UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

Running head: UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

Uncertainty and Prejudice: The Role of Religiosity in Shaping Group Attitudes

Maciej Sekerdej

Małgorzata Kossowska

Aneta Czernatowicz-Kukuczka

Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland

Word count (excl. references, tables and figures): 6882

Corresponding author: Maciej Sekerdej, Insititute of Psychology, ul. Ingardena 6, 30-060

Kraków, Poland, maciek@apple.phils.uj.edu.pl; phone number: +48 799652460

The preparation of this paper was supported a grant from the National Science Centre DEC

2011/02/A/HS6/00155.

The authors declare that there are no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the

research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

This article has been accepted for publication and undergone full peer review but has not
been through the copyediting, typesetting, pagination and proofreading process which may
lead to differences between this version and the Version of Record. Please cite this article as
doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2298

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

Abstract

Past research indicates that being religious is frequently motivated by the need to avoid

uncertainty, and associated with prejudice against value-violating groups. The present

research clarifies these previous findings and shows for the first time a causal link between a

sense of uncertainty and group attitudes through religiosity and the perception of the target

group’s mindset. Study 1 demonstrates that belief in God is associated with uncertainty

avoidance, and increases prejudice against value-violating groups, but simultaneously

increases positive attitudes towards value-consistent groups. Study 2 demonstrates

experimentally that a sense of uncertainty shapes intergroup attitudes when the relationship is

mediated through the belief in God, and the perception that a target group actually violated

perceiver’s values. The results corroborate and broaden previous findings on religiosity,

ambiguity avoidance and prejudice, and for the first time show a causal link between a sense

of uncertainty and attitudes towards value-violating and value-consistent groups.

Keywords: ambiguity, uncertainty avoidance, religiosity, prejudice, value-violating groups

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

People cope with ambiguity and the related uncertainty in many different ways. For

some, the belief in science and technology can help to make natural environment more

predictable (Rutjens, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2009; Rutjens, van Harreveld, & van

der Pligt, 2010). Others find structure in the law, something that is designed to regulate their

interactions with other people (Hofstede, 1984). Yet others fall back on religion, which, by

unifying us with supernatural powers, provides us with protection, frequently even after death

(e.g. Farias, Newheiser, Kahane, & Toledo, 2013; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). In a

nutshell, dealing with ambiguity and uncertainty consists in simplifying the surrounding

environment and making it more familiar and predictable. Nevertheless, this process is not

cost-free, as the simplified picture of the world that results is frequently distorted and has

affective and behavioral consequences (e.g. Devine & Sharp, 2009; Kahneman, Slovic, &

Tversky, 1982; Smith, Mackie, & Claypool, 2015).

Throughout the ages, religion has been for many people a moral, ethical and political

beacon (Wulff, 1991; Piazza & Landy, 2013; Simpson, Piazza, & Rios, 2016). It has provided

guidance for how to live and how to interact with others. It has explained the nature of the

world and provided believers with tools to understand and live in accordance with that world,

such as various values, norms, rituals, duties and taboos. The nature of these belief systems,

how they are actually understood and followed, as well as the degree of adherence to them,

can in turn have diverse consequences for intergroup relations. Therefore, on the one hand,

religiosity can serve as a source of solidarity, integration, dignity, civic attitudes and

behaviors, and respect for customs and tradition. On the other hand, anecdotal examples and

academic research reveal links between religion and chauvinism, intolerance,

authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and other types of prejudice (Allport, 1950; Batson,

Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993; Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011; Hall, Matz, & Wood,

2010; Hunsberger, 1995; Whitley, 2009).

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

This paper examines how dealing with uncertainty by adherence to religion influences

intergroup attitudes. First, we examine the relationship between religious beliefs and the

tendency to avoid uncertainty. Moreover, we test the assumption that the connection of the

two can lead to prejudice towards value-violators, but that it can also increase positive

attitudes towards those groups whose values are consistent with the ingroup’s values. Finally,

for the first time, we experimentally test how, in the face of uncertainty, religious beliefs

determine attitudes towards different groups, regarding the perception of values they follow.

Intolerance of Ambiguity and Motivation to Feel Certain

People vary in their tolerance of ambiguity and uncertainty. Since the early work by

Frenkel-Brunswik (1948; 1949), the concepts of ambiguity and uncertainty have been

discussed in many areas of research including organizational (Robertson & Swan, 2003) and

vocational behavior (Xu & Tracey, 2015), education (Sherrill, 2001), clinical psychology

(Birrell, Meares, Wilkinson, & Freestone, 2011; Gosselin et al., 2008), and creativity research

(Wang, Zhang, & Martocchio, 2011). Following the initial definition by Frenkel-Brunswik

(1949) most researchers conceptualized the intolerance of ambiguity and uncertainty as a

personality trait (e.g. Budner, 1962; Furnham & Ribchester, 1995), or at least a cognitive

dispositions that may influence the propensity for certain affective, cognitive, and behavioral

reactions in response to situations that involve novelty, complexity, unfamiliarity,

unpredictability (Bhushan & Amal, 1986; Budner, 1962; McLain, 1993; McLain,

Keffallonitis, & Armani, 2015). Affective reactions most often include anxiety, discomfort,

but also dislike or anger. Such emotions in turn lead to cognitive effort to resolve ambiguity

and uncertainty and/or a tendency to perceive ambiguous situations in black and white terms.

Finally, low tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty can result in behavioral consequences

such as delayed decision making, attributional errors, and the general avoidance or rejection

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

of ambiguous and uncertain situations and their sources (for a review see Furnham & Marks,

2013).

