Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The Constitutional Commissions
The Constitutional Commissions
IX)
1. Independence
2. Salaries
3. Disqualifications (Sec. 2)
4. 4. Staggering of Terms: they will not resign all the time.
The rationale behind is that the appointing authority is the President. Independence will be violated where a sitting President
simultaneously appoint all the members.
Requisites: Republic v. Imperial
1. The original members of the Commissions shall begin their terms on a common date.
2. Any vacancy occurring before the expiration if the term shall be filled only for the balance of such term.
Held: NO. In n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity. The Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” They are not under the control of the
President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under
the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review
on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman
comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.
The choice of the Acting Chairman the choice of the Acting Chairman
6. Other Prerequisites
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.
In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Chairman:
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential or not.
(2) Whether or not the services of petitioner as ´confidential agentµ was validly terminated on the alleged ground of loss of confidence,
and if not, whether or not she could still be reinstated to said position after accepting the position of Junior Examiner in the same office.
Held:
(1) The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential.
There are two instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential:
(1) When the President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Civil Service Commission) has
declared the position to be primarily confidential; or
(2) In the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functions of the office, there exists ´close intimacy between the
appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state.
In the case before us, the provision of Executive Order No. 265, declaring ´...confidential agents in the several department and
offices of the Government, unless otherwise directed by the President, to be primarily confidentialµ brings within the fold of the
aforementioned executive order the position of confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are
primarily confidential.
(2) Yes. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the termination of her services as confidential agent is
in violation of her security of tenure, primarily confidential positions are excluded from the merit system, and dismissal at pleasure of
officers or employees therein is allowed by the Constitution.
This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of
the appointing power.
Important:
It should be noted, however, that when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not ´removedµ or ´dismissedµ from
office ³ his term merely ´expires, in much the same way as officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for
which he had been appointed or elected, is not and cannot be deemed ´removedµ or ´dismissed therefrom, upon the expiration of
said term.
The main difference between the former ³ the primarily confidential officer ³ and the latter is that the latter's term is fixed of definite,
whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined
when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent.
When this even takes place, the latter is not ´removedµ or ´dismissedµ from office ³ his term has merely ´expired. But even granting for
the sake of argument, that petitioner's position was not primarily confidential and that therefore her removal from said position for loss of
confidence was in violation of her security of tenure as a civil service employee, yet by her acceptance of the position of Junior Examiner
in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS on April 1, 1976, she was deemed to have abandoned former position of ´confidential agentµ in the
same office.
Issues:
1.Is it constitutional to separate career civil service employees not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation
3 dated March 25m 1986?
Yes. Under Section 16 of Article18: Transitory Provisions of the Constitution. It also applies to separations as results of reorganization
after the ratification of the Consti.
2.Was there a valid reorganization in the Bureau of Customs occurring at that time which would validate Dario’s and several others’
separation from office?
NO. NO change in the staffing pattern prescribed by Section 34 of EO 127 wasmade even after Mison took office.
Mison separated 394 Customs personnelbut replaced them with 522. This wasproof that such separations were notmade to improve the
bureaucracy andmake them more efficient.
•
It was also a defiance of President’sdirective to halt further lay-offs as aconsequence of reorganization.
•
Mison did not follow procedures laid downby EO 127 regarding lay-offs.3.Could Mison remove Cesar Dario fromoffice?No. Dario was a
presidentialappointee and thus Mison had noauthority to terminate Dario.Reinstated to positions
Facts:
o Disqualifications (Sec. 7)
N/A to officials covered by Sec. 13, Art. VII (See. CLU vs. Executive Sec, supra)
What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court
as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
In the case at bar, the order of the Commission granting the award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it
wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after which the questioned order was issued; and that this
order of the commission was issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. Hence, the said
resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no
contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from
such order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
o Report (Sec. 4)