International Interactions, 41:256–278, 2015

Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 0305-0629 print/1547-7444 online
DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.982114

Does Membership on the UN Security Council

Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly?

WONJAE HWANG
University of Tennessee

AMANDA G. SANFORD
Louisiana Tech University

JUNHAN LEE
University of Incheon

Recent studies report that temporary members of the UN Security

Council receive favorable treatment from the IMF, the World Bank,
or in US foreign aid in exchange for their political support for per-
manent members. Nevertheless, few studies have examined whether
this favorable treatment and these benefits have actually made any
significant changes in the member states’ voting behavior in the
United Nations. To explore this question, we investigate whether
membership on the UN Security Council influences a state’s vot-
ing in the UN General Assembly. In the analysis of panel data for
197 countries over the period from 1946 to 2008, the empirical
results show that elected members of the UN Security Council tend
to behave similarly with permanent members, especially with the
United States, as the number of loan programs signed with the
IMF and the World Bank increases. Also, US foreign aid signif-
icantly increases temporary members’ vote coincidence with the
United States and other permanent members. In this regard, this
article contributes to our understanding of state voting behavior
and power politics in international organizations.

KEYWORDS UN Security Council membership, vote buying, vote

coincidence

Address correspondence to Wonjae Hwang, University of Tennessee, Department of

Political Science, 1001 McClung Tower, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA. E-mail: whwang@utk.
edu
Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online at www.
tandfonline.com/gini.

256
 Membership on the UN Security Council 257

Do permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) buy

votes from temporary members? Recent studies have reported that tempo-
rary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009a),
the World Bank (Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009b), or in US foreign aid
(Kuziemko and Werker 2006). If foreign aid from the permanent members
or favorable treatment from international financial organizations, of which
the primary stakeholders are permanent members of the UNSC (particularly
the United States), is designed to induce political support from recipient
states, there should be a strong link between membership on the UNSC
and political support for permanent members of the UNSC. Nevertheless, no
empirical study has examined whether this favorable treatment and these
benefits have actually made any significant changes in temporary members’
voting behavior in the UN. This is the question that we explore in this
article. If vote buying is happening, we should be able to observe coop-
erative responses from temporary members toward permanent members of
the UNSC. However, since we are able to observe states’ voting behavior in
the UNSC only when they serve as members, there is a selection issue in test-
ing the vote-buying hypothesis in the Security Council. Also, by examining
differences in voting patterns only between permanent and temporary mem-
ber states, it is difficult to tell whether voting coincidence is influenced by
vote-buying efforts or other factors, such as preference convergence between
them.
As a solution to these issues, this article investigates whether temporary
membership on the UN Security Council has any significant impact on states’
voting decisions in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). If temporary members
decided to cooperate with permanent members of the UNSC as a response
to vote-buying efforts, they are likely to behave similarly with respect to
voting in the UNGA. Therefore, by evaluating states’ voting behavior before
and after they become temporary members of the UNSC and at the same
time examining other nonmember states as a control group, this article tests
the vote-buying hypothesis. In the analysis of panel data for 197 countries
over the period from 1946 to 2008, the empirical results generally confirm
our expectation. Elected members of the UNSC tend to behave similarly
with the permanent members, especially with the US, as the number of loan
programs they receive from the IMF or the World Bank increases. In addition,
the recipients of US foreign aid, regardless of their membership on the UNSC,
tend to vote similarly with the United States.

VOTE BUYING IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

The UNSC is the key international body that is responsible for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security. To execute this responsibility, the
258 W. Hwang et al.

Security Council can pass binding resolutions and support various actions,
including the use of force. To make a decision on substantive issues, the
UNSC needs a majority of nine votes, which includes votes from all five per-
manent members and at least four from 10 temporary members. Although
getting four out of 10 votes from temporary members does not seem too
difficult, permanent members of the Security Council have an incentive to
get as many votes as possible for a few reasons.
First, to ensure the passage of resolutions or any decision, permanent
members may seek out as many votes as possible as insurance (Dreher et al.
2009a, 2009b). Given the important impact of UNSC resolutions on mem-
bers of the UN and on international security generally, permanent members,
especially the United States, have a strong incentive to pay costs as insur-
ance. More importantly, permanent members can boost the legitimacy of
their decisions by increasing the number of favorable votes (Chapman 2007;
Hurd 2007; Voeten 2005). With heightened legitimacy, the US may enjoy
strong domestic public support (Hurd 2007; Voeten 2001) or rally effects
behind the President (Chapman and Reiter 2004). Internationally, permanent
members can easily generate support from the public and mobilize other
member states to participate in associated policy actions such as economic
sanctions or military operations after the passage of resolutions.1 Strong sup-
port for a resolution may reduce criticism on actions taken by the US or
its associated allies. Also, majority support in the UNSC can offer political
cover or justify unilateral action that any permanent member may take after
a failed resolution due to another permanent member’s veto (Dreher et al.
2009b).
Consistent with this theoretical speculation, scholars report that tempo-
rary members of the UNSC receive favorable treatment from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, or more foreign aid from the United
States (Dreher et al. 2009a, 2009b; Kuziemko and Werker 2006). For exam-
ple, Dreher et al. (2009a) show that a temporary member of the UNSC is
more likely to participate in IMF programs and have fewer numbers of con-
ditions in these programs than nonmembers. In another study, the authors
also report a positive relationship between temporary membership on the
UNSC and the number of World Bank projects a country receives (Dreher
et al. 2009b). Kuziemko and Werker (2006) argue that the UNSC members
receive 59% more foreign aid from the United States than nonmembers do.