Referring to the ideas of Frenkel-Brunswik, especially those related to the link

between intolerance of ambiguity and prejudice (see also Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik,

Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), Bochner (1965) formulated a set of implications of the

intolerance of ambiguity, distinguishing between their primary and secondary characteristics.

Among the primary characteristics he included “(a) rigid dichotomizing into fixed categories

– ‘‘need for categorization’’; (b) seeking for certainty and avoiding ambiguity – ‘‘need for

certainty’’; (c) inability to allow for the co-existence of positive and negative features in the

same object, e.g. ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ traits in the same person; (d) acceptance of attitude

statements representing a rigid white-black view of life; (e) a preference for the familiar over

the unfamiliar; (f) a positive rejecting of the different or unusual; (g) resistance to reversal of

apparent fluctuating stimuli; (h) the early selection and maintenance of one solution in a

perceptually ambiguous situation; (i) premature closure.” In turn, persons who possess

secondary characteristics he described as “(a) authoritarian; (b) dogmatic; (c) rigid; (d) closed

minded; (e) ethnically prejudiced; (f) uncreative; (g) anxious; (h) extrapunitive; (i)

aggressive’’ (p. 394).

Drawing on the above division, we assume that the primary characteristics are rooted

predominantly in individual differences, which in turn may lead to the secondary

characteristics that operate chiefly on a functional level. Consequently, the secondary

characteristics can lead to prejudice aimed at keeping the ambiguity and uncertainty and their

sources at bay. In this paper we aim to demonstrate that intolerance of ambiguity and

uncertainty itself is not necessarily related to prejudice against particular, predetermined

groups. Rather, the kind of ideology embraced as part of the secondary traits, in defining the

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

nature of ingroup values, determines which outgroups will be seen as violating those values,

thereby increasing their likelihood of being the target of prejudice.

Need for Closure as a Primary Characteristic of Intolerance of Ambiguity and

Uncertainty

A primary characteristic of the intolerance of ambiguity and uncertainty, one that is

therefore rooted in individual differences, is the need for closure (NFC, Kruglanski, 1989).

The NFC is defined as “the desire for a definite answer on some topic, any answer as opposed

to confusion and ambiguity” (Kruglanski, 1989, p. 14). In other words, the NFC constitutes

an individual’s desire for clear and certain explanations – the “need to avoid uncertainty” –

and an aversion to ambiguity and uncertainty is a core definitional element of cognitive

closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Individuals high in

NFC have a tendency to seize quickly on information and to freeze on chosen answers,

thereby they are inclined to what Bochner (1965) called a “premature closure”. NFC has been

shown to represent a dimension of stable individual differences, however, it can differ also

across situations (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).

Higher NFC scores have been related to: stereotyping (i.e. the “need for

categorization”, Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & Schaper, 1996), the

preference for the familiar over the unfamiliar (Dhont, Roets, & Van Hiel, 2011), and the

early selection and maintenance of one solution in the situation of decision (e.g. impressional

primacy effect, Heaton & Kruglanski, 1991). By and large, the motivational tendencies

underlying NFC lead to the preference for order, predictability and the simplification of the

environment, but also dogmatic world-views and close-mindedness. There is a body of

research showing that NFC predicts adherence to traditional values and resistance to change

(Roets & Van Hiel, 2006), political conservatism (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway,

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2003), right-wing attitudes (Onraet, Van Hiel, Roets, & Cornelis, 2011), and even right-wing

authoritarianism (Kossowska & Van Hiel, 2003).

Religiosity as a Secondary Characteristic of Intolerance of Ambiguity and Uncertainty

As mentioned above, people often cope with ambiguity and uncertainty by adopting a

particular religious creed and following religious rules and rituals. For example, Hofstede has

included the analysis of religiosity in the uncertainty avoidance dimension in his wide-scale

research on national cultures. He defined uncertainty avoidance as “the extent to which the

members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations” (Hofstede,

Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010, p. 181). Hofstede observed that religious denominations differ

substantially on the uncertainty avoidance dimension ranging from high tolerance for

uncertainty in Buddhism, Hinduism, and Protestantism to moderate tolerance in Judaism and

Islam, to low tolerance in Orthodox Christianity and Roman Catholicism (Hofstede, 1997;

Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). Consequently, the lowest tolerance for ambiguity has

been shown predominantly in monotheistic religions based on revelation, where there is only

one absolute truth that explains everything and excludes other explanations.

While acknowledging Hofstede’s ranking of religious denominations on the scale of

uncertainty avoidance we suggest that within a certain denomination, and here we focus

principally on Roman Catholicism, there are also individual differences in uncertainty

avoidance that draw on the degree of religious belief. In other words, we define Catholic

religious orthodoxy as the strength of the belief in God and the importance of obeying

religious regulations: the higher the religious orthodoxy the lower the higher the need for

uncertainty. By the same token, previous findings have shown that some aspects of

religiosity, especially those driven by cognitive conservatism, are positively linked with the

need for closure, for example, the inclusion of transcendence (Duriez, 2003; Kossowska &

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Sekerdej, 2015), intrinsic religious orientation (Nielsen et al., 2009), and religious

fundamentalism (Brandt & Reina, 2010; Saroglou, 2002). Moreover, Hill and colleagues

(Hill et al., 2010) show that religious fundamentalism correlates positively with need for

structure and preference of consistency, and negatively with need for cognition. Thus, we

suggest the need for closure is positively linked to those religious dimensions that offer, or

even emphasize, strict guidance that fulfill the need to avoid uncertainty and provide order in

an otherwise ambiguous environment.

