1.

Few News Items related to Internal Security

i. The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision has dismissed the curative petition filed by the
Central Government, challenging its interim judgment of July 2016 in the case of fake
encounters in Manipur. Coming as it does at this juncture, when the government is asking
for more powers to deal with all kinds of uprisings that it deems against “national” interest,
the apex court’s wise words ought to put a stop to this train of belligerence. The five-judge
bench, headed by Chief Justice J S Khehar advised the government that “an internal
disturbance is not equivalent to or akin to a war-like situation” and that it ought to “proceed
on the basis that there is no war or war-like situation in Manipur but only an internal
disturbance, within the meaning of that expression in the Constitution—nothing more and
nothing less.” The government’s curative petition had challenged the Court’s 2016 interim
ruling in response to a writ petition filed in 2012 by a Manipuri non-governmental
organisation, Extrajudicial Execution Victim Families Association (EEVFAM).
The Court has been unequivocal that the army can be used to “aid civil authorities” but that
this cannot be done for an “indefinite period.” It has also pointed out that “a person carrying
a weapon in a disturbed area in violation of a prohibition to that effect cannot be labelled a
militant or insurgent.” More significant still is the following observation: “If members of our
armed forces are deployed and employed to kill citizens of our country on the mere
allegation or suspicion that they are the ‘enemy,’ not only the rule of law, but our democracy
would be in grave danger.” Given that this is allegedly what is happening today in Kashmir
and in Chhattisgarh, this judgment needs to be disseminated widely.

ii. In Sukma (southern Chhattisgarh) ambush of 24 April 2017, 25 jawans of the 74th
battalion of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) lost their lives, with their responses to
the 13 October 2016 felling of 24 Maoist guerrillas of the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army
(PLGA) in Malkangiri (Odisha) by the Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh. In the former,
hysteria and rage clouded better sense in both big-media and official pronouncements,
whereas in the latter, exultation and euphoria dominated their utterances. But now that the
dust has settled, it is time to pause and ponder about this internal war in which the Indian
state and the Maoists have been engaged. In the Malkangiri ambush, the Maoist guerrillas
were caught unaware and 24 of them perished; in Sukma, a heavily-armed CRPF unit
suffered fatalities because of lapses caused by their prolonged deployment over the last
three to five years. The lapses usually are:
(i) Prolonged deployment instils a sense of lethargy in operations.
(ii) There is a huge dearth of co-ordination between State Police and CRPF in terms of
operations where each see the other as a burden inherently leading to more casualties.
(iii) There are intelligence failures. It’s ironic that in a village of 100 people, more than 300
Maoists were residing and neither the state police nor the Central Forces knew of it.

2. Politics of Counter-narratives and Appropriation (In general answer-writing , name of

any political party shall be removed to show unbiased opinion of Political Parties,
could be helpful in interview also, also read the cultural aspects of different states)
Context: Politics in contemporary India is witnessing the construction of counter-narratives
to the dominant narrative and the appropriation of public figures to suit the interest of the
ruling dispensation at the centre. Such a process is visible not only at the national level, but
also at the regional and local levels. While at the national level the construction of counter-

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 narratives to secularism and cultural plurality is taking place, the phenomenon is also visible
at the local level, such as the celebration of Onam as Vamana Jayanti and the replacement
of the reminiscences of asura king Mahabali with Vamana, the fifth avatar of Vishnu.
Assam: In Assam, counter-narratives have been constructed to appropriate the Sankardev cult.
Meghalaya: Counter-narratives have been constructed to appropriate the Sen Khasis, an
aboriginal tribal group.
Mizoram: The Brus, a displaced minority tribal community which settled in the six relief camps
of Tripura, as parts of the larger Hindu fold.
Tripura: In Tripura, the BJP is engaged in the process of appropriating Maharaja Bir Bikram
Kishore Debbarma Manikya Bahadur into the Hindu fold. Bir Bikram Kishore belonged to the
Manikya dynasty, which ruled Tripura for more than 300 years and was the last king of Tripura.
The charge of appropriation is strengthened by the recent decision of the union government to
install a 184-foot bronze statue of the king. In fact, such appropriation comes in the light of the
BJP’s indictment of both the Congress and the left in the state not having given due recognition
to the king’s contribution to Tripura’s development.

 It was Bir Bikram Kishore, king of Tripura between 1923 and 1947, who took the final
decision of merging Tripura with independent India.

 Commonly described as the architect of modern Tripura, the king initiated land reforms and
reserved land for the indigenous Tripuris in the late 1930s, and set up schools, colleges and
an airport.

 The king also played a critical role in the formation of the present Tripura Tribal Areas
Autonomous District Council (TTAADC).

 However, the premature death of Bir Bikram Kishore engulfed Tripura in political uncertainty.
As his son, Kirit Bikram Kishore was too young to become the king, Kanchan Prava Devi, his
mother and Bir Bikram Kishore’s widow was forced to become the regent. In fact, it was she
who signed the agreement of accession on 13 August 1947, and on 15 October 1949
Tripura merged with the Indian Union.

 On 19 September 2013, on the occasion of the golden jubilee of the Tripura Legislative
Assembly, speaking at a seminar in Agartala, Chief Minister Manik Sarkar revealed that the
members of Tripura’s Manikya Royal family under Bir Bikram Kishore wanted to merge with
East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). However, sensing the public sentiments, before his death,
he expressed his decision to merge Tripura with the Indian Union. He also revealed that Bir
Bikram Kishore had planned its integration with Assam. It has to be remembered that the
States Reorganisation Commission constituted in 1953 proposed to merge Tripura with
Assam. However, the proposal was finally dropped and Tripura became a union territory on
1 November 1956, achieving statehood in 1972.
Analysis: The BJP’s appropriation of Bir Bikram Kishore can be seen in the larger context of the
social composition of and politics in Tripura. The tribal population constitutes around 33% of the
state’s total population and has a history of recurrent clashes between indigenous tribals and

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the Bengalis. The Indigenous People’s Front of Tripura (IPFT) has been demanding a separate
state called Twipra for the tribal population by carving out the TTAADC from Tripura. The BJP,
in fact, is using the tribal indigeneity to counter the consolidation and domination of the Marxist
regime in the state. It is also hoping that the appropriation of Bir Bikram Kishore would bring
more political dividends in its favour as well, so that it can counter the emergence of the
Trinamool Congress, which is replacing the principal opposition in the state, the Congress.
Nagaland - In largely Christian-populated Nagaland, the BJP has constructed a counter-
narrative to Christianity to strengthen its base. The party’s attempt to glorify Naga spiritual
leader and freedom fighter “Rani” Gaidinliu by constructing a memorial museum-cum-library in
Kohima can be seen as a step in this direction.
Gaidinliu (1915–93) fought against the British rule and was imprisoned in various jails in the
North East. She composed over 300 songs, including hymns, patriotic songs and poems.
Gaidinliu, who was described by the British administration as the “terror of North East” was
involved in an armed struggle against it. In fact, Jawaharlal Nehru was fond of Gaidinliu and
called her “Rani” because she took an anti-Naga stand in the Naga self-determination
movement. The Naga agitation was, in fact, the first movement that sprang up in India after
independence and tested Nehru’s ability as a nation-builder. Nehru wanted to counter the Naga
movement, and this forced him to praise Gaidinliu. Gaidinliu, who belonged to the Zeliangrong
community, also resisted the conversion of Nagas to Christianity and defended traditional Naga
animism called Heraka.
It is said that the British administration divided them into three states—Manipur, Assam,
Nagaland (then Naga Hills)—to weaken the protest of Zeliangrong community. The Zeliangrong
Heraka Association (ZHA) opposes the “Westernisation” of Naga culture, and it protects the
indigenous religion, culture and language. It is also critical of Western hedonism and
consumerism and strives to reassert communitarian values.
Recent Political Events: In December 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Nagaland
during the famous Hornbill festival, which coincided with the conclusion of Gaidinliu’s birth
centenary celebrations (26 January 2014–26 January 2015). Modi addressed the people of
Nagaland and emphasised Naga pride. He ended his speech with “Kuknalim” (victory to the
land) instead of “Jai Hind” (victory to India).
The ZHA submitted a memorandum to the Prime Minister demanding that their leader Gaidinliu
must be honoured and recognised. Their other demands included the minting of new coins to
commemorate the birth centenary of Gaidinliu; opening of a central university in Nagaland in her
name and setting up of a department dedicated to the promulgation of the “eternal religion and
eternal culture of Nagas;” renaming the airport as “Rani Gaidinliu Airport;” and installing her
portraits in the Nagaland assembly, the offices of the chief minister, governor and other
ministers. Subsequently, the centre released coins of `5 and `100 denominations with her image
on them to commemorate her birth centenary.
A strong protest however has come from within the Naga community itself. Many Naga tribes
see Gaidinliu as anti-Naga and having betrayed the Naga national movement for a sovereign
state. Organisations such as the Angami Public Organisation opposed any move to glorify
Gaidinliu. The Nagas never recognised her as a spiritual leader and described Gaidinliu as an
outsider and a cult leader

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Analysis: The BJP is highlighting only her opposition to Christianity, and thereby trying to create
communal polarisation among the Nagas in the state. The BJP, in fact, wants to appropriate
Heraka (the indigenous faith based on animism) into Hinduism by projecting her as the “spiritual
leader” of the Nagas against Jesus.
The Sangh Parivar now claims Heraka to be a part of the larger Hindu family. It is argued that
“since many of the practices of the Heraka are derived from Hinduism, the Sangh Parivar has
declared them to be vanavasi (forest-dwellers) and sought to assimilate them into the Hindu
fold.”
Odisha: Odisha with the following announcement: “Two hundred years ago, in 1817, a valiant
uprising of soldiers led by Buxi Jagabandhu (Bidyadhar Mohapaptra) took place in Khurdha,
Odisha. We will commemorate the same appropriately.” The political message of this speech
was apparent when Prime Minister Narendra Modi honoured the descendants of Paiko-
Khandayats, the erstwhile peasant militia caste, during his stay at Bhubaneswar in April 2017.

The textual and uncritical academic history of ancient, medieval and modern Odisha (starting
from primary school textbooks) is replete with the heroics of Odisha’s erstwhile peasant militia
castes who come under the broad category/rubric of Khandayat, Mahanayaks, Paikos,
Chasakhandayat, Kalingi-khandayat, Chasas, etc., as classified by the Nabakrishna Das
Commission on Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC), set up by the Odisha
government. . There have been no critical studies examining the contribution of these and other
castes/communities in Odisha’s vaunted martial tradition, though their heroics and exploits are
articulated and embedded in Odia identity and individual and collective imaginations.

The Paiko-Khandayat uprisings in the colonial times and their dominance in the postcolonial
Odishan politics from local to national levels are harped on about by members of these
communities in all public fora. These historical articulations are made alongside demands for
special category status for the state.

Analysis: The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is hopeful that its political appropriation of the
history, myth, legend and legacies associated with the historically martial castes would enable it
to defeat the regional ruling party Biju Janata Dal (BJD) in the 2019 assembly elections as these
castes form the main support base of the ruling party.
Conclusion: In short, from these experiences, politics can be seen as an ultimate goal to be
reached by whatever means adopted in tune with the specific analysis of the concrete situations
in each states.
3. How Much Transparency? - The Case of Reserve Bank of India
Context:

 Between 2009 and 2011, the central public information officer (CPIO) of the Reserve Bank
of India (RBI) got numerous applications under the Right to Information (RTI) Act seeking
information related to various issues. These included inspection reports of banks, reports of
banks that went on liquidation, advisory notes issued to banks for violation of the Foreign
Exchange Management Act (FEMA), list of banks which were issued show cause notices,
etc.

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 The CPIO had rejected all such applications stating that the required disclosures are
exempted on grounds of economic interests, commercial confidence, RBI’s fiduciary
relationship with the banks, public interest, information exempted under the RTI Act, etc.

 These decisions of CPIO were challenged in Central Information Commission (CIC) which
directed the CPIO to disclose the information sought by the applicants. The RBI later
approached various High Courts and eventually got a stay on CIC’s orders.

 Subsequently, on 30 May 2015, writ petitions filed by the RBI were transferred and heard
together by the Supreme Court. The Court in its judgment upheld the CIC orders and
directed the RBI to provide information to the applicants.
The Judgment: The Supreme Court has ruled that the RBI cannot cite fiduciary relationship
with the banks to withhold information under the RTI Act. The RBI has a statutory duty to
oversee the functioning of the banks and collect information related to their business.
Section 2(f) of RTI Act mandates “information” as inclusive of information relating to any
private body. The Supreme Court judges held that as a “watchdog,” the RBI “should have
been more dedicated towards disclosing information to the general public under the Right to
Information Act.” While this judgment analysed the constitutional aspects of disseminating
information and open governance, there still remain some elementary questions that
deserve greater scrutiny.
Implications of the Judgment:

 First, it is not clear whether the RBI will have any power to provide for time lag in releasing
the information sought from it. Central banks around the world observe a “curtain” period
before releasing important testimonies and reports. Sometimes, immediate release of
information may lead to excessive volatility in the market and impact the competitiveness of
the banking entity. This can be dangerous, especially when the inspection reports contain a
preliminary view of the inspecting officer.

 Second, there is no obligation on part of the RBI to provide data in specific formats. While
traditional information can be provided in paper or pdf format, providing financial data in
paper or pdf format may actually make the analysis difficult for researchers.

 Third, at times, economic policy decisions are based on certain assumptions. Such
assumptions may be based on conditions which are uncertain to the regulators themselves.
Further, different set of economists may react differently to the same set of situations. For
example, in decisions such as increasing or decreasing the interest rates, multiple
economists may have different views. Once the data is public, will the courts also go into the
judicial review of such decisions?

 Fourth, should a consent of the complainant be taken before making their identity or
complaint public? The annual reports of the RBI’s Banking Ombudsman (BO) scheme,
anonymously describes the exemplary cases dealt by the BO office during the year. Should
a similar approach be adopted by the RBI in making other complaints public as well? It has
to be noted that the complainants could be from the whistle-blower category as well.

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 Lately, information released through the RTI is available only to the person who files for it. In
a way, it creates an information asymmetry as the RTI applicant may or may not share this
information with the public. Therefore, should there be an onus on the RBI to ensure that at
least information about pertinent issues is available uniformly to the public?
Information Hitherto Denied: The information held by the central bank can be divided into two
components.

 The first component concerns the working and operations of the RBI as an institution. This
may include information about RBI’s governance, the management of its human resources
or the financial details of its operations. The RBI already provides some of this information
through its annual reports, website, and other publications. But these information bulletins
do not provide details such as the minutes of meetings (except for meetings of the Technical
Advisory Committee on Monetary Policy).

 The second component seems tricky. This deals with the information that is obtained by the
RBI from the regulated entities and third parties (such as complainants, external experts or
advisors, and so on). Section 2(j) of the RTI Act clearly defines “right to information” as
information held by any public authority from “inspection of work, documents (and) records.”
Releasing such information can breach the privacy of individuals. Should the RBI seek
consent of such parties before releasing it to the public? Does the RBI own this information
and can it use the disclosures in any manner it wants? It is difficult to provide simple
answers to these questions.
Conclusion: Section 35 further provides that the RBI, may in public interest, publish any
information obtained by them under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 in such “consolidated”
manner as it thinks fit. But at times, releasing such information may cause bank runs. This is
even more dangerous when the inspection reports contain the preliminary views of the
inspecting officer. In light of the RTI judgment, it would become important for the RBI to make
some adjustments in the manner in which it shall release this information to the public. A
balance will have to be ensured between the confidentiality of information and administrative
transparency. What kind of penalties are imposed by the RBI on different types of banking
entities? Does the RBI overlook minor violations by the banks in order to ensure financial
stability? Does the central bank apply different treatment to large and small banks?
It is true that a civilised country must always keep their inspection procedures easily accessible
to the public. This promotes certainty in the minds of the inspected entities and leaves less
scope for harassment as the procedures to be utilised by the state agency are available to them
in the form of well-defined instruments.
However, in India, the right to get information from the government is a fundamental right which
flows from the Article 19 in the Constitution. The RTI merely provides a mechanism for making
such flow of information possible. Therefore, the contours of the RBI’s accountability and
transparency to the public must not be based merely on RTI. Instead, they must evolve with the
change of time. The RBI must be obliged to release more information on periodic basis.

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At the same time, owing to the complexities of the financial world, certain caution is required in
making this information public. There is a need to decide on certain principles which should
guide the regulators in the release of information to the public.
4. Rampal Power Plants: Indo-Bangladesh Relations
Context: The governments of Bangladesh and India signed a memorandum of understanding
(MoU) on 11 January 2010 to set up two 660 megawatt (MW) capacity coal-fired thermal power
plants in Rampal upzila in Bagherhat district in Bangladesh. The proposed 1,320 MW Rampal
power plants are a joint venture initiative between the Bangladesh Power Development Board
(BPDB) and the Indian National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) at a cost of $1.68 billion.
Several commentators argue that the Rampal plant is meant to be a demonstration of India’s
firm backing of the current Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League government. India–Bangladesh
relations have seen major improvements under Hasina’s rule. Upon returning to power in 2009,
the Hasina government cracked down on anti-India elements in Bangladesh and handed over
several arrested separatist leaders to India. It also reoriented the country’s foreign policy focus
by visibly adopting a pro-India stance.
Adverse Ecological Impact: The Rampal project has attracted intense local, national, and
international criticism over its anticipated adverse effects on the ecosystem of the
Sundarbans— the largest contiguous mangrove forest in the world and the natural habitat of the
Royal Bengal Tiger. The Sundarbans is a protected wetland under the Ramsar Convention. In
1999, the Bangladesh government classified the Sundarbans Reserve Forest and a buffer zone
extending up to 10 kilometres (km) of its perimeter as an ecologically critical area (ECA).
Although the Rampal plant is located 14 km north of the remaining expanse of the Sundarbans,
it is only four kilometres away from the ECA. Besides the Royal Bengal Tiger, the forest is home
to 334 plant and 693 wildlife species, the endangered Ganges and Irrawardy river dolphins, and
many other fish, reptiles, birds, amphibians, and invertebrate species. Already, industrial activity
around the forest, conversion of forestland for agricultural purposes, illegal timber harvesting,
poaching, shrimp farming, and increasing salinity resulting from the diversion of Ganges river
water by India are endangering the forest and its flora and fauna. The establishment of the coal-
fi red power plant in such close proximity to the Sundarbans ECA will further damage the
vulnerable biodiversity of the forest. Consequently, locals and national–international
organisations have banded together to launch a vigorous resistance movement against the
power plants.
People’s Resistance - Parallel with their on-the-street demonstrations, they filed a writ petition
with the Bangladesh High Court in February 2011, seeking an injunction on the land acquisition
and power plant construction which was reversed later on grounds of bilateral relations with
India.
Even, the UNESCO recently wrote a letter to the Government of Bangladesh expressing grave
concern over the power plants’ adverse ecological impacts on the Sundarbans. The letter
insinuated that the Sundarbans might be stripped of its world heritage status as a consequence.
Government Response: Unperturbed, the Prime Minister at a recent press conference
implicitly equated anti-Rampal protesters with the anti-liberation forces. Some commentators
believe that Hasina’s staunch backing of the power plant directly correlates with her alleged

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pleasing-India-at-any-cost attitude. They argue that Hasina is anxious that backing off from the
power plant might be interpreted as an early sign of her loosening grip over power and her
inability to deliver promised benefits to India anymore. Beset by the recent Islamic militant
attacks on foreigners and progressive sections of the society, rampant corruption of public
officials, and Saradha scam type massive irregularities in the banking and financial sectors,
public trust is fast eroding in her government. This absence of a popular mandate has
contributed to her turning increasingly authoritarian and disproportionately relying on Indian
support to circumvent external pressure.
India–Bangladesh Relations: While the relations between the governments of India and
Bangladesh are stronger than ever, a large section of Bangladeshis continue to harbour deep
seated mistrust against India.

 India’s key role in the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 notwithstanding, the construction of
the Farakka Barrage on the Ganges river in 1975, and the subsequent desertification of a
large part of northern Bangladesh soured public perception of India.

 The long litany of complaints ranging from the erection of barbed wire fences along the
border, perceived arm-twisting, yawning trade deficit, frequent gunning down of
Bangladeshis along the border by the Border Security Force (BSF), failure to sign the
Teesta Water Sharing Agreement, to the untold ordeal of common Bangladeshis in
obtaining Indian visa have etched an image of India as an imperialistic, unsympathetic, and
opportunistic hegemon.

 When the then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s much publicised 2011 Bangladesh
visit ended in a fiasco without the signing of any major deals, particularly the Teesta Water
Sharing Agreement, (precipitated by the West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Bannerjee’s
intransigence) people became ever more sceptical of India’s true intentions.

