vercellone (2011).
14 On the idea of a “postmodern rootedness” see Del Pozo Ortea (2011), 85–100.
It responds nevertheless, in an ever more immediate way, to the necessity of a

reintegration, for which hermeneutics sought to provide resources.
b. The image explains, then, a logic of membership inasmuch as it is stylistically

characterized. And there should be no doubt that the style is, at least initially, the
characterization of a place, the reason by which it explains its peculiarities, the
sense of its traditions.
c. From this point of view, and in this framework, it also becomes possible to de-
fine the structure and subjectivity of the image. The category of the sublime will
be useful again here. It will become useful when we want to propose a structuring
of the universe of the image, a first instance of its peculiar semantic articulation.
A first cell of what I would define as morphological. The image has a semantic ar-
ticulation that is consecrated by a minimal expenditure of energy, an articulation
attentive to the energetic economy of communication, which is a vehicle for com-
plex content in the shortest time possible, that is, simultaneously. The economy
of minimal force imposes itself in the framework of an increasing complexity and
on the basis of the necessity to overcome it without betraying it, keeping faith-
ful to the demand – incited in the logic of the image – of transferring a message
semantically dense in a decisively quicker time than that allowed by the discur-
sive/conceptual logic founded on the subject-predicate structure.
d. Once it is accepted that the image is a complex system such as this, one must
ask how the images themselves constitute their syntax, how they articulate, that
is, among themselves, following an alternative to the method furnished by discur-
sive articulation. How can the connection between the images be produced? In
what way can they put themselves into relationships with one another, furnish-
ing some forms of organized sequence in a “logical” sense, broadly construed? I
begin the discussion here, attempting to cast one glance onto the question.
e. To start, one might say that the condition for the connection of images is also
that of their manifesting, that which allows their appearance. This is an occasion –
in this regard – to resume a romantic teaching coming from Philipp Otto Runge. In
order to appear, to assume the configuration they are entitled to, images need an
obscure background that allows them to emerge. Inasmuch as Runge’s silhouettes
testify, they individuate themselves – as they could never do in nature – precisely
because of this background that throws their profile into relief. One could even
say more, perhaps thinking of the influence on Runge exercised by Jakob Böhme.
In the background one might read the provenance of the image, its emergence
from the fabric of creation. Accepting this interpretation – at least inasmuch as it
concerns Runge – one could say that nothing, as a background, is the condition
of being for the emergence of the image.
f. A thesis of this sort could be developed apart from the romantic context of its
first formulation. One could affirm – precisely by extrapolating this idea from its
point of origin – that, in order to manifest itself in its morphological completion
(and not reduce itself therefore in signs, as if they were points without extension),
images are always turned outside of themselves, outside of their own perimeter
and their own confines. The background is, precisely, their condition for being, as
I said above in relation to Runge. In order to make their being emerge and, with
it, also their complex identity – their meaning – images must stand out like this
against that nothingness that is their origin. In order to divest the evil of nothing-
ness of its power, but also to profit from it – the two opposing concepts go hand in
hand here – images attempt to join themselves with other images without know-
ing beforehand the formula by which they will reach their objective. They are,
therefore, always situated over the abyss. Images institute their peculiar syntax
precisely in this way. It is an articulation that is not founded on the evidence of
the copula but on its exorcism of nothingness. And nothingness is not just the
condition of the appearance of the image tout court, but also – as I said above –
of its appearance as an image.
g. We could also assert that, contrary to this discussion, the image is recognizable
because – at least upon first glance – it proposes itself essentially in its singularity
against a background that puts it at risk but renders it altogether intuitable. In this
way, the image gives itself over to meaning through its intrinsic semantics, starting
from its peculiar syntax. It is, as it were, constrained to watching through itself,
outside of itself. On this basis, moreover – apart from its connection with the rest
of the universe of images and with other semantic universes – its own minimal
relationship can be stabilized: reference. It is the image of. . . This too confirms
that precisely the constitutive transcendence of the image is the condition of its
recognizability and therefore that which could define its ontological status.
h. To summarize: Images are manifestations of something which, from them,

emerges only inasmuch as they can appeal to the “background of nothing” that
furnishes their sufficient stress. Thanks to this background, the ontological dif-
ference that defines them as images manifests itself, making it the case, in other
words, that the image is an “image of. . . ”
Now, if the making of an image in a system of signs depends on its stand-
ing out against nothing, we have ipso facto a connection to the structure of the
sublime. The truth of an assertion of this kind becomes evident if we look at the
situation from the opposite point of view: the signs that organize verbal discourse
manifest, above all, their signifying quality, and not their “imaging”, insofar as
they can be placed and seen in sequence. This is not true for the image that “pow-
erfully” manifests its signification in solitude. It “searches” choral character, but
does not hold it from the beginning. In other words, something comes to mean
“in image” inasmuch as it transforms into infinite, into the 𝑛 that indicates the
plurivocity of an indefinite principle of return, that glance onto nothingness that
can make it nothing. In this way, the image becomes an image, and is semanti-
cally structured according to its particular articulation. Thus, it is from the be-
ginning, as it were, “made” for montage installation and, on this foundation, as
Georges Didi-Huberman reminded us recently, to execute a critical task.¹⁵ From
this point of view, the image is inevitably the subject and object of its own struc-
turing where, at most, the same distinction between the two planes almost has a
meaning, again: almost nothing, because it cannot be seen from which point of
view one can structure the gaze, from above or head on, to furnish the subject-
object structure with its peculiar development.
i. Style expresses, in this framework, a synthetic necessity connected to the logic

of the image but also connected to the necessity, increasingly pressing, of explain-
ing a complex logic, a highly articulated semantic content as quickly as possible.
And the intuitive contemporaneity realized in the image and communicated by
style is the quickest possible way of realizing itself from a communication of high
semantic content.
j. In this perspective morphology is suggested as a continuation of hermeneutics

within a theoretical framework profoundly altered with respect to context and
motivation. The integration of sense is, as it were, natural in this scope, where
15 See Didi-Huberman (2010).

intuition aids the knowledge that develops in the image, which will have further
developments in the discursive arena.
k. We now have to address the logic of the image, which opens a radically new
perspective with respect to the hermeneutical integration of sense proposed by
Gadamer. This fundamentally depends on the fact that the image expresses a per-
formative logic that is profoundly different from the discursive one articulated in
the subject/predicate relationship, which is also the logic of the hermeneutical
circle of question and response.
l. The image opens in fact into a holistic context in which we are therefore im-
mersed. We do not have here the distance between subject and object typically
established in a discursive realm. It is a holistic concept in which we are immersed
and on which we depend as much as we influence it. It is a context – scientific or
artistic, it doesn’t matter – characterized stylistically to which we obtain member-
ship and, at the same time, exercise our influence.
m. In this way we must deal with a performative mode of thought that claims to
have a precedence over action. Or better still: it reclaims the idea of “formativity”,
which the Aesthetics of Pareyson proposed to us, the idea of “a doing which, as it
does, invents the way in which it does.”¹⁶
n. One more aspect connected to the peculiarity of the significance of the image
is that it “says” even in solitude. In contrast, no discursive component does so
autonomously, or does so fully. Of course, it is not opportune to oppose image to
concept in a drastic manner. In fact, it is placed at their mutual boundaries.
o. However, the image stabilizes its reference even by itself. It manifests its ref-
erence putting itself in relation to a proper background which makes it stand out
as an image of. . . Upon this basis it combines with other images – and it does
so precisely because of the opaque background, because of that nothing that
surrounds it and that constitutes the condition of its signification. It is exactly
16 Pareyson (1988), 59.

this background, the emptiness upon which the image stands out, which allows
the image to establish contact with other images. The other images are possi-
bilities of unedited relations, analogical-metaphorical relations that also belong
to the discourse, but that the image holds with a decisively greater freedom.
Here is the cognitive potential and the discovery of the image that is indissolubly
joined to its stylistic priority. In fact, the more an image is stylistically charac-
terized, the more it becomes recognized as its message by the community of its
users/contemplators. And this is true for a work of art, a publication, or even a
scientific image.
p. The image tends, therefore, at its heart, always to make itself into an icon. It
tends to re-enchant by making recourse not to the romantic infinite but to tech-
nological devices. It is thus prone to artificially forcing time in the direction of
eternity, rooting in a new space that is itself to be created, producing in this way
new memberships.
References
Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, ed. by J. G. Lennox, Oxford, 2001.
M. Augé, Non lieux. Introduction à une anthropologie de la surmodernité, Paris 1992, 1992.
H. Belting, Florenz und Bagdad. Eine westöstliche Geschichte des Blicks, Munich, 2008.
O. Breidbach and F. Vercellone, Anschauung Denken, Munich, 2011.
M. Del Pozo Ortea, “‘Nocilla Dream’ y la literatura radicante: Un árbol en el desierto del la post-
modernidad”, in: Lucerro. A journal of iberian and latin american studien 17/1, 85–100,
2011.
G. Didi-Huberman, Remontages du temps subi. L’oeil de l’histoire, Paris, 2010.
H.-G. Gadamer, “Warheit und Methode,. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik”, in:
Gesammelte Werke, vol. 1, Tübingen, 1986.
A. Gell, “The Technology of Enchantment and The Enchantment of Technology”, in: J. Coote and
A. Shelton (eds.), Anthropology, Art and Aesthetics, Oxford, 1992.
J. Habermas, “Urbanisierung der Heideggerschen Provinz”, in: J. Habermas (ed.),
Philosophisch-politische Profile, Frankfurt a. M., 392–401, 1971.
M. Heidegger, “Die Zeit des Weltbildes”, in: Gesamtausgabe, vol. 5: Holzwege, Frankfurt a. M.,
74–113, 1977.
L. Pareyson, Estetica: teoria della formatività, 4th edition, Milan, 1988.
C. Taylor, A secular age, Cambridge, 2007.
F. Vercellone, Oltre la bellezza, Bologna, 2008.
Wolfgang Welsch
Wie wir auf Konsistenz aus sind –
und warum
Eine Theorie der Konsistenz habe ich leider nicht anzubieten. Sondern nur einige
Beobachtungen, die sich über Jahrzehnte eingestellt haben. Vielleicht lassen sich
aus ihnen jedoch einige Bausteine zu einer Theorie der Konsistenz gewinnen.
Eines vorab: Ich werde von Konsistenz und Kohärenz nicht wohlunterschie-
den sprechen. Üblicherweise sagt man, Konsistenz sei eine logische Bestimmung,
die verlangt, dass ein Verbund von Aussagen keinen Widerspruch enthält (bzw.
dass kein Widerspruch aus ihm ableitbar ist). Kohärenz verlange hingegen mehr,
nämlich inhaltlichen Zusammenhang und idealerweise eine vollständige wech-
selseitige Stützung der Aussagen. So gesehen, wäre Konsistenz zwar eine notwen-
dige, aber noch keine hinreichende Bedingung für Kohärenz. Ich bin mir nicht si-
cher. In den Fällen, auf die ich mich beziehen werde, scheint Konsistenz immer
schon etwas von Kohärenz zu haben. Wie wenn die beiden durch eine Klammer
verbunden wären, so dass, wenn man vom einen spricht, das andere unwillkür-
lich zugleich im Spiel ist. Vielleicht ist beides in Wahrheit nicht glasklar unter-
scheidbar. Ich sympathisiere mit Davidsons Idee, beides mehr oder minder gleich-
zusetzen: „coherence is nothing but consistency“.¹
1 Welche Erwartungen haben wir an Personen,

wenn wir von ihnen (anscheinend nur)
Konsistenz erwarten?
Die folgende Frage bildet meinen Ausgangspunkt bzw. mein Ausgangsproblem:
Warum verlangen wir von Personen, dass sie in ihren Aussagen konsistent sei-
en? Warum ist das so? Ginge es nicht auch anders? Ich gehe also nicht von einer
logischen, sondern von einer vergleichsweise existenziellen Fragestellung aus.
Warum verlangen wir von Personen Konsistenz? Möglicherweise ist dies die tiefe-
re Fragestellung als die logische. Vielleicht verlangen wir logische Konsistenz,
weil wir personale Konsistenz wollen.
1 Davidson (1990), 134–138, hier 135.