Consequently, one can easily imagine how the belief that one possesses the absolute

truth can smoothly develop into negative attitudes towards those who do not accept it, let

alone towards those who openly disagree with it. Such attitudes are generally amplified under

the threat of uncertainty, in which one would feel inclined to defend the belief that provides

them with certainty. There is a body of research showing that uncertainty threat increases

group identification, adherence to group values, including religious ones (Hogg, Adelman, &

Blagg, 2010), and the propensity to defend them (Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, &

Moffitt, 2007; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001; Van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maas,

Miedema, & Van den Ham, 2005; for reviews see Jonas et al., 2014; Kesebir & Pyszczynski,

2011). In a similar vein, there is also experimental evidence showing that uncertainty threat

increased religious zeal (McGregor, Nash, & Prentice, 2010; cf. also Hogg, Adelman, &

Blagg, 2010 for review) that in turn can increase prejudice against those who do not share

similar values. In fulfilling the need to avoid uncertainty, orthodox beliefs can lead us to

avoid, reject or discriminate against those who might distort the neat and ordered picture of

the world those beliefs provide; to push back against those who are thus perceived as

violating our values.

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

The Present Research

In this paper we examine whether certain types of religious belief are associated with

the tendency to avoid uncertainty, and present the first experimental study that tests how

uncertainty and religiosity shapes the attitudes towards groups that violate the ingroup’s

values and those groups that do not violate those values. To conceptualize different types of

religiosity we draw on Wulff’s idea (1991) that religious attitudes can be summarized in a

two-dimensional space. The first dimension refers to the exclusion vs. inclusion of

transcendence, and specifies to what extent people accept the existence of and feel the unity

with God (i.e. the belief in God dimension). The second, interpretative dimension, is based on

the literal vs. symbolic reading of religious content, and indicates whether religious

expressions and symbols are to be interpreted literally or symbolically.

First, we predict that only the belief in God dimension is related to coping with

uncertainty. This dimension is related to the fulfillment of religious duties (e.g. church

attendance and prayers) and with respect for religious taboos (e.g. obeying fasting) that

believers find reassuring and that bring them closer to God. Moreover, previous finding show

the belief in God dimension (exclusion vs. inclusion; higher values indicating higher belief in

God) correlates positively with predictability, preference for order and conservation, and

conformity values (Duriez, Luyten, Snauwaert, & Hutsebaut, 2002; Fontaine, Duriez, Luyten,

Corveleyn, & Hutsebaut, 2005; Kossowska & Sekerdej, 2015).

We do not expect the interpretative dimension to be related to coping with

uncertainty. This dimension refers to the literal or symbolic interpretation of religious

content. Previous research has not found a link between the interpretative dimension (literal

vs. symbolic; higher values indicating more symbolic belief) and uncertainty avoidance

(Kossowska & Sekerdej, 2015), but it has been found to correlate positively with open-

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

mindedness (Duriez, 2003), and with self-transcendence values (Fontaine, Duriez, Luyten,

Corveleyn, & Hutsebaut, 2005).

We expect that the belief in God mediates the relationship between uncertainty

avoidance and attitudes towards groups that may threaten ingroup values. Previous research

found that the belief in God dimension, but not the interpretative dimension, was related to

prejudice against value violating groups (Shen, Yelderman, Haggard, & Rowatt, 2013; for

similar role of religious fundamentalism see Brandt & Reyna, 2010; 2014), and that the belief

in God dimension mediated the relationship between the need for closure and prejudice

against value violating groups (Kossowska & Sekerdej, 2015).

However, in the present research we additionally expect that, by the same token, the

belief in God will mediate the relationship between uncertainty avoidance and positive

attitudes towards groups whose values are consistent with the ingroup’s values. This is in line

with findings showing that uncertainty, and the anxiety resulting from it, not only lead to

prejudice against those who challenge our worldview, but also to the support of those who

share it (Jonas et al., 2014; Kesebir & Pyszczynski, 2011). Finally, we expect that in the state

of increased uncertainty, the belief in God, along with the importance of obeying religious

rituals and the degree to which other groups are perceived to violate ingroup values, will

mediate prejudice to value violating and value consistent groups.

Study 1 is aimed at replicating and broadening previous findings. We predict that the

belief in God (1) mediates the relationship between uncertainty avoidance and prejudice

against value violating groups (atheists, homosexuals), (2) does not mediate the relationship

between uncertainty avoidance and prejudice against neutral groups (Blacks, who are neither

ingroupers - all our participants were white - nor explicitly value violating group), and (3)

mediates the relationship between uncertainty avoidance and positive attitudes towards value

consistent groups (pro-life supporters, Catholics). In Study 2, which was performed on a

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

preselected sample containing only practicing Catholics, we further tested these hypotheses

by manipulating the feeling of uncertainty and by additionally measuring adherence to

religious rituals and the extent to which the various groups in questions actually violate

religious values.

Study 1

Method

Participants and procedure. The participants were 801 white Polish citizens (49

female, 31 male) who were recruited via community advertisements in social media inviting

them to participate in research on personality and social issues. Their age ranged from 17 to

37 years (M = 23.3, SD = 3.95). All of the participants that declared themselves as believers

were Catholics. Of the participants, 21% had a secondary education, 50% were enrolled in

higher education courses, and 29% already had an advanced degree. Participants were asked

to complete the questionnaire online with the use of Inquisit software. After having filled out

the questionnaire, participants were thanked and debriefed. In exchange for their

participation, each participant were entered a lottery to win one of four present coupons (each

worth approximately $15).