 Prime Minister Narendra Modi salvaged India’s reputation somewhat by ratifying the Land
Boundary Agreement during his 2015 visit to the country. The agreement has permanently
removed one of the thorniest issues in bilateral relations by swapping the 162 enclaves in
each other’s territories. However, people here view India’s decision to press ahead with the
Rampal plants duplicitous since a similar proposal to build a thermal power plant in the
Indian side at Nayachar in West Bengal within 10 km of the Sundarbans Biosphere Reserve
was turned down by the National Green Tribunal (NGT) in 2015 for being too proximate to
the forest. It is justified if Bangladeshis feel aggrieved that being faced with resistance from
within, India is trying to outsource her pollution problem to Bangladesh in the garb of energy
cooperation.
Conclusion: India’s relations with its South Asian neighbours are tenuous at best. While the
election of Maithripala Sirisena in Sri Lanka has allowed India some breathing space, the
constitutional crisis in Nepal, and the ouster of democratically elected pro-India President
Mohammad Nasheed in Maldives highlight India’s challenges with its immediate neighbours.
The less is said about India–Pakistan relations, the better it is. Thanks to the Hasina
government, Bangladesh is perhaps the only country in the subcontinent which stood by India
through thick and thin in the last eight years or so. However bilateral relations are stronger when

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 anchored in popular support. The Indian government can ill afford to let the Rampal power plant
poison public opinion in Bangladesh at such critical moment.
Bangladesh will be holding the next general elections in 2018. The BNP has given enough
indications that the party will participate in the next general elections unlike last time. The Indian
government would be wise to nudge Hasina and privately convey to her that the project must be
shelved for greater bilateral benefits. To allay her concerns, India must reassure Hasina that
shelving the project will not affect India– Bangladesh relations adversely. Yielding to public
demand is not a sign of weakness rather it demonstrates the strengths of democracy.
India can also seize this opportunity to reimagine India–Bangladesh relations by signaling that it
respects Bangladeshi people’s concerns. In fact, the best course of action at this moment would
be to convert the Rampal thermal power project into a renewable energy project at a safe
location away from the Sundarbans. This would not only assuage people’s concerns but also
herald a new era in bilateral relationship. The Indian government has set an ambitious target of
sourcing 175 gigawatts of energy from renewable sources by 2022. By taking Bangladesh along
in this renewable energy journey, the two countries can chart a shared future that is green,
constructive, refreshingly new, and along the lines of the 2015 Paris Agreement.
5. NITI Aayog
Context: The NITI Aayog has been charged with developing a 15-year Vision, a seven-year
Strategy and a three-year Implementation framework. Although expectedly the term “plan” is
scrupulously avoided, it is quite obvious that planning is back. After all, the principal function of
planning is to evolve a shared commitment to a common vision and an integrated strategy not
only in the higher echelons of government, but among all stakeholders. No development
strategy can be successful unless each component of the system works towards a common
purpose with the full realisation of the role that it has to play within an overall structure of
responsibilities. The NITI Aayog mandate meets this requirement admirably.
The process through which the vision and the final strategic plan are evolved and implemented
can be at least as important as both the product (that is, the strategic plan) and the
communication strategy. An inappropriate process of formulating a strategic plan can have a
number of undesirable effects which adversely affect the quality of the plan and even more so
the quality of its implementation. The national planning experience in India clearly illustrates the
dangers of faulty processes, which led to progressive disenchantment with the plan, and
eventually culminated in the demise of the Planning Commission in 2014.
The Planning Experience in India – Indian development strategies have evolved from one
plan to another in response to the objective conditions of the economy and to the challenges of
the moment. Some of these changes have been strikingly bold and original, others more
modest.
i. The First Five Year Plan was not really a plan at all, but an agenda for the reconstruction of
a badly damaged country in the aftermath of the partition.

ii. It is the Second Five Year Plan which set the stage for formal planning in the country. The
politically-mandated objective of the plan was to increase the growth rate of gross domestic
product (GDP) to the maximum feasible given the limitation of resources. The principal
constraint at that time was the availability of savings, and existing growth theories and

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 models held little hope for any dramatic improvement over an extended period of time. The
emphasis on the establishment of heavy industries through public investment, both as a
means of rapid industrialisation and for raising the low savings rate of the economy, was
certainly original in its conception. It reflects the tremendous confidence that our political
leadership of that time, led by Jawaharlal Nehru, had in the analysis and judgment of
technocrats that it chose a path which was largely untrodden. The phased reduction of the
savings constraint and the need for maximising short-run growth also required planning to
be done over multiple time horizons. Thus, the perspective plan was set for 15 years, while
the operative plan was for five years, and annual plans to concretise the resource
allocations.

iii. The Third Plan, conceived during a period of emerging balance of payments problems and
falling international prices of primary products, called for a rethinking of the strategy. A new
constraint—foreign exchange—was emerging and had to be taken into account in addition
to the savings constraint. There were two possible ways to address this issue: (i) increased
emphasis on exports, or (ii) reducing imports through directed domestic production. The
former alternative would require derailment of the strategy to increase the savings rate, and
thereby the long-run productive potential of the economy. Thus, the Third Plan introduced
the concept of import substitution as a strategy for industrialisation and growth. It gelled
well with the political desire for national self-reliance, and, on the other, it was consistent
with the “export pessimism” of main-line economics of the time. Whatever be the merits of
this strategy in hindsight, it received considerable attention, and even acclaim, from
academics and practicing policymakers, and was widely emulated by other developing
countries.

There were two other developments of note during this period, both institutional in nature.
 The first was the explicit recognition of the need to decentralise planning which was
mandated by the federal nature of India’s Constitution. Thus, the states of the union were
expected to undertake state-level plans within the broad framework and resource allocation
of the national plan. Technical support was provided by the centre to the states for this
purpose.
 Second, the import-substitution strategy required the government to intervene in the pattern
of industrialisation over and beyond the role of the public sector envisaged in the Second
Plan. Detailed sectoral planning using input–output models to determine optimal industry-
wise capacity creation by the private sector was institutionalised at this time.

iv. The Fourth Plan came after one of the most difficult periods of Indian economic history. The
period 1965 to 1967 witnessed the worst drought in recent memory and consequent famines
in large parts of North India. At the same time, all aid was cut off to India by donor countries
on account of the Indo–Pakistan War of 1965, including food aid. This traumatic experience
brought food security into the forefront of policy imperatives, which was further buttressed
by the observation that sustained industrialisation was not possible without adequate
provision of wage-goods. Thus, a third constraint was introduced into growth theory—the
wage-goods constraint. The necessary efforts to address the agricultural constraint meant
greater involvement of the centre in agricultural development, which was otherwise a state
subject under the Constitution. This plan was also characterised by the introduction of

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 another concept, which has only recently become popular in the international discourse—
environmental sustainability.

v. The Fifth Plan too was path-breaking. It recognised that growth and industrialisation would
not necessarily improve the living conditions of the people, particularly the poor. The
strategic thinking in this instance was purely political and was driven by one of the most
potent political slogans of independent India— Garibi Hatao—coined by Indira Gandhi. The
concepts of “minimum needs” and directed anti-poverty programmes were innovations of
this recognition. However, this also involved the centre treading further into the domain of
the states. The Fifth Plan also marks a point of departure from the Mahalanobis model, and
a reversion to the Harrod–Domar model. The significance of this shift has perhaps not been
fully appreciated, but it is a clear pointer to the view that was emerging at that time that
savings may no longer be the main constraint to long-run growth.

vi. The Sixth Plan, for the first time, explicitly recognised that the success of the Mahalanobis
model’s heavy industrialisation strategy in raising the savings rate of the country had
created a situation where the savings constraint was no longer binding and indeed excess
capacities were becoming evident in certain industries. A shift in the pattern of
industrialisation, with lower emphasis on heavy industries and more on infrastructure, begins
here. On the other hand, it also represents a shift towards a more “technocratic” planning
approach, where the plan targets became more “realistic,” than “visionary,” which was the
characteristic of the preceding four plans.

vii. The Seventh Plan represents the culmination of this shift in perspective, and may justifiably
be termed as the “infrastructure” plan. It was also during this period that a reappraisal of the
import-substitution strategy and a shift towards a more liberal trading regime begins.

viii. The Eighth Plan was overtaken by the foreign exchange crisis of 1991 triggered off by the
Gulf War, and the economic reforms that came in its wake. The dramatic events and policy
initiatives of the two-year plan holiday period between 1990 and 1992 demanded a full
reappraisal of the planning methodology, and the Eighth Plan represents the first efforts at
planning for a market-oriented economy.

ix. In the Ninth Plan, it recognised that private investment was central to attaining the plan
targets, and that the direction of private investment was driven by the functioning of the
financial sector of the country. Thus, for the first time in Indian planning, the financial sector
was included as an integral part of the plan. This added a fourth constraint—the financial
constraint—which is quite distinct from the savings constraint. It recognises that weaknesses
in the financial sector can potentially prevent the economy from absorbing all the investible
resources available and for the first time in Indian planning history it recognised the
possibility that demand rather than investible resources could become the main constraint to
growth and, as a consequence, the conduct of fiscal policy needed to be brought into the
planning framework rather than be left entirely to the finance ministry.

x. The Tenth Plan marks the return of visionary planning to India after a long period of
incrementalism. It sought to double the per capita income of the country in the next 10 years
and to create 100 million jobs over the same period. To a large extent, these targets were

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 motivated by the demographic pattern that had emerged. It was quite clear that the single
biggest challenge to Indian planners and policymakers, at least for the next two decades,
would be to provide employment to a labour force which would be growing faster than ever
before. The demographic projections indicated that although there was likely to be a steady
reduction in the rate of population growth in the country, the growth rate of the working-age
population had attained a historical peak during the Ninth Plan period at about 2.4% per
annum and would decline only gradually thereafter.

Since the growth of the labour force was unevenly distributed in the different regions of the
country, the spatial pattern of creation of work opportunities becomes extremely relevant. It
would have been naïve to believe that there are no barriers or costs to large-scale migration
within the country. How this confluence can be achieved is therefore a planning issue, and
cannot entirely be left to the markets. In particular, it was noted that there will always be a
tendency for private investment to focus on the already developed regions, which will
accentuate regional disparities. Unless public intervention, particularly in infrastructure, could
gradually redress the initial imbalance, matters would simply become progressively worse.
Therefore, the Tenth Plan laid considerable stress on the issue of regional balance and for the
first time had a separate volume on states.

xi. The Eleventh Plan took forward the insights of the Tenth Plan, and introduced the concept
of “inclusive growth.” It added the focus on human resources, especially health and skills
development. By the middle of the plan it was clear that skills, and not investible resources,
had become the binding constraint on the Indian economy, and would continue to remain so
for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, underemployment of the unskilled or semi-
skilled labour continued to pose a challenge. Thus, increasing alternative work opportunities
in rural areas was a key element of the plan. However, the objectives of this plan also led to
a further sizeable increase in the involvement of the centre in matters of the states. The
Eleventh Plan too was overtaken by events like the global financial crisis of 2008–09 and
the severe drought of 2009 took their toll.
Although the economy recovered fairly rapidly, the growth momentum had been damaged.
In addition, the success of the Tenth and the early years of the Eleventh Plan in raising not
only the growth rate of the economy, but even more so the incomes of the rural poor, led to
a sharp increase in the demand for non-cereal foods. Since the supply response was
inadequate, food inflation accelerated and continued to remain in double digits.

xii. The Twelfth Plan, therefore, was framed under not very favourable circumstances. The
global economy was slow in recovering from the global crisis, and the Indian economy too
had lost its momentum. By now it was clear that the Indian economy was substantially
integrated with the global and its growth path could no longer be viewed independently from
global developments. This plan, therefore, was less about new initiatives and more about
bringing coherence in the development policy environment.
The Process: Demise of Planning Commission - The national planning experience in India is
most instructive in terms of the processes that were employed and their impact on the
effectiveness of the plans. The consultation process operated in three tiers -

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 i. First and foremost, it was embedded in the structure of the Planning Commission, which had
divisions corresponding to each ministry of the central government as well as a state plans
division.

ii. The second tier of consultation was the steering committees and working groups that were
set up by the Planning Commission prior to the preparation of each plan. The steering
committees were chaired by the concerned member of the Planning Commission and
included the secretaries to all ministries concerned with the broad subject area. The working
groups were established by the steering committees to go into the details of subcomponents
of the subject area, and were chaired by the secretary of the most relevant ministry. These
working groups included not only officers of the Planning Commission and the ministries, but
also representatives of selected state governments, academics and other domain experts.
This methodology was very successful in eliciting high levels of information and expertise,
and did contribute substantially to ownership of the plan at the official level of the central
government.

iii. The third tier of consultation was aimed at the political level. This was carried out through
meetings with state governments usually led by the chief ministers. The main consultation
was on what is referred to as “The Approach Paper to the Plan,” which was essentially a
document laying out the strategic thinking underlying the plan. Subsequently, the approach
paper and the final plan document were placed before the National Development Council
(NDC) for approval, at which time the political leadership in principle could demand changes
in these documents. This procedure could have elicited a fair degree of buy-in, provided that
the follow-up processes were better.
As things stood, the state-level consultations were meticulously documented, but no
feedback was ever provided on which suggestions were accepted and which were not along
with appropriate justification. The net result was that states, quite rightly, felt that that this
consultation was merely a façade for the centre to do as it pleased.
The decentralisation process became progressively worse over the years, and steadily
eroded the degree of buy-in, first among states and then even among the ministries. Its
effects on accountability were even worse. Originally, the centre transferred a block grant to
states for development purposes, which were used by the states to fund programmes
designed and implemented by them. Later, carve-outs were made from the total state
allocations for specific purposes of national importance, but the design and implementation
were left to the discretion of the state governments. Up to this point, there was considerable
ownership of the plan by the states despite their reservations about the consultation
process. This began to change from the Fifth Plan itself, with central ministries becoming
more involved in matters belonging to the domain of the states through what are called
“centrally-sponsored schemes” (CSS). The CSS were programmes implemented by the
states but partially funded by the centre. Initially, the CSS were designed by the central
ministries and this unified design was imposed on all participating states. The states not only
resented this imposition, but had little accountability for failure of these schemes. To make
matters worse, the CSS not only reduced the funds available to the states from the central
allocations, but also reduced the amount they had available from their own funds. This was
a further blow to ownership by the states, and a source of even greater resentment.

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 During this period, the Planning Commission did not interfere with the design and
implementation of the CSS, except to undertake cost–benefit appraisal of the proposed
project. This approach ensured that there was full ownership of these schemes and full
accountability at least in the central ministries. Later, however, the Planning Commission
also started to interfere with the design of the CSS. This was the kiss of death, since it
removed both ownership and account ability among not only the states but also the central
ministries. To a large extent, the eventual demise of the Planning Commission was probably
the outcome of this overreach, since it led to widespread resentment in all other tiers of
government.
Although the Planning Commission undertook a detailed midterm appraisal of the progress
of each plan and designed course corrections when necessary, these were rarely informed
by an understanding of the design problems embedded in the original plan. In brief,
therefore, although the Planning Commission did have an understanding of the importance
of processes, these were not thought-through in terms of their impacts on the various
components of the larger system. All too often, the form was mistaken for the substance.
The net result of such faulty processes was a steady build-up of disenchantment and
resentment, which culminated in the eventual demise of the commission, and perhaps of
planning itself in India.
The Vision: Returning to the mandate of the NITI Aayog, from all accounts it appears that
the responsibility for framing the Vision has been delegated to the NITI Aayog, instead of
being articulated at the highest political level. The Indian experience shows that this can be
seriously problematic. The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Tenth Plans were instances
where the vision was articulated at the highest political level, and only the strategic thinking
was left to the technocrats, who also were responsible for the detailed planning. Each of
these plans recorded spectacular success. The Seventh Plan, on the other hand, is an
instance where there was a political vision but little strategic thinking, leading to a situation
where the strategic plan was at odds with the vision. The result was a serious economic
crisis.
The first thing that is quite clear from this experience is that no good strategic planning can
ever occur in the absence of a challenging and well-articulated vision. A good vision
statement must have three critical characteristics:
(i) It must capture the imagination of the nation so that all stakeholders feel that it is an end
worth working towards.
(ii) It should be seen to have full political commitment especially at the highest level.
(iii) It must force the strategic thinkers and technocrats to go beyond mere extrapolations.
On this count alone, the NITI Aayog appears to have been started off on the wrong foot. It is not
too late yet to undo this weakness, but it will require the Prime Minister to:
(i) publicly declare his vision for the nation;
(ii) to charge the NITI Aayog to give it substance; and
(iii) to work actively in propagating it across all stakeholder categories.
It is not as if The Government does not have vision. However, most of the vision statements
which have captured public imagination, such as: “Make in India,” “Swachh Bharat,” or “Beti
Bachao, Beti Padhao,” are inherently sectoral in nature. These can be elements of a larger

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 vision, but left by themselves, they can lead to a seriously distorted strategic framework. The
Government needs to articulate a broader overarching vision which can encompass all of these,
and other, sectoral objectives, and provide the touchstone for gauging their relative importance.
Ideally, the vision should be amenable to quantification to a substantial extent so that the
technocracy is able to work out the targets, the trade-offs, the time dimensionality, and the
strategies that need to be followed. It is not necessary that the vision statement itself must be
quantitative in nature—the quantitative dimensions can be worked out through a process of
interaction between the planners and the leadership. An excellent example of this is the “Garibi
Hatao” (eliminate poverty) slogan of Indira Gandhi as the vision for the Fifth Plan. This vision
forced the planners to first define garibi (poverty) in a measurable, politically-acceptable
manner, and then recast the planning model to include poverty reduction as a specific target.
The end product of this process was not only a comprehensive development strategy, but also a
fundamental contribution to plan modelling.
There have been two pronouncements by the Prime Minister which have the potential for
providing such an overarching vision-

 The first is the slogan that was the centre-piece of Modi’s election campaign: “Sabka saath,
sabka vikas”.
 The second is the target of doubling farmers’ incomes in 10 years, which is similar to the
doubling of per capita income of the Tenth Plan. This, along with the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) which India is a signatory to, can be converted into a
comprehensive development strategy with sufficient ingenuity on the part of the technocrats.
The Strategy and the Action Plan –
i. The first step is conceptualising the strategic approach, which is a creative act linking the
objectives, the constraints and the instruments in a manner which subserves the attainment
of the vision. The second is to subject the conceptual strategy to tests of internal
consistency and feasibility. This is a technical process which quite often requires developing
new analytical frameworks.
ii. The implementation or action plan, on the other hand, is subordinate to and derives from the
strategy. Its purpose is to flesh out the skeleton framework of the strategic approach through
appropriate policies and programmes which can be implemented by the ministries and the
state governments. This separation between the strategy and the implementation
frameworks is important and should not be diluted.

iii. To begin with, therefore, it is important to acknowledge that strategic planning is always and
everywhere a top-down function. Development of a strategy requires a system-wide
perspective which is usually available only at the apex level of an organisation, whether it is
the central or state government. As for bottom-up approach, while the buy-in among
stakeholders is certainly an important consideration in formulating plans, the bottom-up
approach completely misses the whole point of strategic planning. It may be borne in mind
that strategic planning is about achieving a long-term vision which cannot be attained
through a business-as-usual approach, and requires addressing factors not in control of the
government by deployment of factors over which it does have control. At subordinate levels,
it is more than likely that the ministries/state departments will consider what they are
currently doing to be the best for the country, and will simply reiterate the business-as-usual.

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 Even if they do not, it will always be the case that even internal factors will be seen to be
outside the control of the concerned arm of government, which will necessarily distort the
subordinate plan away from that which is optimal at the national level. These problems
cannot be corrected merely by addressing overlaps and contradictions, and dictates a top-
down approach.

iv. A buy-in is extremely important to the success of any plan. There are two other equally
compelling reasons why the process is important. The first is information: different tiers of an
organisation have information which may not be available in other tiers. The second is
accountability: no tier of the organisation should be able to claim that it does not bear some
responsibility for failure.

v. There are three dimensions which need to be taken into account while designing an
appropriate process of strategic planning and implementation:
i. The first is consultation. It has long been established that a major factor in inculcating
ownership is a sense of participation.

ii. The second dimension is decentralisation. No matter how well designed the consultation
process, it cannot either elicit or utilise the variety of detailed information that exists within
the organisation. More importantly, it cannot be the principal modality for building
accountability into the implementation of the plan. This particular requirement demands that
subordinate units, which are ultimately responsible for implementing the plan, are given
sufficient leeway to design their own activities and modes of implementation without
compromising the broad objectives of the plan. In other words, a balance needs to be struck
between over-centralisation, on the one hand, and anarchic freedom at the subordinate
level, on the other.
iii. The third dimension is feedback, which is not so important in actually designing the strategic
plan itself, but is crucial to the “learning” and redesigning process. However, the feedback
design and parameters should be drawn up at the time of formulating the plan if it is to be
really effective. It should be made clear that feedback is not synonymous with monitoring—
an error that is commonly made in designing management information systems (MIS).
Monitoring is essentially an audit activity meant for tracking the progress of implementation
of the plan against the specified measures and timelines. Feedback, on the other hand,
relates to the information required by the planners to judge whether the assumptions and
assessments made by them at the time of plan formulation are borne out by later
developments, which enables them to recalibrate the plan suitably.
Conclusion – The main learning from this experience is that the NITI Aayog needs to devote as
careful thought to the planning process as to formulating the strategic plan itself.
Some of the features of this process can be summarised as:
(i) The Prime Minister should articulate the broad vision for the country, and not merely
endorse a suggestion put up by the bureaucracy.
(ii) The NITI Aayog should work out the components of this vision in terms of the objectives and
targets, and obtain full support of the Prime Minister. It may also be desirable to place these
before the Governing Council of the NITI Aayog for its endorsement.

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 (iii) The broad strategy for attaining the expanded vision should be worked out within the NITI
Aayog, keeping in mind the interrelationships and synergies that may exist among the
various objectives. This strategic plan should confine itself to strategy and not extend itself
to detailed design, which should be left to the lower tiers. This involves laying out the
objectives, the targets, the time path and the resources. All else is detail, which is best done
by others.
(iv) In framing the implementation or action plan, the NITI Aayog should clearly specify which
interventions should be designed and controlled by the central ministries and which should
be left to the state governments with only financial support from the centre.
(v) In the course of formulating the strategic plan, there will inevitably be serious differences of
opinion between the NITI Aayog and the ministries/state governments. These differences
need to be resolved before the strategic plan is finalised. The resolution can only be done at
a level higher than that of the Aayog, and this role has to be played by the chief executive
officer (CEO).
(vi) Last, but not the least, the NITI Aayog should consciously guard against developing hubris,
which inevitably leads to micro-prescriptions—the bane of the erstwhile Planning
Commission.