1
One example is UNSC Resolution 1973, adopted on March 17, 2011, with respect to the civil war situation
in Libya. Although five members, including two permanent members (China and Russia) abstained, the
other 10 members supported the resolution. This resolution authorized the international community to
impose a no-fly zone over Libya and to use all necessary measures to protect civilians. Accordingly,
military intervention led by France, Britain, and the United States followed. Although the multilateral
forces faced some criticism for their military actions, they succeeded in their military operations while
enjoying a relatively high level of legitimacy.
 Membership on the UN Security Council 259

If foreign aid or favorable treatment from international financial organi-

zations where permanent members of the UNSC, especially the United States,
maintain strong influence on decision making2 is designed to induce politi-
cal support from recipients, then we should be able to observe cooperation
between temporary and permanent members in their voting.3 Nevertheless,
no study has empirically tested this vote-buying hypothesis. This is mainly
because it is difficult to evaluate the impact of membership on the UNSC on
states’ voting behavior by only looking at their voting decisions in the UNSC.
Without examining temporary members’ policy preference changes before
and after their membership on the Security Council, we face a selection
bias.
Also, it is necessary to explore whether cooperative voting behavior, if
it exists, is not a result of policy preference convergence between members,
but of vote-buying efforts. International organizations can serve as a con-
duit of norm diffusion among member states (for example, Finnemore 1996;
Pevehouse 2002) or at least promote mutual understanding of policy issues
by reducing uncertainty and conveying information on specific terms and
situations (for example, Russett, Oneal, and Davis 1998). Since members of
the UNSC meet each other frequently and access similar information, they
may be able to promote mutual understanding and share similar opinions
and preferences on voting issues. Therefore, to make sure that cooperative
voting behavior is not simply a result of joint membership on the UNSC but
material incentives provided by international financial organizations and/or
permanent members, we need to examine both member and nonmember
states’ voting behaviors simultaneously.
To test the vote-buying hypothesis, this article analyzes the roll call
vote data in the UNGA. The UNGA deals with diverse voting issues that
might be less salient to permanent members’ national interests than the UNSC
votes and their issues. However, the votes in the UNGA are never negligible,
and neither is the impact of these votes on world politics. We argue that
the impact of vote-buying efforts by permanent members of the UNSC on
temporary members can be observed in UNGA votes to a great extent, if it
exists in the UNSC votes.

2
As is well known, the weighted voting system in the IMF and the World Bank enables states with large
economies, such as the United States, to exercise their voting power to influence important decisions.
For example, for 18 of the most important decisions, including the size of the fund and the use of its
resources, the IMF employs an 85% majority rule. The United States (virtually the only veto power) enjoys
about 17% of the voting power, the United Kingdom and France about 5% each, and China about 3.7%.
The World Bank has a similar majority voting rule.
3
Another theoretical speculation is that vote-buying efforts may in fact generate noncooperative or
belligerent reactions from temporary members, perhaps for domestic political reasons. Especially if vote-
buying efforts are directed to generate cooperation on an issue, the country whose vote regarding the
issue is bought at the UNSC may be reluctant to cooperate with permanent members on other issues.
Although interesting, the empirical results do not support this alternative hypothesis. We appreciate a
reviewer for drawing our attention to this point.
260 W. Hwang et al.

VOTING IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

This article is not new in studying states’ voting behavior in the UNGA.
In fact, a host of scholars have examined states’ voting patterns in this orga-
nization (Alker 1964; Dreher and Sturm 2012; Hagan 1989; Kegley and Hook
1991; Kim and Russett 1996; Voeten 2000). The main debates in this litera-
ture center on whether and how states, especially major powers, affect other
states’ voting behavior in the UN.
The UNGA is the most comprehensive representative international orga-
nization that deals with various agendas, including international security,
territorial disputes, economic development, human rights, and the envi-
ronment. Member states in the UNGA reveal their policy preferences by
casting votes on these issues. By examining a state’s voting behavior and its
(dis)similarity with others, scholars often measure a policy preference gap
between states (Hwang 2010; Voeten 2000, 2004). Along with the UNSC,
the UNGA provides legitimacy to multilateral actions through the passage of
resolutions. Domestically, resolutions adopted by the General Assembly can
give political cover to leaders for taking international actions. By highlighting
an issue and passing a resolution, the United States or any permanent mem-
ber of the UNSC can reduce criticism and opposition from other states and
the world community. Simply put, the permanent members cannot ignore
and underestimate the impact of votes and resolutions from the UNGA on
world politics. As such, they have an incentive to draw cooperation from
others on votes in the UNGA. In comparison to the Security Council, the
power of the General Assembly is rather limited, and not all of its decisions
are likely to be important for the United States. Still, there is ample evidence
that the US government places some weight on the outcome of General
Assembly votes (Bennis 1997; Thacker 1999), especially when they are over
critical issues such as elections of judges to the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) or temporary members to the UNSC (Eldar 2008). Therefore, the analy-
sis of voting coincidence in the UNGA can show the vote-buying efforts by
the US and other permanent members in the UNSC to a great extent.
With respect to the type of instruments that nation states may use to
influence others, much attention has been paid to the role of foreign aid
(Alesina and Weder 2002; Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Schraeder, Hook,
and Taylor 1998). In general, foreign aid is allocated to recipient countries
based on needs such as economic development or rescue from natural dis-
aster (for example, Alesina and Dollar 2000; Boone 1996; Collier and Dollar
2002). Foreign aid is also associated with political backgrounds, such as the
donors’ colonial ties with recipients (Alesina and Weder 2002; Neumayer
2003; Svensson 1999). In many cases, however, the distribution of foreign
aid is strongly influenced by donors’ political desire to draw cooperation
from recipient countries. For example, since the 1980s, the United States
has identified important issues in the UN that are strongly associated with
 Membership on the UN Security Council 261