194 | Wolfgang Welsch
Jedenfalls ist unsere Konsistenzerwartung an Personen ein Faktum. Wir for-

dern Konsistenz im Alltag: „Du sagst mal so und mal anders. Was meinst Du ei-
gentlich? Was willst Du wirklich? Willst Du im Urlaub ins Piemont fahren oder
nach Bayern? Wein oder Bier? Entscheide Dich endlich!“
Und wir verlangen Konsistenz in der Philosophie: Heidegger beispielsweise
verteidigte Sein und Zeit gegen den Vorwurf des Anthropozentrismus, indem er
schrieb: „Welche Gefahren birgt denn ein ,anthropozentrischer Standpunkt‘ in
sich, der gerade alle Bemühung einzig darauf legt, zu zeigen, dass das Wesen des
Daseins, das da ,im Zentrum‘ steht, ekstatisch, d. h. ,exzentrisch‘ ist?“² Aber an-
dererseits hat Heidegger den Anspruch der philosophischen Anthropologie, die
grundlegende Philosophie zu sein, scharf kritisiert.³ Was soll nun gelten? Die Le-
gitimierung der Zentralität der Anthropologie oder ihre Bestreitung? Beides geht
doch nicht zusammen.
Oder, wenn ich ein persönliches Beispiel anführen darf: Heute sagt man mir
manchmal, man wisse gar nicht mehr, wo ich stehe. Früher hätte ich postmoderne
Theorien vertreten, heute würde ich eine Art evolutionistischer Metaphysik ver-
folgen, die irgendwie an Whitehead erinnere. Was halte ich denn nun für richtig?
Das eine oder das andere? Wofür will ich wirklich eintreten?
Dass man zu unterschiedlichen Zeiten unterschiedliche Theorien entwickelt,
sollte eigentlich kein Problem sein, jedenfalls so lange nicht, wie diese Theori-
en zu einander nicht in Widerspruch stehen. Und so verhält es sich hier. Die un-
terschiedlichen Theorien beziehen sich schlicht auf unterschiedliche Fragen und
Sachfelder. Es stimmt, dass ich derzeit eine evolutionäre Ontologie verfolge, aber
ich habe früher keine postmoderne Ontologie entwickelt – ein Konflikt ist also gar
nicht möglich. Oder meine Äußerungen über die postmoderne Architektur einer-
seits und die Koevolution ontischer und logischer Strukturen andererseits berüh-
ren einander überhaupt nicht, können einander also ebenfalls nicht widerstrei-
ten.
2 Heidegger (1967), 21–71, hier 58, Anm.

3 „Die Tendenz zur Anthropologie ist letztlich die Absicht darauf, überhaupt zu entscheiden, was
wirklich ist und was nicht, was Wirklichkeit und Sein heißt; damit aber auch zu entscheiden, was
Wahrheit besagt“. Heidegger (1997), 16. „Anthropologie ist heute denn auch längst nicht mehr
nur der Titel für eine Disziplin, sondern das Wort bezeichnet eine Grundtendenz der heutigen
Stellung des Menschen zu sich selbst und im Ganzen des Seienden. Gemäß dieser Grundstellung
ist etwas nur erkannt und verstanden, wenn es eine anthropologische Erklärung gefunden hat.
Anthropologie sucht nicht nur die Wahrheit über den Menschen, sondern beansprucht jetzt die
Entscheidung darüber, was Wahrheit überhaupt bedeuten kann“. Heidegger (1965), 191.
Aber obwohl somit von den Sachen (Theorien) her kein Anlass zur Rüge be-
stünde, moniert man die Unterschiedlichkeit.⁴ Jemand, der so unterschiedliche
Theorien verfolgt, scheint irgendwie dubios zu sein. Er ist einem nicht geheuer.
Was man möchte und erwartet, ist etwas anderes: dass jemand immer dasselbe
vertritt oder ein und denselben Gedanken sukzessiv entwickelt, anreichert, ver-
feinert.⁵
Aber was ist der Grund, warum man dies verlangt oder erwartet? Der Theori-
enpluralismus – bei einer einzelnen Person – ist anscheinend nicht nur unprak-
tisch, sondern irritierend. Er ist störend. Man ist sich unsicher und fragt sich: Was
meint dieser Mensch denn nun wirklich?
Dabei geht es offenbar um mehr als logische Konsistenz. (Diese ist ja ge-
währleistet.) Wenn man fragt, was jener Mensch eigentlich meine, schwingt die
Befürchtung mit, dass er uns möglicherweise täuschen könnte, dass er mit uns
spielt, dass er uns an der Nase herum führt. Wir strengen uns an, seine Thesen zu
verstehen, seine Theorie zu verfolgen. Der Proponent selber aber ist möglicher-
weise längst woanders. Vielleicht meint er seine Thesen gar nicht ernst, sondern
plappert sie nur so daher. Vielleicht glaubt er selber nicht, dass sie wert seien,
sich damit zu befassen, sich mit ihnen auseinander zu setzen – während wir uns
gutgläubig große Mühe damit geben. Mit anderen Worten: Wir befürchten, dass
dieser Kerl uns täuscht.
Geht es also bei der Konsistenzforderung an Individuen eigentlich um die Er-
wartung sozialer Verlässlichkeit? Ist Konsistenz, tiefer als ein logisches, ein kom-
munikatives oder soziales Prinzip? Richard Rorty war dieser Auffassung.⁶ Aber ich
zweifle – dazu später mehr.
4 In den vorgenannten Fällen (vom Bayern/Piemont-Beispiel an) handelt es sich natürlich nicht
um Widersprüche im Sinn des Aristotelischen Nicht-Widerspruchs-Prinzips, denn man sagt ja
nicht zu gleicher Zeit über dasselbe in derselben Hinsicht einander Widersprechendes. Die exis-
tenzielle Widerspruchs-Problematik geht über diese Forderung logischer Nichtwidersprüchlich-
keit weit hinaus. Was logisch nicht widersprüchlich ist, kann existenziell gleichwohl als wider-
sprüchlich gelten. Und diese Alltagswidersprüchlichkeit einer Person kann von anderen als un-
erträglich empfunden werden: So kann man nicht leben, diese Widersprüchlichkeit macht einen
verrückt.
5 Eine derartige Erwartung erinnert mich allerdings an den Kunstmarkt: Künstler sollen dort eine
eindeutige Identität haben, sie sollen auf Anhieb erkennbar sein und nicht einmal das das eine
und ein andermal etwas anderes machen. Nicht nur corporate identity, auch individual identity
ist ökonomisch bzw. marktstrategisch geboten. So auch in der Philosophie?
6 So jedenfalls hat Rorty im Jahr 2001 meine diesbezügliche Frage beantwortet.
Im Moment will ich nur festhalten: Sofern das Bemerken von Inkonsistenz in
den Verdacht übergeht, wir würden getäuscht, verlangen wir offenbar mehr als
Konsistenz. Wir verlangen Wahrhaftigkeit. Wer inkonsistent ist, indem er inkohä-
rente Thesen vertritt, scheint nicht wahrhaftig zu sein.⁷ Wahrhaftigkeit ist es, was
wir eigentlich wollen, wenn wir Konsistenz einfordern.⁸
2 Innenperspektive
Wechseln wir nun von der Außenperspektive, wo ein anderer sagt, jemand sei
inkonsistent, zur Innenperspektive, wo eine Person ihre Inkonsistenz selber be-
merkt und zu ihr Stellung nimmt.
Ein Beispiel dafür sind die folgenden Zeilen aus Walt Whitmans Leaves of
Grass:
Do I contradict myself?
Very well then . . . I contradict myself;
I am large . . . I contain multitudes.⁹
Whitman bemerkt, dass er sich widerspricht. Und wie reagiert er darauf? Durch
Akzeptation seiner Selbstwidersprüchlichkeit? Zunächst durchaus, indem er
sagt: “Very well then . . . I contradict myself”. Aber dann gibt er eine Erklärung,
die verständlich machen soll, dass diese Widersprüchlichkeit in Wahrheit doch
eine Form von Kohärenz darstellt: „I am large . . . I contain multitudes“. Gemeint
ist Folgendes: Wenn jemand eine Vielzahl von Positionen in sich vereint, dann
ist es nur konsequent, dass mal diese, mal jene in den Vordergrund tritt – er
sich in diesem Sinne also widerspricht. Es wäre geradezu inkonsequent, wenn
bei einem solchen Menschen keine Widersprüche auftreten würden. Entweder
besitzt eine Person wirkliche Pluralität, dann gehören zu ihr auch Widersprüche,
oder sie gerät niemals in Widersprüche, dann war es mit ihrer vermeintlichen
inneren Pluralität nichts. – Das also ist die Weise, wie Widersprüchlichkeit und
7 Wir unterstellen dabei nicht nur, dass der andere konsistent sein will, sondern auch, dass er
es vollständig kann.
8 Vgl. hier den Beitrag von Enrico Berti und seinen Hinweis, dass Łukasiewicz der Auffassung
war, dass Konsistenz eigentlich als praktischer und ethischer Wert zu begreifen sei. Vgl. Łukasi-
ewicz (1951).
9 „Song of Myself,“ Whitman (1985), 85.
Konsistenz hier zusammengebracht werden: Was auf der Ebene der Aussagen
widersprüchlich ist, ist auf der Ebene der Person konsistent.¹⁰
Ich diskutiere ein weiteres Beispiel: Einer meiner Freunde träumt von einem
Vortrag im Stil des Alters. Im Alter ist bekanntlich die Konzentrationsfähigkeit
schwächer, man verliert öfters den Faden der Rede. Ein bewusster Altersvortrag
würde diese Inkohärenz inszenieren. Man würde also wirklich inkohärent reden,
Inkohärentes vortragen (ohne den Nichtzusammenhang zu klären oder auch nur
Stellung dazu zu nehmen).
Aber würde man nicht auch dabei noch einem Prinzip der Kohärenz folgen?
Denn erstens: Dieser Redestil wäre kohärent zur Inkohärenz des Alters. Und zwei-
tens: Man würde darauf achten, dass nicht doch Kohärenz (verborgenerweise)
vorhanden wäre, weil das gegenüber der Intention (Inkohärenz!) inkohärent wä-
re. Es ist das (tiefere) Kohärenzgebot, das hier zu (manifester) Inkohärenz nötigt.
Was diese Beispiele (Whitman, Altersvortrag) zeigen, ist, dass Konsistenz ein
sehr starkes Gebot ist. Wo Inkonsistenz (einander widersprechende Aussagen)
auftritt, sucht man zu zeigen, dass diese Widersprüchlichkeit doch nur eine vor-
dergründige ist, dass auf einer höheren bzw. tieferen Ebene vielmehr doch Kon-
sistenz besteht. Und wenn man inkonsistent reden will, achtet man darauf, dies
konsequent bzw. konsistent zu tun – es darf kein Zusammenhang da sein, sonst
wäre die Rede inkonsistent (weil ihre Inkonsistenz nicht konsistent durchgeführt
wäre). Egal also, ob wir Konsistenz oder Inkonsistenz suchen: Wir fühlen uns in
jeden Falle gedrängt, dies konsistent zu tun. Konsistenz ist das Metagebot. Und
ein sehr starkes Gebot, ein sehr starker Imperativ.
3 Eine klassische Denkform: Aufhebung