6. The Curious Case of Justice Karnan

Context: The Supreme Court, in a rare move, has initiated contempt proceedings against
Justice C S Karnan, a sitting judge of the Calcutta High Court, and has restrained him from
hearing cases. Contempt proceedings were initiated because he had levelled allegations of
corruption against several judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts without substantiating
his claim with any evidence. He had written letters to the chief justice of India and even to the
Prime Minister with a series of allegations against 20 High Court judges. He also alleged that
illegal money was recovered from some High Court judges after the government announced
demonetisation. A seven-judge bench comprising the chief justice of India and six other senior
judges of the Supreme Court took notice of those letters and issued a suo motu contempt ruling
upon Justice Karnan in an unprecedented exercise of judicial reprimand.
Timeline: (Just for a glance)
i. In 2011 Justice Karnan wrote to the National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC),
alleging that he faced caste-based harassment from brother judges of the Madras High
Court, where he was a judge at the time. Caste-based discrimination—if any is to be found
in the highest corridors of India’s judiciary—is a grave offence and calls for serious and
sensitive handling. Justice Karnan, as a High Court judge operating from a position of
authority, if aggrieved, could have utilised in-house mechanisms available to him to address
the problem. Writing a letter to the NCSC turned into an empty formality.

ii. In 2014 Justice Karnan barged into a court room at the Madras High Court exhibiting a
streak of populist sensationalism, during a hearing before a special bench of a public
interest litigation (PIL) on a matter relating to the appointment of certain judges. He told the
bench in open court that the selection was unfair and that he wanted to file an affidavit in his
name. He could have instead attempted to deploy institutionalised mechanisms of
persuading his own collegium, to ensure effective representation of deserving candidates
from underprivileged and marginalised sections of society.

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 iii. Chief Justice of the Madras High Court and later 20 other brethren judges wrote to the then
Chief Justice of India requesting that Justice Karnan be transferred to some other High
Court.

iv. Justice Karnan also wrote to CJI and Chief Justice of Madras High Court, stating that he
wished to stay on in the Madras High Court, in order to fulfil his obligation to prove the
allegations that he had raised against the chief justice and the other judges of the High
Court. Justice Karnan subsequently wrote to the joint registrar of the Right to Information
section, alleging irregularities in the appointment of district judges. He sought details of the
selection process in order to file a complaint before the President of India.

v. In 2015, the next Chief Justice of Madras High Court constituted a recruitment committee to
interview candidates for the recruitment of civil judges. On 16 April, Justice Karnan initiated
a suo motu writ proceeding in which the chief justice’s administrative order was stayed and
the Public Service Commission chairman was restrained from conducting interviews. Justice
Karnan further objected to the inclusion of some judges in the committee. His allegation was
that the fairness of the selection process would be under strain because the two judges
were from the same family and community.

vi. On 17 April, Justice Karnan’s suo motu order was stayed by a division bench of the Madras
High Court. The bench considered questions of jurisdiction and propriety with regards to
Justice Karnan’s order, and maintained that it is the prerogative of the chief justice to
distribute business of the High Court, both judicial and administrative, and that no other
judge of the court could exercise such power. On 30 April, Justice Karnan reiterated his
previous order, violating the division bench’s stay order. He threatened the Madras High
Court chief justice that he would initiate contempt proceedings against him.

vii. In May, the Madras High Court registry moved the Supreme Court asking for a stay on
Justice Karnan’s order. A Supreme Court bench headed by Chief Justice of India agreed,
and stayed Justice Karnan’s 30 April order. The bench maintained that the matter of judicial
appointments should continue without any further interference. Meanwhile, in May, Justice
Karnan made allegations against a colleague on the bench, accusing a brother judge of
sexually assaulting an intern within the High Court premises. Once again, Justice Karnan
was assassinating the character of a brother judge without backing his allegations with any
evidence.

viii. In November, Justice Karnan wrote to the chief justice of Madras High Court with copies to
the chief justice of India and to the President of India, accusing the then chief justice of
Madras High Court of belittling his capacities by giving him “insignificant” and “dummy”
portfolios. In his letter, Justice Karnan expressed the desire to go on long leave. He sent a
second letter to the Union Law Minister, describing the collegium system as one that
produced nepotism and favouritism. He also sent a third letter to the office of the Principal
Accountant General in Chennai, asking him to find out if any financial irregularities had been
incurred on the part of the chief justice of the Madras High Court and the registrar general.
On 12 February 2016 the Supreme Court ordered his transfer to the Calcutta High Court.
Justice Karnan promptly stayed his own transfer order. He asked the Chief Justice of India

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 to file a response on his transfer order and to not interfere in his jurisdiction. By staying his
own transfer order he was violating the principles of natural justice; “nemo judex in causa
sua.”

ix. In February the Madras High Court registry approached the Supreme Court, asking for it to
restrain Justice Karnan from issuing such an order. The Supreme Court stepped in,
quashing Justice Karnan’s stay order. The bench also ordered a blanket stay on all orders
passed by Justice Karnan after 12 February, but allowed him to contest the petition filed by
the Madras High Court. Justice Karnan met with Chief Justice T S Thakur and within a week
furnished a letter of apology to the chief justice of India for staying his own transfer order. In
the letter he attributed his actions to “loss of mental balance due to mental frustrations,” over
alleged caste discrimination against him in the High Court. He agreed to his transfer to the
Calcutta High Court,

x. He was summoned to appear in court in February this year. He refused to attend the
contempt proceedings however, instead asking for a compensatory amount of `14 crore
from the seven-judge bench for “disturbing his mind and normal life.”

xi. The Supreme Court then issued a bailable arrest warrant against Justice Karnan, to ensure
his presence in court for the next hearing on 31 March. During that hearing he requested
that the chief justice restore his judicial work. He further informed the bench that he would
not attend the next hearing, and that the court may arrest him if it pleases.

xii. Since these events, Justice Karnan has “ordered” the seven-judge bench, including the
Chief justice of India, to appear before him at his “residential court,” to face proceedings for
insulting him in open court during the 31 March hearing. He alleges that this constitutes an
offence under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act)
1989. He alleges further that he has been singled out because of his caste identity. He has
attempted to restrict their air travel, and has ordered the Central Bureau of Investigation to
probe his allegations against them.

xiii. On 2 May the Supreme Court took note of his orders finding them “contemptuous” and
ordered that he be administered a medical test, stating that “the tenor of his press briefings
and purported judicial orders passed by Justice Karnan, prima facie suggest that he may not
be in a fit medical condition to defend himself in the present proceedings.” In his response
issued to the press, Justice Karnan announced that he would not cooperate with the
administration of a medical test, and that he had issued non-bailable arrest warrants against
the seven Supreme Court judges for not appearing before him. At the time of writing, the
Supreme Court has directed that no authority is required to act on any orders issued by him.
Misplaced Importance?
i. The Supreme Court condoned the indiscretion of Justice Karnan sitting in judgement over
his own transfer order, which constituted a blatant violation of the basic principles of natural
justice. The act in itself called for his removal on the grounds of judicial incapacity. However,
once he acquiesced to the transfer, the Supreme Court allowed him to resume judicial work
at the transferee High Court.

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ii. Further, Justice Karnan had pleaded mental instability as the reason for his peccadilloes. A
scenario where a judge himself claims mental instability could even justify their
impeachment, on the grounds of mental instability under the Constitution. The Supreme
Court though, turned a blind eye to such deviant behaviour.

iii. Where gross incompetence in judicial conduct was sought to be glossed over under the
excuse of mental instability, subsequently taking note of flimsy corruption allegations
appears to be an instance of misplaced importance. There are no proven cases of
dishonesty against Justice Karnan, but there is definitely a yawning deficit of competence.
Incompetence, though grounds for impeachment, is not a justification for being held in
contempt. Contempt is the power of the court to protect its own majesty and respect. This
power is inherent and the power is recognised in the constitution of the High Court and the
Supreme Court.

iv. The Supreme Court has stated that the assessment is necessary to determine whether
Justice Karnan is fit to defend himself in the contempt proceeding, and has called upon the
judge to subject himself to an assessment by a medical board. Such a stance though, while
understandable in the course of an impeachment proceeding where the mental capacity of
the judge concerned can be considered under merits, in this case could be seen as an
encroachment on Justice Karnan’s rights to dignity and privacy. One must be mindful of the
fact that a contempt proceeding is a quasi-criminal proceeding, and as such, a person facing
a contempt charge must be treated at par with an under-trial accused of a criminal offence.
The rights to dignity and privacy are inalienable facets of the fair trial rights that such a
defendant possesses.

v. The power of contempt is regulated but not restricted in the Contempt of Courts Act 1971.
For example, in the Sahara case the Court utilised its plenary powers to punish the defaulter
who had breached his undertakings to the Securities and Exchange Board of India. The
Constitution of India has vested tremendous powers with the Supreme Court for ensuring
complete justice. Under Article 142 of the Constitution, “enforcement of decrees and orders
of Supreme Court and unless as to discovery, etc. With regard to allegations of impropriety
against a High Court judge, the Supreme Court had earlier fashioned an in-house
mechanism for dealing with such complaints without necessitating impeachment. However,
Justice Karnan’s is the first case where the Supreme Court has exercised the extreme
measure of contempt to discipline a High Court judge.
Can the weapon of contempt be used against a High Court judge instead of impeachment
under Article 124 of the Constitution?
i. The use of contempt jurisdiction in place of a more protracted and often abortive process of
impeachment may be attractive but it has far reaching consequences in the maintenance of
constitutional balance between different organs of the government and their exclusive
domain. Impeachment of a judge is a core premise of parliamentary sovereignty. The use of
contempt jurisdiction in this case constitutes an insidious tip-toeing of the judiciary into what
is a parliamentary prerogative. Though this may be an expedient tool in deserving cases,
the method is fraught with dangers of abuse in the future, which may unsettle the fine
balance of separation of powers under the Constitution. It is well known that hard cases
make bad laws and the exercise of contempt jurisdiction against a constitutional functionary

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 in overlapping cases must therefore be conducted with necessary circumspection and
caution.

ii. The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over the High Courts, but the Constitution
does not explicitly allow administrative and disciplinary control. The Constitution makers
probably refrained from bestowing such powers on the Supreme Court keeping in mind the
high prerogative and powers that the Constitution bestowed on the High Courts themselves.
The High Court is as much a constitutional court as the Supreme Court, though subject to
the appellate jurisdiction of the latter. If the appellate authority were to be bestowed with
disciplinary jurisdiction under the interpretation of the Constitution, it may impair the
independent functioning of the High Courts in interpreting constitutional philosophies in a
free and fair manner, affecting intra-judicial independence within its hierarchical ranks.
Wisely thus, the power of impeachment of a constituent was reserved with another wing of
the government, namely the legislature.

iii. Allegations of corruption in the highest judiciary are not uncommon. Prominent personalities
like Prashant Bhushan have raised issues of corruption against chief justices of India in the
past. An angry letter written by a former chief justice, Justice K Veeraswami, to the inquiry
committee constituted under the Judges Enquiry Act for his impeachment, became the
subject matter of an earlier contempt proceeding before the Supreme Court. The senior
counsel appearing for the Madras High Court has also suggested to the bench that the
proceedings be dropped in view of Justice Karnan’s imminent retirement (he retires on 11
June). The Supreme Court bench however, declined, and in addition to ordering the medical
test, has suggested that the contempt proceedings will continue Justice Karnan’s retirement
notwithstanding. If it does so, the bench runs the risk of reversing the principle of
presumption of innocence which is a golden thread running through any adjudicatory
process involving corporeal punishment, including contempt.

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1. Banking Regulation (Amendment) Ordinance, 2017
Context: Banking Regulation (Amendment) Ordinance, 2017, promulgated on 4 May 2017,
amends the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 to authorise the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to direct
banking companies to initiate insolvency resolution processes with respect to defaults, under
the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
The RBI may “from time to time, issue directions to banking companies for resolution of
stressed assets,” and may appoint committees to advise banking companies.
Proposal:

 Various measures have been suggested in the recent past. The Economic Survey proposed
the creation of a Public Sector Asset Rehabilitation Agency (PARA) which would purchase
the bad loans from the public sector banks (PSBs). The proposed PARA would be financed
from three sources: the issue of government securities, equity shareholding by private
investors, and money from the RBI’s surpluses. Like the PARA, the other proposed
solutions to the stressed assets problem also rely on state financing to clean the financially-
distressed banks’ balance sheets.

 At a reported meeting (in the presence of the Prime Minister) it was proposed that the public
sector undertakings (PSUs) be “coaxed” to purchase the non-performing assets (NPAs) of
the banks’ private corporate sector (PCS) loan defaulters.

 The choice before the government is the following: either recapitalise banks even as debt
recovery processes are underway or find ways to improve their balance sheets by shifting
the bad debts off their books. Of these two options, the second is a quick fix. Here too, it
would be the state that would bear the costs. This is nothing but a subsidy to large firms
belonging to business groups, some of whom have even violated the law.
Issues: These solutions seek to force ways to ensure that the costs of private sector loan
defaults are borne by the state and its enterprises. Following points are worth noting:
a. A study by the research department of the State Bank of India has found that over the
period 2005–06 to 2016–17, while capital infusion into the PSBs was `1.29 lakh crore, the
dividend paid out by the PSBs was `75,000 crore and the cumulative income tax paid was
around `1.5 lakh crore. More has flowed from the PSBs to the exchequer than from the
latter to the public banks. The PSBs have remained in operation despite that, yet the
perception is that NPAs in public banks are a drain on the exchequer and could abort the
fiscal reform effort of the central government. For the last few years, the emphasis has been
on selling a part of the NPAs to asset reconstruction corporations (ARCs) at a heavy
discount. However, the discounts demanded have been such that the PSBs have not found
this route attractive enough, so that actual sale has been far short of expectations.

b. The main problem, however, is that this whole analysis, even if not consciously devious in
intent, is ahistorical. It fails to see why public banking came into existence in the first place,
and why nationalisation proved unavoidable. It does not take into account how past policy
was shaped by what private banks did and did not do.

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c. Nationalisation was unavoidable because, despite repeated efforts of the government,
private promoters of banks who put in little by way of equity, diverted public savings to
projects in which the promoters had a direct or indirect interest. Agriculture and the small-
scale sector were starved of credit. In an effort to cut costs at the expense of inclusion,
privately owned banks limited their branching and restricted their activities to cities. Finally,
with exposure to a few projects that interested the promoters, many banks were vulnerable
and fragile. So growth, inclusion and stability pushed the government to take over the
Imperial Bank of India in the 1950s and a host of other commercial banks in 1969 and after.
Conclusion: If public banks are in dire straits today, it is because, with the closure of
development banking in the country, they have been called upon to finance investments by
the private sector in capital-intensive industry and infrastructure (such as steel and power
generation and distribution, and transportation and communication). With those projects
performing badly, the PSBs should not be maligned so as to build a case to use them as
instruments to write off the large loans on which big private sector operators have defaulted.
2. Furlough and Parole (Just for Knowledge)
Context: The notification issued by the home department on 26 August 2016, the Government
of Maharashtra has amended the Prisons (Bombay Furlough and Parole) Rules, 1959 to narrow
down the circumstances under which prisoners can apply for furlough.
Laws: State governments in India can formulate rules relating to furlough in accordance with
Sections 59 and 28 of the Prisons Act 1894.
Definition: “Furlough” is defined under Clause 3(5A) of the Prisons Act. It is distinct from
“parole” (State of Haryana v Mohinder Singh 2000). Parole refers to the release of prisoners in
response to a particular (usually emergent) situation, like the death or marriage of a loved one,
or a natural calamity such as an earthquake or a flood (Gajanan Babulal v State of Maharashtra
2014).
In contrast, furlough refers to the release of prisoners for limited periods of time, so that they
may maintain their links with society outside the prison. The availability of furlough is recognised
as an important way to humanise [the] penal system and to enable the prisoner to maintain
continuity with his family life and to deal with the family matters and to save him from evil effects
of continuous jail life and to enable him to gain self-confidence and to maintain constructive
hopes and active interest in life.
For these reasons, furlough is understood to be a “substantial legal right” (Sharad Keshav
Mehta v Maharashtra 1989), albeit not an absolute one
3. Happy Days : Happiness Index
Context: The interest to create happiness in a gloomy world riddled with crises and turmoil
appears to be the new agenda of international organisations. The artificial creation and
representation of happiness from sample surveys could be problematic as it may not lead to
genuine expression, but could lead to ignoring the larger structural and social determinants of
health, well-being and happiness.
Ranking: India stands at rank 122 out of 155 countries in the World Happiness Report 2017,
down from 118 and 117 in the 2016 and 2015 reports, respectively. Countries like Somalia (93),

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China (21), Pakistan (96), Iran (112), Palestinian Territories (103), and Bangladesh (110) are
better than India, a country that has more than 17% of the world’s population. The World
Happiness Report comes at a time when there has been increasing academic and political
discourse surrounding the fate of the much-hyped achhe din (good days) as promised by Indian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi during the national election campaign in 2014. India is in the
group of countries with Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Botswana, recording the largest
declines in happiness levels compared to the last report. The Asian region has suffered the
largest regional drop, which the 2016 report attributes to the drop in social support
Point to Ponder:

 (US), where gross national product (GNP) per capita has risen threefold from the 1960s, but
the measures of happiness have not changed.
Conclusion: An important feature of the happiness project is its vision of well-being. Wellbeing,
as contained in the World Health Organization’s (WHO) well-known definition of health, is
conceptualised as multidisciplinary, consisting of both subjective and objective well-being (WHO
1948). It is a social construct that cannot be individualized.
Happiness depends on culture- specific factors, such as influence of philosophical traditions and
material living circumstances. Thus, developing a universal index is far more impractical. Since
happiness (or other similar measures, like life satisfaction) is measured for a given period (like a
week or a year), but an individual may live a short or a long life, the happiness index itself does
not represent the total amount of happiness enjoyed over the whole lifespan.
4. Sixty Years of European Integration
Context: On 25 March 2017, European Union (EU) leaders from 27 member states (sans
Britain) gathered together at the historic Palazzo dei Conservatori in Rome to commemorate the
60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, which laid the foundations of the EU. While the EU has
expanded in size, depth and complexity since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957,
dynamics within its constitutional structures have been exposed to several fissures.
Structures and Fissures: Brexit, rising populism, the continent’s intransigent Eastern Bloc, the
protracted debt crisis and soaring migration are only a pale reflection of a much deeper
constitutional crisis within the EU. Europe stands alone and disengaged not just from its
member states, but far more importantly, from its “peoples.”
The Foundation for a Union: Against the backdrop of a dismayed Europe, reeling under the
destruction of World War II and a destabilising economy, British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill called for a “United States of Europe,” as the only means of consolidating a
disintegrating continent and restoring its glory (Churchill 1946). He advocated for a “sovereign
remedy” marked by what was perhaps unthinkable during those times: “a partnership of France
and Germany” (Churchill 1946).
Indeed, the Treaty which established the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) along
with the Treaty of Rome was the first step, and a remarkable one, towards Churchill’s vision.
The Treaty of Rome, which celebrates 60 years of formally bringing life to the European
Economic Community (as it was then called), took the resolve of further integration and
established a common market along with a customs union comprising six Western European
countries (Belgium, West Germany, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Italy).

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Political Undertones of the EU:

 With each subsequent treaty being ratified, the EU was gradually engulfing its constituents
into a political communion from where there was no turning back.

 The European Court of Justice through its decision in Van Gend en Loos. The EU was
declared to be sui generis (constituting a class alone), sitting uncompromisingly between
what is perhaps much more than simply an intergovernmental organisation comprising of
member states, while simultaneously being less than an enmeshed full federation. Thus, the
architecture of Europe was delineated. The union therefore transformed itself from a subject
of public international law into an entity with constitutional underpinnings, defined and
nurtured by a constitutional commitment embedded within the European Treaties.

 With a constitutional order in place, the EU thrived in ever more astonishing ways. It fostered
democracy in countries like Greece, Spain and Portugal, stood as a countervailing force to
the Soviet Union, and extended its influence in shaping the rule of law in post-Soviet
communist countries.

 On the economic front, the EU comprised of a block with a combined gross domestic
product of about €15 trillion, had an internal market with the free movement of goods,
people, capital and services, and operated as a dominant player in international trade and
commerce. With remarkable growth and modest levels of inflation, the standards of living
amongst half a billion Europeans only increased, peace was sustained and political rivalry
was kept at a minimum.

 The launch of a single currency for the Eurozone and the establishment of the “European
citizenship,” were further indications of a more confident and cohesive Europe. While the
former signified an even greater devolution of sovereignty by member states, the latter
identified a renewed vision for further federalisation of the EU.
Solidarity and Discipline as Fundamentals:

 The architecture of the EU was envisioned to rest on the mutually enforcing principles of
solidarity and discipline among member states. Solidarity is understood as the obligation of
member states to jointly pursue common solutions, through mutual support, to problems
affecting the union as a whole, be it financial or otherwise. Discipline is understood as
imposing an obligation on member states to abide by the rules arising under various EU
treaties.

 However, the pace of European integration far outstripped the capacity of member states to
reflect and assimilate such change into their own domestic institutional structures and
processes. To ease out the process and to leave no member state behind, the EU rules of
discipline were relaxed, monitoring was lightened and soft commitments became the norm.

 Thus, further down the integration path, the principles of solidarity and discipline were both
taken for granted. Ultimately, it had a debilitating effect on the relationship between the
member states and the EU’s institutions on the one hand, and between the EU and its
citizens on the other. Exacerbating that imbalance was the unrestrained and almost frenzied

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 resolve towards further integration, due to the unmindful or unconscious denial of the
unequal advancement of different member states.
Crisis and Institutional Disengagement:

 Once it was no longer feasible to sustain the veil covering the growing polarity between
solidarity and discipline, the EU was muddled into one crisis after the other.

 Consider first, the European sovereign debt crisis. The Eurozone’s debt problems were
essentially the outcome of years of fiscal imprudence by peripheral member states,
untrammeled by the budgetary rules of EU law. In several ways, the weaker member states
were implicitly allowed to go down that path, lest the promise of integration be arrested, or
far worse, questioned. Riding on the strength and confidence of the euro, Greece and other
distressed member states relentlessly borrowed from financial markets, stretching
inexorably, their public balance sheets. Market participants and investors initially turned a
blind eye towards the excesses of these member states, only to realise later that the
promise of solidarity was tied to a delicate balance. Once that balance seemed all but
disturbed, the EU’s credibility came down crumbling, unprepared and unwatchful as it was;
while the European treaties provided no credible solution.

The leaders of the EU were forced to create structures and agreements outside of the various
EU treaties (for instance, the European Stability Mechanism), zealously supported by the
European Court of Justice.