its national interests, has followed other countries’ voting records on these
issues, and has used the records as a criterion for providing foreign aid to
these countries (Dreher, Nennencamp, and Thiele 2008; Kegley and Hook
1991; Wang 1999).
The empirical record on the link between foreign aid and UN voting
is mixed. For example, Kegley and Hook (1991) could not find empiri-
cal evidence that shows a positive link between US foreign aid and vote
coincidence with recipients. They explain that this is partly because recipi-
ents behave primarily based on their national interests rather than economic
needs or because recipients consider aid not as a benevolent action but as
a means for donors to coopt recipients. Wang (1999) reports that a signifi-
cant relationship between aid and UN voting can be found only in the votes
identified as important by the United States. Dreher et al. (2008) suggest that
different aid categories may differ in their ability to induce political support
for donors (especially the United States). While general budget support and
grants are effective in generating support, other forms of aid such as loans
and food aid are not. Carter and Stone (2011) argue that US foreign aid alloca-
tion is influenced by many other factors, such as the recipient’s regime type,
the executive’s political orientation, alliances, and level of development.4
Financial support from international organizations is another means that
can be used to affect states’ UN voting. Since significant decisions in interna-
tional economic institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank are strongly
influenced by their major stakeholders and these states’ national interests
(Eldar 2008; Fleck and Kilby 2006; Gwin 1997; Woods 2003), recipients of
the funds and loans may behave similarly with the major powers in these
institutions. Several empirical studies support this argument. For example, a
recent study shows that recipients of financial support from the IMF and the
World Bank are more likely to vote in line with G7 countries (Dreher and
Sturm 2012).
Although the literature on UNGA voting is extensive, no empirical
study has examined the link between membership on the UNSC and states’
UNGA voting. As the vote-buying hypothesis suggests, if temporary mem-
bers receive financial rewards or benefits from permanent members directly
or indirectly in exchange for political support for their positions (espe-
cially the United States) in the UN, we should be able to observe systemic

4
One theoretical, and also technical issue, in the study of foreign aid and UN voting is simultaneity. That
is, there are at least two possible reasons why foreign aid may lead to similar voting behavior (Carter
and Stone 2011). As realists claim, threats or promises that come with foreign aid from major powers
(donors) may actually influence states’ voting decisions even against their own preferences. In this case,
foreign aid independently affects states’ voting behavior in the UN. However, as liberals may claim, states
that share similar voting preferences with major donors are more likely to receive foreign aid than other
states, and more easily. Theoretical and empirical studies need to address this potential simultaneity issue
in a more rigorous way.
262 W. Hwang et al.

differences in UNGA voting between temporary members and nonmembers

of the UNSC.
Before testing the vote-buying hypothesis, we must first examine
whether joint membership on the UNSC itself promotes vote coincidence
between members in the UNGA. It is likely that temporary members of
the UNSC vote similarly to permanent members in the UNGA due to their
membership. This is because access to common information may reduce
uncertainty about issues in votes and also because frequent interactions with
other members of the UNSC may promote mutual understanding of the votes,
as liberal institutionalism suggests (for example, Abbott and Snidal 1998;
Keohane 1984).5 This speculation leads us to our first hypothesis.
H1: Ceteris paribus, temporary members of the UNSC are more likely
to vote similarly with permanent members of the UNSC in the UN
General Assembly than nonmembers of the UNSC.

In contrast, according to the vote-buying hypothesis, it may not be the

UNSC membership itself that drives temporary members to cooperate with
permanent members in decision making. Instead, political or economic gains
(payoffs) that temporary members receive from permanent members may be
the real cause of political cooperation in UNGA voting. This speculation
leads us to our two main hypotheses.
H2a: Ceteris paribus, as the level of foreign aid increases, temporary
members are more likely to vote similarly with permanent mem-
bers of the UNSC in the UN General Assembly than nonmembers of
the UNSC.
H2b: Ceteris paribus, as the number of programs signed with the IMF
or the World Bank increases, temporary members are more likely
to vote similarly with permanent members of the UNSC in the UN
General Assembly than nonmembers of the UNSC.

To begin our analysis, we create two figures. Figure 1 shows differences

between temporary and nonmembers of the UNSC in their vote coincidence
rates with the United States over the time period 1946–2008. If a state casts
a yes (no) vote when the United States also votes yes (no), we code it as
vote coincidence. By calculating the sum of all coincident votes and dividing
it by the total number of yes/no votes in a given year, we get a measure

5
If the access to common information mechanism exists, we might be able to see vote convergence
among temporary members with each other, and not only with the United States or other permanent
members. We calculated voting convergence rates among 10 temporary members (the majority votes
[yes, no, or abstentions]/total votes [yes + no + abstentions]) and compared them to nonmembers’ rates.
Then, we compared their mean values with each other in terms of both total votes and yearly averages.
Although temporary members have higher mean values than do nonmembers, the differences are not
statistically significant. With respect to total votes, the means for temporary members and nonmembers
are 75.03 and 74.91 respectively, and the t statistic is 0.576. With respect to the yearly averages, the means
for temporary members and nonmembers are 73.91 and 73.21 respectively, and the t statistic is 1.00.
 Membership on the UN Security Council 263

FIGURE 1 Vote coincidence with the United States in the UN General Assembly.

of vote coincidence for a state. To see whether the two lines in Figure 1
are statistically different, we test the mean differences between temporary
members and nonmembers of the UNSC.6 The t statistic is about –7.29, which
is highly statistically significant.
We also examined the differences between temporary and nonmem-
bers of the UNSC in their vote coincidence with each permanent member
separately. In all cases, although not reported in this article, there were sta-
tistically significant differences between them. However, while temporary
member states have higher vote coincidence rates with the United States,
United Kingdom, and France than do nonmembers, those that have higher
vote coincidence rates with Russia and China are nonmembers. This result