Materials. To assess individual differences in uncertainty avoidance we used four

subscales of the Need for Closure Scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994):

. It has been argued that the original

decisiveness subscale, the validity of which has been reported as being doubtful et

al. , see also Kossowska et al., 2002, and Neuberg, Judice, & West, 1997

1
Regarding power analysis, we did the F test for linear multiple regression fixed model, R²
deviation from zero for two predictors using G*power 3.1.9.2 software (Faul, Erdfelder,
Lang, & Buchner, 2007), obtaining the a priori recommendation with medium effect size (f =
0.15) and power at .80 for sample size of 68 participants. Then we decided to enlarge our
sample a bit ending up with the total of 80 participants. We did not conduct any statistical
analyses before we finished collecting the data.

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

measuring ability rather than motivation (Roets & van Hiel, 2007), and thus it

has been replaced by six items developed by Roets and van Hiel (2011).2 The items were

rated on a six-point scale (from 1 = completely disagree to 6 = completely agree) (Cronbach’s

α = .82, M = 3.89, SD = .52). A higher mean score indicated a higher individual need for

closure and thus a greater tendency to avoid uncertainty.

As a measure of the belief in God, participants completed the Post-Critical Belief

Scale (Duriez, Fontaine, & Hutsebaut, 2000; 33 items), reflecting the two dimensions of

religion postulated by Wulff (1991): (1) exclusion vs. inclusion of transcendence,

representing the belief in God component of religion (2) literal vs. symbolic, representing the

interpretative component of religion. Ratings were obtained on a 7-point scale, from 1

(completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). Higher values on the exclusion vs. inclusion

dimension indicate stronger belief in God (Cronbach’s α = .81, M = 3.60; SD = 1.16). Higher

values on the literal vs. symbolic dimension indicate higher levels of a symbolic

interpretation of religion (Cronbach’s α = .82, M = 4.32; SD = 1.01).

To measure prejudice towards different groups, we created the 20-item scale based on

the items developed by Kossowska and Sekerdej (2015) and Aosved, Long, and Voller

(1995), which measures the attitudes towards two value violating groups (atheists,

homosexuals), a neutral group (Blacks), and two value consistent groups (pro-life supporters,

Catholics) (4 items per group). Responses were rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1

(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Scores for negative attitudes toward different

groups were calculated separately: negative attitudes towards homosexuals (e.g. Gays

demand too many privileges, Cronbach’s α = .86; M = 2.58, SD = 1.21), atheists (e.g. Atheists

2
The closed-mindedness subscale was removed from analysis as it has been argued to capture
a different phenomenon (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). It also exhibited low reliability
(Cronbach’s α = .17, see also Czernatowicz-Kukuczka et al., 2014; Neuberg, West, Judice, &
Thompson, 1997). However, all analyses presented in the Results section were also
performed with the closed-mindedness scale included. The obtained results were similar to
the ones presented in the article.

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

pose a threat to moral and social values, Cronbach’s α = .86; M = 1.7, SD = 0.93), Blacks

(e.g. I would not like to spend much time with Black person, Cronbach’s α = .72; M = 1.73,

SD = 0.83), pro-life supporters (e.g. Abortion opponents discriminate and harm women,

Cronbach’s α = .75; M = 2.59, SD = 1.00), Catholics (e.g. Catholics are intolerant towards

non-believers, Cronbach’s α = .75; M = 3.06, SD = 1.1).

Results and Discussion

First, we checked the correlations between the religious dimensions and the need for

cognitive closure, i.e. the proxy for the need to avoid uncertainty. As expected, only the

“inclusion vs. exclusion” (belief in God) dimension correlated with NFC; the correlation

between “literal vs. symbolic” dimension and NFC turned out to be nonsignificant (p = .88),

hence the interpretative dimension was dropped from further analysis. Table 1 shows the

correlations between the analysed variables.

To test the effects of uncertainty avoidance and belief in God on prejudice against

value violating and value consistent groups we used the PROCESS program (Hayes, 2013;

model 4 that is depicted on Figure 1). We controlled for gender, age, and education3.

First, we tested the effects of uncertainty avoidance and Belief in God on the

prejudice against groups that violate ingroup values, namely atheists and homosexuals. In line

with our hypothesis, uncertainty avoidance was significantly and positively associated with

belief in God (path a: b = .57, t = 2.26, SE = .25, p < .05, 95% CI [0.069; 1.078]) but not

with prejudice towards atheists (path c: b = - .21, t = - 1.15, SE = .18, p = .25, 95% CI [-

0.565; 0.152]) nor homosexuals (path c: b = .02, t = .10, SE = .22, p = .92, 95% CI [-0.420;

0.465]), however, the belief in God predicted prejudice (path b) both towards atheists (b =

3
All analyses presented in the Results section were also performed without controlling for
demographics. The obtained results were similar to the ones presented in the article.

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

.48, t = 6.02, SE = .08, p < .001, 95% CI [0.319; 0.635]), and homosexuals (b = .41, t = 4.22,

SE = .10, p < .001, 95% CI [0.218; 0.609]). Using 10,000 bootstrapped samples, we found

unstandardized indirect effects of uncertainty avoidance on negative attitudes towards atheist

and homosexuals through belief in God with a 95% confidence interval that did not include

zero, indicating a significant indirect effect, respectively, IE = .27, SE = .14, 95% CI [0.056;

0.612] and IE = .24, SE = .12, 95% CI [0.048; 0.527].