 Much of the same logic explains the current migration conundrum facing the EU. The want
for more solidarity between Europe’s East and West in dealing with the influx of migrants
has smeared relations between both camps. The relationship between Germany and
Sweden on one hand and the recalcitrant eastern states of Hungary, Poland and Czech
Republic, on the other, exhibiting two opposing extremes, has reached an unceremonious
and complete hiatus. While the former increasingly grows more disconcerted, having to
share the larger burden of attenuating and settling the rising counts of refugees, the latter
have firmed up their stance on not sharing any burden at all; despite explicit EU obligations
mandating an equitable apportionment of responsibility towards refugee claims.

At the other end of the spectrum, lies the dysfunctional Dublin system, which establishes
rules determining the member state responsible for examining an application for asylum. The
“Member State of First-Contact” rule undoubtedly imposes an excessive burden on peripheral
states like Italy and Greece and has led to continuous reprisals, while the conditions of living in
detention centres and refugee camps have only deteriorated.

With not enough solidarity in sight, European leaders were yet again forced to look outside the
EU’s own institutions and processes. The refugee crisis is, to a large extent, exported to the
borders of the EU—through the EU–Turkey agreement signed in 2016— whereby in exchange
for aid money and an assurance for a renewed focus on Turkey’s membership to the EU,
migrants would be stationed in Turkey. Voices from several quarters have raised concerns with
respect to the questionable character of the deal, and its much dangerous precedent for
international refugee rights.

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EU’s Lost Mandate:
The larger effect of the EU’s inability and unpreparedness to deal with its own set of
predicaments has caught the public imagination. Think of austerity, public budget cuts, pension
downgrades, border control and the rest. Amidst the rising disconcertment among people,
charges of “democratic deficit” and “illegitimacy” against the EU have acquired exaggerated
proportions While Britain took the most perilous road in attempting to dissociate itself completely
from the EU, other member states, like France, Italy and Netherlands have witnessed the
alarming rise of right-wing nationalist parties, with either an explicit or implicit agenda for
resisting integration.
Will the EU be able to withstand the institutional pressures from within?

 A clear evaluation of the EU’s lost mandate and an acknowledgement of its procedural
infirmities is perhaps a first starting point in that direction. In this regard, the recent
declaration signed by EU leaders in Rome points to a more humble and perceptive group.

 A sharpened focus with respect to the EU’s vulnerabilities and shortcomings ought to
occupy a heightened priority in its agenda. Further, a concerted rethink ought to transpire,
with respect to questions of legitimacy of EU action and its responsiveness towards
addressing the concerns of its citizens more closely and directly. As against national
member states, the EU can no longer afford to be a distant second in alleviating the needs
of its constituencies.

 Its institutions have to be significantly opened up, the participation of a broader section of
the polity has to increase and transparency in rule-making and enforcement has to be
guaranteed. In other words, there is an overwhelming need to engage more purposively with
concerns of both input and output legitimacy of the EU. The European Parliament on the
one hand and the national parliaments on the other, are perhaps central figures in the EU’s
trajectory towards greater visibility and acceptance. While it is necessary for the former to
look beyond its narrow mandates and act as a veritable source of accountability and
constraint on the EU executive, it is equally imperative for the latter to exploit its newly
increased powers of scrutiny and formal objection, as defined under the Lisbon Treaty.
Putting the individual citizen at the heart of the EU’s unfolding project ought to surface
beyond its usual rhetoric into its most recognisable promise.

 Lastly, a fundamental shift in conceptualising the relationship between the EU and its
constituent member states ought to inform European leaders about matters concerning the
further deepening of the integration process. This entails both a conscious appraisal of the
differing circumstances of each member state and their corresponding capacities in
effectively assimilating the complexities of a redesigned integrated framework. If this means
tempering the integration strategy through a greater use of the “enhanced cooperation”
procedure under the treaties, for able and willing member states, or the reorganisation of the
EU, to reflect a differentiated and multi-tiered integration process, as some have suggested,
so be it.
Conclusion: The EU has strayed a considerable distance from sustaining mutual trust and
cooperation amongst its member states and it is argued that only a significant and pervasive re-

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evaluation of its role and mandate can reverse such a course. The EU needs to be both
prepared and predisposed towards adapting to such change, mindful however, of assimilating
the varying standpoints of its constituent units. To recapture the public imagination of its people,
EU needs to demystify its construct, interact closely at the local level and consolidate its position
as the predominant agent for hope and a better life, thus aligning itself closer to its founding
goals and principles.

5. Tagore and His relevant Praxis (Paper 4 and Essay)

Context: The idea of society, or more appropriately samaj, has been an important
preoccupation with Rabindranath. The notion of samaj as envisioned in his famous Swadeshi
Samaj essay remains at the background, either explicitly or as trace. But this note explores the
general assumptions of the social in Rabindranath and tend to concentrate more on the later
conception of society developed in conjunction with the establishment of Visva–Bharati.
Swadeshi Samaj conceptualised an all India society that would be village based, decentralised
and organic. Rabindranath’s later conception may more properly be called social since it
consists of a set of different institutional practices that are developed over continuous
experiments in Visva–Bharati (and in his estates); further, instead of imagining a social structure
for the country, the Visva–Bharati phase prefers to experiment with a relatively small—although
expanding—area in the hope that it would set an example to the rest of the country—and
provide a platform of global interactions.
The notion of praxis, specifically social praxis, is used here as a phrase that pulls together three
distinct elements –

 First, these are the areas of practices—relating to work carried out in his institutions;
 Second, that of the categories that underline and are embodied in these practices;
 Finally, the futural element, of what is made or sought to be made from these.
Theology of work –

 Visva-Bharati was founded with considerable fanfare in 1921. This was appropriate since
Rabindranath Tagore’s university nurtured the ambition of generating a new culture of
knowledge in India and the world. The problems with this global establishment was that it
was located in a region that was desperately poor. The Hindu, Muslim and Adivasi villages
that lay in the neighborhood of Santiniketan were located on barren land with low
productivity. Stagnant water accumulating in deep trenches allowed malaria-bearing
mosquitoes to multiply, leading to a high number of deaths. The peasantry was deeply
indebted and moneylenders flourished. There was not much influence on locals. For them
rural life existed, as Rabindranath acknowledged, only to supply cheap labour to the
educational establishment. It was a relationship of pure instrumentality.

 Rabindranath did not see this problem however from the viewpoint of a benevolent patron or
as a development planner. Instead he approached the challenge of tackling rural poverty as
a problem of relationship. He referred to the “almost wholly academic” nature of the
institution that he had founded. The only relationship it had with surrounding villagers was to
use them for menial work. The inhabitants of the university lacked, as per Rabindranath, a

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 sense of “intimate contact” with their rural neighbours. He wanted to rectify this by setting up
an establishment that would work for the villagers.
Focus on Intimacy in Zamindari –

 Using the inherited authority of a landlord, Rabindranath experimented with economic and
social measures. He set in motion different schemes for improving the conditions of
cultivation and community life. Contrary to established conventions in which the zamindar
acted as the local dictator—adjudicator, Rabindranath laid down procedures for arbitration
that would bring in the landlord as the last court of appeal and also set up quasi, self-
governing institutions.

 This went hand in hand with attempts to mitigate hierarchical social practices (for instance,
those of sitting according to rules of purity and pollution during public performances) and
complementing these with attempts at becoming personally approachable to the peasants. :
practices that violated the rule of distance that was essential to zamindari authority. In the
1880s, the decade before Rabindranath reached his estates, the Bengal Tenancy
Amendment Bill had provoked a massive debate in the newspapers and legislative
assembly. The bill was designed to stabilise a restive, small peasant economy—especially
prevalent in Eastern Bengal—by providing greater security to tenants without breaking up
the system of big, zamindari landlordism. This bill and its later incarnation in the 1920s, saw
the mainly Hindu landlords combine against tenants who tended to be Muslim, an
antagonism that became endemic to the pre- independence politics of Bengal.

 The relationship between Rabindranath and his tenants was intimate in different senses as
well. It stoked a number of individual, ethical dilemmas. There was, for one, the experience
of guilt at being a landlord. Initially he felt that zamindari was a business and could not
fundamentally improve the lot of the peasantry. At the same time, as he stated in a private
letter, he could not act as a trustee since he had to pay off the huge debts that had been
incurred. Later, Rabindranath came to affirm that the land belonged to the tenants who
worked on it. At the same time he also thought that the net result of distributing his land
would be the domination of the moneylenders who would buy out the smallholdings of the
peasants. This was not a comfortable resolution and he sought other alternatives over time.
To these were added dilemmas of zamindari distance. Rabindranath sought to enter into
immediate and direct relationships with his tenants; but they continued to regard him as a
zamindar and refused to recast that role. Rabindranath was condemned to carry the burden
of inauthenticity.

 Rabindranath inhabited intimacy as a social crisis of personhood. The commitment to work

is also a resolve to work for others; further, this is based on an expectation of mutuality and
symmetrical recognition. Rabindranath defined the aim of rural work as one of inculcating
atmashakti in villagers. The word can be translated in many ways: self-empowerment, self-
dependence, self-making. Brahman is of the same essence as the atman, the individual
soul. Brahman can have a monist conception that is associated with Shankaracharya. This
regards creation as an inferior reality, the apprehension of which has to be removed to
achieve the unity of the Brahman and the atman. But the notion of Brahman is also
productive of dualist, as well as theistic, understandings. It is the latter that Rabindranath
inherits.

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Principle of Love, Creation and Joy of Union –

 Rabindranath extends the idea of an absolute and theistically conceived Brahman by

effectively dissolving it into an ethical principle. He does this by conceiving of the creator as
one who had founded the world on love. The foundational idea of love was properly
speaking, derived from the Vaishnav tradition. Rabindranath interpreted this tradition in his
own way by asserting that the creator produced creation. Love was based on
interdependence between creator and created and hence on mutuality. This removes the
privileged position of the creator itself and inserts love as the central principle of creation.

 The implications of love are equally far-reaching. It is a condition that preserves

separateness as well as the desire for unity—simultaneously. In other words, love is a state
of suspension with the self-continuously reaching out to the other. What we see here is a
move from the strictly metaphysical to the ethical while drawing on background logic of the
metaphysical relationship between the Creator and created. The figure of the Creator
ceases to be the model for the singularity of identity and instead, the relational self becomes
central.

 The relational self is this-worldly. Rabindranath was dismissive of Shankar’s concept of

maya, that is, the belief that this world is an inferior reality. Also, he believes the self to be
processual. A crucial feature is its constant expansiveness. The individual self, for
Rabindranath, is continuously reaching out to living relationships with the living world
outside itself. The real theatre of the Brahman– atman relationship is shifted to immanent
and unceasing attempt of the individual self to unite with the world. At its most extensive—
and as represented in the social thought of Rabindranath—the world is the global condition
itself. This concern accounts for the trenchant critique of the modern global condition that is
dominated by the self-consuming antagonisms of nationalism. Claiming that Vedanta is
about the manifestation of the infinite in all things, Rabindranath goes on to say that world
consciousness can be attained not by the occupation of space but by the expansion of
consciousness. Given the foundation of creation on love, it is only logical for the
relationships that make up creation to desist from the exercise of power either by
suppression or by instrumentalist use of the other.

 There are two modes through which the relational self seeks to knit the global in a web of
relationships. The first is education and the other is work, through mental activity and by
working for livelihood.
Work as a Mode of Relationship: Co-operation –

 On the one hand, the self can orient itself to gathering more power and resources for itself.
The accumulative self lies at the heart of nationalism for Rabindranath; and it is this that
accounts for fetishising competition as the governing principle of global life. It institutes
divisions between nations that act like super corporations engaged in all-consuming
antagonistic and self-destructive competition. On the other, the self is also oriented to the
other and seeks to gain itself through the other. Rabindranath observes that civilisation is
about finding oneself in others: self-expression is achieved through and with others. This
shapes the commitments to both knowledge and work. Work is a mode of relationship and

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 non-instrumentalist work for society involves working with and for the other. The ideal of
work is the Viswakarma, the one who works for all.

 Clearly Rabindranath rules out any commitment to the liberal idea of the autonomous
individual and with it the freedom of the individual to untrammelled accumulation. At the
same time, the social for Rabindranath is not a totality in which the individual is given its
specific place in social relations. The real challenge is that of inventing an institutional frame
to capture the flow and exchange of relationships. Conceptually, Rabindranath does this by
invoking cooperation. The word that Rabindranath uses for cooperatives—an institutional
derivation of cooperation—is samabay. This is a word that resonates with samavaya, the
idea of inter-relationships that explains the nature of creation in Vaisesika philosophy. For
Rabindranath, cooperation is the activity that brings together the singular in dynamic
relationships with its others.

 Nevertheless, the institutional form that he invokes and which is central to his project of rural
work in Sriniketan is that of cooperatives. Equally, cooperatives brought together his
emphasis on the value of the individual with the idea of productively relating to others—and
through this route, addressed the problems of property and work. He believed that individual
property rights were essential to the expression of oneself. But property had to be curbed by
social needs. The twin imperatives were resolved in the institution of rural cooperatives. It
would do so by encouraging individual peasants to pool in their money and labour to buy
machinery and other aids that would improve productivity and allow their farms to run
economically. Concurrently, this would encourage a sense of trust—in oneself and in the
other—which Rabindranath felt was sorely lacking in the peasants of Bengal, Cooperatives
activated atmashakti: that we can now precisely define as individual autonomy achieved in
self-transforming relationships with others.

 Interestingly, Rabindranath does not really refer to worker cooperatives which were, after all,
the dominant tradition of cooperatives in Europe. But Rabindranath is open to the use of
machinery when it is subordinated to agricultural activity. Agriculture expresses the
autonomy of the relational self: he says that it is the first activity of cooperation in the history
of mankind. The work of agriculture opens access to joy. Joy arises when individuals are
related in shared, agricultural activity that also weaves— at the same time—human
intervention with the blossoming of nature.
New Social Fabric –

 Rabindranath spoke of the need of “varied cooperations” on which Visva-Bharati would need
to be based. There was the attempt to produce an overlap between middle-class
representatives with those of peasant learners in agricultural activity, initiate urban, middle-
class youth into rural employments. One of the branches of the newly established university
at Santiniketan was Siksha Satra. Siksha Satra trained selected boys in advanced methods
of agricultural production and then sent them back to their villages to reorganize work
practices there. Specialisation was avoided to allow flexibility of choice.

 Rabindranath even started cleaning and burying his own shit, saying that he wished to join
in the meanest of works to relate intimately to the dust of Mother Earth. Rabindranath raised
a whole set of general issues through this claim, but what stands out is his embrace of

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 waste as a constituent part of nature and nurture. It underlined the fact that the work of
relating to other social groups requires a change in attitudes to the body, nature and social
rules through which one constitutes one’s selfhood.

 In Rabindranath and Gandhi, we have attempts to bring the conceptual and the active closer
to one another. In Gandhi, the metaphysical is filled in by the ethical (and devotional) which
is embodied in his practices of political, social and self-directed action. In Rabindranath, on
the other hand, there is an indecision, an ambiguity, in the way the two are interwoven.
Knowledge and Work –

 Rabindranath identifies two paths to his central concern with the global and these are
knowledge and work. The separation of the two lies at the heart of the effective hierarchy
between Santiniketan—the seat of knowledge production and dissemination—and
Sriniketan, the sphere of agricultural work.

 He believes that conceptual thinking is limiting. He claims that action is an imperative

condition of thought because it is what gives to thought its clarity in embodied reality.
Without action, the conceptual becomes free of all determination and precision. Thus, there
is a constant commitment to blend knowledge into agricultural practices.
Philosophical Anthropology – Surplus in Man

 Tagore sees, workings of mechanisms that go against the very essence of being human that
lies in the human capacity for transcendence beyond what is merely biologically or
materially necessary. In his philosophical anthropology he articulates this through the
concept of “surplus in man” which is natural by design.

 The surplus leads humans to two, mutually connected modes of transcendence.

i. First, of all species, humans are uniquely creative in the sense that they never simply
accept what is merely given, and incessantly strive for creation of the new, driven by a
future-oriented faculty of imagination.

ii. Second, humans are, again, by virtue of their transcendence-seeking nature, oriented
towards forming collectivities by overcoming and transcending their selfish and egoistic
impulses. Tagore frequently invokes the “spirit of unity” informed by love and
cooperation as a ground for social cohesion necessary for social existence.

 Thus in Tagore’s philosophical anthropology, the human is situated between these two
powerful natures, the one that connects them to the natural world shared with other animals
and the other dictated and controlled by mind’s sovereignty: “As an animal, he is still
dependent upon Nature; as a Man, he is a sovereign who builds his world and rules it.”
Religion and Religion of Man –

 Tagore assigns religion the role of addressing the situation of the originary split in the
human subject between the animal nature, on the one hand, and the inner, spiritual nature,
on the other. Tagore sees the situation as contradictory and ever threatening for human
social life as the spiritual part is essential for the latter. Yet, the spiritual component is not

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 “absolutely natural.” The contradiction is between what is “absolutely natural” and what is
proper to humans as their supreme Truth, the divine and the eternal element in them.

 The role of religion lies precisely in overcoming that contradiction by ensuring the smooth
working of that external, supplementary element, or “surplus.” Religion or dharma (used
interchangeably), helps “reconcile the contradiction” by “subordinating the brute nature to
what we consider as the truth of Man.”

 Tagore also mentions the necessity of cultivation of modes of conduct and manners and
forms of habits as disciplines necessary for human social existence. Yet, in contrast to the
materialist interpreters of the origins of civilisation, religion, and community, like Sigmund
Freud or Hobbes, or more recently, Roberto Esposito (2010), we find a distinct idealism
pervading Tagore’s speculative account insofar as emphasis is on spontaneity and
voluntariness of human self-subjection to what is larger than individual self and its natural
inclinations and interests. In other words, the external and internalised elements of coercion,
cultivation, and education are necessary for making humans to adjust to their own true inner
nature. We gain our “true religion” only when we try to come into harmony with this
transcendentally given higher and true nature by sacrificing the elements of our lower, brute
nature that threatens to bring us down from time to time.

 In fact Tagore emphasises the role of religion in early stages of human history in making
possible human social life by producing the unity effect. With the evolution of this spirit in
history and particularly, after the advent of the modern age, there appears the possibility of
the particular religions with their specific deities being replaced by one universal god for the
whole humanity revealing the ultimate historical truth of universal human unity.

Modernity, Civilisation and Nationalism –

 Modern civilisation itself had given rise to elements that were proving the greatest obstacles
to the possibility of human unity. To fully appreciate Tagore’s overall evaluation of the
promise and dangers of modernity, it will be helpful to focus on two of the central concepts
in Tagore’s critique of political modernity— civilisation and nationalism.

 Having originated in Northern Europe in the second half of the 18th century, the concept of
civilisation—along with that of progress—became an essential component of the intellectual
self-consciousness of the Western modernity. The concept of civilisation not only referred to
Western modernity’s active way of demarcating itself from the former feudal age in Europe
in terms of modes of manners, conduct and civility, but it was also used as a geopolitical
concept to differentiate the Western world as more advanced than other regions of the
world. The progress of the West in the fields of science, technology, and commerce were
used as criteria for measuring different regions of the world on a common civilisational scale.
However, later on, the semantic scope of this concept got further broadened when the term
civilisation began to be used, in the disciplines of anthropology and ancient history, to refer
to plural civilisations.

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  Tagore’s turn to India-as-civilisation, unlike many others is not to the Vedas or the Gita, but
to “the thoughts and practices of the medieval mystics, poets, and religions and spiritual
figures. Tagore’s position [thus] opened up the possibility of viewing India as a relatively
more fluid, less rigidly bordered cultural entity defined by a number of mystics and saints,
the boundaries of whose religious identities were never exactly clear.”

 Some of the tendencies in the dominant political concept of civilisation—associated with

industrial capitalism, he finds deeply problematic -

i. First, one of the aspects of the modern civilisation that Tagore found deeply disturbing was
the reversal in the hierarchy of human values that was becoming more and more evident,
particularly after World War I. While in all previous civilisations the “lower passions” like
selfishness were subordinated to the higher ethical values, the dominant tendency in the
modern civilisation was to disturb that balance by confusing the rank and order of values in
the moral hierarchy. Similarly, modern civilisation was dangerously promoting another
reversal in another hierarchy of elements in human affairs. While Tagore says that the role
of such essential components of human rationality as instrumentality, utility, and usefulness,
productivity, etc., was always considered indispensable in all previous civilisations as well, it
was not considered dominant. In modern civilisation, these elements had come to occupy
more than their legitimate place in society at the expense of creativity and harmony.

ii. Second, being based on speed, modern civilisation loses its claim to being a civilisation in
the true sense of the word. This diversity of the ideal of perfection was conceptually
excluded from the colonial geopolitical concept of civilisation. Contrasting with this principle
of creativity is the machine-based and speed-oriented production that, according to Tagore,
characterises modern capitalist civilisation. In terms of the older ideal of civilisation, that is,
the ideal of slow maturing of creative social forms over long periods, modern European
civilisation is not truly a civilisation.

Nationalism
 Tagore defines nation as “the political and economic union of a people” and this union is the
one that “a whole population assumes when organized for a mechanical purpose”. The
goals of this form of political organisation are endless enhancement of its economic, military,
and political power and continuous ideological self-aggrandisement. Externally, at
international level, nationalisms work either through diplomatic deception, lies and
instrumentalisation of other nations, or through overt threat, aggression and war. Commerce
and science are used by nationalisms instrumentally to attain their ever-expanding power
goals, without any clear telos to give them any sense of ethical limits of their actions.

 In “Nationalism in India” Tagore claims that India has never been a nation. Yet, the proper
names Bharat or India or Bengal stand for civilisational units that organised the relation
between the social life and political power in ways very different from the modern Western
statist orientation, clearly manifest in the idea of the nation.