6
In total, 112 countries served at least one term as a temporary member of the UNSC. Since not all
countries served in the UNSC, it is possible that the differences between the two lines observed in
Figure 1 may result from a selection effect to some extent. That is, if countries whose policy preferences
are close to the United States are more likely to be elected to the UNSC than countries that have different
policy preferences from the United States, it may not necessarily be the membership on the UNSC but
the names of countries that explain high voting coincidence rates between these friendly countries and
the United States. This selection effect can be controlled to some extent in fixed effects models. In fact,
as shown in Table 2, the membership variable is not statistically significant in the fixed effects models,
implying that the selection effect is not a great concern in the models. Similarly, Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith (2010) fail to find such selection effects. That is, in their model of the election to the UNSC,
similarities in alliance portfolios with the United States and the US foreign aid variables do not significantly
explain the election to the UNSC. Nevertheless, to address this concern, we create a different figure (not
reported here to preserve space) that includes countries that have at least one term experience as a
temporary member of the UNSC. The results are consistent with those in Figure 1. The t statistic is about
–7.04.
264 W. Hwang et al.

FIGURE 2 Vote coincidence with P3 (including the United States) in the UN General
Assembly.

implies that vote-buying effects may exist with respect to the United States,
United Kingdom, or France, but not the other two permanent states. In this
regard, we create Figure 2, which shows differences in vote coincidence with
the P3 (the United States, United Kingdom, and France) between temporary
and nonmembers of the UNSC. The two lines are statistically different with a
t statistic of about –7.2.
An additional method of examining the impact of membership on the
UNSC on states’ voting behavior is by looking at states’ vote coincidence
rates with the United States (P3) two years before/after and during their
membership on the UNSC, as shown in Figure 3. The mean vote coincidence
rate with the United States two years before (after) UNSC membership is
about 26.99 (26.11), while the mean voting coincidence rate with the United
States during membership is about 29.37. According to t tests, these rates
are statistically different. The t value is 2.48 (for the difference in means
between before and during membership) and 3.44 (for the difference in
means between during and after membership). These results support our
argument: Once a country becomes a member of the UNSC, it tends to have
a higher voting coincidence rate with the United States than before/after its
membership.
The results in the figures present only descriptive statistics, however.
Since there are large variations across countries in their vote coincidence
rates with permanent members, we need to perform rigorous empirical tests
to establish support for the vote-buying hypothesis.
 Membership on the UN Security Council 265

FIGURE 3 Vote coincidence with the United States in the UN General Assembly 2 years before
and after and during membership on the UNSC.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Formally, our model can be expressed as:

y = Xβ + Zγ + u (1)

where the dependent variable is a state’s vote coincidence rates with the
United States or P3 in UNGA voting. When they both vote yes or no together,
we code it as 1, and 0 otherwise. Next, we calculate the annual vote coinci-
dence rate for each country.7 X is a matrix of theoretically motivated variables
(temporary membership on the UNSC, total US military and economic aid,
the total number of programs a country signed with the IMF or the World
Bank, and interactions between membership and US aid and membership

7
In fact, there are four possible voting outcomes in the UN General Assembly: yes, no, abstention, and
absence. Yes or no voting behavior directly reveals a state’s preference over a voting issue. However,
unlike yes or no votes, there are multiple reasons why a country might decide to abstain or not attend.
Absence from a vote, for example, can be used to send a political signal about the issue in question; it can
also, however, simply mean nonattendance. In order to avoid exaggerating the implication of abstention
votes and absences, we treat both as missing in our analyses. Nevertheless, as a robustness test, we also
estimate our models by employing different coding methods of vote coincidence. One method is coding
as 1 when both a temporary and permanent vote yes, no, abstain, or are both absent, and as 0 otherwise.
Another method is to code votes in agreement as 1, votes in disagreement as 0, and abstentions or
absences (at least one of two countries) as 0.5. From both methods, the test results (available in a Web
appendix at http://web.utk.edu/~whwang/papers.html) remain virtually the same.
266 W. Hwang et al.

and loan programs).8 Z is a matrix of control variables. We use fixed-

effects regression with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors (DKSEs), which
deal with pooled time-series cross-section (TSCS) data (Driscoll and Kraay
1998; Hoechle 2007). DKSEs appropriately adjust for the disturbances that are
heteroskedastic and serially correlated. This approach also controls for the
cross-sectional correlation that can cause biased statistical results if ignored
(Hoechle 2007). This method has other advantages of providing a consistent
covariance matrix estimator regardless of the cross-section dimension N , as
well as controlling for a high-order autocorrelation.9