Second, we tested the effects of uncertainty avoidance and the belief in God on the

prejudice towards a group that does not threaten explicitly ingroup values, that is, Blacks. In

this case, the paths between uncertainty avoidance and prejudice (path c: b = - .26, t = - 1.40,

SE = .18, p = .16, 95% CI [-0.626; 0.109]) and the beliefs in God and prejudice (path b: b =

.07, t = .94, SE = .08, p = .35, 95% CI [-0.085; 0.239] ) remained non-significant, showing

no indirect effect of uncertainty avoidance on negative attitudes towards Blacks through the

belief in God (IE = .04, SE = .06, 95% CI [-0.030; 0.208]). Finally, we tested the effects of

uncertainty avoidance and Belief in God on prejudice towards groups that support ingroup

values, that is, pro-life supporters and Catholics. In this case, belief in God predicted

prejudice (path b) both towards pro-life supporters (b = -.42, t = - 4.68, SE = .09, p < .001,

95% CI [-0.597; -0.241]), and Catholics (b = -.59, t = - 6.76, SE = .09, p < .001, 95% CI [-

0.762; -0.415]). Using 10 000 bootstrapped samples, we found unstandardized indirect effects

of uncertainty avoidance on prejudice towards pro-life supporters and Catholics through

belief in God with a 95% confidence interval that did not include zero, indicating a

significant indirect effect, respectively, IE = - .24, SE = .12, 95% CI [-0.529; -0.053] and IE

=- .34, SE = .15, 95% CI [-0.666; -0.071].

In sum, the results of Study 1 show that belief in God (exclusion vs. inclusion of

transcendence), but not the interpretative dimension, is associated with the tendency to avoid

uncertainty. Moreover, we found indirect relationships between uncertainty avoidance and

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

prejudice against atheists and homosexuals, i.e. those who allegedly challenge ingroup norms

and values, via the belief in God. This is in line with previous findings (Kossowska &

Sekerdej, 2015; cf. also Brandt & Reyna, 2010; 2014; Saroglou, 2002). What is more, we

found indirect relationships between uncertainty avoidance and less negative attitudes

towards pro-life supporters and Catholics, i.e. those whose values are perceived to be

consistent with ingroup norms and values, via the belief in God. The findings suggest that in

the search for certainty we reject those who can shatter our well-ordered picture of the world,

but get closer to those, who share our ideals. Interestingly, when an outgroup neither violates

our values nor clearly supports them, these religious beliefs have no impact on prejudice

against those outgroup members.

In Study 2 we further developed and experimentally tested those findings. First,

because the belief in God turned out to be a stable correlate of uncertainty avoidance and a

mediator between uncertainty avoidance and inter-group attitudes, in Study 2 we invited only

practicing Catholics to participate. We measured various indicators of religiosity: church

attendance, praying, and obeying religious precepts (e.g. fasting). Second, to examine the

causal relationship between uncertainty and group attitudes we experimentally manipulated

the sense of uncertainty. Finally to clarify the assumption that the value violation is the factor

that differentiates the attitudes towards the target groups we measured the extent to which

various groups violate the participants’ values. In sum, we tested a double mediation model in

which the feeling of uncertainty was connected with group prejudice through religious

behaviors, and the perception of value violation as the underlying processes. The model is

depicted on Figure 2.

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

Study 2

Method

Participants and procedure. Participants were recruited by distributing the survey links

through popular local Internet portals such as www.gumtree.pl and www.olx.pl. In the

invitation we explained that the survey concerned various social issues. Because we were

interested in recruiting a purposeful sample, we asked participants how much they agreed (or

disagreed) with the statement “I am a religious person”4 on a 7-point scale ranging from 1

(I’m not a religious person) to 7 (I’m a very religious person). Due to the fact that the initial

sample was already consisted prevalently of religious Catholics (M = 4.69 Median = 5.00

Mode = 6.00 SD = 1.78) and keeping in mind the error of central tendency and avoidance of

extreme ratings (e.g. Bardo, Yeager, & Klingsporn, 1982), we decided to include in the final

sample only those who assessed their religiosity as 4 or above. Out of 115 completed cases,

eventually 735 participants (white Catholics, 28 men, 45 women) were invited to the lab. The

age of the participants ranged from 19 to 27 years (M = 21.9, SD = 1.89). Of the participants,

18% had a secondary education, 60% were enrolled in higher education courses, and 22%

already had an advanced degree. They took part in a bigger research program, consisting of

ten short studies in total. For their participation in the whole program, they received

approximately $30.

Manipulation. To elicit uncertainty we presented the participants with nine items that

were allegedly part of a personality questionnaire (the structure of the manipulation adapted

4
This measure of the self-assessed religiosity was also used in other study (Kossowska &
Sekerdej, 2015) and correlated moderately (r = .47) with inclusion vs. exclusion dimension
hence we decided to use it as a filter question in the recruitment of participants for Study 2.
5
Regarding power analysis, we applied the regression based approach (Hayes, 2013), where
we assumed the medium effect (.15) for each of the paths. Next, administering a t-test for a
linear multiple regression fixed model with single regression coefficient and one predictor
(again with the use of G*power software) we obtained the recommendation for the a priori
sample of 55 (for two-tailed, although we had clear directional hypotheses). Again, we
decided to collect more participants, ending up with the total of 73 participants.