 Tagore’s approach to nationalism is decidedly different from most nationalist thinkers—both

in European and anti-colonial contexts—who understood nation as the manifestation of the
organic culture of the people. In his conceptualisation of the idea of alternative civilisation as

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 dharma or sadachar or the idea of sanskriti (culture), he argues for autonomy from colonial
domination, but his conceptualisation of this autonomy cannot be assimilated in its dominant
nationalist conceptualisation.
 Tagore traced all the deep flaws of modern Western “political civilisation” back to the nexus
of the political and the commercial in the apparatus of the modern state. In contrast, the
defining feature of the Indian, as also of the Chinese, was for him the communities’ self-
regulation of their own affairs. Tagore argues that in Indian history samaj had always
retained its autonomy from the kingly power. The kings and dynasties kept changing with
little or minimum impact on the everyday life of the common people autonomously governed
by the samaj. But the relation between samaj and the political power changed with the
colonial state as it was not only a new political power replacing the existing one, but a
different form of political power that was unprecedented in Indian history and that threatened
to fundamentally disrupt the established ways of samaj’s self-government. The modern state
was reducing the state–community distance and was severely weakening the self-governing
powers of the samaj and by reducing its autonomy, was making it dependent on the modern
state even for those functions carried out routinely and effortlessly at its own level.

 Tagore’s critique of the form of the colonial state’s power, unlike the reformist-nationalist
critique, does not collapse into a nationalist proto-state alternative. Interestingly, in this
essay, Tagore also discusses the legal homogenisation of the diversity of community
customs by the colonial legal apparatus. The complete dependence on state power
eliminated all the possibilities of any internal critique or transformation of the samaj and
hence its evolution.

 Tagore asserts that before the advent to the modern abstract power, human relations in
samaj were characterised by social cooperation. In contrast, the political power of the nation
state was characterised by competition, which threatened to eliminate the spirit of social
cooperation. The most problematic aspect of the political power represented by the nation
was that it mobilised those aspects of life that were “least human.” In this way it amounted to
an inversion of the “surplus in man” insofar as it went against the very essence of being
human.

 Tagore finds both modern civilisation and nationalism as founded on rationality that does not
allow the revelation of what is properly and authentically human in them. Since nationalism
works by reducing people to populations, at its worst, it would threaten to reduce humans to
mere biological life of needs and use by reducing them to some kind of force or to resource.
Democracy –

 “Swadeshi Samaj, Rabindranath emphasised needed to rescue swadesh (own country) from
the overpowering grip of colonial administration. According to him, state power should be
confined to war, security and the administration of justice. These should be the main
concerns of sovereignty. Rabindranath gives primacy to such instances in Indian history.
The passivity of society increases in inverse proportion to the degree to which state power
transgresses its limits. The deprivations of pastoral power make mangled toys of helpless
men. Our country is primarily located in its villages. The malignancy of administration was
manifest in the profound deprivations of village life. Rabindranath placed the greatest
emphasis on attaining freedom from this predicament.

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 “We can save ourselves only if our villages become self-dependent and impenetrable [to
colonial power]. Our main problem is how to build this kind of village society”. It is argued
that Rabindranath’s political thought could not accept democracy nor give importance to
institutional power. Mass democracy based on full adult franchise in the 20th century
integrated the regime of power.

 We have to make ourselves into a nation”. The boundaries of his conception of Swadeshi
Samaj was more extensive. That is why he promoted kathakata, jatras, magic lantern and
similar cultural activities.
Critique –
Ambedkar’s philosophies at times clash with that of Tagore. The Ambedkarite question to
Tagore’s social civilisational is the following: what if, adjustment is naturalisation–normalisation
of violence; violence of both exclusion and inclusion; inclusion, especially, because it is the
terms of inclusion into the civilisational that Ambedkar questions. Ambedkar is, as if, looking for
a middle path, an in-between, that puts under erasure the two poles— the two poles of liberal
discourse and theological discourse. Religion has conventionally been seen as personal
salvation/moksha. Dhamma is social. The lone man can do without Dhamma. Society cannot.
Society, according to Ambedkar, has three alternatives: anarchy and dictatorship—both lead to
the loss of liberty—and a third way: Dhamma. Dhamma as this-worldly moksha. Dhamma as
political.
Tagore, unlike Ambedkar, builds on dharma, but in a manner that is different. Both, however,
manage to question the given. One questions the idea of nation and turns to the transformative
social praxis of Sriniketan as ground for and the new morality–ethics of nation-building. The
other questions the idea of a hyper-adjusted social and turns to Dhamma as a social religion of
this worldly moksha.
Conclusion -
Living as we do in a historical period of failures—of socialism, globalisation, liberalism,
capitalism and so many other projects that promised so much and delivered so little—it is
possible for us to cherish elements that open up social necessities to other futures. In the
case of Rabindranath, it is the relational self and the search for intimacy that acts as a hinge
between the cultural, class, geographical divides between Santiniketan and Sriniketan. It is
a hinge that marks the separation while opening it to questioning and more importantly, to
possibilities of producing bridges between them. The hinge haunts the separation and its
hierarchy. The haunting remains of immense value today and marks the surplus over
questions of success and failure.
6. Halakarshana Mural - Nandalal created a mural depicting Halakarshana a ploughing
festival introduced by Rabindranath to honour the tiller of the soil.

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7. Nirbhaya Judgement: Death Penalties

Context: On 5 May 2017, the Supreme Court upheld the high court judgment awarding death
penalty to the four accused in the “Nirbhaya” case, involving the brutal gang rape and murder of
Jyoti Singh in December 2012. The trial and conviction of the guilty in a time-bound manner is a
welcome step.

Points to Ponder:
 The Justice Verma Committee report did not recommend death penalty for rape, but rather
the inclusion of marital rape, the debarring of sexual assault undertrials from contesting
elections, and holding senior police and defence officers accountable for custodial rapes by
those under their command.

 Recognising that crime and punishment were about power, and that justice in cases of
sexual assault was not possible without addressing social relations of gender, class, caste
and community, the commission tried to fix restraints on those wielding power within the
family and state. However, while passing the bill, Parliament rejected all three of these
recommendations and introduced the death penalty instead. In doing so, Parliament lost an
opportunity to enact a more inclusive rape law which could increase the possibility of justice
for all victims/survivors.

 The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 2013 has made punishments for sexual assault more
severe. In introducing the death penalty on the statute books, it has, in fact, undone the
“rarest of rare” doctrine for award of death sentence, paving the way for courts to summarily
award death sentence in cases of rape and murder. However, this change has not had the
intended deterrent impact.

8. Setting Environmental Standards (Focus on Suggestions part)

Context: On 7 December 2015, the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change
(MoEFCC), Government of India, notified a new regulations that limited the consumption of
water and emission of certain pollutants by thermal power plants (TPPs). These regulations
apply to existing plants, and many of them will need retrofits ranging from minor to extensive.
While there are no official estimates in the public domain of the financial implications of these
retrofits, media reports indicate that they could be as high as `2,00,000 crore. Electricity tariffs
are likely to go up. These tariffs represent a large financial burden, but are going to be
welcomed as a step forward in the internalisation of external aspects—the social and
environmental impact—of such projects. Industry reactions have been low-key and whether or
not the regulations will be embraced is unclear. However, the tone of the reactions in the public
domain is that of serious concern regarding the practical side of the implementation. One
argument that many industry players are making is that the time given for compliance (two
years) is too short.
The process by which the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, sets new
regulations or revises existing ones include regulations related to coal-fired thermal power
plants and water. Compared to those in the United States and the European Union the Indian
process is ad hoc, opaque, and has limited scope for public participation. This can lead to

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inappropriate standards, lack of legitimacy of standards, and absence of widespread
acceptance, all leading to ineffective implementation.
Recommendations:
Environmental concerns, including those surrounding the impact of pollution on health, are
growing. With increased public awareness and the increased pace of economic activities, the
importance of establishing adequate and robust standards is also growing. This requires that
the process of setting environmental standards be created on solid grounds. To this end,
following points are worthy of consideration:
(i) The MoEFCC should draw up a comprehensive and transparent process for setting
environmental standards, which should also have a provision for meaningful and substantial
public participation. Public participation should be welcomed at all stages of setting
standards.

(ii) In the Indian context, it is important that such public participation includes input from
independent experts, civil society actors, and also people directly affected by the
environmental impact of economic activities and pollution.

(iii) Such a process should be standardised, but also be flexible enough to meet the needs of
different sectors.

(iv) The process should be codified through guidelines, manuals, and protocols as appropriate,
and it should have legal backing.

(v) The provisions of transparency and public participation should be enshrined in law.

(vi) The process of setting up such a process must be undertaken in a transparent and
participatory manner.

(vii) The standards should be based on comprehensive sector studies that list the key processes
in the sector, important environmental issues and the pollutants that cause them, potential
health and other impacts of pollutants, methods of avoiding, mitigating, and managing these
impacts and pollutants, and a cost–benefit analysis of such methods.

(viii) The reasoning and justification behind the standards must be presented clearly and in
detail. This is particularly important when standards are to be revised because of changing
situations, changing technologies, etc.

(ix) The standards should be subject to regular reviews. Such reviews should be conducted at
specified time intervals and can be triggered by specific situations, which should be
indicated in the process of setting the standards.

(x) In anticipation of establishing a structured process for setting standards, the MoEFCC
should immediately initiate comprehensive industry studies, which are already envisaged by
the CPCB. These studies should be undertaken in an integrated and truly comprehensive
manner, and the studies should include the participation of various key actors, including

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 those mentioned above. They can also draw from the large body of knowledge the MoEFCC
and CPCB already have in place.

(xi) A proper pollution inventory monitoring mechanism can be tremendously beneficial to

setting up standards and effectively implementing them. Such a mechanism, whose data are
publicly accessible, should also be set up simultaneously.
Conclusion - Growing levels of economic activity, mounting pollution, and environment and
public health hazards have led to the urgent need to institute adequate norms and standards to
control and manage these issues. The current process for creating norms is ad hoc, not
properly codified, subject to arbitrary changes, opaque, and has little place for public
participation. This leads to standards that are likely to be inadequate and inappropriate and may
cause the developed standards to lack legitimacy or wide acceptance. All of these imply less
effective implementation, which is already a weakness of the Indian environmental regime.
There is a need to establish a comprehensive, transparent, and participatory process of setting
environmental standards that is backed by research studies. In setting up such a process,
officials can draw useful lessons from similar processes in other regions, including the US and
the EU. Such a process should be properly codified and have appropriate legal backing.

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1. The New Silk Road
Context: Twenty-eight heads of state/government and representatives from 100 countries and
a large number of international organisations gathered in Beijing on 14–15 May as part of the
Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. They launched the Silk Road Economic Belt
and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road project, also called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or
One Belt, One Road. The BRI is a massive international development project that envisages, at
the least, a number of roads, railway lines and ports that will connect major economic centres in
China, via various routes, with Europe.
Japan and India, Asia’s second and third largest economies, however, chose to boycott the
forum. New Delhi was concerned about “sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
Chinese President Xi Jinping, of course, invoked historical memory of the Silk Road or the Silk
Route, the network of trade routes from 150 BCE to the 1450s CE that connected the Asian
continent from east to west, from Japan and the Korean peninsula to the Mediterranean Sea.
The name derives from the lucrative trade in silk but a by-product of the international commerce
was cultural and technological diffusion. While romanticizing the historical Silk Route, Xi
emphasised the advantages of “mutual learning and benefit,” “openness and inclusiveness,”
and called the new Silk Road—the BRI—the “project of the century.”
Geo-politics: The BRI is geographically structured along six corridors and a maritime route.
The six corridors run from Western China to Western Russia; from Northern China to Eastern
Russia via Mongolia; from Western China to Turkey via Central and West Asia; from Southern
China to Singapore via Indochina; from South-western China to and through Pakistan; and, from
Southern China to India via Bangladesh and Myanmar. The “Maritime Silk Road” will run from
coastal China to the Mediterranean via Singapore–Malaysia, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian
Sea, the Strait of Hormuz, etc.
Washington views the BRI as one of the biggest challenges to the United States’ (US) place in
the global economy, as an attempt by China to “seize” leadership of the world economy from it.
Moreover, New Delhi deeply resents the fact that one of the BRI’s six corridors, the China–
Pakistan Economic Corridor, passes through Pakistan-administered Kashmir to which India lays
claim.
The US sees its main contenders as Russia, China, and some sort of combination of European
countries led by Germany. Washington has been spending so much money on defence that no
contender or combination of contenders can ever arise, in the near future, to match it. The 2003
Iraq War and subsequent developments seem to suggest that the US has been militarily busy
redrawing the geopolitical map of Eurasia, especially that of South-Central Eurasia, which
includes the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea basin, and the surrounding nations of Central Asia.
Washington has also been trying to checkmate China’s economic resurgence and the Middle
Kingdom’s reemergence as an Asian regional power. In 2011, it launched its “pivot to Asia”
strategy to this effect and roped in Australia, Japan and India to strengthen its military reach
across the Asia-Pacific. China simply cannot match the US government’s defence spending, not
even a fifth of it. On top of this, there are Washington’s allies, including South Korea and
Taiwan, in addition to Australia, Japan and India, and of course, the US’s global network of
military bases (China does not have any). So China has come up with the BRI to win over, with
international economic cooperation, practically the whole of Eurasia, which the world’s foremost

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imperialist power has kept divided and dependent. Besides, with the massive demand creation
of the BRI project, China will solve the problem of huge overcapacity in its domestic industries,
especially steel.
2. Dalit Assertion in Uttar Pradesh (Bheem Army)
Context: The recent clashes between Thakurs and Dalits in Saharanpur district, Uttar Pradesh
(UP) point towards simmering social relations and clashing cultural assertions following a
change in political guard.
Timeline:

 The first confrontation occurred on 20 April 2017, when the Jatav-Dalits of Shabirpur village,
Saharanpur were poised to erect a statue of Ambedkar to celebrate Ambedkar Jayanti.
These plans were forestalled by the Thakurs who objected to the lack of administrative
permissions for the celebrations, and the statue itself whose outstretched index finger
pointed towards the upper caste locality.
 A second skirmish took place on 5 May 2017 when the Thakurs took out a strident
procession to commemorate the birth anniversary of the medieval Rajput ruler Maharana
Pratap. The Dalits stalled the procession as it entered their segregated colony, also citing
lack of permissions. This time around the confrontation escalated from stone-pelting by both
sides to a rampage by the Thakurs during which they burned down a significant number of
Dalit houses and shops, and desecrated Dalit iconography and shrines. A Thakur youth
died, many members of both communities were injured, and the Dalits fled en masse from
the village fearing further violence.
Analysis w.r.t. Bheem Army: Saharanpur is known to be a socially volatile district, with
frequent tensions and collisions between Hindus and Muslims, as also Thakurs and Dalits.
These tensions are reflected in the political realm too, where the parliamentary seat is held by
the BJP, assembly seats by the Congress–SP alliance, and a fraught municipal poll is due next
month. Saharanpur’s demography is dominated by the lower castes with 26% Dalits and 10%
Thakurs, but Shabirpur village has 60% Thakurs and 15% Dalits. The rise of the BSP and SP
had consolidated the Backward Caste voter base, expanding the possibilities of social mobility.
There is a decisive Ambedkarite turn among the Jatavs, who are traditionally adherents of Sant
Ravidas, a Dalit Bhakti saint. This is easily perceptible from the proliferation of Ambedkar
Jayanti celebrations, Ambedkar statues and posters, and conversions out of Hinduism. Most
notable is the rise of the Bheem Army, which has been leading Dalit action and protest on
caste-based violence in general and Shabirpur clashes in particular, to counter state apathy and
media under-representation. Founded by Chandrashekhar Azad “Ravan,” a young lawyer from
Saharanpur, the Bheem Army is popular with Dalit youth for its quick intervention in atrocity
cases and militant confrontation with perpetrators and police.
Although the UP police is labelling it an anti-social, even anti-state outfit, the rise of the Bheem
Army must be understood in the context of everyday violence and ostracisation experienced by
Dalits, and criminalisation of the public sphere in UP, both sanctioned by the caste–class–state
nexus in the region.
The celebration of Maharana Pratap as a local, cultural icon to unify and mobilise the
community was spurred by the BJP. This is in line with its overall political strategy of leveraging

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the countrywide politicisation of dominant castes that have been disgruntled by the unfolding
agrarian crisis and advances of lower castes. While the long-term political fallout of these
developments are not yet clear, a more aggressive response from disgruntled Dalits as reflected
in Chandrashekhar’s statement that “for elections, we are Hindu; after that we are Dalits,” hints
at the possibility of these fault lines unravelling into a counter-wav e against the BJP.
3. The Crisis in the Judiciary
Context: By sentencing Justice C S Karnan to six months’ imprisonment for contempt of court
on 9 May, the Supreme Court has caused itself immense damage.
Old Incidents: As bizarre and unprecedented as the proceedings regarding Karnan are, they
also serve to highlight the underlying systemic problems in the higher judiciary. Karnan is only
the latest judge in the recent past to have had a run-in with the law. In just the last decade or so,
we have seen two high court judges, Justice P D Dinakaran and Justice Soumitra Sen, face
impeachment hearings in Parliament for corruption and abuse of power, and resign before the
final impeachment motion was passed (Press Trust of India 2011); one retired high court judge,
Justice Nirmal Yadav, facing trial before in a Central Bureau of Investigation case concerning
bribery (Press Trust of India 2014); and another judge, Justice C V Nagarjuna Reddy, against
whom impeachment proceedings have begun for having allegedly discriminated against a Dalit
judge in the state subordinate judiciary.
Analysis:
a. Questions arise about the appointment process and the internal mechanisms for disciplining
errant judges, and not very comfortable ones at that. Is the collegium system of appointment
capable of determining suitability of judges?

b. Are internal grievance mechanisms, closed to the outside public, sufficiently capable of
enforcing probity among judges?

c. Can judges be trusted to pick honest judges and act against dishonest ones in the system?

d. After striking down the National Judicial Appointments Commission amendment and law
(Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v Union of India 2016), the Supreme
Court grudgingly admitted that there needed to be some reform of the collegium method of
appointments in the judiciary, including improvements in transparency and institutional
support. This, however, was not backed by any action, but by a passing of the buck to the
union government to draft an improved memorandum of procedure (Supreme Court
Advocates on Record Association v Union of India 2015).

e. Likewise, the in-house procedure has seen no change or reform in the light of recent events.
It does little to answer the charges of opacity in the judiciary’s functioning, and is unlikely to
inspire confidence in its ability to enforce accountability on the part of judges. The more
serious allegations seem to entirely slip through the cracks when it comes to the in-house
procedure.
Conclusion - It remains to be seen whether the judiciary understands the true nature of the
problem, or will prefer to remain in denial believing that they have “handled it.”

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4. Platform Economy and Formalisation – In Context of employers like OLA and UBER
Context: How relevant is a formal job as a signifier of security in the face of substantial
intergenerational persistence in low-paying, low-skilled occupations? Legal and formal jobs
available to drivers at their skill level in other sectors cannot accrue adequate social benefits
that address and outweigh the costs of living in urban India. The technological efficiency and
organisational capacity of platform economy companies are one example of how worker
vulnerability can be mitigated and curtailed—especially in the context of high underemployment,
low wages and skill barriers (to work) that confront most urban workers.
Positives: Algorithm-based work brings with it the systematisation of work experiences,
automation of processes and an aspect of trust for drivers with regard to the payment for
services, and their income. Drivers, who were previously paid in disparate and irregular intervals
of time, now have an assurance that a faceless company for whom they drive will pay them with
regularity. Text messages and app-based (mobile applications) push notifications convey the
drivers’ income earned and deductibles. Drivers have a constant flow of information that is
regular and consistent, waylaying the several anxieties of contract-less work.
Regulation Needed: However, to merely call this phenomenon “formal” when, in fact, it is
workers mobilising flexibility and technologies to alleviate their vulnerability is to miss an
opportunity to see how new technology can reorder the informal sector. Nilekani’s narrative
undercuts how drivers address the lack of work and income security. In such a view,
technology- or algorithm based work goes unquestioned in how it coordinates economic activity,
and in asking who powers the algorithm. How the urban service-based economy is particularly
well placed to be digitised in this fashion, the algorithm-governing public life needs scrutiny.
Conclusions:

 Central and state governments have proposed bills and acts that seek to regulate these
companies with a focus on taxes, the fees to be paid to the city and the drivers’ behaviour
towards customers. Policy signalling is playing down labour laws, especially for start-ups in
India (PTI 2016), and is attempting to create a “conducive” ecosystem that encourages tech-
based businesses in India. Despite repeated strikes by Uber and Ola drivers in recent
weeks (strikes took place in New Delhi, Hyderabad and Bengaluru in February 2017), there
are no regulatory responses to how to govern these algorithms which directly construct the
workers’ experiences of work, security and precarity.
 As labour activists, legal scholars and academics in developing economies argue for new
categories like the dependent contract, it becomes necessary that ideological and fiscal
innovations grow in parallel to technological innovation.

 There is even talk of conceiving “portable benefits,” which are sponsored by an employer
but are easily transferable and are not predicated on long-term employment within an
organisation. There is an effort to accept the structural changes taking place in the economy
and to build innovative solutions based on them.
This is a moment for us to remember that technological innovations can be easily adapted to
the needs of the Indian economy even if they were inspired and innovated elsewhere—to
work not only for urban services, but for service providers; not only for growth but also for
security.

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5. Pathways of Water Contamination – Urban Swachh Bharat Mission
Context: Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM) was announced on 2 October 2014 with the
objective to achieve universal sanitation and make India open defecation free by 2019, the
150th birthday of Mahatma Gandhi. The SBM is the latest sanitation programme, in a long
line of programmes, going back to the First Five Year Plan in 1954 when the rural sanitation
programme was first introduced. The SBM has arguably been more visible to the public than
its predecessor, the Nirmal Bharat Abhiyan. The SBM programme is being implemented by
the Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation (2014) (MDWS) for the rural (Gramin) segment
and the Ministry of Urban Development (2014) (MOUD) for the urban segment.
The SBM, therefore, offers a promising solution to address the issues of sanitation and
water in rapidly urbanising areas. However, the groundwater and sanitation nexus, in the
emerging periurban regions, needs a detailed discussion in order to understand its
implications for the SBM.
Pathways of Water Contamination - Broadly, water contamination sources can be
classified into sanitation-related and non-sanitation-related sources.

