How can we recognise when we have made progress in the search for knowledge?

Consider two
contrasting areas of knowledge.

Over a span of centuries humanity has enhanced unusually. Hardly anyone would quarrel that those
changes do not constitute a progress. Though, we endured a turbulent journey to develop every field of sci-
ence, to seize the mayhem of ignorance. First of all it is imposed that there is generally any progress and it is
irrefutable. But then it is worth to determine what actually is meant by progress. The dictionaries state it as
development towards an improved or more advanced condition. Word progress has a definitely positive un-
dertone. Therefore it raises a question how to detect a progress? Is it always absolute or displays differently
in manifold branches of knowledge? While it seems quite obvious in reference to such areas of knowledge
as mathematics or natural sciences, the difficulty appears when adherents of technological progress strive to
implement this term in other realms of life. What would then a progress mean in politics or arts? There is no
objective method to measure the artistic values of art or fully consent if any political regime leads to preferable
consequences. Hence, in reference to the search of knowledge progress does not make steps in the pursuit of
truth. The term progress unduly saturated to everyday language and this abuse gives people improper notion
about its meaning. Anyway, still the main question concerning the identification of progress remains intact. To
depict explicitly the bunch of premises that give the sense of progress, in this essay two contrasting areas of
knowledge will be comprised.
As it has been mentioned above, the branch that especially associates with progress is technology. All
devices that are so indispensable in everyday life we owe to the development in natural sciences. We all live
in the world where the verifiable evidence is the most appreciated. Hence, that endeavour for finding proofs
appears to be so significant for people that it may seem to give an impression of explanation. Notwithstand-
ing, there is a conspicuous mistake in contending that proof is a determinant of progress in natural sciences.
Proofs cannot be implemented in experimental sciences, since it is devoid of register of rules that work in the
universe. Indeed, it is unfeasible to elucidate and prove theories in physics. Recognition of progress in natural
science is therefore not dependent on pure logics and reasoning. The combination of sense perception is in-
dispensable in carrying out experiments. Stating an assertion is then viable and its characteristics in fact give
us a sense of progress. Over a span of centuries we aspire to curtail the number of fragmentary theories and to
substitute them with more general ones. If a theory comprises vaster spectrum of observed research than the
previous one, we may be sure that the progress has been made. Nowadays there are two leading theories that
portray the universe. For instance, so revered and exalted special relativity describes only motions of very big,
terminal velocities like speed of light. Old Newton’s dynamics is still applied for more practical problems in
everyday life (small velocities). The main purpose is not to demarcate the spheres of the universe. Once the
only one general theory comprising the whole universe will be accomplished, the full progress will have been
attained.
Creative thinking is not the only way to make a progress in natural sciences. The other method is fre-
quently used in everyday life, for instance on exams of multiple choice type. The probability to select a proper
answer amongst typically four given possibilities is much smaller than to contradict the truth of remaining
three. By elimination of spurious answers the pure mathematical probability to guess this true one augments.
The method of such critical rationalism allows to detect a progress. In general, the nature of scientific theories
is that it is not possible to verify if it’s veracious, but only to demur it. Even a single discrepancy between
assertion and one experiment refutes the theory. Falsificationists approach proposed by Karl Popper assumes
that a good theory is liable to verification procedures and its explanation consists in searching for counter-
arguments that may temporarily deny it. Elimination of errors is a way to tighten and concretise the theories in
natural science and therefore to detect that the progress was made in the search of knowledge. One of plenty
epitomes illustrating this method is divergence between the observations of Mercury’s orbital motion and its
prevision based on Newton’s laws of dynamics. The difference of anticipated and actual position of Mercury
was miniscule. However this slight anomaly sufficed to impugn calculations of classic dynamics and became
a promoter and cornerstone to state the theory of relativity. And prove that the progress had been made.
Paradoxically, ignorance may also furtively provide with sense of progress made over a span of time.
There is a hackneyed and reiterated quotation attributed to Socrates: “I know that I know nothing” portraying
that the excess of information may present questions. With progress made in search of knowledge new doubts
and problems appear. Uneducated and primitive people live a complacent life, they are unaware of many dis-
tresses, because they don’t know them. The whole branch of physics constitutes a broad space to proliferate
doubts. For instance, scientists performed a grand endeavour to investigate thoroughly the structure of matter.
From antic theories combining various elements of nature as constituents of the world to the idea of atoms
and its ingredients (quarks or Higgs bosons). The specified and profound knowledge about the nature of mat-
ter allowed to carry out thorough studies over the masses of galaxies. The idea of dark matter was therefore
introduced, but the foresights according to disseminated knowledge of matter doesn’t elucidate its properties.
Hence, progress evoked tempestuous discussion and mystery that wouldn’t never emerge before.
While in natural sciences there are miscellaneous premises that give an impression of progress, it is not that
easy to determine its meaning in reference to arts and culture. The prevailing notion is that art has been devel-
oping throughout centuries. But there is no way to assess objectively the artistic values of pieces of different
epochs and currents. For example, for some modern art may seem supreme because it gives unlimited area for
interpretation. But for some plain and accidental patterns signify the degradation of taste, because exaggerated
extravaganza is not that beauty they look for. In contrary, classic art demonstrates the harmony of shapes, but
nothing more valuable than a photography and straight forward, realistic representation of the world. There-
fore what we claim as progress is determined by subjective inclinations and preferences. However, progress in
case of arts may be differently perceived. In search of progress we need to reject qualitative factor and resort
to quantitative data. The difference between the past and 20th century is enormous quantitative increment and
huge miscellany of art. The progress is therefore recognised by prevalence of art and number of currents. It
is easily visible as a rate of changing styles. For example, in the renaissance it had been taking at least one
hundred and fifty years to switch onto baroque style. Already on the turn of 19th and 20th century that epochs
lasted about 20 years and now it is counted in just few years.
Summarising, progress is a very general notion that on many fields is considered subjectively. While
in natural science it is still feasible to recognise progress, in fact there is always a possibility that progress is
only temporal and in future may be undermined. Even bigger subjectivity of progress is encountered in any
other area of knowledge, besides mathematics. Hence, we should be more careful using this word in everyday
language, since it is abused not referring to its meaning.

1272 words.

Bibliography
1. Stephen Hawking, Leonard Mlodinow, A Briefer History of Time, Poznań: Zysk i S-ka Wydawnictwo, 2005.
2. Oxford Encyclopedia, 2009, Volumes 5, 15.