der Widersprüche einer niedrigeren Ebene
auf einer höheren (höchsten) Ebene
Die Figur, durch die Widersprüchlichkeit (Inkonsistenz) und Konsistenz zusam-
men gebracht werden, ist (in der Philosophie wie sonst) die einer Ebenenunter-
scheidung. Was auf einer unteren Ebene widersprüchlich ist, kann auf einer hö-
heren Ebene konsistent sein. In Whitmans Beispiel war die untere Ebene die der
Aussagen, die höhere Ebene die der Struktur der Person. Und im Fall der Alters-
10 Eine Stufe weitergedacht bedeutet dies: Wirklich plural ist derjenige, der nicht nur mehrfältig
sein kann, sondern der gelegentlich auch einmal einfältig sein kann. Die Dauermehrfältigkeit
wäre ihrerseits vergleichsweise einfältig. Dagegen stellt die Kombination von Mehrfältigkeit und
Einfältigkeit die höhere und wahrhaftere Mehrfältigkeit dar.
rede war die erste Ebene ebenfalls die inkohärenter Aussagen, die höhere Ebene
aber die der strikten Konsistenz qua Inkohärenz.
Das sind alles Beispiele einer klassischen Figur: Die Widersprüche einer nied-
rigeren Ebene erfahren auf einer höheren (höchsten) Ebene ihre Aufhebung. – Wir
kennen alle die großen Beispiele dafür. Ich erwähne nur drei:
Nikolaus Cusanus’ Lehre von der coincidentia oppositorum besagt: Unsere
Welterfassung ist perspektivisch. Dabei stellen sich jedoch in den unterschiedli-
chen Perspektiven die gleichen Dinge unterschiedlich dar. Zum Beispiel weisen
die Gegenstände in sinnlicher Perspektive Farben auf, in mathematischer hin-
gegen nicht. Aber derlei Perspektivdifferenzen können nicht die letzte Wahrheit
sein. Denn in Gott selbst muss alles eins sein, für Gott stellen sich die Dinge nicht
derart perspektivisch dar. Also muss man über die Perspektivität und den mit
ihr verbundenen Gegensatzcharakter auf Nicht-Kontrarietät hinausdenken. Auch
wo uns die Erfassung dieser Nicht-Kontrarietät noch nicht gelingt, können wir
doch sicher sein, dass sie besteht. Darauf bezieht sich Cusanus’ Formel von der
„coincidentia oppositorum“. Was uns als Gegensatz erscheint, stimmt letztlich
doch zusammen, fällt ineins. Der Zusammenfall der Gegensätze ist die eigentliche
Wahrheit.¹¹
Diese Koinzidenz ist Gegenstand eines über die rationalen Gegensatzformen
hinausgehenden, sie transzendierenden Wissens. Zu diesem gelangt man jedoch
nicht gleichsam von oben (durch höhere Offenbarung, Gnade oder dergleichen),
sondern von unten: durch Ausgang von den Gegensätzen, durch deren Höherent-
wicklung zur Zusammenstimmung, durch das Bewusstsein, dass eine solche Zu-
sammenstimmung auch dort noch besteht, wo wir sie noch nicht zu explizieren
vermögen. Die entsprechende Wissensform ist die docta ignorantia. Sie ist nicht
mehr von der Begreifensart des Verstandes, sondern geht über dessen Eigenart,
die auf begriffliche Bestimmtheit zielt und damit auf Abgrenzung und Gegensatz-
charakter festgelegt ist, hinaus.
Ein besonders bekanntes Beispiel für die Übersteigung der Gegensätze durch
deren spekulative Aufhebung ist natürlich die Hegelsche Dialektik: Die Stufen des
Bewusstsein bzw. des Geistes geraten in für sie unauflösbare Widersprüche, die
sich erst auf der jeweils nächsthöheren Ebene aufheben, wo freilich, bevor nicht
die Stufe des absoluten Wissens bzw. des vollkommenen Schlusses des Systems
erreicht ist, erneut Widersprüche entstehen, die dann den Übergang zu einer wei-
teren Stufe ernötigen.
11 Eine konzise Darstellung der Lehre von der „coincidentia oppositorum“ bietet Kurt Flasch
(1972), 215–255.
Wichtig ist mir, dass sich die Figur der Transzendierung der Gegensätze in
einer höheren Wahrheit auch in anderen Kulturkreisen finde, Wir treffen sie bei-
spielsweise bei dem großen japanischen Philosophen Dōgen (1200–1253) an. In
einem seiner wichtigsten Texte –„Sansuikyo“ („Die Sutren der Berge und Flüs-
se“) – verfolgt Dōgen einander widerstreitende Aussagen wie „das Wasser fließt“
und „das Wasser fließt nicht“ oder „die Berge fließen“ und „die Berge fließen
nicht“.¹² Die Ebene, wo derlei Widersprüche auftreten und Bestand haben, ist die
gewöhnliche Ebene der Perspektivität. Aber wohin führt ein tendenziell vollstän-
diger Durchgang der Perspektiven und die Beachtung dessen, was dabei den ge-
gensätzlichen Attributionen widerfährt? Er führt dazu, dass keines der Prädikate
standhält. Man wird immer auf eine oder mehrere Perspektiven treffen, in denen,
was der einen Perspektive zufolge ein essentielles Prädikat einer Sache ist, mit
gleichem Recht gerade ausgeschlossen, negiert wird. Alle scheinbar essentiellen
Prädikate einer Sache erweisen sich somit als bloß perspektivisch geltend und da-
mit als gerade nicht essentielle Prädikate.¹³
Dōgens Überlegungen zur Perspektivität münden daher in die Aufforderung:
„Transzendiere die Unterscheidung von Gegensätzen!“¹⁴ Es geht für ihn darum,
über die „Welt der Relativität“ hinauszugelangen.¹⁵ „Der ungeteilte Geist transzen-
diert alle Gegensätze.“¹⁶ „Ungeteilter Geist“ meint (im Unterschied zum „unter-
scheidenden Geist“) diejenige Geistform, die sich von der Haftung an die Welt der
Relativität löst, die Welt trans-perspektivisch sieht und so „die ganze Realität“ er-
fasst.¹⁷ – Das ist offenbar der Sicht des Cusaners nicht unähnlich (nur dass Dōgen
diese Auffassung schon zweihundert Jahre früher entwickelt hat).
Überhaupt – diese inter- oder transkulturelle Zwischenbemerkung sei hier ge-
stattet – ist es nicht so, dass nur wir Abendländer konsistenzversessen oder wider-
spruchs-allergisch wären, sondern auch im asiatischen Bereich sind Widersprü-
che Widersprüche und sind zu vermeiden oder aufzuheben. Nur ist die Umgangs-
form mit den Widersprüchen vergleichsweise schonender oder sanfter als bei uns
üblich.
Selbstwidersprüchlichkeit ist also im Osten nicht weniger kontraindiziert als
im Westen. Hierzulande sind wir es (insbesondere in der Philosophie) gewohnt,
12 Zenji Dōgen (1983), 167–174. Vgl. meine ausführliche Interpretation in: Welsch (2011), 38–69.
13 Es gibt keine ausgezeichneten Perspektiven, keine ,Expertenperspektiven‘. Auch Fische sind
nicht die verbindlichen Experten des Wassers. Unsere Perspektive auf das Wasser ist nicht weni-
ger richtig (wertvoll) als die ihre – oder die von Möwen oder Steinen.
14 Zenji Dōgen (1977), 32–39, hier 39.
15 Zenji Dōgen (1977), 34.
16 Zenji Dōgen (1977), 34.
17 Zenji Dōgen (1977), 39.
dass die sicherste (und vielleicht einzig zuverlässige) Widerlegungsart darin be-
steht, den Kontrahenten eines Selbstwiderspruchs zu überführen – ein solcher
Nachweis ist für ihn argumentativ letal, daher kaprizieren wir uns so gerne auf
diese Widerlegungsart. Aber auch im Osten gilt Selbstwidersprüchlichkeit als feh-
lerhaft. Der Unterschied ist nicht einer bezüglich der logischen Option, sondern
nur hinsichtlich der kulturell üblichen Verfahrensweise, mit Selbstwidersprüch-
lichkeit umzugehen. Im Westen demonstrieren wir dem Gegner genüsslich seine
Selbstwidersprüchlichkeit – und tun das zumal vor Publikum. Im Osten vermei-
det man das. Man führt weder die Selbstwidersprüchlichkeit noch den Kontrahen-
ten vor, sondern gibt dem anderen vergleichsweise sanft zu verstehen, warum er
seine Position überdenken und vielleicht verändern sollte. Man vernichtet nicht,
sondern schont. Das ist der kulturelle Unterschied im Umgang mit Selbstwider-
sprüchlichkeit. Aber die logische Basis – dass Selbstwidersprüchlichkeit fehler-
haft ist – ist gemeinsam.¹⁸
4 Konsistenzallergie
Nun aber ist es an der Zeit, die Betrachtungsrichtung zu ändern. Bislang habe ich
gezeigt, wie noch durch alle Widersprüche hindurch eine Konsistenzerwartung
und -befolgung besteht. Konsistenz scheint das Höchste zu sein – in den Wider-
sprüchen oder über den Widersprüchen. Jetzt aber soll die Opposition gegen Kon-
sistenz das Thema sein. Man kann ja nicht übersehen, dass es auch so etwas wie
eine Konsistenz- oder Kohärenz-Allergie gibt.
a System-Skepsis
Der Widerstand gegen Konsistenz/Kohärenz bezieht sich zunächst nicht auf Per-
sonen, sondern auf Systeme, auf philosophische Systeme, auf Gedankensysteme.
In noch relativ gemäßigter Form finden wir diesen antisystematischen Affekt
bei Diderot, wenn er 1765 im Enzyklopädie-Artikel „Philosophie“ schreibt:
Der systematische Geist wirkt dem Fortschritt der Wahrheit so sehr entgegen, weil diejeni-
gen, die ein System von gewisser Wahrscheinlichkeit erfunden haben, nicht mehr eines Bes-
seren belehrt werden können. Sie halten geflissentlich alle Dinge fest, die irgendwie zur Be-
18 Ein treffliches Beispiel für beide Aspekte bietet die Geschichte von Meister Zhuang und
Meister Hui, die über eine Brücke schlendern und die Freude der Fische diskutieren. Zhuangzi
(2003), 129f.
stätigung ihres Systems dienen können, und beachten kaum alle jene Einwände, die gegen
dieses erhoben werden, oder schieben sie durch irgendeine oberflächliche Unterscheidung
beiseite. [. . . ] Sie sehen immer nur jenes Bild der Wahrheit an, das ihre auf Wahrscheinlich-
keit beruhenden Ansichten mit sich bringen; sie halten dieses Bild unbeweglich vor ihren
Augen fest, betrachten aber nie aus einem gewissen Abstand die Kehrseite ihrer Ansichten,
die ihnen zeigen würde, wie verkehrt diese sind.¹⁹
Diderot meint also, dass Kohärenz gegen Wahrheit zeugt, dass sie durch Hilfs-
konstruktionen und Wegsehen erkauft ist – dass sie bloß Systemkitt ist und nicht
Zeichen von Wahrheit.
b Nietzsche: Redlichkeit – als Grausamkeit
In dramatischer Wendung finden wir das Motiv einer – gar auf Dauer gestellten –
Infragestellung von Konsistenz bei Nietzsche, und zwar unter dem Stichwort
„Redlichkeit“.
„Nichts“, schreibt Nietzsche, „gilt mir heute kostbarer und seltner als Red-
lichkeit“ – diese Tugend der „freien Geister“.²⁰ Und wie lautet seine Maxime der
Redlichkeit?
Nie Etwas zurückhalten oder dir verschweigen, was gegen deinen Gedanken gedacht werden
kann! Gelobe es dir! Es gehört zur ersten Redlichkeit des Denkens. Du musst jeden Tag auch
deinen Feldzug gegen dich selber führen.²¹
Die Idee ist die gleiche wie bei Diderot: Es kann vollkommene Schlüssigkeit beste-
hen – und doch alles falsch sein. Daher gebietet Nietzsche einen (gar täglichen)
Angriff auf Konsistenz bzw. Kohärenz – um der Wahrheit willen. Das dicht geknüpf-
te Netz eines schlüssigen Zusammenhangs ist eher verdächtig, es dient nicht der
Wahrheit, sondern sich selbst. Wo die Maxime der Redlichkeit verfolgt wird, da
gilt Wahrheit für höher als Kohärenz.
Ich denke, dass Nietzsches Forderung für jeden heute Denkenden vorbildlich
sein könnte: nicht in den Kokon irgendeines Systems – auch nicht des eigenen –
sich einzuspinnen, sondern die eigene Auffassung erneut zu prüfen, an die Sub-
stanz, an die Eingeweide, ans Eingemachte zu gehen – und dann gegebenenfalls
Erschütterungen und Erdbeben auszulösen, die schöne Konstruktion zu spren-
gen. Als Philosoph sollte man lieber selber an den Wänden des eigenen Denk-
19 Diderot (1961), 390–402, hier 402.