 Under sanitation-related sources, households may dispose both black water

(untreated/partially treated sewage) and grey water (domestic waste water other than
sewage) into open drains, which contaminate local waterbodies and which further
contaminates the groundwater, or the waste water percolates into the groundwater from
poorly designed soak pits and septic tanks.

 In case of non-sanitation related sources, the past use of fertilisers (chemical pollution) and
animal waste disposal (biological pollution) remain relevant in peri-urban towns, as they
transition from rural areas into semi-urban regions.

 The aspect of past pollution, as a major source of contamination, has not been addressed in
the SBM. If, in a peri-urban town, past pollution from agriculture or current livestock
practices is the major contributor to water contamination, then the SBM may achieve the
goal of universal sanitation but it will not solve the problem of unsafe drinking water, as most
drinking water treatment systems are not designed to treat nitrates. Moreover, the
underlying nature of the aquifer can significantly influence the rate of flow of the
contaminants. In areas with hard-rock aquifers, there have been examples of groundwater
contamination from nitrates even at depths of over 1,200 feet (NRDWP website), because of
the presence of “preferential flow paths” through fractures.
Policy Interventions –

 Appropriate On-Site Sanitation System (OSS): If it is established that household-level

poor sanitation systems and toilet designs are the main source of contamination, then the
appropriate intervention is well-designed toilets and OSS under the SBM. Households can
be incentivised, under the SBM, to move from soak pits to an improved OSS such as lined
pits or septic tanks. Under the SBM, households can also avail the services of honey
suckers at a subsidised rate to remove the waste from their pits. This can benefit poorer
households which invest in soak pits, not only because they are cheap but because they
cannot invest in private honey sucker services frequently, as they tend to be expensive.

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 In situ wastewater treatment: In the case of partially treated effluents being directly
released into open drains, low-cost technology such as reed-beds in open drains and
constructed wetlands can be used.

 Community-level treated domestic water: If it is found that contamination is taking place

from non-sanitation related sources, any interventions in the design of sanitation facilities
will not solve the problem of water contamination. Contaminants such as nitrates and
fluorides cannot be treated with the simple process of boiling water. In such cases,
community-level intervention to provide treated drinking water is a potential solution (for
example: Water automated teller machines). This intervention is especially crucial for low-
income and slum households.
Conclusion - There is significant potential for local domestic water supply and sanitation
systems to act as long-term solutions in rapidly growing peri-urban areas. Repeated
engagements with the local community to influence people’s sanitation and water-use
behaviour can also provide a sustainable solution to the problem of the groundwater and
sanitation nexus.

6. Swachh Bharat Mission (Gramin) : Bottlenecks and Remedies

Context: The Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM) launched by the Government of India on 2
October 2014 has a noble objective of making India cleaner by improving the sanitation
conditions in the country. The mission has two major sub-missions, rural (gramin) and urban,
focused on sanitation improvement in rural and urban areas respectively.

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Facts:

 The mission enhanced the “incentive” for constructing each individual household latrine
(IHHL) from `10,000 to `12,000 for most states in India, and this is shared by the Central and
respective State governments in the ratio of 75:25. Providing sanitation facilities in all
schools, anganwadis (child and mother care centres) and provision for community toilet
facilities in areas where necessary are also planned for achieving saturation in sanitation
coverage. Improving solid and liquid waste management (SLWM) is also an important
component of SBM (Gramin).

 The central government introduced the Swachh Bharat cess of 0.5% from 15 November
2015 on the value of all taxable services in India to raise funds for the mission. In addition to
this, the Swachh Bharat Kosh (Clean India Fund) was set up on 24 November 2014 to
attract corporate social responsibility (CSR) funds from the corporate sector and donations
from charities, individuals, and institutional donors as well as non-resident Indians (NRIs) to
bridge the funding gaps.

 By March 2016, 67.3% rural households defecate in the open and only 35% have drinking
water available within the premises.

 The SBM (Gramin) guidelines envisaged the establishment of state and district level Rapid
Action and Learning Units (RALU) that capture innovations and field level best practices and
feed the implementation structures. Though a national level RALU was notified in July 2015,
the states are yet to take this provision seriously, except for Andhra Pradesh and
Chhattisgarh.

 In March 2016, the union cabinet approved the $1,500 million project of World Bank support
to SBM (Gramin) meant to incentivise the performance of states in terms of increase in
sanitation coverage, reduced open defecation, and improvement in SLWM (Press
Information Bureau 2016). This scheme of performance-based incentives may take some
time to come into force.
Bottlenecks Impeding Progress
a. Rural India typically has habitations over a large geographical spread. Reaching the rural
households with effective behavioural change communication is a daunting task given the
limited manpower with necessary skills to implement the mission at block and district levels.

b. The lack of doorstep water supply - Another important prerequisite for acceptance and
usage of IHHLs is the availability of adequate water supply at the doorstep. Unless the SBM
(Gramin) ensures that, many newly-built IHHLs may not be used by people.

c. The need for partial initial investment on construction by the beneficiary households - The
release of incentive has been simplified in SBM with the total payment made in only two
instalments. After the officers of sanitation department approve the sanction of IHHL to a
particular household, a family needs to invest `6,000 on its own to build the substructure of
the toilet for receiving the first instalment of incentive of an equal amount. Thus poor
families, particularly those belonging to Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST)

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 communities, have to invest their own funds first to build the IHHL. This is a bottleneck that
is slowing down the progress of coverage.

d. The existence of many defunct IHHLs in villages - Currently, the Census 2011 or SBM
statistics do not mention defunct IHHLs, but apparently assume that all those constructed
previously are in use.

Remedial Measures
a. Better water supply for faster uptake of IHHLs –
1. After a village is identified for sanitation work, investments should also be made in the same
village to fix water distribution network leaks and breakages; doorstep water connections to
all households should be ensured; better water supply operation and maintenance systems
should be provided by the gram panchayat; and most importantly, sustainability of
groundwater sources that feed the water supply system should be ensured. In the absence
of these measures, villagers may go back to open defecation practice due to inadequate
water supply, especially when droughts and water shortages stare at them.

2. Clubbing the water supply augmentation work with IHHL promotion will encourage better
participation of women and faster progress in sanitation coverage. In addition to investing
the funds of National Rural Drinking Water Programme in a synchronised manner with SBM
(Gramin), innovative provisions of Swachh Bharat Kosh may be effectively used by the
states towards this objective.

b. Leveraging microfinance ecosystem - The high costs and crop failures due to recurring
droughts are also pushing rural households to delay the construction of already sanctioned
IHHLs. The availability of a small loan in advance will help the poor to speedily construct
IHHLs. However, it is not viable for commercial and other banks to give out small loans.
Though microfinance institutions (MFIs) operating in remote rural areas offer microloans,
they are profitmaking companies and charge relatively higher interest rates. Also, they do
not have explicit social objectives such as promoting sanitation. But many women self-help
groups, NGO-led mutually aided cooperative societies (MACS), thrift and credit
cooperatives, and farmers’ cooperatives that work on the principle of self-help, pool
significant amount of money every month in terms of member savings and offer small loans.
Amending the SBM guidelines will help speed up the IHHL coverage in India. The Swachh
Bharat Kosh may be used to build revolving funds at the district level, which may be offered
as loans to these local cooperative institutions. Thus, without imposing much burden on the
poor in terms of interest on the loan taken, it is possible to make SBM (Gramin) more
inclusive and reach its target by 2019.

c. Reviving defunct IHHLs - The enumeration of such defunct IHHLs, both complete and
incomplete ones, should be done separately. SBM (Gramin) should introduce a “renovation
incentive” for such IHHLs as well as offer a doorstep water connection.

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7. India’s Power Sector
Context: Two prominent infrastructure companies belonging to Adani Group and Tata Group
had sought the assistance of electricity regulators to hike the rate at which they sold power to
several state power utility and distribution companies. They claimed that compensatory tariffs to
the tune of nearly `8,000 crore were due to them as they had to absorb an increase in the price
of coal imported from Indonesia used to fuel their power plants. But this was denied to them by
the Supreme Court.
The 11 April Supreme Court order, which relates to a clutch of cases involving power generating
subsidiaries of the Adani and Tata Groups, along with a number of other players in the power
sector, has relieved two particular companies—Adani Power Limited and a subsidiary of Tata
Power Limited, Coastal Gujarat Power Limited (CGPL)—of an estimated `4,300 crore and
`3,600 crore respectively that they had nearly managed to secure as compensation for what
they claimed was an unexpected rise in the price of coal imported from Indonesia. Tata Power
(through CGPL) owns and operates a 4,000 megawatt (MW) “ultra mega power project” (UMPP)
in the town of Mundra, Gujarat while Adani Power operates the 4,620 MW Mundra Power Plant,
both located near the Mundra port in Gujarat. Both thermal power plants use Indonesian coal
and both sell their power to several state power utility and distribution companies (discoms) in
Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab and Haryana. Both companies had argued that an
increased cost in procuring high-quality coal from Indonesia merited an increase in the price
charged by them; implying that the burden of this increased tariff would have fallen on the
discoms, and finally, on the consumers.
The apex court’s order was in response to a set of appeals that had been filed in the Supreme
Court by the state discoms and the civil society non-governmental organisations (NGOs) Energy
Watchdog and Prayas (Energy Group)—both authorised consumer representatives for the
power sector who have been involved in these cases from their origin at various state
regulators—against an April 2016 order of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) based
on which in December 2016 the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) had
awarded compensatory tariffs to the power producers.
Tariff Determination Process
a. Thermal power tariffs have two components: fixed costs and variable costs. Fixed costs
include interest on loans, returns on equity, depreciation, operation and maintenance
expenses, insurance, taxes and interest on working capital. Variable costs comprise fuel
cost (coal and oil) in the case of coal-based thermal plants. The two-part tariff structure
allows power producers to recover fixed costs such as capital investment even when the
entire capacity is not utilised.

b. The Electricity Act allows for tariffs to be determined in two ways. Under Section 62 of the
act it allows tariffs to be determined by the appropriate (state or central) regulatory
commission for the “supply of electricity by a generating company to a distribution licensee.”
In the event of a shortage of fuel supply, the regulator may fix the upper and lower limits of
the tariff in terms of the agreement signed between a generating company and the licensees
for no more than a year to ensure that the price paid by the consumer of electricity is
reasonable.

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c. The second approach to determining tariffs defined under Section 63 of the act is
discovering it through a competitive bidding process. Under this system, power producers
are invited to submit their bids to supply power to state discoms whenever the need for fresh
capacity arises or a new power project is to be set up. Section 63 allows regulatory
commissions to “adopt” such competitively discovered tariffs, under procedures notified by
the central government. The regulatory commissions are meant to monitor the bidding
process and as per guidelines notified in 2005, the central government notifies the standard
bidding documents such as the request for qualification (RfQ), request for proposal (RfP)
and the power purchase agreements (PPAs) that are to be signed between the power
producers and the discoms.
d. Increasingly, it is the process under Section 63 that has become important for most new
power projects in the country. Large contracts for setting up new power plants using non-
renewable fuel sources are up for grabs in India with the Twelfth Five Year Plan.
Issues –

 Following this order by the apex court, both projects at Mundra—originally intended to
supply electricity for a 25-year period—now seem unviable. Only two of the 19 proposed
UMPPs are currently operational. The remaining projects that were envisaged have found
no takers in the private sector. The Gujarat government recently announced that it was
dropping its proposal for setting up a second UMPP in the state and had no intentions of
reviving the proposal. There is a pervasive regulatory ambiguity in this sector. No
clarifications have come from government officials on how best to deal with changes in law
and regulations in foreign countries where Indian corporations operate or have interests that
are directly tied to the financial and operational viability of domestic power projects.

 There is still little clarity on who should bear the higher costs if compensation is due. The
Supreme Court verdict merely patches an individual problem that requires more systemic
policy action to deal with.

 Two other points are also pertinent to consider.

o The first is that the general issue of compensatory tariffs is not necessarily restricted to
coal and conventional ways of generating electricity. Both the Draft National Electricity
Plan of December 2016 and the Twelfth Five Year Plan envision India becoming energy
secure through renewable energy sources rather than coal or other conventional fuels.
With the solar energy sector booming worldwide and India lacking significant domestic
capability to build capacity, equipment will continue to have to be imported. Prices will
rise and fall depending on market forces and India requires a clear plan on how to deal
with all eventualities. Regulators and the government cannot allow ambiguity to prevail
and unconsciously encourage litigation.

o The other point is the question of how seriously India takes deregulation of the electricity
sector that was envisaged in 2003 when the Electricity Act was passed. At that time, the
aim was to “unbundle the various segments of the electricity industry with a view to
enabling competition and choice in the supply of electricity to consumers”. While the aim
has been achieved to some extent in the case of power generation with several private
players having demonstrated capability and competence, power distribution remains a

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 government monopoly. As a result, with all suppliers having to sell their power to the
government bodies which control distribution of electricity to consumers, the consequent
lack of competition benefits entrenched interests.
Conclusion - The Supreme Court order, aside from dealing with the specific issues in the
Adani Power and Tata Power cases, has sent out a strong and unambiguous signal. It
makes it clear that bidders must bid with honesty of intent and that they must do so in a
bidding environment that is fair and which ensures sanctity of contracts. More importantly,
the order makes it clear that it is always the consumer whose interests and rights must come
first. The order may mark a watershed moment for India’s electricity sector.
8. Political Economy of Independent Regulation in India’s Natural Gas Industry:
Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB)
Context: In 2006, Parliament passed the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board
(PNGRB) Act, and the board was formally set up in July 2007. The preamble to the PNGRB
Act 2006 states that the regulator would protect the interests of consumers and entities
engaged in specified activities relating to petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas
and to ensure uninterrupted and adequate supply of petroleum, petroleum products and
natural gas in all parts of the country and to promote competitive markets and for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto.
Issues: The reluctance of the government to share turf with an independent regulator is
essentially because of the politico-economic character of the commodity—petroleum.
Following points are worth noting:
a. Non-notification of PNGRB Act and Section 16: One egregious act of omission by the
Government of India was not legally empowering the regulator, even after it was formally
constituted. While the PNGRB Act received presidential assent on 31 March 2006, and the
board was formally constituted on 25 June 2007 and began functioning from its offices from
that date, the act had not been notified by the government. The PNGRB Act was formally
notified only on 1 October 2007, three months after the board began functioning and that too
after it wrote to the government pointing out this lapse. The government could not have
been unaware that non-notification of PNGRB Act rendered the body illegitimate.
This observation is corroborated by the government’s withholding of another key power from
the regulator—the power to authorise entities to build and operate pipelines or CGD
networks—for three years after it was set up. Section 16 of the PNGRB Act states that no
entity shall lay, build, or operate a common carrier or contract carrier pipeline or a CGD
network unless authorised by the PNGRB. However, by not notifying this crucial section of
the act for more than three years after the board began functioning, the government
prevented the regulator from performing this crucial function.

b. Ambiguous regulatory remit: The act omitted to mention that the existing entities already
operating gas pipelines and CGDs would also come under regulatory purview, a serious
lacuna that weakened the authority of the regulator. This ambiguity over the PNGRB’s
authority to regulate existing monopolies led to legal challenges over its jurisdiction. This
brought all central government licensed companies already in existence within the ambit of
the regulator, but there were many others operating CGD networks in various states without
central government authorisation. These are being brought under regulatory jurisdiction in a

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 piecemeal and selective manner, and till date, not all are under the PNGRB’s remit, leading
to an anomalous situation.

c. Conflict of interest: Consequently, during the first five years of its existence, the PNGRB has
had to rely almost entirely on professionals borrowed from the regulated industry to perform
its functions, a blatant conflict of interest. Not only was the staff borrowed from the public
sector oil and gas companies that PNGRB would regulate, even their emoluments were paid
by their parent companies in gross violation of the tenets of regulatory independence. Even
when the regulator is empowered to hire its own staff, it is constrained by government-
mandated ceilings on emoluments paid to its staff.

d. Government as Adversary: The government’s legal counsel consistently took an anti-

regulator stand in court cases fi led by regulated entities or other stakeholders.

e. Government wrests Control: The biggest setback to independent regulation comes from a
recent cabinet decision to authorise GAIL to build certain major trunk pipelines and to
develop CGNs in major towns along these pipelines. The Cabinet Committee on Economic
Affairs even decided to fund 40% of the cost of the Jagdishpur-Haldia and Bokaro–Dhamra
gas pipeline (JHBDPL) from the exchequer to take care of the viability gap in the project.
The government has gone ahead with the award of licences without reference to the
regulator, which under the PNGRB Act is the sole authority to issue such licenses.
Conclusion - Without a mandate to proactively plan for the sector to extend its reach to all
parts of the country and count on financial support from the government, if necessary, no
regulator seeking to regulate an immature market can hope to deliver. The government’s
recent decision to nominate GAIL to take the infrastructure to hitherto unconnected regions
with the offer of a substantial viability gap fund goes to show that the “national champion”
model is the only way forward for developing countries with sketchy and skewed
infrastructure. The World Bank and IMF have placed faith in markets to provide all manner
of goods and services without making a distinction between those that cater to basic human
needs and those that do not, and between immature and mature markets. A market-based
approach that independent regulation entails can work only when the “needs” of the entire
population are met. Until such time, it will be up to democratically elected governments to
decide how to expand the market.
9. Public Procurement in India
Context: The central government has set out an ambitious national e-governance plan to
automate various government-to-government (G2G), government-to-business (G2B), and
government-to citizen (G2C) functions to tap the efficiency, cost- effectiveness, and
transparency of internet-enabled applications. In line with this, e-procurement is being
adopted on a mission mode. It is mandatory in several states and central government
organisations. Although e-procurement should cover the entire order– to–delivery process, it
is now confined to the tendering process in India.
The National Informatics Centre (NIC) launched an e-procurement portal in 2007–08, where
bids are received and their status can be tracked online. While various governments in India
are using e-procurement to streamline their procurement processes, data generated by
these portals have not been used to derive much meaningful information.

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 Legal Provisions: Articles 298 and 299 of the Constitution lay the foundation for public
procurement. Rule 137 of the General Finance Rules (GFR) 2005 states the fundamental
principles of public buying, where every authority delegated with the financial powers of
procuring goods in the public interest shall have the responsibility and accountability to bring
about efficiency, economy, and transparency, to treat bidders fairly and equitably, and
promote competition.
Factors for Transparency: Three factors are essential for a public procurement regime to
be classified as transparent.

 First, there have to be clear public procurement rules. All participants should be informed
about the procurement rules that will be applied by the contracting authority (for instance,
what are the criteria for selecting suppliers, awarding a contract, and so on).

 Second, procurement opportunities should be public to enable all possible interested

bidders to participate. This is achieved by publishing procurement opportunities in national
and regional bulletins/newspapers.

 Third, the opportunity should be given to scrutinise decisions and to enforce the rules to
ensure that the procurement agency has adhered to them and that the decision was
motivated by commercial consideration, not self-interest.
Pathways for Improvements:
a. Need for training and capacity building: Training and capacity building on public
procurement could lead to an easier, efficient, economic and more transparent procurement
process. Potential bidders also need to be trained extensively for e-tendering.

b. Need for procurement process redesign: Analysis of the data on UP reveals the e-tendering
process is marred by delays, which entail waiting. It was observed that the state and central
public procurement rules are not harmonised, resulting in ambiguity and confusion. Archaic
rules such as mandatory newspaper advertising for any procurement above `50,000 also
need to be done away with in these changed times. Simple ideas like buy-back for e-waste
may be considered in the state’s IT procurement policy. Additionally, using the NIC’s post
tendering module may lead to better and auditable procurement planning and control. The
state may think about establishing a nodal agency for government purchasing along with a
procurement ombudsman.

c. Better bidder management for higher participation:

i. Almost 20%–30% of tenders in the last five years received no bids. In these cases, the cost
of procurement (such as the NIT publication cost and resource cost) goes waste, and
services to citizens get delayed, causing losses. These clearly reflect bidder apathy and
market making failure. A single point registration of bidders may be introduced which may
apply to all procurement processes in the state. It should also allow interested bidders to
apply for registration any time.

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 ii. Besides, there are a few issues related to bidder registration and blacklisting as well as
payment that need to be resolved. Bidder registration and blacklisting processes need to be
simplified. An electronic platform could be a good solution.

iii. Now, the payment has to be approved by the treasury; this process too needs to be
streamlined and simplified. For example, governments may create a “pooling bank account”
for government departments and another one for PSUs. A similar practice is being followed
in Kerala.

d. Transparent public procurement process using e-tendering: E-tendering not only brings
efficiency in public procurement, but also makes the process more transparent, leaving an
auditable trail. Since the NIC’s e-tendering system does not mandate information sharing,
an improvement in the e-tendering system can ensure that AOC information of all financially
evaluated tenders is shared before creating a new tender.
Conclusions: The preconditions for achieving a sound public procurement system are
integrity and commitment to good governance practices through the provision of well-
designed legislation and supporting regulations and review processes. Proper performance
measures and their benchmarking will help in identifying improvement methods and
pathways.