Data
The dependent variable in our analysis is the vote coincidence rate between
an individual state and permanent members of the UNSC in a given year.
We create voting coincidence variables with three permanent members (the
United States, France, and United Kingdom) (P3 Coincidence) and with the
United States alone (US Coincidence). Not all votes in the UNGA are infor-
mative in revealing nation states’ voting preferences. It is unlikely that nearly
unanimous votes show the impact of UNSC membership on voting behav-
ior. Thus, we drop lopsided vote decisions that receive less than 5% votes
as either yes or no.10 The data on UNGA voting derive from Voeten and
Merdzanovic.11
8
Among many different forms of programs in the IMF or the World Bank, certain programs such as
nonconcessional IMF programs or adjustment projects in the World Bank may have a more significant
impact on recipient states’ voting patterns than other loan programs (Dreher and Sturm 2012). Although it
is desirable to disaggregate programs and examine the impact of each special program on voting patterns
separately, we think this can be saved for an extension of this article and is not the main point of this
investigation. Our goal in this article is to test whether the IMF or the World Bank programs, despite
different forms of their programs, in general promote vote coincidence rates between temporary and
permanent UNSC members in the General Assembly.
9
As an alternative method to deal with TSCS data, OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors
(PCSEs) (clustered by country) is also often used. However, there are two reasons why we prefer the
DKSEs to PCSEs. First, as Beck and Katz (1995) demonstrate, the PCSEs estimators tend to be poor
when the panel’s cross-section dimension N is larger than the time dimension T , which is close to the
data structure in this article. Second, the PCSEs have limits in that they only allow for an AR(1) pro-
cess. In contrast, the DKSEs method creates a consistent covariance matrix estimator, regardless of the
cross-sectional dimension N (Hoechle 2007). It also controls for higher order autocorrelation. According
to Hoechle (2007:284), Driscoll and Kraay’s approach loosely applies a Newey-West-type correction to
the sequence of cross-sectional averages of the moment conditions and generates a covariance matrix
estimator that is robust to general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence. As a robustness
test, we reestimated our models using the Newey-West method. The results remain virtually the same.
10
It is also possible that “important” votes may matter more than “unimportant” votes in testing our
arguments, although defining a vote as being important is inherently subjective (Dreher et al. 2008).
For example, the US State Department identifies important votes since 1983 and links these votes to US
foreign policy. Nevertheless, previous studies show that there is no difference in their findings when they
include only important votes (for example, Dreher et al. 2008; Wittkopf 1973). To cover as long a period
as possible (1946–2008) in our analysis, we decide not to use the US State Department classification of
votes.
11
Erik Voeten and Adis Merdzanovic, United Nations General Assembly Voting Data, http://hdl.
handle.net/1902.1/12379 UNF:3:Hpf6qOkDdzzvXF9m66yLTg== V1 [Version] undata1_63longarchive.tab
[fileDscr/fileName (DDI)] UNF:3:PD4NBUEmzGknPc8tr5QM/g==]
 Membership on the UN Security Council 267

The key explanatory variable is temporary membership on the UNSC

(UNSC membership). The UNSC consists of five permanent members (P5)—
the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China12 —and
10 temporary members. To be elected as a temporary member, a country
must be nominated by its regional caucus and approved by a two-thirds
vote of the UNGA. Each temporary member serves a two-year term and can-
not be reelected to consecutive terms.13 There are 112 countries that have
served as a temporary member at least once between 1946 and 2008.14
US Aid is the total US military and economic assistance to a certain state
in the form of loans and grants (measured in constant 1996 millions of US
dollars). This measure (natural logarithm form) comes from Kuziemko and
Werker (2006) and was originally taken from USAID’s Greenbook. Loans
measures the total number of loan programs that a country signed with the
IMF or the World Bank in a given year. This data comes from Dreher and
Sturm (2012).
There are several control variables that may be associated with vote
coincidence, membership on the UNSC, US aid, and loans from international
financial institutions. First, we control for a nation’s sensitivity to foreign aid
and loans. GDP per capita (GDPPC, natural logarithm form), oil exports
minus imports as a percentage of GDP (Oil), and the total size of the popu-
lation (Population, natural logarithm form) are used to this end. We expect
that, as countries become wealthier or economically more powerful, they are
less likely to be sensitive to US foreign aid and/or loans from international
institutions and less likely to vote similarly with permanent members.
Countries that have similar preferences over security issues with a sys-
tem leader may have a greater chance of receiving US aid or loans from
international financial institutions and vote similarly to the system leader.
To control for preference similarity over security issues, we use Kendall’s

12
The Republic of China (ROC) is coded as a permanent member prior to the recognition of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) in 1971.
13
Typically, three of the 10 temporary members are from Africa; two are from Asia; two are from Latin
America and the Caribbean; two are from Western Europe, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand; and
one is from Eastern Europe (Malone 2000). Each regional caucus implements different procedures and
traditions in choosing its nominees (for example, rotation in Africa and power dominance in Latin
America).
14
Given the region-based allocation of UNSC seats and the diverse nomination procedures by regional
groups—especially the rotation procedure in Africa—it is difficult to systemically explain the election of
10 nonpermanent members. Hence, although election to the UNSC is not totally random, it is largely
unrelated to foreign aid or political and economic development factors (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
2010). In this regard, we assume that there is no endogenity issue between membership on the UNSC
and other variables in our models. As explained in the next note, according to a diagnostic test, there
is no multicollinearity issue in our models either. For more detailed information about the systemic
determinants of election to the Security Council, refer to Dreher, Gould, Rablen, and Vreeland (2014).
In an empirical analysis of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, they find that US development aid does not
predict UNSC election. They also find that election to the Security Council derives from a compromise
between the demands of populous countries and a norm of giving each country its turn.
268 W. Hwang et al.