20 Nietzsche (1883–1884), 360 bzw. Nietzsche (1886), 162 [227].
21 Nietzsche (1881), 244 [370].
gebäudes rütteln, statt es krampfhaft vor Erschütterungen bewahren – bevor es

ohnehin wie ein Kartenhaus zusammenfällt.
Solche Redlichkeit scheint sehr schwer zu sein. Aber Nietzsche verlangt gar
noch mehr. Er fordert Redlichkeit „in Bezug auf die Redlichkeit selber“.²² Die
Redlichkeit darf sich nicht zu einer Haltung verfestigen, mit der alles ein für alle
Mal als getan gilt. Noch die Redlichkeit ist dem Gebot unnachgiebiger Befragung
auszusetzen. Als Nietzsche dies einmal tut, entdeckt er in der Redlichkeit einen
Grund von Grausamkeit. Die Redlichkeit ist alles andere als eine unschuldige Tu-
gend:²³ „Fast Alles, was wir ,höhere Cultur‘ nennen, beruht auf der Vergeistigung
und Vertiefung der Grausamkeit – dies ist mein Satz [. . . ].“²⁴ Der Mensch wird
heimlich durch seine Grausamkeit gelockt und vorwärts gedrängt, durch jene gefährlichen
Schauder der gegen sich selbst gewendeten Grausamkeit. Zuletzt erwäge man, dass selbst
der Erkennende, indem er seinen Geist zwingt, wider den Hang des Geistes und oft genug
auch wider die Wünsche seines Herzens zu erkennen – nämlich Nein zu sagen, wo er be-
jahen, lieben, anbeten möchte –, als Künstler und Verklärer der Grausamkeit waltet; [. . . ]
schon in jedem Erkennen-Wollen ist ein Tropfen Grausamkeit.²⁵
Kurzum: Redlichkeit ist durch Grausamkeit grundiert. Redlichkeit ist „gegen sich
selbst gewendete Grausamkeit“.²⁶ An dieser Grausamkeitsdiagnose ist Einiges
dran. Es ist tatsächlich so, dass wir Wissenschaftler, wir Philosophen, wir abend-
ländische Rationalisten uns zu immer erneuter und noch gründlicherer Prüfung,
zu wiederholtem Infragestellen und Durchdenken gedrängt fühlen. Wir halten
es für nötig, Fehlersuche zu betreiben – noch im Gewohntesten, im scheinbar
Sichersten. Wir glauben, alles für ausgemacht Geltende immer erneut einem
Stresstest (wie man das heute nennt) unterziehen zu müssen. Das ist ein Impera-
tiv unserer auf Logos, Begründung und Argument gestellten Kultur.
Aber andererseits: Kann und will man das wirklich immer wieder erneut, im-
mer weiter tun? Hat man nicht irgendwann genug? Reicht es einem nicht irgend-
wann? Will man es damit nicht endlich einmal genug sein lassen? Vielleicht mit
fünfundsechzig, im Übergang zur Emeritierung? Um von nun an nur noch das Er-
arbeitete festzuhalten und zu sichern? Will man nicht irgendwann aus der endlo-
22 Nietzsche (1882–1884), 20.

23 Nietzsche sieht sie als „eine der jüngsten Tugenden“ an (Nietzsche (1881), 275 [456]) – den bra-
ven wie den unbeugsamen Menschen ist diese kommende Tugend noch fremd (Nietzsche (1882),
497 [159]).
24 Nietzsche (1886), 166 [229].
25 Nietzsche (1886), 166f. [229].
26 Nietzsche (1886), 166 [229].
sen Erkenntnisbeunruhigung aussteigen (wie Skeptiker das schon viel früher tun)
und im Kokon eines Systems seine Ruhe finden?
Wie aber stünde diese Haltung zu Konsistenz bzw. Kohärenz? Ohne Zwei-
fel wären die Letzteren darin anerkannt. Aber vielleicht nicht um der Wahrheit
willen. Sondern weil unser Leben Halt und Zusammenhang braucht. Und der
jetzt erreichte ist vielleicht nicht perfekt, nicht endgültig, sondern irgendwann
erschütterbar – aber für die restliche Lebenszeit (für die Restlaufzeit) wird er
halten, und das genügt.
c Die spezifisch moderne Situation
Übersehen wir schließlich nicht, dass die moderne Zuwendung zu Kohärenz einen
besonderen Hintergrund oder Grund hat. Kohärenz, das ist die typisch moderne
Sicherungsmöglichkeit – seitdem wir modern wurden, also nicht mehr an Funda-
mente glauben. Dann ist die Sicherung durch komplexe Netze die einzig verblei-
bende Möglichkeit.
Nietzsche hat das wunderbar beschrieben:
Man darf [. . . ] den Menschen wohl bewundern als ein gewaltiges Baugenie, dem auf bewegli-
chen Fundamenten und gleichsam auf fließendem Wasser das Aufthürmen eines unendlich
complicirten Begriffsdomes gelingt; freilich, um auf solchen Fundamenten Halt zu finden,
muss es ein Bau, wie aus Spinnefäden sein, so zart, um von der Welle mit fortgetragen, so
fest, um nicht von dem Winde auseinander geblasen zu werden.²⁷
Und natürlich sind hier des Weiteren die Nietzsche-Erben zu nennen, zuerst Otto
Neurath:
Wie Schiffer sind wir, die ihr Schiff auf offener See umbauen müssen, ohne es jemals in
einem Dock zerlegen und aus besten Bestandteilen neu errichten zu können.²⁸
Das Schiff der Wissenschaft hat keinen festen Anker, die Wissenschaft bietet keine
absolute Sicherheit, sie ist selber den Schwankungen der hohen See ausgesetzt
und vermag allenfalls von Zeit zu Zeit ein Leck zu reparieren und den drohenden
Untergang zu verhindern.
27 Nietzsche (1896), 873–890, hier 882.

28 Neurath (1932/1933), 204–214, hier 206. – Dieser Satz Neuraths wurde dann auch zum Leit-
spruch von Willard Van Orman Quine (er bildet das Motto von Quine (1960), VII). Und selbst bei
Karl Popper heißt es: „[. . . ] wir entdecken [. . . ], dass dort, wo wir auf festem und sicherem Boden
zu stehen glaubten, in Wahrheit alles unsicher und im Schwanken begriffen ist“. Popper (1969),
103–123, hier 103.
Ebenso Quine:
Die Gesamtheit unseres sogenannten Wissens oder Glaubens [. . . ] ist ein von Menschen ge-
flochtenes Netz, das nur an seinen Rändern mit der Erfahrung in Berührung steht. [. . . ] Jede
beliebige Aussage kann als wahr aufrechterhalten werden, was da auch kommen mag, wenn
wir nur anderweitig in dem System ausreichend drastische Anpassungen vornehmen. Selbst
eine Aussage ganz nahe der Peripherie kann angesichts gegenläufiger Erfahrung als wahr
aufrechterhalten werden, indem mit Halluzinationen argumentiert wird oder indem gewis-
se Aussagen jener Art berichtigt werden, die logische Gesetze genannt werden. Umgekehrt
ist ebenso keine Aussage unrevidierbar. Die Revision selbst des logischen Gesetzes des aus-
geschlossenen Dritten wurde vorgeschlagen, um damit eine Vereinfachung der Quantenme-
chanik zu erreichen; [. . . ]²⁹
Das Netz ist fragil. Gewiss muss es halten – aber nur dort, wo es wirklich darauf
ankommt. Hingegen soll nicht alles absolut fest verspannt, gleichsam zementiert
sein. Sondern das Netz muss – vgl. Nietzsche – zart sein, beweglich und von daher
anpassungsfähig, veränderbar.
Ich will noch ein literarisches Beispiel anfügen – Schriftsteller sind ja oft be-
sonders sensibel für neue Zeitlagen. Italo Calvino schildert in Die unsichtbaren
Städte eine „Spinnennetz-Stadt“ namens „Ottavia“:³⁰
Sie ist auf einem Netz errichtet, das zwischen zwei hohen Bergen gespannt ist. Alle Bauten
dieser Stadt und der gesamte Verkehr sind an dieses Netz gebunden. „Unten ist Hunderte
und Hunderte von Metern nichts: Ein paar Wolken ziehen dahin; noch weiter unten kann
man den Boden der Schlucht erkennen“.³¹
Die Pointe von Calvinos Beschreibung liegt nun darin, dass in dieser Stadt – die
doch konstruktiv von der evidentesten Unsicherheit ist – das Leben sicherer ist
als in den anderen Städten: „Über dem Abgrund schwebend ist das Leben der
Einwohner Ottavias weniger unsicher als in anderen Städten. Denn die Bewoh-
ner wissen, dass ihr Netz nur ein bestimmtes Gewicht zu tragen vermag.“³²
Man kann die moderne Position vielleicht so zusammenfassen: Sie kombi-
niert Kohärenzsuche und Kohärenzallergie. Gewiss suchen und brauchen wir
noch immer Kohärenz, aber kaum haben wir sie erreicht, da stellen wir sie auch
schon wieder infrage, suchen sie aufzubrechen. Wir sind überzeugt, dass das
gegenwärtige Netz nicht das endgültige ist bzw. sein kann. Also muss es umbau-
29 Quine (1979), 27–50, hier 47.

