KABILING ET AL VS NHA CO VS PNB
Facts: LOZANO VS MARTINEZ
Petitioners' are among the landowners whose
title to their respective lots have already been
transferred to respondent NHA pursuant to the
provisions of P.D. No. 1808. Wherein said
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of P.D .
No. 1808. Alleging that said P.D . No.
1808 deprives them of their property without
due process of law and without just
compensation and of their right to protection of
the laws. They further alleged that their
properties are not the proper subject of
expropriation by the government.
Issue/s:
1. Is P.D. No. 1808 unconstitutional due to the
deprivation of due process and just
compensation?
Ruling:
The petitioners' challenge to the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 1808 cannot be
sustained. The objective of the decree,
namely, to resolve the land tenure problem in
the Agno-Leveriza area to allow the
implementation of the comprehensive
development plans for this depressed
community, provides the justification for the
exercise of the police power of the State. The
police power of the State has been described
as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of
powers. It is a power inherent in the State,
plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that man in
organizing the state and imposing upon the
government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to
enable individual citizens or group of citizens to
obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measure to ensure communal peace,
safety, good order and welfare.
Petitioners also cannot complain that they are
being deprived of their property without due
process of law and just compensation since
Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 1808 provides for just
compensation to lot owners who have fully paid
their obligations to the City of Manila under their
respective contracts before the issuance of the
decree, and while including petitioners
Robidante L. Kabiling, et al. to those have not
yet claimed the compensation for their
respective lots.
The motion for reconsideration was DENIED.
CLEMENTS VS NOLTING
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case, the petition arose
from cases involving prosecution of offenses
under the BP 22 also known as Bouncing Check
Law. The defendant in these case moved
seasonably to quash the information on the
ground that the acts charged did not constitute
an offense, the statute being unconstitutional.
The motions were denied by the respondent
trial court, except in one case, which is the
subject of G.R No. 75789, wherein the trial court
declared the law unconstitutional and
dismissed the case. The parties adversely
affected have come to the court for remedy.
Those who question the constitutionality of the
said statute insist the following ground:
1) It offends the constitutional provision
forbidding imprisonment for debt;
2) it impairs freedom of contract;
3) it contravenes the equal protection clause;
4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive
powers; and
5) its enactment is flawed in the sense that
during its passage the interim Batasan violated
the constitutional provision prohibiting to a bill
on Third Reading.
ISSUE:
Whether or not BP 22 or the Bouncing Check
Law is unconstitutional.
RULING:
No, the enactment of the assailed statute is a
valid exercise of Police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition
against imprisonment for debt. It may be
constitutionally impermissible for the legislature
to penalize a person for non-payment of debt
ex contractu, but certainly it is within the
prerogative of the lawmaking body to prescribe
certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to
public welfare. Acts mala in se are not only acts
which the law can punish. An act may not be
considered by society as inherently wrong,
hence, not malum in se, but because of the
harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be
outlawed and criminally punished as malum
prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise
of its police power.
The enactment of the said statute is a
declaration by the legislature that, as a matter
of public policy, the making and issuance of a
worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to
be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of
the police power and is not repugnant to
the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the
offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment.
It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is
not intended or designed to coerce
a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is
to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them
in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects
on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the
act not as an offense against property, but an
offense against public order.
Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere
undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is
an order addressed to a bank and partakes of
a representation that the drawer has funds on
deposit against which the check is drawn,
sufficient to ensure payment upon its
presentation to the bank. There is therefore an
element of certainty or assurance that the
instrument will be paid upon presentation. For
this reason, checks have become widely
accepted as a medium of payment in trade
and commerce. Although not legal tender,
checks have come to be perceived as
convenient substitutes for currency in
commercial and financial transactions. The
basis or foundation of such perception is
confidence. If such confidence is shaken, the
usefulness of checks as currency substitutes
would be greatly diminished or may become
nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy
that confidence should be deterred for the
proliferation of worthless checks can only
create havoc in trade circles and the banking
community
RUTTER VS ESTEBAN
Facts: On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban
two parcels of land situated in the Manila for
P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid outright, and
the balance was made payable as follows:
P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942, and P2,400
on or before August 27, 1943, with interest at
the rate of 7 percent per annum. To secure the
payment of said balance of P4,800, a first
mortgage has been constituted in favor of the
plaintiff. Esteban failed to pay the
two installments as agreed upon, as well as the
interest that had accrued and so Rutter
instituted an action to recover the balance
due, the interest due and the attorney's fees.