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

from Edwards, Wichman, & Weary, 2009; the items in the experimental condition from the

Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale by Buhr & Dugas, 2002). Participants had to judge whether

a given statement applied to them or not (answering either yes or no). All items were worded

in a way that they were true for most people. In the uncertainty condition all statements were

related to uncertainty, therefore by answering “yes” the participants were reminded that they

do experience uncertainty in their lives. Sample statements from the uncertainty condition

are: “In my life there were situations when I felt a lot of stress because of uncertainty.”,

“Sometimes I cannot sleep at night if I do not know what might happen the next day.” In the

control condition the statements were neutral such as: “Breakfast is the time when I prepare

myself for the day”, or “Sometimes I made my decisions on the spur of the moment.” As a

manipulation check we measured the time the respondents spent doing the task. Previous

studies (Alquist, 2010; Milkman, 2012; Swanson & Briggs, 1969) show that uncertainty is

cognitively and emotionally demanding, and therefore we assumed that it would take

participants longer to fill out than the control condition (the number of words used in both

conditions was equal).

Following the manipulation participants were asked to assess on a scale ranged from 1

to 10 the extent to which prayer, church attendance, and obeying religious precepts (e.g.

fasting) are important for them. Eventually we collapsed those items into one religious

behaviors indicator of good reliability (Cronbach’s α = .81; M = 6.82, SD = 1.86). Next they

filled out a 20-item scale as in Study 1 measuring negative attitudes towards homosexuals

(Cronbach’s α = .85; M = 3.64, SD = 1.12), atheists (Cronbach’s α = .79; M = 2.75,

SD = 0.92), Blacks (Cronbach’s α = .78; M = 1.89, SD = 0.92), pro-life supporters

(Cronbach’s α = .53; M = 2.20, SD = 0.74), and Catholics (Cronbach’s α = .72; M = 2.40,

SD = 0.86). Additionally we measured the extent to which homosexuals, atheists, Blacks,

pro-life supporters and Catholics were perceived to violate values important for the

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

participants (“Members of this group violate values that are important for me”) on a scale

ranged from 1 to 10; higher scores indicating greater value violation (atheists M = 5.52 SD =

2.37; homosexuals M = 6.19 SD = 3.39; Blacks M = 2.84 SD = 2.10; Catholics M = 2.63 SD =

2.10; pro-life supporters M = 3.77 SD = 2.27). After completing all the measures, participant

were thanked and debriefed.

Results and discussion

Table 2 shows correlations for the variables measured in Study 2.

Manipulation check. As expected, most of statements in both conditions were

answered “yes”: in the uncertainty condition M = 7.0 (SD = 1.71), while in the control

condition M = 7.2 (SD = 1.41), t(71) = 0.52, p = .61, Cohen’s d = 0.12. Regarding the time

spent on the task we observed a significant difference between conditions t(71) = 2.11, p <

.05; as expected in the uncertainty condition people spent more time doing the task (M =

43.66 sec., SD = 13.8 sec.), then in the control condition (M = 37.53 sec., SD = 10.82 sec.).

To test the effects of uncertainty, via the indicators of religious behaviors and the

perception of value-violation, on the prejudice against value violating and value consistent

groups we used the PROCESS program (Hayes, 2013; model 6). The model of the tested

relationships is presented in Figure 2. We controlled for gender, age, and education. We

expected that there would be a significant, positive indirect effect of uncertainty through

religious behaviors and the perception of value violation on prejudice towards value violating

groups. We expected that these indirect effects would be significant and negative in the case

of value consistent groups. We expected these indirect effects to be non-significant in the

case of non-value violating groups.

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

Using 10,000 bootstrapped samples we found (1) unstandardized indirect effects of

uncertainty on prejudice against atheist and homosexuals through religious behaviors and the

perception of value violation with a 95% confidence interval that did not include zero,

indicating a significant indirect effect; respectively, IE = .05, SE = .04, 95% CI [0.003;

0.185] and IE = .14, SE = .06, 95% CI [0.050; 0.330]; (2) unstandardized indirect effects of

uncertainty on prejudice against pro-life supporters and Catholics through religious behaviors

and the perception of value violation with a 95% confidence interval that did not include

zero, indicating a significant indirect effect, respectively, IE = -.08, SE = .05, 95% CI [-

0.218; -0.017] and IE = -.06, SE = .04, 95% CI [-0.183; -0.010]; and (3) a non-significant

indirect effect of uncertainty on prejudice against Blacks through religious behaviors and the

perception of value violation, IE = -.05, SE = .04, 95% CI [-0.159; 0.013]. All effects for

value-violating and value-consistent groups are reported in Table 3 and Table 4.

In summary, Study 2 confirmed the causal relationship between uncertainty and group

attitudes with the mediating role of religiosity. As expected, we found indirect relationship

between the sense of uncertainty and both prejudice against value-violating groups and less

negative attitudes towards value-consistent groups via adherence to religious rituals.

Furthermore, it additionally confirmed the assumption from Study 1 that the value-violation

is indeed the factor that differentiates the attitudes towards the target groups.

General Discussion

The present research investigated how dealing with uncertainty by adherence to

religion influences group attitudes. It has been argued that the following of religious codes in

the search for moral, ethical and cultural guidance, can be motivated by the need to avoid

uncertainty, along with the need for coherence and control (Brandt & Reyna, 2010; Hofstede,

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010; Wulff, 1991). The research reported here shows that not all types

of religiosity are connected with those needs. Drawing on Wulff’s (1991) model of religious

dimensions, in Study 1 we demonstrated that only the belief in God (exclusion vs. inclusion)

dimension, but not the interpretative (literal vs. symbolic) dimension was associated with

uncertainty avoidance. Exclusion versus inclusion of transcendence is the dimension that

reflects the degree to which one accepts the existence of God, and names himself or herself a

religious person. It manifests a desire to feel the unity with God and to follow His teachings.