30 Calvino (1984), 85f. bzw. 81.
31 Calvino (1984), 85.
32 Calvino (1984), 86. – Natürlich ist für Calvino Venedig – die Stadt, die auf Pfählen ruht – das
Urbild einer derartigen Stadt. „Jedes Mal, wenn ich dir eine Stadt beschreibe, sage ich etwas über
Venedig“ (ebd., 100).
fähig bleiben. Deshalb sind wir gegen das endgültige Festzurren – sind system-
allergisch. Oder man könnte auch sagen: Wir sind gegen den systemfixierenden
Typ von Konsistenz zugunsten eines flexibilitätsaffinen Typs von Konsistenz. Für
belebende Widersprüche offen zu bleiben gilt uns als Gebot der Klugheit.
*
Blicken wir zurück: Die Konsistenz kann recht unterschiedliche und komplexe
Formen annehmen. Es kann, bei vordergründiger Widersprüchlichkeit der Aussa-
gen (und auch Handlungen) einer Person um die innere Konsistenz dieser Person
gehen. Oder wir treffen, bei den Meisterdenkern, auf Konsistenz als die höhere
dialektische Einheit gegenüber der Unterschiedlichkeit der Gegensätze (Heraklit,
Dōgen, Cusanus, Hegel). Oder wir streben, in der Moderne, nach Konsistenz und
Kohärenz, indem wir haltgebende, aber zugleich flexibilitätsoffene Netze entwi-
ckeln. Ferner: Auch wo Einsprüche gegen Konsistenz auftreten, ist es doch nicht
so, dass wir uns gänzlich von Konsistenz verabschieden würden. Schließlich: Hin-
ter der Forderung nach Konsistenz kann immer wieder mal etwas anderes und
mehr als die Forderung nach nur logischer Konsistenz stehen. Es kann um Ver-
lässlichkeit, um Wahrhaftigkeit, um das Netz unserer wissenschaftlichen oder so-
zialen Überzeugungen etc. gehen.
Zum Schluss will ich die Katze aus dem Sack lassen. Was steckt im Grunde,
was steckt letztlich hinter unserer Forderung nach Konsistenz? Wenn Konsistenz
nicht das Letzte ihrer selbst ist, wenn es in ihr um mehr als ein bloß logisches Prin-
zip geht; und wenn auch die bislang erwogenen Hintergrundsgrößen (Einheit der
Person, soziale Verlässlichkeit, Kohärenz des Aussagennetzes etc.) nur vorläufige
Statthalter sind, was ist es dann eigentlich, wovon her Konsistenz geboten ist?
5 Der tiefste Grund: ontologisch

Letztlich und eigentlich, scheint mir, ist Konsistenz ein ontologisches Gebot. Kon-
sistenz ist nämlich ein elementares Wirklichkeitsprinzip oder genauer: Wirklich-
keitsbildungsprinzip. Diese meine Perspektive ist ungewohnt und überraschend –
aber vielleicht mag man sie erwägen. Ich versuche sie hier in sehr abgekürzter
Form plausibel zu machen.³³
In der Bildung des Universums fand sich von sehr frühen Stadien an eine
bestimmte Tendenz: Seiendes tendiert zu Strukturbildung. Das Mittel dazu ist
Selbstbezüglichkeit, Reflexivität. Sehr früh schon kam es zur Entstehung syste-
33 Vgl. dazu ausführlich Welsch (2012), 876 ff.

martiger Entitäten. Das begann mit Kleinstsystemen: aus dem nach dem Big Bang
entstandenen Plasma bildeten sich nach ca. 370.000 Jahren erste abgegrenzte
Entitäten heraus, die Selbstbezüglichkeit aufwiesen – die Atome. Sie sind durch
Systemcharakter und Selbstbezüglichkeit bestimmt, sofern ihre Glieder (Kern
und Elektronenschale) strikt aufeinander bezogen sind und dieser wechselsei-
tige Bezug für das Sein der Atome konstitutiv ist.³⁴ Selbstbezüglichkeit machte
sich dann des Weiteren innerhalb von Großverbänden geltend, als sich winzig
kleine Dichteunterschiede der Materie infolge der Gravitationskraft von selbst
verstärkten und zur Bildung von Galaxien führten. Noch Subformen der Galaxien
wiederholen das gleiche Schema: Sonnensysteme weisen eine sehr genaue und
über Äonen stabilisierte und nachjustierte Abstimmung der Planeten unterein-
ander und mit dem Zentralgestirn auf.³⁵
Auch etliche chemische Reaktionen führen zu temporär stabilen Formen von
Selbstorganisation. Zum Beispiel weisen bei den Bénard-Zellen die prozessual
(und erneut nach dem Schema der Selbstverstärkung kleinster Abweichungen)
entstehenden Muster eine Fähigkeit zur Selbststabilisierung unter variierenden
Energiebedingungen auf (auch wenn hier noch weitaus engere Grenzen gezogen
sind als nachfolgend beim Lebendigen, das sich unter weit größeren Schwankun-
gen seiner externen Bedingungen zu erhalten vermag).
Beim Organischen entsteht dann erstmals wirkliche Individualität. Organis-
men sind Selbstbetreiber. Die Selbstbezüglichkeit ist beim Lebendigen gleichsam
von der Systemebene ins Einzelseiende gerutscht – das nun in sich systemartig
verfasst ist. Organismen sind durch ständige Kohärenzherstellung gekennzeich-
net. Sie bewirken ihre innere Kohärenz (Homöostase, Metabolismus, Zellrepro-
duktion) sowie ihre äußere Kohärenz (Passung im Verhältnis zur Umwelt, insbes.
auf dem Weg sensu-motorischer Bezüge). Kohärenzherstellung ist die ratio essen-
di der Organismen. Insofern ist sie zunächst einmal ein biotisches Gebot – lange
bevor sie ein logisches oder argumentatives Gebot ist.
Aber Kohärenz ist eben nicht nur auf dem elementar-biotischen Niveau essen-
tiell, sondern dann auch auf den höheren Niveaus des Lebendigseins, also bei-
spielsweise im Bereich von Kognition, Selbstbewusstsein, Welterkenntnis. In der
elementaren Erfahrung, dass man nicht gegen den Widerspruchssatz denken und
leben kann, schwingt noch die Nötigung zu organismischer Kohärenz mit. Damit
will ich jedoch nicht sagen: Weil Kohärenz ein organismisches Gebot ist, deshalb
ist sie auch ein Denkgebot. Ich habe hier keinerlei Reduktionismus im Sinn. So
34 Atome sind im Anorganischen gewissermaßen die Vorläufer der Zellen im Organischen. Sie
weisen Innenregulation und Außenabgrenzung auf.
35 Man könnte schon darin ein komplexeres Analogon zur Atomstruktur sehen.
wenig Kohärenz deshalb ein organismisches Gebot ist, weil sie zuvor schon ein
physikalisches Gebot war, so wenig ist sie ein mentales Gebot, weil sie zuvor be-
reits ein biotisches Gebot darstellte. Sondern ich sehe es so, dass Kohärenz ein
seinsgenereller Zug ist – koextensiv mit der Tendenz zur Selbstorganisation, al-
so dem allgemeinsten Treiber ontologischer Strukturbildung. Deshalb besteht die
Nötigung zur Kohärenz im Physikalischen wie im Biotischen und dann auch Men-
talen. Was nicht in einem elementaren Sinn stimmig wäre, könnte weder entste-
hen noch sich im Sein halten.
Kohärenz ist somit das generellste ontologische Gebot – auf welcher Ebene
auch immer. Wenn ich in das argumentative Kohärenzgebot (dem Philosophen
sich so sehr und schier ausschließlich widmen) hineinhorche, dann vernehme
ich als die tiefste Schwingung darin das generell-ontologische Gebot zur Kohä-
renz. Ich meine also: Wenn wir dem Nichtwiderspruchsprinzip folgen, so nicht
bloß, weil wir Organismen sind, und nicht bloß, weil wir denkend sind, sondern
weil wir Seiende sind, und weil Kohärenz das elementarste und generellste onto-
logische Prinzip ist. – In diesem Sinn dürfte Aristoteles dann doch recht gehabt
haben, als er darauf insistierte, dass das Widerspruchsprinzip nicht einfach als
logisches, sondern grundlegender als ontologisches Prinzip zu verstehen ist.³⁶
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M. Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik [1929], Frankfurt a. M, 1965.
M. Heidegger, „Vom Wesen des Grundes“ [1929], in: Wegmarken, Frankfurt a. M., 21–71, 1967.
M. Heidegger, „Der Deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) und die philosophische
Problemlage der Gegenwart“, Vorlesung Sommersemester 1929, in: Gesamtausgabe, Bd.
28, Frankfurt a. M, 1997.
J. Łukasiewicz, Aristotle‘s syllogistic. From the standpoint of modern formal logic, Oxford, 1951.
O. Neurath, „Protokollsätze“, in: Erkenntnis 3, (1932/1933), 204–214.
F. Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden, hrsg. von G. Colli und
M. Montinari, Berlin und New York, 1999.
36 Aristoteles (2003), Metaph. IV 3, 1005 b 23–32. Vgl. dazu Welsch (1987), 237f.
F. Nietzsche, „Morgenröthe“, in: Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden,

hrsg. von G. Colli und M. Montinari, Bd. 3, Berlin und New York, 1881.
F. Nietzsche, „Nachgelassene Fragmente“, in: Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15
Bänden, hrsg. von G. Colli und M. Montinari, Bd. 10, Berlin und New York, 1882.
F. Nietzsche, „Die fröhliche Wissenschaft“, in: Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15
Bänden, hrsg. von G. Colli und M. Montinari, Bd. 3, Berlin und New York, 1882–1884.
F. Nietzsche, „Also sprach Zarathustra“, in: Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15
Bänden, hrsg. von G. Colli und M. Montinari, Bd. 4, Berlin und New York, 1883–1885.
F. Nietzsche, „Jenseits von Gut und Böse“, in: Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15
Bänden, hrsg. von G. Colli und M. Montinari, Bd. 5, Berlin und New York, 1886.
F. Nietzsche, „Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne“ [entst. 1873, publ.
1896], in: Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden, hrsg. von G. Colli
und M. Montinari, Bd. 1, Berlin und New York, 873–890, 1896.
K. Popper, „Die Logik der Sozialwissenschaften“, in: T W. Adorno u. a. (Hrsg.), Der Positivis-
musstreit in der deutschen Soziologie, Neuwied und Berlin, 103–123, 1969.
W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object, Cambridge 1960, 1960.
W. V. O. Quine, „Zwei Dogmen des Empirismus“ [1951], in: Von einem logischen Standpunkt.
Neun logisch-philosophische Essays, Frankfurt a. M., 27–50, 1979.
W. Welsch, Aisthesis. Grundzüge und Perspektiven der Aristotelischen Sinneslehre, Stuttgart,
1987.
W. Welsch, Immer nur der Mensch? Entwürfe zu einer anderen Anthropologie, Berlin, 2011.
W. Welsch, Homo mundanus. Jenseits der anthropischen Denkform der Moderne, Weilerswist,
2012.
W. Whitman, Leaves of Grass [1855], New York, 1985.
D. Zenji Dōgen, „Shinjingakudo“ („Lernen durch Körper und Geist“) [1243], in: Shōbōgenzō –
Die Schatzkammer der Erkenntnis des wahren Dharma, Bd. 1, übers. v. M. Eckstein, Zü-
rich, 32–39, 1977.
D. Zenji Dōgen, „Sansuikyo“ („Die Sutren der Berge und Flüsse“) [1240], in: Shōbōgenzō –
Die Schatzkammer der Erkenntnis des wahren Dharma, Bd. 2, übers. v. J. Renner, Zürich,
167–174, 1983.
Zhuangzi, Zhuangzi(Auswahl), Stuttgart, (2003).
List of Contributors
Jc Beall is Professor at the Philosophy Department of the University of Connecti-
cut, Director of the University of Connecticut Logic Group, and Professorial Fellow
at the University of Aberdeen. He is author of several books on truth, logic, lan-
guage, and metaphysics, among them: Logic The Basics, London: Routledge 2010,
Spandrels of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009, Logical Pluralism (with
Greg Restall), Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006, Revenge of the Liar (ed.), Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press 2008, Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox (ed.),
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, The Law of Non-Contradiction (ed., with
G. Priest and B. Armour-Garb), Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, Possibili-
ties and Paradox: An Introduction to Modal and Many-Valued Logic (with Bas van
Fraassen), Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004. More information is available
from Beall’s website: entailments.net.
Enrico Berti is professor emeritus of History of Philosophy at the Università