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 1. Lessons from ‘COALGATE’
Context: The 23 May decision of Judge Bharat Parashar to sentence former Coal Ministry
Secretary Harish Chandra Gupta to two years’ imprisonment in a case relating to illegal
allotment of a coal-bearing area to a private firm, has sent shock waves through the
bureaucracy. Serving and former members of the elite Indian Administrative Service (IAS) have
sharply attacked the decision of the special court instituted to try criminal cases initiated by the
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). These bureaucrats have claimed that Gupta is being
victimised for following faulty government policies relating to allotment of coal “blocks” or
acreages.
Lessons: This episode has highlighted two significant aspects about how the law is enforced in
the country –
i. The first is the manner in which an ambiguity in a legal provision offers scope for misuse of
discretionary powers.
ii. The second is the way in which criminal proceedings have taken place in what is popularly
called “Coalgate,” or the scandal relating to allotments of 214 coal blocks to private firms
from 1993 declared illegal by the Supreme Court in August 2014.
Section 13(1)(d)(iii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: The law enforcement
machinery has apparently been selective in acting against the many suspects in “Coalgate”.
Also, there is an ambiguity in Section 13(1)(d)(iii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
The section states that a public servant is guilty of criminal misconduct if this person “obtains
for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest.” In
other words, it does not become obligatory for the CBI or any other law enforcement agency
to prove “criminal intent” or quid pro quo (a favour or advantage granted in return for
something else) while seeking prosecution of a government official. The repeal of this
section is currently being examined by a committee of Parliament. Gupta and his supporters
in the IAS argue that he has been convicted for at best a possible “error” in deciding to allot
a coal block to KSSPL without any criminal intent or quid pro quo. Justice Parashar,
however, ruled that Gupta had kept the then coal minister and former prime minister in the
dark and misled him before obtaining his “final approval” for the allotment. This judgment
can be appealed only in the Supreme Court.
2. NAXALBARI AND AFTER: LESSONS FROM 50 YEARS
Context: Fifty years ago, a Maoist faction within the Communist Party of India (Marxist)—
the CPI had split into two in 1964—organised an armed peasant struggle in a remote North
Bengal area called Naxalbari (from where the Indian Maoists got their name). The
Communist Party of India (Marxist– Leninist) (CPI(ML)), formed in 1969, splintered into
various factions, some of which are still active and have their own women’s organisations
comprising the broader ML or Naxalite movement. Since 2004, when the CPI(Marxist–
Leninist) (People’s War) [CPI(ML)(PW)] and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) joined to
form the CPI(Maoist), the activities of this party and the mass organisations close to it have
been generally referred to as the Maoist movement.

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History:
Phase I: It began in March 1967, but was brutally crushed by mid-July of that year. Many
Naxalbaris smouldered in different parts of India from 1968 to 1972, the most significant being
the ones at Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh and Bhojpur in Bihar. They too were, however,
cruelly crushed by the repressive apparatus of the state. Even as the revolutionaries of the
1960s and 1970s were defeated, the conditions that gave rise to the revolution continued to
exist, and newer generations of the dominated, exploited, and oppressed ensured that the
revolution staged a comeback, and intellectuals who could not remain unmoved took their side,
taking the place of those who died or retired.
The uniqueness of Naxalbari and its special contribution to the Indian people’s struggle for
emancipation during the first phase of the movement (1967–72) suggests that it was conceived
as, and actually proved to be, not just another peasant insurgency but part of a larger project:
founding a revolutionary communist party and, under its leadership, making the first
comprehensive attempt to accomplish the new democratic revolution, with agrarian revolution
as its axis, along the path of area-wise seizure of power
The party-in-the-making launched the Naxalbari movement at a time when the Indian people’s
fighting mood was at its highest. The specific timing was also significant—just after the
installation of the UF government in Bengal, which was not in a position to immediately launch a
Congress-style repression—and this granted the struggle a breathing space to grow. And when,
finally, paramilitary forces were deployed to crush it, the prudent decision to try and spread the
movement to newer regions rather than staking everything on the fight in a single area supplied
the bedrock for party, which in its turn contributed immensely to the expansion and
intensification of the movement.
The opposite happened when the party’s political deviations and organisational problems
resulted in huge losses for the movement and splintering of the party itself. After the great
setback also, revival of the movement depended on rebuilding the party/ its factions. , as we
look back on 50 years of Naxalbari, the movement–party dialectic appears to be key to
understanding the dynamics of this movement in the 20th century and also in the 21st century.
Phase II: The second phase (1977–2003) of the Naxalite movement was marked by mass
organisations and mass struggles, especially in North Telangana and other parts of the then
province of Andhra Pradesh, in what was then central and south Bihar (the latter, now
Jharkhand), and in parts of what is called Dandakaranya, the forest area situated on the border
and adjoining tribal districts of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and Odisha. The
Bastar region in southern Chhattisgarh slowly began to emerge as a stronghold. Armed squads
and village-level militias were organised in self-defence. “Land to the Tiller” and “Full Rights
to the Forest” were the core issues. With expansion, however, the Indian state launched full-
scale counter-insurgency and the party began to suffer losses. By the beginning of the new
millennium, however, the movement became more difficult to completely subjugate.

As for the debate over strategy and tactics, among the old survivors of the movement and the
new followers who joined it, they moved in two different directions—one prioritising participation
in parliamentary elections, trade union activities and mass agitations, the other returning to the
old policy of village-based armed struggle to seize power.

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Those who chose to follow the other direction of armed insurrection claimed to be the rightful
owners of the legacy of Naxalbari. They were represented mainly by the CPI(ML)(PW) and the
Maoist Communist Centre (MCC)—which resorted to the old path of peasant-based guerrilla
warfare. During this second phase of the movement, it was the CPI(ML)(PW), in the decade
spanning 1990 and 2000, which was able to regain the Naxalite space in the Indian political
scenario. Primarily based in Andhra Pradesh, and led by Kondapally Seetharamaiah, the PW
could expand its influence and control a large terrain bordering Odisha and parts of
Maharashtra.

At around the same time, the MCC had set up bases in Bihar, carrying out similar revolutionary
activities. In 2004, the PW and the MCC, and several other Naxalite armed groups, merged into
a newly named political party called the CPI (Maoist).

Phase III: In its third phase (2004 onwards), the Bastar region has become a bastion of Maoist
resilience with two remarkable mass organisations already in place, the Dandakaranya Adivasi
Kisan Mazdoor Sanghatan and the Krantikari Adivasi Mahila Sangh, one of tribal peasants and
workers, the other of tribal women, and a Bhoomkal Militia (its name derives from a 1910 tribal
rebellion) that feeds into the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army.
This inaugurated the third phase of the Naxalite movement. It could embrace a vast territory
stretching from Bihar, Jharkhand and Odisha in the east, through Chhattisgarh and bordering
parts of Maharashtra in the centre and the west, and to Andhra Pradesh in the south. Their
achievements were acknowledged even by a government-appointed committee, which
submitted its report to the Planning Commission in April 2008. This report described how, over
several years, the Maoists organised their base in inaccessible and neglected forest and hilly
areas, whose inhabitants (mainly tribals) had been denied their basic rights like minimum wages
(for tobacco leaf pickers in Andhra Pradesh, for instance), and had been exposed to violence by
feudal landlords, private contractors, forest guards and police. In these base areas, the Maoists
carried out land reforms, established schools and provided health facilities, thus acting as a sort
of surrogate government.
‘Causes of Intimacy’ vis a vis Adivasis - Communist ideology for a classless and casteless
society translated into the humaneness of revolutionary subjectivity, treating the people they
came across with dignity, as equal human beings, over time making them a part of an extended
family in the region. Many youth moved back and forth between the guerrilla armies and the
villages, often escaping a domestic problem, even if just for a while.
Moreover, people had developed individual social relations with Maoist cadres and leaders, the
sum of which could not be reduced to a simple love/hate, support/ reject attitude towards the
movement. Perhaps, the Maoists were aided in this embedding because Adivasi society had an
elective affinity with their communist values, a point which the Maoists did not fully recognise.
In contrast to the Maoists, the Indian state had historically dominated these regions through
economic and extra-economic exploitative extraction and, in this process, oppressively treated
its populations as subjects (not citizens) who were expendable. The modern state, with the
arrival of the British East India Company, followed by the government under the British crown,
and then the independent Indian government, penetrated the area through taxation and
exploitation of the forests for military purposes and railway sleepers. Historically, the state was

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experienced primarily through the police and forest guards, both repressive outsiders from
whom Adivasis sought to keep away.
The high-caste northerners (often Biharis) who formed the state were notoriously distanced by
the villagers because they both looked down on the people of this area as jungli, who is wild and
savage, and treated them as such, as barbaric. In everyday life, it was often the small things
that mattered: the tone of voice with which one was spoken to, the way one was greeted, etc.
Though it is obvious that there are limits to humanity in the practice of armed revolutionary
movements, what the Indian Maoist case seems to suggest is the importance of the
humaneness of revolutionary subjectivity in nurturing the development and persistence of
revolutionary mobilisation.
Role of Women - As per the report of the Ninth Congress held in 2007, the Maoist party
accepted the prevalence of patriarchy as one of its shortcomings and decided to resolve this
problem. A question was also sometimes raised about whether women could rise to the
leadership in the Maoist party.
There has been a sea change in the approach towards and participation of women in the
Naxalite movement in both understanding and practice. First, unlike women in nongovernment
organisations or even some Dalit women’s organisations, the Maoist movement has always
emphasised on the link between patriarchy and class. Without class struggle and overthrowing
the ruling class, patriarchy cannot be challenged because every type of class society
perpetuates patriarchy in different forms.
Another change in understanding is similar to that regarding caste: that caste and gender are
part of both the base and the superstructure. Women will not get equality automatically after the
revolution but have to concretely fight against the cultural, social and economic practices which
discriminate against them throughout the struggle. This is why it is heartening to see the Adivasi
women of central India and Jharkhand boldly defying their own patriarchal norms.
However, in the last decade, there has been a sharp decline of urban women’s movement
which mushroomed in the 1990s probably due to a massive crackdown on Naxalites, Marxists,
Dalits and democratic spaces as well. In urban areas, some women activists have felt stifled by
a patriarchal attitude amongst the male activists, especially those of an older generation.
Women have been told that feminism is an ideology that divides the working class and should
be avoided. Rather than seeing feminism as an anti-patriarchal axis sharpening the gender
question within broader philosophical trends like liberalism, Marxism, Gandhian or Ambedkar
thought, some activists tend to see feminism and Marxism as incompatible. The Indian Maoist
movement seems in denial of issues pertaining to queer issues, like same sex relations,
transgender or intersex people.
Future of the Naxalite/ Maoist Movement: In its strategy, the CPI (Maoist) continues to
adhere to Mao’s programme of agrarian revolution that was followed in China. But is it
applicable in today’s India? The following points are worth noting:
a. Government crushed the rebellion of the Naxalite tribals in Andhra Pradesh’s Srikakulam,
and followed it by ameliorative measures in 1972, like setting up the Girijan Cooperative
Corporation which advanced loans to the tribal farmers for agricultural improvement. In West
Bengal’s Naxalbari itself, from where the Maoist movement started in 1967, the support
base of the movement was neutralized by the introduction of land reforms by the Left Front

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 government in the late 1970s, which benefited, to some extent, the poor peasantry. The
erosion of the original Maoist bases in Naxalbari and Srikakulam raises an important
question. Were the peasant supporters of the Maoist programme at that time ideologically
committed to the political goal of overthrowing the Indian state and replacing it with a
socialist system, or were they more concerned with their immediate economic needs—
ownership of their little plots which was being threatened by encroachers, minimum wages
for agricultural labourers, among other demands? Once these demands were met by an
accommodating administration within the structure of the Indian state, the erstwhile peasant
supporters of the Maoist movement in Naxalbari and Srikakulam in the period 1960–70
withdrew into their cocoons of an assured sustainable existence.

b. The Maoist bases are besieged from all sides by the Indian state’s armed forces. Regular
raids and overrunning of the guerrilla bases by the security forces are shrinking the size of
the “Red Corridor” and reducing the effectiveness of Maoist armed resistance. Recently,
major CPI(Maoist) leaders, who had been ideologically committed to the cause have
surrendered.

c. Whether the basic Maoist strategy and tactic of capturing state power is applicable to the
vast stretches of the rural plains (as well as the urban metropolises) of India, where the
inhabitants cope with different types of problems emanating from various layers of the socio-
economic system.
Crisis of Maoist Political Strategy and Military Tactics-
a. Both the political strategy, and the military tactics of the movement, were flawed from the
beginning. As for the political strategy based on the Chinese revolutionary paradigm, what
could have been valid for China in the period 1920–40, was not universally applicable in
India with its diversified agrarian society and economy that was fractured by sociocultural
values and practices, driven by caste and tribal loyalties. Despite their individual courage
and self-sacrifice, the Indian Maoist leaders have remained crippled by a limited
understanding of these complexities of the vast heterogeneous Indian society.

b. During all these decades, the Maoist political strategy of an agrarian revolution through
guerrilla struggles had remained restricted to, and been tested only in the confines of a tribal
society in inaccessible forest and hilly areas. The tribals fit into the Maoist class category of
poor peasants. They suffer from extreme forms of economic and social exploitation by
landlords, as well as displacement from their lands by multi-national industrial houses—the
two enemies which could be described as “semi-feudal” and “semi-colonial” in Maoist
theoretical terms. Although successful within these areas, the CPI(Maoist) has not been
able to build similar armed resistance against feudal oppression in the plains areas of the
rest of India.

c. Changing Agrarian Economy- The changes challenge the traditional Maoist theory of
agrarian relations. Recent findings suggest that India’s rural economy is undergoing radical
changes— transforming the nature of landholdings, changing the character of the
agricultural classes, giving birth to a footloose working class from amongst the poor
peasantry who are forced to work in the non-farming sectors as contractual labourers. From
the available evidence, it appears that the current trends in the Indian countryside do not

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 conform to the conventional Maoist theoretical analysis of a rural society along a four-class
categorisation of landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants and poor peasants. Such strict
class divisions are being blurred by the intrusion of global neo-liberal industrial interests in
the rural economy. The rural socio-economic power structure that was ruled by a class of big
farmer-turned landlords (known as jotedars) has been taken over by a variety of vested
interests ranging from progenies of old landlords who have diversified into non-agricultural
occupations like trading, services, etc., to extraneous forces like industrial houses, building
contractors, road construction agencies, owners of passenger buses and trucks to carry
freight, among others. They offer employment opportunities to the unemployed rural poor,
which to some extent have loosened their dependence on agriculture and weakened their
traditional semi-feudal ties. These rural poor have developed stakes in the economy
according to their respective occupations. A new generation of Indian rural population
whose demands and requirements are different from those that were addressed by the
Naxalite leaders and activists in the 1960–70 period has emerged. It is therefore difficult for
the Indian Maoists today to mobilise these diverse segments of the rural poor into one
homogeneous class of exploited peasants, with the single target of the amorphous “semi-
feudal” system as their enemy.

d. Strategic Change – Indian communist revolutionaries should realise that they are fighting
quite a different war (and on a different turf) than what was fought by their Chinese
comrades from the 1920s to the 1940s in China. They will have to forge a new strategy to
cope with the neo-liberal capitalist features that mark the Indian rural economy and larger
society today. Besides, they need to fight the other threat of religious fundamentalism. They
should also recognise the importance of the new forms of popular protest against the neo-
liberal economy—ranging from non-violent mass agitations like the Narmada Bachao
movement against big dams, to sporadic explosions of violence by villagers resisting their
displacement by multinational industrial projects like POSCO in Odisha, or popular
demonstrations against special economic zones or nuclear plants.

Contradictions in Maoist Movement

a. The first contradiction is that, while the making of emancipatory futures requires the creation
of new communities representing the values of imagined ideals, there is also the need to
rely on the support of pre-existing family relations, which anchors one to the present and the
past. For the Naxalites, their egalitarian values enabled them to form kinship networks into
Adivasi communities, but it also led to a constant stream of youth walking in and out of the
guerrilla armies, as though they were simply the home of an uncle or an aunt. Immersion in
local communities through kinship can be the strength of such movements, but it can also
become an Achilles’ heel when the same battles and betrayals within families that bring
people to the guerrilla armies emerge in those very armies. Moreover, in the end, even
those leaders who seemed to live like ascetics, apparently having subverted and left their
pasts behind, found it difficult to totally break from their families and submitted to their
demands to the detriment of the revolutionary community.

b. The second contradiction is that the creation of a more egalitarian future requires smashing
the structures of capitalism that generate inequality, but immersion in the capitalist economy
is necessary to fund and sustain such movements. It is then, perhaps, inevitable that any

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 such movement will create cadres who get integrated into the imaginations and values of
the very societies they are working against, conflicted by the desire to accumulate wealth
and status for their personal gain, eventually turning them into betrayers.

c. The basis of the third contradiction, is their adherence to an outdated analysis of the Indian
economy as semi-feudal and semi-colonial as explained above.

e. The fourth contradiction is that mobilising people to fight against inequality and injustice may
require the use of arms, but violent resistance will bring the violence of state repression. The
Maoist retreat into the Adivasi heartlands of India and their analysis, which led them to
carrying out a protracted people’s war from there, trapped them—in the face of the Indian
security force battalions—to focus on their military strategy at the expense of working with
the people for a new imagined future. Also, In the process of taking on the might of one of
the most powerful capitalist states and ruling classes among the developing countries of the
world, the Maoist movement has become increasingly more militarised. The Indian state too
has been striving to limit the movement exclusively to armed confrontation. Consequently,
the movement is finding the going difficult.

d. The final contradiction is that such movements seek to create new casteless, classless
communities where women will be equal to men, but are most often led by men from elite
backgrounds. In their challenge to the structural inequalities of society, they neglect the
incipient inequalities within too often. In the Maoist case, although many Adivasis and, in
some areas, women joined the revolutionaries, the higher-caste leaders not only failed to
give sufficient space for the nurturing of lower-caste, Adivasi and women leaders, but also
seemed to neglect the fact that the societies they worked amidst had more egalitarian
gender relations than the ones from which they had come.

The Anti-Maoist Strategy - The latest form of police repression through the encirclement
of Maoist bases and elimination of their leaders and cadres in the Dandakaranya area is
fuelled by the Indian state’s need to free this area of any popular resistance against its neo-
liberal model of “development.” Under this model, India’s earth—its mineral resources and
forest wealth— are being opened up to the rapacious multinational and domestic corporate
business houses without adequate consideration for the tribals. Such a plan of
“development” necessitates the displacement of the rural households from their homes thus
depriving them of their meagre sources of earnings, through the appropriation of their
common space of forestlands.
It is this skewed political economy of the Indian state—bolstered by a militarist security
apparatus—which has aroused the spirit of resistance, and revitalised the 50-year-old
Naxalite movement. The Maoists are articulating the demand of the indigenous tribal
population that they must have a voice in policies regarding the use of their natural
resources. The stakes of both the Maoists and the Indian state are thus quite high in this
mutual contest.
The Indian state is following a twofold military strategy to destroy the Maoist movement—
first, by capturing and killing its cadres, and second, by removing its ideologues from the
leadership. The arrest of Kobad Ghandy (a well-known Maoist intellectual) and the killing of

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 Azad in Andhra Pradesh have dealt a severe blow to the Maoist movement. Bereft of their
political leaders—who have either been killed, or arrested, or forced to surrender—the well-
armed Maoist cadres are now reduced to roving gangs of marauders and extortionists. The
emphasis on militarism to the exclusion of ideological teaching has driven some of the
cadres to anti-social activities.
The Indian state wants to snap the “relations of intimacy” of the Maoists with the wretched of
the earth, and is aggressively working at eliminating the Maoist movement by any and all
available means, fair or foul, even violating with impunity Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions and Protocol II relating to non-international armed conflict. The Maoist
movement is, in turn, bent upon overthrowing the Indian state, through a combination of
protracted armed struggle, mass mobilisation, and strategic alliances with the oppressed
nationalities. However, neither of these possibilities—what the Indian state and the Maoists
are respectively bent upon achieving—stands a chance at this juncture.
The Indian state—whether ruled by the Congress or the present Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP)—has been consistently following a policy of belligerent militarist repression against
the Naxalite movement, despite repeated warnings by its own agencies that what needed to
be done was to redress the economic and social inequities.
Assumptions Underlying State Policy –
Assumption 1: Maoist movement was engaged in overthrowing the Indian state.
No doubt that is their ultimate goal and that is what the party programme of the Communist
Party of India (Maoist) declares as their objective. But they were engaged in concrete struggles
touching the lives of the people.

Peasant uprising in Naxalbari in 1967 was related to the rights of tillers over land they cultivated.
The Srikakulam struggle during 1968–72 was over the Adivasis’ right to land and forest
produce. Many Naxalites joined the Janata Party movement and campaigned against the
Emergency in 1974–77. From the 1980s onwards, almost all the Naxalite groups with various
names and political programmes made land and forest rights their main programme for political
mobilisation. Unequal land relations, with a high magnitude of poverty and social exploitation in
rural India, and the persisting trend of extraction of forest resources and alienation of tribal land,
were put at the centre of political discourse by the Naxalites.

After India adopted economic reforms and global capital began to enter mineral rich areas of
India, the issues of land and forest rights acquired new significance. The three resource-rich
states of central and eastern India—Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Odisha—attracted national
and foreign capital.

Therefore, the central issue that engaged all forms of people’s movements in Adivasi areas was
the dispossession of land and forest. Instead of recognising this, policymakers keep referring to
the ideology of “overthrow by armed struggle.” The Maoist movement, during the reform period,
grew as a strong force against the industrialisation strategy of the state—a strategy that caused
displacements, destroyed livelihoods, disrupted the ecosystem by degrading the environment
and our natural resources, and alienated locals by disrespecting their culture and knowledge
systems.

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Unless the assumption guiding state policy is re-examined, and state takes into account the
reasons for the mass support behind the Maoist movement, no amount of deployment of force
will win over the Adivasis.

