PCIB V. ESCOLIN 1.

WON SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR SETTLEMENT OF

MRS. HODGES ESTATE SHOULD ALREADY BE CLOSED,
Short Summary: BASED ON THE DECEMBER 1957 COURT ORDER
Mr. and Mrs Hodges both made in their wills provisions ALLEGEDLY ADJUDICATING MR. HODGES AS SOLE HEIR?
that upon their deaths, their whole estates should be NO
inherited by the surviving spouse and that spouse could ….no final distribution to all parties concerned of the
manage and alienate the said lands, with the exception estate
of the Texas property. Upon death of the latter spouse,
the residue of the estate inherited by the later spouse 2. R90.1 (on RESIDUE):
from the spouse who predeceased him would redound …after residue assigned to parties entitled to it, S.P.
to the brothers and sisters. Mrs. Hodges died first then deemed ready for FINAL CLOSURE:
Mr. Hodges, but since there was no liquidation of Mrs. 1. Order issued for distribution/assignment of
Hodges’ estate, the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges estate among those entitled
wanted to determine the extent of her estate that they 2. Debts
could inherit. (believe me, this is a short summary…case  Funeral expenses
is long…)  Expenses of administration
 Widow allowance
Facts  Taxes
-Charles & Linnie Hodges, both TEXAN nationals,  Etc.
provided in their respective wills that …should be paid already
 bequeath remainder of estate to spouse…during
lifetime 3. Motion of party requesting the same (not motu
 remainder goes to brothers and sis of surviving proprio) Would include distribution of residue of estate
spouse -Here:
-Mrs. Hodges died first. Mr. Hodges appointed as a. No final distribution of residue of Linney's
EXECUTOR estate
 in Financial Statements submitted before the b. No special application made by charles/PCIB
court, he made statements that the estate of c. Merely allowed advance or partial
Mrs. Hodges is 1/2 of conjugal estate payments/implementation of will before final
 that he allegedly renounced his inheritance in a liquidation
tax declaration in US d. If charles already deemed sole heir, why PCIB
 for 5 years before his death, he failed to make needed to file a motion to declare that Charles
accounting, failed to acquire final adjudication is indeed the sole heir?
of wife's estate
3. ON ALLEGED INTENTION OF MR. HODGES
-Charles died. Magno, initially administratrix of both PCIB: He intended to adjudicate whole estate to himself
spouse's estate, later replaced by PCIB for Charles' (Thus, no residue left, thus ulit, tapos na special
estate proceeding)

WON Action is prescribed? BUT SC:

NO. 33 appeals were timely made
-Court did not pass upon its timeliness
WON Certiorari and Prohibition is proper?
YES. Appeal insufficient remedy
-many appeals, same facts, same issues = multiplicity of
suits
WON THERE IS STILL A RESIDUE FOR MRS. HODGES'
HEIRS?
YES.
1. Whatever was intended, he can't deprive those
who have rights over the estate
2. Order - motion filed merely for exercise of
ownership pending proceeding
3. Mr. Hodges was aware that wife's siblings had
rights:
 In FS, stated that 1/2 of conjugal estate
belonged to Estate of Linney
 In Petition for will's probate, he listed
the bros and sis as heirs
 Lawyer of Magno was initially lawyer of
Charles when latter was still executor of
 Linney's estate – so may know what
Charles' intended
 Charles admitted omitting a bro of
Linney
 He even allegedly renounced his share
of the estate (but was not proven)
 Charles had duty, as Surviving spouse,
of trustee of wife's estate so had to act
in GF
4. ON PROPERTIES FOR SIBLINGS: since there's still a
residue, can't close SP yet
>PCIB: NO LIQUIDATION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTIES YET,
PCIB SHOULD SOLELY ADMINISTER EVERYTHING TO
DETERMINE THE SEPARATE ESTATE OF LINNEY, OVER
W/C MAGNO COULD ADMINISTER H:
NO. both PCIB and Magno should administer
a. It was Charles' fault why no administration of
estate yet
b. Admin should both be
 impartial
 extent of interest
c. Executor (PCIB) of Executor (Charles, over
Linney's) Can't administer estate of decedent
(Linney) _ R78.6
d. Liquidation of conjugal partnership may be
done in either spouse's probate proceedings -
R73.2
SUCCESSION: WON THERE'S SUBSTITUTION? None
1. No simple or vulgar substitution (A859, NCC)
 no provision for:
i. Predecease of T for designated
heir
ii. Refusal
iii. Incapacity of designated heir to
accept inheritance
2. No fideicomissary substitution
 no obligation on Charles to preserve the
estate
3. There's simultaneous institution of heirs subject
to resolutory condition of Charles' death
 Charles was to enjoy the whole estate
 but he can't dispose of property mortis
causa (because it's already subject to
the will made by his wife, which he
agreed in the provision of his will)
4. Charles didn't get mere usufruct: he exercises
full ownership
PRIL: WON RP LAW GOVERNS LEGITIME OF CHARLES?
No answer yet. Remanded
Art 16, NCC > applies: law of nationality
If we apply Texas PRIL law:
 Personal property: law of domicile
 Real property: law of situs (both in RP)
IF Art16 applies, then Texas law should govern; Texas
law provides no legitime
So renvoi to RP: RP Law provides that the Surviving
Spouse, being the sole heir,
gets 1/2 o the conjugal property, then 1/2 goes to the
estate of the spouse. If 1/2 of the estate of the spouse
goes to the surviving spouse which is the sole heir, then
Charles gets 1/4 of the whole conjugal property.
Court said that Texas law may apply, but since not
proven as…
 Courts can't take JN
 should show foreign law:
o As certified by person holding/having
custody of such law
o Certificate that such officer does have
custody over said law
o Aznar can't be used to show what Texas
law may contain, as there's a time
difference between this case and that
case, thus the Texas law might have
changed in between the rulings
BUT WHATEVER HAPPENS, PCIB can't claim that the
estate of Linney is not entitled to at least 1/4 of conjugal
property, they having argued that it is so.
NOTES:
1. will executed in Texas - Oklahoma
2. Charles made executor by Linney, but Charles
had no executor - so administrator dapat
3. as regards foreign laws:
 Should be proved as a fact
 R132 on Public documents
 SIR: Dapat use an expert witness
 Prove in accordance w/RP law
PCI Bank vs. Escolin
If there is no absolute obligation imposed upon the first
heir to preserve the property and transmit it to a second
heir, there is no fideicomisaria. The institution is not
necessarily void; it may be valid as some other
disposition, but it is not a fideicomisaria.
 were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article
16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the
PCIB VS. ESCOLIN Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-
56 SCRA 266 fourth share would be her free disposable portion,
taking into account already the legitime of her husband
FACTS: under Article 900 of the Civil Code.
Linnie Jane Hodges died giving her testamentary
provisions to her husband. At the time of her death, she
was citizen of Texas but, was, however domiciled in the
Philippines. To see whether the testamentary provisions
are valid, it is apparent and necessary to know what law
should be applied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable.

RULING:
It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it
must be proven whether a renvoi will happen or
whether Texas law makes the testamentary provisions
valid. In line with Texas law, that which should be proven
is the law enforced during the death of Hodges and not
in any other time.

The Supreme Court held that the estate of Mrs. Hodges

inherited by her brothers and sisters could be more than
just stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon
the proper application of the principle of renvoi in
relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent
laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no legitime
as contended by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can
be held that Hodges had legally and effectively
renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the
circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of
the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in
a position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of
law, on any of these two issues, and We, therefore,
reserve said issues for further proceedings and
resolution in the first instance by the court o quo, as
hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that
pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at
this stage, Our considered opinion is that it is beyond
cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs.
Hodges, her husband could not have anyway legally
adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her
whole share of their conjugal partnership, albeit he
could have disposed any part thereof during his lifetime,
the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is
the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than
one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, as of
the time of her death, minus what, as explained earlier,
have been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by
Hodges in favor of third persons since then, for even if it