di Padova. He is member of the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Institut In-
ternational de Philosophie, Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, Société
Européenne de Culture, Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie,
Accademia Galileiana di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti and the Società filosofica italiana
(which he has directed from 1983 to 1986). His major works include: La contrad-
dizione, Milan: Città Nuova 1977, Aristotele. Dalla dialettica alla filosofia prima,
Milan: Bompiani 1977, Le vie della ragione, Bologna: Il Mulino 1987, Contrad-
dizione e dialettica negli antichi e nei moderni, Palermo: L’Epos 1987, Le ragioni
di Aristotele, Rome and Bari: Laterza 1989, Storia della filosofia (together with
Franco Volpi), Rome and Bari: Laterza 1991, Aristotele nel Novecento, Rome and
Bari: Laterza 1992, Introduzione alla metafisica, Turin: UTET 1993, Il pensiero
politico di Aristotele, Rome and Bari: Laterza 1997, In principio era la meraviglia.
Le grandi questioni della filosofia antica, Rome and Bari: Laterza 2007, Nuovi studi
aristotelici, 4 volumes, Brescia: Morcelliana 2004–2010, Dialectique, physique
et métaphysique, Louvain-la-neuve: Peeters 2008, Sumphilosophein, Roma-Bari:
Laterza 2010, Invito alla filosofia, Brescia: La Scuola 2011, Aristotele, Brescia: La
Scuola 2013.
Francesco Berto Francesco Berto is professor of metaphysics at the University of

Amsterdam and research leader at the Northern Institute of Philosophy, University
of Aberdeen. He has published various books and papers on metaphysics and the
210 | List of Contributors
philosophy of logic, among them: L’esistenza non è logica. Dal quadrato rotondo ai
mondi impossibili, Rome and Bari: Laterza 2010, There’s Something About Goedel.
The Complete Guide to the Incompleteness Theorem, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell
2009, How to Sell a Contradiction. The Logic and Metaphysics of Inconsistency,
London: King’s College Publications 2007, Logica da Zero a Gödel, Rome and
Bari: Laterza 2007, Teorie dell’Assurdo. I rivali del Principio di Non-Contraddizione,
Milan: Carocci 2006.
Franca D’Agostini teaches Philosophy of Science at the University of Turin (Po-

litecnico) and Logic and Epistemology of the Social Sciences at the University of
Milan. She is author of books in Italian and English on Truth, Paradoxes, and the
History of Contemporary Philosophy, among them: Analitici e continentali, Milan:
Raffaello Cortina Editore 1997, Breve storia della filosofia nel Novecento, Turin: Ein-
audi 1999, Logica del nichilismo, Rome and Bari: Laterza 2000, Disavventure della
verità, Turin: Einaudi 2002, Paradossi, Milan: Carocci 2009, The Last Fumes. Ni-
hilism and the Nature of Philosophical Concepts, Aurora: Davies Group Publishers
2009, The Responsibility of the Philosopher (ed.), New York: Columbia University
Press 2010, Introduzione alla verità, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri 2011, I mondi co-
munque possibili. Logica per la filosofia e il ragionamento comune, Turin: Bollati
Boringhieri 2012.
Elena Ficara is junior professor at the University of Paderborn. Her works include:
Die Ontologie in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neu-
mann 2006, Heidegger e il problema della metafisica, Rome: Casini 2010, Die Be-
gründung der Philosophie im deutschen Idealismus (ed.), Würzburg: Königshausen
& Neumann 2011, Philosophie und Skeptizismus. Kant, Fichte, Hegel (ed.), Fichte-
Studien 39, 2012, “Dialectic and Dialetheism,” in: History and Philosophy of Logic
34, 2013, 35–52.
Luca Illetterati is professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the Università di Padova.

He is author and editor of numerous books on Hegel, the concept of limit in Ger-
man Classical Philosophy as well as on the philosophy of nature. Among them:
Natura e ragione. Sullo sviluppo dell’idea di natura in Hegel, Trento: Verifiche
1995, Figure del limite. Esperienze e forme della finitezza, Trento: Verifiche 1996,
Introduzione, traduzione e commento a: G. W. F. Hegel. Il meccanismo, il chimismo,
l’organismo e il conoscere, Trento: Verifiche 1996, Filosofia come esperienza del
limite. Problemi di introduzione, Padua: CUSL 2002, Tra tecnica e ragione. Prob-
lemi di ontologia del vivente in Heidegger, Padova: Il Poligrafo 2002, La filosofia

come esperienza del pensiero e scienza della libertà. Un approccio a Hegel, Padua:
CLEUP 2009, Hegel (together with P. Giuspoli and G. Mendola), Milan: Carocci
2010.
Angelica Nuzzo is professor of Philosophy at the Graduate Center and Brooklyn

College (City University of New York). She has received her PhD at the Scuola Nor-
male Superiore di Pisa and her Habilitation at the Universität Heidelberg. She has
been Alexander von Humboldt Fellow and is author of numerous books in En-
glish, German and Italian. Among others: History, Memory, Justice in Hegel, New
York: Palgrave, 2012, Hegel and the Analytic Tradition, London and New York:
Continuum 2009, Ideal Embodiment. Kant’s Theory of Sensibility, Bloomington:
Indiana University Press 2008, Kant and the Unity of Reason, West Lafayette: Pur-
due University Press 2005, Logica e sistema. Sull’idea hegeliana di filosofia, Genoa:
Pantograf 1996, Rappresentazione e concetto nella logica della Filosofia del diritto
di Hegel, Naples: Guida 1990, System, Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag 2003.
Graham Priest is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the Graduate Center,

City University of New York, and Boyce Gibson Professor Emeritus at the Uni-
versity of Melbourne. He is known for his work on non-classical logic, particu-
larly in connection with dialetheism, on the history of philosophy, and on Bud-
dhist philosophy. He has published articles in nearly every major philosophy and
logic journal. His books include: In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent,
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1987 (2nd edition: Oxford: Oxford University Press
2006), Beyond the Limits of Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995
(2nd edition: Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002), Logic: a Very Short Introduc-
tion, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000, Towards Non-Being: the Semantics and
Metaphysics of Intentionality, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005, Doubt Truth
to be a Liar, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006. His new book, One, is about to
appear with Oxford University Press.
Achille Varzi is Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University, New York. He is

an editor of The Journal of Philosophy, a subject editor of the Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy, and an associate or advisory editor of The Monist, Studia
Logica, Synthese, Dialectica, The Review of Symbolic Logic, and several other
journals. He writes mainly on logic, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language.
Among his books: Il mondo messo a fuoco [The world in focus], Rome: Laterza 2010;
212 | List of Contributors
Insurmountable Simplicities (with Roberto Casati), New York: Columbia University

Press 2006; Ontologia [Ontology], Rome: Laterza 2005; Parole, oggetti, eventi e al-
tri argomenti di metafisica, Rome: Carocci 2001; Parts and Places (with Roberto
Casati), Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1999; An Essay in Universal Semantics, Dor-
drecht: Kluwer 1999; Holes and Other Superficialities (with Roberto Casati), Cam-
bridge MA: MIT Press 1994.
Gianni Vattimo is professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the Università di Torino.

He has been active in the Partito Radicale and the Democrats of the Left, and the
party Italia dei Valori. Since 1999 he is a member of the European Parliament. He
is author of numerous books (all translated into major languages), among them:
Essere, storia e linguaggio in Heidegger, Turin: Filosofia 1963, Ipotesi su Nietzsche,
Turin: Giappichelli 1967, Introduzione ad Heidegger, Rome and Bari: Laterza 1971,
Il soggetto e la maschera, Milan: Bompiani 1974, Le avventure della differenza, Mi-
lan: Garzanti 1980, Al di là del soggetto, Milan: Feltrinelli 1981, Il pensiero debole
(ed. together with P. A. Rovatti), Milan: Feltrinelli 1983, La fine della modernità, Mi-
lan: Garzanti 1985, Introduzione a Nietzsche, Rome and Bari: Laterza 1985, La soci-
età trasparente, Milan: Garzanti 1989, Etica dell’interpretazione, Turin: Rosenberg
& Sellier 1989, Filosofia al presente, Milan: Garzanti 1990, Oltre l’interpretazione,
Rome and Bari: Laterza 1994, Credere di credere, Milan: Garzanti 1996, The Future
of Religion (together with R. Rorty, ed. by Santiago Zabala), New York: Columbia
University Press 2005, Christianity, Truth, and Weak Faith (together with R. Girard,
ed. by P. Antonello), New York: Columbia University Press 2009, Hermeneutic Com-
munism (together with Santiago Zabala), New York: Columbia University Press
2011.
Federico Vercellone is professor of Aesthetics at the University of Turin. His works

deal with the relationship between aesthetics and contemporary hermeneutics,
the history of nihilism in European thought, and the tradition of German Roman-
ticism. His most recent research focuses on the notion of morphology in order
to provide a multidisciplinary approach to the concept of form, image, and phe-
nomenon. His most recent publications include: Introduzione a Il nichilismo (1992;
German translation, 1998); Nature del tempo. Novalis e la forma poetica del ro-
manticismo tedesco (1998); Estetica dell’Ottocento (1999; Portuguese translation,
2000; Spanish translation, 2004); Morfologie del moderno. Saggi di ermeneutica
dell’immagine (2006); Oltre la bellezza (2008, Castiglioncello prize 2009; Spanish
translation, 2013); Pensare per immagini (2010, with Olaf Breidbach; new German
edition, 2011; English edition, forthcoming); Le ragioni della forma (2011); Dopo la
morte dell’arte (2013).
Klaus Vieweg is professor of German Classical Philosophy at the University of

Jena. He has been Alexander von Humboldt scholar and visiting professor in
several universities (Pisa, Seattle, Tuebingen, Kyoto, Vienna, Prague, Torino,
Bochum, Naples, Siena, Medellin, Shanghai). His main interests include German
Idealism, Hegel, ancient and modern Scepticism, practical and political philos-
ophy. Among his publications are: Das Denken der Freiheit – Hegels ,Grundlinien
der Philosophie des Rechts‘, Munich: Fink 2012; Philosophie des Remis – Der junge
Hegel und das ,Gespenst des Skeptizismus‘, Munich: Fink 1999, Il pensiero della
libertà – Hegel e lo scetticismo pirroniano, Pisa: ETS 2007, Skepsis und Freiheit –
Hegel über den Skeptizismus zwischen Literatur und Philosophie, Munich: Fink
2007, Inventions of the Imagination, (ed. together with R. T. Gray et al.) Seattle:
London 2011; Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes (ed. together with W. Welsch)
Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 2008; Die Aktualität der Romantik (ed. together with
M. Forster) Berlin: LIT 2012; Shandean Humour in English and German Literature
and Philosophy (ed. together with J. Vigus, K. Wheeler) Oxford: Legenda 2013;
Genius loci. Ansichten großer Philosophen in Text und Bild, Darmstadt: WBG 2014.
Wolfgang Welsch is professor emeritus at Friedrich Schiller University Jena.