Assumption 2: Welfare policies such as PESA, Forests Rights Act and rehabilitation law
should work.
All the rights-based, development- oriented laws passed in recent years were very important. In
fact, each of them was the result of sustained campaigns by social movements such as right to
information (RTI) campaign and the Campaign for Dignity.
The struggle in Adivasi areas is about political power, the power of self-governance, power to
control the resources of the region and formulate plans to develop in such a way that they would
not only end poverty, create employment and protect the environment and natural resources
and their knowledge systems, but one that would negotiate with outside forces, national and
international, to jointly set up programmes based on mutually agreed terms.
It may be said that PESA ensured that. In fact, that was one of the ideas behind the law. But in
practice, as extensively documented, it was routinely violated. Local gram sabhas are nominally
held and manipulated by pro-corporate elements, protected by the district administration, to get
project proposals passed. The Forest Rights Act was also seen as securing Adivasi rights over
forestland, but the clearances for industrial projects have violated the spirit of the law.
Few cases of apparent victory of people’s movements to stop certain projects— such as
Vedanta’s aluminium plant and bauxite mining in Niyamgiri shutting down because the 12 gram
sabhas governing the region were against it, or the withdrawal of the POSCO project as a result
of a persistent campaign by the local people—are not the defining features of this situation. In
Narayanpatna in Odisha’s Koraput district, for example, a peaceful campaign to restore tribal
land to the original owners, as per law, was suppressed and the Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangh was
banned and branded as a Maoist organisation. The Niyamgiri Suraksha Samiti led by socialists
and Gandhians has also been recently called a front organisation of the Maoists
The overall strategy was the Green Hunt strategy—to apply superior armed forces that can
suppress the Maoist movement. Home minister P Chidambaram’s famous formulation, “clear,
hold, develop” shaped the policy framework. The progress in “area domination” was the main
concern, along with “neutralising” (eliminating) Maoists. This totally changed the
“developmental” intention which was a key element of the policy. The “security-centric” policy
drove the state policy.
Assumption 3: Counter-insurgency drive with superior force can suppress the Maoist
movement
Internationally, the far superior United States Army was defeated by Vietnamese guerrilla forces
during 1965–75. After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the US-led military invasion of Afghanistan and
Iraq has failed to accomplish the stated goals of US foreign policy.
Indian policymakers cite the Punjab experience, saying that the massive armed operations of
the security forces led by K P S Gill crushed the Khalistani militants, resulting in a peaceful
political and economic environment in Punjab, post the 1980s. There are other facts that should
be pointed out: one is that common people were so harassed by the Khalistanis that they

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supported, or at least, acquiesced with police action. Two, more and more evidence convinced
the Sikh population that not only was the dignity of the Panth safe, but also that Sikhs exercised
substantive political power in Punjab and enjoyed a respectable place in the overall Indian
power structure.
In the Maoist areas we are going to witness an unprecedented deployment of CRPF personnel
and the newly reconstituted India Reserve Battalions. There is clamour by some to bring the
Army into action and to enforce AFSPA. The application of AFSPA in Manipur has been a
source of alienation in that region.
In this militarised region, the Maoists too have committed many excesses. In almost all these
areas there are frequent cases of an Adivasi, or of an ordinary villager, sometimes a panchayat
leader, being killed as they were accused of being a police informer. Punishments given in Jan
Adalats are conducted through summary trials and can sometimes be very irrational. The
attacks on politicians— the killing of a Jharkhand Mukti Morcha Member of Parliament in 2007
and the attack on INC leaders in May 2013 in which Mahendra Karma, the founder of Salwa
Judum, Chhattisgarh INC chief Patel and veteran leader V C Shukla were killed—have been
widely condemned. The derailment of the Gyaneswari Express on 28 May 2010, in which 150
passengers were killed, was attributed to the Maoists. Their attitude towards surrendered
cadres also has been questionable. The nexus between Maoists and local contractors,
industrialists, tendu leaf dealers and other businessmen, involving monetary extortion, has also
been reported.
The Way Ahead

 Wider consultation: Policymaking should ensure inputs from broader consultation with
scholars, civil liberty activists, civil servants, current and past, nongovernmental
organisations and all political parties. There is a tendency to dismiss the civil liberty groups
as front organisations of Maoists.

 Panchayats for self-development: Panchayats in the Maoist movement areas must be

enabled to function autonomously, without being forced to act as agency of state repression.
In many areas, the Maoists did not interfere in the implementation of welfare programmes
such as MGNReGS, ICDS (Integrated Child Development Services) and NRHM (National
Rural Health Mission). In fact, they ensured that there was no corruption in the public
distribution schemes.

The panchayats should decide what kind of economic development is needed in their area.
They can come up with a plan for full employment by a certain date, full implementation of the
RTE up to high school, and universal healthcare among other things. The present top down
model, be it under the Planning Commission or the NITI Aayog, with the “Mission 2017”
objective to clear the region for industries, has to be replaced by an Adivasi Self-Development
Plan. The Virginius Xaxa Committee’s recommendations on tribal areas, submitted in 2014,
should be taken seriously with regard to this question.

 People’s security: The panchayat- block- district- and state-level joint committees,
comprising a cross section of expertise for peace and security in these regions, may be set
up to plan and monitor the situation. Expertise ranging from agriculture, forestry and water

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 engineering, locally relevant industrial technology, cyber technology to modern infrastructure
buildings demanded by the local committees, would be made accessible to the panchayats.

3. SPRING THUNDER - A spring thunder over India is how the People’s Daily in China
described the Naxalbari movement of 1967, which began in a small north Bengal village and
spread like wildfire all over the state and beyond.

4. Timeline of Naxalism in India- http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/spring-

thunder-to-bloody-rebellion-key-dates-in-history-of-naxal-maoist-movement/story-
oNQvRRvKVvkHunXiaQWMUI.html

5. Dalit Dilemma in context of Saharanpur Riots:

Twenty-one years after the political rise of the community in Uttar Pradesh, the Dalits seem to
be barely featuring on Mayawati’s political agenda. Following points are worth taking a glance:
 The community stands at the crossroads. It has become vulnerable under the BJP
dispensation because the upper castes have acquired a sense of collective entitlement over
the backward castes and Dalits, claiming that they alone stayed with the BJP through its
peaks and troughs in UP.
 The SP was never Dalit-friendly because of the historical antagonisms that existed between
the well-off backward castes like the Yadavs and the Dalits.
 The “Hinduised” Dalit sub-castes, subsumed by the BJP, are unlikely to leave the party in a
hurry.
 The bruised and battered Congress, that had coaxed Dalit fealty for several decades, does
not know what kind of social alliance it wants.
 Little wonder then that young and politically conscious Dalits are being drawn to the “Bhim
Sena,” an organisation that has shot to prominence after the violence in western UP.
Spearheaded by a Saharanpur lawyer, Chandrashekhar Azad, it has, however, several
miles to travel and tests to endure under a hostile regime before it can justifiably claim to be
a party of the Dalits.

6. A Disjointed Doctrine Reviewing the Military’s Joint Doctrine

Context: The second edition of the joint doctrine of the Indian armed forces was released in
April 2017. The recently released joint doctrine of the armed forces outlines the manner in which
they expect to fight the next war. Though the doctrine suggests “decisive victory” is possible, it
bears reminding that the closer they get to this the closer would be the nuclear threshold. Since
the doctrine does not dwell on the nuclear level, it cannot be said that the doctrine makes India
any safer. However, the doctrine’s take on civil–military relations is far more interesting.
From its resemblance to the army doctrines in terms of language and production values, the
joint doctrine appears to have an army pedigree. The army chief recently let on that the draft
national security strategy and national military strategy are soon to be given to the government
(PTI 2017). First, this appropriation by the army of the lead role in doctrine-making does not
bode well for jointness. There is, within the HQ IDS, the Directorate of Doctrine (DoD)—that
took ownership of the joint doctrine—which should logically be in the lead role on the two
projects the army has appropriated. Even so, the DoD can at best address military strategy, not

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national security strategy, which is presumably the domain of the National Security Council
Secretariat (NSCS).
Positives –
a. The joint doctrine makes clear that, India’s aim being “comprehensive national
development,” national security entails creation and sustenance of an enabling environment.
For the military, this primarily implies prevention of war through deterrence and other
supportive roles for the military, such as aid to civil authorities, and humanitarian and
disaster relief. It rightly points to preconditions for use of military power, namely, in the
national interest; with necessary force levels; with clear objectives, capable of
reassessment; with support of people; and as a last resort.

b. Though in its diagrammatical description of the higher defence organisation, the doctrine
misses out on the link between the NSCS with the SFC— within the NSCS is nestled a
Strategic and Defence Division, which deals with strategic planning. This division also
comprises military staff who serve the non-uniformed NSA. The comparative lack of military
heft in nuclear decision making leaves a void in institutional checks and balances for the
inordinately high-powered and unaccountable NSA. This explains the persisting status quo
in the face of multiple reports recommending the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff or
permanent Ch COSC. The doctrine, in its chapter-long discussion on civil–military relations,
sensibly recommends inclusivity in the national security structures so that military input is
not only a statutory requirement, but is expected, sought and given.

c. To note the doctrine’s signal contribution, it rightly alights on, among others, democracy,
secularism, inclusive socio-economic development, respect for diversity, peaceful
coexistence, pluralism, and tolerance as national values.

d. The doctrine echoes the popular, and erroneous, strategic discourse, deeming the threat to
these as an “eastward spread of [Islamic] fundamentalist and radical [Islamist] ideologies”
and an “engineered radicalized tilt towards such ideology amongst India’s [Muslim] youth”.

Flaws -
a. There is a conceptual flaw. The joint doctrine spells out three “states” of being: peace;
conflict or war; and a combination of the two. It sees the difference between peace and
conflict as the absence of threat in peace, and in conflict the presence of threat
necessitating military measures. However, threats also exist in peace and military measures
are taken to deter and mitigate these, without transitioning to conflict. The conceptual clutter
might just be a case of lazy editing and can be left at that. However, the concept of peace is
defined as absence of “real or perceived threat” not only to the country’s national interests,
but also to that of its “strategic partners,” the latter a patently unnecessary inclusion.

b. Some problematic phrases also give one pause for thought. One such phrase is “decisive
victory,” occurring thrice in the document. When obtaining politically desirable outcomes is
sufficient as a military aim, going for decisive victory can be overkill and is unnecessarily
escalatory. The armed forces intend to “shock, dislocate and overwhelm” the enemy.

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c. Another beehive stirred by conventional operations simultaneously will be the hybrid war—
asymmetric war waged by irregulars—which the doctrine prognosticates as the future form
of war. Together, these will put paid to the fond expectation in military writings, and echoed
in the document, of a “short” war. Since the document does not have a section on nuclear
war— plausible between nuclear powers—it does not provide the necessary grist to thinking
intelligently on how a war can turn out. The absence of discussion on escalation avoidance,
control and de-escalation suggests that the armed forces are living in denial of the nuclear
reality, the Achilles’ heel of the joint doctrine.

d. This gap is attributable to a structural flaw. While the HQ IDS serves the Chairman of The
Chiefs Of Staff Committee (Ch COSC)—the “first among equals” among the chiefs—it
does not have a dedicated section of the staff dealing with nuclear conflict. The Ch COSC is
in the reporting line of the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). Since the SFC is the custodian
of India’s nuclear deterrent and executor of nuclear operations, it quite rightly is not the
locus for nuclear decision-making input. Further, the Ch COSC is double hatted in also
being the operational head of his service. Thus, the Ch COSC— the focal point for
professional military advice—is hobbled.

e. According to the doctrine, the second channel of reporting of the SFC is the National
Security Advisor (NSA). The NSA is a civilian appointed by executive order, unlike in the
United States where appropriate legislation and procedures of appointment and on roles
exist.

f. Nevertheless, the doctrine’s discussion on Low Intensity Conflict Operation (LICO) is only in
response to proxy wars waged. The doctrine’s merging of counter-infiltration and
counterterrorism operations within the LICO came at a price. It misses the indigenous
dimension and the aspects of militancy and insurgency altogether that were better captured
earlier by the two doctrines on sub-conventional operations, that of the army and the joint
doctrine.

g. The doctrine’s characterisation of the internal conflict in Jammu and Kashmir as a proxy war
calling out for the LICO makes for a very limited approach to conflict management and
resolution in Kashmir.

Conclusion - The military is virtually the last institution standing. With the publication of this
joint doctrine, it has staked out its professional space, but would need to engage with the
concerns raised here. Of greater significance, however, in the present context, is its brave hark
back to constitutional values as national values, knowing that these sit at odds with the definition
of national values held by its political masters.
7. ‘Constitutional Morality’
Context: The recent hearing of the case of triple talaq in the Supreme Court has raised some
seminal questions of constitutional morality. The Attorney General of India, Mukul Rohatgi,
representing the government, reportedly contended that triple talaq was not a fundamental part
of Islam and was not protected by Article 25 of the Constitution, which protects the right to

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religion of all citizens. He is reported to have clarified that the right to religion was not absolute
and it was subject to reasonable restrictions spelt out in Article 19(2).
Analysis: The above arguments cannot be negated on ethical grounds. However, the activist
lawyer, Flavia Agnes, has raised a valid question of “practical ethics” in this context. She urged
the Court not to shut the doors of community-based interventions in family issues, in the light of
the fact that women were denied their basic rights.
The argument is that the Supreme Court should uphold the principle of “constitutional morality”
in its judgments regarding the unconstitutional practices being followed by some members of
the majority community. Senior advocate Indira Jaising and her associates reminded us
sometime back of the fallout of the 2005 Supreme Court judgment in the State of Gujarat v
Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab case, which justified the total ban on cow slaughter. The fact that
this heightened cow vigilantism or rather lumpenism, is using India’s apex court to justify some
of its behaviour, makes the issue even more perplexing. The Mirzapur judgment testifies that
the “constitutional morality” of the apex court is not always free from “communitarian” bias.
8. ‘Chalo Nagpur’ Campaign
Context: The ‘Chalo Nagpur’ campaign mobilised thousands of women marchers and drew
attention to not only the exploitation and violence suffered by women from the lower castes,
classes and marginalised sections but also their efforts to build connections with women
engaged in similar aims across the world.
Analysis: The city of Nagpur in Maharashtra has a special significance in the Ambedkarite
social consciousness—it is the site of the mass historic struggle for reclaiming the Buddhist
tradition, symbolised by Deeksha Bhoomi.
Nagpur also symbolises both the wound of a massacre (the brutal, collective murders of four
members of the Bhotmange family in Khairlanji) and the mass resistance against it. So when
women rooted in the Phule–Ambedkarite ideology decided to take out a march on the 120th
death anniversary of the pioneering reformer Savitribai Phule on 10 March 2017, Nagpur was
the chosen destination. Thousands marched to protest the increasing violence against women
from marginalised sections. Violence that is invariably an outcome of the ideologies of
Brahminism, Manuwad and Hindutva, all of which have provided the legitimating force to
hierarchies, subordination, discrimination and subjugation of women as the “ideal” form of social
order.
The women marchers commemorated and saluted the contribution of Savitribai and Fatima
Sheikh (a teacher and supporter of the Phules) towards women’s emancipation. The “Chalo
Nagpur” campaign signified that the struggle against gender oppression was simultaneously a
struggle against caste discrimination and class exploitation, as well as a struggle against
subjugation/erosion of democratic voices. Moreover, this was a struggle against the
commoditisation of women, the physical and sexual abuse they encountered, and the multiple
forms of enslavement they confronted.
Savitribai Phule was the first trained woman teacher, who dared to liberate all women from the
bonds of enslavement by educating them.

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9. Agrarian Distress and Farmer Suicides
The Context: This has been a ripe issue for decades and the following points are noteworthy.
Signs of Distress –
a. A striking peculiarity of agriculture in India is the continuing proliferation of small
landholdings. The percentage of land owned by marginal farmers has gone up drastically,
from 38% in 1953–54 to 70% in 2003, and over 80% of all landholdings are small or
marginal.
b. The contribution of the agricultural sector to India’s economy has dropped sharply. Today, it
accounts for merely 13.7% of gross domestic product (GDP). The decrease in the
contribution of agriculture to GDP, however, has not been accompanied by a matching
reduction in the share of agriculture in employment.
c. Investment in Indian agriculture has been declining for several years. Investment in
agriculture as a percentage of gross domestic product reduced from 1.91% in 1991 to
1.31% by 2004 and is at present less than 1% of the GDP.
d. Various estimates indicate that gross capital formation in agriculture has remained below
3% over the last 15 years.
e. Though the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD 2013) report
indicated a tenfold increase in the flow of formal credit from 2000–01 to 2011–12, it was
insufficient to rule out the predominance of non-institutional sources of credit. In addition,
commercial banks prefer “deepening” credit over “widening” it, making formal credit more
accessible to farmers with larger landholdings.
f. Estimates put the number of indebted agricultural households in the country at 52%. The
average outstanding loan per agricultural household is `47,000, and the proportion of
indebted households in both Maharashtra (57%) and Punjab (53%) is higher than the
national average of 52%.
g. Farmer suicides in India need to be situated in this distressing context. Latest estimates
indicate that almost 2,70,000 farmers have committed suicide over the last one-and-a-half
decades.

Factors Causing Distress –

a. Shame of Debt - Indebtedness and the inability to repay loans cause loss of face and
sometimes, public ridicule. The dependency on credit from the family intensifies if other
avenues of borrowing, including moneylenders, have been tried and exhausted. The shame
associated with one’s inability to repay is immense in village society and it is all the more
acute if money is borrowed from relatives. Banks and moneylenders do not necessarily
chase after borrowers for repayment, but families affected by suicide were most burdened
by the obligation to repay relatives under any circumstances. Thus, the problem intensifies
after the suicide as the family is often left without an earning member and the debt remains
unpaid even after the unfortunate death, creating the possibility of further suicides.

b. Flawed Cropping Pattern - Dryland farming on small landholdings in adverse conditions is

always a risky proposition. This risk severely reduces a farmer’s ability to repay and remain
eligible for fresh loans. Repeated crop failure emerges as a recurring stress factor that has
pushed farmers to the brink over the past decade. Lack of timely rainfall after the sowing

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 operation, excessive rainfall after sowing, or hailstorms before harvest could be fatal to the
crop. There seems to be a direct and positive correlation between yield of BT cotton and
rainfall in the right amount and at the right time. Hence, the cultivation of BT cotton in an
area entirely dependent on unpredictable rainfall with no alternative source of irrigation
cannot possibly be the appropriate crop choice.

c. Excessive use of Natural Resources - If the cultivation of BT cotton is not suited to

Yavatmal, rice cultivation is ecologically unsustainable in Sangrur. Diversification of
agriculture away from wheat and paddy is necessary for improving soil fertility and
maintaining an ecological balance. Rice cultivation has had an adverse impact on
groundwater, as 2,000–4,000 litres of water are required to produce one kilo of rice. Falling
water tables threaten farmers across the state, particularly those who operate on smaller
landholdings, as the cost of boring a well is directly proportional to the depth of the well and
not the size of land. With the water table sinking each year, a farmer invariably has to bear
the huge recurring costs of digging deeper without the assurance that the new depth at
which water is available today will be sustainable in the near future.

d. Rising Input Costs - The farmer is also hurt due to increases in the cost of production. All
farmers in both regions complained about rising input prices (seed, water, electricity,
fertiliser, pesticide and land rent) and the absence of a commensurate increase in minimum
support price (MSP). Traders and middlemen make profits at the cost of farmers who are not
able to store the harvest and wait for the right price. High land lease rates in Punjab have
encouraged many landowning farmers to rent out their landholdings fully or partially to
generate an income without the burden of farming operations.

e. Dependency on Informal Credit - High rates of interest from non-institutional sources of

credit compel farmers to prioritise the payment of these debts before dues to banks are
paid. In one scenario, the farmer borrows from moneylenders and relatives at a very high
rate of interest (as much as 10%–12% per month) to pay off the bank loan in order to remain
eligible for fresh credit from the institutional source. A short-term crop loan taken from the
bank has to be repaid on time, at the end of every financial year (31 March) to avail of
interest-free credit or an increase in loan amount. Given the scale of non-profitability of
farming and repeated crop failures, it is obvious that a small and marginal farmer would find
it extremely difficult to repay a bank loan. Hence, it is not surprising that the rate of default,
according to central and cooperative bank records, is alarming.

f. Loans from Informal Sources and Banks - In the second scenario, in which farmers
prioritise repayment of loans taken from informal sources over bank loans in order to
maintain their rapport with the moneylender, or to avoid verbal abuse, and to remain
creditworthy. Several families become heavily indebted either because of out-of-pocket
medical expenditure or because of large expenses on marriage12 or consumer durables.
A continuous flow of cash is required to meet expenses on regular household consumption,
basic health and education (all of which have increased manifold). This becomes a major
issue for farmers operating on small landholdings with no non-farm sources of income.
With few avenues to access institutional capital for non-farm expenditure, dependency on
non-institutional sources to meet these expenditures is inevitable.

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 g. Farmers lack storage facilities, and this compels them to sell their crops soon after harvest
even if they do not get the best price, because of the pressure to repay to non-institutional
credit sources charging high rates of interest.

Reformative Measures –
a. Immediate Interventions –
i. Cropping Pattern - The foremost requirement to resolve the crisis is to move towards
farming practices according to agro-climatic zones. Cropping patterns that are harmful to
nature and natural resources should be discouraged through denial of support prices or
denial of crop loans for the wrong choice of crops, no matter how profitable the cultivation
might be in the short term. Similarly, incentives should be given to those crops that are more
suited for cultivation in their agro-zone.
ii. Indigenous mixed farming patterns that are not cost-intensive should be encouraged. It
helps in providing food grain support to the family and rejuvenates soil fertility.
iii. Institutional Credit Disbursal System-
a. Incentivising repayment by modifying the institutional credit disbursal system is essential to
minimise the number of bank defaulters by introducing the option of repayment in
installments. There are greater chances of recovery if payment of the outstanding loan
amount is bifurcated into smaller portions.
b. A proportionate loan–land ratio would enable the farmer to retain rights over the rest of his
landholdings, which can then be used as a source of liquidity. Currently, a farmer’s entire
holding cannot be sold or further mortgaged since a bank loan locks in all the land owned by
him.
c. A specific dryland farming credit policy should be considered, as the nature of cultivation
often varies fundamentally from rainfed farming and requires a different kind of attention.
d. Cashless loan components should be introduced to avoid diversion of crop loans towards
non-farm expenditures, where payment to a formal credit source can be made at the point of
sale (factory or dealer).
e. Restructuring of loans against localised crop failures, where specific and targeted
compensation packages take extreme weather events or natural calamities into account. In
addition, the principles of cross-subsidisation are more effective if they are shaped along the
lines of group insurance schemes for groups of farmers who bear the risk together and not
individually

b. Long-term Policies - Long-term measures would, of course, include land reforms and
correcting the terms of trade that are against the cultivating class. However, it is also clear
that penury and deprivation would have a cascading effect on the economy as a whole. The
stance of the state does not help either, as the public expenditure on agriculture as a
percentage of the GDP is less than 1% and has remained at that level for the last decade-
and-a-half. We need far-sighted and sustained policy initiatives to provide farmers dignified
livelihoods; these are essential to sustain agriculture, which is so critical to our collective
well-being. In an economy driven by jobless growth, compulsive migration to cities is often a
case of distress transhumance. These migrants then become the new “serfs” of the informal
services and construction sector, while the existing rural and agrarian problems remain
unresolved.

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