CASE # 1

G.R. No. L-22595 Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-
appellee, vs. ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant November 1, 1927

Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant. Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

Facts

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of
the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition;

(2) denial of his participation in the inheritance;

(3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition;

(4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of
transfer of said business; and

(5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone
the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until
the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.

Moreover, the Joseph G. Brimo states at his will that the distribution of his will be the institution of
legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the
testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to
the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and
effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.

Issue

Whether or not the Andre Brimo is consider legatee even if he questioned the will?

Ruling
Yes! Andre Brimo is consider legatee even if he questioned the will. As mentioned in article 792. The
invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other
dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions
if the first invalid disposition had not been made.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be
made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the
scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any
pronouncement as to costs.

The fact is that even if the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the
Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be
the same as those of the Philippines.
CASE # 2

G.R. No. L-28904 CIPRIANA GARCIA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ISABELO SANTIAGO and ALEJO

SANTIAGO, defendants-appellees December 29, 1928

Gregorio Perfecto for appellant. M. H. de Joya and Pompeyo Diaz for appellees.

OSTRAND, J.:

In her complaint the plaintiff alleges that she was married to the defendant Isabelo Santiago on April 8,
1910, and that from that date they lived together as husband and wife, until continued family
dissentions compelled her to leave the conjugal dwelling on February 3, 1925; that defendant Alejo
Santiago is a son of Isabelo Santiago by his first wife, and Prisca Aurelio is a daughter of plaintiff by her
first husband; that said Alejo Santiago seduced Prisca Aurelio, and the latter gave birth to a child; and
that the other defendant Isabelo Santiago, instead of seeing to the vindication of the honor of plaintiff's
daughter by requiring his son to marry her, has refused to have anything to do with the matter, thus
seemingly countenancing the illicit relations between them.

The court therefore order that its administration be placed in the hands of plaintiff. The defendants'
answer to the complaint was a general denial.

Taking into consideration the facts stated, we do not think that the plaintiffs' separation from the
husband in unjustified. Under these circumstances, to compel the plaintiff to cohabit with her husband
can only lead to further quarrels and would probably be unfortunate for both parties. The separation
therefore seems necessary.

Issue:

Is it right for the plaintiff to to demand for maintenance allowance from his former cohabitant?

Ruling:

Yes! It is valid for the plaintiff to seek for moral damage and prejudice towards his ex-cohabitant.
CASE # 3

G.R. No. L-27791 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SANTIAGO

MANOS, Defendant-Appellant December 24, 1970

Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Isidro C. Borromeo and Solicitor
Dominador L. Quiroz for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Torcuato L. Galon, for Defendant-Appellant.

FERNANDO, J.
Facts

This appeal presents the grim picture of a son being prosecuted for and convicted of parricide for
causing the death of his father. Nor was there a denial on his part that such a tragic fate befell his sire
because of a weapon in his hands. He would however claim the justification of self-defense. The lower
court did not believe him.It was affirm the appealed sentence of reclusion perpetua, subject to the
modification as to the pecuniary liability.

The lower court, in the appealed judgment, relied principally on the testimony of an eyewitness, Dionisia
Malasarte. 1 She declared on the witness stand that on September 1, 1960, at about 4:00 o’clock in the
afternoon, the deceased Ricardo Manos, left a bolo and two bamboo tubes in her sari-sari store located
in Alegria, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At about 6:00 that evening of the same day, he returned to
the store, this time accompanied by appellant. He informed the witness, then upstairs, that he came
back to get the things he left with her. She went down so that she could give them back to him. It was
then that she heard him tell the appellant that it was time to go home as it was already night, and his
grandson, a child of the appellant, would be looking for him. Apparently, appellant misconstrued the
remark and asked his father whether he resented the fact that he was taking care of such child. Ricardo
Manos took care to explain that such was not the case, for otherwise the child might not have lived till
then. Appellant implied that the father was in a bad mood precisely because of the trouble occasioned
by the rearing of the grandson. At this juncture, he pushed aside his father who fell down face upward.
It was then that appellant dealt the blows with his bolo that proved fatal. The victim was hit first in the
stomach and then in the breast.

Insofar as the first assigned error is concerned, namely, the failure of the lower court to appreciate the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, appellant did have a point. As pointed out in the brief of
the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice Antonio P. Barredo, however, "since parricide is
punishable with a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, namely, from reclusion perpetua to
death," it is immaterial insofar as the penalties concerned as the presence of one mitigating
circumstance still requires the imposition of the lower of the two such indivisible penalties,
namely, reclusion perpetua, which was done in this case.

Issue:

Is the statement of the appellant considered for his claim of self-defense valid?
Ruling:
No! Thus no merit attaches to three of the assigned errors, the second, the third and the fourth assailing
the lower court for not giving full weight to the claim of self-defense on the part of appellant and in
giving full credence to the testimony of Dionisia Malasarte. Nor should the fifth assigned error as to the
admission of a medical certificate issued by one doctor when another doctor testified as to the nature of
the wounds necessitate any further discussion. Independently of such testimony, there is no question as
to the fact of death having been satisfactorily shown. The fifth assigned error is thus taken care of. Nor
did the lower court misapply the law when it required appellant to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
even if, as alleged in the sixth assignment of error, the mother as well as the brothers and sisters of
appellant, such heirs, would, perhaps feeling the natural impulse, hope to exculpate appellant, a mother
and a brother testifying in his favor. That should dispose of the sixth assignment of error.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of April 12, 1967 is affirmed with the modification as to the
pecuniary penalty and the accused, Santiago Manos, is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased, excluding himself, in the sum of P12,000.00 and to suffer the other
accessory penalty provided for by law. With costs.