He has been visiting professor in several universities, among them at Berlin’s
Freie Universität, Humboldt Universität and Stanford University. He is author of
several books about aesthetics, postmodernism, Hegel, and evolutionary phi-
losophy. Among them: Aisthesis. Grundzüge und Perspektiven der Aristotelischen
Sinneslehre, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 1987, Unsere postmoderne Moderne, Weinheim:
VCH Acta humaniora 1987 (7th edition: Berlin: Akademie Verlag 2008), Ästhetis-
ches Denken, Stuttgart: Reclam 1990 (6th edition: 2003), La terra e l’opera d’arte.
Heidegger e il Crepusculo di Michelangelo, Ferrara: Gallio Editori 1991, Vernunft.
Die zeitgenössische Vernunftkritik und das Konzept der transversalen Vernunft,
Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1995 (4th edition: 2007), Grenzgänge der Ästhetik,
Stuttgart: Reclam 1996, Undoing Aesthetics, London: Sage 1997, Immer nur der
Mensch? Entwürfe zu einer anderen Anthropologie, Berlin: Akademie 2011, Blick-
wechsel. Neue Wege der Ästhetik, Stuttgart: Reclam 2012, Mensch und Welt. Eine
evolutionäre Perspektive der Philosophie, Munich: Beck 2012, Homo mundanus –
Jenseits der anthropischen Denkform der Moderne, Weilerswist: Velbrück Wis-
senschaft 2012, Der Philosoph. Die Gedankenwelt des Aristoteles, Munich: Fink
2012.
Index of Names
A Chuaqui, R. 79
Abel, G. v Church, A. 38, 53, 79
Alston, W. P. 32, 46, 47, 51, 52 Code, A. 98, 107
Aristotle 1, 2, 6, 9, 31, 46, 51, 53, 59, 60, 63, Cogburn, J. 51
78, 80, 97–103, 105–108, 123, 137, 173, Cohen, C. 63, 79
182, 191, 207 Cohen, S. M. 98, 107
Arló-Costa, H. 67, 78 Colletti, L. 152
Armour-Garb, B. 1, 2, 9, 13, 25, 26, 51, 52, 80, Copi, I. 63, 79
107, 108 Crubellier, M. 101, 107
Arruda, A. I. 79
Asenjo, F. G. 59, 78 D
Assmann, J. 122, 124 da Costa, N. 59, 67, 79, 99, 107
Augé, M. 184, 191 D’Agostini, F. v, 4, 5, 32–34, 46, 47, 52,
105, 107
B Dancy, R. M. 6, 9, 98, 99, 107
Batens, D. 19, 21, 23, 25, 80 Davidson, D. 193, 207
Baum, M. 111, 116, 117, 124 de Boer, K. 130, 152
Del Pozo Ortea, M. 186, 191
Beall, JC 1–4, 9, 13, 28, 30, 37, 43, 48, 51, 52,
80, 100, 107, 108 Deligiorgi, K. 125
Becker, J. 167, 169 DeVidi, D. 63, 79
Diderot, D. 200, 201, 207
Belnap, N. D. 65, 69, 78
Didi-Huberman, G. 189, 191
Belting, H. 186, 191
Dōgen Zenji 199, 208
Bencivenga, E. 53, 56, 78
Dubikajtis, L. 67, 79
Benjamin, W. 176, 179
Berti, E. 6, 97–99, 107, 132, 151, 152, 196
E
Berto, F. 2, 6, 9, 60, 78, 92, 99, 100, 106–108, Eklund, M. 28, 30
132, 135, 136, 143, 152 Eldridge-Smith, P. 3, 9, 28–30, 43, 45, 52
Bodei, R. 112, 124 Eldridge-Smith, V. 3, 9, 30, 43, 45, 52
Brandom, R. 71, 80, 132, 135, 152 Evans, G. 58, 74, 79
Breidbach, O. 186, 191
Brown, B. 51, 81, 92 F
Bubner, R. 124 Fait, P. 101, 107
Burge, T. 33, 35, 45, 51 Faizi, H. v
Butler, J. 1, 9 Ficara, E. 29, 32, 52
Field, H. 42, 52
C Findlay, J. N. 131, 152
Calvino, I. 204, 207 Fine, K. 58, 79
Carlson, D. G. 125 Flasch, K. 198, 207
Cavini, W. 63, 78, 79 Føllesdal, D. v
Cesa, C. 111, 117, 124 Frege, G. 5, 55, 58, 79
Chiereghin, F. 149, 152 Fukuyama, F. 174, 175, 179
Chihara, C. 16, 25 Fulda, H. F. 136, 152
Christensen, D. 37, 51 Furth, M. 98, 107
216 | Index of Names
G Kroon, F. 44, 49, 52

Gadamer, H.-G. 8, 181–184, 190, 191 Kuhn, T. 178, 179
Gaio, S. 100, 107 Künne, W. 46, 52
Gell, A. 185, 191
Gobbo, E. 100, 107 L
Gödel, K. 53, 79 Lambert, K. 54, 56, 79
Goethe, J. W. 110, 124, 150 Lehmann, S. 56
Gottlieb, P. 98, 100, 107 Leibniz, G. W. 60, 79, 97
Gregoire, F. 132, 135, 152 Lennox, J. G. 191
Grim, P. 2, 9 Leonard, H. S. 56, 79
Grünkorn, G. v Levesque, H. 90, 92
Guyer, P. 164, 169 Lewis, D. K. 65, 67, 69, 74, 79, 91, 92
Littmann, G. 100, 107
H Łukasiewicz, J. 9, 59, 62, 63, 79, 97, 98, 105,
Haack, S. 63, 79 107, 196, 207
Habermas, J. 181, 191 Luporini, C. 111, 124
Harris, H. S. 124 Lynch, M. 52
Hartmann, N. 132, 152
Hegel, G. W. F. 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 25, 32, 36, 51, 52, M
97, 99, 103, 106, 107, 109–125, 127–133, Maier, H. 97, 108, 111, 125
135–138, 140–154, 156–170, 173, 174, Malachowski, A. R. 207
176, 179, 183, 198, 205, 207 Marconi, D. 135, 136, 152
Heidegger, M. 8, 175, 178, 179, 181, 185, 186, Mares, E. 3, 9, 14, 16, 25, 48, 52, 81, 82, 87,
191, 194, 207 92, 100, 108
Henrich, D. 154, 169 Matte Blanco, I. 98
Hintikka, J. 56, 79 McTaggart, J. 135, 152
Horstmann, R. P. 130, 152, 169 Meheus, J. 13, 25
Houlgate, S. 125, 145, 152 Meist, K. 111, 124, 200, 205
Hyde, D. 58, 79 Mesch, W. 124
Meyer, R. 88, 93, 99, 108
I Michel, K. M. 124, 169, 179
Illetterati, L. 7 Mignucci, M. 98, 108
Miller, D. 23, 25, 107, 144, 152
J Moldenhauer, E. 124, 169, 179
James, D. 154, 158, 169 Moretto, A. 141, 152
Jaśkowski, S. 57, 59, 65, 67, 69, 71, 79
Jean Paul 168, 169 N
Neurath, O. 203, 207
K Nietzsche, F. 43, 50, 186, 201–204, 207, 208
Kahn, C. H. 123, 124 Nikolaus von Kues 207
Kant, I. 1, 2, 7, 9, 33, 47, 51–53, 79, 97, 109, Nuzzo, A. 7, 52, 111, 119, 120, 122, 125,
110, 113–119, 121, 124, 132, 133, 136, 152
138–140, 145, 151, 152, 156, 158,
162–169, 182, 207 P
Kneale, M. 55, 79 Pareyson, L. 190, 191
Kneale, W. 79 Pelletier, F. J. 58, 80
Kneale, W. C. 55, 79 Pippin, R. 116, 125, 154, 169
Index of Names | 217
Popper, K. 25, 103, 104, 108, 130–132, 152, Simon, E. v

203, 208 Soames, S. 14, 26
Poser, H. v Solomon, G. 63, 79
Priest, G. 1–6, 9, 13–17, 24–26, 32, 33, 35, Sorensen, R. 35, 36, 52
37, 49, 51, 52, 59, 68, 71, 72, 78, 80, 82, Speck, J. 207
83, 86, 87, 93, 99, 100, 104–108, 147, Spinoza, B. 173, 179
148, 152 Stekeler-Weithofer, P. 167, 170
Proudfoot, D. 65, 80, 91, 93 Strawson, P. F. 71, 80
Putnam, H. 46, 49, 50, 52
T
Q Tahko, T. E. 108
Quante, M. 154, 156, 168, 169 Taylor, C. 181, 191
Quine, W. V. O. 14, 25, 28, 30, 34, 52, 56, 80,
203, 204, 208
V
van Woudenberg, R. 48, 52
R
Vander Laan, D. A. 87, 93
Rantala, V. 86, 89, 93
Varzi, A. C. 4, 5, 36, 52, 58, 67, 71, 74, 78, 80
Renner, J. 208
Vasil’év, N. A. 59, 80
Rescher, N. 71, 80
Vattimo, G. 8
Restall, G. 37, 51, 87, 93
Vercellone, F. 8, 186, 191
Ricoeur, P. 176, 179
Vieweg, K. 153, 156, 170
Roller, C. v
Vorderobermeier, K. v
Rorty, R. 177–179, 195, 207
Rosenkranz, K. 153, 169
Routley, R. 2, 9, 15, 26, 59, 68, 80, 88, 93, W
99, 108 Weber, E. 13, 25, 181, 185
Russell, B. 5, 16, 18, 23, 26, 33, 53, 55, 56, Wedin, M. V. 55, 62, 80, 100, 108
58, 72, 79, 80, 99 Welsch, W. 8, 9, 199, 205, 207, 208
Whitehead, A. N. 55, 80, 194
S Whitman, W. 196, 197, 208
Sainsbury, M. 34, 42, 52, 77, 80 Williams, R. 58, 69, 80
Salmon, N. 58, 80 Williamson, T. 52, 80
Sans, G. 156, 170, 208 Wittgenstein, L. 35, 45, 52
Schick, F. 154, 158, 159, 170 Wood, A. 163, 170
Schlipp, P. A. 79 Wouters, D. 13, 25
Schöps, D. v
Severino, E. 98 Z
Shakespeare, W. 177, 179 Zalta, E. 9, 87, 93, 107, 108
Shapiro, S. 100, 108 Zhuangzi 200, 208
Simmons, K. 100, 107 Žižek, S. 1, 9
Subject Index
A – linguistic 3, 14, 16, 48