The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of
the properties mortgaged in accordance with
law. Esteban claims that this is a prewar
obligation contracted and that he is a war
sufferer, having filed his claim with the
Philippine War DamageCommission for the
losses he had suffered as a consequence of
the last war; and that under section 2 of RA
342(moratorium law), payment of his obligation
cannot be enforced until after the lapse of
eight years. The complaint was dismissed. A
motion for recon was made which assails the
constitutionality of RA 342.
Issue: Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional
on non-impairment clause grounds.
Held: Yes. The moratorium is postponement of
fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state
through the medium of the courts or
the legislature. Its essence is the application of
police power. The economic interests of the
State may justify the exercise of its continuing
and dominant protective power
notwithstanding interference with contracts.
The question is not whether the legislative
action affects contracts incidentally, or directly
or indirectly, but whether the legislation is
addressed to a legitimate end and the
measures taken are reasonable and
appropriate to that end.
However based on the President’s general
SONA and consistent with what the Court
believes to be as the only course dictated by
justice, fairness and righteousness, declared
that the continued operation
and enforcementof RA 342 at the present time
is unreasonable and oppressive, and should
not be prolonged should be declared null and
void and without effect. This holds true as
regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, with
greater force and reason considering that said
Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in
point of time as regards the suspension of
the enforcement and effectivity of monetary
obligations.
ILUSORIO VS CAR
ORTIGAS VS FEATI BANK
Facts: Plaintiff is engaged in real estate
business, developing and selling lots to the
public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision
along EDSA. On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as
vendor, and Augusto Padilla and Natividad
Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate
agreements of sale on installments over two
parcels of land of the Subdivision. On July 19,
1962, the said vendees transferred their rights
and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of
one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of
payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff
executed the corresponding deeds of sale in
favor of Emma Chavez. Both the agreements
(of sale on installment) and the deeds of sale
contained the stipulations or restrictions that:
1. The parcel of land shall be used exclusively
for residential purposes, and she shall not be
entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel
from it or any other lots belonging to the Seller.
2. All buildings and other improvements
(except the fence) which may be constructed
at any time in said lot must be, (a) of strong
materials and properly painted, (b) provided
with modern sanitary installations connected
either to the public sewer or to an approved
septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a distance
of less than two (2) meters from its boundary
lines.
Eventually said lots were bought by defendant.
Lot 5 directly from Chavez and Lot 6 from
Republic Flour Mills by deed of exchange, with
same restrictions. Plaintiff claims that restriction
is for the beautification of the subdivision.
Defendant claimed of the commercialization
of western part of EDSA. Defendant began
constructing a commercial bank building.
Plaintiff demand to stop it, which forced him to
file a case, which was later dismissed,
upholding police power. Motion for recon was
denied, hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not non-impairment clause
violated.
Held: No. Resolution is a valid exercise of police
power. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs
through several cities and municipalities in the
Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream
of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and
pollution are hardly conducive to the health,
safety or welfare of the residents in its route.
Health, safety, peace, good order and general
welfare of the people in the locality are
justifications for this. It should be stressed, that
while non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not
absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the
legitimate exercise of police power
GANZON VS INSERTIO
FACTS:
Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon executed a deed of
absolute sale of a parcel of land in favor of
private respondents. Several months later, a
deed of real estate mortgage was executed
between the same parties to secure the
payment by the private respondents of a
promissory not in favor of petitioner. Private
respondents filed a civil action against
petitioners after Ganzon initiated extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings in accordance with
the terms and conditions of the said mortgage.
Respondent judge ordered the substitution of
the mortgage lien with a surety bond.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the order of respondent judge
violates the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution.
RULING:
YES. Substitution of the mortgage with a surety
bond to ensure the payment of a loan would
in effect change the terms and conditions of
the mortgage contract. Even before trial on
the very issues affecting the contract, the
respondent court has directed a deviation
from its terms, diminished its efficiency and
dispensed with a primary condition.
Instant petition si GRANTED. Orders of the trial
court are SET ASIDE
DEL ROSARIO VS DE LOS SANTOS
ABELLA VS NLRC
FACTS
PETITIONER Abella leased a farmland from
Ramona for a period of 10 years and
renewable for another 10 years at the option
of the former. Abella hired the private
respondents Quitco and Dionele. Abella
renewed the lease for another ten years. At
the expiration of the lease, she dismissed both
private respondents and turned over the
hacienda to the owners. Private respondents
filed a complaint against petitioner. for
overtime pay, reinstatement, and illegal
dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the
dismissal was warranted by the cessation of
business, but the respondents are entitled to
separation pay, invoking Art. 284 of the Labor
Code, as amended.
ISSUE
Whether or not private respondents are
entitled to separation pay.