TABLE 1 Summary Statistics (1946–2008)

Variables Observations Mean (SD) Minimum Maximum

US Coincidence (%) 1,616 18.32 (10.59) 0 63.16

P3 Coincidence (%) 1,616 20.93 (12.71) 0 83.93
UNSC Membership 1,616 0.076 (0.264) 0 1
Ln(US Aid)a 1,616 15.07 (4.822) 0 22.22 (4.47)
Loans (IMF,WB) 1,616 2.772 (2.862) 0 18
Trade Dependence (%, 1,616 0.042 (0.058) 0 0.583
trade/GDP)
Ln(GDPPC) 1,616 8.109 (0.781) 6.05 10.06
Ln(Population) 1,616 9.259 (1.483) 6.18 13.82
Oil 1,616 −7.610 (16.03) −92.06 60.88
Democracy 1,616 0.559 (0.360) 0 1
Tau_leader 1,616 0.191 (0.391) −0.289 0.762
a
Measured in 1996 dollars, billions.

tau-b rank-order correlation coefficients as a measure of the similarity of a

state’s alliance commitments (portfolios) with the system leader’s alliance
portfolios (Tau-leader) (Bueno de Mesquita 1975). Democratic countries
(Democracy, measured using Polity IV’s 21-point scale and normalized
to take values between 0 and 1) and countries whose economies are
significantly dependent on bilateral trade with the United States (Trade
Dependence, the sum of export and import to/from the United States as
a percentage of GDP) may vote similarly with the United States and other
permanent members. We obtained these measures from the EUGene data-
generating software program (Bennett and Stam 2000). Table 1 provides
summary statistics of the data and variables used in this analysis.15

RESULTS

Tables 2 and 3 report empirical results of vote coincidence with P3 members

and the United States respectively. The results do not confirm our expec-
tation in Hypothesis 1, as shown in Models 1.1 and 2.1. In these models,
membership on the UNSC itself does not promote vote coincidence with
permanent members, and the signs are actually negative, although statisti-
cally insignificant. However, the US aid variable is statistically significant and
shows a positive impact on vote coincidence in all models. The number

15
We checked for the presence of multicollinearity in our models. The variance inflation factors for all
variables are reasonably low. The highest is 1.93 for the population variable and the average VIF scores
for all variables is 1.43. Given these results, we can say that multicollinearity is not a serious issue in our
models. According to outlier tests, there are several outlier observations in the trade dependency variable.
To see whether these observations significantly drive the results, we reestimated our models by dropping
these observations. There are virtually no significant changes in the results.
 Membership on the UN Security Council 269

TABLE 2 Temporary Membership on the UNSC, Aid, Loans, and UNGA Voting Coincidence
with P3 (1946–2008)

Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 Model 1.4

UNSC Membership −0.437 −1.465 −1.385 ∗∗∗

−1.146
(0.470) (1.547) (0.473) (1.583)
US Aid 0.242∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.051) (0.047) (0.050)
UNSC∗ US Aid 0.066 −0.016
(0.107) (0.116)
Loans −0.146 −0.146 −0.187 −0.188
(0.181) (0.181) (0.186) (0.184)
UNSC∗ Loans 0.250∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.091)
Trade Dependence 24.807 24.795 25.033 25.040
(17.549) (17.525) (17.504) (17.522)
Ln(GDPPC) −1.132 −1.117 −1.079 −1.082
(2.301) (2.300) (2.285) (2.281)
Ln(Population) −13.825∗∗ −13.839∗∗ −13.829∗∗ −13.826∗∗
(5.481) (5.492) (5.474) (5.485)
Oil −0.101∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Democracy 4.899∗∗∗ 4.923∗∗∗ 4.880∗∗∗ 4.873∗∗∗
(1.153) (1.163) (1.163) (1.185)
Tau_leader 10.719∗∗ 10.687∗∗ 10.521∗∗ 10.526∗∗
(4.827) (4.841) (4.811) (4.811)
N 1,616 1,616 1,616 1,616
Within R2 0.14 0.139 0.140 0.140
F-statistic 65.75∗∗∗ 63.35∗∗∗ 62.57∗∗∗ 62.15∗∗∗
Note. Four all four models, the dependent variable is Vote Coincidence with P3. The results are controlled
for fixed effects. The lag of autocorrelation is 10. Numbers in parentheses are Driscoll-Kraay standard
errors. ∗∗∗ p< .01, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .10. The hypothesis tests are based on two-tailed tests.

of loan programs signed with the IMF or the World Bank does not have a
significant impact on vote coincidence with the United States or P3.
These results imply that the UNSC as an international institution may
not induce cooperation among members. Following the vote-buying hypoth-
esis, we then examine whether membership on the UNSC has a significant
impact on vote coincidence when conditioned on foreign aid or loans from
international financial institutions.
Models 1.2–1.4 and 2.2–2.4 in these tables report the empirical results of
the conditional hypotheses. In these analyses, we focus on the link between
UNSC membership and vote coincidence with the United States or P3 (the
United States, United Kingdom, and France). This is because the vote-buying
effects are likely to exist between temporary members and the United States
(and its close allies, the United Kingdom and France) and also because efforts
to buy votes are likely to be salient when there is a disagreement among the
five permanent members, especially between the United States and China
(and/or Russia).
270 W. Hwang et al.

TABLE 3 Temporary Membership on the UNSC, Aid, Loans, and UNGA Voting Coincidence
with the United States (1946–2008)

Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Model 2.4

UNSC Membership −0.193 −3.227 ∗

−1.537 ∗∗
−2.798
(0.713) (1.826) (0.604) (1.805)
US Aid 0.322∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.066) (0.074) (0.076)
UNSC∗ US Aid 0.194 0.086
(0.134) (0.139)
Loans −0.255 −0.255 −0.313 −0.309
(0.202) (0.201) (0.208) (0.205)
UNSC∗ Loans 0.355∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.099)
Trade Dependence 31.899 31.867 32.230 32.196
(20.281) (20.182) (20.177) (20.148)
Ln(GDPPC) −0.546 −0.506 −0.479 −0.465
(2.579) (2.588) (2.555) (2.562)
Ln(Population) −19.473∗∗∗ −19.511∗∗∗ −19.465∗∗∗ −19.482∗∗∗
(6.719) (6.727) (6.710) (6.720)
Oil −0.111∗∗ −0.112∗∗ −0.112∗∗ −0.112∗∗
(0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Democracy 4.743∗∗∗ 4.806∗∗∗ 4.696∗∗∗ 4.727∗∗∗
(1.454) (1.448) (1.461) (1.467)
N 1,616 1,616 1,616 1,616
Within R2 0.17 0.167 0.168 0.168
F statistic 71.66∗∗∗ 68.75∗∗∗ 70.15∗∗∗ 70.35∗∗∗
Note. For all four models, the dependent variable is Vote Coincidence with the United States. The results
are controlled for fixed effects. The lag of autocorrelation is 10. Numbers in parentheses are Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors.
∗∗∗
p < .01, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .10. The hypothesis tests are based on two-tailed tests.