This kind of religiosity implies that when you follow religious traditions and laws you are

under God’s protection and that nothing wrong can happen to you. It is also connected with

religious rituals and customs such as prayers, church attendance and respecting religious

taboos; behaviors that also provide reassuring consolation and the feeling that one is fulfilling

their duties and obligations. On the other hand, the interpretative dimension reflects the

degree to which one seeks questions, rather than answers. It is a kind of religiosity that

challenges and goes beyond religious dogmas rather than treating them as a source of

certainty and consolation.

Furthermore, we demonstrated that the belief in God mediated the link between

uncertainty avoidance and attitudes towards groups whose image was in conflict, or in line,

with the ingroup’s religious worldviews. Specifically, the belief in God increased prejudice

against groups that supposedly violated the ingroup’s religious values (atheists,

homosexuals), and decreased prejudice against those that supposedly supported the ingroup’s

religious values (Catholics, pro-life supporters). Importantly, the belief in God did not

influence attitudes towards a group whose image was neither in conflict nor in line with

religious worldviews (Blacks). Finally, we demonstrated experimentally that the link between

the sense of uncertainty and inter-group prejudice was mediated by adherence to religion and

religious rituals and the perception that the target group actually violated the perceiver’s

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

values. When a target group was perceived to violate religious values it increased prejudice,

however, when it was perceived to supported those values it decreased prejudice. What is

more, when a target group was perceived to neither violate nor support religious values, the

mediation remained non-significant.

Thus, the present studies found that the tendency to avoid uncertainty is not connected

with religiosity as a whole, but with its particular dimensions that put emphasis on the

inclusion of transcendence, along with a strong adherence to religious values and norms, the

fulfillment of which gives the believers a sense of security and confidence. It seems that

rejecting those who do not share our picture of the world is a by-product or a cost of a sense

of certainty that comes from such religious orthodoxy. Since it is based on the fear of

uncertainty, one can speculate that it is not a sense of confidence deeply rooted in thorough

reflection and individual work, but rather a shallow and imbalanced state that often does not

endure a challenge of alternative views. This interpretation is supported by the selective

nature of this rejection. Namely, the prejudice, which is often a result of anxiety, is directed

only at those who challenge our worldview and ostensibly violate our values. If we are

largely indifferent to the values of the target group, and if they do not pose a threat to our

worldview, the uncertainty avoiding prejudice does not appear. This pattern of selective

tolerance was anticipated by some researchers (Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993; Brandt

& Reyna, 2010; Herek, 1987; Kossowska & Sekerdej, 2015; Shen et al., 2013).

However, our research adds something more to the story. Namely, apart from

measuring the attitudes towards value-violating and value-indifferent groups, we additionally

measured the attitudes towards groups whose values should be perceived as consistent with

religious worldviews. As it turned out, uncertainty avoidance, as mediated through the belief

in God, led to less negative attitudes towards those groups. In other words, if the values of a

target group are believed to be in line with ours, in moments of uncertainty we are drawn

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

closer to them, as they can help buffer our threatened worldview. This is consistent with

findings showing that uncertainty and the resulting anxiety not only lead to prejudice against

those who challenge our worldview, but also to solidarity with those who share it (Jonas et

al., 2014; Kesebir & Pyszczynski, 2011). Thus, it additionally confirms that the belief in God

dimension is a way to cope with uncertainty and uncertainty-based anxiety with all the

consequences it entails.

Moreover, Study 2 found a causal relationship between the sense of uncertainty and

prejudice through religious behaviors and the perception that a target group’s values are

actually at odds with ours. In doing so, we measured participants’ self-evaluations as

religious persons and practicing believers (at the preselection stage), and asked them directly

whether a target group violates their values. The results indeed confirmed our previous

conclusions: a sense of uncertainty increased adherence to religious rules, and through the

comparison between a target group’s and our values (consistent, violating, indifferent) lead to

the expected consequences, namely, negative attitudes towards those who violate our values,

less negative/more positive attitudes towards those who support values similar to ours, and

neither positive nor negative attitudes towards those whose values are perceived to be neutral

to ours.

In conclusion, it is well-known that religion is a multidimensional phenomenon that

serves as a moral, ethical and political beacon for many. Our data would suggest that the kind

of religiosity that offers concrete guidance and direct access to transcendental Truth may help

to fulfill an epistemological need to avoid uncertainty, something that is particularly

attractive to people with a low tolerance of ambiguity and uncertainty. An important

limitation of the current study, however, is our rather homogeneous sample, composed only

of Roman Catholics. Hence, the generalizability of our results is still an open question and

requires further research. Likewise, in the present research we focused on broad categories of

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

religiosity such as religious orthodoxy or the general level of belief in God. Therefore, in

future research some finer-grained aspects of religious life can be explored, such as religious

orientations (Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993), that also address people’s response to,

and coping with, uncertainty. Finally, some recent research show that this phenomenon does

not have to be limited to religious people but also “dogmatic atheists” (those who strongly

believe that there is no God), who exhibit a similar strong need to avoid uncertainty, and the

need for concrete guidance even though they are looking for it by following different paths

(Kossowska, Czernatowicz-Kukuczka, & Sekerdej, 2016). And in both cases, strong

adherence to such guidance can lead to the exclusion of other worldviews and to the rejection

of, and prejudice against, those whose values are at odds with ours. It can also lead us to

getting along only with those who agree with us. What is more, uncertainty makes that

process almost certain.