RULING
The Court upheld the ruling of the Labor Arbiter
that Article 284 is the applicable law in this
case. Art 284, as amended ref FACTS
PETITIONER Abella leased a farmland from
Ramona for a period of 10 years and
renewable for another 10 years at the option
of the former. Abella hired the private
respondents Quitco and Dionele. Abella
renewed the lease for another ten years. At
the expiration of the lease, she dismissed both
private respondents and turned over the
hacienda to the owners. Private respondents
filed a complaint against petitioner. for
overtime pay, reinstatement, and illegal
dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the
dismissal was warranted by the cessation of
business, but the respondents are entitled to
separation pay, invoking Art. 284 of the Labor
Code, as amended.
ISSUE
Whether or not private respondents are
entitled to separation pay.
greater number of employees who can avail
of the benefits under the law, which is in
consonance with the avowed policy of the
State to give maximum aid and protection to
labor.ers to employment benefits to farm
hands who were not parties to petitioner's
lease contract with the owner of Hacienda
Danao-Ramona. That contract cannot have
the effect of annulling subsequent legislation
designed to protect the interest of the working
class.
It is well-settled that in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor
Code and its implementing regulations, the
workingman's welfare should be the primordial
and paramount consideration. It is the kind of
interpretation which gives meaning and
substance to the liberal and compassionate
spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of
the New Labor Code which states that "all
doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of this Code
including its implementing rules and regulations
shall be resolved in favor of labor." The policy is
to extend the applicability of the decree to a
greater number of employees who can avail
of the benefits under the law, which is in
consonance with the avowed policy of the
State to give maximum aid and protection to
labor.

RULING PVBEU VS PVB

The Court upheld the ruling of the Labor Arbiter

that Article 284 is the applicable law in this
case. Art 284, as amended refers to
employment benefits to farm hands who were
not parties to petitioner's lease contract with
the owner of Hacienda Danao-Ramona. That
contract cannot have the effect of annulling
subsequent legislation designed to protect the
interest of the working class.

It is well-settled that in the implementation and

interpretation of the provisions of the Labor
Code and its implementing regulations, the
workingman's welfare should be the primordial
and paramount consideration. It is the kind of
interpretation which gives meaning and
substance to the liberal and compassionate
spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of
the New Labor Code which states that "all
doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of this Code
including its implementing rules and regulations
shall be resolved in favor of labor." The policy is
to extend the applicability of the decree to a