As the results in both tables show, the US aid variable does not condition
the relationship between the UNSC membership and vote coincidence with
either the P3 or the United States. However, this does not mean that foreign
aid from the United States fails to promote vote coincidence with the United
States or P3. The result simply indicates that the US aid has a strong indepen-
dent positive impact on states’ vote coincidence with the United States and
P3, regardless of their membership on the UNSC. In other words, countries
that receive US foreign aid tend to behave similarly with the United States in
their UNGA voting. In comparison to a temporary member of the UNSC that
does not receive any US foreign aid, it is estimated that temporary members
that receive about $4.47 billion (the maximum value in the data) have about
8% higher vote coincidence rates with the United States (17.4% versus 25.5%)
in Model 2.3, holding other variables constant.16

16
Since the same amount of dollars can be valued differently across countries due to different sizes
of their economies, the level variable might be limited in fully evaluating the effect of foreign aid on
recipients’ incentives to vote together with the United States. As an alternative way of measuring the
 Membership on the UN Security Council 271

Moreover, it appears that the loan variable has a strong conditional

impact on the link between membership on the UNSC and vote coincidence
with both the P3 and the United States alone. When the number of loan
programs signed with the IMF or the World Bank is small, temporary mem-
bers are less likely to vote with the United States or P3 than nonmembers
of the UNSC. In comparison to a nonmember of the UNSC that signs zero
(two) loan programs, a temporary member that signs the same number of
programs has about 1.54% (1.15%) lower vote coincidence rate with the
United States in Model 2.3, holding other variables constant. However, as
the number of loan programs increases, temporary members, in comparison
to nonmembers, are more likely to vote similarly with permanent members.
For instance, when a temporary member signs 18 (15) loan programs, the
state has about 4.85% (3.79%) higher vote coincidence rates with the United
States than a nonmember of the UNSC that signs the same number of pro-
grams (23.1% versus 18.25%) in the same model. To show this conditional
relationship between temporary membership, loans, and vote coincidence,
we create two figures of marginal effects (Figures 4 and 5) based on Models
1.3 and 2.3.

FIGURE 4 Marginal effects of membership on the UNSC on vote coincidence with P3

(conditioned on loans from IMF and World Bank). This figure is based on model 1.3.

impact of foreign aid on recipients, we used foreign aid as percentage of recipients’ GDP per capita
levels. Nevertheless, there were no significant changes in the results (available in a Web appendix at
http://web.utk.edu/~whwang/papers.html).
272 W. Hwang et al.

FIGURE 5 Marginal effects of membership on the UNSC on vote coincidence with the United
States (conditioned on loans from IMF and World Bank). This figure is based on model 2.3.

These figures show that the impact of UNSC membership on vote coin-
cidence with the United States or P3 is conditioned on the number of loan
programs signed with international financial institutions.17 When the number
of loans is smaller than three, the membership variable has a strong nega-
tive impact on vote coincidence with the United States or P3. This implies
that in general, temporary members of the UNSC tend to have lower vot-
ing coincidence rates with the United States or P3 than nonmembers when
they receive few loans. Largely, this result is consistent with the report from
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) and Dreher et al. (2014). They report

17
The size of loans may matter more than the number of projects approved in the IMF and the World Bank
in explaining vote coincidence. In our test, however, the size of loans does not have a significant impact
on vote coincidence. This result is, in fact, in line with previous findings. Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland
(2006) report that UNSC membership does not affect the size of IMF loans but only the probability of
participating in an IMF program. Similarly, Dreher et al. (2009b) show that neither disbursements nor
commitments in terms of the amount of World Bank loans is significantly affected by temporary UNSC
membership. There are a few possible reasons why only the number of projects/loans matters but not the
size of loans. First, disbursements of money largely depend on projects that are arranged years before.
When loans are disbursed, we may not be able to observe a direct impact of the loan on vote coincidence.
Second, as Dreher et al. (2009b) report, the results may imply that the average loan amount might be
small. In other words, the additional amount of money is not large enough to be detected by the statistical
model, while the number of additional projects is. Third, the determinants of loan projects may not fully
correspond to those of loan amounts. If this is the case, we may need to specify a different model that
explains the amount of loans. For example, Oatley and Yackee (2000) show that larger IMF loans go
to countries in which American banks were highly exposed and to governments closely allied with the
United States.
 Membership on the UN Security Council 273

that the size of the population is a significant factor that explains election to
the UNSC, while the regime type, security alignment with the United States,
or the size of US foreign aid to a country does not have a significant impact
on election to the UNSC. The results imply that elected members of the UNSC
(usually countries with a relatively large population) may have lower vote
coincidence rates with the United States than nonmembers. However, this
negative effect disappears as the number of loan programs increases. Once
there are more than three loan programs, the membership variable no longer
has a significant negative impact on vote coincidence. Moreover, when the
number of loan programs is sufficiently high, the impact of membership
becomes positive. When the number of loans is higher than nine (Figure 4)
and 12 (Figure 5), UNSC membership promotes voting coincidence with the
United States or P3. In sum, the figures indicate that the number of loans has
a substantively meaningful conditional impact on the relationship between
UNSC membership and vote coincidence with the United States or P3 when
it is higher than two.18
The test results for control variables generally meet our theoretical
expectations. As the size of the population and oil production increase,
countries tend to vote dissimilarly to the P3 or the United States. The GDP
per capita variable also shows a negative impact on vote coincidence rates,
although statistically insignificant. Democracies or countries that share similar
preferences over diverse voting issues tend to have higher vote coincidence
rates with P3 or the United States.19 Trade dependence appears to have a
positive but insignificant impact on vote coincidence rates in all models.