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UNCERTAINTY AND PREJUDICE

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Table 1. Correlations between belief in God, need for closure and prejudice against atheists,
homosexuals, Blacks, pro-life supporters and Catholics.

1 2 3 4 5 6
Belief in God
Need for Closure .26**
Prejudice against atheists .55** .04
Prejudice against homosexuals .40** .04 .46**
Prejudice against Blacks .08 -.14 .33** .45
Prejudice against pro-life supporters -.50** -.18 .37** -.34** .06
Prejudice against Catholics -.63** -.26* .34** .20 .13 .48**

*p < .05, **p < .01

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Table 2. Correlations between variables measured in Study 2.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Religious behaviours
Values violation by atheists .18
Values violation by homosexuals .30** .29*
Values violation by Blacks -.26* -.04 .18
Values violation by pro-life supporters -.44** -.04 .07 .28*
Values violation by Catholics -.41** -.23* -.18 .37** .38**
Prejudice against atheists .33** .48** .25* .05 -.08 -.25*
Prejudice against homosexuals .13 .19 .58** .34** -.06 -.12 .46**
Prejudice against Blacks -.18 -.01 .28* .56** .18 .12 .23* .47**
Prejudice against pro-life supporters -.46** -.21 -.17 .19 .60** .42** -.22 -.26* .19
Prejudice against Catholics -.53** -.11 -.30* .01 .39** .41** -.35** -.26* .00 .42**

*p < .05, **p < .01

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Table 3. Tests of Direct and Indirect Effects in the Figure 2 Mediational Model for value-violating groups.

Atheists Homosexuals
Effect Path Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff. SE 95% CI
Direct effects
Uncertainty → Religious behaviors a 1.00ᵃ .42 [0.17, 1.83] 1.00ᵃ .42 [0.17, 1.83]
Uncertainty →Value-violation b -1.08 .57 [-2.22, 0.06] -0.97 .71 [-2.39, 0.45]
Uncertainty → Prejudice c 0.10 .19 [-0.28, 0.48] 0.23 .23 [-0.22, 0.68]
Religious behaviors → Value-violation d 0.30 .16 [-0.01, 0.62] 0.79ᵃ .20 [0.39, 1.18]
Religious behaviors →Prejudice e 0.15ᵃ .05 [0.05, 0.26] -0.01 .07 [-0.15, 0.13]
Value-violation → Prejudice f 0.18ᵃ .04 [0.10, 0.26] 0.18ᵃ .04 [0.10, 0.26]
Indirect effects
Uncertainty → Value-violation
axd 0.30ᵃ .20 [0.01, 0.85] 0.79ᵃ .35 [0.23, 1.66]
via Religious behaviors
Uncertainty → Prejudice
axe 0.15 .07 [0.04,0.34] -0.01 .08 [-0.21, 0.14]
via Religious behaviors
via Value-violation
Independent of Religious behaviors bxf -0.19ᵃ .12 [-0.50, -.0007] -0.17 .13 [-0.51, 0.04]
Mediated by Religious behaviors axdxf 0.05ᵃ .04 [0.003, 0.18] 0.14ᵃ .06 [0.05, 0.33]

Note. Path = Figure 2 path. Coeff. = unstandardized path coefficient. SE = standard error. CI = bootstrapped percentile confidence interval.
Results are based on 10,000 bootstraps (N = 73).
ᵃ 95% confidence interval does not include 0.

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Table 4. Tests of Direct and Indirect Effects in the Figure 2 Mediational Model for value-consistent groups.

Catholics Pro-life supporters

Effect Path Coeff. SE 95% CI Coeff. SE 95% CI
Direct effects
Uncertainty → Religious behaviors a 1.00ᵃ .42 [0.17, 1.83] 1.00ᵃ .42 [0.17, 1.83]
Uncertainty →Value-violation b 0.91 .46 [-0.01, 1.84] -0.005 .52 [-1.04, 1.03]
Uncertainty → Prejudice c -0.42ᵃ .17 [-0.77, -0.08] -0.11 .14 [-0.40, 0.11]
Religious behaviors → Value-violation d -0.57ᵃ .13 [-0.83, -0.31] -0.51ᵃ .14 [-0.80, -0.22]
Religious behaviors →Prejudice e -0.18ᵃ .05 [-0.28, -0.07] -0.10ᵃ .04 [-0.18, -0.01]
Value-violation → Prejudice f 0.10ᵃ .04 [0.02, 0.19] 0.16ᵃ .03 [0.09, 0.23]
Indirect effects
Uncertainty → Value-violation
axd -0.57ᵃ .26 [-1.19, -0.14] -0.51ᵃ .28 [-1.22, -0.10]
via Religious behaviors
Uncertainty → Prejudice
axe -0.18ᵃ .09 [-0.41, -0.04] -0.10ᵃ .05 [-0.24, -0.01]
via Religious behaviors
via Value-violation
Independent of Religious behaviors bxf 0.09ᵃ .07 [0.002, 0.30] -.0009 .09 [-0.19, 0.16]
Mediated by Religious behaviors axdxf -0.06ᵃ .04 [-0.18, -0.01] -0.08ᵃ .05 [-0.22, -0.02]

Note. Path = Figure 2 path. Coeff. = unstandardized path coefficient. SE = standard error. CI = bootstrapped percentile confidence interval.
Results are based on 10,000 bootstraps (N = 73).
ᵃ 95% confidence interval does not include 0.

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Figure 1. Mediational model tested in Study 1

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Figure 2. Mediational model tested in Study 2

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