Antinomies 7, 34 f, 59, 124, 153, 157, 163 f, – morality of 7, 153 ff
166, 168 f – necessary 8, 99, 133 ff
Aufhebung 99, 112, 168, 197 ff – ontological implications of 4 f, 16 f, 31 ff,
131 ff
B – reality of 31 ff
Belief 22, 33, 36 ff, 51, 59 f, 82, 88 ff, 97, 106, – representing 81 ff
114, 162, 174, 178 – true 2 ff, 31, 44, 99, 105 f, 130, 147 f
Bivalence 42, 58, 63, 68 f, 72 f, 76 f Contravalence
– and contradiction, 5, 59, 62 f, 64 ff
C
Coherence 90, 149, 193, 196 ff, 200 f, 203 ff D
Concepts 13, 15, 17 ff, 21 ff, 48 ff, 67, 113, 132, Democracy 175 f, 182
188 Dialetheia 2, 5, 13 ff, 43, 48, 69, 77 f, 106, 148
Conceptual Revision 17, 22 – de dicto/de re 5, 69, 77,
Conditional – metaphysical 43 f
– relevant, 87 f – metaphysical/semantic 16 f, 48 f
Conflicting pieces of evidence 39 Dialetheism 1 ff, 13 ff, 31 f, 43, 45 ff, 59, 99 f,
103, 106, 148
Conflicts 35, 38, 114, 132, 174 f, 177
– reliability 38 – and alethic realism 45 ff
– metaphysical/semantic 3 f, 15 ff, 48 ff
Consistency 89, 193 ff
Disagreement 1
– allergy [Konsistenzallergie] 200 ff
Contradictions
E
– and determination 113, 118, 129 f, 134,
Ex contradictione quodlibet (ECQ) 61, 71, 81
137 ff, 148
Ex falso quodlibet (EFQ) 88, 130, 133
– and Hegel’s Sittlichkeit 115 ff
– and Kant’s Moralität 115 ff, 153 ff F
– and limits 7, 24, 59, 114, 127 ff Facts 3 ff, 17 f, 32 f, 39 ff, 69, 104, 110 f, 176
– and Verstandeslogik 110 ff – de se/de re 32
– at the empirical world 3 f, 16 f, 27 ff, 33, 47 – epistemic 39, 43 ff
– by fiat 13 ff – kinds of 46 ff
– conceiving 6, 82 – liar-like facts 3, 42 ff
– conceptual 3, 16, 24, 48, 51, 111, 114, 121, – logical 42 f
136, 182, 184, 186 f – modal 47
– controlling 8, 173 ff – negative 3, 17, 45
– doxastic 36, 38, 46 f – semantic 43 ff
– effectiveness of 2 – soft 43 ff
– evidence of 4 f, 31 ff, 49, 51, 59, 69 ff, 77 f, Fiction 28 f, 36, 42 f, 48 f, 65 ff, 90 ff
106, 110 the Finite 142 ff
– genuine 4-5, 68 ff, 77 f – and the Infinite 145 f, 147
– insuperable 173 ff
– irreducible 3, 8 f, 34 f H
– justice of 6 f, 109 ff Hermeneutics 174 ff, 181 ff
220 | Subject Index
I Ontological
Images 186 ff – neutrality 53 ff
Inconsistency 19, 23, 71 – overdeterminacy 5, 69
Ontology 17, 59, 63, 133
L – and revolution 8, 178 f
Laws of Logic 69, 87 f, 90, 113 f, 127, 129 f – postmodern 194
– and moral laws 115 ff
– Contraposition 88
– De Morgan 22 P
– Double Negation 22, 147
Paradox
– Excluded Middle 27, 58, 61, 63, 73, 76
– Fermi-Hart 39, 44
– Identity 127
– in metaphysical perspective 40 ff
– Non-Contradiction 2, 5 f, 31, 53 ff, 97 ff, 113,
– Liar 25, 28 f, 41 ff, 59, 99, 106
195, 207
– of the Preface 37 f, 42
Logic
– and metaphysics 53 ff – Pinocchio 3 f, 27 ff, 43 ff
– and truth 53 f – Rapunzel 3 f, 27 ff
– and validity 53 f – Reliability 38 ff
– classical 31, 49, 68, 71, 81, 83 – Russell’s 16, 23, 99
– discursive 65, 67, 69 – Semantic 4
– epistemic 82, 88 – Set-theoretic 31, 35, 38
– free 56, 57 f, 61 f, 71 – Sorites 31, 34 f, 38
– in the locked room 53 ff – True 34 ff, 45
– non-classical 2, 35 – Veridical 34 ff
– of fiction 69 – Zeno’s 38, 99
– of representation 88 ff
– paraconsistent 1, 5, 36, 59, 61, 71 f, 81, 99,
103, 147 R
– relevant 5, 81 f, 87, 90, 92 Realism
– alethic 4 f, 32, 45 ff
M
– metaphysical 4, 47, 49 ff
Metaphysics 1 f, 17, 32, 39, 46 ff, 53 ff, 58
Reality 2 ff, 13, 18, 31 ff, 53, 91, 97,
Moderne 203 ff
103, 105 f, 110 ff, 123, 128 f,
Moralität 109 f, 114 ff, 117 f, 153 ff
131 ff, 147 ff, 159, 199, 176,
Morphology 181 ff
178, 183
Redlichkeit 201 ff
N
Reductio ad absurdum 34
Negation 17, 20 ff, 33 f, 42, 47, 62, 68, 86,
131, 133, 138 f, 143, 145 Refutation 6, 42, 97, 100 ff, 112
– and determination 118
O S
Objects 4, 16 f, 24, 178, 198 Schranke 138 f, 144 ff, 163, 165
– of experience 32 Selbstbestimmung
– spatial 140 – and Fremdbestimmung 165 ff
– transcendental 47 Semantic predicates 14, 28 f
– vague 74, 77 Sorites see Paradox
Subject Index | 221
T V
Trivialism 5 f, 49 Vagueness 17 ff, 58, 72.
Truth 1 ff, 13 ff, 17 f, 24, 29, 32 ff, 37, Validity 53 f, 60 ff, 65, 67, 75, 82, 87, 129
40, 43 ff, 53 ff, 67 ff, 81, 84 ff, 98,
102 ff, 106, 120 f, 128 ff, 148 f, 173 ff, W
189 Weltgericht 6 f, 119, 121 ff
– at some world 4, 28, 85 f Weltgeschichte 6 f, 109, 119, 121 ff
– concept of 4, 24, 49 ff World
– epistemic 40 f – disenchantment of 8, 181 ff
– in a story 4, 28, 43, 65 – empirical 3 f, 27 f
– realistic 40 – re-enchantment of 8, 185
– spandrels of 28 f Worlds
Truth value gaps 21, 33, 40 f, – ersatz 67
84 ff, 86 – impossible 81 ff, 87 ff
Truth value gluts 3, 33, 27 ff, – non normal 6, 81 ff, 87 ff
84 ff, 86 – possible 28, 44 f, 67, 69, 75, 84 ff, 87 ff, 99

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(Berlin Studies in Knowledge Research) Elena Ficara-Contradictions - Logic, History, Actuality-Walter de Gruyter Inc (2014)

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Elena Ficara

Prof. Dr. James Conant

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

© 2014 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Part II: History

Part III: Actuality

List of Contributors | 209

Index of Names | 215

Subject Index | 219

Graham Priest (Contradictory Concepts) examines a question at the very core of

Franca D’Agostini (Paradoxes and the Reality of Contradictions) explicitly ad-

8 See Beall (2009).

Francesco Berto (Representing the Contradictory) asks about the possibility of

Enrico Berti (Objections to Aristotle’s Defence of the Principle of Non-Contra-

Angelica Nuzzo (The Justice of Contradiction: Logical Advancement and Histori-

9 See Łukasiewicz (1910) and Dancy (1975).

11 Kant (1900ff.), AA IV.

Gianni Vattimo (Insuperable Contradictions) argues that philosophy has always

Federico Vercellone (A Disenchanted Reenchantment. Hermeneutics and Mor-

1. Are the dialetheias simply in our concepts/language, or are they in real-

I will take up these issues, in the two parts of the paper.²

2 Dialetheism, Concepts, and the World

– if a person is 16 years or over, they are an Adult

Now suppose there is a person, Pat, who is 17. Then we have:

(*) Pat is both an Adult and not an Adult.

– if a person is 16 years or under, they are a Child

2.2 Semantic Dialetheism

The dialetheism engendered by the definition of ‘Adult’ is transparent. There are

– every property-holder shall have the right to vote

– Pat is a male and not a male.

Abs Something is a member of the collection {𝑥 : 𝐴(𝑥)} iff it satisfies the

7 The example comes from Priest (2006a), Section 13.2.

This leads to contradiction in the form of Russell’s paradox.¹⁰ Again, there is no

2.3 Contradictions in the World

10 Take 𝐴(𝑥) to be 𝑥 ∉ 𝑥, and 𝑟 to be {𝑥 : 𝑥 ∉ 𝑥}. Then we have 𝑦 ∈ 𝑟 iff 𝑦 ∉ 𝑦. Hence, 𝑟 ∈ 𝑟 iff

– Whenever we have a language or set of concepts that are dialetheic, we

– Any language (set of concepts), 𝐿, that represents things in a dialetheic

– Can the language be replaced in theory?

3.2 The Possibility of Revision

In this case there is an easy fix. ¬𝑃𝑥 is equivalent to 𝑃𝑏 𝑥 ∨ 𝑃𝑓 𝑥. So we can deal

(¬(𝐴 ∨ 𝐵))+ is ¬(𝐴+ ) ∧ ¬(𝐵+ )

3.3 Expressive Loss

Abs 𝑥 ∈ {𝑦 : 𝐴(𝑦)} ↔ 𝐴(𝑥)

Abs󸀠 𝑥 ∈󸀠 {𝑦 : 𝐴(𝑦)} ↔ 𝐴(𝑥)

Substituting {𝑦 : 𝑦 ∉󸀠 𝑦} for 𝑥 gives us Russell’s paradox, as usual. We have not,

24 A detailed discussion of all this can be found in Priest (1995).

– Grass is growing iff what Rapunzel says is false.

And the chapter ends in grassy gluttiness:

– Rapunzel says that grass is growing.

– Birds are flying iff what Rapunzel says is false.

3 Against Pinocchio’s Beard

Eldridge-Smith’s argument (2012) is from a uniform-solution principle: same

1. the inviolability of the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC) is not justified by

They are all acceptable, I suppose. More controversial is the fifth:

5. as there is some evidence of contradiction, in virtue of 1–4 we should ac-

In this reconstruction, the crucial point is the evidence of contradictions; or also:

Elementary Particles, Quantum Mechanics, and the Special Theory of Relativity,

2 Paradoxes and the Evidence of Contradictions

8 See Priest (2006), ch. 2.

2.2 What Is a True Paradox?

Now we have here a more restrictive definition: a true paradox, properly

15 Wittgenstein (1985), 112–113.