ROBUSTNESS TESTS

To see whether our results are robust across alternative model specifications
and assumptions, we perform a series of additional tests. First, if a country
already has a large number of programs running, additional new programs

18
To see whether one (or both) of the two types of loans drives the results, we reestimated our models by
including two separate variables: one for World Bank loans and the other for IMF loans. According to this
test, it is the number of World Bank loans that drives the results. Since the number of IMF loans varies
only between zero and three in our data, while the number of the World Bank loans varies between
zero and 18, it is understandable why World Bank loans drive the results. Also, since the United States
has more leverage over the World Bank than the IMF (Dreher and Sturm 2012), this result makes sense.
Nevertheless, we decided to use the combined measure. This is because we believe theoretically that the
direction of the impact of the two types of loans on voting coincidence is the same and also because in
this way we can simplify our argument and empirical tests.
19
In the models of vote coincidence rates with the United States, we did not include the variable of
preference similarity with a system leader (tauB). This is because including this variable can cause an
endogeneity problem in the models, since the United States was the system leader during the period of
analysis.
274 W. Hwang et al.

may not bring a significant change to the already existing positive relation-
ship between the recipient and the United States or P3 (that is, diminishing
marginal effects). It can be also argued that a new program that goes to a
country with no existing loan program may not alone generate a significant
impact on the recipient’s cooperative political behavior. Instead, we may be
able to observe such an impact only when a certain number of programs
large enough to mobilize the country are running (that is, threshold effects).
Although additional loan programs may have diminishing marginal effects
on the recipient when the country already has a large number of programs
running, we believe that the new loan programs should still have discernible
effects on the country. To see whether it matters that a country already has a
large number of programs running, we included a new variable for existing
loan programs and retested our models. The results remain the same.
The end of the Cold War might also have affected states’ voting behavior
in the General Assembly. During the Cold War, the West or the East might
have been able to generate support from nonaligned countries in direct and
open ways rather than through bribery. After the Cold War, however, coun-
tries may be less constrained by alignments, and thus they are more likely to
vote based on their own preferences rather than be pressured by the West or
the East, increasing the importance of bribery in achieving alignment (Dreher
and Sturm 2012). To test for Cold War effects, we replicate our models by
creating two samples (before/after 1991). The test results confirm previous
findings (Dreher and Sturm 2012) that the IMF and the World Bank loan pro-
grams become more important in explaining vote coincidence in the UNGA
after the Cold War.
Moreover, the timing of UNSC membership may matter, since aid and
loans might be given to governments to reward previous voting com-
pliance or to bribe votes up front. To test whether the time structure
of UNSC membership is associated with vote coincidence, we reestimate
our models with a series of dummy variables for two years and one
year before UNSC membership, the first and second year of member-
ship, and one and two years after membership ends, following Kuziemko
and Werker’s (2006) strategy of event-time specification. There are virtu-
ally no significant changes in the results (available in a Web appendix
at http://web.utk.edu/~whwang/papers.html) even after incorporating these
time dummies in our models.

CONCLUSION

This article examines whether membership on the UN Security Council influ-

ences a state’s voting behavior in the UN General Assembly. Membership
on the UNSC may lead temporary members to vote similarly with perma-
nent members for two possible reasons. First, similar voting behavior can
 Membership on the UN Security Council 275

be observed because membership on the UNSC may promote interactions

between member states, reduce uncertainty surrounding voting issues, and
enhance mutual understanding. Also, as the vote-buying hypothesis suggests,
members of the UNSC may behave similarly because of political or economic
benefits. If permanent members of the UNSC offer foreign aid and favorable
financial treatment to temporary members to induce their political support,
it is not institutional features or culture but the political and economic lever-
age of great powers that promotes cooperation in voting between the two
groups of states.
The empirical findings support the vote-buying hypothesis. That is,
elected members of the Security Council tend to behave similarly with per-
manent members, especially with the United States, as the number of loan
programs signed with the IMF and the World Bank increases. US foreign
aid also has a strong positive impact on states’ voting coincidence with
permanent members. The findings of this article contribute to our schol-
arly understanding of voting behavior in the UN and international power
politics.
There are some limitations in this study, and likewise there are research
opportunities for future work. Member states in the UN, including tempo-
rary members of the UNSC, may be sensitive to certain issues (for example,
security-related votes) more than others (such as economic development-
related votes). Generating support for security-related issues in comparison
to economic development or human rights issues may be a more difficult task
for permanent members. In other words, voting patterns between permanent
and temporary members may vary across diverse voting issues. If this is the
case, we need to disaggregate voting issues into different categories and
examine our theoretical claim at the issue-area level. In this way, we may be
able to find more dynamic patterns of states’ voting behavior. In addition, not
all permanent members share similar preferences over diverse voting issues.
Similarly, globally powerful but not permanent members such as Japan and
Germany may have the capacity and the incentive to buy votes. Therefore, it
is desirable to examine the findings of this article at the individual state level
for each permanent member of the UNSC and other powerful nonpermanent
members.

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